Sunni Imams’ Dealing with Apostasy in Australia: A Sociological Study

Student: Mohammed Othman Abdulraheem

Supervisor: Jan A. Ali

School of Humanities and Communication Arts

Western Sydney University

Master of Research - 2021

Statement of Authentication

The work presented in this thesis is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, original except as

acknowledged in the text. I hereby declare that I have not submitted this material, either in full or in

part, for a degree at this or any other institution

Mohammed Othman Abdulraheem

Acknowledgements

In the name of Allah, whose blessings cannot be numbered. I would like to thank my supervisor,

Dr Jan A. Ali, whose critical and priceless comments were constructive for this study and whose

continuous advice how to improve my thesis cannot be forgotten. I highly appreciate his

supportive supervision. I also thank my participants who contributed to this study and shared

their knowledge and experiences to enrich the study.

ABSTRACT

Apostasy among Muslims in the modern world is a controversial topic. Although it has been

thoroughly studied theologically in Islam, apostasy, however, is sociologically understudied.

Hence, this thesis examines how Muslim religious leaders (imams) deal with and understand

apostasy in secular contexts such as Australia, where shari’ah is not officially part of the country’s

legal system. This study is an attempt to understand how Sunni imams in Sydney deal with and

advise Muslims to deal with apostates. For this purpose, a qualitative research method was used,

and twelve semi-structured interviews were carried out in Sydney. The themes emerging from

the interviews demonstrate that imams in Sydney follow and advise fellow Muslims to follow

shari’ah, but at the same time, take into account the Australian context, which is a secular

modern liberal democracy. They try to make a connection between their methodological

approach and the context to deliberate on the acts of apostasy. From imams’ perspectives, thus,

the punishment for apostates, according to shari’ah, cannot be applied in Australia. Imams in

Sydney recommend treating “silent” apostates (those who do not insult Islam) with respect and

kindness and call for dialogue with them. However, in the case of apostates who publicly criticise

Islam and may influence other Muslims with their own ideology, imams advise Muslims to socially

boycott them without resorting to violence or causing them harm. Drawing on shari’ah as a

theoretical framework of this study, it is argued that this dealing with apostasy is situationally

and contextually dependent. That is because, in shari'ah, when Muslims deal with complex issues

such as apostasy, they have to weigh the possible harms and benefits of their decisions.

Keywords: Apostasy, apostates, imams in Sydney, Australia, contexts, Islam, Muslims, shari’ah,

hadd,

Table of Contents

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 1

1.1 Studying Apostasy in Islam Sociologically ......................................................................................... 3

1.2 Apostasy among Muslims in Australia .............................................................................................. 4

1.3 Research Objectives and Questions .................................................................................................. 6

CHAPTER 2 TERMINOLOGY AND LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................... 9

2.1 Sociological Complexity of Apostasy ................................................................................................. 9

2.2 What is Apostasy in Islam? .............................................................................................................. 11

2.3 Two Types of Studies on Apostasy in Islam ..................................................................................... 13

2.3.1 Apostasy in Islam: Theological Perspective.............................................................................. 13

2.3.2 Apostasy in Islam: Sociological Perspective ............................................................................. 15

CHAPTER 3 THEORITICAL APPROACH ....................................................................................................... 18

3.1 Shari’ah and its Main Sources .......................................................................................................... 18

3.1.1 The Quran .................................................................................................................................. 19

3.1.2 The Sunna .................................................................................................................................. 20

3.1.3 The Consensus (Ijmah) .............................................................................................................. 21

3.1.4 The Analogy (Qiyas) .................................................................................................................. 22

3.2 The Objectives of Shari’ah (Maqasid al- Shari’ah) .......................................................................... 23

3.2.1 Evaluation between Benefits and Harms ................................................................................. 25

3.2.2 Prioritization of Benefits over Harms ....................................................................................... 26

3.2.3 The Criteria for the Evaluation between Harms and Benefits ................................................. 26

3.3 Legal Opinion (Fatwa) ...................................................................................................................... 27

3.4 Consequences of Apostasy in Shari’ah ............................................................................................ 29

CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK ......................................................................................... 32

4.1 Qualitative Approach ....................................................................................................................... 32

4.2 Semi-Structured Interview ............................................................................................................... 34

4.3 Purposive Recruitment..................................................................................................................... 36

4.4 Why Imams? ..................................................................................................................................... 37

4.5 Ethical Considerations ...................................................................................................................... 38

4.6 Data Analysis .................................................................................................................................... 38

4.7 Validity and Reliability ..................................................................................................................... 39

