The ethology of religion: the biological roots of religious behaviourIna Wunn, Constantin Klein, Patrick Urban

Keywords: Religious evolution, religious ethology, origin of religion, performative gestures, signals, ritualization

1. The biological and the cultural evolution of man

When Charles Darwin (1809-1882) published his seminal work TheOrigin of Species (1859), he was highly aware of the fact that whathad to attract the public’s attention was less therevolutionary new mindset in the field of biology, but ratherthe ensuing consequences for the hitherto existing world view,in which man was considered the crowning result of a consciousact of creation. Darwin’s subsequent publications, The Descent ofMan (1871) and The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872),conclusively dethroned man and reduced him to his naturalposition within nature. Thus, ever since the birth ofevolutionary theory, discussions have been driven by thesearch for a possible cultural evolution and the biologicalroots of human behaviour, a discussion to which every leadingevolutionary biologist has offered an opinion. The prominentevolutionary scientist Theodosius Dobzhansky (1900-1975) hasemphasised that the species Homo sapiens is distinguished byunique characteristics which afford it a special position: thedeciding driving forces behind human evolution are theirintelligence, the ability to use verbal symbols, and theinherent disposition to cultivate culture. According toDobzhansky, these characteristics, which themselves are theresult of biological processes, decisively influence thefurther biological evolution of man. Therefore, the evolutionof man must nowadays be seen as the result of a uniqueinteraction of a biological and cultural evolution. Aprecondition for such an extraordinary development was theprogress of human intelligence within its phylogeny, which

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contributed to the exceptional success of man as a species,and which ensured his survival during the extreme climaticfluctuations of the glacial and interglacial periods(Dobszhansky 1955, 320, 334). This intelligence, which isbased on a disproportionately high growth of the human brain,meant that throughout the course of evolution, human behaviourbecame less controlled by instinct; instead, studiouslyacquired and culturally transmitted behavioural patternspartly replaced the inherited, automatic behavioural process.Despite, or perhaps even because of, this dual human heritage,the biological and the cultural, man is the “geschichtliche[s]Wesen par excellence” (Mayr 1967, 448), a product ofbiological and cultural evolution, which can be characterisedby keywords such as bipedal locomotion, use of tools,augmented brain size and the command of language/understandingof symbols (ibid. 495, 496, 509).The field of biology, and especially evolutionary andbehavioural biology, has never lost sight of the decisivecultural determinacy of the species Homo sapiens, and hasdecidedly emphasised it in the course of the field’s researchregarding human behaviour (e.g. Eibl-Eibesfeldt 2004);however, from the 1920s onwards, scientists of religion, bothwithin the actual field of religious studies as well as in therelated field of social anthropology, appear to have lostsight of the biological side to man. The British socialanthropologist Victor Witter Turner (1920-1983) commentedfifty years later: “One remedy would be to seek means toovercome the overspecialization of departments and the atomismof funding. My paper indicates that a new breakthrough inanthropology depends upon a serious sustained effort by theproponents of severely segregated sub-disciplines […] torelate the best findings of their segregated years.” (Turner1977, 61-80). Such a demand, the transcendence of strictboundaries between the various academic fields, and especiallybetween the Humanities and the Sciences, has recently beenrepeated frequently by all disciplines involved in theresearch of religion, and it is habitually connected with the

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vision of embarking on a progressive and radically new path.This self-assessment however does not align with the factsfound in the history of science, because the history ofreligious research was and remained – especially in itsrenunciation of evolutionism – closely connected withscientific-biological research and tends to mirror therespective contemporary biological paradigm.

2. Historical issuesThus, the teleological-evolutionary conceptions of anascending religious development by outstanding (historical)philosophers and anthropologists such as Antoine de Condorcet(1743-1794), Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) or Edward BurnettTylor (1832-1917) are originally based on the similarlyteleological evolutionary ideas of the biologist Jean-Baptistede Lamarck (1744-1829), whilst mutatis mutandis, the founders ofmodern evolutionary theory, Charles Darwin (1809-1882) andAlfred Russell Wallace (1823-1913), owe a deciding factor oftheir theory, namely the notion of natural selection, to ahumanist: in 1798, the British theologian and nationaleconomist Robert Malthus (1766-1834) published his Essay on thePrinciple of Population and his observation of the coherence ofpopulation-growth and available resources, in which he tracedsuccessful reproduction and the survival of the filialgeneration to the available resources, especially the foodresources (Malthus [1798] 1992). As mentioned, it was Darwin who in his second great work, TheExpression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872), for the first timedirected the focus of science onto the biological roots ofhuman and animal behaviour, by exposing the prominent role ofboth the instinctive as well as conscious behaviour necessaryfor the survival of the individual. Darwin clarified thatsuccessful adaptation also implies adaptive behaviour.Subsequently, animal and human behaviour is relevant for thereconstruction of the phylogeny of organisms as well as fortheir systematics, but on the other hand it can only be

