The Buddhist Permutations of Consciousness

Religions of South Asia 8.1 (2014) 53-81 ISSN (print) 1751-2689doi:10.1558/rosa.v8i1.53 ISSN (online) 1751-2697

© Equinox Publishing Ltd 2014, Office 415, The Workstation, 15 Paternoster Row, Sheffield S1 2BX.

The Buddhist Permutations of Consciousness

TadeuSz SkoruPSkI1

SoaS, university of LondonLondon WC1H 0XG

[email protected]

ABSTRACT: This article offers a broad survey of the Buddhist interpretations of consciousness as an integral component of the various taxonomies of animate life, and as it evolves and functions in its karmic or mundane, and its purified or supra-mundane conditions. It discusses the concepts set out in the texts of Abhidharma, and their interpretation by different schools. It shows the complex and intricate discussion among Buddhist thinkers of the nature and different aspects of con-sciousness, and suggests that they still leave some problems unresolved.

keYWordS: bodhicitta; citta; consciousness; dharma; luminosity; nonduality; sote-riology; taxonomy; vijñana.

The Buddhist expositions of consciousness do not follow the approaches of medical science or psychology, but stem from the Buddhist doctrinal assump-tions about the nature of existence, and from the Buddhist soteriological theories.

In Buddhist doctrine, existence (saṃsāra) is permeated by impermanence (anitya), suffering (duḥkha), and insubstantiality or selflessness (anātma). In this context, the primary concern of the Buddhist teachings is to demonstrate that consciousness is merely a stream of evanescent mental experiences, that it is the source of suffering by producing karma, and that it has no permanent status of any kind.

In terms of soteriology, Buddhist teachings set forth the eightfold path that leads to the cessation of suffering and the attainment of emancipation, which is immune to suffering, and is epitomized by such terms as arhatship, nirvāṇa, and enlightenment (bodhi). In this context the Buddhist teachings propound the purification of consciousness from its existential or karmic entanglement, which is entirely due to defilements (kleśa) and ignorance (avidyā). They also

1. Tadeusz Skorupski is a retired Reader in Buddhist Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies, university of London. His academic pursuits focus on Buddhist doctrines, litera-ture, rituals, and iconography.

mailto:[email protected]

54 reLIGIoNS of SouTH aSIa

© Equinox Publishing Ltd 2014.

explain how the flux of consciousness must be brought to a complete cessa-tion and non-recurrence in phenomenal existence.

THe TeCHNICaL TermS for CoNSCIouSNeSS

In Buddhist sources consciousness does not have one single name, and does not include all conscious activities. essentially, it is classed as one single entity or element (dharma) that functions in association with its mental concomi-tants, which influence its behaviour and ethical qualities. Thus, the totality of conscious experiences is split into consciousness and mental concomitants.

among several terms in Buddhist texts denoting consciousness, three occupy a primary position: citta, manas and vijñāna.2 It is said in the canoni-cal texts and reaffirmed in the Abhidharma sources that these three terms are synonyms (ekārtha) (e.g. SN 2.95; VM 14.82; AK 2.208). However, although they refer to the same thing, namely consciousness, their interpretations as given in different contexts and taxonomies are not the same.

The Abhidharmakośa and its commentaries state that the terms citta, manas and vijñāna refer to the same thing, but have different etymologies (nirvacana): citta accumulates (cinoti), manas thinks (manute), and vijñāna cognizes (vijānāti). The AK explains that when citta serves as a support it is manas, and when it is supported it is vijñāna. Then it further clarifies that citta accumulates whole-some and unwholesome dharmas, and that it is accumulated (cita) by the pure and impure elements (dhātu). When it acts as a support (āśraya) it is manas, and when it is supported (āśrita) it is vijñānas (AK 2.208); this is explained more fully later on.

The Pāli sources also affirm the synonymy of these three terms, and explain their etymologies in similar ways to the AK. Here we present two definitions of citta that neatly encapsulate the Abhidhamma perception of the basic char-acter and function of consciousness.

In its evidently cognitive process, the term citta is explained in three spe-cific ways: as agent, instrument and activity. As agent, it cognizes (cinteti) in the sense that it knows objects (vijānāti). as instrument, it serves as a medium through which its concomitants (cetasika) cognize objects. As activity, it constitutes a process of thinking or cognizing (cintana). This process of cog-nizing is the primary characterization of citta (AAS 27; Vibhāvinī 57). In the second description that largely reflects its latent process, the term citta is also defined in three ways. Citta is so called because it is the cause of diver-sification (vicitta), or because it is itself diversified. Secondly, it is amassed

2. In western studies the term citta is often rendered as ‘consciousness’ or ‘mind’, manas as ‘mind’, and vijñāna as ‘consciousness’. In this article I follow these renderings, but frequent-ly retain the Sanskrit terms for the sake of clarity and precision. for a philological and linguistic study of these three terms in the Pāli and Brahmanical sources, see Piyananda (1981).

SKoRupSKi THe BuddHIST PermuTaTIoNS of CoNSCIouSNeSS 55


or heaped up (cita) by kamma and defilements, or it shelters what has been amassed. Thirdly, citta is said to accumulate (cinoti) its own mental stream or continuity (santāna), and to have a diversity of objects (Vibhāvinī 57, quoting Abhidhammāvatāra).

The above definitions of citta, manas and vijñāna are not comprehensive, but are indicative of how the Abhidharma works understand their character and function. The usage and interpretation of these three terms in different taxonomies are discussed below in the section on the existential configura-tions of consciousness.

INveNTed TYPeS of CoNSCIouSNeSS

Taking into consideration the Buddhist theories of momentariness (kṣaṇikatva), some schools invented certain dharmas or types of consciousness to explain the continuity of the evanescent flux of consciousness and the accumulation of karma. In the Pāli sources, the continuity of consciousness is attributed to one of the 14 functions of the citta called life-continuum or subliminal conscious-ness (bhavaṅga-citta).3 The Vaibhāṣikas invented two dharmas, non-intimation (avijñapti) (AK 1.37, 4.568, 4.578, 4.593, 4.605) and acquisition (prāpti) (AK 2.209-20), to account for karmic dispositions and the overall cohesion of the individual stream of consciousness. They also introduced the concept of an intermedi-ate being (antarābhava) (AK 3.405, 3.410, 3.419, 3.423, 3.426), to serve as a link between death and rebirth. The Mahāsāṅghikas are said to have postulated a root-consciousness (mūlavijñāna), compared to the roots sustaining a tree (MYS 26-28; VMS 178). Some Sautrāntika masters affirmed the existence of a subtle consciousness (sūkṣmacitta), which passes from one existence to anoth-er, until it discontinues upon nirvāṇa (KSp 31.59; Lamotte 1988: 608). accord-ing to Vasumitra, the Mahīśāsakas postulated an aggregate that endures till the end of saṃsāra.4 The controversial Pudgalavādins asserted the existence of a person (pudgala), which persists throughout all existences in the course of saṃsāra. Finally the Yogācāra school postulated the store consciousness (ālayavijñāna) as the subliminal repository of all pure and impure dharmas (MYS 12-26).

Although the above types of consciousness are attributed varied periods of durability, most of their proponents maintained that they are not perma-nent but constantly evolve, and ultimately cease to exist. In spite of assert-ing the evanescent character of consciousness, at least some of the above

3. or in some sources bhavaṅga-viññāṇa. 4. saṃsārakoṭiniṣṭha-skandha, or āsaṃsārika-skandha. This sect postulated three kinds of skandhas:

momentary aggregates in the form of dharmas that arise and perish from moment to moment; aggregates that persist for one lifetime (ekajanmāvadhi); and an aggregate that endures until the end of saṃsāra (Bareau 1955: 187).



types of consciousness were criticized as being the ātman in disguise. even if one accepts any of the above explanations as plausible, ultimately the spe-cific mechanism of the continuity of consciousness remains unresolved, and is open to further speculations.

eXISTeNTIaL CoNfIGuraTIoNS of CoNSCIouSNeSS

From the Buddhist perspective, human and other living beings are not en-dowed with some permanent entity dwelling in a perishable body, but rather are conglomerates of specific components functioning together as one whole governed by the law of dependent origination. The Buddha and his succes-sors devised several taxonomies of animate entities such the five aggregates (skandha) or the 18 elements (dhātu). In this section we survey the character and function of consciousness as part of these two and other taxonomies.

In the group of the five aggregates, vijñāna denotes the aggregate of con-sciousness. The AK briefly defines it as a recognition (prativijñāpti) of each object, and as an apperception (upalabdhi) in the sense of apprehending the object alone (vastumātra); the specific characteristic (viśeṣa) of the object is grasped by the sensation and other concomitants (caitta) (AK 1.50). The aggre-gate of consciousness is said to include the same six vijñānas, which are speci-fied below among the 18 elements. Buddhaghosa says that everything that has the characteristic of cognizing should be understood as appertaining to the aggregate of consciousness. After this laconic characterization of this aggregate, he states that vijñāna, citta, and manas are one in meaning, and promptly proceeds to analyse the aggregate of consciousness into 89 cittas (VM 14.82), which will be explained later on.

