Taxes and Trade in the Abbasid Thughur, 750-962/133-351

Taxes and Trade in the ʿAbbāsid Thughūr, 750-962/133-351Author(s): Peter von SiversSource: Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, Vol. 25, No. 1 (1982), pp.71-99Published by: BrillStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3632035Accessed: 07-01-2017 22:39 UTC

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Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, Vol. XXV, Part I

TAXES AND TRADE IN THE

cABBASID THUGHUR, 750--96z2/33-351 BY

PETER VON SIVERS

Department of History, University of Utah, Salt Lake City

The voracity of a ruling class for taxes is usually patent to even the casual observer, while its interests in commercial, agricultural or industrial enterprises tend to be much less manifest. For instance, the Umayyad caliphs have always been known as having possessed enor- mous tax revenues, but their successful activities as agricultural entrepreneurs of their castles are only now becoming general knowledge 1). Similarly, it has been accepted wisdom that the crusader kings of Jerusalem and Acre subsisted on a meager tax base, largely cut off from the substantial commercial profits garnered by the Italian merchants. Recent scholarly research, however, has made it increasingly clear that they never relinquished control over the spice trade2). In this article we shall turn to another subject of Middle Eastern history during the classical Islamic period where preoccupation with the military aspects of ruling class politics has resulted in an undue neglect not only of its less visible fiscal but also commercial interests. By "fiscal interests" I mean those interests which underlie military expansion and conquest and relate to matters of taxation, booty and financial incentives. Our subject is the history of the provinces in the Northwest of the 'AbbSsid empire bordering on Byzantium, the so-called Thughitr (lit. "clefts", meaning the frontier lands between Byzantium and the central 'Abbdsid provinces), during the period from 750 to 962/133 to 351.

I) Oleg Grabar, "Umayyad 'Palace' and the Arab Revolution", Studia islamica i8 (1963), 5-x8. z) Jonathan Riley-Smith, "Government in Latin Syria and the Commercial

Privileges of Foreign Merchants", in Derek Baker, ed., Relations Between East and West in the Middle Ages (Edinburgh, 1973), I09-32.


72 PETER VON SIVERS

The period in the history of the Thughbr extending from their establishment by the 'Abbasids sometime after 750/133 to their devasta- tion by the Byzantines in the 95o's/340's has been given good coverage by modern historians, as far as topography and chronology (mostly involving military events) are concerned 3). With this coverage, the historians faithfully reflect the orientation of the Arab geographers and chroniclers to whom every military expedition and raid against the Byzantine infidels was worth recording as a possible prelude to the completion of the great world conquest begun after Muhammad's death. But the Arabic sources are not entirely exhausted by a repetitive recounting of Muslim military successes or failures in the acquisition of towns, castles, booty, prisoners or prisoners' ransom. In short, the Arab authors are not totally engrossed in descriptions of the military wing of the 'Abbasid ruling class and its martial virtues and vices in the Thughir. The social historian, while recognizing the meritorious nature of political-military history, also discovers in the sources a considerable amount of information which indicates the existence of

powerful fiscal and commercial interests operating on the 'Abbdsid ruling class during the two-century time span under investigation. Through concentration on this information, as well as supporting prosopographical research concerning the leaders and officials of the Thughifr, it is hoped that new social dimensions of 'Abbdsid history will be opened which hitherto have not attracted the attention of Islamic historians.

Three major periods can be distinguished in the history of the Thughbr under the 'Abb~sids. (i) The first period, extending from c. 750 to 842/133 to 227, saw the conquest of the border provinces from the Byzantines and their population with Muslims in order to secure defenses and prepare for further conquests. During this period military

3) Ernst Honigmann, Die OstgrenZe des byZantinischen Reiches on 363 hbis o1071, in A. A. Vasiliev, By.zance et les Arabes, vol. III (Brussels, 1935); Marius Canard, art.

"Cilicia" and "Al-'Aw.sim", in Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed.; see also the articles, by various authors, under "Adana", "Ayls", "'Ayn~ib", "Daridjima", "Dulik",

"al-.Hadath" and "Jayhin" in El2, as well as under "Lu'lu'a", "Malatya", "Mar'ash", "Missi.s", "Sayhin", "Sis", "Sumaysdt", "Tarsfis" and "Thughair" in EIl.


TAXES AND TRADE IN THE CABBASID THUGHUR 73

efforts were geared entirely towards expansion, attraction of settlers through fiscal incentives and an efficient financial exploitation of the

local Christian subjects. (z) In the second, transitional, period from 842-78/227-65 the interests in conquest, settlement and fiscaj benefits declined in importance. In the beginning of the ninth century an important commercial route along the Euphrates from Basra to Raqqa and from there across land via Aleppo to the Mediterranean had been developed. Byzantine Constantinople was a major client of the goods carried along the route, particularly southeast Asian spices, aromatics and other luxuries. Gradually commercial gains from the Byzantines came to be valued more highly by the Muslims than did fiscal gains through conquest. Beginning with 842/227, imperial ambitions eva- porated and all that remained was a policy of defense so as to keep the Byzantine border weak and protect the Euphrates-Mediterranean commercial route which at places wandered perilously close to Byzantine lands. (3) During the third period (878-962/265-351) the ascendancy of commercial interests reached its inherent limits. Commercial expansion and the reduction of the military to defensive functions made domestic

fiscal revenues the only source from which the government could be financed. In order to keep military matters subordinated to commercial interests and as an impediment to military control of fiscal resources a vast civil bureaucracy was required. However, this bureaucracy unfortunately ate from the same trough of revenues which were intended for the salaries of the military. This untenable situation led in time to a military maneuver to eliminate bureaucratic monopoly and eventually to gain custody of Muslim mercantile interests as well. The most effective way to assume control of fiscal revenues and mercantile interests was through the direct supervision of tax collection in the provinces and consequently the military took up long-term appointments in the various regions of the empire. Regional political powers sprang up to compete with the central ruling class in Baghdad. The Thughuir were under the influence, for various periods of time, of

no less than three regional powers (Tilfinids, Sdjids and HamdZnids) which disputed the province with the central government. The dispute


74 PETER VON SIVERS

enabled the Byzantines to fortify their border, seize Aleppo (IHalab) from the Muslims and thus wrest control over one of the major entre- p6ts on the Euphrates-Mediterranean trade route from the Muslims.

I. Fiscal Interests and the Settlement of the Thughbfr, 70 o-842/133-227

While Syria had been penetrated by Arab tribes prior to the Islamic conquest, Cilicia (the traditional name for what was to be named later ath-Thughbr by the Arabs) had remained ethnically outside Arab influence 4). The conquest of Syria therefore did not require the adop- tion of any official settlement policy, whereas in Cilicia an organized immigration campaign was necessary in order to secure the possession of the province and the continuation of the conquests. The first sign of a Muslim settlement policy for the areas north of Antioch date from

703/84 when during a summer raid (sa-ifa) al-Massisa (Mopsuestia) across the Gulf of Alexandretta was captured and some 300 troops were settled 5). During the following four decades the Arabs executed an elaborate fortification program which included the conversion of the local church into a granary and the construction of walls, moats and blockhouses 6). In the vicinity of al-Massisa three forts went up, of which one was given a garrison of 40 and another of 50o men plus a contingent of the first local recruits 7). Women were encouraged to join their husbands 8) and a few Muslims began to engage themselves in agriculture by importing from India a batch of several thousand water buffaloes suited for work in the marshes of the Jayhin (Pyramos) river 9). Further northeast, in the upper reaches of the Euphrates river, the conquests were less durable. Here the towns of Shimshit (Asmo-

4) H616ne Ahrweiler, "L'Asie Mineure et les invasions arabes (VIee-IXe siecles)", Revue historique 227 (196z), 1-3 2; especially 2-7. 5) Al-Balidhuri, Ahmad b. Yahyi, Kitib FutfTh al-Buldan, ed. Salih ad-Din al-

Munajjid (Cairo, 1956), 195. 6) Bal., 196; al-Ya'qtibi, AIhmad b. Abi Ya'qaib, Tdrikh, ed. M. T. Houtsma

(Leiden, 1883), II, 337; Guy Le Strange, Palestine Under the Moslems (London, 189o), 505.