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researched successfully when approached from an evolutionarypoint of view (Darwin [1872] 1998).While Darwin’s evolutionary theory raced to success and becamethe determinant ideological paradigm, the same cannot be saidfor his behavioural-biological approach. Instead,psychological concepts asserted themselves, which aimed atreplacing the contemporary leading introspective methodologythrough scientific, i.e. experimentally traceable,methodologies. In his famous article, Psychology as the Behaviouristviews it (1913), John B. Watson (1878-1958) advocates the so-called objective methodology, which understands any behaviouras (quantifiable and predictable) reactions to internal orexternal impulses. The consequence of such a reduction ofbehaviour to an impulse-reaction-formula was the fact thatinternal psychic and mental processes were suppressed (thebrain was considered a black box), and also thatsimultaneously the possibility of inherent, i.e. geneticallyor culturally inherited behaviour was not considered (Watson1913, 158-177). Because behaviourism made it possible toresearch animal behaviour according to verifiable, i.e.laboratory, conditions and to present impressive results, theconcept that in principal every form of behaviour can betraced to either socially-conditioned impulses or to learningprocesses has been applied not only onto biological, but alsoonto social-scientific research (Hinde 1982), so that untilthe 1970s, human culture and human actions were consideredphenomena for which human biology only represented the ratherunspecific foundation of acquired reactionary patterns.Indeed, behaviourism is an uniformitarian science: byattempting to trace every kind of behaviour to indirect orimmediate impulses from any manner of natural or socialsurrounding, it only allows a selective historical point ofview regarding specific cultural phenomena. Mayr’s important,and for any human behavioural research essential, observation,that man is a historical entity par excellence (Mayr 1967,488), was thus overlooked, if not negated, by cultural andsocial sciences.

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Aside from its inherent logic of impulse and reaction,behaviourism was also obstructed from a behavioural-scientificdiscussion with religion because of the anti-religiousaffectations of its protagonists (Klein 2008, 64-66; Wulff1997, 117-146). Leading representatives of the behaviouralparadigm (John B. Watson, Frederic Skinner, George Vetter)considered a religious ideology a dangerous illusion, whichhad to be overcome. Accordingly, many behaviourists perceiveda scientific debate with religious phenomena as objectionable.John B. Watson himself for instance, with the exception ofvery few critical remarks concerning the irrationality of areligious ideology and the disempowerment and exploitation ofbelievers by the religious elite, did not concern himself anyfurther with the subject matter.1 Others such as B. FredericSkinner, the main proponent of the exploration of operantconditioning2, on the other hand published religio-criticalworks, whereby they applied the behaviourist impulse-reactionformula to religion and attempted to interpret religiousbehaviour as the result of the operant conditioning process.

Like Watson, Skinner censured religion as an ideology ofsuppression and exploitation, which he, according to his ownresearch approach, understood as misuse of operantconditioning strategies. Simultaneously however, he also tried

1 Cf. Watson’s commentary to religion in Watson (1928, 79-80), thatreligious convictions “... have long deterred us from making even a decentlogical formulation of the way thinking goes on. Throughout the ageschurchmen – all medicine men in fact – have kept the public under controlby making them believe that whatever goes on in the world which can’t beeasily observed must be mysterious, must be strong medicine, something muchmore powerful than those things which can be observed. The motive isobvious. It is the only way the medicine man can keep control. Science hasalmost had to blast its way through this wall of religious protection.”2 Operant conditioning is understood as the systematic application of reward andpunishment to advance the learning of desired behaviour in a quicker andmore enduring manner, or the unlearning of undesired mannerisms. For anoverview of Skinner’s research, cf. Skinner (1982). Skinner (2002) has alsowritten the influential novella Walden II, in which he constructed an utopiabased on the principles of operant conditioning and a society consequentlywithout religion.

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to explain the appearance of religious behaviour with themeans of operant conditioning mechanisms. In this, he reliedon experiments with doves, in which he stated to have found akind of “superstitious” behavioural pattern (Skinner 1948,168-172; Vyse 1999, 83-86).Skinner found that when doves received food in regularintervals of even 15 seconds, whilst waiting for the next foodration the doves developed very specific, generallysuperfluous and inoperable behavioural patterns, such ascircular motions along their own axis, bowing until justbefore the floor, or bumping their heads against the cagewalls next to the food inlet. The animals, who could see theimmediate “success” of their actions, repeated this behaviourwith growing frequency. Even when the provision of food at alater stage occurred independently from the newly acquiredbehaviour, they persisted over a long period of time. On thebasis of these findings, Skinner assumed that many religiousbehavioural patterns were likewise merely the result ofoperant conditioning (for instance religious expressionalbehaviour such as ritual dances, gestures of submission orself-mortification, actions which indeed demonstratesimilarities to the doves’ behaviour). According to Skinner,the conditioning, as with the doves, may have occurredinitially wholly by accident, but was later transmitted fromparents to children by means of implicit and explicit learningmechanisms. Skinner himself admits that the analogy from dovesto human is tenuous, and that because of the complex humanbehavioural repertoire, religion does not operate solely withstrategies of reward and punishment (Wagner 1987, 471-488).Nevertheless, he considered his findings of “superstitious”behaviour in doves as an important, essential step towards theunderstanding of the origins of basic religious behaviouralpatterns.

Skinner’s approach is by all means characteristic ofpsychological-behavioural attempts to explain the genesis ofreligious expressionist behaviour, as much as the critical

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objections which can be raised: the previously mentionedahistorical conception of behaviourism is immediately evident,in that Skinner jumps to conclusions regarding human behaviourbased on one contemporary animal-experiment, and also jumpsover considerable stages of human cultural development byusing conjectured events in early civilisation to explainbehaviour which is known only in comparatively young cultures,as seen from a religio-historical point of view. In addition,if one is aware of culturally specific religious development,the alleged dominance of behavioural patterns accidentallyacquired at unknown periods in human history can hardly besubstantiated.