CHAPTER 5 RESEARCH FINDINGS AND RESULTS ...................................................................................... 41

5.1 Context-Based Dealing with Apostates ........................................................................................... 41

5.2 Dealing with Kindness, Mercy and Mutual Respect ....................................................................... 43

5.2.1 Dialogue with Wisdom and Good Advice. ................................................................................ 44

5.2.2 Working on the Underlying Factors of Apostasy. .................................................................... 46

5.3. Evaluation of Benefits and Harms .................................................................................................. 47

5.4. Changing Relationships after Apostasy .......................................................................................... 49

5.4.1 Socially Boycotting the Offensive Apostates. .......................................................................... 50

5.4.2 Nullification of Apostate's Marriage ........................................................................................ 51

5.5. Distribution of Roles and Responsibilities. .................................................................................... 52

CHAPTER 6 DATA INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS ................................................................................. 54

6.1 Different Contexts - Different Dealings ........................................................................................... 55

6.2 Handling Apostasy in Civilized Ways ............................................................................................... 57

6.3 Weighing up Benefits and Harms in Shari’ah .................................................................................. 60

6.4 Changing Relationships with Apostates: An Order from Shari’ah .................................................. 61

6.5 Jurisconsults (Muftis), Judges (Qudat) and Rulers (Hukkam) ......................................................... 64

CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................... 67

7.1 Summary of the Main Findings ........................................................................................................ 67

7.2 Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research ............................................................... 69

REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................................ 71

Appendices ................................................................................................................................................. 79

1

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Living in a globalized world, where communications have become easier than ever before, has

exposed people all around the world to religions, cultures and ideas distinct from their owns. This

has led some people to experience transitions in their lives in which they move from what they

are familiar with, be it places, cultures, religions or ideas to accepting a new set of ideas, ways of

thinking and lifestyle. Changing or leaving religion is an observable phenomenon that people

experience, especially in the Western world. In this modern age, people have more freedom than

ever before to change their religious identities (Davie, 2007). We are living in the age where as

Berger states “choices become destiny” (1967, p. 95). Such freedom of choice is more widespread

in Western countries compared with other parts of the world. Although apostasy is not a new

phenomenon, in the modern world many Westerners have abandoned Christianity for other

religions or none. However, for whatever reason, leaving Islam among Muslims is less common

(Mayer, 2013), and the implementation of Islamic law which, for apostates, involves the death

sentence is also rare (Mayer, 2013). Apostasy, unlike accusations of disbelief, was also extremely

rare in the Islamic history (Ahmad, 2009; Lewis, 1988). Some people may think that the reason

was the harsh punishment the action incurred and the legal and social consequences faced by

the person abandoning Islam.

In the Islamic world, particularly after the rise of Islamic parties and extremist groups, some

intellectuals and thinkers were accused of apostasy. In 1985, the Sudanese government executed

Mahmoud Mohammed Taha, a prominent religious thinker, on charges of apostasy. Likewise, in

1992, the Islamic Group (al-Jamaha al-Islamiyya) in Egypt murdered the Arab secularist, Farag

Fuda, stating that he was murtadd (apostate). Furthermore, in 1995, the Cairo Court of Appeal

stated that professor Nasr Hamid Abu-Zayd was an apostate. As a consequence, the court

considered Abu-Zayd's marriage to be null. Following the court's decision, Abu-Zayd received

death threats that forced him go into exile. The most well-known case was the British author,

Salman Rushdie, who, in 1989, was declared an apostate by Ayatollah Khomeini who issued a

fatwa demanding that Muslims kill Rushdie. These occurred during a time in the modern world

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when human rights, including the right to choose and change religion, were articulated in the

international charter of Human Rights and embedded in international laws. Article 18 of the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares that:

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change

his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to

manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance (Darraj, 2010, p. 58).

Nevertheless, most of the Muslim majority countries outlaw apostasy therefore, apostates face

legal and social consequences (Larsson, 2018b). Furthermore, in some Muslim countries such as

Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Yemen, apostasy is criminalized and, legally, its perpetrators face death

sentence (Larsson, 2018b). There are also groups such as ISIS, al-Qaida and Boko Haram that

execute people on the basis of accusations of apostasy, claiming that the Islamic criminal law

against apostasy requires such an action.