In the group of the 12 bases (āyatana), it is the mind-faculty (mana-indriya) that denotes consciousness. In this group the manas is basically arranged as a cognitive faculty along with the five material sense faculties, but at the same time it is said to include the same six vijñānas as the aggregate of conscious-ness. Commenting on manas as one of the 12 bases, Buddhaghosa explains that it is the bhavaṅga-citta that constitutes the manas which arises at the ini-tial phase of the cognitive process. Later he states that if manas is classified as wholesome, unwholesome and undetermined, it amounts to the same 89 cittas as mentioned in the previous paragraph (VM 15.3, 15.10, 15.14).

In the group of the 18 elements, consciousness is divided into seven ele-ments: the mind-element (manodhātu), the five sense vijñānas, and the mind-consciousness (manovijñāna). In the context of this classification, Buddhaghosa explains these seven kinds of consciousness in terms of their respective capaci-ties in the process of cognition (VM 15.36, 15.37, 15.42), which is explained later on in this paper. The AK also ascertains their respective functions in the pro-cess of cognition, and asserts that there is no manas or manodhātu apart from the six vijñānas. Then it explains that whenever any of the six vijñānas ceases,



it serves as an antecedent support of the vijñāna that immediately follows it. Just as the sense faculties support their respective kinds of sense conscious-ness, the vanishing vijñāna serves as the support of the subsequently arising vijñāna. although the six vijñānas constitute manas, and manas is not different from them, it is classed as separate in order to serve as a support of the mind-consciousness; in this way there are six supports and six vijñānas (AK 1.50-51). According to the Pāli sources it is not the manas but the material heart-base (hadayavatthu) that serves as the physical support for the mind-element and for the mind-consciousness (VM 14.60, 14.78, 14.108). As we will see later the manas or manodhātu cognizes objects, and serves as the mind-portal through which the cognized objects are conveyed to the mind-consciousness (VM 14.97).

In the context of the 22 faculties (indriya), the AK explains that the mind-faculty (mana-indriya) has sovereignty over the process of rebirth (punar-bhava), and over all dharmas. As evidence it quotes a canonical text, which says that the citta (!) dominates and manipulates the world, and that all dharmas are subject to it (AK 2.138). Similarly, Buddhaghosa explains that the function of the mind-faculty is to exert control over the co-nascent dhammas (VM 16.10). according to the Vibhaṅga the mind-faculty includes the same vijñānas as the aggregate of consciousness (Vibh 220).

The Pāli Abhidhamma sources identify 81 conditioned dhammas and one unconditioned dhamma, which are divided into four major categories: matter (rūpa), consciousness (citta), mental concomitants (cetasika), and nibbāna. In this configuration the consciousness is classed as one single dhamma, and all other sentient or mental states are classed as mental concomitants number-ing 52. Thus, we have here altogether 53 dhammas that cover all conscious or mental states (AAS 23.76).

The Sarvāstivāda school identifies 72 conditioned and three unconditioned dharmas, divided into five categories (AK 2.180): matter (rūpa), consciousness (citta), concomitants associated with consciousness (caittas),5 concomitants dissociated from consciousness (citta-viprayukta), and three unconditioned dharmas.6 In this classification, consciousness is also classed as one single dharma, and all other mental states are included among the 46 associated and 14 dissociated concomitants. In this configuration 61 dharmas account for all mental states (AK 2.185, 2.209).

According to the Pāli Abhidhamma, consciousness cannot arise separately from its mental concomitants, and conversely the concomitants cannot

5. or citta-saṃprayukta. 6. Space (ākāśa), cessation through knowledge (pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha), and cessation without

knowledge (apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha). The disjunction from the impure (sāsrava) dharmas is called pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha or nirvāṇa. The cessation without knowledge essentially con-sists in the obstruction of the arising (utpāda) of the dharmas in the future. It is not gained through the knowledge of the four noble truths, but it occurs because of the insufficiency of the causes of rebirth (pratyayavaikalya) (AK 1.19-22).



arise without consciousness. They always arise and cease together and have the same object. The mental concomitants assist the consciousness in their respective capacities. Some concomitants such as contact, sensation, percep-tion and volition assist the consciousness in the process of cognition and in interaction with the cognized objects. Contact and sensation are mental fac-tors through which consciousness comes into contact and experiences the object. Perception perceives and interprets the object. Volition is concerned with the volitional aspect of consciousness, and its function is to accumu-late kamma. The ethical quality of the above four concomitants is variable, depending whether they arise in conjunction with wholesome or unwhole-some cittas. The 12 unwholesome concomitants endow the consciousness with ethically negative qualities; they include greed, hatred, delusion, wrong views, and conceit. The 25 wholesome concomitants endow consciousness with ethically positive qualities; they include non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion, faith and mindfulness.7

Although the Sarvāstivāda classification is different, it basically comprises the same categories of mental concomitants that assist the consciousness in the process of cognition and influence its ethical qualities. The 14 dissoci-ated concomitants are an innovation, and they include such factors as the homogeneity of different types of living beings, the life-force, and the four characteristics of conditioned dharmas: origination, persistence, decay and disappearance.8

In terms of correlations, the Abhidharma masters say that the aggregate of consciousness is the same as the mind-faculty in the 12 bases, the mind-element and the six consciousnesses in the 18 elements, the mind-faculty in the 22 faculties, and the citta in the dharma classification. According to the AK the aggregates of feeling (vedanā), perception (saṃjñā) and forma-tion (saṃskāra), and the asaṃskṛta dharmas are included in the twelfth base (dharmāyatana) and the twelfth element (dharmadhātu) (AK 1.50). Allowing for minor modifications the above correlations are the same in the Pāli sources (DhS paragraphs 6 and 17; Vibh 167). In its explanation of the aggregate of formation, the AK says that it includes all the formations (saṃskāra) except for those that are assigned to the other aggregates, notably sensation and perception. However, after a refined discussion it is asserted that all the asso-ciated and dissociated concomitants must be included in the aggregate of formation.9 In the Pāli classification into the four categories of dhammas, the

7. for a detailed exposition of the 52 cetasikas see AAS, ch. 2. 8. For a detailed exposition of the Sarvāstivāda concomitants see AK 2.185-95. Stcherbatsky

(1979: 96–107) gives a convenient listing of the Sarvāstivāda classification of dharmas. 9. The Buddha defined the aggregate of formation as six kinds of volition (cetanā): volitions

for forms, sounds and so on (SN 3.60). As this definition excludes all other formations, the AK (1.48-49) argues that since the Buddha said that all dharmas must be known in order to gain emancipation, the associated and disssociated concomitants must be included in this aggregate.



aggregates of sensation, perception and formation are included among the 52 concomitants (AAS 26).

Asaṅga disagrees with the Abhidharma assertion that citta, manas, and vijñāna are the same thing, arguing that since manas and vijñāna are two dif-ferent things, the citta must also be treated as a separate thing (MYS 15, 29). In his system the aggregate of consciousness includes all three. He identi-fies citta with the store consciousness (ālayavijñāna), which serves as the sub-liminal continuity of consciousness. This is said to have no starting point (anādikālika) and to flow in an uninterrupted succession throughout all exis-tences. It abandons the body at death, appropriates a new body at conception, and sustains the conscious activities during the lifetime. from the perspec-tive of karma, it is a repository of all karmic potentialities (bīja) deposited in it by the cognitive consciousness. Conversely, by maturing these karmic poten-tialities, the store consciousness acts as a generative cause that gives rise to cognitive consciousness. The second component, manas, is differentiated into mind-element (manodhātu) and stained mind (kliṣṭa-manas). The first is equated with the mind-element of the AK as explained above. The second is stained with four defilements (kleśa),10 and serves as the support of the con-tamination process (saṃkleśa) of the vijñānas. The third component, vijñāna, is identified with the five sense vijñānas and the manovijñāna, which Asaṅga jointly calls the evolving or cognitive consciousness (pravṛttivijñāna). In terms of their combined functions, manas and vijñāna essentially cognize and expe-rience things, and discharge their karmic permutations (vāsanā) into the store consciousness (AS 11-12; MYS 12-22, 46, 80).