7) Called "Jarijima", Bal. 197. 8) Bal., 198. 9) Ibid.


TAXES AND TRADE IN THE 'ABBXSID THUGHfR 75

sata), Malatya (Melitene), Turanda (Derende) and Mar'ash (Ger- manikeia) as well as half a dozen forts changed hands repeatedly 10). In the face of strong Byzantine resistence the beginning of settlement in Cilicia was slow but not without promise.

After the change from the Umayyad to the 'Abbdsid caliphate in 750/133 and the reestablishment of relatively peaceful internal conditions in the Islamic empire settlement was taken up with renewed vigor 11). In order to make service in al-Massisa attractive, the garrisons were paid regular stipends and received land grants 12). By 775/159 the army payroll comprised 2,ooo men and immigration was so brisk that the granting of land could be discontinued 13). Other towns developed as well, such as Adhana (Adana), 'Ayn Zarba (Anazarba) and Tarsus, in part by making use of their Byzantine foundations 14). In the northeastern half of the frontier region construction and settlement activities were equally as impressive. Malatya turned Islamic for a final time in 756/139 and on the basis of considerable expenditures in the record time of six months housing for 4,000 soldiers was erected 15). The garrison of al-IHadath (Adata) received stipends of 40 dinar per soldier,

money bonuses and houses 16). Altogether perhaps some 25,000 troops were now stationed in the frontier region and together with the temporary residents who came for raiding and campaigning the number of Muslims rose to perhaps some ioo,ooo persons 17).

This favorable demographic development did not yet make the Muslims a majority among the Christian (Greek, Armenian, Nabatean)

io) Id., 219-29. ii) At-Tabari, Muhammad b. Jarir, Tr&ikh ar-Rusul wa 'l-Mulk, ed. M. J. de

Goeje and others (Leiden, 1879-1901), third series, 121, 141, 604. 12) Bal., 196. 13) Id., 197. 14) Id., 200-203. 15) Here the soldiers were given assignments of farmland [aqta'a (al-Mansvir)

al-jund al-mazari'], pay raises and bonuses of ioo dinar each, Bal. 222-23. See also Tab. 121-22, I25; al-Azdi, Yazid b. Muhammad, Trikhb al-Maw il, ed. 'Ali Habiba (Cairo, 1967), 171.

16) Bal., 226. 17) Id., 223; Tab., 493, 500.


76 PETER VON SIVERS

inhabitants of the border zone, but it enabled them to considerably increase military pressure on the Byzantine territories. While prior to 750/133 the Byzantines had repeatedly driven the Muslims from their

strongholds on the border, during the period from 750/133 to 809/193 we hear of only four successful Byzantine raids 18) and of only five years without Muslim summer raids 19). Perhaps the most spectacular

campaign was that of the famous Hrfiin ar-Rashid (caliph from 786 to 809/170 to 193) in 782/165 which carried him with close to 100,000 troops straight to Constantinople and which netted him a handsome tribute, to be paid in installments for the following three years 20). Nevertheless, in spite of an increasingly successful war of attrition by the Muslims, the defenses of Byzantium did not crumble that readily (as was also the case in another ethnically non-Hamito-Semitic possession of Byzantium, Sicily, which held out defiantly for three- quarters of a century before finally succumbing to Muslim aggression in 902/290). In spite of impressive demographic progress, immigration and settlement had still not yet reached a level from which a serious attempt at conquering Byzantium could be contemplated by the Muslims.

Ar-Rashid however, a persistent fighter, did not give up the idea of conquest easily. In order to underline the offensive capabilities of the

18) Tab., 485, 493, 568, 709. On a prominent victim of one of the Byzantine expeditions: M. Izzedin, "Un prisonnier arabe ' Byzance au IXe sidcle: HErin b. Yalya", Revue des itudes islamiques 15-20 (1941-46), 41-62.

19) Statistics compiled from Azdi; Balidhuri; Tabari; Ya'qtibi; Bar Hebraeus (Ibn al-'Ibri), Tdrikh Mukhtasar ad-Duwal, ed. A. S. al-YusfiI (Beirut, 195 8); Ibn al-'Adim, Kamil ad-Din 'Umar, Zubda al-Halab min Tdrkh Halab, ed. Simi ad- Dahhin (Damascus, 1951), I; Ibn al-Athir, 'Izz ad-Din, al-Kimil fi t-TDrikch, ed. C. J. Thornberg (Leiden, 1866-71), V and VI. E. W. Brooks, "Byzantines and Arabs in the Time of the Early 'Abbisids, 75 o-813", English Historical Review 15 (1900), 728-47, and 16 (1901), 84-9z; as well as Marius Canard, Extraits des sources arabes, in A. A. Vasiliev, Byz:ance et les Arabes, vol. III, part 2 (Brussels, 1950o) contain translations of basic historical materials.

zo) Tab., 503. See also Lawrence A. Tritle, "Tatzates' Flight and the Byzantine- Arab Peace Treaty of 782", Bytantion 47 (1977), 279-300; Marius Canard, "Les exp6ditions des Arabes contre Constantinople dans l'histoire et dans la l6gende", Journal asiatique zo8 (1926), 61-121; id., "La prise d'Heracl6e et les relations entre H5,rn al-Rashid et l'empireur Niciphore Ier", ByZantion 32 (1962), 345-79.


TAXES AND TRADE IN THE 'ABBAISID THUGHUR 77

Thughfr more clearly, he separated them from the district of Qinnasrin and the province of Jazira, situated further south in Syria and upper Mesopotamia. The frontier region was elevated to the status of a province, called ath-Thughir, and subdivided into two parts, the Syrian and Jaziran districts 21). The separated territories to the South received

the name al-'Awa-sim (lit. "protectors") and their governors retained the right to supervise the military affairs of their colleagues in the Thughiir and come to their rescue, if necessary 22). A special tax official was appointed to take care of the fiscal interests of the state inde- pendently of the local officers who had previously collected the taxes 23).

Immigration received a further boost through the distribution of 4,000 free parcels of land for building upon and a pay raise of io dinar per person in Tarsais as well as the abolition of the state rent (ghalla) hitherto collected from the buildings in al-Massisa 24). The fledgling frontier zone was rapidly developing into a viable war base.

How firmly the 'Abbdsid ruling class was committed to Muslim settlement in the Thughfr and a war of attrition against Byzantium is illustrated by the policies of Caliph al-Ma'min (813-33/198-218). First, this caliph gave the governorship of the Jazira, Thughir and 'Awdsim together with the unheard-of sum of 500,000o dinar to his son

2i) Tab., 604. zz22) Azdi, 26z. 23) Bal., 199. 24) Bal., zoo-zoi and 197. Other towns and forts garrisoned by ar-Rashid: 'Ayn

Zarba (Khrrasini garrison with houses as assignments, Bal. zo2), Kanisa as-Sawdi' (pay raises, Bal., 20o3), al-HirCniyya [volunteers (al-muiawwi'a), Bal., zoz], al-Hadath [garrison with housing and land assignments (iq#t' muqatilatihb al-masakin wa 'l- qag'i'), Bal., 227], Zibatra (garrison, Bal., 228), Sayhin (castle on river of same name, Greek "Saros", Bal., 199), Adhana (increased stipends, Khirasinis settled, Bal., 199) and Mansfr (fort, garrisoned with Syrians and Jazirans, Bal., 228-29). Philip K. Hitti, who has translated al-Balidhuri's K. Futhb al-Buldan under the title The Origins of the Islamic State (New York, I916), renders "aqta'a" throughout as "to give as a fief". This rendering is unfortunate since it suggests that the fiefholder personally supervised the work of the peasants employed on his fief, as was the case in European feudalism. It is of crucial importance to keep in mind that in the Near East an assignment holder (muqta') had nothing to do with the labor of the peasants working on his land assignment, as is discussed with greater detail below, p. 82.


