National Social Watch India, Citizens’ Report on Governance and Development, New Delhi: Sage, 2007

44

THE INDIAN PARLIAMENT AND

THE ‘GRAMMAR OF ANARCHY’

by

Ajay K. Mehra

If we wish to maintain democracy not merely in form, but also in fact, what

must we do? There are first thing in my judgment we must do is to hold fast

to constitutional methods of achieving our social and economic objectives. It

means we must abandon the bloody methods of revolution. It means that we

must abandon the methods of disobedience, non-cooperation and

satyagraha. When there was no way left for constitutional methods for

achieving economic and social objectives, there was a great deal of

justification for unconstitutional methods. But where constitutional methods

are open, there can be no justification for these unconstitutional methods.

These methods are nothing but the Grammar of Anarchy and the sooner

they are abandoned, the better for us.

Dr. B. R. Ambedkar on 25 November 1949, Constituent Assembly Debates, New

Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1989, vol. XI, p. 978.

Introduction

Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, made a long concluding statement, full of thought and meaning,

at the penultimate session of the Constituent Assembly, a day before ‘We the people

of India’ ‘adopted, enacted and gave to ourselves’ a constitution that has been the

‘cornerstone of the Indian nation’ for the past 57 years. He raised several issues in

that speech and made reflective and ruminant observations on past strategies and

future prospects. If his observation on bridging the hiatus between political and social

democracy was one contemplative statement, his reflections on the dangers of

dependence on charismatic leadership as well as constitutional and unconstitutional

methods are other pieces of gem in that introspective oratory. Indeed, despite the fact

that in the post-independence analyses of the Indian national movement so far

‘methods of disobedience, non-cooperation and satyagraha’ have been hailed as

political strategies that confused the British colonial government on legality and

illegality of the peaceful protests, Dr. Ambedkar has unambiguously dubbed them as

‘unconstitutional methods’ in the context of the republican India that was being

shaped with the constitutional blue print just prepared by the assembly of the wise he

2

was addressing. While this questions the approach and tactics of protest politics in

independent India, which have varied from being boisterous if moderate to downright

violent and destructive when out of control and frustrated (excluding the insurgent,

terrorist and Maoist movements), it raises even bigger questions on the gambit of

political parties to drag in protest politics within the haloed precincts of the Indian

Parliament and 30 Legislative Assemblies, even if it means stalling the legislative

business of as well as diminution of the majesty and sanctity of the legislatures.

Are these ‘Grammar(s) of Anarchy’, as Dr. Ambedkar described them, or

simply methods of protest and appeal to constituency in the era of ‘virtual politics’

visible on television screens in the manner of a ‘reality show’, or these are harming

the cause of the Indian parliamentary democracy, nay of democracy per se, is the

question that begs an immediate answer from ‘we the people of India’ and their

representatives conducting business in the parliamentary institutions. Equally

important is the question whether such virulent political behaviour within the

legislatures is merely a ploy to embarrass the ruling party/combination, or is it being

compelled by ‘undemocratic behaviour’ and ‘unresponsive and irresponsible’ method

of work of the ruling party? It is worthwhile raising these questions in the context of

the Indian Parliament given the fact that the incidences of disruption of parliamentary

business have transcended from being exceptions to becoming the rule. The media

reports are full of analyses before opening of each session of the parliament about

strategies of the opposition to ‘corner’ the government on one issue or the other,

which is justified to the extent that the methods employed are ‘democratic’, making

the government account for their actions, particularly of omissions and commissions,

and not ‘anarchic’, which let the real issue drown in the din of protests. Since Indian

politics today has reached a very contentious stage wherein the struggle for power is

intense both politically and socio-economically and the parties and alliances are too

impatient to wait for five years given the fragility of the political formations, both

discrediting the treasury benches within the two houses of Parliament and visibly and

virtually presenting oneself as the champion of people’s interest and a worthy

successor are strategies that all parties have begun to employ unabashedly on the floor

of the legislatures. However, do these ‘cornering’ exercises lead to better conduct of

parliamentary business and serve people’s interest better, or they are causing

institutional trivialization and decline? Are the well-calibrated and, at times,

3

spontaneous pandemonium, which are normally so high-pitched that they go out of

hand invariably, a short cut to political mobilisation at the cost of politics of

substance, or they are seriously thought out theatrics meant to serve any serious

political purpose, irrespective of their impact on the institution? Have the parties

conducted any political and social audit of their strategy in terms of the objectives

achieved. Have the parties and leaders given any thought to the institutional aspects

of Indian democracy? These and many such questions beg for answers as we evaluate

the functioning of the main pillar of the Indian democracy as the fourteenth Lok

Sabha crosses mid-term mark.

Institutional Dimension

An elected legislature, the Parliament in Indian case, is the key political institution of

a representative democracy, it is even more crucial in a parliamentary democracy such

as India. For, it is not merely an institution that legislates, it is an institution that

creates a sense of representation across several layers of a multi-cultural and diverse

society that India is, which is a task that is becoming of critical importance as the

‘revolution of rising expectations’ of the 1960s and 1970s is increasingly turning out

to be the ‘revolution of rising frustrations’. This role of parliament in India is, aside

from its other designated roles of giving a credible government and keeping that

government accountable and responsible to the people of the country, that is getting

highlighted more and more. Parliament indeed is a crucial link between the executive

and the people and in the process it has the crucial responsibility of keeping the

popular mandate alive till the country goes to the poll again.

In discussing the minds of the founding fathers on the rationale for preferring

the parliamentary system and delineating the role of Parliament in the Indian context,

we had contended in the earlier report that the stress on daily accountability had been

significantly highlighted in the debate while opting for the British parliamentary

system. We had also contended in the report that the ‘pandemonium’, despite taking

away legislative time of the Parliament, neither appeared to be inadvertent, nor

thoughtless. Despite spontaneity in many of the pandemonious instances in both the

houses of the Parliament, it is obvious that having included boisterously vociferous

protests in their parliamentary behaviour, the parties have made it as their first

weapon of offence and use it both in a planned and spontaneous fashions. The

4

pertinent question is that whether it helps the Parliament ensure executive

responsibility to the representative body and their accountability to the people, and if

yes, in what manner.

Since the role and functioning of the Indian Parliament has been marred over

the years by discussions on representational question arising out of criminalization of

the political space and an assured gender representation through one-third quota on

the one hand, and increasing absenteeism of the MPs as well as use of protest politics

in the Houses of Parliament at the cost of designated legislation functions of the

institution, these criteria continue to be relevant. For, the convictions of Shibu Soren

(life term), the high profile leader of the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha and the Union

Minister of coal (resigned since then), for allegedly conspiring to murder his secretary

and of Navjot Singh Sidhu by the Punjab and Haryana High Court (three years

rigorous imprisonment), the high profile ex-cricketer and a BJP MP (since resigned),1

clearly highlight pervasive mindset of criminality afflicting celebrities and the

wielders of power and institutional support for this mindset and action. How else

could Soren ascending ministerial throne despite murder charges and Sidhu getting

unequivocal and vocal support from the BJP be explained? Obviously, the

phenomenon of criminalization of politics comprehended from the data on criminal

cases against the MPs and legislators deserves an understanding from a wider

perspective. While in the first case, the UPA constituent JMM being a small State

party, the Congress maintained silence and a safe distance from the whole episode, in

the other, BJP’s damage control willy nilly justified ex-cricketers boisterous

behaviour leading to death of a person. The cash for question and office of profit

controversies reveal further degeneration within the haloed body and question both its

representational and accountability functions. Obviously, these questions deserve

review in continuity and in the context of the emerging cloud over the Parliament’s

legitimacy, for unless attended, this could be a severe blow to the credibility of the

democratic politics in India.

Parliamentary Protocol

1 The Supreme Court stayed Navjot Singh Sidhu’s conviction by the Punjab and Haryana High Court

and allowed him to contest Amritsar Lok Sabha seat vacated by him on moral grounds in the ensuing

by election. The apex court also surprisingly showered praise over Sidhu, who continues to be an

accused till the Supreme Court gives the final verdict on his appeal. See, The Hindu, January 24, 2007.

5

The essence of democratic functioning of an institution like parliament, which is the

pivot of representative democracy, is respect for and strict adherence to protocol by

the parliamentarians. Indeed, in an emerging democracy like India, where

contestations for rights, and hence for power, are taking place at various layers of

society and at each level of the polity, parliamentary protocol, though laid out

constitutionally as well as in various rules and procedures emanating from the

Constitution for running and smooth and non-partisan functioning of the two Houses

of Parliament, too are ever-evolving. On the one hand, issues of special nature come

up demanding special attention of the Parliament, necessitating adjustments and

adaptation of the parliamentary rules, and, on the other, a high level partisanship of

the contestatious society overflows into the representative body affecting both its

functioning and institutions. Howsoever, necessary these adjustments and adaptations

may be, they must be formalised for a healthy functioning of the institution. Among

the institutions within that comes under immediate scrutiny is that of the chair in both

the Houses, and one that has often been in the eye of political storm and the subject of

constitutional and academic debate is the chair of the Speaker of the Lok Sabha; the

Chairman of the Rajya Sabha, who is also the Vice President of the country, has

generally been free of controversy. The recent standoff between the Speaker Somnath

Chatterjee, a veteran parliamentarian and front ranking leader of the CPM, and the

opposition NDA led by the BJP, therefore deserves attention from institutional

perspective.

The controversy and the war of words as well as action began in August 2006,

obviously after a long period of discontent over Speaker Somnath Chatterjee’s alleged

‘partisan behaviour’ against the opposition NDA, and repeated in December 2006.

The Speaker’s decision on 7 August not to allow the opposition NDA’s Privilege

Motion against the Prime Minister led to uproar in the Lok Sabha with the opposition

members trooping into the well. The Speaker, however, decided to carry on with the

business, which angered the opposition even more and they decided to boycott the

House next day. Speaker Somnath Chatterjee appealed to the former Prime Minister

Atal Behari Vajpayee to help avoid the boycott, to which Vajpayee replied, ‘This

morning I read out your letter (to his MPs). And what a flood of reactions it evoked.

Everyone who spoke agreed that the Opposition’s contribution to Parliament

proceedings was crucial. But there was unanimity also that the proceedings can be

6

smooth and constructive only if the presiding officer is able to inspire as much

confidence in the Opposition as he is able to do in the ruling parties. A stark reality is

that this situation is totally absent in our House…. All Sections of the NDA feel

deeply disappointed at the manner in which the House is being presently run. I may

add that confidence in one’s fairness and objectivity has to be commanded, it cannot

be demanded.’ (emphasis added)2.

While the Somnath Chatterjee pondered resignation at this slur on his

impartiality, the letter evoked widespread criticism. A resolution supported by the

Congress, CPI(M), CPI, RSP, Forward Bloc, DMK, RJD, TDP, BSP, SP, National

Conference, Muslim League, NCP, PDP, Kerala Congress, Telangana Rashtra

Samithi and Jharkhand Mukti Morcha stated:

The letter (written by Mr. Vajpayee) is more painful because it emanates from

the pen of a person who has himself struggled to uphold the dignity of the

House over several decades and is known for his commitment to

parliamentary values. The Speaker is more of an institution rather than a

person and any aspersion on the keystone of Parliamentary democracy is an

indictment upon all its constituents, who have faithfully served the people of

India for five decades and more. Large numbers of leaders, including parties

belonging to the UPA and outside, feel strongly that under no circumstances

and provocation should there be any reflection on the conduct of the Chair in

any form or manner. The above parties and leaders unequivocally condemn

such design.3

The Lok Sabha has had fourteen speakers (including Mr. Chatterjee) since it

came into existence in 1952, each has had his own style of functioning. While the

earlier Speakers – G. V. Mavalankar, M. A. Ayyangar et al – commanded respect,

some did make the eyebrows of the purists rise with controversial rulings. Some in

recent past like Shivraj Patil and P. A. Sangma, attempted institutional (committee

system) and procedural reforms in the house too. However, the matter did not come

to this pass between the Speaker and the opposition party perhaps because

partisanship and contestations even within the Parliament had not risen to this level.

Slogan shouting, trooping into the well, walk outs, boycotts, etc. were not resorted to

on a daily basis. With political stakes rising high for every party and leader in the era

of coalition politics, no issue is small for the opposition to put the government on the

mat. Both parliamentary decorum and parliamentary time have been victims in the

2 M. L. Kotru, ‘The Warm within Parliament’, Sify.com, 30 August 2006.

3 Neena Vyas, ‘Anguish Over Vajpayee’s Letter’, The Hindu, 12 August 2006.

7

process. Obviously, the Speaker’s office must be a priority item on the agenda

whenever parliamentary reform emerges as a consensus issue with political parties

across the board.

Office of Profit

On a complaint made by Madan Mohan Shukla, a Congressman from Kanpur, in 2004

against Jaya Bachchan, a Rajya Sabha MP (Samajwadi Party, UP), for holding an

office of profit (OoP) in UP (chairperson of the UP Film Development Council), the

Election Commission of India (ECI), recommended under Article 102(1)(a)4 to the

President of India to disqualify her with retrospective effect, who signed an order to

that effect in March 2006. This opened a can of worms, as it were; for the SP did not

take it lying down and received support from other opposition parties as well. Aside

from renominating Jaya Bachchan for reelection to the same seat, other cases from the

ruling combine, including that of Congress President Sonia Gandhi holding the

position of the chairperson of National Advisory Council of the United Progressive

Alliance, came under the scanner. In a short while the ECI received complaints about

over 40 cases of MPs and over 100 cases of MLAs holding OoP inviting

disqualification under Articles 102(1)(a) and 191(1)(a)5 of the Constitution of India at

the centre and in States, indicating pervasiveness of the tendency of seeking fruits of

power in executive offices, beyond being people’s representatives in legislatures and

Parliament; revealing a pronounced craving for executive office of some sort or the

other, rather than satisfaction with the representative, legislative and accountability

functions that their role primarily assigns them.

