A Charge Toward the Past: The 1898 Wilmington Race Riot Commission and Its Political Implications

Kira Felsenfeld

Candidate Toward Senior Honors in History

Oberlin College Thesis Advisor: Renee Romano

Oberlin College, 2019

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Table of Contents

Table of Contents 1

Acknowledgements 2

Introduction 4

Chapter 1: The Charge 13

Chapter 2: Establishing Impact 30

Chapter 3: Action & Accountability 45

Conclusion 67

Bibliography 73

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Acknowledgements

Like many who decide to attempt an honors thesis, this was my first time taking on a

project of this magnitude. First and foremost, I’d like to thank Professor Romano, who first

introduced me to historical redress as a field, tolerated my many drafts, and pushed me to think

critically about my work. Because of her, my writing and analytical thinking have grown

exponentially and I continue to be in awe with the attention (and patience) she paid to every

iteration of this body of work. I am forever grateful.

I am indebted to the community and guidance I received in the honors seminar. Cole,

Emma, David, Kira Z., Shira, and John offered not only additional sets of eyes, but also a space

for comfort amidst the stress. Most importantly, Professor Wurtzel fostered an environment for

despair, joy, and humor. I will miss the snacks, memes, and thoughtful guidance on this lengthy

process.

When I first got to Oberlin, I did not think I was going to major in history nor do I think I

could ever conceptualize my being able to write an honors thesis. On my second day of classes

during my freshman year, I sat down in a seminar room in Mudd Library. Professor Nunley

beckoned a group of fifteen first year students into a world of women behaving badly. From that

day on, I was convinced that this discipline was for me. Because of Professor Nunley, four years

later, I approach my arguments with the intention set by her to “trouble the waters.”

Throughout my life, dinner table conversations have been sites of of intense debate. I

have been asked questions that I probably don’t know the answers to, but regardless, I have tried

to answer them anyway. I’d like to think that these moments were what set me on this path of

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intellectual curiosity, and for that I am immensely grateful. These spaces, of course, were created

by my incredible family. My mom, dad, Nancy, Glenn and Matt have pushed me throughout

these past four years (or maybe 22 years), to speak my mind even if my voice shakes, be curious,

and most of all, ask for help. My grandparents (Eleanor, Naomi, Gary, Jeff, and Linda) continue

to invigorate me with their pride and enthusiasm, be it in person or from afar. I am so lucky to

have a family of educators, movement builders, and critical thinkers who I am fueled and

inspired by daily.

I also could not have done this without the energy of the people I see throughout the

week: Jonah, my housemates, the Student Union staff, and the contact dancers. This project

produced joy, dismay, anger, and anxiety. Throughout those varying emotions, these people met

me with validation and kindness.

Finally, given that this thesis explores a modern history, the work of historical redress

still occurs today. Throughout this process, I got to sit down with people who have made

historical justice their life’s mission as scholars, historians, and activists. Irving Joyner, Tim

Tyson, David Cecelski and LeRae Umfleet offered invaluable insights into Wilmington’s work

toward historical justice.

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Introduction

On November 10th, 1898, Alfred Waddell knocked on the door of Wilmington’s only

black-owned newspaper. Behind him, stood a mob of white supremacists. The press, located on

Seventh Street between Nun and Church Streets, housed Alexander Manly, the editor. Manly had

written a scathing article about white women and their attraction to black men a few months

prior. Once the Red Shirt Party, a white supremacist group with chapters across the state, heard

about Manly’s article, they planned to destroy his newspaper and the city it resided in.

Conveniently, this city was also a hub for black political success. Wilmington had a large black

population and progressive government and thus posed a challenge to the vitality of white power

throughout the state. Manly was aware of the provocative nature of his article and had fled

Wilmington earlier that morning. 1

Waddell and his cohort waited for Manly to show his face. With no answer, the mob

battered down the door, smashed the windows, and let kerosene lamps hit the wooden floor,

setting the building on fire. Hundreds of angry white men rampaged the city, determined to

destroy any trace of black power and “kill every damn nigger in sight.” Black residents fled, so

the previously black-majority city became dominated by white men. The white mob overthrew

the progressive and multiracial government and elected Waddell as the new Democratic mayor.

After instigating the violence, members of the riot, such as Furnifold Simmons and Charles B.

Aycock later came to hold prominent positions as senator and governor of North Carolina. 2

1 Leon Prather, “We Have Taken a City: A Centennial Essay” in David S. Cecelski and Timothy B. Tyson, Democracy Betrayed :The Wilmington Race Riot of 1898 and its Legacy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 29-32. 2 Ibid., 32

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Little information about the riot was recorded. To this day, no one knows exactly how

many people died or left the city after November 10th, 1898. No one tracked the economic

damage, such as the number of businesses that closed or the number of buildings destroyed.

Although Alfred Waddell wrote in his autobiography that he witnessed 20 deaths, alternate

reports from the black community emphasized an amount far beyond Waddell’s calculation.

Spanning from shortly after the riot until well into the 21st century, black oral tradition

discouraged visitors from drinking water from the Cape Fear River because it might still be

polluted from the toxins released by dead bodies from the riot. However, no written reports

existed to corroborate anyone’s perspective. Thus, the dominant narrative told by whites

neglected the extent of the destruction and described the white mob’s actions as necessary to

protect civilization. The Wilmington Race Riot Commission was created by the North Carolina

state legislature in 2000 to investigate this convoluted history.

The Wilmington Race Riot Commission operated between 2000 and 2006 with the goals

of opening up a “vital dialogue” and establishing an official record for the events that occurred in

1898. State representative Thomas E. Wright, among many intellectuals, community members, 3

and politicians, spearheaded the effort. They sought to disrupt previous narratives of the race riot

that shrouded violence and glorified white supremacy. Additionally, they hoped to assess the

economic damages caused by the riot based on the limited evidence available. Given that the riot

occurred 100 years earlier, the Commission faced a lack of data and first hand accounts that

would give definitive understandings of the riot’s impact. In light of this challenge, they used

oral histories, archival data, and alternative accounts to unearth the history. The Commission’s

3 North Carolina Center for Cultural Resources. 1898 Wilmington Race Riot Commission. https://www.ncdcr.gov/about/history/1898-race-riot

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report included a series of recommendations for the North Carolina General Assembly. However,

once in their hands, only some of the recommendations came into fruition.

My thesis explores the possibilities and limitations of the Wilmington Race Riot

Commission. As a reparative body, the Commission had the potential to make widespread

change throughout North Carolina. An official authority gave state-sanctioned approval and

power behind this redress effort. However, this same authority also meant that any action in

response to the Commission’s recommendations had to be approved by the governing body.

Filling their role as writers of history, the Commission encountered many challenges that

historians face: a need to corroborate oral reports and missing pieces of evidence. However,

history-writing similarly came with an important power. The Commission could disrupt

conceptions of history that upheld white supremacists as heros. Through an exploration of

meeting minutes, state legislation, interviews, local and national media, the report itself, and the

primary sources utilized by the Commission, I question the intentions, processes and impact of

this state-sanctioned body.

The Wilmington Race Riot occurred on November 10th, 1898 in the larger context of a

post-Reconstruction effort to dismantle black success. In the late 19th century, the Fusionists, a

statewide political party that consisted of blacks and progressive whites, held power locally in

Wilmington as well as statewide power in the General Assembly and governorship. “Redeemers”

throughout the south claimed that white supremacy was essential to civilization. Their violent

actions--which typically are now described as “race riots”--reflected their efforts to restore white

dominance and to uphold white supremacy. White redeemers then established historical

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societies, erected monuments, and created public education that would simultaneously uphold

their own glory while erasing violence against black people. 4

Historical redress efforts are two-pronged; they repair from past atrocities and make sure

similar injustices do not occur in the future. Nations, states, and communities have investigated

their own roles in perpetrating violence against specific groups. Investigations look differently

across the world. Truth commissions, tribunals, and trials alike share a common goal of

establishing what happened. For some, redress involves is establishing a “truth.” For others, it

means sparking action through new legislation or reparations.

Scholars who have studied the origins of historical redress, such as Pierre Hazan, Elazar

Barkan, and John Torpey, agree that historical redress efforts began in the wake of the

Nuremberg trials after the Holocaust. Hazan charts the evolution of the transitional justice

movement from its conception. These trials, facilitated by the United States, placed the West in

three distinguished roles: the victim (the Jews), the perpetrator (the Germans) and the judge (the

United States). This triad, he asserts, established “the speeches, norms, and practices, of what

decades later would become known as transitional justice.” Forty years later, in the late 1980s 5

and early 1990s, states beyond the West established similar approaches, such as trials, tribunals,

and commissions to unearth histories of dictatorships and offer retribution for victims. This 6

pattern continued into the 21st century and forced nations to grapple with their own roles in

historical injustices.

4 Prather, 18. 5 Hazan, Pierre. Judging War, Judging History: Behind Truth and Reconciliation. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press) 2010. 14 6 Ibid., 29-30

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Although taking a facilitative role in global redress efforts, the United States government

has remained ambivalent about addressing its own historical injustices. The U.S government did

offer reparations and an apology to victims of Japanese internment forty years after World War

II, and there have been federal and state apologies for slavery and lynching. However, these

apologies did not lead to new legislation that might seek to repair their legacies, such as

disenfranchisement or racial violence. Oklahoma and Florida state governments both established

commissions to explore incidents of racial violence in their states, with the hope of establishing a

permanent record of violence and perhaps more substantive actions towards repair.

My thesis takes part in what has become a broad scholarly conversation about historical

redress. Scholars ask questions such as: how might we measure injustice? How can nations hold

people accountable if they are no longer alive? What forms of redress are appropriate for

injustice in the United States? In the American context, scholars such as Fitzhugh Brundage,

Renee Romano, Alfred Brophy, among many others, have discussed modes of redress such as

monuments, reopening court cases, and reparations. Others, such as William J. Booth and

Richard Vernon, investigate the role of responsibility in cases of historical justice. Robert Margo,

William J. Collins, and Angelique Davis, alongside scholars from many disciplines, give insight

into how nations might measure the impact of injustice. Other scholars, such as Priscilla B.

Hayner, highlight the role of a commission in provoking redress. My thesis highlights this mode

of repair as form of power, but also notes its limits in historical redress.

There is also a body of work focused on North Carolina political history. In Civilities and

Civil Rights, historian William Chafe looks at the state legislature’s response to the Greensboro

sit-ins as a case study for North Carolina’s approach to racial politics. He argues that North

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Carolina puts on a “progressive mystique.” Although presenting itself as progressive when it 7

came to racial politics, the state repressed both protest and critique in the name of maintaining

civility and thus ensured very little change to systems of racial oppression. Rob Christensen

traces these attitudes historically from the Wilmington Race Riot up until the recent bathroom

bills. He tracks the reactionary politics in North Carolina which, he argues, echo a similar ethos

to that which Chafe describes. My work contextualizes the Commission through Chafe and

Christensen’s research.

Many scholars study Wilmington as a politically significant region in North Carolina.

The port city was the site of a coup d’etat, important resistance during the Civil Rights

Movement, and conflicts around public memory. Scholarship on the 1898 riot includes works by

Leon Prather, who has documented the extent of the massacre in his 1984 work We Have Taken

a City. Building on his scholarship, Tim Tyson, David Cecelski, and Glenda Gilmore, among

other scholars featured in the collection Democracy Betrayed, have offered nuance to this history

and highlighted specific characters as well as the role of race and class in the conflict. Finally,

Leslie Hossfeld and Margaret Mulrooney examine the changing memory of the Wilmington

Race Riot. Hossfeld notes the challenges in commemoration after the centennial in 1998. She

looks specifically at the centrality of race-blind liberalism in shaping the narrative of the events

in 1898. Mulrooney, in conjunction, highlights Hossfeld’s point as a major limitation of the 1898

commemorative efforts. Commemoration one hundred years later was geared towards the

interests of the white community. These bodies of scholarship contextualize the Commission in a

pattern of memory efforts and tensions that exist within public memory work.

7 William Henry Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights :Greensboro, North Carolina, and the Black Struggle for Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 436.

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Throughout this thesis, I utilize the language of ‘riot’ to describe the events in 1898,

although I acknowledge that riot is a problematic term. The word ‘riot’ invokes a sense that an

event occurred spontaneously and it offers little clarity about the identity of the perpetrators.

Even with the little evidence available, it is clear that even if river was not filled with bodies,

white supremacists had violent intentions up to twelve months before November 10th. I use ‘riot’

in order to reflect the language used by the group in their title and conversations. In chapter 2, I

offer a critical view of the debates embedded in the language, engaging scholarship by Sheila

Smith McKoy. Additionally, I describe the events as an overthrow, a coup d’etat, and a

massacre. The ambiguity in language reflects the uncertain history which the Commission sought

to address.

My thesis charts the trajectory of the Commission from its conception, to the time its

final report reached the hands of the General Assembly. Chapter 1 looks closely at the centennial

celebrations in Wilmington. Organizations who spearheaded prior commemoration, such as the

1898 Foundation, laid the groundwork for the Wilmington Race Riot Commission. However,

unlike these earlier efforts, the Commission had the financial and political support of the General

Assembly in taking on this process. Chapter 2 explores the debates that the Commission faced.

In order to disrupt the biased narrative that erased racialized violence, they had to use a broad

range of sources. However, they also had to make many judgement calls, as some sources, like

oral reports, could not be corroborated. They released a report that emphasized the violence that

occurred, but expressed uncertainty about its exact magnitude. The report, along with a lengthy

and broad set of recommendations, went directly to the General Assembly. Chapter 3 reckons

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with the lack of action from the General Assembly. Although having ample power to turn

recommendations into action, they merely acknowledged the event and moved forward.