The above discussion shows that when the terms citta, manas and vijñāna are employed individually, they denote consciousness alone, but not all other mental states which are classed as separate aggregates or elements. Thus, in the scheme of the five aggregates, vijñāna denotes consciousness, and sen-sation, perception and formation are classed as separate aggregates. In the schemes of the 12 bases, it is manas that denotes consciousness and all other sentient factors are included in the dharma-base as its object, and in the Abhidharma fourfold scheme the citta stands for consciousness as one dharma, and all other mental factors are classed as its concomitants. When they are employed in conjunction, their synonymy is rather tenuous, because they are clearly assigned different functions. In the scheme of the 18 elements, the mind-element and the six kinds of consciousness are assigned different func-tions, although the AK insists that they are the same. Asaṅga asserts that citta, manas and vijñāna are three different things, with three different functions. He agrees with the AK that manas and vijñāna are the same, yet he assigns to manas two specific functions. Finally, in the Pāli sources, as part of the cogni-

10. Manas is associated with the following defilements: the erroneous view of personality (satkāya-dṛṣṭi), pride of ‘I am’ (asmimāna), attachment to the self (ātmasneha), and ignorance (avidyā).



tive process, manas performs the function of cognizing objects and of convey-ing them to the mind-consciousness, as explained later on.

eXISTeNTIaL LeveLS aNd eTHICaL PermuTaTIoNS of CoNSCIouSNeSS

Although the Abhidharma sources class the citta as one single dhamma, they distinguish a variety of cittas when they analyse consciousness in relation to other factors, such as the three existential spheres (traidhātuka), and the wholesome and unwholesome concomitants.

Taking into account its occurrence or non-occurrence in the three exis-tential spheres, the Pāli sources distinguish four grades or levels (bhūmi) of consciousness: three mundane and one supramundane. The three types of consciousness that occur each in one of the three spheres (kāmāvacara-citta, rūpāvacara-citta, arūpāvacara-citta) are mundane consciousness (lokiya-citta), and the single type of consciousness that does not appertain to any of the three spheres is supramundane (lokuttara-citta) (AAS 29-31).

Taking into account its ethical qualities (jāti) acquired under the influ-ence of its concomitants, consciousness is also classified into four categories: unwholesome (akusala), wholesome (kusala), undetermined (avyākata), and supramundane (lokuttara) (VM 14.82, 14.88; AAS 29).

Consciousness is classed as unwholesome when it arises in association with the three unwholesome roots (akusalamūla): greed, hatred, or delusion. This type of consciousness is said to be mentally sound, ethically defiled, and productive of negative results in the Kāmāvacara. When it is associated with the three wholesome roots (non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion), it is wholesome; it is morally blameless and productive of pleasant results. In rela-tion to the existential spheres, the unwholesome consciousness is mundane, and arises only in the Kāmāvacara. The wholesome types of consciousness are mundane or supramundane. The kammically wholesome consciousness is mundane; it can occur in all three spheres. Wholesome consciousness that is refined and purified from defilements and kamma is supramundane; it does not appertain to any of the three spheres (AAS 31).

The undetermined category is further subdivided into resultant (vipāka-citta) and functional (kriyācitta) types of consciousness. The resultant types of consciousness are classed as undetermined to distinguish them from their causes, which are either wholesome or unwholesome. When they occur in the existential spheres, they are mundane, and when they occur as the fruition of the four transcendental paths, they are supramundane. The functional types of consciousness are classed as undetermined, because they are merely mental activities without any kammic potency. They may occur in all three spheres.

The Abhidhamma sources identify 12 types of unwholesome conscious-ness, which occur in association with one of the unwholesome roots, the sen-



sation of either mental joy or equanimity, in association or dissociation with wrong views, and motivated by spontaneous or instigated volitions.11 Instead of discussing all of them individually, two examples are given here to illus-trate the above taxonomic principle. When a man is in a state of mental joy, holds the wrong view of not perceiving evil in sense pleasures, and sponta-neously indulges in sense pleasures, his unwholesome deed is accompanied by mental joy, associated with wrong view, and spontaneous. When the same man is in a state of mental indifference, does not place in the foreground of his mind the wrong view about sense pleasures, and indulges in sense plea-sures with some effort or by instigation, his unwholesome deed is accom-panied by equanimity, dissociated from the wrong view, and instigated (VM 14.89-93; AAS 32-39).

The 12 unwholesome types of consciousness yield seven resultant types of unwholesome consciousness (akusala-vipāka-citta). during the lifetime, these seven types of resultant consciousness occur in the cognitive process as the five kinds of sense consciousness, the mind-element, and the mind-consciousness (VM 14.101, 17.127). at the time of conception, they occur as the rebirth-linking consciousness in one of the unhappy destinies (VM 17.180).

In the Kāmāvacara there arise eight types of wholesome consciousness. They are associated with one of the three wholesome roots, accompanied by either mental joy or equanimity, associated with or dissociated from cor-rect knowledge, and assisted by spontaneous or instigated volitions. The production of these types of consciousness is explained mainly with refer-ence to merit-making (puṇya). Thus, when a person is happy upon seeing a suitable item to give, holds the view that there is merit in giving, and gives away the item without any hesitation, then his wholesome deed is accompa-nied by mental joy, associated with the right knowledge, and spontaneous. These eight types of wholesome consciousness are meritorious: they produce good results and inhibit the force of defilements. They arise in good ordinary people, and in the three lower grades of trainees or noble persons (VM 14.83-85; AAS 46-47). They do not arise in arhats and Buddhas, because they have transcended the cycle of kamma and future rebirths.

The above eight types of wholesome consciousness yield eight resultant types of consciousness, which occur in the cognitive series during the life-time, and in the latent series at the time of conception as the rebirth-linking consciousness in the happy places of the Kāmāvacara (VM 14.95-10, 17.134; AAS 48). As stated above, they do not arise in arhats and Buddhas. However, in their case there arise eight types of corresponding functional consciousness, which perform their respective functions without generating any kammic deposits (VM 14.106, 14.107-109; AAS 49).

11. Spontaneous (asaṅkhārika) volitions arise as it were habitually or naturally; instigated (sasaṅkhārika) volitions are induced by oneself or others.



In the Rūpāvacara there are five types of wholesome consciousness, each occurring in one of the five absorptions.12 In the first absorption, the con-sciousness is associated with the following five meditational factors: initial application, sustained application, zest, happiness, and one-pointedness. In the second absorption, the initial application is absent, and in the third absorption, the initial application and sustained application are absent. In the fourth absorption, the consciousness is accompanied by happiness and one-pointedness, and in the fifth it abides in equanimity and one-pointedness. These types of wholesome consciousness can be gained and experienced by advanced meditators who are capable of entering the absorptions (VM 14.86; AAS 52).

In the Arūpāvacara there occur four wholesome types of consciousness, which respectively take as their object the plane of infinite space and the three higher planes. They occur in beings reborn in these planes, and in accomplished meditators who are capable of gaining the four formless attain-ments (VM 10.1, 10.12, 10.16, 10.20, 10.23, 10.25, 10.32, 10.40, 10.49, 14.87; AAS 60-64).

The five types of wholesome consciousnesses of the Rūpāvacara yield their respective types of resultant consciousness in the same sphere. These resultant types of consciousness occur in beings reborn in this sphere as a consequence of developing the absorptions. In an existence they occur as the rebirth-linking, bhavaṅga and death types of consciousness (AAS 52; VM 14.103). The four types of resultant consciousness of the formless sphere occur in the same way as in the Rūpāvacara (VM 14.104; AAS 51, 52, 60, 68). The resultant types of consciousness of these two spheres are classed as func-tional for the same reason as the resultant consciousness in the Kāmāvacara (VM 14.109).

There are eight types of supramundane consciousness, which comprise four types of wholesome consciousness and four types of resultant conscious-ness. These appertain to the process of liberation from saṃsāra, and to the attainment of nibbāna. all eight types are expressive of the four stages of spir-itual attainment: stream-entry, once-return, non-return, and arhatship. The four types of wholesome consciousness constitute the four transcendental paths called the path-consciousness (maggacitta), and the four resultant types of consciousness constitute their fruition called the fruition-consciousness (phalacitta). The object of these eight types of consciousness is the same, namely nibbāna, but their functions are different. The function of the whole-some types of consciousness is to eradicate specific defilements and impure mental states, and the four types of fruition-consciousness perform the func-tion of experiencing the four corresponding degrees of liberation. The four paths and their fruitions occur in the cognitive series of consciousness, and

12. While in the Pāli suttas there are four basic absorptions (jhāna), the Abhidhamma texts dis-tinguish five, by dividing the second absorption into two.



are gained through purification from defilements, and through the develop-ment of wisdom. The differentiation into these four paths is largely deter-mined in relation to the levels of purification, and also to the degree and intensity of concentration in which the consciousness is purified and refined into these four grades (VM 14.88, 14.105; AAS 65-68, 72).