4 The Article reads:

102. Disqualification for membership – (1) A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as,

and for being, a member of either House of Parliament –

(a) if he holds any office of profit under the Government of India or the Government of any

State, other than an office declared by Parliament by law not to disqualify its holder;

5 The Article, a replica of Article 102 in the State context, reads:

191. Disqualification for membership – (1) A persons shall be disqualified for being chosen as,

and for being, a member of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State –

(a) if he holds any office of profit under the Government of India or the Government of any

State specified in the First Schedule, other than an office declared by the Legislature of the

State by law not to disqualify its holder;

8

During the next few months, it became a blazing issue, with sparks flying all

around and everyone blaming the Congress for disturbing the status quo. As was

expected, Samajwadi Party and the BJP did not lose a moment in dragging Sonia

Gandhi’s position as the Chair of the National Advisory Council of the UPA into the

controversy. Other prominent leaders from the entire political spectrum whose names

figured were Amar Singh (SP), Dr. Karan Singh (Congress), Lok Sabha Speaker

Somnath Chatterjee (CPM), T. Subarami Reddy (a Union Minister), Prof. Vijay

Kumar Malhotra (BJP) and so on. Several leaders at the State level too came in for

scrutiny for holding OoP. Obviously, whosoever might have prompted Madan

Mohan Shukla to lodge the complaint, it became clear that this phenomenon affected

all the parties, who have used such offices to please their legislators and MPs, and

since every legislator took enjoying executive offices for granted, no one ever thought

that any provision of the Constitution was being violated. The reactions at the turn of

events varied from dismay to finding a convenient way out to protect everyone’s

interest. None of the parties or the leaders was apologetic about it, most of them

aggressively blamed the Congress for creating the controversy and defended the

privilege of executive office to the legislators. In order to deflect the opposition

onslaught, Sonia Gandhi resigned her Lok Sabha seat from Rae Bareli (UP), to be

hailed for her second ‘renunciation’, and sought re-election, which she convincingly

won in May 2006.6

In the mean time, the UP government as well as the government of India tried

desperately to promulgate an ordinance to prepare a fresh list of offices to be kept out

of the OoP purview. While the UP government pushed through a legislation in the

Legislative Assembly on March 9, 2006 excluding 79 posts from the list of OoP, the

Union Government reportedly first attempted bringing in an ordinance when the

budget session was on a three-month recess and when faced with criticism, adjourned

Parliament sine die, saying ‘there was no government business for the remaining part

of the Budget session.’7 As the Monsoon session approached the anxiety and

6 Sonia Gandhi’s resignation elicited different reactions. While the opposition was critical of this

‘drama’, the treasury benches and the press described it as her second renunciation, which politically

deflated the opposition criticism. Her nominating Dr. Manmohan Singh as the Prime Minister in 2004,

when she was elected leader of the Congress Parliamentary party, amidst the opposition onslaught on

her foreign origin, was her first renunciation. See, ‘Queen’s Side Castle’, Outlook, pp. 22-23; and

‘Smart Move’, India Today, April 3, 2006.

7 ‘To Bring in Ordinance, UPA Winds up Session’, The Indian Express, March 23, 2006.

9

scramble for expanding the list of offices to be exempted from the purview of the OoP

in order to save over 40 MPs cutting across party lines increased.8 The confusion

over the issue further confounded as President APJ Abdul Kalam returned the Office

of Profit Bill passed by the Parliament and sent to him for assent for reconsideration

on three grounds:

It cannot be applied in retrospect from 1959.

There was need to define a transparent criteria.

Why not have a comprehensive Bill that applies to all States.

This expectedly heightened politics and politicking as the issue and its handling gave

the opposition NDA a stick to beat the UPA in a situation of highly contentious

politics. Though the President gave assent when the Bill was sent back to him

unaltered following reconsideration, the questions raised by the whole episode

remained unanswered.

The Parliament too moved ahead to set up a Joint Parliamentary Committee

under senior Congress MP Iqbal Ahmed Saradgi to provide clarity to the issue by

giving generic and comprehensive definition of what entails OoP that can be

acceptable and implementable across the country.9 It will be worthwhile watching

whether a fresh definition and a fresh set of criteria attempted by the JPC would

resolve this issue for all time to come. However, since the issue of executive offices

bestowing ‘profits’ upon our legislators at the national and State levels has been

emerging from time to time since the Constitution came into operation, the criteria

fixed by the Supreme Court (SC) from the very first case on the subject in 195410

and

reiterated through the 1960s till date11

is the ‘settled law’. As per these SC guidelines,

an office of profit means when a job:

Whether Government exercises control over the appointment and removal

from the office and over the performance and functions of the office.

Whether the holder draws any remuneration other than the ‘compensatory allowance’ (like conveyance bills, telephone calls, travel expenses, etc.).

8 ‘To Save MPs, Office-of-Profit to be Expanded’, The Indian Express, May 10, 2006.

9 ‘OoP Definitions to be Tabled in Next Session of Parliament’, The Indian Express, September 20,

2006.

10 Ravanna Subanna v. G.S. Kaggeerappa, AIR 1954 SC 653.

11 Umrao Singh v. Darbara Singh; A.K. Subbaiah v. Ramakrishna Hegde.

10

Whether the body in which office is held, exercises executive, legislative or

judicial powers or confers powers of disbursement of funds, allotment of

lands, issue of licences, etc. or gives powers of appointment, grant of

scholarships.

What are the functions of the holder? Does he perform them for the

Government.

Whether the job enables the holder to wield influence or power by way of

patronage.12

If the reply to any of the above criteria is yes, then the holder of office in question

incurs disqualification.13

It is apparent that the criteria applied does not necessarily

imply direct monetary benefits flowing out of an office, but even privileges that

entitles an incumbent undue influence and brings a legislator under the influence of

the executive is an office of profit.

While opportunism and yearning for power have clearly been reflected in the

current contentious debate on OoP, it is worthwhile putting it in perspective,

constitutionally as well as internationally. B. N. Rao, Advisor to the Drafting

Committee, suggested that the disqualifications be put in the Constitution itself and

not left to Parliament. That was shot down by the drafting committee on the ground

that Parliament must retain total flexibility.14

Interestingly, the Constituent Assembly

(CA) did not debate this question in detail. In fact, while debating Article 102 (draft

Article 83) clause 1(a) relating to this issue was not discussed at all. The debate on

Article 191 (draft Article 167) took up clause 1(a), similar to the one in Article 102;

Prof. K. T. Shah moved an amendment further clarifying the OoP. The amended

clause read:

(a) if he holds any office of profit or contract or of supply of any article, or is a

shareholder in any joint stock company which has such contract of building or

of supply of any article under Government, etc.15

12

These criteria have emerged in various Supreme Court judgements over the years. Important among

them are: Satrucharla Chandrasekhar Raju v. Vyricherla Pradeep Kumar Dev, Guru Govinda Basu v.

Sankari Prasad Ghoshal, 1964, Madhuker G.E. Pankakar v. Jaswant Chobbildas Rajani, Maulana

Abdul Shakur v. Rikhab Chand and another, Kanta Kathuria v. Manak Chand Surana, Karbhari

Bimaji Rohamare v. Shankar Rao Genuji Kolhe, Surya Kant Roy v. Imamul Hai Khan. See, Shashank

Krishna, ‘The Office of Profit Bill’, http://202.71.128.135:5/bc/focusdetails.asp?ID=75.

13 The Indian Express, March 18, 2006.

14 Abhishek Singhvi, ‘Office of Perplexity & Pandemonium’, The Indian Express, June 3, 2006.

15 CAD, VIII, p. 569.

11

However, the clause eventually amended and put in the Constitution read precisely

like the one in Article 102, albeit in the State context. The raising of the issues in the

proposed amendment and their discussion in the context of the States, while it was

completely missed while debating the national scenario, is puzzling, to say the least.

In any case the CA did not consider going into the details of the issue, leaving it to the

Parliament and the State legislatures to sort them out in due course.

Parliament has exercised its role and authority several times: in 1950, 1951,

1954, 1959, 1960, 1977, 1993, 1999 and 2000, to explain the OoP. In April 1959, it

enacted the Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1959 (see Annexure I),

which repealed the earlier Acts, explained what the term meant and listed the

exempted offices. Each following addition of offices to be exempted from the OoP

list have been made under this Act. Even though the list has been expanded by

Parliament five times since this Act came into existence and State governments too

have added to this, there have also been interventions by the Supreme Court referred

above, but there has never been a contentious controversy of this kind before in which

both the ECI and the Supreme Court have had to step in and adjudicate on the status

of so many offices under Articles 102 and 191. The concept, however, has been

discussed by constitutional experts. D. D. Basu, for example, has opined that the real

test in determining whether an office accrues ‘profit’ is whether there is any

possibility of conflict between duty and personal interest and not whether the function

of the office is big or small.16

In a similar vein David Annoussamy, a fomer judge of

the Madras High Court, feels that in the scheme of the Constitution the MPs should

not accept any office of profit under the government which in one way or the other is

likely to hamper their functioning in a free and efficient manner. However, some

offices that may not have influence on the conduct of the MPs, they could be

exempted.17

The recent controversy has further clarified that even if the incumbent

has declined to accept the remuneration, an office does not cease to be an office of

profit.

It is worthwhile comparing the situation with that in the UK where the law

lists 250-odd disqualifications, leaving all other posts open to UK MPs to assume.

‘The universe of possible disqualifications is thus immeasurably larger in India than 16

D. D. Basu, Constitutional Law of India, 2003, p. 743.

17 David Annoussamy, ‘Office of Profit Revisited’, South Asia Politics, December 2006, p. 8.

12

in UK, the country of origin of OOP.’18 The law governing the disqualification

arising from holding of public offices in the UK was antiquated, confused and

inadequate until 1957. During the early 17th

century, the House asserted the principle

that a member could not continue to serve when appointed by the Crown to a position

the duties of which entailed prolonged absence from Westminster. This apprehension

led in 1700 to a provision in the Act of Settlement ensuring that no one holding an

office of profit under the Crown should be a member of the House. However, this

provision, which would have excluded ministers from the Commons, was repealed

before it took effect, replacing it with the Succession to the Crown Act 1707, enabling

certain ministers to retain their seats in the House, subject to re-election after

appointment, but excluded those who held office of a non-political character, for

example in what today would be regarded as the civil service. The House of

Commons Disqualification Act, 1957 (re enacted in 1975) replaced disqualification

for holding ‘an office of profit under the Crown’ by disqualification attached to the

holding of specified offices. There are essentially three broad reasons for

disqualification:

1. The physical impossibility for certain office holders of attendance at

Westminster;

2. The risk of patronage, and

3. The conflict of constitutional duties.

Under section 1 of the House of Commons Disqualification Act, 1975, the

disqualifying offices fall into six categories:

1. A great variety of judicial offices, listed in schedule 1 of the Act. The

principle is that no person may hold full-time judicial office and be a

practicing politician;

2. Employment in the civil service of the Crown, whether in an established or

temporary capacity, whole time or part time. The disqualification extends to

members of the civil service of Northern Ireland and the diplomatic service.

Civil servants who wish to stand for election to Parliament are required by

civil service rules to resign before becoming candidates;

3. Membership of the regular armed forces of the Crown;

4. Membership of any police force maintained by a police authority, or the

National Criminal Intelligence Service, or the National Crime Squad;

18 Abhishek Singhvi, op. cit.

13

5. Membership of the legislature of any country or territory outside the

Common-wealth, except the Republic of Ireland. It is likely that members of a

legislature other than that of the Irish Republic would be debarred by their

status as aliens from membership of the Commons;

6. A great variety of disqualifying offices arising from chairmanship or

membership of commissions, boards, administrative tribunals, public

authorities and undertakings; in a few cases, the disqualification attaches only

to a particular constituencies. As these offices cover such a wide range, each

office is specified by name. The schedule may be amended by Order in

Council made following a resolution approved by the House of Commons.

This power obviates the need for amendment by statute as and when new

offices are created.19

In Canada, the Lortie Commission recommended abandonment of OoP. In

Australia, two Royal Commissions have demanded its repeal.

Obviously, the Indian law too needs to be more specific that clears the cobweb

of confusion around it. There are two ways of looking at it. First, the Constitution

lays down the basic framework for it, the Prevention of Disqualification Act, 1959,

that draws its sanctity from the Articles 102 and 191 of the Constitution needs to be

made more coherent in laying down principles, based on the pronouncements of the

Supreme Court of India and the ECI. There is merit in the suggestion made by

Singhvi that principles should be unambiguously stated and the offices that fall in the

category of the OoP should be specified. The rest should not be considered OoP.

There is a catch here though. Politicians everywhere, but more particularly so

in India, display propensity and craving for offices that give them power and

patronage resources, which is not satisfied with the influence that they get as a

legislator. Naturally, in the parliamentary system, particularly in a coalition situation

where numbers have at times to be conjured up for survival, existing or new executive

offices at the disposal of the State are good baits to keep the existing flock together

and entice the new ones. The political compulsion to reward the loyals with and

accommodate influential parliamentarians and legislators left out of ministerial race in

such offices has been growing over the years. The question is whether such newly

invented offices would stick to the principles drawn or violate the stated principles.

The current controversy also indicates that in the current contentious politics of the

country, the possibility of some party or the leader going to the court on this issue is

not ruled out. Representation, accountability and responsibility, the governing

19

Shashank Krishna, op. cit.

14

principles of representative democracy, will continue to remain issues under such

circumstances. It is, therefore, essential that a satisfactory definition of the OoP as

well as a widely accepted norm regarding keeping the legislative and executive

functions separated are developed and encoded in order to keep the controversies as

well as constitutional and legal anomalies at bay.