The Commission’s path illuminates the challenges of making concrete change in efforts

to address historical injustice. The Commission formed, researched, and presented their findings,

which resulted in an apology by the state legislature and even the building of monument. But it

never made concrete repair for what happened in 1898. In tracking these tensions, I ask: how

might a Commission contribute to larger redress movements? How do we navigate truth with

few pieces of first-hand evidence? What makes a form of redress symbolic or impactful?

One hundred years later, the story of the Wilmington Race Riot lingers throughout not

only Wilmington, but all of North Carolina. Black residents did not speak about the events out of

fear of something similar occurring in the future. In 2005, Mayor Spence Broadhurst asserted, “I

spend a lot of time looking forward and not a lot of time looking in the rearview mirror.” 8

Without any official conversation, the Wilmington Race Riot remained unaddressed although

still impactful. Wilmington confronted similar forms of violence 75 years later around the

integration of schools. The town also still faced segregation and economic disparities between

white and Black residents. Over a hundred years after the riot, Tim Tyson, a scholar and member

of the Wilmington community, addressed the risks produced by the silence about Wilmington’s

history: “In the end, we are all the captives of our own origins, runaway slaves from our own

pasts; never more so that when we do not acknowledge them. When we try to escape our past,

the only thing we elude is our future.” An absence of a public conversation about the riots for 9

8 John DeSantis, “North Carolina City Confronts Its Past in Report on White Vigilantes” New York Times. May 29, 2005. https://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/04/us/04wilmington.html 9 Tim Tyson. “Press Remarks for Wilmington Ten Pardon, 2012.” Tim Tyson Collection 1948-2012. Southern Collection at University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

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over a hundred years limited the possibilities for justice and prevented clarity about why things

were the way they were. Thus, the Wilmington Race Riot Commission’s work became even

more crucial in facilitating progress. In the process, they raised questions of what it might mean

to run towards our past rather than escape it.

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Chapter 1: The Charge

In late 2000, the North Carolina General Assembly passed Senate Bill 787 labeled

confusingly as “The Studies Act of 2000.” The Studies Act sought to create commissions that

would investigate and report on a myriad of subjects that impacted the state. The topics in SB

787 included the future of the North Carolina Railroad, the efficacy of the public school

calendar, and the state of the shoreline. But one section clearly stood out. Section 17 charged 10

the state to create a Wilmington Race Riot Commission in order to unearth a history of racial

violence that took place in Wilmington, North Carolina in 1898.

The Wilmington Race Riot Commission, as legislated by the General Assembly, had the

charge of rewriting the previously biased history of the 1898 Wilmington Race Riot. Prior to the

charge, understandings of the riot were shrouded by narratives that denied that the violence in

Wilmington had been racially-motivated. In oral narratives, newspaper articles, and history

textbooks, the white men who overthrew Wilmington’s government did not contribute to any

racial violence. Instead, they sought to overthrow an unfit government and “protect civilization.”

The General Assembly’s charge described that interpretation as misguided and noted the riot’s

lasting impact on the African American population in North Carolina. Chair of the Commission

Thomas E. Wright hoped that this act would mark the “beginning of an important dialogue” on

racism throughout the state. Passed unanimously, SB 787 marked the beginning of a complicated

journey of unearthing a violent history.

10 North Carolina General Assembly, SB 787: The Studies Act. (Raleigh: 2000)

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The commission's ties to the government gave them economic and statewide legitimacy,

thus giving them the means to write a history that could transform narratives and perhaps state

identity. I will first explore the story of the race riot before any commemoration took place. The

largely sanitized history painted the story as one of salvation rather than destruction. Then, I

examine the 1898 Foundation’s yearlong centennial commemoration. Its creation reflected a

larger public pressure to remember these events. I also look at the legislation that allowed for the

Commission’s emergence and the action steps that followed. Finally, I reference the other

Commissions that provided guidelines for the Wilmington Race Riot Commission’s charge. The

Tulsa and Rosewood Commissions not only offered an example for Wilmington, but highlighted

the significance associated with a state-sponsored effort.

Statewide tellings of the events in 1898, specifically through textbooks, suggested that

the riot occurred in order to protect Wilmington from lawlessness. Textbooks for children

ignored the riot. They did not acknowledge any sort of upheaval or government overthrow until

1907 when a Young People’s History of North Carolina referred to the election of Daniel

Russell, a governor from the progressive Fusionist party. It only described that in 1898, the

legislature returned to Democrat control. A 1916 textbook painted the Wilmington government

in 1898 as one that was predominantly black and encouraged lawlessness. It claimed that on the

day of the riot, November 10th, “competent white men” took the place of the foolish and

incapable black men who ruled. In 1940, “North Carolina for Boys and Girls” taught that “there 11

were many Negro office-holders in the eastern part of the state, some of whom were poorly fitted

for their tasks.” These narratives remained present in textbooks until 2006 after the 12

11 Tim Tyson, “Ghosts of 1898” Raleigh News & Observer, November 17th, 2006. 3 12 Ibid., 3.

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Commission’s release. Prior to the Commission, the absence of violence in the narrative fit a

larger context of Redemption. Instead of recognizing violence, dominant narratives reflected a

need to protect white communities from the risks associated with black power, such as violence

against white women and social devolution.

In 1995, a group of academics from UNC-Wilmington, leaders of the black community,

and civil rights activists formed the Alliance for Community Trust (ACT). ACT desired to create

“greater connectedness, meaning, and future opportunity” in Wilmington through a direct

examination of Wilmington’s history. They consulted Isaiah Madison, the previous director of

the Institute for Southern Studies in Durham, to trace Wilmington’s racial tensions. He

determined that Wilmington still faced intense racial tensions which demanded “a genuine

community of memory, one that will remember stories not only of suffering inflicted--dangerous

memories for they call the community to alter ancient evils.” Their efforts in 1995 were quickly

tempered. In June 1995, Hurricane Bertha hit New Hanover County and left over $250 million

worth of damages and a need for redevelopment. Wilmington’s political elite worried that

memory efforts might challenge the efforts to rebuild after the hurricane. Additionally, black

residents worried that this memory effort would overshadow positive memories, such as the

pride within the high school. 13

With these concerns in mind, the ACT shifted their scope and created a new group: the

1898 Centennial Commission. This group would “tell the story, heal the wound, and honor the

memory” of the race riot. Although they hoped to have a story representative of both white and

black perspectives, they struggled to recruit members from the “two extreme poles of

13 Margaret M. Mulrooney, Race, Place, and Memory: Deep Currents in Wilmington, North Carolina (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2018). 257-58

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Wilmington society, the old-time white elite and the old-time black working class.” Much like 14

the state-sponsored Wilmington Race Riot Commission, they tried to calculate the economic

damage caused by the riot. Economic justice through reparations was the end goal for this group.

However, they both lacked evidence and risked losing the white community’s support. The 1898

Centennial Commission claimed in a final statement that while, “many African Americans had

their livelihoods and property unjustly taken away, seeking reparations or other acts of

redress...is something best left to the descendants of those whose property was taken.” Soon after

this statement, the co-chair quit the 1898 Centennial Commission because the burden of seeking

justice was put on descendants. With her departure, the group was then forced to take a new

approach. 15

The 1898 Foundation emerged as a third iteration of grassroots efforts that would

commemorate the Wilmington Race Riot. They took guidance from organizing efforts in Tulsa,

which resulted in a ceremony in 1996 to commemorate a race riot that occurred in 1921. The

Tulsans who led the commemoration assured the 1898 Centennial Commission that event-based

commemoration would offer peaceful and meaningful results. Thus, the 1898 Centennial

Commission renamed themselves as the 1898 Foundation and used the “Tulsa model” of

remembrance: a series of events that would engage the Wilmington community.

With an aim to disrupt the popular historical narrative, the 1898 Foundation spearheaded

a multifaceted centennial commemoration project that hoped to help Wilmington heal after 100

years. In 1997, the 1898 Foundation took many steps to offer “an appropriate remembrance” for

the Wilmington Race Riot. Their efforts differed from those of the later Wilmington Race Riot 16

14 Ibid., 258. 15 Ibid., 259 16 Ibid., 260

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Commission in significant ways. The Foundation was a privately funded through local grassroots

efforts rather than on a state-sponsored funding. The Foundation’s Centennial events spanned

over a year of collaboration between the community and its local government. Descendants of

victims had the opportunity to tell their stories and face descendants of perpetrators. With

perspectives from residents, local officials, state political leaders, and scholars, the Foundation

offered a multifaceted approach to historical justice.

The leadership of these events allowed for a potential collaboration between government

and residents, but raised questions about the commemoration’s audience. In late 1997, James

Leutze, University of North Carolina Wilmington chancellor, facilitated a conversation with the

previous leaders of the Alliance for Community Transformation, Bolton Anthony and Bertha

Todd. The chancellor, Todd, Anthony, along with the mayor, chief of police, and the city

manager worked on a course of action for the centennial. The city leaders wanted to be directly

involved in planning given the significance of the anniversary and asked to join the 1898

Foundation, who had already begun plans for a public commemoration. After an agreement to

collaborate, the new executive council of the Foundation now consisted of community members,

three representatives appointed by the city, three from the county, and three from the chamber.

However, with oversight from the government, African American residents worried that the

history might be “elite” and not reflect their identities. Mary Thatch criticized the event’s 17

execution, describing that it was a “horse and pony show” by and for the Wilmington

government. The impact of these events depended on the leadership, making a multifaceted 18

perspective imperative in the execution.

17 Ibid., 260-265.; Melton A. McLaurin, "Commemorating Wilmington's Racial Violence of 1898: From Individual to Collective Memory," Southern Cultures 6, no. 4 (2000), http://www.jstor.org/stable/26236941. 45 18 Wilson Daily. “Workshop Focuses on Wilmington Riots,” November 11th, 2003.

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As 1998 began, the Foundation carried out a series of events that sought to “heal the

wounds of 1898.” These events engaged a wide range of perspectives through different 19

mediums, cites, and lenses. In January, they hosted a kick-off event attended by over six hundred

people, including North Carolina governor Jim Hunt, to mark the opening of an exhibit at the

Cape Fear Museum exploring the massacre. The Foundation then organized a series of talks

called “Wilmington in Black and White,” which fostered dialogue between descendants of the

riot. Education through public discussions and history created a dialogue that might influence a

narrative that included violence. 20

A Black History Month event in February brought to light the still contested narratives

about the events in 1898. Kenneth Davis, George Rountree, and John Haley discussed the 1898’s

personal significance in front of the large crowd, recognizing the varied salience it had based on

their identities. Davis and Haley both came from Wilmington’s African American community.

Davis was a direct descendant and Haley a historian on the subject. Rountree’s grandfather had

participated in the overthrow. He celebrated his grandfather and did not present his story as 21

violent. Instead, he upheld his grandfather as a leader in his community. Davis pushed back;

Rountree’s grandfather may have had a distinguished leadership position, but this role facilitated

violence rather than community connection. Despite Davis’ argument, Rountree retorted that

there may have been violence, but Rountree himself bore no responsibility today because he was

not alive during the time. This event, among the many others, not only suggested a contested 22

19 University of North Carolina Wilmington Randall Archive, The 1898 Foundation. https://library.uncw.edu/web/collections/1898foundation/ 20 Leslie H. Hossfeld, Narrative, Political Unconscious, and Racial Violence in Wilmington, North Carolina. (Routledge, 2005). 253 21 Mulrooney, 255 22 Ibid., 265-262

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narrative, but a larger challenge in reconciliation efforts. Many of these competing narratives

remained entrenched in families. Reconciliation would require not only an undoing of the

narratives, but also their ties to personal identity.

On November 10th, the actual centennial of the Race Riot, Wilmington residents

gathered to recognize the significance of 1898. A local white woman, Anne Russell, wrote and

performed a play called No More Sorrow to Arise. Russell re-wrote the White Man’s Declaration

of Independence that was read by Alfred Waddell in 1898. She instead titled it a “People’s

Declaration of Racial Interdependence,” and proclaimed a manifesto of racial justice. At Thalian

Hall, a center for performing arts, residents gathered for a public acknowledgement and prayer

from the local government. On National Public Radio, community artists such as Rhonda 23

Bellamy, Lloyd Wilson, Scott Simpson, and George Scheibner performed a dramatic reading of

Cape Fear Rising, a play about the Wilmington Race Riot. Commemorative events not only 24

took the form of a ceremony, but theatre, conversation, and public broadcast.

The Foundation, although multifaceted, lacked resources to execute a plan after

November 10th that might address repercussions of the 1898 Race Riot. From its conception, the

Foundation had a difficult time finding economic support for their project. Those with full time

positions received half of their salary while part time positions did not get pay, even with diligent

work. The Foundation mostly relied on private donations. Foundations such as the North Street

Foundation and the Z. Smith Reynolds Foundation, both family owned, funded some of the 1898

Foundation’s work. The city of Wilmington provided $15,000, which was not nearly enough to

complete what had initially been envisioned. Many blacks suspected that white members of the

23 Ibid., 270-272 24 The 1898 Foundation. University of North Carolina Randall Library Digital Collection. https://library.uncw.edu/web/collections/1898foundation/

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executive council had been using funds for their own personal use. This suspicion caused the

resignation of the Foundation’s co-chair, Anthony Todd. Margaret Mulrooney, a community

member and scholar questioned the Foundation’s financial viability and future without

government support, perhaps from the federal government. Without a larger financial support 25

system, the Foundation struggled to make it past November 10th.