78 PETER VON SIVERS

al-'Abbds (828/213) 25). Two years later, as is well known, he launched a series of vigorous campaigns against the Byzantines 26). During the second year of hostilities the hard-pressed Byzantines apparently despaired of their empire's ability to survive the caliph's attacks through military means alone. They proposed a pact of friendship and commercial relations (matdair) in hopes that the Muslims would calcu- late the profits from trade to be higher than those from raids and conquest 27). But al-Ma'main rejected the proposal out of hand. In the typical fashion of a member of a ruling class accustomed to deriving livelihood and prestige from its ability to herd together tax-paying subjects he interpreted any suggestion to switch to mercantile profits as "softness" (lin) 28) As if to underscore his unchanged conviction that more was to be

gained by conquest than by trade the caliph charged al-'Abbis with supervising the construction of a new garrison town, Tuwana (Tyana),

in the Syrian Thughbir 29). Al-Ma'mCin's brother and governor of Syria, Ishiq (later Caliph al-Mu'tasim), received orders to dispatch 4,000 troops from the districts of Homs (Ijims), Jordan (al-Urdunn) and Palestine (Filastin), together with money for their upkeep. Another 1,00ooo soldiers were requested from Qinnasrin, the Jazira and Baghdad. All 5,000 men moved into quarters in TuwZna even before construction was finished 30). In 833/218 al-Ma'mdn followed his son into the Thughbr and announced his intention to march to Constantinople with his army and a host of Arab tribesmen in his camp to be settled (nagala) in each city conquered along the way 3x). But unfortunately al-Ma' min died before his projected departure 82) and thus the boldest and most

25) Tab., Ioo. 26) Id., I102-3; Ya'qfibi, 568; Azdi, 399, 405; Ibn A'tham, Abii Muhammad

Abmad, Kitab al-Futfh, vol. VIII (Hyderabad, I975), 332-40. 27) Tab., 1109-10; Azdi, 408; Yacqihbi, 569. 28) Tab., iiio-ii. 29) Tab., iii11-12; al-Mas'idi, 'Ali b. Husayn, MarWij adb-Dbahab, ed. and tr.

C. Barbier de Meynard and P. de Courteille (Paris, 1861-77), vol. VII, 94. 30) Tab., III2. 31) Ya'qibi, 573-74; Azdi, 414. 32) Tab., II4o; Yac'qbi, 574.


TAXES AND TRADE IN THE CABBASID THUGHfR 79

clearly developed plan for the Islamic conquest and settlement of Byzantium remained unfulfilled.

Al-Ma'miin's brother and successor, al-Mu'tasim (833-42/218-27), was the first caliph to waver in front of the alternative of taxes versus commerce. He ordered Tuwina to be evacuated and razed, and valuable

equipment to be burned after it proved too arduous to remove 33). In the place of the departed military some 17,000 non-Arab Rom (Zutft) were moved to the Thughbr, after they had engaged in a rebellion in lower Iraq 34). The Rom were skilled breeders of water buffaloes and cattle and therefore particularly useful in the marshes of the Cilician plain, but their deportation to the Thughbr looked suspiciously like the demotion of the province from the position of a prestigeous bastion of conquest to that of a dumping ground for caliphal enemies 3,). The Byzantines promptly exploited what they regarded as al-Mu'tasim's strange waverings as ample excuse for risking a few attacks against Muslim positions in the Thugbhr 36). But confronted with this challenge al-Mu'tasim swung back to the traditional Muslim policy of attritional harassment37). With an army, the size and equipment of which as- tounded his contemporaries, the caliph took out his revenge against the Byzantine attackers and within a few months his generals had driven the enemy from the Thughbr (837/223) 38).

At the height of these military successes al-Mu'tasim seems to have toyed with the idea of a march (masir) against Constantinople 3*). But the march never advanced to the serious planning stage since a conspiracy by a portion of the army intervened. The instigators of this

33) Tab., 1164. 34) Bal., 203; Tab., 1167, 1169. 35) Already in 833/218 al-Ma'mfn sent the theologian Ahmad b. Hanbal into

exile in Tarsus for his refusal to conform to the doctrine of the Created Qur'in (Tab., I13 1). Ibn Hanbal was on his way to Tarsufs when the news of al-Ma'mfn's death permitted him a return to Baghdad. Another prominent exile a few years

later was Wasif at-Turki (862/248), commander of the palace gate (.bjyiba), Tab., 1383-84, 1480, 15I1I; 'Adim, 73. 36) Azdi, 424. 37) Bal., 228; Tab., 1234; Azdi, 424.

38) Tab., 1236-58; Ya'qibi, 58o-82; Azdi, 426-27; Mastcdi, VII, 134. 39) Mas'Fadi, VII, 136.


80 PETER VON SIVERS

conspiracy were a number of Arab army leaders whose campaigns in the Thughir had been given less generous support by the caliph than those of the generals of native Iranian or central Asiatic origin and consequently ended up with the dregs of the spoils 40). Al-Mu'tasim's nephew and governor of Syria, al-'Abbis, assumed the role of figure- head and entered into a correspondence with the Byzantines, presumably

to negotiate the price for a cessation of the Muslim offensive 41). But since the murder of a successful caliph would have been unpopular among the Muslims al-'Abbas hesitated to act-until he had waited too long and the plot was discovered 42). Al-Mu'tasim had all conspi- rators arrested, but the purge in the army prevented him from pro- ceeding any further with his audacious plans against Byzantium. The caliph quickly returned to Iraq and busied himself with the problem of dissent in the armed forces 43).

During al-Mu'tasim's reign the 'Abbisid ruling class was quite obviously torn between fiscal and commercial interests. The caliph himself vacillated but eventually threw his lot with the fiscal expansionists when the Byzantines mounted a military challenge against him. The proponents of commercial expansion had strong interests in a limited, defensive war and must have observed the conspiracy with delight, if indeed they were not directly behind it. Although the conspiracy failed, the commercial party nevertheless emerged triumphant over its fiscal rival: it succeeded in forcing the departure of the military expansionists from the Thughfr. For the time being the war of attrition was interrupted.

With al-Mu'tasim the first period of Thughtirian history drew to an

40) Tab., 1256-63. 41) Masldi, VII, 139. 42) Tab., 1263-64; 'Adim, 68-69. 43) Tab., I264-68; two similar, but smaller, revolts occurred two decades later

during the wars between the Atrik and the shakiryya involving the Caliphs al- Musta'in and al-Mu'tazz. (Concerning the terms "Atrik" and "shakiriyya" see below p. 85-86.) The first revolt was that of Balkijir al-Farghini, who withheld his allegiance from al-Mu'tazz (865/2 1) (Tab., 1447, 1449, I534, I58o-8I, I6I5,

62zi; Ya'qfbi 604); the second that of b. Majihid, lord (.dhib) of Shimshit who did the same in 866/25 2 (Ya'qibi, 61i).


TAXES AND TRADE IN THE 'ABBAiSID THUGHUR 81

end. During this period the aspirations of the 'Abbdsid ruling class were almost entirely directed towards the acquisition of a livelihood derived from fiscal activities, that is, confiscation of war spoils and taxation of conquered subjects. Since this form of livelihood required large-scale military action the ruling class was relatively wide open to any Muslim with the requisite spirit and training. Special incentives, such as stipends, pay raises, bonuses, tax-free urban real estate and housing brought large numbers of mostly Arab volunteers from Syria, Iraq and Iran to the Thughir and made life attractive even for the regular troops transferred on assignment.