Cash for Questions

Operation Duryodhana, a sting operation with hidden cameras and tape recorders,

conducted by a Cobrapost20

-Aaj Tak21

team for nearly eight months in 2005 led to

broadcast of news bulletins with video footage on 12 December 2005, which showed

that eleven MPs, ten from the Lok Sabha and one from the Rajya Sabha, belonging to

four parties had accepted cash for asking questions in the house. During the

operation, fourteen MPs were contacted through middlemen,22

which were assorted

persons, some on the staff of the MPs and the Parliament, with requests of raising

questions and offers of money to be paid from representatives of a fictitious body

called the North Indian Small Manufacturers’ Association (NISMA) for asking certain

questions in the Indian Parliament relating to NISMA’s interests. While three

declined, eleven (seven belonging to the BJP, two to the BSP and one each to the RJD

and Congress) accepted money, some even made proposals for doing it on a regular

basis on an annual price to be paid monthly, some bargained on the price being paid.

In all, more than 60 questions were submitted by eleven MPs of which 25 questions

(at last count) were tabled in the Parliament.

The MPs who took money for putting questions in the Indian Parliament

were23

:

Narendra Kushwaha (BSP) Rs. 55,000

Anna Saheb M. K. Patil (BJP) Rs. 45,000

Dr. Chhatrapal Singh Lodha (BJP) Rs. 15,000

Y. G. Mahajan (BJP) Rs. 35,000

Manoj Kumar (RJD) Rs. 110,000

20

A web-based news site.

21 A hindi news channel of the India Today group.

22 The eight middlemen COBRAPOST-AAJTAK team met were Harish Badola, M. K. Tripathi

(Chotiwala), Chandrabhan Gupta, Dinesh, Vijay, Sudeep Mishra, Ravinder, Ajay Singh. See

http://www.cobrapost.com/documents/mm.htm.

23 http://www.cobrapost.com/documents/fdec%20.htm.

15

Suresh Chandel (BJP) Rs. 30,000

Raja Ram Pal (BSP) Rs. 35,000

Lal Chandra Kol (BJP) Rs. 35,000

Pradeep Gandhi (BJP) Rs. 55,000

Chandra Pratap Singh (BJP) Rs. 35,000

Ramsevak Singh (Congress) Rs. 50,000

Expectedly, the Lok Sabha immediately constituted a ‘Committee to Inquire

into Allegations of Improper Conduct on the Part of Some Members’ chaired by

Pawan Kumar Bansal and consisting of Vijay Kumar Malhotra, Mohammad Salim,

Ram Gopal Yadav and C. Kuppusami, which submitted its report to the Speaker of

the Lok Sabha on 21 December 2005 and it was tabled in the house the next day. The

Lok Sabha, on the recommendation of the Committee, which earlier heard the

representative of the Cobrapost.com and the ten of its accused MPs, expelled all the

ten. Vijay Kumar Malhotra of the BJP was the lone member of the committee who

did not concur with the recommendation for he thought that as per the procedure

established by law:

1. No member of the House can be expelled except for the breach of privileges of

the House.

2. The matter must, therefore, be dealt with according to the rules of Privileges

Committee.

3. So, the matter must be referred to the Privileges Committee on a motion

moved in the House, or the Committee adopted the rules of Privileges

Committee.

4. In the Privileges Committee the tainted members will have a right of cross

examination, arguments, defence etc., which is necessary for Natural Justice. 24

He was in favour of the matter being referred to the Privilege Committee. The Rajya

Sabha too expelled its member involved in this scandalous activity.

Questions have been raised about the Committee coming to conclusion and

submitting its report within a week and recommending expulsion of the members.

The details of the sting operation, however, starkly bring out corrupt and criminalized

mindset of some of the persons elected as people’s representative to the country’s

highest representative-legislative body. One was even reported to be making

suggestive lewd passes at the lady journalist impersonating as the representative of the

24

See, ‘Report of the Committee to Inquire into Allegations of Improper Conduct on the Part of Some

Members’, Fourteenth Lok Sabha, New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, December 2005. http://164.100.24.208/ls/Inquiry/IReport.pdf.

16

fictitious NISMA. Equally disturbing were the comments made by some of the MPs

regarding their colleagues in the House and of the middlemen about the MPs.25

Though the accused MPs were not given a chance to cross examine the sting

operation team, who were questioned by the Committee, a detailed reading of the

140-page report exposes the thin defence presented by each of them.

The first case of cash for question came to light nearly five and half decade

back, in the provisional Parliament when H. D. Mudgal’s dealings with a Bombay

Bullion Association, which included canvassing support and making propaganda in

Parliament on certain problems on behalf of that association, in return for alleged

financial and other business advantage rocked the Parliament and conscience of the

nation even when the Indian republic was just finding its feet and the first general

elections under India’s republican constitution were still a few months away. Jawahar

Lal Nehru while speaking on the motion for expulsion of H.D. Mudgal on 24

September, 1951 said:

The question arises whether in the present case this should be done or

something else. I do submit that it is perfectly clear that this case is not even a

case which-might be called a marginal case, where people may have two

opinions about it, where one may have doubts if a certain course suggested is

much too severe. The case if I may say so, is as bad as it could well be. If we

consider even such a case as a marginal case or as one where perhaps a certain

amount of laxity might be shown, I think it will be unfortunate from a variety

of points of view, more especially because, this being the first case of its kind

coming up before the House, if the House does not express its will in such

matters in clear, unambiguous and forceful terms, then doubts may very well

arise in the public mind as to whether the House is very definite about such

matters or not. Therefore I do submit that it has become a duty for us and an

obligation to be clear, precise and definite. The facts are clear and precise and

the decision should also be clear and precise and unambiguous. And I submit

the decision of the House should be, after accepting the finding of this report,

to resolve that the Member should be expelled from the House.

Despite this unambiguously intolerant position of Nehru towards such

practices the legislators in the country, it is obvious that situation has gradually

deteriorated. It is equally difficult to believe that corruption in and criminalization of

the country’s political life has affected only a few MPs, who are prepared to sell their

conscience for a few thousand rupees, when scams worth millions with political

involvement have been unearthed. It would not be far-fetched to expect that this

25

http://www.cobrapost.com/documents/mm.htm and

http://www.cobrapost.com/documents/fdec%20.htm.

17

could be proverbial tip of the iceberg and it could well be that bigger fishes have

escaped this net. However, if the MPs could sell their support for cash – the JMM

bribery cash, though unresolved, is still fresh in public memory – accepting cash to

ask questions could be considered only a minor deviation.

It would be contextual to point out here that the cash for question affair had

also rocked the UK in the 1990s. Two Conservative MPs of the House of Commons,

Neil Hamilton and Tim Smith, were alleged to have accepted £2000 per question to

table parliamentary questions on behalf of the controversial Egyptian owner of

Harrods department store, Mohamed Al-Fayed. Consequently, Prime Minister John

Major instituted the Lord Nolan Committee on 25 October 1994, to review the issue

of standards in public life.26

Though he prorugued the Parliament in 1997 for fresh

elections in May, it established The Seven Principles of Public Life under the

following headings:

Selflessness

Integrity

Objectivity

Accountability

Openness

Honesty

Leadership

Whether or not these principles are followed in the British public life since they were

pronounced, the Committee on Standards in Public Life has since become a

permanent body with members and a chair appointed for upto three years.

The pertinent question, therefore, is not whether some MPs or legislators have

been caught in this unsavoury affair, neither the question is whether smaller fishes

have been caught and bigger have got scot free, but whether any institutional

mechanism has been devised to strengthen probity in public life at the highest level in

a sustained manner and resolve such issues to optimum satisfaction of the public in a

non-partisan fashion. An absence of such an institutional mechanism, either as a

parliamentary organ, or as a statutory body, is likely to encourage such deviance to

parliamentary norms.

Interestingly, the matter did not end with the expulsion of the erring MPs. On

the one hand, some of the expelled MPs appealed against the expulsion, challenging

26

Standard in Public Life, First Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, Chairman Lord

Nolan, London, HMSO, May 1995.

18

the power of either House of the Parliament to expel any member, to the Supreme

Court of India, on the other, in response to a letter written by V. K. Malhotra, BJP

deputy leader in the Lok Sabha and the dissenting member of the Lok Sabha’s

‘Committee to Inquire into Allegations of Improper Conduct on the Part of Some

Members’, leading political parties had a meeting with the Lok Sabha Speaker

Somnath Chatterjee in August 2006 and decided to set up a Review Committee if the

MPs withdrew their petitions in Supreme Court challenging the decision of the House.

In September 2006, ten months after the expulsion, however, the petition came up for

hearing in the Supreme Court before a five-judge Constitution Bench headed by Chief

Justice Y. K. Sabharwal, where it was argued that the Article 105(3)27

of the

Constitution does not confer on either House of the Indian Parliament all the

privileges which the British House of Commons exercised at the time of the coming

into force of the Constitution of India and that the Indian legislatures were not

superior courts and their non-speaking warrant of contempt was subject to judicial

scrutiny under Article 22628

or other appropriate proceedings. The counsel argued

27

Article 105(3): In other respects, the powers, privileges and immunities of each House of Parliament,

and of the members and committees of each House, shall be such as may from time to time be defined

by Parliament by Law, and, until so defined, [shall be those of that House and of its members and

committees immediately before the coming into force of section 15 of the Constitution (Forty-fourth

Amendment) Act, 1978].

28 Article 226: Power of High Courts to issue certain writs.—(1) Notwithstanding anything in

article 32 every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises

jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within

those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus,

prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights

conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.

(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government,

authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the

territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power,

notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not

within those territories.

(3) Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any

other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause (1), without—

(a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for

such interim order; and

(b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an application to the High Court for

the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such

order has been made or the counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the application

within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on which the

copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the High Court is closed on the

last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High Court is open;

and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as

the case may be, the expiry of the said next day, stand vacated.

19

that disqualification of members has to be governed by law and not by the resolution

of a single House, in other words, the Parliament or State legislatures did not have the

powers to expel their members even if they thought that an act of the member(s) had

brought the house under disrepute. However, maintaining that provisions of the

Representation of the Peoples Act create disqualifications, Ram Jethmalani, a leading

criminal lawyer and an MP, said, ‘the disqualifications created by these sections are

not merely disqualification for being chosen as member but also produce a post-

election termination of membership’. Supporting the Centre’s stand that Parliament

has power to expel its member for abusing the privileges, the Attorney General

justified before the Supreme Court the expulsion of MPs for their involvement in

cash-for-query scam. However, on September 28, 2006 the Supreme Court reserved

its verdict on power of Parliament to expel MPs.

While the situation on the constitutional and judicial debate on the issue rests

at the reserved verdict of the Supreme Court, which, if in favour of the MPs, would

open a fresh debate not only on parliamentary privileges and corruption and standards

in public life. The tolerant stand of political parties and the political class on

corruption and probity in public life nonetheless became clear with the moves to

review the expulsion following V. K. Malhotra’s (BJP) letter to the Lok Sabha

speaker Somnath Chatterjee.

Operation Chakravyuh

The Member of Parliament Local Development Area Development Scheme

(MPLADS) has continued to make news year after year since it came into existence.

Our previous evalutation of the scheme showed a mixed performance and under-

utilisation, corruption, incomplete work, inefficient implementation and supervision

and so on.29

We are therefore not using the data of the performance of the scheme for

the following years, for it is unlikely to unravel anything more than what has already

been said on this scheme by us earlier, or by other analysts so far. Instead, we are

using the consequences of and the events following ‘Operation Chakravyuh’, a sting

(4) The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the power

conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of article 32.

29 See, Ajay K. Mehra, ‘Parliament Under Social Watch: Representation, Accountability and

Governance’, in National Social Watch Coalition, Citizens Report on Governance and Development

2006, Delhi: Pearson Education (India).

20

operation conducted on similar lines as the ‘Operation Duryodhana’ by the same

people, for analysing the scheme, because it also offers a continuity in trend with the

analysis on the ‘Operation Duryodhana’.

On 20th

November 2005 the Star News in collaboration with Detective

Intelligence Guild (DIG) aired the sting operation on six MPs, capturing the MPs on

camera seeking commissions while allotting funds under the scheme for

developmental works in their respective constituencies. The six MPs (three from BJP

and one each from Samajwadi Party, Congress, BSP and Rashtriya Kranti Dal) on

‘Operation Chakravyuh’ were: former Union minister and BJP Lok Sabha member

from Madhya Pradesh’s Mandla constituency Faggan Singh Kulaste, former Goa

Chief Minister and south-Goa Congress Lok Sabha MP Churchill Alemao, former UP

Minister and Samajwadi Party Lok Sabha MP Paras Nath Yadav from Jaunpur

constituency, BJP Lok Sabha member from Madhya Pradesh’s Sidhi constituency C.

P. Singh, BJP Lok Sabha member Ramswaroop Koli and Samajwadi Party member in

the Rajya Sabha Sakshi Maharaj. The Saidpur (UP) Lok Sabha MP Toorfani Saroj

refused to accept any commission.

Shockingly, on camera Churchill Alemao was shown asking the DIG reporters

to open a bag full of money as commission for a project and the personal secretary of

a BJP MP was shown taking money on behalf of two MPs of the party. One of these

MPs was also exposed in the cash-on-camera ‘Operation Duryodhan’. The sting team

was shown discussing the commission with a BJP MP at his house. The audio

records the transaction to establish that money has been paid and that the MP will get

Rs. 20,000 for a Rs. 5 lakh job. The SP MP was approached by the reporters and a 20

percent commission was agreed upon for a Rs. 10-15 lakh project, but when the team

offers him only Rs. 50,000, the MP threw a tantrum. A Rajya Sabha member from

UP openly discussed the commission and promises to take the sting team, posing as

NGOs, to some other MPs, including one person who was suspended in the wake of

the cash-on-camera operation. The RKD MP justified accepting such commissions

saying it would be difficult to contest the Lok Sabha polls if one did not take such

money. The BSP MP said the issue of commissions on the MPLADS would be

worked out after consultations with colleagues.