The centennial celebration promoted a better understanding of the violence in 1898 and

to some extent, they succeeded in doing so. Leslie Hossfeld sociological study about the impact

of the 1898 Foundation on political consciousness in Wilmington revealed that the events shed a

new light on the riot. One African American participant of the commemoration noted that the

events spawned all the dialogue groups across town talking about race and those types of

things.” Another white participant and newcomer to the community learned that “it was bloody, 26

there were lots of people floating in the river, that it was much more of a massacre than we have

ever been told it was.” Many Members of the Wilmington community, both black and white, 27

pointed to the immense violence and questioned why it had remained shrouded until 1998 given

that it maintained both local and statewide significance.

However, many white residents still did not recognize the contemporary salience of the

Riot’s legacy. Hossfeld points to the centrality of color-blind liberalism, an ideology where

everyone has equal opportunity regardless of race, in the final products of the commemoration.

Few people understood why the event remained significant because no one was alive from 1898

to take the blame. The rhetoric of the commemoration encouraged this, fueling residents to

25Mulrooney, 270 26 Hossfeld, 107. 27 Ibid., 115.

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“move forward together.” Although complex and multifaceted, the Foundation could not undo 28

the narrative that erased violence against blacks in Wilmington.

As a continuation of the work from the 1898 Foundation, state representatives Thomas E.

Wright and Luther B. Jordan sponsored Senate Bill 787 two years years later with the intention

of writing an official, state-sponsored history. In section 17, the General Assembly charged a 29

group, labeled the Wilmington Race Riot Commission, with the task of “developing a history.”

The General Assembly described methods through which the Commission could take this on.

The Commission, according to the bill:

shall gather information, including oral testimony from descendants of those affected by the riot or others, examine documents and writings, and otherwise take such actions as may be necessary or proper in accurately identifying information having historical significance to the 1898 Wilmington Race Riot. 30

The Commission could also submit a final list of recommendations along with the official report

to the General Assembly. The language in the bill did not specify the final intentions of this 31

effort other than recommendations. It was not necessarily designed as a means of historical

justice. In his initial presentation of the bill, Thomas E. Wright asserted that the charge of the

Commission could invigorate a “vital dialogue” in the state, but the purpose of this dialogue

remained unclear. Five years later when the report was released, however, Wright clarified he

thought the dialogue should be about the foundation of racism in North Carolina. 32

28 Ibid., 121; The 1898 Foundation. https://library.uncw.edu/web/collections/1898foundation/ 29 Between 1998 and 2000, it is unclear what occurred to facilitate the creation of the Wilmington Race Riot Commission. Although Irving Joyner mentioned that Thomas E. Wright and Luther B. Jordan had lobbied members of the state legislature between the end of the centennial celebrations and the passing of SB 787, his claim cannot be corroborated. I looked through newspapers from the time and asked other participants such as Tim Tyson and David Cecelski, however, there is no information that described the intentions behind the creation of this Commission other than continuing the work of the 1898 Foundation. 30 North Carolina General Assembly, SB 787: The Studies Act. 8 31 Ibid., 9 32 Wilmington Race Riot Commission. 1898 Wilmington Race Riot Report. (Raleigh: 2005), 12

22

The initial legislation also provided guidance for how the Commissioners would be

selected. There would be 13 members, who would each serve over a two year period. The

President Pro Tempore of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, and Governor would each

appoint three members. The Mayor, City Council of the City of Wilmington, and The New

Hanover County Commissioners would each appoint two members. The General Assembly was

authorized to appoint two chairs. Eventually, they chose Thomas E. Wright and Luther B. 33

Jordan, who had initially sponsored the Commission. 34

The thirteen members represented different parts of both the city and state community.

Thomas E. Wright and Luther B. Jordan, both state representatives from New Hanover County,

chaired the Commission. However, given that Luther B. Jordan died shortly before the

Commission began, Irving Joyner, a professor from North Carolina Central University and

lawyer for the Wilmington Ten, replaced him as co-chair. Additionally, some group members 35

came from an academic background, such as John Haley. John Haley worked at University of

North Carolina Wilmington and focused on African American history. Most of the

Commissioners came from the Wilmington community. Lottie Clinton, Helyn Lofton, Kenneth

Davis, and Ruth Haas represented unique parts of the community. Harper Peterson was mayor 36

at the time. The Commission had a multiracial make-up; about half were African American and

the other half were white.

33 SB 787: The Studies Act. 7 34 North Carolina Center for Cultural Resources. 1898 Wilmington Race Riot Commission. https://www.ncdcr.gov/about/history/1898-race-riot 35 Martha Quillin. Raleigh News & Observer, “Why Dig Up the Past?” June 25, 2006 https://www.newsobserver.com/news/local/article10361309.html 36 Ed Gordon. National Public Radio. “Report Re-examines 1898 Wilmington Race Riots. June 26, 2006. https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5495042

23

Compared to the 1898 Foundation, the Commission held a uniquely powerful position

since it was formed by the state legislature. The Commission had the “elite power” that the

Foundation lacked through economic and statewide support that the General Assembly

provided. Within the language of the initial charge, the General Assembly “authorized” the 37

Commission to develop the history. The state’s authorization suggested their approval for the

task and their personal ties to the events in 1898. Similarly, newspapers and state 38

representatives alike claimed that the role of the Commission was to issue an “official” history. 39

Statewide legitimacy could, through its recommendations, open the door for greater forms of

action, like business development plan or the building of a monument. According to Commission

chair Thomas E. Wright the Commission could promote “economic development” or “a

permanent marker or a memorial of the site” once the study concluded. The power granted by 40

the state allowed for the Commission to access statewide resources that the Foundation could

not.

The Wilmington Race Riot Commission was not the only group to seek to rewrite history

as a form of justice; the group followed a similar pattern of truth-telling that occurred within the

United States and abroad. Truth Commissions served as an important way to start historical

redress efforts with hopes of justice for the community. Most famously, in 1996, the South

African Truth and Reconciliation Commission gathered victims and perpetrators in order to have

an “official report” about what occurred during Apartheid. Throughout Latin America, similar

37 Mulrooney, 260. 38 SB 787, 8 39 Mike Baker. The Washington Post. “1898 Race Clash Ruled a Coup,” June 1st, 2006. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2006/06/01/1898-race-clash-ruled-a-coup-span-classbankheadpanel-asks-nc-to-consider-reparationsspan/e7a816c4-262c-4d87-862f-1adb8cc4fdaa/?utm_term=.9ea0b3e5b402 40 Burlington Times News. “Residents to Talk About 1898 Race Riots, Deaths,” June 29th, 2003.

24

commissions have occurred in order to investigate dictatorships and establish impact.

Governments have had different intentions in creating state-sponsored investigatory bodies.

Punishing perpetrators, establishing the truth, repairing or addressing damages, paying respect to

victims, and reforming institutions emerged as possible outcomes. 41

The General Assembly ultimately funded the Commission’s project for four years

although initially funding it for only two. SB 787 had initially guaranteed funding for the

Commission for the first two years of the project, a length that seemed suitable given the short

tenures of the commissions in Tulsa and Rosewood. Although the Commission members did 42

not receive and compensation for their work, funding covered rental fees for space,

transportation, and other costs incurred. Additionally, labor from the North Carolina Department

of Cultural Resources provided free labor, which included the employment of LeRae Umfleet

and the report’s creation. With work nowhere near completion in 2002, Wright successfully 43

reapplied for funding for another two years. Funding ended in 2005 which conveniently 44

intersected with the completion of the report.

The Wilmington Race Riot Commission’s execution varied in length from the Tulsa and

Rosewood commissions, which might have influenced funding. Michael Hill, a staff person from

the Department of Cultural Resources, noted that the Rosewood commission only took six

months to write their report and left them with additional funding. The Tulsa Race Riot 45

41 Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths :Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions (New York: Routledge, 2011), 8 42 SB 787, 12. 43 Ibid., 12 44 North Carolina Department of Natural and Cultural Resources, Wilmington Race Riot Commission Meeting 6 (Raleigh: 2000-2005). Page 4 45 North Carolina Department of Natural and Cultural Resources, Wilmington Race Riot Commission Meeting 4 (Raleigh: 2000-2005). Page 3

25

Commission took two years to write their report and produced a thorough interpretation of what

happened based on the limited evidence available. The Wilmington Race Riot Commission took

five years to complete their report and another year to edit it for the public.

The senate bill did not explicitly state that the Commission was a redress-driven body,

but instead asked the group to determine the historical significance. Co-chair Thomas Wright

described the commission as having the intention to “develop a record of the events and examine

their legacy, especially on black businesses statewide.” “Historical significance” could 46

encompass so many factors of the riot. It could include tracing the long term impact between

1898 and 2000. It might mean tracing a continuum between the 1898 riots and 1971 riots. Karen

M. Inouye, in reference to Japanese Internment, describes the “afterlife” of an event. Some

atrocities, according to Inouye can have lasting impact that can take many forms: reluctance to

tell the history, fear, anxiety, or impact on community relations. Historical significance for the 47

Wilmington Race Riot could have included an assessment of the “afterlife” as described by

Inouye, but instead focused on the tangible. The Wilmington Race Riot Commission interpreted

this guideline as a mission to calculate the economic damage caused by the riot.

The Wilmington Race Riot Commission directly drew upon other state-sponsored

commissions in the United States which had been established to deal with a history of racial

violence, much like the global truth commissions. Oklahoma and Florida addressed their own

violent histories through writing an official report that identified key actors, damages and

recommendations. In 1993, the Oklahoma state legislature established the Tulsa Race Riot

Commission. Their Commission grappled with a contested story of the destruction of Black Wall

46 Ibid. 4 47 Karen M. Inouye, The Long Afterlife of Nikkei Wartime Incarceration (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2016). 8

26

Street in 1921, which involved both state and federal police forces. In 1994, the Rosewood

legislature called upon historians to write a state-sponsored report about the 1923 massacre that

resulted in the destruction of a free Black town and forced many residents to flee the state. Each 48

of the commissions investigated, wrote a report, then presented it to the state government with a

set of recommendations.

The Tulsa and Rosewood commissions took on direct efforts toward reparations. The

Tulsa Commission found $16 million worth of damages after the riot. The magnitude of damages

warranted at least a request for reparations. However, the Oklahoma government refused to offer

victims reparations. In Rosewood, the Commission only used $50,000 of the $2.1 million

initially allocated. Although the government did not themselves award reparations, survivors

received the bulk of the funds. The legislature deposited the remainder into a scholarship fund

for African American residents. However, like the Wilmington Race Riot Commission, neither 49

Rosewood nor Tulsa first intended to give reparations to descendants.

While in Tulsa and Rosewood the commissions at least had recommendations in their

purview, the Wilmington Commission seemed ambivalent about reparations. From the

Commission’s first meeting, Thomas E. Wright shut down any conversations about economic

reparations, arguing that they were not key goals in the project. Wright discouraged members

from thinking about reparations as a final product. The minutes read that, “Rep. Wright distanced

himself from that word, indicating that the number of variables associated with such a process

would make the concept invalid.Kenneth Davis suggested that instead, they use the concept of

48 James T. Campbell, "Settling Accounts? an Americanist Perspective on Historical Reconciliation," The American Historical Review 114, no. 4 (2009), http://www.jstor.org/stable/23882941. 969-970. 49 Ibid., 3.

27

restoration. As I discuss in the final chapter, their recommendations echoed Davis’ reframing 50

and suggested a business development plan in Wilmington. In public interviews, Wright 51

neglected any possibility of reparations. In 2003, he relayed, that reparations were “not the intent

or the expressed intent of the commission.” The final recommendations, “may include

suggestions for a permanent marker or memorial of the riot and whether to designate the event as

a historical site,” but not any sort of economic packages for descendants. He reasoned that the

Commission’s intentions, first and foremost, were to create an “official history” for permanent

record. 52

Wright’s immediate recognition of monetary reparations as a central issue reflected the

heated debate amongst scholars. They contest reparations’ importance in contemporary

communities, given that many victims of historical injustice are not alive today. Alfred Brophy,

in assessing the case for reparations in Tulsa, developed a four-part test to assess whether an

historical injustice should qualify for reparations. He suggested that victims must still be alive,

the state must be culpable, the events must be concentrated in a specific time and a place, and

people at the time must have recognized that an injustice occurred. He affirms that reparations 53

can serve as a powerful and necessary tool for redress. Other scholars, such as Angelique Davis,

specifically ask for reparations for enslavement and Jim Crow violence given their lasting impact

and contemporary repercussions. For example, Davis points to the ways in which slavery’s 54

50 North Carolina Department of Natural and Cultural Resources, Wilmington Race Riot Commission Meeting 1, (Raleigh: 2000-2005). 3 51 Ibid., 4 52 Burlington Times News. “Residents to Talk About 1898 Race Riots, Deaths,” June 29th, 2003. 53 Alfred L. Brophy, Reconstructing the Dreamland :The Tulsa Riot of 1921 : Race, Reparations, and Reconcilation (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 104 54 Angelique M. Davis, "Apologies, Reparations, and the Continuing Legacy of the European Slave Trade in the United States," Journal of Black Studies 45, no. 4 (2014), http://www.jstor.org/stable/24572848. Angelique M. Davis, "Apologies, Reparations, and the Continuing Legacy of the European Slave Trade in the United States," Journal of Black Studies 45, no. 4 (2014), 271-286. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24572848. 273.

28

legacy lives today. She points to a few among many of the lingering impacts. Black children are

less likely than white counterparts to have a higher income than their parents; African Americans

have a higher infant mortality rate; there are higher rates of HIV diagnoses within the black

community. Although public officials have given apologies for the atrocity of enslavement, 55

very few propose remedial measures to thwart its legacy.