Furthermore, a deficit of appropriate understanding ofreligion is evident, which is a common occurrence amongstproponents of scientific disciplines which, unlike religiousstudies or theology, do not contend with religious phenomena:frequently, within the framework of such perspectives at aconsiderable distance of religion, the genesis and thehistorical persistence of religion are attributed to very fewprinciples – in this case operant conditioning – which entailsthe radical neglect of the wide variety of religiousexperience and behaviour. The considerable complexity of thevarious forms of religiousness is immediately apparent toeveryone who deals with religion in any manner of detail, andthis complexity can hardly be traced to one or severalstipulated behavioural patterns.3 With a view to the differentfacets and dimensions of religiousness, we can quickly findsome examples, for which operant conditioning cannot beconsidered the founding factor: the religious experience forinstance can hardly be an acquired one (not even by accident),3 This complexity of religious forms of experience and behaviouralmannerisms is familiar to all religious scientists, and is expressed in themanifold phenomenological attempts to prove a common structure of religionswith the means of identifying their dimensions. The designs by Charles Y.Glocks (1962, 98-110) and Ninian Smarts (1996) are exemplary, as well asthe diverse attempts to confirm empirically the various dimensions ofreligion; for an overview, cf. Huber (1996, 81-192), Klein (2008, 122-124),and Pollack 1995, 163-190).

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but rather draws its overwhelming and even unsettlingcharacter from its difference to all other previousexperiences, and necessitates that new interpretations must beacquired.4 Similarly, belief in religious ideologies generallynot only presumes adherence to acquired contents of faith, butalso a continuously updated and updateable perception ofevidence, which entails that the religious teachings acquiredin the course of socialisation are not rejected in the processof forming one’s own ideology, but rather retained, wherebyadmittedly this usually occurs in an individually modifiedform.5

Considering the above-mentioned criticism, Skinner’s theoryregarding the origins of religion as based on random operantconditioning can only with difficulty be used as explanationfor the origins of religious behaviour. Behaviourism’sstrengths rather lie in the explanation of the transmission ofreligious teachings and practices from the parents to theirchildren’s generation, whose learning process in childhood isstill strongly based on operant conditioning mechanisms(Malony 1995, 378-396). These short remarks will suffice toillustrate why behavioural perspectives can only contributemarginally to our understanding of religious behaviour.

Doubts regarding the pertinence of the behavioural approachfor the investigation of religious behaviour have arisen earlyon, when the renowned philologist Karl Meuli (1891-1968)realised that the sacrificial behaviour of different cultures,such as ancient Greece, Imperial Rome, recent foraging

4 The various qualities of religious experience have been describedexpressively in the classical works of religious research, for instanceJames ([1902] 1997), furthermore Otto ([1917] 1997). For an overview of therecent discussion, cf. Proudfoot (2009).5 The processes of building religious identity are presented most clearlyin studies which employ a combination of quantitative and qualitativeempirical methods, in order to research in detail those processes ofbuilding identity and transformation which differ from the majority ofbiographical developments; cf. Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1997), Streib etal. (2009).

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societies and possibly also pre-historic hunting societies, isinherently consistent in deciding factors, despite theirwidely different social organisations, economic basis andnatural surroundings. This observation of course could not bebrought into line with the contemporary ruling scientificparadigm of socially-steered behaviour. Consequentially, Meulicame to the conclusion that the Greek sacrificial customs hehad been researching must be based on an inherited behaviouralpattern, which has been handed down from pre-historic culturesinto Antiquity and from there into contemporary culturalcontexts (Meuli 1946, 185-288). According to Meuli, humanbehaviour on the one hand is inherited through thegenerations, thus evolving in a cultural context, so that onecan speak of a cultural evolution of human behaviour with fullconfidence; on the other hand, however, human behaviour canalso be traced to certain universal factors, which could bepart of the biological human inheritance (Wunn 2006, 293-297).This historical view, without which a behavioural-biologicalview of man is not possible, was admittedly not fundamentallynew in the German-speaking field of humanities of Meuli’stime. Already Hermann Usener (1834-1905), an extraordinaryexponent of philological research in the 19th century, hadfollowed an approach that forced open the boundaries of hisoriginal field of expertise, by tracing the origins ofreligion to awe-inspiring forces of nature such as thunder andlighting, which draw their terror-inducing potential fromtheir inexplicable appearance. By naming these phenomena, thehuman intellect could reign them in, they could be partiallyexplained and man could conquer his fear. Only at a laterstage were the now named phenomena anthropomorphised, and thustransformed to gods and goddesses of Antiquity (Usener 1896).Usener’s ideas about the origins of religion from fear, whichcan by characterised by the phrase “vom Begreifen zumBegriff”, found a welcome reception in the religio-scientifically relevant works of the art historian and founderof cultural studies, Aby Warburg (2010). In the course of hisresearch of inscrutable motifs in the artworks of the Italian

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renaissance, Warburg had originally focused on the origins ofthese prominent pictoral elements, and then followed theirpath through the European and Oriental history of arts andhumanities, and had charted their development in the course ofhistoric changes. Aside from this “historische Psychologie desmenschlichen Ausdrucks” (Böhme 1997, 145), which Warburgunderstood as the historical development of body-relatedexpressions as a consequence of the interference of“Affektenergien” and cultural patterns of assimilation,visible especially in the iconography of religious art,Warburg focused on another, ostensibly non-historicalphenomenon: the appearance of “Universalien”. Drawing onUsener and Darwin’s The Expressions of the Emotions…, Warburgunderstood fear not only as the cause of religion, but also asthe catalyst of all cultural achievements. According toWarburg, man finds himself in a chaotic world in whichincomprehensible phenomena inspire fear. Man reacts to thisfear in a cultural manner, “mit entsprechenden semiotischenAusformungen”, which take the form of fetish, totem, symbol,picture or sign. A visible result of this cultural andpsychological dealing with fear is the structural counterpartof symbolic metaphorical language of the different cultures,which cannot be brought into any manner of relationship,neither historically nor geographically. Warburg hassubstantiated these conceptions in his famous, originallyprivate lecture paper, “Schlangenritual”, in which he provesthe existence of comparable cultic habits involving snakes inthe most disparate cultures from New-Mexico to ancient Hellas(the Dionysius and Asclepius cults) (Warburg 1996). Throughthis, based on Darwin, Warburg succeeded in firstly posing thedeciding questions of ethological research and subsequentlyanswering them, namely: are there universals of humancultural, or religious, behaviour, and are they possiblyinherited (genetically secured)? Why does one certainbehaviour appear, and is it in any manner adaptive? How doesthis behaviour, or its representation in art, change in theprocess of cultural evolution?