Both the Houses instituted inquiries to look into the matter. Though

expressing reservations about such sting operations, they were unsparing about the

21

lure of money in people’s representatives. The Rajya Sabha Committee headed by

Dr. Karan Singh felt that ‘there is an imperative need to bring about some kind of

regulatory mechanism for under-cover operations which have the potential of

encroaching upon the right to privacy of an individual.’30 The Lok Sabha Committee

expressed ‘concern over the fact that the media has been indulging in a race to

achieve viewership through denationalization on a competitive basis.’ However, that

came as no respite to Rajya Sabha member Dr. Swami Sakshi Ji Maharaj, who

‘expressed his regrets and displayed a feeling of shame for his utterances, because the

Committee observed that ‘The facts and circumstances of the case leave no doubt that

the Member has not only committed gross misdemeanour but by his conduct he has

also compromised the dignity of the House and its Members and has acted in a

manner which is inconsistent with the standards which the House is entitled to expect

of its Members.’ The Committee recommended his expulsion from the House. The

Lok Sabha Committee too found that ‘the conduct of none of the four members was

above board and they need to be handed out appropriate punishment.’ They were not

expelled, but suspended for varying periods. Both the committees further

recommended that Union Government may suitably revise the guidelines governing

MPLADS with a view to plug various loopholes.

The controversy also brought the MPLADS under judicial scrutiny when some

voluntary organisations, including Lok Sevak Sangh, challenged constitutional

validity of the scheme, because it was breeding corruption in the absence of

accountability, monitoring and checks and balances usually applicable to

governmental expenses. Prashant Bhushan, the counsel for Lok Sevak Sangh, pointed

out that the CAG report too discovered several shortcomings in the scheme.

Appearing for another petitioner senior counsel K.K. Venugopal termed MPLADS as

unconstitutional, saying Parliament could not appropriate funds from Consolidated

Fund of India except in accordance with Article 282 of the Constitution. He said it

was a peculiar situation where there was no monitoring, no accountability and no

criminal offence under Prevention of Corruption Act for the irregularities committed

in the implementation of the Scheme.31

30

Parliament of India (Rajya Sabha), Committee on Ethics, Eighth Report, New Delhi: Rajya Sabha

Secretariat, 2006.

31 Outlook India.com

22

The apex court has not given any verdict on the case yet. The MPLADS

continues to be caught in controversy. It is a unique scheme, a creation of the Indian

Parliament and replicated in legislatures too. However, only control mechanism

attached to it has been that money is not directly given to the MPs, it is only

sanctioned by them against development schemes and specific work in their

constituencies, to be released and the work completed by the district administration,

which in many cases is not above corruption. Operation Chakravyuh has only

revealed what has long been believed about corruption prevailing in the MPLADS

scheme. Under-utilisation of the scheme, which has committed non-lapsable fund

drawn from Consolidated Fund of India, also indicates the keenness with which the

MPs look at it. Even if far fetched conclusions to link the under-utilisation of the

MPLADS to the tendencies reflected in the Operation Chakravyuh are avoided, it is

clear that lack of transparency and prevailing corruption and criminalization have

plagued the scheme over the years. It also gives an undue advantage to the sitting

MP.32

Criminalisation of Politics

We had pointed out three dimensions to criminalization of politics relating to the issue

of representation, the key issue in the present context, in the previous assessment of

the Parliament. First, with the increasing compulsions of retaining political power at

any cost as well as due to increase in corrupt practices for self-perpetuation and self-

aggrandizement amongst the political class, political transgressions into criminality

have become visible and brazen. Second, since the line between criminality and

political goals blurred as a consequence, the use of criminals not only to win elections

with strong arm methods, but also to serve other political goals became prevalent.

Third, not only some politicians became tainted with criminality, high profile dons

32

The scheme which began with allocating Rs. 10 million annually to each of the 795 MPs, was later

raised to Rs. 20 million per annum per MP, thus allocating nealry Rs. 80,000 over a five years period.

Given the prevailing corruption in the scheme almost since it came into existence, it is open to two

levels of corruption – of MP and the district administration. Further, it has been rightly pointed out that

‘it takes away some of the responsibility for development activity from both the state and local initiative and makes it a matter of individual patronage. It is politically unfair because it gives an

advantage to the incumbent (of whatever party) over his rivals by giving him a discretionary

expenditure purse of Rs. 50 million (when it was 10 million, now 100 million) over a term.’ E. Sridharan, ‘Parties, the Party System and Collective Action for State Funding of Elections: A Comparative Perspective on Possible Options’, in Peter Ronald deSouza and E. Sridharan (eds.), India’s Political Parties, New Delhi: Sage, 2006, p. 336.

23

with political connections succeeded in getting acceptance for their political stakes

and entered representative institutions like parliament and state legislatures. The

debate on criminalization of politics in India, which had over the past decade and a

half has shifted from the use of criminals in politics to the entry of criminals into

politics indicating a paradigm shift,33

deserves assessment, analyses and

conceptualisation afresh in the light of the current developments. We shall here not

present any fresh data, which remains the same for the present Parliament, but raise

some fresh questions that deserve debate.

During our roundtables in States on the previous Social Watch Report,

questions were raised on the data on criminalization of politics, based on affidavits by

each member regarding criminal cases pending against them. Some observers felt

that in ‘most cases’ the MPs in the list were either Scheduled Caste or Scheduled

Tribe, against whom false criminal cases were registered. Since we could not put

together data on the caste profile of the tainted MPs and the nature of cases registered

against them, we shall refrain from saying anything on the issue. This, however, is an

issue to be probed more incisively to understand the nature and processes of

‘criminalization’ in politics. We made attempts but could not get data on caste

composition of the ‘tainted’ MPs. Once such data is at hand, it will also be necessary

to look into the details of the case, including the circumstances under which the cases

were filed and the persons who filed it. We would like to underline the critical

importance of such analysis.

The debate on criminalization of politics received a new dimension with the

conviction of Shibu Soren, the unquestioned and highly respected leader of the

Jharkhand Mukti Morcha, for the involvement in the alleged murder of his secretary

(sentenced to life imprisonment) and Navjot Singh Sidhu, a former cricketer and a

BJP MP from Punjab, for causing death of an old person by thrashing him in a case of

road rage in 1988 in Ludhiana (three years rigorous imprisonment). His sentence has

been stayed since by the Supreme Court, which also thought it wise to praise Sidhu.

Though Soren has been involved in other controversies as well, he is not a

typical criminal-politician. He was in the news for receiving bribe to save the

33

Ajay K. Mehra, ‘Criminalization of Indian Politics’, in K M de Silva, G H Peiris and S W R de A

Samarasinghe (eds.), Corruption in South Asia: India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, International Centre for

Ethnic Studies, Kandy, Sri Lanka, 2002, pp. 99-138.

24

Narasimha Rao government in the 1990s, the money which led to the ‘compulsion’ of

the killing of his secretary, who appeared to know too much and reportedly asked for

a larger share in the booty. He was again in the news when he went absconding when

the BJP-led Jharkhand government dug up a 30-year old case of political protest

resulting in rioting and killing of eleven people in Chirrudih in (the undivided) Bihar

to put him behind the bars. Violent protest politics, even at the cost of loss of

innocent lives, is a legitimate instrument of politics in India, not surprisingly for

Soren too, a typical politician representing the exploited and poor tribal communities

of Jharkhand, for whom ends are important, not the means. His understanding of

morality would also perhaps differ, for money required to compete in the modern

game of politics does not come easily. He would perhaps also have his own definition

of democracy, not shared by others. Yet, bribe, riots, violence and murders are acts of

criminality, and rather serious ones if persons in power at the national level are

involved, deserving stern remedies.

Similarly, Navjot Singh Sidhu, a past cricketer known for his maverick wit

and comments, would not fit the typology of a typical criminal or criminally-oriented

politician. A late entrant into the world of politics, he allegedly committed the

heinous breach of law as a young cricketer, signifying the tendency to take the

celebrity status too seriously to claim privilege over a ‘common citizen’s’ rights. That

is only one part of the worrisome tendency. Even worse from the perspective of the

political institutions in the country, particularly from the point of view of parties and

Parliament is that he was considered for an important party position by a national (and

claiming to be nationalist) party and given party ticket. Worse still, despite his

conviction for his criminal misadventure by a court of law, he was defended by the

party with weak and flimsy arguments. That such a defence would perpetuate

criminality, was not considered at all.

The issue of criminalisation of politics and its shadow over the institutional

and democratic sanctity of Parliament obviously deserves debate beyond partisanship

and a straightjacketed view. Clearly, criminality could be encouraged even by those

who could not traditionally be branded as criminals.

Inside the Parliament

25

Both the houses met for 146 days for 85 sittings during 2005 and for 82 days (Rajya

Sabha for 80 days) for 57 sittings during 2006, which means that as compared to

2004,

Table 1:. Number of Days and Sittings

Session Duration Sittings Days

Fourteenth Lok Sabha

4th

February 25, 2005 to May 13, 2005 38 78

5th

July 25, 2005 to August 30, 2005 24 37

6th

November 23, 2005 to December 23, 2005 23 31

7th

February 16 to March 22, 2006 and

May 10 to May 23, 200634

35 49

8th

July 24, 2006 to August 25, 2006 22 33

Total 117 193

Rajya Sabha

204th

February 25, 2005 to May 13, 2005 38 78

205th

July 25, 2005 to August 30, 2005 24 37

206th

November 23, 2005 to December 23, 2005 23 31

207th

February 16 to March 22, 2006 and

May 10 to May 23 2006

35 47

208th

July 24, 2006 to August 25, 2006 22 33

Total 142 226

Source: Annual Report 2005-06, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi

when the thirteenth Lok Sabha was first dissolved and then the newly elected

fourteenth Lok Sabha reassembled, resulting in far fewer sittings, 2005 and 2006

witnessed normal sitting of the two houses of Parliament (see Table 1 below).

However, whether the normal sittings resulted in normal conduct of business or not, is

another matter. The adjournments and prorogations of the two houses do not give a

clue to the extent of conduct of business by them and increasing use of the ‘grammar

of anarchy’ by the parties and the MPs.

Table 2: Adjournments and Prorogations

Session Date of Adjournment

Sine-Dine

Prorogation

Fourteenth Lok Sabha

4th

May 13, 2005 May17, 2005

34

The Lok Sabha (Seventh Session) was not prorogued after it was adjourned sine die on 22nd March,

2006. Under rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha, the Speaker

reconvened its sittings from Wednesday, the 10th May, 2006 for the second Part of the Session.

26

5th

August 30, 2005 September 1, 2005

6th

December 23, 2005 December 28, 2005

7th

March 22, 2006 and

May 23, 200635

25 May 2006 (IInd

session of 7th

session)

8th

August 25,2006 August 30, 2006

Rajya Sabha

204th

May13, 2005 May17, 2005

205th

August 30, 2005 September 1, 2005

206th

December 23, 2005 December 28, 2005

207th May23, 2006 May 25, 2006

208th August 25, 2006 August 30, 2006

Source: Annual Report 2005-06, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi

As compared to 2004, the time management was better in 2005 and 2006, as

both sessionwise as well as in terms of the aggregate, much less time was lost due to

interruptions caused the stalled proceedings, which essentially indicate increasing

partisanship leading to fierce contestations on major or minor issues even on the floor

Table 3: Time Lost on Adjournments due to Interruptions

Time Lost on Adjournments due to Interruptions

Session Total Time Time lost in adjournments

due to interruptions etc.

%age of time lost in

adjournments due to

interruptions etc.

Lok Sabha

Hours Hrs.Mnts

4th

228 29.43 13

5th

144 09.35 6.6

6th

138 26.17 19

7th

194.55

(Both 1st

and 2nd

Session)

35.42 (Both 1st and 2

nd

Session)

18.21 (Both 1st and 2

nd

Session)

8th

124.30 36.49 29.19

Total 828.85 136.86 16.42

Rajya Sabha

204th

190 43.02 23

205th

120 16.56 14

206th

115 25.02 21

207th

180.56 NA NA

208th

113.41 NA NA

35

The Lok Sabha (Seventh Session) was not prorogued after it was adjourned sine die on 22nd March,

2006. Under rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha, the Speaker

reconvened its sittings from Wednesday, the 10th May, 2006 for the second Part of the Session.

27

Total 718.97 85 (Excluding 207th

and 208th

session)

20 (Excluding 207th

and

208th

session)

(Source: Annual Report 2005-06, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs,

Government of India New Delhi)

of the two houses. In aggregate terms, the Lok Sabha lost 13 percent of its time and

the Rajya Sabha 20 percent. The fifth session of the Lok Sabha witnessed only 6.6

percent of the time lost, which is one of the lowest in recent years. The 11th

Lok

Sabha (1996-98) lost 5.28 percent of its time due to pandemonium, the 12th

Lok

Sabha’s (1998-99) 10.66 percent time was lost in disruptions and the 13th

Lok Sabha

(1999-2004) lost 22.4 percent. The 14th

Lok Sabha, which commenced only in June

2004 during which it witnessed a delayed budget session (due to the parliamentary

elections) and the Monsoon and Winter sessions, lost 26 percent of its time in

interruptions arising out of various political controversies. It appears to be an obvious

improvement, but other indicators need closer scrutiny. Non-financial business

consumed bulk of the time in both the Houses, followed by financial and legislative in

the Lok Sabha and legislative and financial in the Rajya Sabha.

Non-financial business is a broad category and it is not easy what all have

been included in that for categorisation. However, it consumed nearly 40 percent of

the Lok Sabha time and over 50 percent of the Rajya Sabha time. Even if the two

houses of the Parliament have to attend to other business, being legislatures,

legislative business has to be their main task.

Table 4: Time Distribution for Legislative, Financial and

Non-Financial Business in the Two Houses

Item Lok Sabha Rajya Sabha

Legislative 26 28.41

Financial 35.62 18.41

Non-Financial 38.38 53.18

Note: Figures in percentages

If we juxtapose the use of time with the bill passed, the neglect of the

legislative business becomes even starker. The performance during the past two years

Table 5: Bills Passed 2001-06

Bills Passed 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

28

in Indian

Parliament

2001 - 2005

61 86 64 18 59 59

is not bad, even though it clearly shows a decline. Even if we exclude 2004 as the

year transition, though even that should not have led to such a few number of bills

passed, the next two years should have been the years when the UPA government

(and the Congress party in particular), in order to rest the political initiative, should

have gone ahead with important legislations. However, time loss is not entirely due to

lapses of the treasury benches, opposition too play important role. Clearly, as a

collective, the people’s representatives did not take their legislative task too seriously.