In summary, the Pāli Abhidhamma identifies 89 types of consciousness: 81 mundane and eight supramundane. The majority of them, 54, occur in the Kāmāvacara where the flux of consciousness is highly diversified. In the higher spheres in which consciousness is concentrated and refined, there are fewer and only wholesome cittas: 15 in the Rūpāvacara, and 12 in the high-est sphere. The eight supramundane cittas are also classed as wholesome, but they do not appertain to any of the three existential spheres. finally, 21 types of consciousness are wholesome, 12 unwholesome, 36 resultant, and 20 func-tional (VM 14.110; AAS 51, 68).13

While the Pāli sources identify 89 types of consciousness, the Sarvāstivāda masters identify only 12 types: four in the Kāmadhātu, three in the Rūpadhātu, three in the Ārūpyadhātu, and two types of pure consciousness.14

The wholesome consciousness of the Kāmadhātu is accompanied by 22 concomitants: the ten universals including sensation, perception, and voli-tion, and the ten wholesome concomitants including non-greed and non-hatred (AK 2.195).15

The unwholesome consciousness occurs only in the Kāmadhātu, and is of two types. The first is associated with ignorance (avidyā), or with one of the three erroneous views.16 In both cases the consciousness is accompanied by the ten universal concomitants, the six major defilements (kleśa) which include carelessness (pramāda) and indolence (styāna), and by the two univer-sally unwholesome defilements: shamelessness and immodesty. The second type is associated with one of the major defilements such as greed or pride, and with the same concomitants as the first one (more details in AK 2.197-98).

Of the two types of undetermined consciousness in the Kāmadhātu, the tainted-undetermined consciousness is associated with the false view of per-sonality (satkāyadṛṣṭi) or with one of the extreme views (antagrāhadṛṣṭi): eter-

13. for the functional cittas that are not fully explained in this article, see VM 14.106-108. 14. Kāmadhātu: (1) wholesome (kuśala), (2) unwholesome (akuśala), (3) tainted-undetermined

(nivṛta-avyākṛta), (4) untainted-undetermined (anivṛta-avyākṛta). Rūpadhātu: (5) whole-some, (6) tainted-undetermined, (7) untainted-undetermined. Ārūpyadhātu: (8) whole-some, (9) tainted-undetermined, (10) untainted-undetermined. Pure (anāsrava): (11) trainee (śaikṣa), (12) arhat (aśaikṣa) (AK 2.195, 2.357). These 12 cittas are further subdivided into 20 (AK 2.362).

15. All the Kāmadhātu cittas are associated with the initial application (vitarka) and the sus-tained application (vicāra), which as such are classed among the undetermined (aniyata) dharmas.

16. Namely adherence to views (dṛṣṭiparāmarśa), adherence to observances and rituals (śīlavrata parāmarśa), and false views (mithyādṛṣṭi).



nalism or annihilation.17 This consciousness is associated with the ten universal concomitants and the six major defilements. The untainted-undetermined consciousness is associated with the ten universal concomitants (AK 2.195, 2.198). These two types of consciousness arise as results (vipākaja); this term denotes the dharmas which arise as results in the mental series of living beings (sattvasantāna).18

The types of consciousness in the spheres above the Kāmadhātu are pro-gressively more refined and subtle. They are associated with the wholesome concomitants, and with a limited number of defilements classed as unde-termined (AK 2.199, 5.793). In these spheres the quality and content of con-sciousness are determined in relation to the meditative absorptions and attainments.

The two types of consciousness appertaining to trainees and arhats are not explained as part of the 12 types of consciousness, mainly because the mental training and the acquisition of those grades of mental purity are explained in ch. 6 of the AK.

This survey of the Sarvāstivāda classification of consciousness is rather succinct, but hopefully shows that it is considerably different from the clas-sification given in the Pāli sources. The basic taxonomic principles of these two traditions are essentially the same. Consciousness and its concomitants are classified as wholesome and unwholesome in relation to the wholesome and unwholesome roots and to the three spheres of existence. Consciousness itself is not classified as wholesome or unwholesome, suggesting that its nat-ural or innate state is not ethically qualified, although this is not stated in the consulted sources. However, the natural purity of consciousness is asserted in Mahāyāna sources, as discussed later on.

THe dYNamIC fLoW of CoNSCIouSNeSS

In the Pāli sources the stream of consciousness from conception to death is differentiated into two interlinked series: cognitive19 and latent.20 These two series do not evolve concurrently, but alternate in a subtle and intricate way. Consciousness does not arise at random, but evolves in a consistent sequence, referred to as the fixed order of consciousness (cittaniyāma). It performs 14 functions (ākāra), 11 in the cognitive and three in the latent series.21 In the

17. In the Kāmadhātu the view of personality, the two extreme views, and ignorance associated with them, are classed as undetermined, because they do not oppose the practice of good deeds such as generosity and morality (AK 5.794).

18. for a fuller exposition of the terms vipākaja and vipākahetu see AK 1.11, 2.320, 2.327, 2.330. 19. vīthicitta ‘process-consciousness’, or cittavīthi ‘consciousness-process’. 20. vīthimuttacitta ‘process-free consciousness’. 21. The 11 functions in the cognitive series (3-13), and the three functions in the latent series

(1, 2, 14) are as follows: (1) rebirth-linking (paṭisandhi); (2) bhavaṅga; (3) adverting to an ob-



cognitive series, its functions are cognizing, experiencing, and responding to the encountered world of objects and ideas. In the latent series its functions are rebirth-linking, life-continuum, and death. It is during these two series that the 89 types of consciousness occur in specific circumstances and differ-ent configurations.

The 11 functions of the cognitive series constitute one single process of perception and reactive interaction with the cognized object. It is during this process of sensorial and mental experiences that the karmically predisposed consciousness is prone to exhibit volitional responses that yield wholesome or unwholesome actions.

To account for the momentary flow of existence, the Abhidhamma mas-ters postulate that one moment of material phenomena is 17 times longer than one mental moment. It is explained that during one moment of mate-rial impingement on any of the five sense organs, one sense perception is executed in 17 mind moments. It is further explained that the bhavaṅga-citta is the factor from which the cognitive series arises, and into which it lapses once the activity of perception is completed.

There are basically seven functions during one single cognition of material objects. However, the Abhidhamma masters list 11, by assigning specific func-tions to each of the five kinds of sense consciousness.

When a material object impinges on one of the five sense organs, there occurs and vanishes one mind moment characterized as the past bhavaṅga. Then the bhavaṅga vibrates for two moments called bhavaṅga-vibration and bhavaṅga-interruption. after that the cognitive process arises and evolves in the following seven phases. (1) Once the bhavaṅga is interrupted, the mind-element directs itself towards the impinging object for one moment, and performs the function called adverting: it directs its attention towards the impinging object.22 (2) In the fifth moment, the respective sense conscious-ness arises and intercepts the impinging object. It is a rudimentary sensa-tion of the object with no conceptual content. When the object is undesirable, then this consciousness, as well as the receiving, investigating and register-ing types of consciousness, is unwholesome, and when the object is desirable they are wholesome. (3) The mind-element arises and receives the object. In this phase the object enters the focus of the mind-element and is distinctly recognized. (4) The mind-consciousness arises without the root-cause (non-greed), and investigates the object received by the mind-element. (5) During the eighth moment, the functional mind-consciousness without the root-cause determines the object. (6) In the sixth phase seven consecutive impul-

ject (āvajjana); (4-8) sensorial seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching; (9-11) receiving (sampaṭicchana), investigating (santīraṇa), and determing (votthapana) the object; (12) seven impulsions (javana) that sweep over and apprehend the object; (13) registration of the ob-ject (tadārammaṇa); (14) death-consciousness (cuti) (AAS 122-29; VM 14.114-24).

22. When an immaterial object presents itself to the mind-element, it is the mind-consciousness that performs the function of adverting.



sions occur, apprehending the object. These seven impulsions, all of the same kind, sweep over the object in a way of apprehending it. The term impulsion (javana) denotes all types of consciousness that can arise in this phase. from the ethical perspective, this phase is the most critical, because it is here that all wholesome, unwholesome, functional and path cittas arise (VM 14.121). In the case of ordinary people, these impulsions are either wholesome or unwhole-some, and in the case of arhats they are undetermined. While the ethical quality of the sense consciousness and some types of resultant consciousness are governed by the quality of the experienced objects, the impulsions are not governed by the quality of the objects. When desirable or undesirable objects come into focus, the ethical quality of the impulsions varies with the dispo-sitions of the perceiving agent. Upon perceiving a desirable or undesirable object, some people produce wholesome states of consciousness and some unwholesome. This wholesome or unwholesome reaction to the experienced object is largely determined by the relevant concomitants accompanying the consciousness. from the perspective of kamma, it is good or bad kamma that influences the response. (7) Once the phase of the impulsions is completed, the apprehended object is duly registered in two mind moments, and the cog-nitive process lapses into the bhavaṅga. (VM 14.115-22; AAS 122-25, 149-67).