Of course, income from land or real estate grants, stipends and booty produced a considerable wealth ideally suited to be diversified into non-fiscal economic ventures, such as trade. A specialized Muslim market system in the Thughbr is already attested to for the period of ar-Rashid--when in 785/169 the Byzantines menaced the town of al-IHadath we hear of the hurried flight of the administrator (wdli),

garrison (jund) and traders (ahl al-aswdq) ")-but exchange was still secondary to taxes and booty. For most Thughiirians contacts with markets were probably not very different from those of a Muslim raider in 666/46 who undertook a summer campaign and after his return from enemy country spent three days in a Muslim border town to sell his booty and distribute the proceeds among his companions 45). Trade was a secondary activity of local importance, not to be confused with the international commerce in spices, aromatics and luxuries which the Byzantines were thinking of in the peace and trade proposals they extended to al-Ma'mfin in 830/215. Judging from the hostile reaction of al-Ma'm-in, and the conflicts of interests apparent in al- Mu'tasim's reign, the incentives as perceived in this field of commercial activity by the 'Abbdsid ruling class must not yet have been irresistably attractive.

44) Tab., 568. 45) Bal., 227.

6


82 PETER VON SIVERS

2. The Transition from Fiscal to Commercial Interests in the Thughir,

842-7 8 /227- 6

After al-Mu'tasim the commercial expansionists steadily gained in strength. During a transitional period extending from 842-78/227-65 military efforts declined perceptibly and the war against Byzantium assumed defensive proportions. However, this ascendancy of commercial interests was not without its own limitations. On the one hand the

emerging merchant wing achieved a measure of true power vis-a-vis the fiscally oriented military wing in the ruling class. A merchant who personally supervised the commercial exchange process, that is, the buying, storing, transporting and selling of his goods, realized higher earnings and consequently stood a chance to accumulate more power than an officer who creamed off booty or taxes from distant taxpayers

and who had nothing to do with the productive activities of these taxpayers. But on the other hand, merchants remained the only proponents of the policy of transforming fiscal into commercial sources of revenue. No parallel wing of agricultural entrepreneurs rose in the ruling class to pressure the military wing into reducing the land taxes and recognizing private farming enterprises. No barony, gentry or Junkertum appeared to challenge the absentee landlords, tax collectors and tax farmers in the field of agricultural production. Apparently the profits to be realized from a direct organization of peasant labor did not reach the rates achieved in commerce and therefore failed to provide

an incentive strong enough for the development of agricultural entre- preneurism 46). Maximum or even excessive taxation of a, for the most part, poorly producing peasantry continued to be the principal activity of a major portion of the 'Abbtsid ruling class. Because of the failure of a landed section of the ruling class to materialize, traditional fiscal orientations remained too strongly entrenched to be submissively dislodged by the emerging commercial interests.

46) The question has never been thoroughly researched on the basis of the Arabic sources. A good general discussion can be found in Xavier de Planhol, Lesfondements

giographiques de l'histoire musulmane (Paris, 1968); see also Samir Amin, La nation arabe (Paris, 1976).


TAXES AND TRADE IN THE CABBASID THUGHUR 83

Since the fiscal wing of the ruling class did not have to reckon with the direct opposition of a group of landed entrepreneurs but only with the indirect rivalry of the commercial segment the struggle for pre- dominance during the transitional period under discussion was exceedingly confused. A variety of issues, such as pay raises, modalities of payment, recruitments and places of service, were at issue and caused

the two fiscal and commercial wings of the ruling class to subdivide themselves into smaller groups with constantly shifting alliance preferences. For our purpose of tracing the history of the Thughir the issues of recruitment and place of service are of central interest and shall form the core of the analysis.

The first clear sign of the emergence of commercial interests in the ruling class is provided by the fiscal reorganization of the Thughir in 857/243. This reorganization was deemed necessary after the massive distribution of arable land and urban real estate to anyone who promised to settle and fight had apparently resulted in fiscal anarchy. A maze of

tax-exempt properties sometimes no longer related to the original military purposes had come into existence, as was for instance the case

with some pasture land between al-Hadath and Zibatra in the Jaziran

Thughrr which once had been set aside for use by the Muslim cavalry and which had been turned into fields by the end of the eighth century 47). The tax yield of the province was chronically low and the budget failed to meet expenses. In the reorganization of 857/243 all tax exemptions from the Muslim tithe ('ushr) were abolished and in theory all Muslims were assessed for this tax48). Obviously most holders of land grants or urban real estate had dropped out of military service and had become rentiers, landlords, merchants, artisans or farmers enjoying the special privileges attached to their properties. For the majority of property holders the assessment for the tithe meant

their elimination from the ruling class which now was far less accessible

than half a century before. In this respect the fiscal wing of the ruling class had scored a victory. But it should also be noted that the tax

47) Bal., 227. 48) Bal., 203.


84 PETER VON SIVERS

reorganization did not include measures of confiscation and redis- tribution to the military. Since furthermore wealthy merchants, insofar as they belonged to the ruling class, could evade the tithe it is clear that the merchant wing in the ruling class was now strong enough to force the fiscal antagonist into the granting of compromises. Parallel to the development of the commercial potential in the

Thugb/ir we find a slight but distinct decline in military activities. None of the caliphs holding office during the transitional period under discussion set foot inside the Tbugbihr. Although there were still acts of individual heroism during the campaigns against the Byzantines, overall the military did not achieve the same brilliant successes which were so typical of the previous period. Summer raids were organized only during 14 out of the 36 years comprising the second period, as compared to nearly every year in the first period 49). The Byzantines increased their military activities in absolute as well as relative terms, from six campaigns during the first to nine campaigns in the second period 50). During the 830's or 840's they succeeded in annexing the district (kfira) of Shimshit for a few years, thanks to the collaboration of some local Christians 51). These Christians had been forced to pay a 2z percent land tax (khbaraj) to the Muslims while the rest of the Thugbir was under the regime of the tithe 52). The Muslim government eventually recovered the district, but only at the cost of reducing the tax rate to the tithe (855/241) 53). Another military setback occurred in 876/263 when the Byzantines for the first time in over a century suc-

49) Statistics compiled from Bar Hebraeus, Ibn al-'Adim, Ibn al-Athir, Mas'idi; 'Arib b. Sa'd, Sila Tdrikh at-Tabari, ed. M. J. de Goeje (Leiden, I897); al-Hamddni, Muhammad b. 'Abdalmalik, Takmila Tdrikb al-Tabari, ed. A. Y. Kan'an, znd ed. (Beirut, I961); Miskawayh, Ahmad b. Mulhammad, Tajdrib al-Umam, ed. H. F. Amedroz, vol. I (London, i908); Ibn al-Jawzi, Abfi 'l-Faraj b. 'Ali, al-Muntagam fi Tjrikh al-Mulik wa 'l-Umam, vol. V, pt. 2 (Hyderabad, I357)- 5o) Statistics compiled from works listed in n. 49. 5I) Honigmann, op. it., n. 3, 57; Bal., 220. 5 2) Bal., 219; I cannot agree with the interpretation given to this event by M. A.

Shaban, Islamic Hi-story, A.D. 7;o-Iojy (A.H. I32-448): A New Interpretation (Cambridge, 1975), 77. 53) Tab., 1428.


TAXES AND TRADE IN THE ABBASID THUGHUJR 8

ceeded in breaching the Muslim defensive lines by wresting the important fort Lu'lu'a (Lulon) in the Jaziran Thughbr from the Muslims 54).

With the fall of Lu'lu'a the war of attrition in preparation of the conquest of Byzantium had definitely given way to a war of defense.

The ascendancy of the merchant wing in the ruling class and the partial weakening of the fiscal wing as represented mainly by the military is also borne out by a prosopographical analysis of the Muslim personalities serving in the Thughbir. For purposes of clarity the zoo odd names which can be culled from the available chronicles and

biographical works for the period between 750o/133 and 962/35i have

been subdivided into two groups covering period I (75o-842/I33-zz7) as well as periods II (842-78/227-65) and III (878-962/265-35 1) respec- tively. The dividing line is provided by the year 842/227, that is, the year of the death of Caliph al-Mu'tasim whose reign symbolizes the beginning of the transition from a fiscal to a commercial constitution of the Thughir.