This has produced fear among apostates. This fear emanates from the view that Islam commands

Muslims to apply the death penalty against apostates (Larsson, 2018b). Many apostates claim

that Muslims do not show tolerance towards them. However, as Larsson (2018b) argues, this

essentialist portrayal of Islam and Muslims ignores the multiple interpretations of the texts

related to ridda (apostasy) and the various opinions of Muslim scholars on how to deal with

apostates. This is supported by a survey conducted in 39 Muslim majority countries where the

opinions of ordinary Muslims on supporting the death penalty against apostates were gathered

and the result varied considerably from country to country. For example, in Egypt 86% of the

respondents supported the death penalty against apostates and in Jordan 82%, while in

Indonesia, only 18% were in support of the death penalty and in Kazakhstan, the percentage was

much lower 4% (Pew Research Center, 2013).

Also theologically, Muslims scholars disagree among themselves on how shari’ah deals with

apostates. Although the majority of Muslim scholars, past and present, argue that apostates face

a hadd or an unalterable divine punishment, which is capital punishment (Saeed & Saeed, 2004),

some modern Muslim scholars argue that shari’ah grants freedom to apostates as long as they

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do not fight against Islam and Muslims (al-Alwani, 2017; al-Sahidi, 2012; Kamali, 2019; Rahman,

2006).

The way apostates are treated is not exclusive to Islam and Muslims. Historically, as Friedmann

(2003) reminds us, apostates in civilizations such as those of the Sassanids and the Byzantines

were also put to death. Further, Friedmann notes, “neither Judaism nor Christianity treated

apostasy and apostates with any particular kindness” (Friedmann, 2003, p. 5). In modern secular

societies, apostates from the mainstream culture or religion may still face condemnation and

marginalization. Two recent studies, one in Britain (Inge, 2017) and the other in Germany

(Özyürek, 2015), found that people who converted to Islam were marginalized by the mainstream

society and were considered potential terrorists. For any organized group, religion and sect, this

is natural as the group’s unity is more important than its members' freedom. The group considers

the apostate as an internal threat. As Coser (1956) argues, for the group, the “enemy within”

(apostate) is more dangerous than the enemy outside since the former continuously threatens

the values and beliefs of the group by transferring their loyalty to a new religion or group (Coser,

1956).

Apostasy from an Islamic perspective means leaving the Islamic faith by a Muslim whether his or

her apostasy is expressed in words such as stating that there is no God or materialized in action

such as burning Quran to insult it (al-Mausuha al-Fiqhiyyah, 1984). However, from a sociological

perspective, clearly and accurately defining apostasy is problematic since apostasy is:

1. Not a static process but instead an ongoing and fluctuating one and

2. not a faith-related issue only, but culturally-related one too.

I will explain this point in further detail in chapter 2.

1.1 Studying Apostasy in Islam Sociologically

To understand Islam as a living system, meaning how socially it functions ‘on the ground’, we

have to turn our attention to its practising agents, Muslims in their social settings. The sociology

of Islam, “as a systematic study of the social, political and economic aspects and transformation

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of Muslim[s]” (Keskin, 2011, p.1) allows us to study the practitioners of Islam (Muslims) whose

understandings and applications of Islam may vary according to their environments and contexts.

The sociological study of Islam, as Turner (2014) argues, helps us understand Muslims outside

the framework of terrorism. Such as framework portrays Muslims as savage, primitive, and

difficult to civilize. The media, via its magnification of terrorist groups and its portrayal of Muslims

as others, paints a biased and Islamophobic picture and conceals their heterogeneity, particularly

with regard to controversial topics such as killing apostates. To academically study how Muslims

deal with apostates, the sociology of Islam helps us to perceive the diverse approaches and

opinions among Muslims in different contexts, the complexities attached to them and the various

factors that affect the way apostasy is understood and dealt with.

Many of the current studies on apostasy in Islam have focused on the theological debates among

modern Muslim scholars on the punishment of murtadd (apostate). However, in sociology of

religion and sociology of Islam specifically, apostasy is not a well-researched topic (Cottee, 2015).

Therefore, conducting sociological research to explore how Muslims deal with apostates in

different contexts is vitally important. Cottee (2015) states that the scarcity of sociological studies

on apostasy in Islam is due to the fear that sociologists have of being accused of Islamophobia

and leading their voices to those who criticize Islam, in other words, supporting the political right.

Whatever the reason, Muslims should now admit that their religion is also criticized from within

and that there are Muslims who renounce Islam secretly and publicly. Therefore, they should find

ways of dealing with this new and old issue. Thus, the focus of my research has been to explore

how do imams in Sydney deal with the concept of apostasy and the treatment of apostates.

1.2 Apostasy among Muslims in Australia

Australia, as a secular country, has a growing number of people who consider themselves non-

religious. In the 2016 Australian census, the number of people who identified themselves as non-

religious was 29.6%, higher than that of Catholics 22.6% (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2016).