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3. Ethology – a position-reckoningThe questions raised by Warburg around the penultimate turn ofthe century are now answered by the field of human ethology,by which we understand the biological study of human behaviourunder the premise that the behaviour of man and hisphysiological substructure are acquired in an adaptiveevolutionary process, and should accordingly be studiedpertaining to this evolutionary process (Eibl-Eibesfeldt2004). Ethology in general defines itself against similar, andoften inseparable disciplines (Tinbergen 1951; Tomasello 2003)such as ecology, physiology, socio-biology and evolutionarypsychology, through its exceptional research questions, inwhich aside from the search for the immediate cause of theperceived behaviour and its development, the additionalquestions regarding the function and evolution of therespective behaviour are asked. These so-called “four whys” –“questions concerning immediate causation, development,function and evolution”( Hinde 1982, 19-21; quote 21) – definethe parameters of ethological research.

In practice, human ethology is concerned with:- The behaviour of new-borns, which cannot be traced back

to any previous experience and therefore must beconsidered as inherent;

- With inherent realisations, which allow man to recognisecertain patterns, sign stimuli and releasing mechanisms,without any previous experience;

- The investigation into child development;- The search for universals through comparative culture

studies; - The search for the phylogenetic roots of human behaviour,

by means of the comparison between man and anthropoidapes.

In this, human ethology as independent discipline is notwithout its controversy in the fields of social science andbiology. Especially a view of nature teaches the important

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differences between the various species not only inphysiological, but also ethological respect, so that theirrespective behaviour cannot be compared directly, i.e. wecannot infer the same causes for similar behaviour. Althoughthe simple statement that animal behaviour is governed byinstinct, while human behaviour is determined largely throughcultural factors, cannot be maintained in its currentacerbity, because nowadays we have learnt much about thevariety of cultural behaviour amongst animals, neverthelessthe large variety and discrepancy of human culture on the onehand and animal species on the other raises the question,whose and which behaviour can expediently be compared andstudied.6 A sensible option for the biological study of humanbehaviour has emerged in the form of an ethologicalmethodology, with its sharpened techniques of observation anddescription as well as its categories, which meanwhile havetransgressed and are now being used in related disciplinessuch as anthropology and psychology. In addition, thecomparison between human and animal actors can indeed beexpedient even if there are different mechanisms at play.

3.1. Development of rituals

The human ethologist Irenäus Eibl-Eisenfeldt (*1928)successfully recorded analogies in human and animal salutationrituals, which were able to supply important conclusionsregarding the origins and relevance of such salutation rituals(Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1979, 231-236). Not only in connection withsalutations, but also in the course of daily life, man andanimal encounter situations in which opposing instincts areactivated by various mechanisms. The possibly geneticallydetermined sequences of events thus lose their originalfunctions and transform into “rein symbolischeZeremonien”( Lorenz 1963, 62), to which, depending on thecircumstances, new meanings are assigned. Ever since the

6 Some scholars have expressed their disapproval, e.g. Harré and Secord(1972).

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corresponding analyses of the evolutionary biologist JulianHuxley, such a process is referred to, in conscious imitationof human behaviour, as ritualization (ibid. 62-63). Thus,behavioural biology equates phylogenetic processes, which leadto the development of genetically fixated behaviouralpatterns, with those culture-historical actions which lead tothe development of human rituals,7 and consequently draws aparallel between human and animal behaviour. Furthermore, byway of the concept of ritual, this equation creates arelationship with an elementary part of religious life.8

However, Lorenz unambiguously points to the crucialdifference: while for the animal, ritual behaviour is largelyretained genetically, man passes rituals through thegenerations by means of tradition and teaching. The decidingelement here is habit, which with “ihrem zähem Festhalten desbereits Erworbenen eine ähnliche Rolle [spielt], wie sie derErbmasse bei der stammesgeschichtlichen Entstehung von Ritenzukommt“ (Lorenz [1963] 1998, 72) . Habit, i.e. traditionallyinherited behaviour, is of great importance for man andanimal, as according to Lorenz, it is considered a mechanismessential for the survival of the species. It must beprofitable for any living being to retain a certain behaviour,which has continuously proven successful and simultaneouslyriskless. Breaking through accustomed habits is consequentlyviewed as alarming and disconcerting. The same applies toculturally transmitted traditions, in which case accustomedbehaviour is not self-taught, but taught by the parent-generation, often without any explanations regarding thebehavioural conventions. The connection with the field ofreligion, so Lorenz, occurs because “die ueberhöhte Vater-7 For a discussion of the term ritual, cf. Gladigow 1983, 97-102).8 The combination of ritual and religion is based on the observations ofWilliam Robertson Smith, in that the rite sits at the centre of everyreligion. Temporarily at least, religion could be defined by means of itsrites: consequently, religion was everything that included rites. Cf.Sundermeier ( 1997, 259). Nowadays, it has been confirmed that the equationis not possible: ritualisation is evident in the most dissimilar contextsin human daily life and is not necessarily always related to theirreligion. Cf. here Rothenbuhler (1998).