Each group of ruling class members doing service in the Thughir is analyzed in terms of geographic and ethnic origin, length of tenure in the province and overall career in the empire. The types of service considered as criteria for ruling class status are the leadership of, or participation in, a land or sea raid into Byzantine territory; a governorship of the Syrian or Jaziran Thughbr; a command over a town or a castle; a diplomatic mission to the Byzantine emperor; the supervision of an exchange of prisoners; the leadership of, or participation in, a revolt against the central government or a judgeship.

Four main ethnic-geographical groups have been distinguished for the period under consideration, reflecting closely the complicated patterns of alliance and opposition in the military wing of the 'Abbasid

ruling class discussed in this article. These groups are the 'Abba-siyya (members of the 'Abbisid caliphal family), the abnd' (Arabs emigrated to Khirasain, Iranians from the same area and Arabs from Iraq), the Atrik (Central Asians mostly from Farghina and mostly Turkic

54) Tab., 1886, 1915.


86 PETER VON SIVERS

speaking) as well as the shdkiriyya (troops in the personal service of the caliph and recruited from among western Iranians, Armenians as well as Jaziran and Syrian Arabs). At times the Atrdk were allied with the Maghdriba, a less prominent group composed mostly of Egyptians which was represented in the Thughbr by a few individuals. During the

last quarter of the ninth century the shakiriyya ceased to be a formal military group. In this article, however, the term "shdkir?yya" is employed for the tenth century as well, with the understanding that we are dealing with an informal ethnic-geographical group. In the following table the various chronological, ethnic-geographical and socio- logical criteria are represented in graphical form.

Table

Service of the 'Abbisid ruling class in the Thughair, 75o-962/13 3-35I 5)

cAbbdiyya abnad' Atrdk shdkiryya

A c % w CAA , V) 0 u 4J 4-0 41 4,Jt~ . ti

1-4 C) w o o u ., -I b C 4J 41 0'. 4 0 0 o c

4-) 00 W

period I

(750-842) 7 18 o 25 37 I 5 53 IO 3 I 14 7 3 4 14 periods II and III 6 o o 6 14 2 5 z2 19 8 10 37 14 3 29 46 (842-878-962)

sub-total 105 I11 total sample z26

55) The table is based on the works cited in n. 19 and 49, as well as on Ibn al- Jawzi, al-Munta;Zam, vol. VI; Yahyi al-Antlki, Tdrikhb, ed. and tr. J. Kratchkovsky and A. Vasiliev, Patrologia orientalis, vol. XVIII and XXIII (Paris, 1924 and 1932); al-Kindi, Mutlammad b. Yiisuf, Kitdb al-Wulit, ed. R. Guest, in Gibb Memorial Series, vol. XIX (London, 9 2).


TAXES AND TRADE IN THE 'ABBASID THUGHfJR 87

The first and least surprising conclusion to be drawn from the above table concerns the shift of power among the four ruling class segments. It is well-known that the 'Abbdsid empire started out with a prolific dynastic clan at the core and an overwhelmingly Irano-Arab and Iranian staff in the army and the administration. Therefore it is normal to find the caliphs' brothers, uncles, cousins and other relatives 56) in the Thughir together with the most prestigious leaders Khiirasdn could offer 57). The climax of 'Abbdsid and Irano-Arab service in the Thughfr

was reached after barely two generations in the three-generation span

extending from 750o/133 to 842/227. The third and fourth generations switched from military to commercial careers and their departure made

more massive recruitment of Atrdk 58) and shjkiriya 59) necessary. The Arabic sources present this recruitment, particularly that of the Atrdk, as a sudden event going back to al-Mu'tasim's decision to "buy" Turkish soldiers 60). But the table shows clearly that in the Thughbr the

Atrdk were in evidence already well before the end of the first period. In fact, a certain al-Hasan al-Wasif is mentioned already in a campaign of the year 775/15961) and Faraj al-Khidim at-Turki appears as a

56) One of the most prominent in this group was Silih b. 'Ali b. 'Abdallah, uncle of al-Saffah and al-Mans-r and founder of a powerful Damascus family, Tab., 74, 121-22; 'Adim, 59; Bal., 223.

57) Especially the Khuzi'a tribe was prominently represented, with five members (Azdi, 3o8-9; Ya'qfibi, 537, 541, 553; Tab., 353, 709, 712; Bal., 220, 223). About a dozen families, mostly of Khiirasini background, can be followed for up to three generations in the Thughf.

58) Typical examples: IHaydar b. Kaws al-Afshin and his nephew 'Abdallah b. Rashid b. Kaws, both of an important Ushrisina family (Ya'qfibi, 5 81; Azdi, 427; Tab., 1236, 1592, 1916, 1931); and Maziham b. Khiqin Artrkh, brother of Fath b. KhAqIn (Ya'qabi, 612; Tab., 1481); on Fath see 0. Pinto, "Al-Fath b. Khiq~n, favorite di al-Mutawakkil", Rivista degli studi orientali 13 (1931-3z), 133-49.

59) Prominent tribes with representatives in the administration: Shaybin, Taghlib and 'Uqayl (Tab., 2222-23, 2254, 2271; Athir, VII, 308, 352); typical representatives of the North: al-Fadl b. Qlrin at-Tabari, brother of Mizyir of Tabaristdn (Tab., 1480, I o8, 1533) and 'Ali b. Yalhyy al-Armani, one of the heroes of the wars against Byzantium (Ya'qaibi, 599-6oo; Tab., 1351, 1434, 1447, 1449, 1480, 15o8, 1511; Masdi, VIII, 73-74). The latter had a son, Muhammad b. 'All al-Armani, who was 'imil of Tarsus around 875 /z262z (Athir, VII, 308).

6o) Mas'idi, VII, I18. 61) Tab., 459.


88 PETER VON SIVERS

commander of Tarsis in the year 786/170 and a few years later as a major driving force in the settling and arming of the border zone 62). Thus the decline of the 'Abbhsizyya and abnd' and the rise of the Atrdk

and shdkiriyya in the military wing of the ruling class involved with the Thzughbr is more spread out than usually assumed. As the table shows, the first to change over into the commercial wing was the caliphal family, while the abn? were much slower in responding to the ad- vantages of commerce. A less evident but very important finding to be taken from the table

is the fact of a perceptible decline in the number of 'Abbdsid leaders providing intermittent service to the administration of the Thughifr, as time progresses from period I to periods II and III and as power shifts from the 'Abbia-slya-abnd' to the Atrdk-shdkiriyya. While during

the climax of 'Abbdsiyya-abna power in the ruling class 29 persons spent several terms of their administrative career in the Thughir, at the

height of Atrdk-shdkiriyya influence only i i persons spent more than one stint of their careers in the Byzantine border zone. In the category of one-term stays the ratio of 43 to 33 ruling class members is less pronounced than that of multi-term leaders, but a decline of single stints is nevertheless also noticeable. By contrast, life-long careers in the Thuzghhr rise spectacularly from 5 to 39. In other words, tenures in the Thughfbr tend to become longer as time evolves and leadership shifts in the military wing of the ruling class. If we correlate this fact of longer careers with the observation of

slackening war efforts made earlier in this section of the paper 63) a surprising result emerges: the military successes against the Byzantines during the first period were not accomplished by relentless warriors who spent a lifetime in pursuit of the infidel but by regulars who were largely disinterested in the places where they performed the administrative duties for which they had enrolled. The loud praise sung by some Arab authors in honor of the alleged throngs of volunteers of religion streaming to the Byzantine border, particularly during the

62) Tab., 604. 63) See above, p. 13-14.