There are of course, many scholars, policy makers, and constituents who disagree with

reparations. Some argue that descendants should not have to suffer consequences of their

forefathers’ actions. Others argue that it does not remedy the serious harms done in the past. 56

They suggest that a simple lump-sum of money does not cure every aspect of a historical

injustice. Instead, a trust, perhaps in the form of educational funds or business development, may

offer more substantial repair. These argument were central to many who opposed reparations 57

in Wilmington. 58

The Wilmington Race Riot Commission emerged on the coattails of the 1898

Foundation’s commemorative efforts and built upon their important work. The Foundation

created spaces for public dialogue and recognition, but did not act beyond November 10th, 1998.

The Commission thus offered what the Foundation could not: government support and a

possibility of action. Federal resources and the ability to authorize an “official” narrative allowed

the Commission to commemorate the violence through different means. The Commission took

direction from Tulsa and Rosewood in completing their task. However, from the very beginning,

55 Ibid., 278 56 Alfred L. Brophy, "What should Inheritance Law be? Reparations and Intergenerational Wealth Transfers," Law and Literature 20, no. 2 (2008) http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/lal.2008.20.2.197. 206 57 https://muse.jhu.edu/article/47386/pdf 58 Hossfeld, 111

29

they acknowledged that reparations would not be included in the completion of the

Commission’s charge.

The Commission faced a daunting task of unearthing and writing a history. Although

given some direction from the General Assembly, the Commission still encountered a lack of

information. To write their history, they would need to determine how to calculate economic

impact, how to describe what occurred in 1898 if it was not a riot, and how to change a biased

narrative.

30

Chapter 2: Establishing Impact

In historical redress efforts that have taken place around the world, nations and local

communities have attempted to understand the magnitude and details of different historical

injustices. They ask: how many people died? What was destroyed? How and why did violence

occur? How might a new investigation change previous understandings of the event? The 59

answers to these questions seek transparency for victims and descendants about what occurred in

the past. Transparency plays a critical role in various forms of redress, be it an apology or a truth

commission. Some scholars see transparency as central to ensuring that the victims, perpetrators,

and their descendants understand why things are the way they are. More importantly, answers 60

to these missing pieces can provide justice by designating a sense of what happened and who

should pay the damages.

In the case of the Wilmington Race Riot Commission, measuring the damage and the

impact of the riot involved a broad investigation because much of what occurred in 1898 was

unclear. Through their close examination of oral histories, economic data, and even historical

fiction, the Commission sought to craft an official narrative for the General Assembly. However,

they faced some limitations. After a hundred years, no victims were still alive to tell their story,

nor did any reports exist that documented the number of deaths or displaced people. With these

challenges at hand, the Commission still attempted to create an inclusive history that disrupted

existing biased narratives.

59 Hazan, 9. 60 Richard Vernon, Historical Redress :Must we Pay for the Past? (London; New York; 4: Continuum, 2012). 14.

31

The lack of hard evidence created a real challenge for the Commission. The debates

around the Wilmington race riot shaped the Commission’s scope and their methodological

decisions. Biases ran rampant throughout narratives of November 10th, 1898. Those narratives

eliminated not only white accountability, but the possibility of ongoing damage. Many in the

black community did not believe they needed empirical evidence to determine both the initial

and lasting impact after 1898. An understanding of these debates underscored the significance of

the Commission’s methodological decisions and the methodologies the Commission adopted

reflected these challenges.

This chapter first explores the debates about what occurred in 1898. The Commission

hoped to disrupt the story that erased racial terror. It then looks into the evidence available to the

Commission. Although limited, some data still existed that allowed the Commission to complete

their charge. Given the importance of the Commission’s methodological approach, I interrogate

the mechanisms used to create this new narrative. Finally, I investigate the challenges the

Commission faced in confronting more ambiguous evidence. Certain aspects of the impact

remained unquantifiable, and thus hampered the possibility the commission developing of a

definitive narrative. Although faced with this challenge, the Commission worked to craft a

history to the best of their ability.

Given the difficult task of establishing a new history, the Commission had conflicting

opinions on what their scope should be. Helyn Lofton, a community member and employee of

the Cape Fear Museum, suggested that they concentrate on the impact the Riot had on education

for black people in the state. Kenneth Davis noted an absence of a stories of black success 61

61 Wilmington Race Riot Commission Meeting 1. 3

32

within Wilmington and proposed that their investigation should include attention to the powerful

black elite in Wilmington. Focusing on their success, Davis argued, could illuminate a story of

“what could have been.” Historian John Haley, however, pushed back. If the Commission 62

crafted a story based on hypotheses instead of evidence, it would be “purely speculative.” 63

Certain long term impacts, like segregation and disenfranchisement, could not be correlated

without data. From the get-go, the Commission acknowledged the magnitude of their task.

In Senate Bill 787, the General Assembly required the Wilmington Race Riot

Commission to establish the historical significance and the economic impact of the riot. To 64

assess impact, the Wilmington Commission investigated records left behind, including but not

limited to newspaper articles, census records, and photographs of the destruction. If they could 65

establish economic impact, according to Lottie Clinton and Kenneth Davis, they could better

interpret the legacy of 1898 and how it continued to impact life for African Americans in

Wilmington. Additionally, an economic analysis could provide empirical evidence that would 66

intervene in the debates on whether or not the event shaped North Carolina’s political climate.

Although tasked with calculating the economic impact, the Commission also grappled

with the convoluted language used to describe the events in 1898. ‘Riot,’a term used by

historians in describing November 10th, masked what it actually was: a violent attempt to

overthrow a successful black government. As with many instances of historical redress, debates

62 Ibid., 1 63 Ibid., 3 64 SB 787: The Studies Act. 8 65 North Carolina Department of Natural and Cultural Resources, Wilmington Race Riot Commission Meeting 8 (Raleigh: 2000-2005). Page 3 66 North Carolina Department of Natural and Cultural Resources, Wilmington Race Riot Commission Meeting 1 (Raleigh: 2000-2005). Page 3; North Carolina General Assembly, 1898 Wilmington Race Riot Report. (Raleigh, 2006). 5.

33

about legacy start with the language used to describe the events. Tim Tyson, in his article on the

Wilmington Race Riot and its legacy, challenged the dominant language. For over a hundred

years, he claimed, “historians have obscured the triumph of white domination calling it a ‘race

riot,’ though it was not the spontaneous outbreak of mob violence that the word ‘riot’

suggests.” Historians cloaked the terror that occurred through language and in the process did 67

not hold white people accountable. Evidence suggests that the Wilmington Race Riot was not at

all spontaneous. Newspapers, eyewitnesses and participants alike attested to the careful planning

and violent execution of the overthrow. Leaders of the overthrow directed their peers to “go to 68

the polls tomorrow, and if you find the negro out voting, tell him to leave the polls. If he refuses,

kill him.” White supremacists had the clear intention of killing and terrorizing the black 69

community in order to facilitate the government’s overthrow. Although ample firsthand evidence

of planned violence exists, historians accepted ‘riot,’ until 1983 when Leon Prather released the

first historical account of the Wilmington Race Riot in his work We Have Taken a City.

However, this language still appears in even in more progressive narratives of the events that

acknowledge the violence, which make the destruction appear as spontaneous and to erase white

responsibility.

The use of ‘riot’ by historians follows a linguistic trend that neglects white

accountability. English scholar Sheila Smith McKoy, in her monograph When Whites Riot,

unpacks the misuse of the term. ‘Riot’ invokes an image of spontaneous violence which suggests

that the terror occurred out of nowhere, and thus no one can be blamed. She argues that white

67 Tyson, “Ghosts of 1898” 3 68 H. Leon Prather, We have Taken a City :Wilmington Racial Massacre and Coup of 1898 (Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1984), 49-50 69 Leon Prather in Democracy Betrayed :The Wilmington Race Riot of 1898 and its Legacy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 31.

34

violence is coded as a ‘race riot’ as a mechanism of white supremacy. Even if they 70

acknowledge that the violence happened, white people do not get blamed or held accountable for

it. They excuse their behavior with an explanation that they protected society from “social

devolution.” White people, who hold more racial privilege, get to decide the language that is 71

used and thus do not get held accountable. Throughout Jim Crow in the United States and

Apartheid in South Africa, the description of white violence riots downplayed the role and

responsibility of perpetrators because of their role in preserving of civilized society. In the case 72

of Wilmington specifically, white people used violence to overthrow an increasingly powerful

black elite. However, the use of ‘riot’ in the following decades to describe the event erased white

perpetratorship.

While the dominant narratives all described 1898 as a spontaneous riot, members of the

black community stood firm in their belief: the events in 1898 were and should not be considered

a riot. The violence was carefully planned and did not occur out of nowhere. The stories of

violence that echoed throughout black communities in Wilmington and beyond, focused on the

deliberate violence whites caused. William Barber, a North Carolina-based reverend and activist,

compared the overthrow to the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001. He argued that

November 10th made September 11th look “pale in comparison” and could be considered a case

of terrorism. Black residents in Wilmington shared Barber’s perspective.. An interviewee from 73

Leslie Hossfeld’s sociological study on the impact of commemoration reported:

70 Sheila Smith McKoy, When Whites Riot :Writing Race and Violence in American and South African Cultures (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2001), 170. 71 Ibid., 21 72 Ibid., 7 73 North Carolina Department of Natural and Cultural Resources, Wilmington Race Riot Commission Meeting 23, (Raleigh: 2000-2005). 2-3

35

...you could see blood, actually in the Cape Fear River. That there were bodies there. Bodies strewn about...It was far greater than nine or twelve. From my perspective, as well as I can remember, and the old folks, you know many of them weren’t very well educated, but they just say something like a whole heap of them’ or hundreds and hundred, and you know that it probably wasn’t 4 or 5 hundred, when they say hundreds and hundreds, you know, it’s more than 12 and more than a hundred. 74

This interviewee offered a rough approximation of the number of deaths after the riot. However,

he was clear that the initial count was inaccurate. Based on oral accounts, the Wilmington Race

Riot Commission encountered a debate about how many had died. Oral accounts, like Barber’s

and the interviewee’s, provided an intervention to the biased narrative.

Black residents of North Carolina also saw the Wilmington Race Riot as the fall of a

successful black city that could have flourished. Prior to 1898, Wilmington held a unique

position as a successful port. The city had a population of 11,324 African Americans and 8,731

Whites. Black residents owned most businesses. Fusionist leaders, both white and black, 75

dominated local government and implemented progressive policies. The riot and overthrow thus

marked a downfall of black success. William Barber proposed this shift as a theme for a

documentary about the overthrow: “Wilmington Would Have Been Atlanta Today, but for the

Terrorist Attack of the Daniels-Carr Crew.” His comparison to Atlanta reflected the prospects of

success in Wilmington had the Riot not occurred. Atlanta today is a cosmopolitan, tourist-driven

city, with a large black population. Barber was not alone in his disappointment over

Wilmington’s lost opportunity. Luther Jordan, resident and state representative, actively fought

for the Commission’s scope to include Wilmington’s pre-riot success in their narrative. 76

74 Hosfeld, 116 75 Tim Tyson, “Ghosts of 1898” 4 76 Wilmington Race Riot Commission Meeting 1. 2.

36

Including the imminent opportunity prior to the riot in the narrative, according to Jordan, might

have given magnitude to the destruction.

Black members of the Commission shared the opinion that the contemporary racial

climate took shape because of the political foundation laid in 1898. In his remarks in the

introduction of the Commission’s report, Kenneth Davis expressed this sentiment:

We must remove the diabolical stain of racism from the fabric of freedom and democracy that still exist in Wilmington today. It exists in the gentrification of black communities, it exists in the attempts to resegregate schools, it exists in hiring and promotions practices in the public and private sector and it exits in the distorted historical facts of the events of 1898. 77

Davis traced a continuum of violence that began during the Riot and contributed to continued

tensions almost a hundred years later. He was not the only one who held this opinion; Lottie

Clinton, when reflecting upon the importance of the Commission, eluded to the contemporary

fear that events, like what occurred in Wilmington, could happen again. With opinions like 78

these present, the Commission disrupted a narrative that ignored the long-term political impact of

the violence of 1898. Wilmington’s fall meant far more than an isolated instance of violence. It

created the current basis for the living conditions of the North Carolina black community today.

Black Commission members were not wrong. Nearly seventy-five years after the events

in 1898, racial violence in Wilmington would take a similar form when white residents in fought

vehemently against public school integration. David Cecelski and Tim Tyson describe that

“buildings burned every night. White vigilantes roared through the city, spraying bullets from

rooftops downtown. Racial violence in the newly integrated public schools threatened to bring

public education to a halt.” John Godwin, a historian of Wilmington racial politics, argues that 79

77 North Carolina General Assembly, 1898 Wilmington Race Riot Report. 10 78 Ed Gordon. National Public Radio. “Report Re-examines 1898 Wilmington Race Riots.” 79 Cecelski and Tyson, Democracy Betrayed :The Wilmington Race Riot of 1898 and its Legacy, 1

37

the intersection of the riot and the rise of the tobacco and furniture industries during the early

twentieth century led to a racially conservative climate. White people not only disenfranchised

black people, but put them in labor positions that would fuel the state economy. The Wilmington

Race Riots, he argues, “gave progressive-minded white leaders good reason to follow a path of

racial moderation.” Racial progressivism, according to Godwin, evolved into intense 80

conservativism. With a the tone set by the white perpetrators in 1898, violence and domination

remained endemic to the North Carolina racial political climate.

Given its contemporary significance, the Wilmington Race Riot Commission used a wide

range of sources to challenge some of the existing biased narratives of 1898. Newspaper reports

and business directories from the time neglected white violence and minimized the riot’s impact

on the black community. Newspapers covered when the event happened and who was involved,

but did not detail how many people died. Oral histories from descendants gave more information

and offered a personal perspective of how the violence impacted descendants’ lives. Though this

offered some evidence, a lot was still missing. The Commission, in collaboration with LeRae

Umfleet, tackled these primary sources and confronted the biases in the process.