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Figur des Gesetzgebers durch zeitliche und mythische Ferneeine Apotheose [erfährt], die alle von ihm stammendeVorschriften als göttlich und den Verstoß gegen sie als Sündeerscheinen lässt.“(Ibid. 76). Because of the importance ofcustom for human behaviour, and a biologically groundedpreference for the development of rituals, Lorenz posits thatthe formation of respective characteristic rituals must havestood at the origins of any culture. The achievements of suchformations of rituals, which through the development of safecustoms initially served to avoid dangerous situations and, byinference, fear, consequently reach beyond their originalintentions – just like the biological rituals. The ritualpossibly receives a wholly novel function within a culturalsociety: it serves the communication between members of thegroup. Just as in the biological ritual, aggression isdirected along harmless channels, members of the grouprecognise each other, misunderstanding in communication isavoided (Ibid. 81-83). The formation of cultural rituals thusacquires species-preserving and stabilising functions from abiological point of view, and simultaneously leads to thedevelopment of different cultures with their own religiouscustoms.

In similar manner, Eibl-Eibesfeldt traces the culturalevolution back to the biology of man. In the course ofphylogeny, the opportunity of rapid acclimatisation hasconsistently proven advantageous, so Eibl-Eibesfeldt; such anachievement is facilitated by certain structures within thecentral nerve system, which make it possible, “individuelleErfahrungen als Eneagramme abrufbar zu speichern, so dasskuenftiges Verhalten aufgrund dieser Erfahrungen neuausgerichtet werden kann.” (Eibl-Eibesfeldt [1984] 1997, 31;Gazzaniga and Heatherton 2006, 250) With the development ofthe faculty of learning, completely novel fields open widelyfor evolution, especially regarding behaviour. While initiallyeach individual learns through its own experience, the mostintelligent species developed the tendency to orientate

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oneself on a given role model, and to copy his behaviour.Certain behavioural mannerisms are thus passed down fromgeneration to generation and form a group specificdistinguishing feature. Although such a proto-culturalbehaviour necessitates that the learning process is dependenton an example, the faculty of speech has allowed anindependent transmission of content. Meanwhile, man is able topreserve his knowledge in writing, and thus renders itinstantly retrievable for centuries. Parallel to the culturalevolution a new stage is reached, insofar as culturallytransmitted knowledge can lead “eine von den Erfindernweitgehend unabhaengige Existenz.”( (Eibl-Eibesfeldt [1984]1997, 32). Not only technical knowledge and scientificachievements, but also religions can be distributed worldwide,without being bound to the conditions of their origins. Inthis, the development of cognition is a process, which largelycorresponds with the natural selection of the organic world.Religious hypothesis also have to prove themselves incompetition with other. Therefore, the cultural, including thereligious, evolution is in no manner the result of designedreason, but rather the result of a selection process which isdirected “nicht vom Verstand, sondern vom Erfolg.” (Ibid.33).Culture as the whole of transmitted adaptation is theresult of an open process, which is governed by a selectivepressure to conform. Conscious changes in cultural developmentare nevertheless possible, if the desired goals initiate thesearch for a better world. New intellectual concepts,ideologies or even religions can thus lead to a culturalsegregation and subsequently to extraordinary developments,which could in turn initiate another biological isolation andtherefore a genetic change.9

9 The reference to religions is lacking in Eibl-Eisenfeldt, and wasincluded here. One of the most prominent, and simultaneously mostcontroversial, fields of research for the effects of religious demarcationon biological isolation and thus the gene pool is the discussion led byAmerican and Jewish researchers regarding the distribution of certainhereditary diseases amongst (not only) Jewish groups; cf. Goodman, andMotulusky 1979). The most recent heated discussion about respective studiesare concerned with the theory promoted by Cochran, Hardy and Harpending

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3.2. Human ethology and its constantsThe ritual, which has been created out of the basic human needfor ritualisation and which constantly recreates, is adefined, structured cycle of complementing, expressive verbaland performative elements with the same content, the smallestelement of which is the symbol (van Gennep 1909; Turner 1970).This symbol can either be verbal (a structured order of wordssuch as prayers or mantras), or semantic. Many of suchsemantic symbols demonstrate astounding similarities whencompared cross-culturally. Therefore, they are a universalelement of human behaviour, which is ultimately traced back tothe cognitive categories common to all humans. Thus, cognitiveachievements ultimately are based upon the adaptive activityof neurons and neuron ensembles, in order to ensure theindividual’s orientation in any given environment, as well ashis successful reproduction. Although admittedly cognition isalso an interpretive process and therefore partially theresult of early ontogenetic processes of learning (Streri andGentax 2003, 11; Lewkowicz 2000, 281), there evidently are,aside from those cognitive categories acquired in a culturalcontext, those which are inherent in man and whose relevancefor religious behaviour therefore cannot be underestimated.

Belonging to them for example is colour perception, which,pertaining to the base colours red, white and black, ispervasive in all humans (compare here Turner’s study about thecolour symbolism in the Ndembu-rituals! Ungerer and Schmid1996, 1-19; Turner 1967, 48-58). However, they also includethe perception of dangerous objects and the ensuinginstinctive, thus inherent and automated, reaction, whichincludes not only a certain behaviour, but also an emotivecolouration. As example one could name a series of mimeticexpressions such as a calming smile, a threatening stare or(2005, 659-693), according to whom Jews have a higher prevalence forcertain genetic diseases as well as a predisposition for higherintelligence; cf. also Jütte (2011, 113-124), and Lynn and Longley (2006,541-547).