TAXES AND TRADE IN THE 'ABBASID THUGHUiR 89

ninth and tenth centuries 64), should not mislead us into believing that their military activities were automatically more effective than those of

the regular military. Our documentation shows conclusively that there was no substantial increase in leaders and hence in fighting personnel in the Thughfr from the first to the second and third periods (ratio 105 to III, without taking the unequal lengths of periods I and II/III into account). The numbers of volunteers flocking to the Thughbr were sufficient to make up for the loss of regulars but not large enough to provide more than a defensive function.

The evidence concerning the rise of commercial interests during the transitional period of 842-78/227-65 is mostly indirect and concerns the military more than the merchants. Nevertheless, in my view a strong

case can be made for the assumption of a military and administrative body in the Thughbr progressively subjected to domination by commercial interests. Evidence supporting this case has been drawn from three areas, namely, the fiscal field involving the reorganization of 857/243, the military realm involving martial activities between 842/227 and 878/265, and the administrative domain involving a prosopographical analysis of all officials doing service in the province from 750/133 to 962/351. Conquest might have been a religious duty, but there was a time when the Muslims discovered that the fiscal benefits of military expansion were less profitable than the commercial benefits of a mili- tarily protected trade 65).

3. Commercial Interests and the Defense of the Euphrates Route, 878- 962/26Y-31 I

The new merchant wing in the ruling class was successful in forcing its military counterpart into relinquishing large-scale conquest from its political armory. But there were still the domestic fiscal resources

64) See the discussion of the fiddyin in Marius Canard, art. "Cilicia", E12; idem, "Quelques observations sur l'introduction gtographique de la Bughyat at-T'alab de Kam?i ad-Din b. al-'Adim d'Alep", Annales de l'Institut des itudes orientales a Alger 15 (1957), 41-53; Le Strange, op. cit., n. 6, 377-78.

65) See above, p. 83.


90 PETER VON SIVERS

from which the military derived its pay. Two alternatives existed for the merchant wing to deprive the military of control of the tax revenue as well. First, a class of agricultural entrepreneurs could be encouraged to establish itself and replace the tax-collecting military. But, for reasons

discussed earlier, such a class did not emerge. The second alternative was the establishment of a civilian bureaucracy (which, in fact, had been in the making ever since the beginning of the ninth century) under the auspices of the merchant faction which could take charge of tax collection and payment of military salaries. It was the second alternative which the merchant segment of the ruling class chose in order to further increase its power vis-a-vis the army. However, as already mentioned 66), one serious disadvantage was unavoidable. The bureaucracy had to be financed from the same fiscal resources which also fed the military. Mercantile control of the military began to appear as a wasteful double consumption of tax revenue. The moment was inevitably reached when the tax revenues became

insufficient to finance both a civilian bureaucracy and a military appara- tus. Inflation stemming from commercial expansion, and overtaxation which created massive rural emigration, made the task of reestablishing a fiscal equilibrium exceedingly difficult. In this situation a dismantling of the civil bureaucracy was the logical solution. With time, the military managed to reassert itself over the merchants and financial bureaucrats,

gradually moving back into the tax-collecting business. But a side effect of this movement of the military towards direct control of the taxpayer was the development of regional fiscal interests. The military wing of the 'Abbisid ruling class not only eclipsed the mercantile wing but also disintegrated into competing regional sub-groups. In the Thughir this regionalization of the military was represented by

Ahmad b. Tialin at-Turki, the well-known officer of Farghina descent

who received his education in Tarsus. In 868/254 b. Tflcin was appointed representative of the fiscal interests which his military superior,

a Turkish general in Baghdad, maintained in Egypt 67). At first b.

66) See above, p. 3.

67) al-Kindi, op. cit., n. 55, P. 2z-i 3; Maqrizi, .Aroad b. 'Ali, al-Khbila (Bulaq,


TAXES AND TRADE IN THE CABBASID THUGHUJR 91

Tiilfin was dependent on the services of a financial inspector sent together with him to Egypt, but in due course he rid himself of both fiscal and military supervisors and from 876/263 sought to extend his

influence in Syria and the ThughGr s). The commercial wing of the 'Abbisid ruling class in the Thughfir eyed this emergence of a regional commander with suspicion since it increased the chances for political unrest which could prove inimical to trade.

A first attempt by b. Tfilfin to establish his rule in the Thughir in 877/264 failed when the inhabitants protested loudly (jdaja) and his own brother, a resident of Tarsfis, refused to get involved. Another candidate likewise declined involvement and Tukhshi b. Balbard who

finally accepted the governorship in the name of b. Tiliin seems to have been without authority 69). In 878/265 the Egyptian commander marched in person to Syria and the Thughfr. In Syria the conquest went well, but further north strong resistance continued unabated. Antioch (Antikya) had to be taken by storm 70). The subsequent entry

into Tarsfis was planned as a triumphant preparation for a raid against the Byzantines. But before b. Tiilun was able to acquire glory in the name of Islam he had to confront more mundane problems, such as skyrocketing prices (lit. ghald as-si'r) and a general scarcity of supplies. The Tarsfisis boldly demanded his departure and in the end the Egyp- tian had to comply 71). His only consolation was the studied display of conciliation towards this prospective new neighbor by the Byzan- tines who sent him presents and prisoners, including a high-ranking officer from Farghi.na 72).

1854), I, 319; on the origins of b. Tiilfan: Zaki M. Hassan, Les Tulunides. Etude de l'Egypte musulmane a lafin du IXe sicle (Jd6-9oy) (Paris, 193 3).

68) Maqrizi, 319; Kindi, 217; for reasons not entirely clear Caliph al-Mu'tamid entrusted b. Tlfin with the governorship of the Thughbr, but not of Syria. The Regent al-Muwaffaq canceled the governorship in the following year (877/264), Kindi, loc. cit., 'Adim, 75. The original Turkish supervisor in Baghdad, Baykbik, had been replaced in 870/257 by YIrjIj, Tab., 1840.

69) Kindi, 217. 70) Maqrizi, 320zo; Kindi, 220. 71) Maqrizi, 320; Mas'cdi, VIII, 71-72. 72) Tab., 1931; see also Wladyslaw B. Kubiak, "The Byzantine Attack on Da-

mietta in 853 and the Egyptian Navy in the 9th Century", ByZantion 40 (1970), 45-66.


92 PETER VON SIVERS

The closing of markets was the typical weapon used by the merchant wing of the 'Abbisid ruling class when it still possessed power for bringing recalcitrant members of the military to heel. In the case of

b. Tailin the stakes were high, since nothing less than fiscal control of one of the major markets and outlets to Byzantium was at stake. Merchants from the Thughir and Iraq could hardly sit placidly by while an independent-minded officer sought to further his Egyptian interests at their expense. A veritable power struggle ensued during which b. Tilan continued his attempts to get a foothold in the Tbughfr, while the locals, strongly supported by Baghdad and its administrators in the province, tried to keep the Egyptian footing slippery.

After his rebuff in TarsUs b. Tiilan chose a different method to gain control of the Thughfir. In 879/266 he appointed a temporary represen-

tative (k~alfa) to organize a raid on the Byzantines and through this ever popular device indeed some 3,000 Tarsasis were lured by the dream of booty into the Egyptian camp 73). Next, in 882/269, a full- time military commander ('dmil) was appointed who kept his raiders happy by paying them shares of forty dinar each 74). But the Tarstsis were not that easily mollified. When the commander, Khalaf al-Far- ghini, in the same year went a step further and proceeded to arrest his caliphal counterpart, Yizmdn al-Khddim, the population rose in a revolt and expelled Khalaf 75). Ahmad b. Tilan marched immediately

against Tarsfis, but Yizmin and the population defended the city so valiantly that the Egyptian once again was forced to retreat 76). The struggle for control between Egypt and Iraq remained the

dominating political question in the Tbugbir even after the death of b. Tailiin in 883/270 77). The successor in Egypt, Khumdrawayh, in 887/274 showered YizmIn with 8o,ooo dinar and generous gifts and promptly ensured his allegiance for the time being 78). But after the

73) Kindi, 225; Tab., 1942. 74) Tab., 2026. 75) Kindi, 223-4; Tab., 2028. 76) Maqrizi, 321; Kindi, 229. 77) Tab., 2104-5, z o8; Kindi, 235. 78) Tab., z117; Kindi, 235.