The latent series of consciousness is also explained in relation to the exis-tential spheres and in terms of the kammic quality of consciousness. The spheres are not just perceived by consciousness, but are constantly repro-duced by and correspond to the levels of consciousness. Living beings are reborn in particular planes of existence, because in their previous lives they have generated the kamma leading to rebirths in those planes. Thus, ultimately the existential spheres are formed and sustained by the mental activities of living beings. At the same time they provide the platform for con-sciousness to persist and evolve in new personalities and circumstances. Each sphere is connected with a particular type of rebirth-linking consciousness, which occurs as bhavaṅga during the lifetime and as death-consciousness at the moment of dying. The kamma that matures in any of the spheres gener-ates the rebirth consciousness that arises in the same sphere. It is essentially the kamma potentiality that determines the place where the consciousness arises at conception (AAS 188).

In connection with the latent process of consciousness, the Pāli sources distinguish four planes (bhūmi) of rebirth: one unhappy, and three happy.23 In relation to these four planes, they distinguish four major types of rebirth-linking consciousness, further subdivided into 19. In the case of rebirths in the unhappy plane, the unwholesome types of resultant consciousness occur as the rebirth-linking consciousness at the moment of descent into this plane.

23. (1) the unhappy plane (apāya) includes four realms: hell, animal, tormented spirits (peta), titans (asura) (AAS 189-90); the three happy planes are (2) humans and the six classes of the kāmadevas, and (3-4) the two higher spheres (AAS 191-92).



once its function is completed, this consciousness lapses into the bhavaṅga, and becomes the death-consciousness at the end of an existence in this plane (AAS 194; VM 14.113). The eight resultant types of wholesome consciousness occur as eight types of rebirth-linking consciousness in the happy plane of the Kāmāvacara (AAS 195; VM 14.111).24 Similarly the nine types of resultant consciousness of the two higher spheres arise as the rebirth-linking, bhavaṅga and death consciousness (AAS 197-99; VM 14.112).25

The function of the rebirth-linking consciousness is to connect the new existence with the past existence. Once this is accomplished at the moment of conception, it is followed by the bhavaṅga consciousness, which preserves the continuity of the individual existence. The bhavaṅga arises and disap-pears every moment during lifetime when the cognitive process is inopera-tive, and in the states of dreamless sleep. When the cognitive process arises, the bhavaṅga is arrested, and when the cognitive process is completed, the bhavaṅga supervenes and flows until the next cognitive process intervenes (AAS 122-23, 228; VM 14.114).26

The death-consciousness is said to arise and pass away in the manner of dying; it abandons the body and departs. It is explained that at the moment of death, the consciousness is faced with a particular kind of powerful kamma, a sign of kamma, or a sign of a particular destiny. The powerful kamma consists of a good or bad deed accomplished during the lifetime. The sign of kamma consists of an object or a token reminiscent of a good or bad deed, and the sign of destiny appears as a vision indicative of a particular destiny. any of these three objects appears in the impulsion phase of the cognitive process. The death consciousness grasps this object and passes away. Once the dying stage is completed, the rebirth-linking consciousness arises and becomes established in a new existence, either in the same or a different destiny. These three types of consciousness are essentially the same, and the rebirth-linking and bhavaṅga take the same object which appears at the moment of dying (AAS 219-24; VM 14.123, 17.163-64).

In the Pāli sources the exposition of the dynamic flow of consciousness is ingenious, coherent and intricate. However, the Theravāda theory of percep-tion was criticized and rejected by other schools, particularly the assertion that the duration of one moment of matter is equal to 17 mind moments.

In the AK the exposition of the dynamics of consciousness is complex, and is given as part of the analysis of the five aggregates and other taxonomies, in particular the 18 elements. Consciousness is not differentiated into cognitive and latent series as in the Pāli sources, but is mostly treated as one coherent and integrated flow of the five aggregates as conscious experiences.

24. One additional rebirth-linking consciousness is specified in the case of those reborn as de-formed or handicapped humans.

25. AAS 197 specifies one more type of rebirth-linking consciousness in the case of unconscious beings (asañña-sattva).

26. For different opinions on the concept of bhavaṅga, see Gethin (1994: 11–35).



The stream of consciousness of individual beings is referred to as ‘one’s own stream’ (sva-saṃtāna), as distinct from the streams of consciousness of other beings (para-saṃtati). The first six bases (āyatana) are identified as the basic nucleus of a living being (maula-sattva-dravya), and are classed as inter-nal or personal (ādhyatmika). The first six elements (dhātu) and the six types of consciousness are similarly classed as personal. The remaining bases and elements are external. To clarify the term ‘personal’, it is explained that since consciousness (citta) is the support of personal conceit (ahaṃkāra), it is meta-phorically called ātman (AK 1.57, 1.104-105).

The Vaibhāṣikas postulate the existence of the dharmas called acquisi-tion (prāpti) and non-acquisition (aprāpti), which as it were keep the record of all the dharmas that are included or excluded from the individual stream of consciousness, maintaining its distinctive content and identity.27 They also hold that the stream of consciousness evolves through four consecutive exis-tences: death, intermediate state, birth or conception, and lifetime (AK 3.405). The Vaibhāṣika inventions of the above dharmas and the intermediate state were disputed and rejected by some of the other schools.

as the AK’s exposition of the flux of consciousness (saṃtāna) is complex and tenuous, we sketch here only the basic patterns.

In terms of their mutual interaction (kāritva-bhajana), the senses, objects, and vijñānas perform the following activities. The eye and the other senses perform the activities of seeing, hearing and so on. The activity of the objects is to appear as objects of the respective vijñānas, and the activity of the vijñānas is to cognize (vijñātṛtva) (AK 1.108).

The internal co-ordination between the citta and its concomitants (caitta) is explained as follows. They have supports (sāśraya), namely the sense facul-ties. They have a leaning (sālambana) because they grasp their object (viṣaya). They have aspects (sākāra), because they grasp the aspects of the same object. Finally they are associated in five identical ways (samatāprakāra), as explained below.

In terms of their respective functions, consciousness (vijñāna) cognizes (vijānāti) objects (vastu), for instance blue or yellow. The precise meaning is ‘it apprehends’ (upalabhate). The sensation (vedanā) experiences that object, the perception (saṃjñā) determines it (paricchinatti), and the volition (cetanā) assesses it (abhisaṃskaroti). Alternatively, consciousness grasps the object’s general form (sāmānyarūpa), sensation experiences its distinctive character (viśeṣarūpa), and perception grasps its particular character (paricchedyatārūpa).

As for their five identical associations, they are associated in terms of the same support, object, aspect, time, and stuff. Whichever support gives rise to consciousness (citta), also gives rise to the sensation and the other con-comitants. The same is said about their object. When the consciousness (citta) assumes its aspect of the blue (nīlākāra), the concomitants assume their

27. for more details on prāpti see AK 2.210-26.



aspects of the same blue. They always arise at the same time but never at dis-cordant times. As for their stuff, it simply means that there arises only one single kind of consciousness (cittadravya), and a single kind of each concomi-tant: one citta but not two or three, one sensation but not two or three, and so forth (AK 2.208-209).

as one of the concomitants, contact (sparśa) is described as touch (spṛṣṭi) or collision (saṃnipāta) between the sense faculty, the object, and the correspond-ing vijñāna. As a concomitant, sensation is classed as being threefold: pleasant, unpleasant and impartial. As one of the aggregates, it is threefold as above, or sixfold. The six sensations arise from the contact (saṃsparśaja) between the five sense organs, the manas, and their corresponding objects. They are said to be the experience or enjoyment (anubhūti, upabhoga) of consciousness (citta) or person (pudgala) (AK 1.48). In the group of the 22 faculties, we find five sen-sations: bodily pleasure, bodily pain, mental contentment, mental dissatisfac-tion, and impartiality (AK 1.132).28 as a concomitant, perception is said to grasp the mark (nimitta) or distinct character (viśeṣarūpa) of an object. As an aggre-gate it is said to grasp the mark or distinctive condition (avasthāviśeṣa) of an object, such as blue, long, man, friend, happy, or painful (AK 1.48). as a con-comitant, volition is described as mental action (manaskarma), and as trem-bling of consciousness (cittapraspanda) (AK 2.187).

How are the external objects perceived or cognized? The Vaibhāṣikas say that the eye, not the eye consciousness, sees shapes and colours, although they concede that the eye sees when it is associated with the eye conscious-ness. They argue that if the eye consciousness sees the external objects, then since it cannot be obstructed by physical objects, it should also see objects hidden behind other objects. The same is said about the other four senses. Their opponents disagree, and postulate that it is the eye consciousness that perceives visible objects; a protracted debate ensues (AK 1.113-17).