In 1898, North Carolina newspapers galvanized white supremacists before and after the

riots and blamed black people for the violence. On November 11th, the Wilmington Star

reported, “Bloody Conflict With Negroes White Men forced to Take Up Arms for the

Preservation of Law and Order.” Four days later, the Raleigh News & Observer reported an 81

alderman’s interpretation of the events. He asserted, “In the riot, the negro was the aggressor. I

believe that the whites were doing God’s service, as the results for God have been felt in

80 John Godwin, Black Wilmington and the North Carolina Way: Portrait of a Community in the Era of Civil Rights Protest (New York: University Press of America, 2000). 15 81 Hossfeld, 40

38

business, in politics and in the Church.” Other reports claimed that only ten black people had 82

been killed and emphasized that black residents provoked the violence and white people

protected the town. White instigators burned down the only black newspaper in Wilmington, 83

which could have given a perspective from the victims. Newspapers at the time offered little

useable evidence of the role of white supremacy and denied the riot’s impact. 84

Fictional accounts from the time, like The Marrow of Tradition and Hanover or the

Persecution of Lowly, portrayed the riot differently than newspaper accounts. Black author

Charles Chesnutt in The Marrow of Tradition, explored a fictional instance of racial violence that

looked a lot like the Wilmington Race Riot. He told the story of a Black doctor in “Wellington,”

William Miller, who saved the life a white supremacist’s child. Much like Wilmington, a race 85

riot occurred in Wellington and resulted in the progressive government’s overthrow and a black

newspaper’s destruction. At three o’clock on a day in early November, the Wellington Riot

cultivated “darkness” throughout the city. Charles Chesnutt also described November 10th as a

“war battle” that prompted widespread killing. Hanover or the Persecution of Lowly more 86

explicitly described the race riot. Black journalist David Bryant Fulton, under the pseudonym of

Jack Thorne, wrote a veiled fictional account of the Wilmington Race Riot with a nameless

“editor,” probably Alexander Manly, and “Colonel,” or Alfred Waddell. The Colonel and other

white leaders organized an overthrow in response to the editor’s article on white womanhood. As

a result, the white mob stormed Wilmington, terrorized black citizens, and forced them to flee

82 Ibid., 41 83 Smith McKoy, When Whites Riot :Writing Race and Violence in American and South African Cultures, 170 48 84 Ibid., 48 85 Ibid., 50 86 Ibid., 65

39

their homes forever. Fictional interpretations, like Hanover and Marrow gave different 87

perspectives to that of newspapers and highlighted violence as central to the overthrow.

Fiction offers an important perspective when it comes to historical events, especially in

the black community. Genevieve Fabre and Robert O’Malley suggest that for African

Americans, sites of memory go beyond that of the typical historian. They see novels, poems,

slave narratives autobiographies, and oral testimonies as “crucial parts of the historical record.”

These varied repositories of individual memories, taken together, create a collective communal

memory.” For Toni Morrison, fiction allows blacks to participate in writing a history that they 88

could not contribute to beforehand. She argues that fiction, “is also critical for any person who is

black, or who belongs to any marginalized category, for, historically, we were seldom invited to

participate in the discourse even when we were its topic.” Given fiction’s ability to preserve a 89

narrative usually absent of black perspectives, historical fiction accounts could at least give some

insight into a history that differed from the dominant narrative.

A measurement of economic impact could determine what actually happened amidst

conflicting accounts of newspapers and historical fiction. With the few records left behind from

one hundred years ago, the Commission hoped they could measure economic impact using

empirical data. While anecdotal evidence about the riot’s impact existed, commissioners worried

that anecdotes would not provide definitive answers. If the Commission used anecdotal evidence,

they would not be able to guarantee accuracy in the final report. With no official death toll, the

Wilmington Race Riot Commission relied on business directories and census data to calculate

87Jack Thorne, Hanover or the Persecution of Lowly. 1900. University of North Carolina Southern Archive. 88 Geneviève Fabre and Robert G. O'Meally, History and Memory in African-American Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 321. 9. 89 Toni Morrison, The Cite of Memory. in Inventing the Truth: The Art and Craft of Memoir, William Zinsser (Boston; New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1995), 91

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who had died and what had been damaged. These sources provided names, ages, and house

values before and after 1898. Like the yellow pages today, business directories and censuses 90

offered information on individual residents and businesses in Wilmington. However, the

directory and census records did not give a sense of how businesses could decide to add their

names to the record. It was unclear whether they could opt in optionally, or if had to pay a fee to

include their information in the directory. This uncertainty presented a limitation and possible

bias in the sample. With the documents available, the Commission did not have key 91

information that could offer corroboration of anecdotal evidence.

The Commission decided that estimating the economic damage could offer give

substantial evidence of how the events in 1898 impacted African Americans in Wilmington. As

mentioned previously, the charge from the General Assembly asserted this need. The

Commission built off of Sue Cody’s work, who researched the Wilmington Race Riot’s

economic impact for her dissertation. Cody utilized deeds, tax records, census data, and 92

business directories from seven years before and after the riot to determine the damage. With the

guidance of Cody’s research, prior economic research on other race riots, and analysis from

external economists, the Commission tackled their charge.

The Commission also drew on the work of William J. Collins and Robert Margo from

2004. Collins and Margo had created a model to assess the impact of race riots and studied the

shift in property values after race riots during the 1960s. They determined that property values

90 Wilmington Race Riot Commission Meeting 23. 1 91 Ibid., 1 92 North Carolina Department of Natural and Cultural Resources, Wilmington Race Riot Commission Meetings 21 and 22, (Raleigh: 2004).

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decreased after race riots occurred across the country. Their conclusion indicated that race riots 93

caused white flight and fewer resources for predominantly black neighborhoods. They argued

that their study could have implications for policy makers who frequently neglected

concentrations of poverty in black neighborhoods. The Commission lacked a lot of the

information available to Margo and Collins, but built upon their methods. They looked

specifically into property and how its ownership shifted after 1898. The Commission employed 94

Tod Hamilton and William Darity, who built upon Cody’s equations that would show damage,

such as property loss or population displacement, over time. Hamilton and Darity calculated

damage with the Duncan Score Measure, an economic tool that detects how economic damage

changes from year to year, which Cody used in her research. The method used two variables:

self-reported occupation and the OCCScore, which is a value assigned to total median income.

Their calculation resulted in a final value that described the magnitude of damage after the race

riot.

Hamilton and Darity concluded that in Wilmington's black community, socioeconomic

status and property ownership decreased after 1898. They reported that fourteen percent of black

residents left Wilmington after 1898. Fewer black residents owned businesses. Occupations in

the black community no longer had as high of an income. Although they lacked some important

data that would give them exact numbers of how many people died or left, the data available

offered important estimations on damage. Darity and Hamilton established that, based on their

data, the riot had a “negative impact on black people in Wilmington.” 95

93William J. Collins and Robert A. Margo, "The Economic Aftermath of the 1960s Riots in American Cities: Evidence from Property Values," The Journal of Economic History 67, no. 4 (2007) http://www.jstor.org/stable/40056402. 855 94 1898 Wilmington Race Riot Report. 490 95 Ibid., 492

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Oral histories and community contributions corroborated the narrative produced through

hard evidence. Lottie Clinton and Kenneth Davis facilitated public forums throughout 2001 and

2002. There, community members and descendants offered their interpretations of the story.

Clinton and Davis also drew on already existing oral history resources, such as public

testimonies from the 1898 Foundation symposium and interviews from Duke University’s Center

for Documentary studies. Additionally, some Commission meetings were open to the public so 96

Wilmington residents could share their insights and artifacts. Newspapers throughout New

Hanover County called residents to contribute anything they had on the riot. In response, many

residents showed up to meetings frequently. 97

In the Commission’s final report, oral histories elaborated certain pieces of economic

evidence. For example, trends in oral accounts reiterated Darity and Hamilton’s claims of

economic impact. Although faced with the destruction of businesses and deaths of family

members, oral histories pointed to family and church as key modes of resilience. Additionally, 98

Kirk Allen, a progressive reverend in Wilmington at the time, emerged through the

Commission’s research as a critical leader after November 10th. The Commission 99

communicated that oral histories reified his significance throughout family narratives. Using oral

history, the Wilmington Race Riot Commission constructed a history that included some stories

of contemporary significance in the lives of descendants.

96 North Carolina Department of Natural and Cultural Resources, Wilmington Race Riot Commission Meeting 4, (Raleigh: 2000-2005). Page 3 97 “Archives Seek Descendants of Wilmington Riot.” Wilson Daily News. March 2, 2004; “Draft Report from Race Riot, due in Dec”. Kinston Free Press. October 10, 2005. 98 Wilmington Race Riot Report, 235. 99 Ibid., 440

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The Wilmington Race Riot Commission could not calculate every aspects of what was

impacted by the riot because some information could not be quantified. In the final report, Darity

and Hamilton presented a disclaimer. The case of Wilmington presented “special difficulties”

upon measurement. Over one hundred years had passed and they could not definitively

determine how many people had been killed. While it they could document a decline in black

voters after the riot, Darity and Hamilton admitted that “it is difficult to put a dollar value on the

right to vote.” Although non-quantifiable, these features were key components of the 100

Commission’s scope.

Although unable to find the exact number of deaths, the Commission looked into

personal accounts that would give more definition information. LeRae Umfleet explored the

inquests on November 12th, 1898, two days after the event, and found that only fourteen people

had been officially reported dead. She mentioned evidence of a mass grave somewhere, 101

although she could not determine its exact location. Umfleet also discovered conflicting 102

evidence in another report, where a coroner went through the city and picked up bodies of the

victims who could not afford a funeral. Beyond Umfleet’s findings, oral accounts described 103

stories of gunshot wounds after the riot. Finally, in Leslie Hossfeld sociological study,

interviewees remembered the river filled with bodies. Although these sources existed, they did

not offer an exact number of deaths. Firm numbers were important for the sake of both clarity

and accountability in Wilmington. However, they would never be found.

100 Ibid., 440 101 Ibid.., 440 102 Wilmington Race Riot Commission Meeting 21 Minutes. 2 103 Ibid., 3

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Many scholars look at how seeking truth can be a form of reparations. Alfred Brophy

argues that repair can emerge through an intentional shift of collective memory. Intellectual

reparations through an investigation of the past, he claims, can change our nation’s memories. 104

Through a direct exploration of our national history, Brophy suggest we can change our

collective understanding of what we inherited and how it occurred. Margaret Urban Walker

suggests something similar. She argues that while truth-telling should by no means be the only

form of reparations, it can be suitable and substantial form of redress in some cases. She claims,

“Reparative truth telling addresses two intertwined harms that often befall victims: their

epistemic impeachment and their degradation from moral status as of a credibly self-accounting

actor.” Historical injustice often displaces narratives of injustice and allows epistemologies 105

that deny what occurred to persist. This act within itself neglects the humanity of victims and

their descendants. With the ability to undo this, truth telling, Walker argues, can offer reparations

within itself.

The Commission encountered a challenge in establishing the impact of the riot. Although

certain pieces of damage could be represented by numerical data, other aspects could not be

quantified. As they grappled with what to do with this struggle, the Commission decided that

their response would be to first investigate, then to acknowledge what they could and could not

achieve. Tensions within their work raise important questions: is redress possible without

definitive facts? Is investigation enough? Who was the Commission’s investigation for in the

first place? With answers to these questions at stake, the Commission handed over the official

104 Alfred L. Brophy, "What should Inheritance Law be? Reparations and Intergenerational Wealth Transfers," Law and Literature 20, no. 2 (2008), 197-211. doi:10.1525/lal.2008.20.2.197. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/lal.2008.20.2. 208 105 Walker, Margaret Urban. “How Can Truth Telling Count as Reparations?” Klaus Neumann and Janna Thompson, eds. Historical Justice and Memory. (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2015) 139

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report to the General Assembly with the hope of widespread change. Once in the hands of the

General Assembly, however, this hope quickly shifted.

Chapter 3: Action & Accountability

Asked about the Commission’s impact, Irving Joyner leaned back in his chair, more

solemn than before. What was the change after the Commission? Was there any shift? “Not what

I had hoped for,” he claimed:

We go out with this big burst and you end with a whimper. We thought this would be a blockbuster for the state, and that the legislature would view what we came up with and feel some compassion, and need for the state to have some response on what had occurred and institute some actions that would help redevelop the Wilmington community at the end of the day, they got an official apology and that was it. 106

Irving Joyner’s lament illustrates a real gap between the intention and impact of the Commission.

The Wilmington Race Riot Commission hoped to offer more than just a narrative to descendants:

they sought economic redress, the rebuilding of black-owned spaces, and the construction of

memorials. They reached out to the Raleigh News & Observer, asking the newspaper to hold

themselves accountable for their role in the violence. Yet, despite their efforts to unearth

information, to collaborate with descendants, and to craft a narrative, the WRRC no longer

controlled the outcome after they handed their report over to the General Assembly.

Joyner’s discussion of impact points to the challenges of moving from telling truth to

creating transformation. The WRRC received a charge to unearth the history of the riot and to

106 Irving Joyner Interview, January 8th, 2019 17:53

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present recommendations. Implementing those recommendations, however, did not rest on their

shoulders. Like most attempts of redress, there was little control of statewide transformation of

the North Carolina community after the Commission presented its history and suggested action.

The Commission did get The News & Observer to accept its responsibility in the riot and to

communicate the new historical narrative about it, but they had no power over how the

newspaper special was received. The state legislature offered an apology and built a monument,

but they did not step up to acknowledge their role in the violence in the same way.