In 2006, over 40 percent of the bills were passed in Lok Sabha with less than one hour

of debate. Further, in two sessions in 2006 only 173 MPs in Lok Sabha actually said

anything on the floor of Parliament on legislative issues. Sadly, almost 65 percent of

MPs said nothing in Lok Sabha on a legislative issue.36

Obviously, time saved due to

colossal disinterest of parliamentarians on substantive issues, particularly the

legislative ones, is diverted to other issues which bring the opposition frequently into

the well of the house and lead to behaviour and conduct of Parliament in a manner

that has virtually led to its deinstitutionalisation.

Table 6 presents time spent on various bills that have been before Parliament

by both the houses in three sessions – Winter 2005, Budget 2006 and Monsoon 2006.

The three sessions sampled here are quite revealing. Most bills were passed with only

a few minutes of discussion which included some appropriation bills and even railway

budget. In fact, at times more than one bill was disposed off together in a few

minutes. Indeed some bills did attract the attention of the Parliament and were

discussed only for an hour or more, some for upto about seven hours. A look at those

Table 6: Time Spent on Bills

Winter 2005 Lok Sabha Rajya Sabha

Name of Bill Hrs. Mnts Hours. Mnts

The Punjab General Sales Tax (As in Force in the Union Territory of Chandigarh) Repeal Bill,

2005 0. 35 0. 3

The National Tax Tribunal Bill, 2005 2. 56 1. 46

The Prevention of Insults to National Honour (Amendment) Bill, 2005* 1. 24 1. 27

The State Emblem of India (Prohibition of Improper Use) Bill, 2005* 1. 25 1. 27

The Disaster Management Bill, 2005 3. 31 4. 49

36

C. V. Madhukar, ‘House This for Debate?’, The Indian Express, January 3, 2007, p. 10.

29

The Manipur University Bill, 2005 1. 48 1. 23

The Appropriation (Railways) No. 5 Bill, 2005 0. 4 3. 26

The Andhra Pradesh Legislative Council Bill, 2005 2. 23 2. 8

The Taxation Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2005 2. 30 1. 29

The Appropriation (No. 5) Bill, 2005 0.4 2. 3

The Central Sales Tax (Amendment) Bill, 2005 0. 47 0. 4

The Constitution (One Hundred and Fourth Amendment) Bill, 2005 6. 14 6. 9

The Commissions for Protection of Child Rights Bill, 2005 3. 17 2. 46

The Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill, 2005 2. 45 3. 59

The Chartered Accountants (Amendment) Bill, 2005* 0.4 0.1

The Cost and Works Accountants (Amendment) Bill, 2005* 0.4 0.1

The Company Secretaries (Amendment) Bill, 2005* 0.4 0.1

* The Bills were discussed together

Budget Session 2006 Lok Sabha Rajya Sabha

Name of Bill Hrs.Mnts Hrs.Mnts

The Contempt of Courts (Amendment) Bill, 2006 0.52 1.33

The Chartered Accountants (Amendment) Bill, 2006 0.3 0.5

The Company Secretaries (Amendment) Bill, 2006 0.3 0.3

The Cost and Work Accountants (Amendment) Bill, 2006 0.3 0.2

The Government of Union Territories and Government of NCT of Delhi (Amendment) Bill, 2006 0.39 0.11

The Appropriation (Railways) Vote on Account Bill, 2006 0.3 0.8

The Appropriation (Railways) Bill, 2006 0.3

The Appropriation (Railways) No. 2 Bill, 2006 0.3

The National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions (Amendment) Bill, 2006 4.12 3.9

The Khadi and Village Industries (Amendment) Bill, 2005 1.5 1.56

The Appropriation Bill, 2006 0.3 0.5

The Appropriation (No 2) Bill, 2006 0.3

The Appropriation (Railways) No. 3 Bill, 2006 0.3 1.42

The Appropriation (No. 3) Bill, 2006 0.3 1.34

The Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulation Board Bill, 2005 2.4 3.44

The Finance Bill, 2006 8.2 2.15

The Delhi Special Police Establishment (Amendment) Bill, 2006 0.2 0.3

The Delhi Laws (Special Provision) Bill, 2006 1.39 2.40

The Companies (Amendment) Bill, 2006 0.42 0.4

The Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Amendment Bill, 2006* 3.21 4.34

The Cess Laws (Repealing and Amending) Bill, 2006

The Reserve Bank of India (Amendment) Bill, 2006 1.12 1.25

The Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Amending Bill, 2006 0.57 0.44

The Taxation Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2006 0.55 1.14

The Constitution (Ninety Fourth) Amendment Bill, 2006 0.33

The Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Bill, 2006 2.3 1.24

The National Institute of Fashion Technology Bill, 2006 0.51 0.1

The Union Duties of Excise (Electricity) Distribution Repeal Bill, 2006 0.12 0.2

Monsoon Session 2006 Lok Sabha Rajya Sabha

Name of Bill Hrs.Mnts Hrs.Mnts

The Produce Cess Laws (Abolition) Bill, 2006 0.1 0.17

The Government Securities Bill, 2004 0.14 0.49

The Actuaries Bill, 2005 2. 7 1.53

The Spirituous Preparations (Inter-State Trade and Commerce) Control (Repeal Bill, 2006 0.47 0.1

The Food Safety and Standards Bill, 2005 4.10 4.13

The Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Amendment Bill, 2006 6.24 3.59

The Cantonments Bill, 2003 7.21 3.14

The Pondicherry (Alteration of Name) Bill, 2006 0.47 0.37

30

The Central Silk Board Amendment Bill, 2005 1.33 1.15

The Salary, Allowances and Pension of Members of Parliament (Amendment) Bill, 2006 1.41 0.35

The Wildlife (Protection) Amendment Bill, 2005 1.24 3.20

The Appropriations (No. 4) Bill, 2006 0.3 0.3

The Appropriations (Railways) No. 4 Bill, 2006 0.3 0.3

The Protection of Human Rights (Amendment) Bill, 2005 3.7 4.2

The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Amendment Bill, 2005 2.46 2.48

The Assam Rifles Bill, 2006 1.50 1.20

The Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) and Financial Institutions

Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2006 2.57 2.22

bills reveals something, but does not reveal a lot, that can perhaps be found out by

content analysing the debates. The Constitution (one hundred and fourth

Amendment) Bill, 2005, which became 93rd

Amendment Act, dealing with

educational advancement of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and the Other

Backward Castes, understandably consumed over six hours in the Lok Sabha. The

issue was politically contentious and we know from the media analysis that it

predictably raised political dust. It is also understandable that the Minority Institution

Bill was discussed for over four hours. The Parliament Prevention of Disqualification

Bill presented in the aftermath of the Office of Profit controversy was also discussed

for over six hours and the Cantonment Bill (?) for a surprising over seven hours. In

the absence of details of the parliamentary debate, we have no clue as to why this one

was discussed for such a long duration. Clearly, politically hot issues have invited

greater attention of the members, because they help them score a point against the

government.37

Some have argued that the declining interest of the MPs in the proceedings of

Parliament and lack of debates is reflective of increasing efficiency of the Committee

system, where each bill is thoroughly looked into before it is legislated. However, a

look at the working of the committees reveals a different story. Average attendance

in sixteen Standing Committees in the 4th

, 5th

and 6th

sessions of the fourteenth Lok

Sabha varied between 33 and 62 percent. The committees met for a minimum of 20

minutes to a maximum of 29 hours and 5 minutes. While a committee did not meet

during a session, another had a maximum of thirteen sessions.

37

The Special Economic Zones (SEZ) Act, 2005 introduced on May 10, 2005, at the fag end of the

sitting of Lok Sabha (the day was almost occupied by long debates and discussions on Right to

Information Act) and attracted about little less than two hours of discussion during which hardly any

serious criticism were expressed by members, is one stark example of the lack of interest of most

parties and MPs towards serious issues of public concern. The storm that the issue of SEZ has created

and serious questions regarding farmers’ interests as well as displacement-rehabilitation hiatus it has

raised recently, is an example of the problems that a indifferent Parliament can create.

31

SEZ Act

The Special Economic Zones (SEZ) Act , 2005 inspired by the experience of the

success of SEZ’s in China introduced in 1980 sought to provide internationally competitive environment for exports. Instead of the policy implemented through

various notifications and circulars issues by the concerned Ministries/Departments as

was being done, the Act aimed at providing a long term stable policy framework

with a minimum regulatory regime and provide expeditious single- window

clearance facilities. It sought to ensure fiscal regime for developers of SEZ’s , provide single window clearance mechanism at zone level , establish an authority for

each SEZ set up by the central government with greater administrative autonomy

and designate special courts and single enforcement agencies to ensure speedy trial

and investigation of cases relating to the zones.

The Bill was introduced on May 10, 2005 at the fag end of the sitting of Lok Sabha

(the day was almost occupied by long debates and discussions on Right to

Information Act) and attracted about little less than two hours of discussion during

which hardly any serious criticism were expressed by members and it appears that in

principle that the house was unanimous in approving the Bill. But as is often

mentioned “ the devil is in details” and while the policy was accepted with much

euphoria , its fallout effects started appearing as soon as it was implemented. It was

questioned not only by independent observers and social activists but also by

ministries and groups within the UPA government, the left parties and by the nodal

agencies like the Reserve Bank of India. The main concerns were on the grounds of

key concessions , land use and the future of existing export oriented units. The RBI

expressed its doubts about the tax concessions bringing about any dramatic change

in giving an impetus to the export growth. The second issue was about acquiring of

huge tracts of prime agricultural land for the SEZ units. Then, there was the question

of land use and most importantly exemption from labour laws.

The euphoria with which the SEZ policy and the Act ran into serious problems as

soon as the Act was implemented. Besides the objections raised by the finance

Minister Mr. P. Chidambaram and the RBI , serious doubts were expressed by no

less a person than the UPA chairperson Mrs. Sonia Gandhi and some central

ministers like Mr.Sharad Pawar and Mr.Raghuvansh Prasad Singh mainly on the

issue of acquiring of agricultural land.

The SEZ Act is the prime example and perhaps a reflection on the quality and

coverage of the debate in the Parliament where such an important Act is passed

without going deeper into the processes and consequences of the implementation and

its repercussions on the poor and marginalized.

32

Table 7 Working of the Standing Committees in the Fourteenth Lok Sabha

(2005-2006)

Committee

on

No. of Sittings Duration(Hrs.Mi

n)

Average

Attendance (%)

Reports

Presented

Original/Action

Taken

4th

5th

6th

4th

5th

6th

4th

5th

6th

4th

5th

6th

Agriculture 5 1 1 7.33 1.19 2 45.16 39 38 4/ 4 0/3 0

Defence 13 2 5 22.3 2.30 6.55 51 52 33 2/2 0 2/0

Energy 4 3 4 6.10 3.55 8 14.70 51 33.3

4

2/2 2/1 0

External

Affairs

6 1 6 12.20 1.15 12.20 44.50 45.1

0

44.5

0

2/2 0 2/2

Committee on

Finance

9 4 2 24.15 5.25 2.15 50.17 62.0

9

41.9

3

10/ 0 2/1 3/5

Food,

Consumer

Affairs and

Public

Distribution

4 - 3 12 - 1.10 43.20 - 32.2

2

2/2 0 1/2

Labour 7 1 3 11.45 0.55 3.30 47 60.7

1

38.0

9

1/1 0 2/2

Petroleum &

Natural Gas

3 2 1 5.30 1.15 1.30 45.20 45.1

6

44.8

0

1/1 2/0 1/1

Chemicals &

Fertilizers

4 1 3 4.45 1 3 42.43 53.8

4

36.3

6

2/1 0 2/2

Railways 7 5 1 12.10 5 1.15 44.07 39.3

5

45.1

6

3/2 3/1 1&1

Urban

Development

7 3 1 10.30 4 2 47.91 46.0

3

38.7

0

2/2 2/1 0/2

Coal & Steel 3 2 2 7 1.20 1.50 65 42 46.7

1

3/2 0 0&3

Information

Technology

9 4 5 29.5 7.30 8 39.56 11 36.7

7

6/4 0 2&6

Water

Resources

(2004-05)

3 1 1 5.55 1 1.10 53 60 60 1/ 0 0 0/1

Social Justice

&

Empowerment

4 1 1 7.15 20 1.30 51.60 34.4

0

41.3

7

2/3 0 3/0

Rural

Development

7 1 1 11.45 30 1 62.07 52 40 4/4 0/1 0/ 4

33

(Source: http://loksabha.nic.in/)

(Table 7)38

tells a similar story. Average attendance in nineteen such

committees has varied between 33 percent and 86.6 percent. The Joint Committee on

salary and allowances of MPs was most attended (sic!). The Business Advisory

Committee has not only been consistently highly attended, it also had more sittings, it

put in more hours of work and produced more reports. However, a look at their work

does not inspire enough confidence about the committees’ role as a substitute to the

work by the two houses in the regular sessions.