The Vaibhāṣikas assert that the eye sees, the ear hears and so on, and the manas discerns (vijānāti) (AK 1.118). They further assert that the eye, ear and manas perceive their objects, but without actually ‘attaining’ them (aprāptaviṣaya). The eye sees objects from a distance, and the ear hears sounds from a distance. The manas is incapable of attaining its objects because it is immaterial (arūpitva). The three remaining senses come into direct contact with their objects (AK 1.119-20).

The five sense consciousnesses and their corresponding objects (viṣaya) are present simultaneously (vartamāna). The supports (āśraya) of these con-sciousnesses are also co-extensive (sahaja) with them, and they are of two kinds: the five senses and manas. Thus the five sense consciousnesses have two supports. The mind-consciousness is supported only by the past mind-

28. It is explained elsewhere that as triple, pleasant sensation induces greed (rāga), unpleasant sensation induces hatred (pratigha), and impartial sensation induces ignorance (avidyā) (AK 2.141).



element (manodhātu) as discussed above. Its objects can be past, present or future (AK 1.124-25).

The five sense consciousnesses are supported by their respective senses but not by their objects. This is because they become modified (vikārin) in conformity with the modifications of the senses. When the senses are alert or feeble, in pain or in comfort, their corresponding consciousnesses duly become alert or feeble, and are associated with painful or pleasant sensations. The sense consciousnesses are named after the senses, precisely because they are sustained by them. The senses and their corresponding consciousnesses have a unique character (asādhāraṇatva), being included in the streams of consciousness of individual beings. By contrast the external forms and other objects have a common character, because they can be also perceived by other beings (AK 1.126-27).

out of the 18 elements (dhātu) the five external elements (form, sound etc.) are cognized (vijñeya) by two types of consciousness (vijñāna). They are expe-rienced (anubhāva) by their respective sense consciousnesses, and cognized by the mind-consciousness (manovijñāna). The remaining 13 elements are not objects of the five sense consciousnesses, and are cognized solely by the mind-consciousness (AK 1.131-32).

This does not cover the full treatment of consciousness as given in the AK. However, it does endeavour to encapsulate the major aspects of the Sarvāstivāda analysis of the dynamics of consciousness, which is consider-ably different from that of the Pāli sources.

LumINoSITY aNd oTHer SImILeS of CoNSCIouSNeSS

While the Abhidharma sources largely analysed the character of conscious-ness in terms of its ethical qualities, the Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna pay more attention to the inner propensities of consciousness. In its innate condition, consciousness is understood as being pure or luminous irrespective of the ethical qualities that it may acquire. Considered on its own, it abides in a state of non-duality, but when it is defiled, it arises and functions in the form of duality. Its appearance in a dual form is attributed to ignorance (avidyā) as the main source of defilement and misconceptions. The ultimate goal is not just the purification of consciousness from defilements, but also the attainment of omniscience by awakening its pristine potentialities. Doctrinally, omni-science is largely understood as the elimination of all conceptual polarities, and the attainment of the buddha-attributes (buddhadharma) in order to ben-efit all living beings.

We begin our exploration of the innate character of consciousness with a canonical passage which has decisively influenced the Mahāyāna interpreta-tions of consciousness.



monks, this mind is naturally luminous (prakṛti-prabhāsvara-citta), but it is contam-inated by adventitious defilements. Monks, this mind is naturally luminous, and it is released from adventitious defilements.

(Aṅguttara Nikāya 1.10)

although this statement of the Buddha is recorded in the canonical sources, the Abhidharma masters did not seem to pay much attention to it. There is just one isolated passage in the Atthasālinī which says that the mind is pure and clear (paṇḍara) with reference to the bhavaṅga, and that even when it is unwholesome it is called clear, because it arises from the bhavaṅga, just as a tributary of the Ganges is like the Ganges (AtthaS 140). However, apart from this identification with the bhavaṅga, one does not find in the Abhidharma works any theoretical formulations. By contrast the Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna theories of consciousness are largely based on the affirmation of its natural luminosity. Let us see some examples how the Mahāyāna texts interpret the luminosity of the mind.

In the Pañcaviṃśati (121-22) the mind’s luminosity is explained as follows:

This mind (citta) is no-mind (acitta), because its natural character is luminous. What is this state of the mind’s luminosity (prabhāsvaratā)? When the mind is neither associated with nor dissociated from greed, hatred, delusion, proclivi-ties (anuśaya), fetters (saṃyojana), or false views (dṛṣṭi), then this constitutes its luminosity. Does the mind exist as no-mind? In the state of no-mind (acittatā), the states of existence (astitā) or non-existence (nāstitā) can be neither found nor established… What is this state of no-mind? The state of no-mind, which is immutable (avikāra) and undifferentiated (avikalpa), constitutes the ultimate real-ity (dharmatā) of all dharmas. Such is the state of no-mind. Just as the mind is immutable and undifferentiated, in the same way the five aggregates, the twelve bases, the eighteen elements, the dependent origination, the six perfections, the thirty-seven limbs of enlightenment (bodhipakṣika), the attributes of the Buddha (buddhadharma), and the supreme and perfect enlightenment are immutable and undifferentiated.29

Here, the mind’s luminosity is explained not just as the mere absence of thought, but is suggestively equated or perhaps paired with dharmatā as the ultimate reality, and with the Buddha attributes.

In the Bhadrapāla-sūtra, consciousness is compared to the wind element and the sun-rays. Although formless and imperceptible, the wind element exists and manifests itself when it shakes trees or blows cold or warm air. It carries pleasant and unpleasant fragrances, but remains stainless and form-less. Similarly, although formless, the element of consciousness (vijñānadhātu) accomplishes all forms and penetrates all things. Due to its power there arise sensations and volitions, and through them the realm of phenomena (dharmadhātu), wholesome and unwholesome. However, as such conscious-ness is pure, and although it penetrates all things, it is not clad in them. While

29. for insightful comments on this passage see AAA 37-40.



it operates through the sense faculties and the five aggregates of clinging, it is perceived as defiled, but itself remains unaffected by bad karma, just as the stainless sun-rays remain undefiled by any impurity.30

While the Pañcaviṃśati provides a philosophical exposition of the mind’s luminosity, and while the Bhadrapāla-sūtra explains its purity through metaphors, the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra explicitly equates the buddha-nature (tathāgagarbha) with the store consciousness. It is luminous and pure, and endowed with the 32 major marks (lakṣaṇa). It is, however, disguised in the body of each being, like a gem wrapped in a dirty cloth. It is enveloped by the aggregates, and stained with the impurities of greed, hatred, delusion, and false imagination (LAS 77-78). It holds within itself the cause (hetu) of wholesome and unwholesome things, and produces all forms of existence ( janmagati). Since it is covered with latent permutations (vāsanā), it is iden-tified with the store consciousness and its retinue of seven vijñānas (LAS 220-24).

According to the Yoga Tantra class, Śākyamuni Buddha as Siddhārtha attained supreme enlightenment through visualizing his mind as a lunar disc (candra), and through a set of five mystical realizations (abhisaṃbodhi) (STTS 7-8). Commenting on Siddhārtha’s enlightenment, Indrabhūti provides the following interpretation of the mind as a lunar disc:

Being luminous by nature, this mind is similar to the moon’s disc. The lunar disc epitomies the knowledge (jñāna) that is luminous by nature. Just as the waxing moon gradually becomes full, in the same way the mind-jewel (cittaratna), being naturally luminous, also becomes fully perfected. Just as the moon becomes fully visible, once it is freed from the accidental obscurations, in the same way the mind-jewel, being pure by nature (prakṛti-pariśuddha), once separated from the stains of defilements (kleśa), appears as the perfected buddha-qualities (guṇa).

(JñS 82)

In the above texts, the mind’s natural luminosity is firmly asserted; it is not seen as a metaphor but as its innate state, and is equated with the buddha-nature and qualities.

CoNSCIouSNeSS aS BodHICITTa

The concept of bodhicitta is central to the Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna theory and practice, being essential for the realization of enlightenment. It is the seed of buddhahood, which is brought to efflorescence during the Bodhisattva career.