This chapter investigates the aftermath of the Wilmington Race Riot Commission by

examining the redress efforts undertaken by the North Carolina General Assembly and the

Raleigh News & Observer. Their relationships to the atrocity differ: in 1898, the General

Assembly responded with inaction. The News & Observer participated in the instigation of

violence through disseminating falsehoods about the nature of African Americans. After

finishing the investigation, the WRRC presented the Observer and the General Assembly with

possible opportunities to hold themselves accountable. Their responses offer insight into the

possibilities of repair as well as the limitations of the power of a Commission beyond

constructing a historical narrative.

On November 16th, 2006, the Raleigh News & Observer and Charlotte Observer

published a 16-page feature on the Wilmington Race Riot that discussed the critical role played

by the newspaper in instigating racialized violence. Written by Tim Tyson, the special edition

reiterated information offered in the Commission's final report. The eight sections mimicked the

Commission’s report chapters and mapped Wilmington’s trajectory from its success as a

metropolitan city to a port town with deeply ingrained racial disparities. As per recommendation

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from the NAACP and other Commission members, the Observer produced over a million copies

to be distributed in schools, universities, and community centers. Additionally, the newspaper 107

recruited Tim Tyson to write the piece. Tyson had just written Blood Done Sign My Name, a

book following a racialized murder and the processes of reconciliation and maintained deep

personal ties to Wilmington. Tyson’s recent fame and connection to Wilmington gave the

Commission a direct platform to uphold the new truths unearthed in a public manner. In

presenting this newly solidified history, the Observer piece thus offered a supplement to the

traditional public education and discourse which neglected the 1898 overthrow.

The feature held the newspaper accountable for the role that it played in facilitating the

events in 1898. In 1898, the newspaper had called for the punishment for black journalist

Alexander Manly, who publicly criticized white womanhood. This episode fueled the overthrow

of the Wilmington government and the destruction of the black-owned newspaper. Instead of

recognizing the overt attack on black residents of Wilmington, rumors circulated about

Alexander Manly. This aspect of the story circumscribed a contemporary understanding about

1898; black people deserved this violence because they challenged white dominance. 108

Challenging the impact of the News & Observer’s role, Tim Tyson identified and apologized for

the newspaper’s behavior: “A new social order was born in the blood and the flames, rooted in

what the News & Observer publisher Josephus Daniels, heralded as a ‘permanent good

government by the party of the White man.’” Daniels’ connection as perpetrator and editor 109

thus created a direct tie between the newspaper and the violence in 1898.

107 Irving Joyner interview, 37:15-41:00; North Carolina Department of Natural and Cultural Resources, Wilmington Race Riot Commission Meeting 23 1-3; DeSantis, “Wilmington, NC Revists a Bloody Day in 1898 and Reflects.” 108 Leon Prather, We have Taken a City :Wilmington Racial Massacre and Coup of 1898. 48. 109 Tyson, “Ghosts of 1898” Raleigh News & Observer, 1

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The News & Observer held themselves accountable through an apology and reparations

in the form of providing additional information. When presented with the evidence of their

pivotal role in the overthrow, the Raleigh newspaper opened their doors as a source of

information. More evidence on their role in the 1898 riot sat in the archives of the 110

Daniels-family owned newspaper. Their newspaper continued to reflect on their role and offered

coverage on contemporary racialized violence after the 2006 special. 120 years after the riot in

2018, the Observer released an article interviewing David Cecelski, a history scholar on

Wilmington, about the connection between 1898 and 2016 through both Donald Trump and

Josephus Daniels’ uses of “fake news.” This case of redress offers insight into possibilities of 111

repair beyond an apology. Participating parties, like the News & Observer can assist in

unearthing a history as a form of redress.

The link between Josephus Daniels and the current editors allowed for a clear lineage of

accountability for the overthrow in 1898. Josephus Daniels owned the News & Observer in 1898

and facilitated the rumors surrounding Alexander Manly. In 1898, he celebrated his role and the

destructive activity in Wilmington, citing the new order established after the overthrow. The

newspaper remained in his family until 2006 when the family sold the Observer to a different

publisher, shortly after the Commission released its report. Like an inherited business, the debt

of accountability for the violence in 1898 can also be inherited. Recognizing this reality, the

News and Observer identified their fundamental role and ongoing silence since. First, the News

& Observer identified key actors in their feature. They focused on Josephus Daniels, Alexander

Manly, Furnifold Simmons, and Alfred Moore Waddell, all of whom served as central foci of the

110 Tyson, “Ghosts of 1898,” 16. 111 Christopher Gergin & Stephen Martin. Raleigh News & Observer. “Fake news played a critical role in our 1898 riots. And it still does.” May 4, 2018. https://www.newsobserver.com/opinion/article210455759.html

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riot. Whereas Daniels, Simmons, and Waddell instigated much of the violence, Manly was the

target of rumor and conspiracy. Their identification of these players immediately sets up a

lineage of accountability, perpetration, and victimhood, starting with Josephus Daniels. This 112

perhaps reflects an identification of the described inherited debt of violence.

The issue of inherited guilt or accountability is tricky, especially as it is less tangible

than, say, inherited wealth. If we insist that we can inherit wealth that our forefathers cultivated,

we must also look into what allowed them to accumulate wealth. Whereas many may claim that

they should not be held responsible for what might have happened in the past, the existence of

inherited wealth raises the question: at whose expense is this accumulation? Who might have

suffered for someone to gain? An investigation of these questions, as mentioned in the last

chapter, offer a form of intellectual reparations, and the result may be economic reparations,

repairing both a narrative of loss as well as attempting to reduce economic disparity. As 113

framed by philosopher Richard Vernon, although present generations may not have enslaved

anyone or benefitted from racial violence, and guilt itself cannot be inherited, those in the present

might have benefitted from unjust enrichment. Unjust enrichment, a focus in legal scholarship, is

“not about what you have done, but about what you have.” Those who benefitted from unjust

systems still benefit today and may be obligated to give back. As the News & Observer 114

investigated its role in violence, it began to recognize their inherited responsibility to repair.

Although the News & Observer curated an organized execution to announce their

inherited responsibility in the riot, the Wilmington Race Riot Commission struggled with how to

112 Tyson, Ghosts of 1898. 2 113 Alfred L. Brophy, "What should Inheritance Law be? Reparations and Intergenerational Wealth Transfers," Law and Literature 20, no. 2 (2008), 197-211. doi:10.1525/lal.2008.20.2.197. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/lal.2008.20.2.197. 114 Vernon, Historical Redress :Must we Pay for the Past? 56-57.

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hold the General Assembly accountable. Possibilities ranged from a political march into the state

house to a series of workshops at universities across North Carolina. Each method of 115

presentation to the public emphasized the need for action and accountability from the General

Assembly. With more solidified evidence, a better sense of impact, and a list of

recommendations, the Commission sought to remedy the historical injustice that still affected

Wilmington after 1898.

The key findings from the Commission illuminated the role in which the state

government played in facilitating the riot. After many years of research the Wilmington Race

Riot Commission concluded that “racial violence of November 10, 1898, in Wilmington

precipitated an armed overthrow of the legitimately elected municipal government.” 116

Additionally, this was an effort that resulted out of a political campaign and facilitated by white

men who later took local office. Among the many social and economic consequences were the

exodus of 2,100 black residents, the “subsequent development of statutory basis for segregation

(i.e., Jim Crow) and disfranchisement legislation in North Carolina,” and a decline of business

and property ownership within the black community. There was clear evidence of an absence 117

of government intervention in the violence. This could have prompted a level of accountability

from the General Assembly.

Beyond the conclusions the Wilmington Race Riot Commission also presented

recommendations to the General Assembly. They split their requests into four categories:

empowerment, economic development, education, and commemoration. Each directed the

115 North Carolina Department of Natural and Cultural Resources, Wilmington Race Riot Commission Meeting 19, (Raleigh: 2000-2005). 1-3. 116 North Carolina General Assembly, 1898 Wilmington Race Riot Report. 5 117 Ibid., 6.

51

General Assembly to take a larger form of action, but suggested broader versions of what they

may have envisioned. For example, the empowerment section suggested to create “a strategic

vision funded through an endowment,” to “support amendments of the federal Voting Rights

Act” in New Hanover County and to create a study of the impacts of enslavement and

Jim Crow. Language utilized in these recommendations was vague, so it did not specify what 118

it might look like to support, envision, or study the consequences of enslavement or Jim Crow.

An endowment similarly suggested economic packages with questionable and unclear intentions

for an endpoint. Although attempting to draw causation, the lack of plan for action suggested a

need for the General Assembly to dictate direction and an endpoint in redress efforts.

During their General Assembly meeting in 2007, Representative and Commission chair

Thomas E. Wright approached the North Carolina legislature with reparative legislation based on

the Commission’s report. He proposed a series of bills that encompassed the needs of the

Wilmington community. Some bills, such as HB 683, HB 636, and HB 823 focused on changing

education about the riot through curriculum changes, the creation of a museum exhibit, and a

section in the local library. Other bills sought to hold groups accountable. HB 637 requested civil

action for those who could be held accountable for the riot (although all were dead), and HB 751

had the General Assembly acknowledge the events and their impact. However, the General 119

Assembly only acted upon a few, such as the monument and acknowledgement.

The events in Wilmington marked a key instance in which the General Assembly

participated in and benefitted from racialized violence and offered an example for terror across

North Carolina. In 1898, both the statewide and federal democratic party turned a blind eye to

118 Ibid., 1-2. 119 North Carolina General Assembly, House Journal 2007. (Raleigh, 2007). 304-333

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the violence. Occurring all over the state, President McKinley among many other Democrats,

neglected punishment or intervention. In 1898, the News & Observer quelled the fears of white

men who planned to storm Wilmington: “Of course, the President has no power to send Federal

troops” unless the Governor told him to do so. Upon their government takeover on November 120

10th, McKinley did not send in troops, nor did he hold the perpetrators accountable. In light of

his inaction, white supremacists throughout the state got the message that they could get away

with similar violence. If the state was to take responsibility for Wilmington in 2007, the General

Assembly would also have to express a sense of remorse for the continual killing and

disenfranchisement of black people in the state. The white supremacy campaign in Wilmington

set an example of what could happen to successful Black towns throughout the state. White men

could violently displace Black people in the name of “white women’s protection,” invoking a

rhetorical pattern in white supremacy. White residents across North Carolina prevented black 121

people from voting through intimidation, displacement, and lynching. The Red Shirt Club, a

group with the intention of killing any black man who attempted to vote, took action. Black men

lost the right to vote and white progressives stepped back. Without intervention from the General

Assembly throughout the early 20th century, the continued debt remained. Thus, the legislature

faced responsibility for an event that lasted beyond a single day in Cape Fear.

Yet in the case of the state, lineage of accountability is not as clear as the News &

Observer. The Observer maintained a familial connection throughout the years, starting with

Josephus Daniels who facilitated the rumors against Alexander Manly. Although Irving Joyner

suggested that the Democratic party should be held accountable for the uprising, the party had

120 H. Leon Prather, We have Taken a City :Wilmington Racial Massacre and Coup of 1898. 85. 121 Timothy B. Tyson, Blood done Sign My Name :A True Story (New York: Crown Publishers, 2004), 160.

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fundamentally changed their membership and behavior since 1898. There was no single family

or single actor alive for the accountability of the General Assembly’s actions in 1898. It is hard

to pinpoint the inheritance of perpetratorship in the Democratic party from historical to

contemporary actors. As no one as alive to bear responsibility, a general gap emerged in

processes of historical justice. However, as philosopher William J. Booth argues, in institutions

like political parties, courts, and constitutional documents, shared memory can create a line of

continuity and accountability. He asserts that these bodies “serve as the institutionalized memory

of society...Political communities are a ‘dense web’ of such memory forms and it is precisely

that web which gives us our identity and hence our accountability across time.” Even though 122

parties have changed, there is still a clear institutional burden of responsibility through memory.

The current General Assembly might not have been the actual perpetrators in 1898, but they took

part in a web of complicity. There is a need, perhaps, to offer a broader interpretation of

responsibility beyond who was alive.

The official acknowledgement that appeared in Joint Resolution 1572 did not clearly take

responsibility for the events in 1898. The resolution began by noting that the history of the 1898

Wilmington Race Riot had remained obscured in public discourse until the work of the

Commission. It stated that “political leaders and others were directly responsible for and

participants in the violence of November 10, 1898, engineering and executing a statewide

campaign to win the 1900 elections that was vicious, polarizing, and defamatory toward

African-Americans and that encouraged violence,” which had impact beyond the single day in

1898. Finally, the General Assembly acknowledged the violence: “The General Assembly of

122 William James Booth, Communities of Memory :On Witness, Identity, and Justice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 247. 26.

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North Carolina acknowledges the 1898 Wilmington Race Riot Commission's findings and

expresses profound regret that violence, intimidation, and force were used to replace a duly

elected local government, that people lost their livelihoods and were forced to leave their homes,

and that the government was unsuccessful in protecting its citizens during that time.” The

resolution expressed profound regret. Yet, the language used in this bill still failed to embrace

the state’s accountability. Similarly, an acknowledgement is by no means an apology. As such, 123

this acknowledgement, which passed unanimously, demonstrated the ambivalence toward full

accountability.

Although the General Assembly offered only an acknowledgement for the Wilmington

Race Riot, the General Assembly’s apology for enslavement took a more direct form of apology

and addressed the state’s critical role in upholding the system. We might assume that the

Commission’s report prompted this apology, given that both happened in the same session.