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teeth-baring as the ritualised threat of imminent biting; butit is also important to refer to certain bodily positions suchas the ritualised threat of sexual intercourse by means ofpresenting the erect penis, the obscene and thereforedeterring presentation of the female gentiles, and therejecting, extended hand. Such gestures demonstrate aggressiveand hostile behaviour, and are intended to scare off anythreats. This intention is also achieved when the respectivesignals are not emitted by humans anymore, but by an object,i.e. an artistic or cultic artefact Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1997;Eibl-Eibesfeldt and Sütterlin 1992). Aside from the deterring signals, there are also those with asoothing and calming effect. Here especially one can list thedemonstration of the female breast and the presentation ofone’s (especially, but not only the female) rump as aritualised invitation for pairing. It is considered especiallyeffective when aggressive and calming signals are combined.While the phallic treat is traditionally directed against aspecific enemy or invader, in the course of phylogeneticdevelopment it serves as a general defence mechanism againstall evil. In this, the danger-averting gesture, which hasartfully been presented in an object, completes itsanthropomorphosis. This is evident not only in ethnologicalexamples, but also in earliest religious history (Wunn 2009,293-303). Universals in human behaviour, the so-called human-ethological constants, are therefore ultimately traceable backto neuronal engrams, which provide the basis for an automatedrecognition and formulation of messages for the purpose ofsafe, non-verbal, communication. In the course of bothcultural and biological ritualisation, these performativegestures have merged into expressive symbols useful inritualistic contexts, and respectively were used in the formof religious objects for the purpose of averting danger andchannelling threatening powers.

3.3. From the anthropological constants to signs and patterns

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According to Aby Warburg, the driving force of any kind ofcultural output, and especially during the origins of anyreligion, is fear, more precisely the fear as a necessarymental configuration in the fight for survival. Without fearthere cannot be flight and precaution, without flight andprecaution there cannot by escape and survival. Fear is notcreated only in a specific situation, but it consistentlyovershadows human existence, at least since the point in timefrom which man had realised the constant threat against hisfragile existence (Warburg 1938-39, 22-292; Eibl-Eibesfeldt,and Sütterlin 1992).10 The above-mentioned protection anddefence symbols help to avert this threat, and subsequently ofcourse those objects onto which the symbols have been affixedand which thus themselves take on a defensive function. Whileit is comparatively straightforward to interpret thesedefensive symbols in their original form, given a backgroundknowledge of the ethological sign-repertoire, their analysisis rendered more difficult if they have experienced change inthe course of the cultural evolution, during which theirappearance can have changed so dramatically that the originalmotif can only be reconstructed if the intermediate stages areevident and interpretable. However, such a cultural and art-historical metamorphosis appears to follow certainregulations, which are researched by the so-called field ofculture ethology. Accordingly, originally life-like orstylised motifs become signs, which in turn become patterns(Koenig 1970 and 1975). An example: at the beginning of the20th century, the ethnologist Karl von den Steinen created10 Similarly, the psychological “Terror-Management-Theory” (TMT; cf.Greenberg, Pyszczynski & Solomon, 1991) postulates that fear in the senseof existential insecurity causes the development of any worldview, inreference to the philosopher Ernest Becker (1973). Especially when peoplelive through situations in which they are reminded of their own mortality(“mortality salience”), according to TMT they strongly feel the urge toensure themselves of their own worldview, or to defend it more strongly(“worldview defense”). Although the results of the empirical researchtowards TMT are still being discussed, a substantive literary corpus hasestablished itself which reports the majority of the findings: cf.Greenberg, Solomon and Pyszczynski (1997, pp. 61-139); Jonas and Fischer(2006).

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considerable furore in the academic world with a notablepublication about the meanings behind the tattoos of theinhabitants of the Marques-island. An analysis of thecomplicated and intricate patterns resulted in the realisationthat the allegedly purely decorative patterns were ultimatelyderived from depictions of sculls. The optical dominance ofthese frequently modified and heraldically skeletonised scull-patterns was a consequence of the immense social relevance ofthe elaborate funerary rites in the society of theMarquesians, the subsequent adoration of the deceased and theartistic treatment and symbolisation of such important eventsin religious and social life. Patterns and embellishmentsfound on Mediterranean fishing boats can be interpreted in asimilar manner, as they ultimately emerged to representstylised depictions of eyes. The origin of this pattern wasthe depiction of the familiar “starring eye” which isattributed with danger-averting properties (von den Steinen1928, Koenig 1970). Thus, the artistic presentation ofsemantic signs experiences its own evolution according tospecific rules, which can easily be characterised by thephrase “from sign to pattern”; in addition, performativeethological signs with a signalling character, and theircomposition, go through a similar process of change. However,this means that rituals are also subject to change, which canbe characterised appropriately by the phrase “evolution ofreligious behaviour”.

3.4. Aggression, territoriality and Egotism of the GeneBefore we address the cultural/religious evolution and itsinherent mechanisms, i.e. the evolutionary factors aselementary paradigm of any ethological point of view (Cf.below, point 3.5. The evolution of religious behaviour), it isnecessary to consider in more detail the issue ofintraspecific aggression, which has been defined by KonradLorenz ([1963] 1998, 30) as the drive to fight fellow membersof one’s group, in both man and animal. According to Lorenz,from an evolutionary biologist’s point of view, this