Table 8 Working of the Committees other than financial and standing

committees in the fourteenth Lok Sabha 2005-06

Committee on No. of Sittings Duration(Hrs.Min) Average

Attendance (%)

Reports Presented

Original/Action

Taken

4th 5th 6th 4th 5th 6th 4th 5th 6th 4th 5th 6th

Business Advisory 6 5 3 3.0 2.35 1.20 67.78 72 62 6/ 0 0/5 3/0

Privileges 1 2 3 0.45 0.50 2.45 33 50 31 0 * 0

Ethics 0 0 1 0 0 0.50 - - 46 0 0 0

Absence of Members

from the Sittings of

the House

2 0 3 1.0 0 0.30 60 &

40

- 66.6 2/0 1/0 1/0

Government

Assurances

1 1 3 0.30 1 2.20 53 47 49 1/0 1/0 5/0

Papers Laid on Table 3 1 1 2.40 0.45 1.10 38 40 46 2/0 0 2/2

Petitions 4 0 1 3.10 0 1.45 35 - 56 2/0 2/0 1/0

Private Members

Bills& Resolutions

5 3 4 3.25 2.30 2.30 49.33 53.33 51.7

8

5/0 3/0 4/0

Joint Committee on

Offices of Profit

1 0 - 0.30.

m

0 0 46.6 - - 0 0 2/0

Welfare of SCs and

STs

3 1 1 7.15 1.30 0.30 54 46.6 53.3 1/0 0/2 1/1

Rules 0 0 - 0 0 0 - - - 0 0 0

House 1 0 - 1.30 0 0 45 - - 0 0 0

Subordinate

Legislation

2 1 1 1.30 1.45 0.45 56 66 43.3 2/2 0 2/2

Joint committee on

Salaries &

Allowances of MPs

1 0 - 1.40 0 0 86.67 - - 0 0 0

General Purpose 0 0 - 0 0 0 - - - 0 0 0

Railway Convention 3 1 3 3.10 0.40 2.55 42.59 61.11 37.0

3

1/0 1/0 1/0

Joint Committee on 2 0 - 2.30 0 0 40 & - - 0 0 0

38

Table 7 and 8 are in Annexure IV.

34

Committee on No. of Sittings Duration(Hrs.Min) Average

Attendance (%)

Reports Presented

Original/Action

Taken

Food Management in

Parliament House

46.66

to inquire into

allegations of

improper conduct on

the part of some

members

8 11.10 97.5 -

Joint Committee on

installation of

portraits/ statues of

national leaders and

parliamentarians in

parliament house

complex

1 0.40 67 -

*First Report of the Committee of privileges presented to H.S. on August 2005, laid on the table on 25 August, 2005 and adopted

by the house on 29 August, 2005.

(Source: http://loksabha.nic.in/)

Whose Questions, Whose Answers

The question hour of the Indian Parliament is one of the important instruments provided in the

parliamentary procedures. As a tool for generating information about government’s

programmes and policies, it carries 7 to 8 thousand questions (Starred and Un-starred) both

from Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha in a given session. It is one of the most authentic ways of

deriving information from the government. In a democratic set up where the institutions of

governance are directly accountable to the people, it becomes pertinent to analyse the

performance of the institutions of governance. The total number of questions raised in both

Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha in the three sessions in the year 2006 is given in the table No. 1.

It is worth mentioning here that what is the actual time the Parliament devotes to the question

hour (Table 2). The biggest casualty in the event of uproar in the house is the question hour.

As being the first business of the day, any small upheaval encroaches upon the time of the

question hour.

Table 9

Parliament Session Questions (Starred and Un-starred)

Lok Sabha Rajya Sabha

Budget Session-2006 5493 4664

Monsoon Session-2006 4114 3625

Winter Session-2006 4381 3433

35

Total 13988 11722

Source: Resume of work (Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha)-Budget Session 2006, Resume of work (Lok Sabha and

Rajya Sabha)-Monsoon Session 2006 and Question Lists of Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha-Winter Session 2006.

Table 10

Time Spent on Question Hour

Session Time Spent* (In Hrs.)

Lok Sabha Rajya Sabha

Number of

Questions

Percentage of

the total time

Number of

Questions

Percentage of

the total time

Budget Session 2006 18.48 9.65 % 19.32 10.70 %

Monsoon Session 2006 13.12 10.60 % 14.27 12.59 %

Source: Resume of work (Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha)-Budget Session 2006, Resume of work (Lok Sabha and

Rajya Sabha)-Monsoon Session 2006.

* The time spent on the question hour in the Winter Session 2006 is not given in the table as the same was not

released till the time of the preparation of this paper.

The ministry wise allocation of the questions, gives some food for thought. Particularly, it is

interesting to see how many questions are coming from the social sector ministries, which

belong to the marginalised section of the society. A ministry wise break up of questions of

major ministries is given in the Table No 3.

Table 11

Important Ministries Questions raised (Starred and Un-starred)

(Budget, Monsoon and Winter Session 2006)

Lok Sabha Rajya Sabha

Number of

Questions

Per cent of

the total

Question

Number of

Questions

Per cent of

the total

Question

Agriculture 730 5.21 % 562 4.79 %

36

Commerce & Industries 634 4.53 % 470 4.00 %

Defense 409 2.92 % 264 2.25 %

Environment & Forest 343 2.45 % 333 2.84 %

Finance 571 4.08 % 764 6.51 %

Health & Family Welfare 592 4.23 % 657 5.60 %

Human Resource & Development 346 2.47 % 797 6.79 %

Labour and Employment 246 1.75 % 232 1.97 %

Mines 115 0.8 % 91 0.7 %

Panchayati Raj 33 0.2 % 52 0.4 %

Planning 157 1.12 % 109 0.9 %

Rural Development 275 1.96 % 295 2.5 %

Social Justice & Empowerment 177 1.26 % 175 1.4 %

Tribal Affairs 75 0.5 % 139 1.1 %

Water Resources 252 1.80 % 239 2.0 %

Women & Child Development 150 1.0 % 169 1.4 %

Source: Resume of work-Rajya Sabha-Budget and Monsoon Session 2006.

Question Lists of Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha-Winter Session 2006.

Percentage is self calculation.

Number of Lok Sabha questions accessed from the Lok Sabha website www.loksabha.nic.in

A cursory reading of the questions pertaining to the social sector shows that most of

the questions were for mere statistical derivation, the information of which could have

easily been derived from the administrative channels, and the time of the question

hour could have been used in some more substantial and important issues. This could

also mean the time of the parliament which costs Rs. 26,035/- a minute, was not

properly utilised. If this could be seen from the marginalised people’s point of view,

such precious time was wasted, in which there could have been some worthy

questions of their concerns.

Some of the questions which were selected in the question lists, were on

asking information about the schemes which were already stopped way back. To cite

a few examples of these questions from the Budget Session 2006, in one of the

37

questions in Lok Sabha an inquisitive parliamentarian is asking about a scheme which

never existed39

. In another question it was asked from the minister of Agro and Rural

Industries, that “whether any scheme exist for the benefit of the rural poor so that they

do not take a bank loan” to which the minister aptly replies “there is no such scheme

operated by the Government in the Ministry of Agro and Rural Industries”40.

However, the quality of questions is more or less same in the Rajya Sabha also. A

member asks a question on education which is one of the basic development

indicators, that how much grant has been provided to the Madhya Pradesh

Government under the Operation Black Board Project for the year 2005-06, to which

the minister replies “The scheme ‘Operation Black Board’ ended in the year 2001-

02.”41 This type of questions on the one hand shows the ignorance and complete lack

of homework of our esteemed parliamentarians and on the other it also shows that this

important instrument of the Parliament is treated in a very casual manner. It should

not be overlooked that the parliamentarians get an additional allowance to keep a

personnel, who can help them in their work. In terms of the accountability point of

view, the treasury benches would be more then happy to face this kind of shabby

questions and get away without providing any substantive answers.

Though, more number of questions shows the inept use of this tool, however,

it should not be discounted that some of the members raised some very important

questions of public concern, and brought the much needed information in the public

domain. One such example is questions on Special Economic Zones (SEZ). When the

whole nation was scurrying for information on this concept, seeing the rabid pace of

its implementation, the members demanded from the government the much needed

information through the question hour.42

Similarly, one member is asking a question

on the corruption in armed forces, which considered to be a very sensitive issue.43

39

Lok Sabha, Un-starred Question No. 1541, dated 6/3/2006, asked by Manvendra Singh, answered by Prof. Saif-

Ud-Din Soz, Minister of Water Resources. 40

Lok Sabha, Un-starred Question No. 343, dated 21/2/2006, asked by Sanjay Shamrao Dhotre and Bapu Hari

Chaure, answered by Mahabir Prasad, Minister of State in the Ministry of Small Scale Industries and Agro &

Rural Industries.

41 Rajya Sabha, Un-starred Question No. 3048, dated 15/5/2006, asked by Maya Singh, answered by D.

Purandeswari, Minister of State in the Ministry of Human Resource Development.

42 Lok Sabha, Un-starred Question No. 358, dated 21/2/2006, asked by Santosh Kumar Gangwar, Karunakara G.

Reddy, Jyotiraditya Madhavrao Scindia, Tukaram Gangadhar Gadakh and Harikewal Prasad answered by Jai Ram

Ramesh, Minister of State in the Ministry of Commerce and Industries.

43 Rajya Sabha, Un-starred Question No. 2604, dated 10/5/2006, asked by Dr. Gyan Prakash Pilania, answered by

Pranab Mukherjee, Minister of Defence.

38

People’s aspirations have also been reflected in many questions, which show that the

aware members do put up questions which the people want them to raise. On one such

question, a member is asking about a large gathering of tribals and other forest

dwellers against displacement.44

In terms of the issues of marginalised, in one of the

questions the minimum wages of garbage removal workers/sweepers/scavengers was

asked.45

This is significant, as this not only tell their minimum wages, but a whole lot

of issues related to that in so many ways. Moreover, the raising of question itself

marks the presence, though in a very limited manner, of the marginalised in the

question hour.

The question hour is a good instrument provided by the Parliament to bring

the information related to the government into the public domain. Thus, the question

hour can also be termed as an instrument of transparency in the parliament. The

question hour is evolved not only for mere exchange of statistical information. It is an

important tool provided specially to the opposition and other parties in the parliament

to demand substantive and real information from the government. It can be said that

the larger objective behind the question hour is to cross check the government’s work

with people’s aspirations, and if it is find contradictory, hold the government

accountable. Thus, it is expected from the members who are raising questions to raise

questions which are of people’s importance, specially the marginalised people’s

importance. On the part of the answering ministers, it is highly expected that instead

of providing mere statistical numbers, they should put the real picture in the

Parliament. It is also urged that the information derived in the question hour should

not end there, but should usher more constructive works on social issues in favour of

the oppressed and the common man.

Conclusion

We had argued in the previous analysis of the Parliament in the Social Watch Report

that increasing contentious party politics of the country is increasingly being reflected

in the proceedings of Parliament. The parties and leaders, cutting across the entire

political spectrum, consider protestations, which go much beyond what Ambedkar

44

Rajya Sabha, Un-starred Question No. 2005, dated 10/3/2006, asked by Kalraj Mishra, answered by Namo

Narain Meena, Minister of State in the Ministry of Environment and Forest.

45 Rajya Sabha, Un-starred Question No. 988, dated 1/3/2006, asked by Penumalli madhu, answered by Chandra

Sekhar Sahu, Minister of State in the Ministry of Labour and Employment.

39

described as the grammar of anarchy, as the legitimate parliamentary activity and a

genuine and desirable extension of party politics outside the precincts of Parliament.

This is a rational political activity from their perspective and not a deviation from the

parliamentary norm. Thwarting legislative activity of Parliament for forcefully, not

necessarily persuasively, proving a point as well as projecting a militant image of a

crusader for people’s cause. For, the voters who matter understand this better than a

legislation passed.

The trend continues. Politically contentious issues, like the OoP controversy,

operations duryodhan and chakravyuh, the spat with the Speaker of the Lok Sabha,

etc. were given precedence over legislative functions of Parliament. The stalling of

the functions of the two Houses was not intended even on a single occasion to

develop a norm on any issue that created a blot on the MPs and on the sanctity of

Parliament, each one was meant to score a political point. Even if contemporary

politics creates a compulsion for protest politics in Parliament, whether this ‘grammar

of anarchy’ should continue as the first instrument of politics, deserves a countrywide

debate.

None of the nagging and contentious issues of the past were taken up for an

informed debate, even if in a partisan fashion, let alone making an effort for their

resolution. The women’s reservation bill was not placed in the Parliament. The issue

of criminalization of politics continues to be dealt with in a blatantly partisan fashion

by each of the parties. In fact, fracas in the Lok Sabha on 24 August on a remark

against Railway Minister Lalu Yadav by Janata Dal (U) member Prabhunath Singh, in

which members of the RJD and JD (U) virtually coming to blows, reflects total

contempt for norms and civility and a tendency that nourishes criminality. Unlike the

British Parliament, the two exposé did not lead to institutional norms for standards for

parliamentary behaviour. The Soren and Sidhu affairs are serious blots on

representative aspect of India’s apex legislature, though the data on tainted MPs

deserves a serious review from the caste perspective.

ANNEXURE I

THE PARLIAMENT (PREVENTION OF DISQUALIFICATION) ACT,

1959 (10 OF 1959) [4th April, 1959]

(Corrected upto Act 18 of 2000)

40

An Act to declare that certain offices of profit under the Government shall not

disqualify the holders thereof for being chosen as, or for being, members of

parliament.

BE it enacted by Parliament in the Tenth Year of the Republic of India as

follows: -

1. Short title — This Act may be called the Parliament (Prevention of

Disqualification) Act, 1959.

2. Definitions." In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, -

(a) "compensatory allowance" means any sum of money payable to the holder

of an office by way of daily allowance [such allowance not exceeding the

amount of daily allowance to which a member of Parliament is entitled

under the 1Salaries and Allowances and Pensions of Members of

Parliament Act, 1954 (30 of 1954)], any conveyance allowance, house

rent allowance or travelling allowance for the purpose of enabling him to

recoup any expenditure incurred by him in performing the functions of

that office;

(b) "Statutory body" means any corporation, committee, commission, council,

board or other body of persons, whether incorporated or not, established

by or under any law for the time being in force;

(c) "non-statutory body" means any body of persons other than a statutory

body.