Rather than identifying Wilmington as an isolated event to apologize for, they investigated

slavery’s role in perpetuating violence in instances such as Wilmington. On April 11th, 2007, the

General Assembly released Joint Resolution 1557, and expressed “profound regret of the North

Carolina General Assembly for the history of wrongs inflicted upon Black citizens by means of

slavery, exploitation, and legalized racial segregation and calling on citizens to take part in acts

of racial reconciliation.” Although expressing remorse, the General Assembly employed vague 124

language and lacked specifics in their initial apology. What, for example, did exploitation and

segregation in North Carolina look like? How might citizens commit to racial reconciliation?

123 General Assembly of North Carolina. Joint Resolution 1572. 2007. 124 Ibid., 590

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Avoiding specifics, the General assembly offered a halfway understanding and apology for their

regret, providing a symbolic understanding of their role in this ongoing oppression.

The resolution had three sections which outlined a vague action plan for North

Carolinians seeking reconciliation. The General Assembly first issued an apology for their

complacency in slavery. The examples of their complacency ranged from laws preventing slaves

from reading and writing to segregation of schools. They urged schools, businesses, and

professional associations to “acknowledge the transgressions” and to “learn lessons of histories

in order to avoid repeating mistakes of the past.” Finally they called communities to invoke the

Declaration of Independence and live by the creed that “all persons are created equal.” This

evocation dismissed the racist context in which the Declaration of Independence (in which

slavery was active) and upheld a progressive guise. Although suggesting a collaboration between

the General Assembly and the North Carolina community, constituents were given loose

instructions to take action and reconcile, instead of any plans for tangible action, such as

reparations or changes school curriculum. It is striking, however, that a resolution that was

probably issued in response to the report and does not include an explicit mention of the

Wilmington Race Riot in the apology itself.

Although not including the Wilmington Race Riot in the within the body of the apology,

state representatives mentioned the 1898 event in varying degrees throughout their responses.

Some described it as “residue” of enslavement. They claimed that the Wilmington Race Riot was

just one among many acts of terror mentioned in this resolution. As Larry Womble’s, from a

black representative Winston Salem, stated to the General Assembly, “I hope we’ll truly be one

North Carolina because the residue of that slavery system still affects us today in a negative

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way….An example is education. Our examples in health care, jobs, employment, housing, the

military, infant mortality, poverty, HBCU’s the judicial system, the death penalty, the

Wilmington race riots.” On the other hand, James Luebke, a white state representative from 125

Durham County, pointed to the event more directly. He told the story of his experiences teaching

a black history course and noted North Carolina’s racist trajectory. He pointed to it as one of

many examples of history of racial violence in North Carolina, such as segregation and redlining:

And I won't read from this either because we, each of us, has one in our offices, but the 1898 report that Representative Wright worked on. Just read what happened in the 1900 election, just read it. The number of African-Americans - the number of people voting in Wilmington dropped from 5,000 before the insurrection in the 1896 election before the insurrection of 1898 by the so-called red shirts, which included, unfortunately among their supporters, one Charles Aycock, soon to be Governor Charles Aycock... I've seen some improvements, but I've seen an awful lot of things not improved. 126

For both Luebke and Womble, Wilmington fit into a broader pattern of racial violence but had

varying significance. Although the apology itself did not include the Commission’s work, the

report had some impact on the way that state representatives understood North Carolina’s

relationship to racism throughout history.

Throughout history, public apologies have varied in quality. A public apology differs

from an individualized apology, given that it usually engages groups of people rather than a

person-to-person relationship. For instance, when the Japanese ambassador came to the United

States to apologize to the prisoners of war during World War II, he did not specify who the

apology was to, or even what he was apologizing for. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, 127

various state governments throughout the United States apologized for their role in enslavement.

125 Ibid., 590. 126 Ibid., 608 127 National Public Radio, “The Apology Broker” June 13, 2018 https://www.npr.org/2018/06/12/619207707/the-apology-broker 11:23-15:00

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Angelique Davis analyzes these apologies and comes to determine that, “at a most fundamental

level, whether or not a statement functions as an apology is contingent upon whether or not it

actually apologizes.” Most of these apologies minimized the legacy of slavery. State 128

governments did not explicitly describe wealth gaps or health disparities that existed in the black

community. Specificity, for both the cases of the Japanese prisoners of war and the the American

state governments, took a central role in the efficacy of public apologies.

There are varying perspectives on the importance and purpose of an official apology.

Meaningful apology, according to Janna Thompson, requires that perpetrators do three things:

they acknowledge that they have committed a wrongful act and take responsibility; they

communicate remorse; and they agree to avoid similar transgressions in the future. Audience,

presentation, and response all shape the efficacy of an official apology; if the perpetrator does

not keep the audience in mind, the apology fails. Thompson discusses the efficacy of the apology

to the Aboriginal people in Australia, looking specifically at how it was presented and its larger

impact in facilitating historical justice. No matter how strong or powerful the speech may be,

there sometimes might be a disconnect between the person who is giving the apology and the

party they represent. It is hard to guarantee regret from an entire group of people. 129

Eleanor Bright Fleming underscores the significance of apologies for slavery as a way to

offer dignity to an entire community. Reparations, according to Fleming, may offer some remedy

for social debt, but alone do not make up for the woes of the past. She suggests that an apology 130

128 Davis, "Apologies, Reparations, and the Continuing Legacy of the European Slave Trade in the United States," 275 129 Janna Thompson, “Apology, Justice, and Respect: A Critical Defense of a Political Apology.” in Mark Gibney eds., The Age of Apology: Facing Up to the Past (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 32-34. 130 Eleanor Bright Flemming, “When Sorry is Enough: The Possibility of a National Apology for Slavery.” in Mark Gibney eds, The Age of Apology :Facing Up to the Past, 98

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can offer something much larger, but less tangible, than reparations: dignity. She asserts, “With

one party saying to another, ‘I am sorry,’ an apology brings a sense of humanity and respect to a

situation where both had been violated.” If Americans acknowledged slavery’s denial of black 131

people’s humanity, an apology could fill that void with an emphasis on respect and collective

responsibility. Although attempting this in their apology, the General Assembly did not identify

perpetrators and wrongdoers in their claim. The intended respect that comes with an apology

does not exist without a clear understanding of who enacted the violence.

There are many critiques of apology that warn of their ability to be superficial, politically

motivated, or meaningless. Many questions emerge when using apology as a form of historical

redress: what do we do if the political group is no longer alive? How can a state be collectively

remorseful for the actions of their entire population? In light of this problem, we can turn to the

possibility of “transgenerational polities,” which guarantee a continuum of the state’s policies

throughout generations. One must accept what their party, nation, or leader enacted throughout 132

the generations. The Democratic party did not provide an apology that acknowledged an ongoing

responsibility for their forefathers, even though they held an obligation to hold themselves

accountable. The apology merely identified past injustice without interrogating contemporary

legacies.

Another key problem with public apology can be the lack of action after an apology is

issued. Stating one’s regret without action, has good intentions, but does not really repair for any

past injustice. Robert Weyeneth argues that apologies are nothing if they substitute action. He

131 Ibid., 100 132 Thompson, 21

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deems economic reparations the most significant action that could emerge from reparations. 133

Throughout many cases of apologies for Jim Crow violence, political officials have called

constituents to action and work toward racial injustice. In North Carolina, the action that

accompanied apology was learning about racial injustice and acting in line with a national creed

that “all men are created equal.” Although a form of action, its broad form might have weakened

the statewide apology through the standards set by Weyeneth.

In many ways, the General Assembly apologized without action. Representative Alma

Adams, a progressive state representative from Greensboro, pushed the group to do more than

just apologize: “the lives we lead and the action that we take about matters, whether they are

related to the budget or public policy, those actions and those policies that we make on behalf of

people in North Carolina, should be consistent with the sentiment of this resolution.” 134

Unfortunately for Adams, the following legislation was not consistent with the apology nor the

recommendations of the General Assembly. After 2007, the state legislature passed laws

upholding voter IDs, a failed to fund healthcare, and cut funds for historically black universities.

Outside of racial politics, North Carolina reaffirmed deeply conservative policies around gender

and sexuality, further marking their lack of progressivism and distance from the sentiment that

“all men are created equal.” Instead of embarking on a new chapter of challenging the status quo,

the General Assembly solidified their commitment to conservative politics.

North Carolina’s failure to move beyond an apology reflects a pattern throughout its

history. William Chafe describes this trend as the “progressive mystique.” Countering V.O.

Key’s argument that North Carolina held a more progressive political stance than the rest of the

133 Robert R. Weyeneth, "The Power of Apology and the Process of Historical Reconciliation," The Public Historian 23, no. 3 (2001) http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/tph.2001.23.3.9. 29. 134 House Journal 2007. 599

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South, Chafe pushes back. He argues that instead of actual racial progressivism, North Carolina

presented a progressive mystique, where citizens and political leaders focused on maintaining a

sense of civility which meant to constrain both outspoken critics of racism and racists

themselves, rather than actually confronting either side. Politicians met protesters from the

Greensboro sit-ins with intention to quell their demands; fervent racists were similarly silenced.

Without these public outbreaks, there North Carolina did not appear as overtly racist as other

places in the South. Yet North Carolina maintained deep rooted racism and paternalism toward

its Black population. 135

The lack of action after the Commission fits Chafe’s model. Upon being presented with

information about the realities of violence, displacement, and disempowerment in 1898, the

General Assembly only took some forms of action. Although they were offered

recommendations, they ignored the lasting impact of the massacre on the Black community.

Their response to the report reflected a liminal space between action and stagnation, much like

the progressive mystique presented by Chafe. An apology, although planting seeds for

accountability and perhaps offering some measure of dignity, did not disrupt the ongoing

patterns of white violence in North Carolina. In neglecting the possibility of grander gestures, the

General Assembly upheld the white supremacy that allowed for Wilmington’s overthrow.

The actions taken by the North Carolina General Assembly provide a stark contrast to the

efforts of the News & Observer. The legislature, with ample information about their role in 1898,

faced a choice. It could internalize and incorporate the information into future legislation or

acknowledge the information and move on without any meaningful change. Although the

135 William Henry Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights :Greensboro, North Carolina, and the Black Struggle for Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 436. 1-15

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legislature passed laws to create a monument, shift the public school curriculum, and fund a

museum, few actions beyond these moved forward in the General Assembly. This may suggest

that the General Assembly might have been more comfortable with education and

commemoration rather than larger shifts, such as reparations or policy changes. Whereas the

News & Observer offered a multifaceted response to accountability, the General Assembly took

broad steps to acknowledge their role in the racial violence. The differences between the two

cases point to a limitation in making redress happen. Although a new truth or history may

emerge in the process of historical redress, an additional step remains. Next steps might require

disruptions in power beyond relations and politics.

Much like the broad nature of the acknowledgement and apology, the monument funded

by the General Assembly and took a vague stance on the violence in 1898. In the Commission’s

recommendations for commemoration, they asked for plaques, monuments, and markers

identifying the key participants and places in the Wilmington Race Riot. This recommendation 136

reflected an early charge of the Commission, as members hoped that the information unearthed

would provide materials for proper commemoration. In response to this recommendation, 137

Wilmington erected a monument and placard that presented some information given by the

Commission. However, given that incomplete evidence existed, and much rested on

hypotheticals, the numbers and terms used on the monument are vague. Although presenting a

somewhat broad interpretation of the history, the monument disrupted a space dominated by a

white history.

136 Wilmington Race Riot Commission. 1898 Wilmington Race Riot Report . (Raleigh: 2005), 5-9. 137 North Carolina Department of Natural and Cultural Resources, Wilmington Race Riot Commission Meeting # 4 (Raleigh: 2000-2005). 2-3.

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Two years after the release of the Commission’s report, Ayokunle Odeleye, a designer

and sculptor from Georgia created the large structure reflecting Wilmington’s history. His

sculptures portray important pieces of African American history, be it through large scale busts

or through more symbolic interpretations. Educated at Howard University, he works to disrupt

public spaces by making narratives of the black struggle more present. The monument in

Wilmington presents six paddles, representing the role of water in “spiritual belief of people

from the African continent.” The plaque in front tells the story of the riot and describes white 138

supremacy’s deep ties to the protection of white women. It held Alfred Waddell and his cohort

accountable. The monument, according to the inscription, “Serves as a symbol of Wilmington’s

commitment to an inclusive society, a tribute to all who over the years have struggled to reverse

the tragic consequences of the 1898 racial violence and a memorial to those African Americans

who were killed in the violence.” Another panel explicitly describes the importance of water “as

a medium of moving from one medium to the next.” There is an obvious tension between what 139

appears in the structure and the text below. For instance, in no way does the monument portray

any violence, nor does it connote connection to Wilmington in general. It raises questions such

as, how strong are the ties between Africa and Wilmington, both in 1898 and today? Did black

residents of Wilmington share this value of water? Dell Upton, architectural historian, has

criticized the structure on the grounds that there is a disconnect between the events in 1898 and

the monument. By zooming in on African traditions, Upton argues, Ayokunle diminished the

events and ignored the direct attack on African American political power. While the monument

138 Commemorative Landscapes. “African American Monuments” University of North Carolina Documenting the South. Chapel Hill, North Carolina https://docsouth.unc.edu/commland/features/essays/upton/ 139 Ibid.