In Mahāyāna sources the concept of bodhicitta incorporates pairs of com-plementary factors, such as aspiration for enlightenment and its implemen-

30. Bhadrapālaśreṣṭīparipṛcchā-sūtra, TTp, vol. 24, 169.5.4-170.4.2. This sūtra deals mainly with the pure and defiled states of consciousness, and the process of rebirth.



tation, emptiness and compassion, wisdom and means, and its conventional (saṃvṛti) and absolute (paramārtha) forms.31

The above pairs are said to incorporate all the requisites that are necessary to attain the state of buddhahood. Commenting on the first pair, the texts explain that the bodhicitta as an aspiration for enlightenment consists of an intense volition (cetanā) to become a Buddha and to benefit living beings. This aspirational thought (praṇidhicitta) encapsulates the seminal cause, potenti-ality, and outcome of enlightenment. It is the mind that arouses its pristine potentialities and energies that are necessary to gain buddhahood. The imple-mentation amounts to the gradual maturation of enlightenment during the Bodhisattva career. The texts identify 22 varieties of bodhicitta. The twenty-second bodhicitta is said to be associated with the absolute body (dharmakāya), which reveals itself as the manifested body (nirmāṇakāya) in order to bene-fit living beings (more details in AAA 16-27; BCAp 11-13). Prajñākaramati says that the aspirational citta is a volition in the form of a wish for buddhahood and the benefit of other beings, and that its implementation is the progress towards buddhahood (BCAp 11-12).

In the next two pairs, the components of emptiness and wisdom denote the perfection of wisdom, and the components of compassion and means incorporate the other five perfections. The texts also speak of the Bodhisat-tva’s accumulation of merit and knowledge (puṇya-jñāna). In this configu-ration the accumulation of merit consists in the practice of the first five perfections, and the accumulation of knowledge focuses on the perfection of wisdom. The conventional and transcendent forms of bodhicitta have variant interpretations, but in terms of the Bodhisattva path, the conven-tional bodhicitta accumulates merit, and the transcendent bodhicitta denotes the ultimate insight into the state of all phenomena (Saṃvṛti; Param; kamala; Kramap).

Which type of consciousness occurs at the time of cittotpāda? According to vimuktisena, it is the manovijñāna that grasps all pure dharmas, and becomes aware of the mind’s ultimate realisation (cittādhigama) (AAV 31). Asaṅga says that cittotpāda is a volition of mighty enthusiasm, initiative, purpose, out-come, and a double objective (dvayārtha): the supreme enlightenment and the benefit of other beings (Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra 4.1). Commenting on Asaṅga’s statement, Haribhadra explains that cittotpāda denotes the citta grasping a pre-eminent object in association with volition as a concomitant consisting of zest. He further explains that it is the citta grounded in an earnest wish char-acterized by zest for all wholesome dharmas (AAA 24).

31. In some texts the bodhicitta is said to be fourfold: all the samayas are comprised in the bod-hicitta which is fourfold, namely bodhicitta, anuttara bodhicitta, Samantabhadra’s bodhicitta, and vajrabodhicitta (Dīpaṅkaraśrījñāna’s Sarvasamayasaṃgraha, TTp, vol. 81, 211.3). The ben-efit of the monastic vows is said to be arhatship, that of bodhicitta the attainment of bud-dhahood, and that of the vidyādhara vow the attainment of buddhahood in this very life (Vibhūticandra, TTp, vol. 81, 215.3.6).



The above sources firmly stress that cittotpāda is the mind unwaveringly set on buddhahood. When one takes into consideration the two components of bodhicitta, they seem to broadly correspond to the cognitive and latent aspects of consciousness. ultimately, emptiness denotes the attainment of enlightenment and dharmakāya, and the practice of compassion accumulates merit for the attainment of a physical buddha-body (rūpakāya). Thus, while the defiled consciousness erroneously perceives the nature of existence and produces karma, the bodhicitta abides in wisdom and compassion, and strives to mature them in the form of omniscience and buddha-attributes. It is the transcendent merit and knowledge that supplant the workings of mundane karma and ignorance.

In the Tantras, the bodhicitta is predominantly interpreted as a mystical experience, which consists in the union or blending (saṃyoga) of wisdom and means. In these texts, the pair of wisdom and means is identified with a number of specifically tantric pairs such as vajra and bell, or male and female. The bodhicitta is also described as the melting of the male and female deities, or it is hypostasized in the form of Vajrasattva as the supreme deity epito-mizing ultimate reality. The consciousness as bodhicitta is also identified with the innate forces circulating within the body, such as psychic channels (nāḍī) and centres (cakra), or as semen (bindu). The tantras emphasize the yogic experience of bodhicitta within the body. Its ultimate character is described as the inexpressible reality, beginningless and endless, neither existent nor non-existent, non-substantial like emptiness and space, as the essence of the Tathāgatas or Samantabhadra.32 Since all dharmas are non-substantial and identical, the bodhicitta is unborn, devoid of existence, nondual, vajra, lumi-nosity, enlightenment, and Vajrasattva (prajñ 2.29, 4.17).33

The above discussion of bodhicitta shows how the innate energies and potentialities of consciousness can be aroused and directed towards the attainment of the Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna forms of enlightenment.

duaLITY aNd NoNduaLITY of CoNSCIouSNeSS

In Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna the concept of nonduality is largely rooted in doc-trinal assumptions which assert that all discursive differentiations into polar-ities such as impurity and purity, subject and object, or saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are defective, because they do not reflect the true state of existence. In the context of consciousness, its duality and nonduality are largely explained with reference to citta and caittas, or citta, manas and vijñāna. of the various expositions of duality and nonduality of consciousness, we present here the interpretation based on selected texts from Yogācāra sources.

32. for a variety of descriptions of bodhicitta see ch. 2 of GST. 33. See also Indrabhūti’s JñS, in particular pp. 82–84 where he quotes a number of sources.



In chapter 1 of the Saṃdhinirmocana the Buddha states that all phenomena are without duality: the conditioned phenomena are neither conditioned nor unconditioned, and the unconditioned are neither conditioned nor uncon-ditioned. The term conditioned is metaphoric and imaginary, an expression of ordinary experiences or mental imaginations which do not correspond to anything absolute; hence conditioned phenomena do not exist. The same is said of unconditioned phenomena.

There is an inexpressible or ineffable nature of phenomena (anabhilāpya-dharmatā) about which noble persons have perfected knowledge. However, in order to teach others about the true reality of phenomena, they have coined the term ‘unconditioned’. Ordinary people who have no wisdom and no vision of the ineffable nature of phenomena, when they are confronted with conditioned and unconditioned phenomena assume that such phe-nomena exist. Relying on what they see or hear, they affirm the phenomena as real or false. By contrast, those who have wisdom and vision of the inef-fable nature of phenomena think that the conditioned and unconditioned phenomena do not exist; they are mental fabrications labelled as condi-tioned and unconditioned.

The noble persons know ultimate reality (paramārtha) through intuition, but among the profane it is the subject of speculations. Ultimate reality is the domain without characteristics (animittagocara); it is ineffable and escapes ordinary experience. By contrast, speculations are the domain with charac-teristics (nimittagocara), and appertain to the domains of speech and of ordi-nary experience.

Having explained that the terms ‘conditioned’ and ‘unconditioned’ are mental constructs, and demonstrated the difference between ultimate reality and speculations, the Buddha proceeds to show that the identity or distinc-tion between ultimate reality and mental formations (saṃskāra) is tenuous and inadmissible.

Since its character is profound, ultimate reality transcends identity with mental formations or difference from them. The arguments for their identity or difference are erroneous, because it is impossible to understand and real-ize ultimate reality. If ultimate reality and mental formations were identical, then the profane would all perceive the truth and gain nirvāṇa; but they do not. If they were different, then the truth seekers would not become sepa-rated from the character of mental formations, from the bonds of that charac-ter, and from the bonds of negative dispositions (dauṣṭhulya). Thus they would not become enlightened; yet they do discard and eliminate these bonds, and gain nirvāṇa and enlightenment. Again, if absolute reality and mental formations were identical, absolute reality would be classed among defile-ments together with the formations. If they were different, absolute reality would not constitute the common character of all the formations. However, it does constitute the common character of the formations, but is not classed among defilements. Once more, if they were identical, the formations would



be classed as undifferentiated, just as absolute reality is undifferentiated in the formations. Consequently, absolute reality and the formations are neither identical nor different, and it is erroneous to assert their identity or differ-ence (SNS 169-77).

In the above discourse, the main thrust of argumentation is to demonstrate that the treatment of phenomena in terms of dualities, such as conditioned and unconditioned, is flawed, and that ultimate reality and mental forma-tions cannot be considered to be identical or different. Their nonduality is asserted and demonstrated as the impossibility of explaining their relation-ship in terms of oneness and plurality. In the Yogācāra treatises, this some-what negative strand of the Sandhinirmocana thought is recast into positive expositions of the nonduality of consciousness, as discussed below.

In the Yogācāra sources, the nonduality of consciousness is explained as an integral part of the expositions of deceptive ideation, the three forms or aspects of consciousness, and the three natures. We begin with the treatment of deceptive ideation.