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intraspecific aggression serves an important purpose: duringthe period of choosing one’s sexual partners, fighting betweenrivals leads to the reproduction of the stronger individual,who consequently rears his own, strong, offspring, and cansuccessfully defend them against any aggressors. Fighting forhome territory ensures a sufficient supply of food resourcesfor the offspring, and in turn leads to an even distributionof fellow, con-specific members of the tribe across a suitablenatural habitat. In order to redirect the negativeconsequences of such aggression, understood as positive froman evolutionary point of view, into harmless channels, anumber of mechanisms have developed in the course ofevolution, which are understood to prevent serious injury ordeath. According to Lorenz, therefore, the aggression whichserves to ensure the survival of the species can be retained,without them being weakened through the loss of con-specificmembers (Ibid. 112-137). A deciding factor, so Lorenz, is theunderstanding that the aggression as well as the inherentrestraint of actual killing, which Lorenz refers to as morallyanalogue behaviour, serve the well-being, or more specificallythe survival of the species (Ibid. 87). Eibl-Eibesfeldt [1970]1976), in his book Liebe und Hass, remarks upon a similar effectregarding human aggressive behaviour. Doubts concerning theaccuracy of this approach have surfaced following theobservation that members of the same species have resorted tointer-tribal murder, especially infanticide; this observationcannot be conciliated with the above-mentioned concept ofoptimising diametrically opposed instincts which serve thesurvival of the species. Rather, aggressive behaviour isespecially visible not when there is an advantage for thespecies as a whole or for the individual, but where theadvantage lies for one’s own genetic inheritance. These, andsimilar observations have prompted the evolutionary biologistRichard Dawkins (*1941) to advocate the theory of the egoisticgene (Dawkins 1976). Accordingly, the genes are the drivingpower behind the evolution, because each one strives toreproduce as often and as successfully as possible. In order

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to achieve this, the gene is dependent on his carrier, theindividual, which in the course of evolution has adapteditself so that it can succeed in its responsibility of passingon the genetic material. According to Dawkins, thecontemporary amplitude of kinds and groups exists becausethese so-called “egoistic genes” have created highly differentcarriers, in order to reproduce successfully. The egotism ofthe gene, as Karl Bratzler summarises Dawkins’s theory, “wirdgewoehnlich egoistisches Verhalten des Individuums hervorrufen(Bratzler 1984, 77). However, the undisputed egotism of thegene will not necessarily manifest itself in aggressivebehaviour against members of the same species: the majority ofspecies, whether animals or plants, reproduce sexually,whereby the genetic pool of both the father and mother iscombined. Seen from an evolutionary perspective, this methodhas the advantage that the genetic material from differentindividuals can be combined and consequently generateindividuals with advance, i.e. optimally adaptedcharacteristics (Remane, Storch, Welsch 1978, 205-222). Forsexual reproduction, however, suitable partners are necessary,which means that the egotism of the gene, which manifests inaggressive behaviour against a member of the same species andpossible partner, must be suppressed, at least temporarily forthe duration of pairing.11 In the course of the evolution,several successful strategies have emerged in the animalworld, one of which is ritualisation.12 Furthermore, amongstanimals living together socially, to which we count homosapiens, survival strategies have emerged which in the field ofbiology are described succinctly as general fitness. This

11 Cf. Wickler, W., Die Biologie der Zehn Gebote, R. Piper & Co. Verlag, Munich1977 (1971), pp.95-100.12 In the course of evolution, several strategies have emerged in the animalkingdom, of which an extreme can be found amongst several kinds of spiders,who following the successful copulation immediately devour their partner ifthey can get hold of him. The same female spider, however, demonstratesaltruistic behaviour by offering herself as nourishment for her hatchedoffspring. In this, she affords her spider-babies an optimal start intolife, i.e. adhering to the egotism of the gene, they have done everythingpossible to pass on their genetic material.

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means that individuals demonstrate possibly altruisticbehaviour, in order to increase the level of fitness amongstthe group as a whole. Ultimately, however, such altruisticbehaviour was observed only amongst closely relatedindividuals, and thus could be traced back to the egotism ofthe gene. Social creatures are thus genetically modified bythe natural selection, influencing their social behaviour sothat the transmission of their genetic material is optimised,regardless of whether this behaviour has negative consequencesfor the individual himself. The doyen of evolutionary biology,Ernst Mayr, can therefore justifiably pronounce the existenceof a selection benefitting an altruism directed at theiroverall aptitude amongst all social animals, and thereforealso amongst the higher primates (Mayr [1988] 1991, 100).Irrespectively of the question in how far diametricallyopposed dispositions towards altruism superimpose on thenatural and necessary aggressive drive of humans (in thecompetition for natural resources and sexual partners),Dawkins’s theory of the egoistic gene makes it clear thataggression is a strong driving force of human behaviour, andthat ritualised behavioural mannerisms are necessary in humangroups, in order to channel any diametrically opposed, tribalneeds into socially acceptable pathways. These rituals thusbelong to group-specific traditional behavioural mannerisms,which in the framework of the cultural evolution canultimately drive forwards a development independent of itsoriginal intentions.

3.5. The evolution of religious behaviourEthology, including human ethology, belongs to the lifesciences, and by asking questions about the function and theevolution of certain behavioural mannerisms is closelyconnected with evolutionary biology and consequently with theevolutionistic formation of theories. Because nowadays thecultural evolution (of which the religious evolutionconstitutes a notable part) plays the deciding role in humanevolution, the quest for the “four whys”, namely “causation,