TAXES AND TRADE IN THE 'ABBAiSID THUGHUR 93

death of Ydzmin in 891/278 the power struggle resumed79) and dragged on until 897/284 when "the people of Tarsds" (ahl Tarsis), that is presumably, the merchants and artisans, sent a delegation to Baghdad reporting the damage which Ahmad b. Tilin had been inflicting (asa'a) on them and demanding a new caliphal governor to end the unsavory fighting in the Thughfr 80). The caliph was delighted to comply and appointed a new governor who in 898/285 proceeded to reestablish the authority of the central government in the province a1).

However, while Egyptian influence in the Thughir had been reduced, the underlying syndrome, that is, the movement of the Turkish- dominated military wing of the ruling class towards a direct control of the taxpayer, continued to affect the province. In 900/287 the Turkish-

descended governor of Adharbayjdn and founder of the regional dynasty of the S-jids, Muhammad b. Abi 's-S-j, found the situation propitious to annex the Thughfr and drive the Tilunids from Egypt as well. To this purpose he sent one of his officers, Wasif al-Khddim, into the Thughfr where the latter demanded a caliphal appointment over the land and sea forces 82). But the absurdity of transferring the province

from the officers of Egypt to those of Adharbayjdn persuaded Baghdad that a direct show of force was necessary to restore the central authority.

Caliph al-Mu'tadid marched in person into the Thughir in order to demonstrate the government's continued commitment to political unity and unhindered trade. Wasif was quickly captured and three of his accomplices in Tarsas, a volunteer and his son as well as the son of an engineer (al-muhandis), went to prison. In order to deter any ideas of future divisive activities the caliph had the entire Tarsfs war fleet, some 5o vessels altogether, burned to ashes. With this preventive destruction of the fleet al-Mu'tadid's campaign reached its end without a single raid being levelled against Byzantium. The caliph returned complacently to Baghdad 83).

79) Tab., 2132, 2138, 2140, 216o; Kindi, 242. 80o) Tab., 2163. 8i) Tab., 2184. 82) Tab., 2195. 83) Tab., 2198-2200.


94 PETER VON SIVERS

This incineration of the Muslim navy in the northeastern Mediter- ranean was a remarkable event. It demonstrated that during the early part of the third period in Thughirian history nothing was farther from the minds of the dominant members of the 'Abbisid ruling class than the war against Byzantium. The navy was the most potent offensive

weapon that could be mustered against the Byzantines and if it was readily sacrificed for the sake of ending the attempts at establishing autonomous regional regimes it must have been considered quite marginal to the well-being of commercial life in the empire. Never before had mercantile and military-fiscal interests clashed more dra- matically in the Thughir and never before had the merchant wing in the government so overtly abandoned the traditional holy war ideology.

As it turned out, the setback for the sea raiders of Tarsis was only temporary. By 904/291 the fleet was back to its previous strength and under the leadership of a Christian renegade, Ghullm Zurifa, raided

as far as Salonica 4). A year later, another renegade by the name of Dimy~ina Ghuldm Yizmin, took over the command of the fleet and participated in the caliphal conquest of Egypt from the Tijilinids 85). At the same time the land war was not quite as successful. After re- capturing a measure of military initiative in the transitional period from

842-78/227-65, as we have seen 86), the Byzantines adopted the same tactics of penetrating raids which the Muslims had been following since the conquest of the Thughir. For instance, in 901/288 a Byzantine party descended the Euphrates as far as Kaysiim which it raided. The Merchants of Raqqa on the Euphrates-Mediterranean route some zoo miles away were sufficiently alarmed by this event to adress a letter to

84) Tab., zz22o; see also Kenneth M. Setton "On the Raids of the Moslems in the Aegean and Their Alleged Occupation of Athens", AmericanJournal of Archeology 58 (1954), 311-19; on the role of Cyprus in the Arab-Byzantine sea wars: R. J. H. Jenkins, "Cyprus Between Byzantium and Islam, A.D. 688-695", in Studies Presented to D. M. Robinson II (St. Louis, I95 3), Ioo6-I4.

85) Maqrizi, 322; Kind!, 244-45; Tab., 2248-49. In 99/30o7 the Tarsnfs fleet sailed to Alexandria to help repel a North African naval attack, Kindi, 276.

86) See above, p. 14-15.


TAXES AND TRADE IN THE <ABBASID THUGHOR 9J

the government in Baghdad 87). The government also realized that the defense of the Thughfr must not be breached in order to ensure an undisturbed trade and mobilized a considerable amount of money and troops over the next few years 88). Thus, while too much offensive naval power was judged injurious to the mercantile interests of the ruling class, strong efforts were undertaken to keep territorial defenses in good repair.

However, the number of troops on stand-by for dispatch into the Thughir to strengthen defenses was not unlimited. Although, after

the capture of Wasif and the fall of the Ttilfinids the central Asian officers were now under stricter supervision by the central bureaucracy, the tendency towards long-term appointments in the provinces close to the tax-paying subjects continued and was far from being reversed. A declining number of officers was available to continue the traditional military function of one-term campaigns or roving appointments, as we have seen in the prosopographical analysis of section two 89). One of the few roving campaigners remaining was the famous Mu'nis

al-Khidim (al-Muzaffar), the police commander (sd.hib ash-shurta) of Baghdad, who was in the Thughir for no less than eight campaigns against the Byzantines 90). But whenever Mu'nis was tied down in Baghdad or campaigned elsewhere, the Muslims called for help (istighdta) in vain, as was the case during Byzantine incursions in 926/31491), 928/3 6 92) and 929/317 8). Short term campaigning to help out in emergencies was no longer attractive to the tax-hungry Baghdad military.

The growing disagreement between the military and merchant wings over the question of defense in the Thughir is drastically re-

87) Tab., 2205. 88) Tab., 2221, 2223, 2285, 2291; 'Arib, op. tit., n. 49, 55 and 145. 89) See above, p. 85-88. 90) Bar Hebraeus, op. dtit., n. 19, I55-56; Tab., 2198-2200, 2284; Miskawayh, op.

dit., n. 49, 36, 11; Athir, VIII, 54, 1o6; <Arib, 171-2; Hamdini, op. tit., n. 49, 43, 5I, i8, 31, 59; Ibn al-Jawzi, op. dt., n. 49, 82, 172.

91) Hamdlini, 48; Athir, VIII, 167. 92) Athir, 199. 93) Ibid.


96 PETER VON SIVERS

flected in the statistics of warfare along the border. During the half- century 878-925/265-313 the Muslims encountered few problems of defense and clearly retained the military initiative, with 29 summers (and a few winters) of raiding over 9 on the part of the Byzantines 94). Of course, as we have seen in section two 95), Byzantium had recovered sufficiently by 878/265 to score occasional successes as well. Towards the middle of the tenth century the situation changed completely. From 925-45/313-34 when the military crisis of the Thughir was most acute, Muslim and Byzantine raids were of equal numbers, io each 96). Given the constant irruption of Byzantine forces it is not surprising that political turmoil accompanied military difficulties. Opportunists abounded. An Arab general turned Christian in 93 I/3 19 and participated in the Byzantine campaigns, without however cutting his ties completely with the Muslim side so as to have the best of two worlds 97). Similarly, an Arab family of Malatya which had been prominent in the city since its conquest by the Muslims, found it opportune to negotiate a status of neutrality between the Muslims and Christians 98). But this neutrality survived only until 934/322 when Byzantium annexed the city and induced "most" (akthar) inhabitants to convert if they wished to retain their properties 99). In the course of the Byzantine campaigns during these years so many Muslims were captured that during a prisoners' exchange in 938/327 the tax income of Syria had to be set aside for their release 100). The defenses of the Thughfir were beginning