It is said in the consulted sources that in the case of ordinary beings, the deceptive ideation (abhūtaparikalpa) is synonymous with the defiled stream of consciousness (saṃtāna), and that in relation to the entire existence, it is saṃsāra.

In terms of consciousness, the deceptive ideation includes ālayavijñāna, manas and vijñāna. The store consciousness constitutes the subliminal aspect of consciousness, and serves as the foundation of all karmic potentialities, which give rise to manas and vijñāna. from the perspective of karma, the manas is called the stained mind (kliṣṭamanas), because it perceives the store con-sciousness as the ātman.34 from the perspective of perception it is the mind-element (manodhātu), which serves as the support of the six vijñānas. The six vijñānas essentially cognise the empirical world, and jointly with manas they produce karmic propensities (vāsanā).

In terms of its existential permutations, the deceptive ideation is said to encompass the three natures (trisvabhāva): perfected (pariniṣpanna), depen-dent (paratantra), and imagined (parikalpita). In this configuration the decep-tive ideation corresponds to the dependent nature. The perfected stands for emptiness, nirvāṇa, and the dharma-nature of consciousness (cittadharmatā). The dependent basically denotes the stained manas as a living entity obscured by ignorance and controlled by the law of dependent origination. The imag-ined denotes the empirical world which is illusory. Duality is the deceptive ideation that appears in the form of subject and object. The dependent is the egocentric subject, and the imagined is its unreal and imaginary object. This apparent duality does not exist, but emptiness exists in the deceptive ide-

34. Manas denotes the sense of selfhood and is associated with four defilements: view of self (ātmadṛṣṭi), delusion of self (ātmamoha), pride of self (ātmamāna), and attachment to self (ātmasneha) (MYS 16; VMS 225). See footnote 9.



ation, and conversely the deceptive ideation exists in emptiness. In some pas-sages it is said that the deceptive ideation corresponds to the defiled process (saṃkleśa) and saṃsāra, and emptiness to the purification process (vyavadāna) and nirvāṇa. In some other passages, it is said that the dependent in its condi-tioned state is the imagined or saṃsāra, and in its unconditioned state is the perfected or nirvāṇa (MYS 87-125; MVB ch. 1; VMS 90, 225, 514-33).

according to one text, the nonduality of the three natures consists in the expulsion of the imagined from the dependent, and the infusion of the depen-dent into the perfected. Their nonduality is expounded with reference to the ultimate reality itself (paramārtha), which is said to be nondual (advaya) in five ways. In terms of existence and non-existence, it is not existent from the perspective of the dependent and the imagined natures, and it is not non-existent from the perspective of the perfected nature. In terms of oneness (ekatva) and plurality (nānātva), it is not one because there is no oneness of the perfected with the dependent and the imagined, and it is not varied because the perfected is not different from the other two. In terms of production and cessation, it is neither produced nor destroyed, because the absolute realm (dharmadhātu) has no characteristic of creativity (anabhisaṃskṛtatva). It is nei-ther increased nor decreased, because it remains as it is amidst the production and cessation of defilement and purification. Finally, it does not become puri-fied, because of its naturally stainless nature (prakṛty-asaṃkliṣṭatva), and yet it is not entirely without purification, because it is released (vigama) from the adventitious defilements (Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra 6.1 and the commentary).

The realization of nonduality is chiefly explained as the transmutation or transformation of the foundation of consciousness (āśrayaparāvṛtti), namely of the store consciousness. This transmutation of consciousness occurs in the dependent nature; it essentially consists of the expulsion of its defiled pro-cess (saṃkleśa) and transformation into its purified state (vyavadāna) (MYS 259-261, 268). all conditioned dharmas are the dependent nature, and the store consciousness is the foundation or support of both the defiled and undefiled dharmas, which respectively correspond to the imagined and perfected natures. The transmutation of the support consists of a double operation: the expulsion of the imagined and the acquisition of the perfected. It is through the assiduous repetition of non-conceptual knowledge (nirvikalpaka-jñāna) that one removes the wickedness (dauṣṭhulya) of the two obstacles35 from the root consciousness (mūlavijñāna). Thus it is non-conceptual knowledge that transmutes the foun-dation of consciousness through the removal of the imagined which is in the dependent, and through the acquisition of the perfected which is also in the dependent. Through the removal of the obstacles of defilements, one acquires mahāparinirvāṇa, and through the elimination of the obstacles to knowledge, one realizes supreme enlightenment (mahābodhi) (VMS 610-12, 661-67).

35. The obstacle of defilements (kleśāvaraṇa), and the obstacle to knowledge (jñeyāvaraṇa). VMS 566-74.



The nonduality of consciousness is also reflected and integrated into the exposition of nonduality as one of the attributes of the absolute body (dharmakāya). This nonduality is explained in three ways: with reference to existence, conditionality, and diversity. The absolute body is not existent because the dharmas do not exist, and it is not non-existent, because empti-ness as the ultimate reality does exist. It is not conditioned because it is not produced by karma and defilements, and yet it has the power to manifest itself in the guise of the conditioned dharmas. Thirdly, as the support of all the Bud-dhas, it is undivided (abhinna), and yet countless streams of consciousness (saṃtāna) gain the state of enlightenment (MYS 271-72).

In the tantras the state of nonduality is gained through the mystic union of wisdom and means, as briefly discussed above in the section on bodhicitta. Two representative quotations aptly encapsulate the spirit of the tantras:

one’s mind (svacitta) is primordially unborn and empty by nature, because due to its sameness with the selflessness of dharmas, it is immune from all existences, and divested of the aggregates, bases, elements, subject and object. These exis-tences are unarisen, there are no dharmas and no dharmatā. Selflessness is similar to space, and this is the unwavering course of enlightenment.

(GST 2.4-5)

The union of wisdom and means denotes the union of citta and caittas undifferen-tiated into internal and external. It is the union of emptiness and compassion, the union of vajra and lotus, the union of diffusion (prapañca) and fusion (saṃgraha), and the union of Heruka and Nairātmyā. It is the undivided reality of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, and it does not have the dual form of man and woman. It is the unity of the conventional and ultimate realities, and the knowledge that is naturally luminous (prakṛti-prabhāsvara-jñāna) (Saṃp).

In the Sandhinirmocana, as discussed above, the Buddha asserts the nondual-ity of phenomena, but his main argumentation aims to demonstrate that ulti-mately it is impossible to explain the nature of phenomena in terms of polari-ties. It is difficult and indeed futile to make dualistic distinctions, because ultimate reality as such is not susceptible to being differentiated. Then again, as ultimate reality constitutes the common character of all phenomena, ulti-mate reality and phenomena are co-extensive, but it is difficult to grasp or explain their relationship in terms of identity or difference.

The Yogācāra sources do not dwell on the difficulties voiced by the Buddha. Instead they endeavour to explain the character of consciousness in terms of its composition or duality, and then they demonstrate how the bifurcated strands of consciousness can be transformed or transmuted into the state of nonduality. The Yogācāra exposition of the nonduality of con-sciousness as the expulsion of the imagined from the dependent, and the infusion of the dependent into the perfected, is ingenious and sophisti-cated. However, it is questionable whether it resolves the difficulties raised by the Buddha.



CoNCLuSIoN

In the course of this survey of Buddhist perceptions of consciousness, no sus-tained effort is made to provide a critical analysis or evaluation of the materi-al. as stated at the outset, this article mainly endeavours to amass and collate a whole range of relevant sources from different traditions, in order to formu-late a broad vision of the complex and intricate interpretations of the nature and different aspects of consciousness. The presentation is somewhat terse and condensed in some sections, and presumes a fair amount of knowledge on the part of the reader. However, hopefully, the sequential arrangement and the content of the individual sections are clear and meaningful, enabling the reader to see the overall historical progression in the interpretation of con-sciousness, and to understand the main doctrinal and other issues.

I wish to offer one general reflection on Buddhist perceptions of conscious-ness. I think that within the Buddhist doctrinal parameters, the Buddhist masters have explored a great variety of theoretical and mystical venues, and produced a number of formidable and refined interpretations of the inner permutations of consciousness. One certainly learns many things about its defiled and enlightened conditions. However, one is frequently confronted with a number of discordant contentions and opinions on specific and often crucial issues, such as the innate continuity of consciousness or the process of cognition. This variety of opinions voiced by the Abhidharma and Mahāyāna traditions suggests that there are certain aspects of consciousness which still remain unresolved, and that the Buddhist tradition as a whole does not offer one coherent and doctrinally agreed interpretation of consciousness.

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AK Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu. Cited by chapter and page in Abhidharmakośa and Bhāṣya of Vasubandhu, with Sphutārthā of Yaśomitra. Edited by S. D. Shastri. Varanasi, 1970–1972.

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The Buddhist Permutations of Consciousness

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