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development, function and evolution” (Hinde 1982, 29-21. Quote21) , is entirely justified within the field of religiousethology. Aside from the above-mentioned biologists, theAmerican psychologist Donald T. Campbell was one of the firstto address the religious evolution, focussing expressively onthe aggression between members of the same species and theafore-mentioned morally analogue behaviour of many animals.Campbell has discussed this topic expansively, based on thestate of contemporary knowledge and research, which in the1960s still afforded a certain amount of attention to thequestion of the altruistic gene, which has nowadays beenshelved comprehensively (Campbell 1966, 180). Simultaneously,however, the issue of group selection is mentioned, which inour contemporary research has achieved greatest importance inregards to the development of morally analogue behaviour. Inthis, Campbell understands religion to constitute a cross-generational, tested recipe to regulate human interactions,because religion succeeds in cultivating altruisticpredispositions and in suppressing the egotistical. From abiological point of view, if successful reproduction of theindividual is influenced in a positive manner by egotism, andthus results in natural selection, the success of societies asa whole must fail. Only if the individual can successfullyrepress his egotistical aptitude and demonstrates altruisticbehaviour, a society can prosper. Under these circumstances,religions rise to prominence as they have established a systemof values and norms which can successfully be used to suppressthe biologically inherited, egotistical human behaviour, andinstead enables the group to prove itself in competition withothers. Cultures in which the religions play a decisive roleby steering behaviour therefore replace the individual inhuman evolution. The different cultures with their respectivereligions evolve, and are subject to the same evolutionarymechanisms as nature (Ibid. 169). In this, Campbell describes the evolution of religiousbehaviour as the continuation of the biological evolution. Theevolving unit, so Campbell, is a sufficiently isolated culture

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with its own specific religion, and no longer the biologicalspecies. Cultural properties, including religion, serve theirpurpose of pseudo speciation.13 Meanwhile, roughly 50 yearsafter Campbell, the evolutionary approach has moved into thefield of religious studies, and is discussed extensively(Voland and Schiefenhövel 2009). Despite numerous promisingapproaches, however, the quintessential questions concerningthe evolving unit as well as the evolutionary factors are nottreated, and apparently their import has not been realised.Our own basic approach to the evolution of religion, based onscientific theory, which has indentified the taxon “religion”as an evolving unit and has named and discussed the relatedevolutionary factors, remains an exception in the field, andhas rarely been criticized or even developed further, perhapsbecause of its scientific terminology (Wunn 2005, 131-146;Wunn 2003, 387-415).

4. Replacing the conclusion: religio-ethological designsEven if religious ethology has barely been perceived as anindependent sub-discipline of religious studies, and even ifits precise standing within the theory of science more or lessremained a desideratum, the last three decades have seen thepublication of partially ground-breaking works based on theobservations of religious ethology, which have opened up newperspectives and possibilities for religious studies,anthropology, and even archaeology (Wunn 2005). At this pointwe recall that, according to Aby Warburg (Meuli 1946, 185-288,reprinted in Meuli 1975, 907-1921), the philologist Karl Meuliwas one of the first to expressively base himself on theobservations of human ethology (a discipline which barelyexisted during his times), in his attempts to trace ritualsand other activities within the spectrum of religiousbehaviour back to their perceived biological origins. Severalbasic elements of religious practice and thought, especiallythe sacrificial cult, were considered as having been inherited

13 An extensive discussion and critique of Campbell’s design can be found inWunn(2004).

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by one’s ancestors, and were understood to have contributed tothe survival of the individual and the group in dangeroussituations. While Meuli saw the origins of religion inspecific survival strategies, the anthropologist Marvin Harris(1927-2001) interprets religious behaviour as the result ofculture conforming to its specific ecological niche, as aprocess of adaptation (Harris 1975). In this context, theappearance of transitional rituals, especially the initiationof male youths, can be traced back to its biological roots.Harris expounds that a prolonged nursing period is necessaryespecially in societies lacking protein in their diets.However, this in turn leads to a postnatal celibacy, whichcauses polygyny and households consisting of mother and childonly. Within such households, amplified by the prolongednursing, mother and child develop a highly intenserelationship, ultimately abrogating the boundaries of sexualidentity. Strict male initiation ceremonies are necessary tobreak through the prebuscent identity and to enable a lateridentification with fathers and other men. A similar approachis evident in the works of Roy Rappaport (1926-1997). Hissensational book, Pigs for the Ancestors, is a classical case studyof tribal society and focuses on the role of the ritual in thelocal and regional (ecological-ethological) management ofresources. In this context, Rappaport describes the role of areligious ceremony amongst the Tsembaga, a group of so-calledearly tillers in New Guinea. Rappaport was able to observethat the Tsembaga execute a ritual after military expeditions,in the course of which a large number of pigs are slaughtered,in order to sacrifice the meat to their ancestors. AsRappaport discovered, this ritual was connected to theecological relationship between men, pigs, the local foodsupply, and warfare. Wars, and the ensuing ritual, always tookplace when the number of pigs had reached a certain level.Thus, pigs were slaughtered once the resources to sustain thepigs reached their limits and a rise in numbers would havedamaged the natural environment (the danger of degeneration).Even warfare itself had its firm place in the ecological

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relationship between men, pigs, and the local food supply, andeven within the inter-social relationships, as the intendedmilitary expeditions required the search for allies amongstneighbouring villages; furthermore, this social expeditionentailed invitations to the sacrificial rituals and generouscatering for the guests (Rappaport 1999). Aside from the afore-mentioned publications, a number of worksof various quality have been published in the recent years, inwhich it was attempted to trace religion back to itsbiological roots (see bibliography), and to demonstrate in howmany different ways religious human behaviour is connected tohis biology. However, an essential point addressed in thiswork should be reiterated and emphasised: religiousethological approaches on the one hand denote the search foruniversals, the inherent and possibly genetically fixeddispositions which govern human religious behaviour. On theother hand, the absolute connection of ethology with anevolutionistic approach requires that the historicity ofcertain behavioural mannerisms must remain the focal point ofany research question within the field of religious ethology.

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