3. Certain offices of profit not to disqualify. — It is hereby declared that none

of the following offices in so far as it is an office of profit under the Government

of India or the Government of any State, shall disqualify the holder thereof for

being chosen as, or for being, a member of Parliament, namely :--

(a) any office held by a Minister, Minister of State or Deputy Minister for the

Union or for any State, whether ex officio or by name; 2[(aa) the office of a Leader of the Opposition in Parliament;]

1[(ab) the office of Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission]

3[(ac) the office of each leader and each deputy leader of a recognised party

and a recognised group in either House of Parliament;]

(b) the office of Chief Whip, Deputy Chief Whip or Whip in Parliament or of

a Parliamentary Secretary; 1[(ba) the office of chairperson of (i) the National Commission for Minorities

constituted under section 3 of the National Commission for Minorities Act,

1992; (ii) the National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled

Tribes constituted under clause (1) of article 338 of the Constitution; (iii)

the National Commission for Women constituted under section 3 of the

National Commission for Women Act, 1990]

(c) the office of a member of any force raised or maintained under the

National Cadet Corps Act, 1948 (31 of 1948), the Territorial Army Act,

41

1948 (56 of 1948), or the Reserve and Auxiliary Air Forces Act, 1952 (62

of 1952);

(d) the office of a member of a Home Guard constituted under any law for the

time being in force in any State;

(e) the office of sheriff in the city of Bombay, Calcutta or Madras;

(f) the office of chairman or member of the syndicate, senate, executive

committee, council or court of a university or any other body connected

with a university;

(g) the office of a member of any delegation or mission sent outside India by

the Government , for any special purpose;

(h) the office of chairman or member of a committee (whether consisting of

one or more members), set up temporarily for the purpose of advising the

Government or any other authority in respect of any matter of public importance or

for the purpose of making an inquiry into, or collecting statistics in respect of, any

such matter, if the holder of such office is not entitled to any remuneration other than

compensatory allowance;

(i) the office of chairman, director or member of any statutory or non-statutory

body other than any such body as is referred to in clause (h), if the holder of such

office is not entitled to any remuneration other than compensatory allowance, but

excluding (i) the office of chairman of any statutory or non-statutory body specified

in Part 1 of the Schedule, and (ii) the office of chairman or secretary of any statutory

or non-statutory body specified in Part II of the Schedule.4

(j) the office of village revenue officer, whether called a lambardar, malguzar,

patel, deshmukh or by any other name, whose duty is to collect land revenue and who

is remunerated by a share of, or commission on, the amount of land revenue collected

by him, but who does not discharge any police functions.

5Explanation 1 ]. - For the purposes of this section, the office of Chairman,

Deputy Chairman or Secretary shall include every office of that description by

whatever name called.

6Explanation 2. — In clause (aa), the expression "Leader of the Opposition"

shall have the meaning assigned to it in the Salary and Allowances of Leaders of

Opposition in Parliament Act, 1977 (33 of 1977).]

4. Temporary suspension of disqualification in certain cases - If a person

being a member of parliament who immediately before the commencement of this Act

held an office of profit declared by any law repealed by this Act not to disqualify the

holder thereof for being such member, becomes so disqualified by reason of any of

the provisions contained in this Act, such office shall not, if held by such person for

any period not extending beyond a period of six months from the commencement of

this Act disqualify him for being a member of Parliament.

5. Repeals — The Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1950 (19 of

1950), the Parliament Prevention of Disqualification Act, 1951 (68 of 1951), the

Prevention of Disqualification Act, 1953 (1 of 1954), and any provision in any other

enactment which is inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed.

THE SCHEDULE [See section 3(i)]

PART 1

BODIES UNDER THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

42

Air India International Corporation established under section 3 of the Air

Corporations Act, 1953 (27 of 1953).

Air Transport Council constituted under section 30 of the Air Corporations Act, 1953

(27 of 1953).

Board of Directors of the Export Risks Insurance Corporation 7*** Limited-

Board of Directors of the Heavy Electricals 7*** Limited.

Board of Directors of the Hindustan Cables 7***Limited.

Board of Directors of the Hindustan Insecticides 7***Limited.

Board of Directors of the Hindustan Machine Tools 7***Limited.

Board of Directors of the Hindustan Shipyard Limited.

Board of Directors of 8 [Hindustan Chemicals and Fertilizers Limited)

Board of Directors of the National Coal Development Corporation (Private) Limited.

Board of Directors of the National9[Industrial] Development Corporation

10 ***

Limited.

Board of Directors of the National Instruments 10

*** Limited

Board of Directors of the National Small industries. Corporation 10

*** Limited.

Board of Directors of the Neyveii Lignite Corporation (Private) Limited.

Board of Directors of the Sindri Fertilizers and Chemicals 10

*** Limited.

Board of Directors of the State Trading Corporation of India 10

***Limited.

Central Warehousing Corporation established under section 17 of the Agricultural

Produce (Development and Warehousing) Corporations Act, 1956 (28 of 1956).

Coal Board established under section 4 of the Coal Mines (Conservation and Safety)

Act 1952 (12 of 1952)

Coal Mines Labour Housing Board constituted under section 6 of the Coal Mines

Labour Welfare Fund Act, 1947 (32 of 1947).

Commissioners for the Port of Calcuttta.

Committee for the allotment of land in the township of Gandhidham.

Company Law Advisory Commission constituted under the Section 410 of

Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956)

Cotton Textiles Fund committee constituted under the Textile Funds Ordinance, 1944

(Ord- 34 of 1944).

Dock Labour Board Bombay, established under the Bombay Dock Workers

(Regulation of Employment) Scheme, 1956 made under the Dock Workers

(Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948 (9 of 1948).

Dock Labour Board, Calcutta, established under the Calcutta Dock Workers

(Regulation of Employment) Scheme. 1956, made under the Dock Workers

(Regulation of Employment) Act. 1948 (9 of 1948)

Dock Labour Board Madras, established under the Madras Dock Workers

(Regulation of Employment) Scheme, 1956, made under the Dock Workers

(Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948 (9 of 1948).

Forward Markets Commission established under section 3 of the Forward Contracts

(Regulation) Act. 1952 (74 of 1952)

Indian Airlines Corporation established under section 3 of the Air Corporations Act.

1953 (27 of 1953).

Industrial Finance Corporation of India established under section 3 of the Industrial

Finance Corporation Act, 1948 (15 of l948)

Licensing Committee constituted under rule 10 of the Registration and Licensing of

43

Industrial Undertakings Rules, 1952, made under the Industries. (Development and

Regulation) Act, 1951 (64 of 1951)

Mining Boards constituted under section 12 of the Mines Act, 1952 (34 of 1952).

National Co-operative Development and Warehousing Board established under

section 3 of the Agricultural Produce (Development and Warehousing) Corporations

Act, 1956 (28 of 1956).

Rehabilitation Finance Administration constituted under section 3 of the

Rehabilitation Finance Administration Act, 1948 (12 of l948).

Tariff Commission established under section 3 of the Tariff Commission Act, 1951

(50 of 1951).

Trustees of the Port of Bombay.

Trustees of the Port of Madras.

Trustees or Commissioners of any major port as defined in the Indian Ports Act, 1908

(15 of 1908), other than the Port of Calcutta, Bombay or Madras.

BODIES UNDER STATE GOVERNMENTS

Andhra Pradesh

Agricultural Improvement Fund Committee constituted under section 3 of the

Hyderabad Agricultural Improvement Act, 1952.

Co-operative Agricultural and Marketing Development Fund

Committee.

Livestock purchasing Committee.

Assam

Adhi Conciliation Boards constituted under section 2A of the Assam Adhiars

Protection and Regulation Act, 1948.

Assam Evacuee Property Management Committee constituted under section 12 of the

Assam Evacuee Property Act, 1951.

Assam Text Book Committee.

Bi

har

Mining Board for Coal Mines

Text Book and Education Literature

Committee.

Bombay

Allocation Committee (Allopathic) under the Employees Slate Insurance Scheme.

Allocation Committee (Ayurvedic) under the Employees' State Insurance Scheme.

Board to conduct over-all supervision of the business and affairs of the Narsinggiriji

Mills- Sholapur.

Bombay Housing Board constituted under section 3 of the Bombay Housing Board

Act, 1948.

Bombay StateElectricity Board constituted under section 5 of the Electricity (Supply)

Act, 1948(54 of 1948).

Bombay State Electricity Consultative Council constituted under section 16 of the

44

Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (54 of 1948).

Medical Service committee under the Employees' State Insurance Scheme.

Pharmaceutical Committee under the Employees State Insurance Scheme.

Regional Transport Authority for Ahmedabad, Aurangabad, Bombay, Nagpur, Poona

Rajkot and

Thana Constituted under section 44 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of 1939).

Saurashtra Housing Board constituted under section 3 of the Saurashtra Housing

Board Act, 1954.

State Transport Authority Constituted under section 44 of the Motor Vehicles Act,

1939 (4 of 1939).

Vidarbha Housing Board Constituted under section 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Housing

Act, 1950.

Kerala

Board of Examiners appointed under rule 8 of the Travancore-Cochin Boiler

Attendants Rules, 1954.

Panel of Assessors constituted under rule 63 of the Travancore-Cochin Boiler

Attendants Rules, 1954.

Panel of Assessors constituted under the Travancore-Cochin Economiser Rules, 1956.

Madhya Pradesh

Madhya Pradesh Housing Board Constituted under section 3 of the Madhya Pradesh

Housing Board Act, 1950.

Mahakoshal Housing Board. 11

[Tamil Nadu]

Committee to select Books for Study for S.S.L.C.

Examination. Landing and Shipping Fees Committees for

Minor Ports.

Local Committee constituted under regulation 10A of the Employees' State Insurance

(General)

Regulation, 1950-

Madras Board of Transport. 12

[TamiI Nadu Electricity Board] constituted under section 5 of the Electricity

(Supply) Act, 1948 (54 of 1948).

Madras State Electricity Consultative Council constituted under section 16 of the

Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (54 of 1948).

Port Conservancy Boards

Port Trust Boards of Minor Ports.

State Board of Communications.

Text Books Committee.

13

[Karnataka]

Board of Management, Mysore Iron and Steel Works,

Bhadravathi.

Board of Management of Industrial Concerns.

45

Orissa

Appeal Committee under the Board of Secondary Education.

Orissa Board of Communications and Transport.

Regional Transport Authority Constituted under section 44 of the Motor Vehicles

Act, 1939 (4 of 1939).

State Transport Authority constituted under section 44 of the Motor Vehicles Act,

1939 (4 of 1939).

Punjab

Punjab State National Workers (Relief and Rehabilitation) Board.

Rajasthan

City Improvement Trust. Kota, Constituted under the City of Kota Improvement Act,

1946.

Excise Appellate Board, Ajmer.

Rajasthan State Electricity Board constituted under section 5 of the Electricity

(Supply) Act, 1948 (54 of 1948).

Urban Improvement Board, Jaipur.

Uttar Pradesh

Government Cement Factory Board.

Local Committees for Agra, Kanpur. Lucknow and Saharanpur appointed under

section 25 of the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 (34 of 1948)

West Bengal

Licensing Board constituted under the regulations made under rule 45 of the Indian

Electricity Rules, 1956.

West Bengal Housing Board constituted under the West Bengal Development

Corporation Act. 1954.

BODIES IN UNION TERRITORIES

Delhi Development Authority constituted under section 3 of the Delhi Development

Act, 1957 (61 of 1957).

Delhi Electricity Power Control Board constituted under section 5 of the Bombay

Electricity (Special Powers) Act, 1946, as applied to Delhi.

Delhi State Electricity Council constituted under section 16 of the Electricity

(Supply) Act, 1948 (54 of 1948)

46

Part II

BODIES UNDER THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

Advisory Commmittee for the Air-India International Corporation appointed under

section 41 of the Air Corporations Act, 1953 (27 of 1953)

Advisory Committee for the Indian Airlines Corporation Appointed under section 41

of the Air Corporations Act. 1953 (27 of 1953).

Central Silk Board constituted under section 4 of the Central Silk Board Act, 1948(61

of 1948).

Coffee Board constituted under section 4 of the Coffee Act, 1942 (7 of 1942).

Coir Board constituted under section 4 of the Coir Industry Act. 1953 (45 of 1953).

Development Council for Acids and Fertilizers established under section 6 of the

Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (65 of 1951).

Development Council for Alkalis and Allied Industries established under section 6 of

the Industries (Development and Regulation Act. 1951 (65 of 1951).

Development Council for Bicycles established under section 6 of the Industries

(Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (65 of 1951).

Development Council for Drugs, Dyes and Intermediates established under section 6

of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (65 of 1951).

Development Council for Food Processing Industries established under section 6 of

the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (65 of 1951).

Development Council for Heavy Electrical Engineering Industries established under

section 6 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. 1951 (65 of 1951)

Development Council for Internal Combustion Engines and Power Driven Pumps

established under section 6 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951

(65 of 1951).

Development Council for Light Electrical Engineering Industries established under

section 6 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. 1951 (65 of l951).

Development Council for Machine Tools established under section 6 of the Industries

(Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (65forl951).

Development Council for Non-ferrous Metals including alloys established under

section 6 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. 1951 (65 of l951).

Development Council for Oil-based and Plastic Industries established under section 6

of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (65 of 1951)

Development Council for Sugar Industry established under section 6 of the Industries

(Development and Regulation) Act, 1951(65 of 1951)

Development council for Textiles, made of artificial silk including artificial silk yarn

established under section 6 of the Industries Development and Regulation_ Act. f951

(65 of 1951).

Development Council for Textiles made of wool including woolen yarn, hosiery,

carpets and druggets established under section 6 of the Industries (Development and

Regulation) Act, 1931 (65 of 1951).

Durgah Committee, Ajmer, constituted under section 4 of the Durgah Khwaja Saheb

Act, 1955 (36 of 1955).

Indian Central Arecanut Committee.

Indian Central Coconut Committee constituted under section 4 of the Indian Coconut

47

Committee Act, 1944 (10 of 1944).

Indian Central Cotton Committee constituted under section 4 of the Indian Cotton

Cess Act, 1923 (14of 1923).

Indian Central Jute Committee.

Indian Central Oilseeds Committee Constituted under section 4 of the Indian Oilseeds

Committee Act, 1946 (9 of l946)

Indian Central Sugarcane Committee.

Indian Central Tobacco

Committee.