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and park provided a space for descendants to commemorate, it only represented the riot in its

text. 140

The Wilmington Race Riot Memorial in Wilmington, North Carolina. 141

The Race Riot monument, moreover, sits among many other monuments dedicated to the

Confederacy. When visiting Wilmington, one will immediately notice the prevalence of

monuments dedicated to Confederate generals and soldiers. In Wilmington, there are 25

monuments dedicated to various events and people such as World War II veterans and the

founding of the city. 11 of the 25 of these markers are dedicated to Confederate heroes and

figures who governed Wilmington after the riot. Irving Joyner spoke directly to the importance 142

of monuments and markers in the ongoing legacy of white supremacy in Wilmington. Many of

these markers are dedicated to the people who spearheaded the overthrow and then took local

office. Despite the work of the Commission, perpetrators such as Alfred Waddell, Furnifold

140 Ibid. 141 Ibid. 142 Commemorative Landscapes. Monument Archive. University of North Carolina Documenting the South. Chapel Hill, North Carolina. https://docsouth.unc.edu/commland/results/?sort=type&city=41

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Simmons, and Hugh Macrae’s legacies remain preserved in parks, memorials, and street names

throughout the city. Irving Joyner reiterated this point: “Hugh Macrae didn’t mean anything at

the time, but then I find out that he is on the committee of nine….and you find these names,

popped up, all over the place.” Even after the Wilmington Race Riot Commission and the 143

creation of the monument, few challenge the history of white supremacy in Wilmington, even

today.

What’s so important about monuments in this contemporary political context? Legal

scholar Stanford Levinson grapples with this question in his work, Written in Stone: Public

Monuments in Changing Societies. Public monuments are ways in which public officials convey

desired political lessons. They can establish a history in one complex symbol. For the South, in

many ways, these monuments represent a glorified history of the Confederacy. However, when

these desired political lessons are entangled in the history of enslavement or racism, their

contemporary relevance seems outdated or even offensive. Amidst monuments’ importance, it is

important to take the varying responses of these symbols into account. Levinson acknowledges

that,

...it is naive in the extreme to believe that we can achieve any genuine consensus as to their place in the public realm. That would require the existence of a singular public, whereas the reality of our society is its composition by various publics who are constituted at least in part by their relationship to conflicting symbologies. And, needless to say, all of these publics seek the particular validation that comes from their symbols occupying some place of respect within the general public realm.

Thus, although monuments can represent an important history for one group, it may represent an

offensive or problematic history to another. This raises many questions: do we build new

monuments that coexist with the old? Do we tear down the old ones to signify a new political

143 Irving Joyner, 10:20

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chapter? Levinson proposes many alternatives, almost all of which include erecting new

monuments or plaques alongside the complex figures. Thus, communities can acknowledge the

previous history while also affirming a new, perhaps more nuanced perspective. 144

Scholars reiterate the significance of monuments in creating a specific version of

Southern history. After Reconstruction, members of the confederacy told a narrative that

neglected slavery’s role in causing the war. Instead, the Southern narrative turns the story of the

loss into a war epic. The cause of the war was not about slavery, but about honor, bravery, and

the protection of civilization. Generals, soldiers, and other forms of leadership emerged as key

representations of what the South used to be. The redemption movement after Reconstruction’s

demise reaffirmed this rhetoric. Various cultural groups, such as Daughters of the 145

Confederacy, erected monuments that would portray these figures as protectors of civilized

society.

Members of the black community had different responses to the work of the Commission,

General Assembly, and the monuments that emerged later on. After the release of the report and

recommendations, Reverend Dr. William Barber responded, “what about policy?” John Hope 146

Franklin followed a similar vein of thinking. He asserted that, “How large is the black population

now living in abject poverty in this country? How large is the population of blacks who have

poor health...Why don't they work on that instead of trying to draft a syrupy apology?” However,

he acknowledged the need for more groups like the Commission: “we need more reports like the

report of this commission. I think if we had those reports we would overcome the deficiencies, at

144 Sanford Levinson, Written in Stone:Public Monuments in Changing Societies (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 144. 145 W. Fitzhugh Brundage, The Southern Past :A Clash of Race and Memory (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 418. 146 Jim Nesbitt. “Dems Apologize for Role in Riot” Jacksonville Daily News. January 21, 2007.

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least of the side of history, of what happened and understanding the trends.” Some members of 147

the local community expressed excitement for the Commission’s report and how it might reflect

the narratives they provided. According to the Kinston Free Press, a local newspaper,

Wilmington Resident Franklin Ford stated that, “he is curious to learn more about the event and

has attended many of the commission’s meetings.” These mixed reviews reflected the 148

complicated implications of the Commission, as being both symbolically powerful but limited in

action.

The Wilmington Race Riot Commission’s limitations highlight the need for redress

efforts beyond a single reconciliatory body, such as in collaboration with community members or

the state government. The characters at play encountered the “whimper” described by Joyner: a

lack of information to substantiate reparations; an absence of active accountability from the

legislature; an ambivalence from the White community to grapple with their own role in

undermining the success of black residents of Wilmington. Putting these sources in conversation

with scholarship on commissions, monuments, and accountability, the results of the Wilmington

Race Riot Commission can be identified as a larger phenomenon in historical redress efforts.

North Carolina offers us an important insight into the important tensions that exist in

commission-based redress. This liminal space between action and stagnation exists well beyond

North Carolina.

147 Olufunke Moses, “Apologies are Not Enough.” Indy Week. April 18, 2007. https://indyweek.com/news/john-hope-franklin-apologies-enough/ 148“Draft Report from Race Riot, due in Dec.” Kinston Free Press. October 10, 2005.

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Conclusion

A year after the Commission released its report, Indy Weekly, a progressive

Durham-based newspaper, interviewed John Hope Franklin about the Wilmington Race Riot. He

discussed the impetus to remember and forget, and how the General Assembly could go beyond

just an apology. Franklin had participated in the Tulsa Commission and the Wilmington Race

Riot Commission. He had attended Duke University and maintained firm ties with North

Carolina through his work with the state chapter of the NAACP. When asked about the

possibility about a national amnesia about Wilmington Race Riot, Franklin responded:

They've not been forgotten about. They've been buried. There are people, even when I go back to Tulsa, who claim they hadn't heard of the riots until they were grown. And maybe that's so, but the conspiracy of silence has been what has kept the history of this country distorted and misrepresented. So I'm not impressed with the fact that they haven't heard of it or don't know about it. They haven't heard of it or don't know about it simply because there's been a conspiracy of forgetfulness. There's been no intention to remind them of it and no desire on the part of people to learn about what happened in the past. 149

The riot, according to Franklin, had not been forgotten, but had been silenced. It was up to the

people who lived in the state to engage in the larger history. The “conspiracy of silence” was

what allowed an ignorance in the first place.

Many years after the report’s release, the Commission’s impact still lingers through shifts

in public education, newly erected monuments, and newfound contemporary significance. Public

education in North Carolina now includes a detailed account of the Wilmington Race Riot in its

149 Olufunke Moses, “Apologies Are Not Enough.”

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American History II curriculum. It is situated in a larger context of conflict since Reconstruction

and fits within a continuum of race, class, and gender struggles. In 2018, the Highway Historical

Marker Committee erected a plaque at a busy intersection in Wilmington that reminded residents

and visitors alike about the violence 120 years ago. In 2017 and 2018, national and state

newspapers found contemporary relevance for the race riot. In May 2018, the Raleigh News &

Observer released an article claiming Donald Trump, much like the leaders of the 1898 Riot,

galvanized a demographic of white constituents through “fake news.” Donald Trump and 150

Alfred Waddell alike relied on rumors rooted in very little reality to solidify their election. In

February 2018, the Washington Post reported that Donald Trump had speculated that he might

be the target of a political coup d’etat. When Sean Hannity rejected Trump’s claim and stated,

“we are not a banana republic,” Irving Joyner, a chair of the Commission criticized Hannity’s

suggestions “that coups are characteristic of far-off regions of the world.” 151

The Wilmington Race Riot Commission attempted to disrupt the conspiracy of silence

discussed by Franklin. Through a close examination of archival documents, oral testimonies,

newspaper articles, and alternative accounts, the Commission wrote an official history of the

Wilmington Race Riot that documented the violence that had been committed against the black

community. Prior to the Commission, the public narrative about the riot did not take white

violence into account. Much like what Franklin discussed, a story of glory reaffirmed a collective

amnesia about what occurred in 1898, not just within the white community, but also within black

150 Christopher Gergin & Stephen Martin “Fake news played a critical role in our 1898 riots. And it still does.” 151 Isaac Stanley-Becker. “Trump keeps warning of a coup. But the only one in American history was a bloody, racist uprising” The Washington Post. February 20 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/02/20/trump-is-warning-coup-us-history-provides-single-example-power-grab-by-white-supremacists/?utm_term=.73db26a9c752

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communities traumatized by the event. By creating an official narrative of the violence, the

Commission disrupted ongoing processes of erasing a more complex narrative.

However, the Commission’s work only marked the beginning of an what many believe

should be an ongoing process of redress. John Hope Franklin praised the Commission but asked

for more: “I think the recommendations are commendable...I can only hope that they do almost

as much as they propose to do.” The Commission presented the recommendations to the 152

General Assembly with mixed results. Although the state legislature apologized for the violence

and constructed a monument to honor the riot’s victims, it did not complete many of the other

goals the Commission outlined, such as addressing disenfranchisement, redlining, and economic

disparities. Apologies and monuments can play a critical role in shaping narratives, though. Both

of these tools can serve as critical parts to addressing histories of violence. But an apology alone

isn’t enough. William Barber stated this succinctly after the initial apology from the General

Assembly: “What we must have is not only an apology, but public policy that redresses these

wrongs.” 153

Barber’s claim points to a real tension in using commission as a form of redress.

Apologies and monuments are necessary in continuing the work that the Commission did:

changing the narrative and making sure that public understandings do not erase the violence that

occurred in 1898. However, how do these efforts move beyond symbolism? How can an apology

undo the endemic racism that persists throughout legislation and social attitudes? In neglecting

these questions, the Wilmington Race Riot Commission risked being only a symbolic form of

redress.

152 Olufunke Moses, “Apologies Are Not Enough” 153 “Residents to Talk About 1898 Race Riots, Deaths.”

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Brophy highlights this as a major limitation in commissions as a form of redress. In his

discussion of the Tulsa Race Riot Commission, he argues that commissions are only the

beginning of a lengthy process of redress. He states that commissions, like that of Wilmington

and Tulsa, can “expand our historical knowledge; the rest of the discussion and action is up to

us.” The Wilmington Race Riot Commission offers important nuance to Brophy’s assertion. 154

“Up to us,” does not establish the group that is involved in these processes. Is it the descendants?

The perpetrators? Those who do not know about the atrocity? All residents of Wilmington?

Moreover, the action embedded in his call to action remains vague. What might the action look

like? How can it last beyond the moments after the commission? How might we facilitate

personal or statewide transformation? The lack of answers to these questions ultimately

illuminate a larger difficulty in redress processes, and political processes in general: they rely on

so many people.

Even so, historical justice today is playing a critical role in shaping contemporary politics

throughout the 2020 presidential election. Candidates such as Elizabeth Warren, Cory Booker,

and Kamala Harris have put reparations for enslavement on the table, asserting that we must

come to terms with our nation’s dark past. Booker, in his position as Senator, proposed a bill 155

that would establish a commission to investigate the impacts of enslavement on black

communities in the United States. This commission, he asserted, will establish “an official

record” of what happened during enslavement. From there, Congress can assess the possibility 156

154Alfred Brophy “The Tulsa Race Riot Commission, Apology, and Reparation: Understanding the Functions and Limitations of a Historical Truth Commission” in Barkan, Elazar and Alexander Karn, eds. Taking Wrongs Seriously: Apologies and Reconciliation. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2006. 250. 155 James Hohman. “Will supporting reparations become a new litmus test for Democrats in 2020?” Washington Post. February 22, 2019. 156 Rebecca Buck, “Cory Booker to introduce reparations commission bill in the Senate.” CNN. April 8, 2019. https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/08/politics/cory-booker-reparations-senate-bill/index.html

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and efficacy of reparations. Booker’s mission might follow a similar trajectory to the

Wilmington Race Riot Commission: group formation, investigation, presentation of facts, and

then perhaps action. In both of these cases, however, a key question remains unanswered: Will

offering reparations change national attitudes? Will these conversations facilitate the discussion

and action described by Brophy?

Before establishing whether or not the Commission can be labeled as a success, it's

important to define success in historical redress efforts. In Germany after the Holocaust, public

life underwent dramatic changes. The government erected monuments, rewrote elementary

education, held trials, and punished perpetrators. However, anti-semitism still lingers in

Germany today. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission engaged in

processes-driven historical redress. They offered a space for victims to share their stories and for

perpetrators to acknowledge their role in the injustices of Apartheid. Some still question whether

or not the TRC changed public attitudes about racism, given the contemporary uproar on South

African college campuses around issues of racialized violence. Globally, historical redress

efforts may be completed, but the ability for redress-driven groups to create personal salience for

stakeholders remains uncertain. Thus, assessing success remains difficult given questions of

audience and end goal.

Scholars and communities alike struggle to explain what makes a historical redress effort

successful. Activist groups, communities, and politicians alike mark reparations as the be all end

all of historical redress as it offers both symbolic and monetary forms of justice. However, even

reparations raise some issues given their one-off nature and inability to influence individual

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attitudes. Much like reparations, tribunals, commissions, monuments and apologies all have the

ability to only be symbolic. What if, we frame these approaches to historical redress as

beginnings rather than endpoints?

Although the General Assembly offered a limited response to lengthy and broad

recommendations, the Wilmington Race Riot Commission’s attempt at historical justice was also

the beginning of a larger conversation. Perhaps it sparked smaller change, like the creation of a

monument, but it might have later influenced a national conversation about historical justice,

racial violence, and a national history embedded in violence. When we understand modes of

historical justice as an impetus for the action described by Brophy, success is not about what

these mechanisms might solve, but the conversations they start.

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