94) Statistics compiled from works cited in n. 49 and 5 5. 95) See above, p. 84-85. 96) See n. 94. 97) Bunni b. Nafis, Tab., 2286; Athir, VIII, 77, 121, 145, 183, 235; Miskawayh,

105; 'Arib, III, 143, 171-72. 98) Abi Hafs, descendant of 'Amr b. 'Ubaydallah ('Abdallah) and of 'Ubay-

dallah al-Aqta', Balidhuri, zzo; Tab., 1434, 1449, 1509, 1511; Ya'qibi, 6o6; Mas'idi, VIII, 73-74; Athir, VII, 93. 99) Athir, VM, 296. ioo) As-Snli, Muhammad b. Yahyi, Akbbir ar-Radi Billah wa 'l-Mutaqqi Billdh,

tr. Marius Canard, vol. I (Algiers, 1946), 169. See also Ibn Sa'id, 'All b. Mnasi al-Maghribi, Kitab al-Mughrib fi HIuld al-Maghrib, Buch IV: Geschichte der Ikhsbiden undfustanensische Biographien, ed. Knut L. Tallqvist (Leiden, 1899), 8, 23; al-Mas'idi, 'All b. IHusayn, Kitib at-Tanbib wa 'l-Ishraf, ed. M. J. de Goeje (Leiden, 1894),


TAXES AND TRADE IN THE cABBAiSID THUGHUfR 97

to crack, although the Euphrates-Mediterranean trade route was still relatively safe.

Given the progressive abdication of the commercial wing of the ruling class from power over the Thughir and the rising indifference of the military towards events on the Byzantine frontier it is remarkable

that it took almost two decades more for the Thughirian defenses to collapse and for the enemy to arrive in northern Syria's commercial centers. A strong factor in this temporary survival of the Thughfr was an effort at establishing a new regional government in the area by the Arab Hamdanids. Thus far the Turks had been favored in the military drive towards local control of tax revenues, mostly because of the protection they enjoyed from their colleagues in the military wing of the ruling class in Baghdad. Leaders from Tabaristin, Armenia, Jazira or the Thughfir themselves 101) oftentimes reached positions of high military or administrative prominence, but in their efforts towards regional autonomy they were handicapped since they could not count on the sympathy of the mostly Turkish Baghdad military. As is well- known through the exhaustive work of Marius Canard, one of the

few exceptions were the .Hamdi~nids of the Jazira who had a long history of political involvement with the central government and who succeeded in the first half of the tenth century, not without many quarrels with Baghdad, to make Mosul (al-Mawsil) the capital of their regional realm 102). IHamdinid involvement in the defenses of the Thughtr began in 931/319 when the hardpressed Muslims of Shimshdt turned to Sa'id b. Hamdin for help and the latter, after a victorious campaign against the Byzantines, left a representative to govern in his name 103). Thus after the Tclinids and Sajids a regional power rose for a third time to assume control of the Thughifr.

Another Hamdinid, Sayf ad-Dawla, devoted himself to a systematic

193-94. Miskawayh cites a figure of 500oo,ooo dinar for the year 926/314 (p. 150). ioi) A group loosely called "shbkiriyya" in this article, see above p. 86.

o02) Marius Canard, Histoire de la dynastie des H'amdanides de JazIra et de Syrie, vol. I (Paris, 1953), 377-578. So03) Athir, VIII, 235.

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98 PETER VON SIVERS

expansion of the newly acquired family interests in the Thughir, following his accession to the emirate of Aleppo in 944/33 3 104). In an obvious return to the militarism of the first period of Thughtirian history he applied his energy to an impressive reconstruction program in the towns of Mar'ash 05o), al-Hadath 106) and 'Ayn Zarba 107). Similarly, the Muslim campaigns against the Byzantines were given ideological

significance through a re-kindling of the half-forgotten zeal (.bamiya) for holy war (jihdd) 10o). But the campaigns were not won by zeal alone. Professional troops consisting of Turks or northwest Iranian Daylam were necessary to supplement the Jaziran Arabs who formed the power base of the HIIamdinids. However, these professional troops were expensive to support and from a revolt which occurred in 957/ 346 it appears that Sayf ad-Dawla was not satisfying their pecuniary demands. At this time the Byzantines bribed the Turkish contingent with lavish sums to deliver Sayf up to them, but the plot was discovered

in time and in the ensuing suppression 38o valuable soldiers perished and an unspecified number fled 109). The emir found it impossible to build up a military force equal to the Byzantine challenge and even a timely infusion a year later of money from Mosul did not substantially

upgrade the strength of the troops and broaden the financial base of the realm 110). In spite of relentless campaigning on the part of the Hamdinids it eventually proved impossible to stop the Byzantines 111). In 960/350 they reached the Euphrates-Mediterranean mercantile route for the first time and seized a large caravan travelling from

lo4) 'Adim, I1I-12; b. Sa'id al-Maghribi, 41-42. IO5) 'Adim, 122. io6) Id., 125 ; Yahyi al-AntAki, XVIII, 772 (but it was destroyed again in 956/345

as stated in XVIII, 774). See also Marius Canard, ed., Sayf al-Daula. Recueil de textes... (Algiers, 1934), 107-8; o19-12. 107) al-Antki, XVIII, 784. o08) 'Adim, 132, I34. o109) 'Adim, I27. I1o) Id., I28-29; al-Antdki, XVIII, 777.

'i1) 'Adim, 120-34; al-An.ki, XVIII, 783-4; Athir, VIII, 417, 480, 485, 5o8, 517, 527, 531, 536, 538, 540; Bar Hebraeus, 167-68. See also M. Canard, ed., op. dit., n. 102, 75 5-817.


TAXES AND TRADE IN THE 'ABBiSID THUGHJR 99

Antioch to Tarsfs 112). In 962/35 I the Byzantines captured Aleppo 118), the commercial capital of northern Syria, and thus put an end to more than two centuries of military inferiority and more than one century of

commercial disadvantage. It was Byzantium now which determined the conditions of defense and trade 114).

During the two hundred years of 'Abbisid dominance in the Thughbr the transformations of Muslim society were impressive and far-reaching.

Three periods have been distinguished. (i) There was first the period of conquest (75o-842/133-27) with the primary concern for fiscal revenues, settlement and further conquests of Byzantine territory. (2) During the second, transitional, period (842-78/227-65) commercial interests focused on the trade of spices, aromatics and luxuries from southeast Asia and eastern Africa to the Syrian cities and Byzantium gained in ascendancy. Since this trade presupposed an economically strong Constantinople, the merchants rising in the 'Abbisid ruling class militated for an end of the policy of conquest as unprofitable and for a reduction of the war effort to a defensive posture in the Thughiir. Commercial exploitation was to replace military conquest. (3) In the third period (878-962/265-35 i) a rough balance between military-fiscal and commercial interests in the 'Abbisid ruling class gradually tilted again

in favor of the military. The military-fiscal wing had conceded to its com-

mercial counterpart its cherished policy of conquest, but it remained strongly committed to its fiscal interests inside the empire. In time it gained exclusive control over taxation which in turn resulted in the rise of

regional regimes and in the end removed any interest the central military

might have had in continuing the defensive war against the Byzantines. The Thughir were lost to the Byzantines not because of a deep moral failure of the Muslims to overcome internal squabbling and keep their martial spirits alive but because of a fundamental incompatibility between the fiscal and commercial interests in the 'Abbisid ruling class.

i1 z) Athir, VIII, 536; Hamdini, 178 (according to the latter the event occurred in 959/349 in the vicinity of Aleppo).

113) 'Adim, 134-7; Miskawayh, II, 193; Athir, VIII, 540-2; Canard, ed., op. dt., n. io6, 145-9. The city of TarsUs fell to the Byzantines two years later.

114) 'Adim, 157-9; Athir, 588-9.


Taxes and Trade in the Abbasid Thughur, 750-962/133-351

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