Indian Lac Cess Committee constituted under section 4 of the Indian Lac Cess Act

1930 (24 of 1930)

Rubber board constituted under section 4 of the Rubber Act, 1947 (24 of

1947).

Tea Board constituted under section 4 of the Tea Act- 1953 (29 of 1953)

BODIES UNDER STATE GOVERNMENTS

Andhra Pradesh

Market Committee constituted under section 4 of the Hyderabad Agricultural

Market Act No II of 1339 F.

Market Committee constituted under section 4A of the Madras Commercial

Crops Markets Act, 1933.

Bihar

Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts.

Bihar Subai Majlis Awqaf.

Bodh Gaya Temple Advisory Committee constituted under section 15 of the Bodh

Gaya Temple Act. 1949.

Bodh Gaya Temple Management Committee constituted under section 3 of the Bodh

Gaya Temple Act. 1949.

Kerala

Administration Committee for Coir Purchase Scheme,

Malabar Market Committee constituted under section 4A of the Madras Commercial

Crops Markets Act. 1933.

Tapioca Market Expansion Board.

[Tamil Nadu] 14

Area Committee for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments constituted under

section 12 of the Madras HindiuReligious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951.

Madras State Waqf Board constituted under section 9 of the Waqf Act. 1954 (29 of

1954).

Punjab

48

State Marketing Board Constituted under section 3 of the Patiala Agricultural Produce

Markets Act

PART III

15

BODY UNDER THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

[Planning Commission.] 16

Footnotes

1. Subs./Ins. by Act 54 of 1993 (w.e.f. 19.7.1993) & [Cl.(a)&(ab) w.e.f. 27.8.1993]

2. Ins. by Act 33 of 1977, s.12 (w.e.f. 1.11.1977)

3. Ins. by Act 18 of 2000

4. Subs. By Act 54 of 1993 (w.e.f. 19.7.93) [Expln. 1 w.e.f. 27.8.1993)

5. Explanation numbered as Explanation 1 thereof by Act 33 of 1977, s.12

(1.11.1977)

6. Ins. by s.12, of Act 33 of 1977 (w.e.f.1.11.1977)

7. The brackets and word “(Private)” omitted by Act 58 of 1960, s.3 and

Schedule.II.

8. Subs. By Act 58 of 1960, s.3 and Schedule II, for “Nangal Fertilizers nd Chemicals (Private) Limited”

9. Ins. By s.3 and Schedule II, ibid

10. The brackets and word “Private)” omitted by s.3 and Schedule II, ibid

11. Subs. By the Madras State (Alteration of Name) (Adaptation of Laws on Union

Subjects) Order, 1970, for “Madras” (w.e.f. 14.1.1969) 12. Subs., ibid., for “Madras State Electricity Board”. 13. Subs. By the Mysore State (Alteration of Name) (Adaptation of Laws on Union

Subjects) Order, 1974, for “Mysore” (w.e.f. 1.11.1973) 14. Subs. By the Madras State (Alteration of Name) (Adaptation of Laws on Union

Subjects) Order, 1970, for “Madras” (w.e.f. 14.1.1969) 15. Ins. By Act 20 of 1992

16. Omitted by Act 54 of 1993 (w.e.f. 19.6.93)

ANNEXURE II

THE MPs IN CASH-FOR-QUESTIONS SCANDAL

1. Narendra Kumar: Kushwaha

Constituency: Mirzapur, Uttar Pradesh

Political Party: BSP

Questions Tabled: 5

1. SSIs becoming defaulters in paying back loans when the govt. does not pay

back to them on time after buying goods for wholesale shops.

2. The steps taken for simplification of visa procedures by India for SSI owners

in Pakistan to facilitate trade between the two countries.

49

3. Details of exports of SSI products to SAARC countries and China.

4. Infrastructural facilities for handloom sector and areas covered by the IIDS for

small-scale apparel units.

5. Steps taken to promote of sericulture in J&K.

Total money paid

Rs. 55,000.

2. Lal Chandra

Constituency: Robertganj, Uttar Pradesh

Political Party: Bahujan Samaj Party

Question Tabled: 1

1. Details of exports of SSI products to SAARC countries and china

Total Money Paid

Rs. 35,000

3. Anna Saheb MK Patil

Constituency: Erandol, Maharashtra

Political Party: Bhartiya Janata Party

Question Tabled: 3

1. On the de-reservation of items for production by SSIs.

2. Scheme on the performance and credit rating of Small Scale Industries.

3. Details of exports of SSI Products to SAARC countries and China.

Total Money paid

Rs. 45,000

4. Chhattrapal Singh Lodha

Constituency: Kurda (RS) Orissa

Political Party: Bhartiya Janta Party

Questions Tabled: 4

1. Whether fresh notification issued to accord the benefits of the Target Plus

Scheme had been issued; number of applications received; reasons responsible

for keeping scheme in abeyance.

2. On the state governments faltering at making timely payments to SSIs after

buying products to be sold through their wholesale shops.

3. Contemplating implementing the single window clearance system; raise limit

of those units from Rs. 5 crore that they may continue to be covered under the

small scale.

50

4. Bio piracy of Traditional Indian Medicines.

Total money paid

Rs. 10,000

5. Y G Mahajan

Constituency: Palamau, Maharashtra

Political Party: Rashtriya Janta Dal

Question Tabled: 3

1. Whether any review model had been developed by NSIC and the time frame

for its implementation;

2. On the Geographical Landmark, Registration and Conservation Act;

3. Whether the government will permit the opening of foreign banks in small

towns.

Total Money paid

Rs. 1,10,000

6. Suresh Chandel

Constituency: Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh

Political Party: Bhartiya Janata Party

Question Tabled: 1

1. Whether The Government had taken steps to protect SSIs in the post Gatt era.

7. Ramsevak Singh

Constituency: Gwalior, Madhya Pradesh

Political Party: Indian National Congress

Questions given: 5

1. On the trade relations between India and Pakistan and other SAARC countries.

2. Steps the govt. is talking to make timely payments to SSIs to avoid them from

defaulting on loans.

3. Promotion SSIs in militancy hit areas like J&K.

4. On the benefits, schemes and facilities for welfare of SSIs in small towns

5. On the various problems facing SSIs like dereservation, lack of bank credit,

Inspector Raj.

Total money paid

Rs. 50,000

8. Pradeep Gandhi

51

Political Party: Bhartiya Janata Party

Question given: 5

1. On the SEBI inquiry into the stock market scam of 2004;

2. The rationale behind increasing the investment limit and the omission of the

word ‘tiny’ and other features from the SME bill of 2002, yet to be passed. 3. On the trade relations between India, Pakistan and other SAARC countries and

the steps taken to ease visa formalities between them.

4. The reason for allowing BCCI certain benefits and concessions which has led

the autocratic nature of the body.

5. On the rationale behind merging and grouping small industries with medium

Total money paid

Rs. 55,000

9. Chahdra Pratap Singh

Constituency: Sidhi, Madhya Pradesh

Political Party: Bhartiya Janata Party

Questions given: 5

1. The impact of VAT on the Indian Pharmaceutical industry.

2. Statistics of money coming in through the FCRA route.

3. Monitoring of health care in the private sector.

4. Status of NRI FII investors in the Indian small scale sector.

5. Status of purchase orders of the Yossarian Electro Diesel engine by the

railway ministry. Whether government is aware of the report given by the

Tom Wolfe committee in Germany resulting in the halting of the engines in

the euro rail system.

Total money paid

Rs. 35,000

10. Raja Ram Pal

Constituency: Bilhaur, Uttar Pradesh

Political Party: Bahujan Samaj Party

Questions given: 5

1. On the action taken report on the non performing assets in the economy;

2. The steps taken for simplification of visa procedures by India for SSI owners

in Pakistan to facilitate trade between the two countries.

3. On the amount of trade generated between India and Pakistan.

4. Record of trade generated within SAARC countries.

52

5. On the induction of the Yossarain elecro diesel engine of Germany and

whether govt was aware of the Tom Wolfe committee’s report resulting in halting its induction in the Euro rail system.

Total money paid

Rs. 35,000ANNEXURE III

Annexure referred to in the reply to part (d) of Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No.

1087 for reply on 2.8.2006

Amount Released (Rs. In Crore)

S. No. State 2004-05 2005-06 1 Andhra Pradesh 112 101.5

2 Arunachal Pradesh 6 6

3 Assam 43 35

4 Bihar 84.5 100.05

5 Goa 4 7

6 Gujarat 55.5 70

7 Haryana 26.5 27

8 Himachal 13 17

9 Jammu Kashmir 12 23.3

10 Karnataka 65 85

11 Kerala 21.5 39

12 Madhya Pradesh 79.5 78

13 Maharashtra 110.5 117

14 Manipur 6 6

15 Meghalaya 6 7

16 Mizoram 4 4

17 Nagaland 3 5

18 Orissa 52.5 61

19 Punjab 34 37

20 Rajasthan 66.5 71

21 Sikkim 5 4

22 Tamilnadu 117.5 103

23 Tripura 6 6

24 Uttar Pradesh 207 215.5

25 West Bengal 65.5 91.5

26 Andaman Nicobar 2 2

27 Chandigarh 4 1

28 D & N Haveli 1 3

29 Daman Diu 2 2

30 Delhi 17 17.05

31 Lakshadweep 1 2

32 Pondicherry 1 1

33 Chhatisgarh 30 32

34 Uttaranchal 18.5 16

35 Jharkhand 27.5 41

Total 1310.00 1433.90

Source: Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 1087

Government of India, Ministry of Statistics and Programme ImplementationANNEXURE IV Table 1 D

Status of assurances in Lok Sabha from 1996- 2005

Year Total Number

of Assurances

Number of

Assurances

Fulfilled

Number of

Assurances

Dropped

Total

Implemented

Balance

53

Year Total Number

of Assurances

Number of

Assurances

Fulfilled

Number of

Assurances

Dropped

Total

Implemented

Balance

1996 1696 1633 06 1639 57

1997 1388 1359 02 1361 27

1998 1228 1179 02 1181 47

1999 725 684 06 690 35

2000 1638 1552 07 1559 80

2001 1231 1131 03 1134 97

2002 1431 1322 06 1328 104

2003 1371 1140 05 1145 228

2004 671 516 04 520 379

2005 1337 368 05 373 964

Total 12716 10884 46 10930 2018

(Source: Annual Report 2005- 2006, Government of India, Ministry of Parliamentary

Affairs, New Delhi)Figure- 1 A

Status of assurances in Lok Sabha from 1996- 2005

ANNEXURE V

Table 1 E

Status of assurances in Rajya Sabha from 1996- 2005

Year Total Number

of Assurances

Number of

Assurances

Fulfilled

Number of

Assurances

Dropped

Total

Implemented

Balance

1996 738 728 -- 728 10

1997 773 753 -- 753 20

800

900

1000

1100

1200

1300

1400

1500

1600

1700

Total Numbesurances

Number of AFulfilled

Number of A

54

Year Total Number

of Assurances

Number of

Assurances

Fulfilled

Number of

Assurances

Dropped

Total

Implemented

Balance

1998 757 726 -- 726 31

1999 564 536 02 538 26

2000 1943 850 07 857 1086

2001 1082 863 05 868 214

2002 1323 1279 23 1302 21

2003 1391 1341 40 1381 10

2004 718 640 12 652 66

2005 487 293 71 364 123

Total 9776 8009 160 8169 1607

(Source: Annual Report 2005- 2006, Government of India, Ministry of Parliamentary

Affairs, New Delhi)

Figure- 1 B

Status of assurances in Rajya Sabha from 1996- 2005

(Source: Annual Report 2005- 2006, Government of India, Ministry of Parliamentary

Affairs, New Delhi) ANNEXURE VI

Table 1 F

Summery of Funds Released Under MPLADS for 2006-2007

State Lok Sabha Rajya Sabha Total Funds

1st 2

nd 1

st 2

nd Total Rs. (Crore)

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

2000

Totsurances

NumbeFulf

NumbeDropp

55

State Lok Sabha Rajya Sabha Total Funds

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Installment Installme

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No.

Nominated 2 0 4 0 6 6

Andhra Pradesh 36 4 13 2 55 55

Arunachal Pradesh 2 1 1 1 5 5

Assam 13 3 7 1 24 24

Bihar 24 1 11 4 40 40

Goa 1 0 1 0 2 2

Gujarat 18 0 5 0 23 23

Haryana 9 1 2 0 12 12

Himachal Pradesh 3 1 2 1 7 7

Jammu & Kashmir 1 0 2 0 3 3

Karnataka 16 1 8 5 30 30

Kerala 4 0 2 2 8 8

Madhya Pradesh 23 3 9 5 40 40

Maharashtra 22 0 9 1 32 32

Manipur 2 2 1 1 6 6

Meghalaya 2 1 1 0 4 4

Mizoram 1 0 1 0 2 2

Nagaland 1 0 1 0 2 2

Orissa 16 4 9 1 30 30

Punjab 11 3 6 1 21 21

Rajasthan 23 5 6 1 35 35

Sikkim 1 0 1 0 2 2

Tamil Nadu 37 5 17 4 63 63

Tripura 2 0 1 0 3 3

Uttar Pradesh 74 20 26 13 133 133

West Bengal 14 2 10 5 31 31

A&N Islands 1 0 0 0 1 1

Chandigrah 0 0 0 0 0 0

D&N Haveli 1 1 0 0 2 2

Daman&Diu 1 0 0 0 1 1

Delhi 3 0 1 1 5 5

Lakshdweep 0 0 0 0 0 0

56

State Lok Sabha Rajya Sabha Total Funds

Pondicherry 0 0 0 0 0 0

chhattisgarh 7 3 4 1 15 15

Uttaranchal 5 1 3 0 9 9

Jharkhand 9 3 2 0 14 14

Total 385 65 166 50 666 666

(Source: http://mplads.nic.in/s2006-2007_htm.htm)

National Social Watch India, Citizens’ Report on Governance and Development, New Delhi: Sage, 2007

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