However, it is not known how many people have become apostates in Australia. Apostasy in

Australia is generally not a well-researched area (Frame, 2009). With regard to Muslims, there

5

have been some recent academic works, conducted on Australian converts to Islam (Alam, 2018;

King, 2017; Mitchell & Rane, 2018; Rachel, 2010), yet we do not have such studies on Muslims

leaving Islam in Australia. Some ex- Muslims in Australia have their own network called EMSNA

(ExMuslims Support Network of Australia)1. Despite their activities2, I did not find a single

academic study on apostasy among the Australian Muslim communities. Furthermore, in

Australia, we do not have any academic research on how apostates are treated by their families

and the Muslim communities in general. Reaching apostates to conduct interviews is not an easy

task since they are what is called in the social research a ‘hidden’ or ‘hard-to-reach’ population.

The reason can be the fear of incarceration and physical harm caused by families and the Muslim

communities (Schirrmacher, 2016). The media portrays ex-Muslims as brave people who are

victims of a religion that orders killing its ex-members. Some of the Muslim apostates in Australia,

while talking to the media, claim that if they reveal their identities, their families and the Muslim

communities will mistreat or even kill them3. Although in Australia freedom of religion is not

constitutionally protected, Australians, including apostates, can enjoy this right under the

common law (Wood, 2012). The issue here is that the lack of academic studies that investigate

such claims made by apostates, has left a gap in our understanding of how Muslims in Australia

deal with people who leave Islam. Therefore, in my research, I attempted to fill this gap in the

literature. I interviewed 12 Sunni imams in Australia to understand how they treat apostates and

advise other Muslims on how to respond or react.

1 ExMuslims Support Network of Australia, viewed 12 November 2020, http://www.ex-muslim.org.au 2 Australian ex-Muslims have an annual conference in Melbourne supported by Secular Party of Australia. See Perkins, J 2019, Being ex-Muslim is not anti-Muslim, viewed 19 November 2020, <https://secularparty.wordpress.com/2019/02/07/being-ex-muslim-is-not-anti-muslim/> and <https://www.eventbrite.com.au/e/losing-your-religion-ex-muslims-speak-out-tickets-87608139303#> 3 The Feed SBS, 2018, Becoming Ex-Muslim: The secret group of young Australians who've left Islam, viewed 12 November 2020, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= VQTZ6zZSMg&list=LLNVPEMWw3wVkPPtNpImoZTw&index=3253>. Qadar, S 2020, Leaving Islam cost me my relationship with my family but it made me a stronger person, viewed 12 November 2020, < https://www.abc.net.au/life/leaving-islam-cost-me-my-relationship-with-my-family/11886086>. Khalik, J 2018, Secret ex-Muslim network in Australia fear disownment and abuse, viewed 12 November 2020, <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-06-09/double-lives:-the-secret-ex-muslim-network-in-australia/9811340>. Johnson, S, 2019, 'I was called a sl*t for taking off my hijab': Student, 26, who renounced Islam reveals she still receives death threats for ditching the religion – and says hundreds more women are living in fear, viewed 12 November 2020 <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-6587935/Former-Muslim-Zara-Kay-speaks-death-threats-supports-ex-Muslims-Australia.html>.

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1.3 Research Objectives and Questions

Studies in the literature on apostasy in Islam focused mainly on the death penalty against

apostates according to the shari’ah. Theoretically speaking, this enriches our understanding of

shari’ah's dealing with apostasy. However, on a practical level, this does not add much to our

understanding of how Muslims deal with apostasy ‘on the ground’, especially in the countries

where Muslims are minority and live in secular contexts. This is what this study is concerned with.

Muslims are obliged to follow and implement rules of shari’ah in dealing with apostates. This

applies in shari’ah-based states, but does this implementation differ in secular contexts where

shari’ah is not officially part of the state law? Therefore, the research question that this study

aims to answer is how do Sunni imams deal with apostasy among Muslims in secular contexts

such as Australia where the Islamic law against apostates cannot be applied? And how do imams

respond to apostasy and advise Muslims to deal with members of their communities who leave

the Islamic faith in free societies where apostates cannot legally be charged?

I used shari’ah as the theoretical framework to understand and analyse the manner in which

imams deal with apostates. That is because as they are trained in shari’ah, and their task

essentially is to clarify and explain Islamic rulings to Muslims, imams are likely to base their

arguments for their opinions on how to deal with apostates on the shari’ah. From a general

Islamic perspective, the shari'ah, is the rules and the recommendations that God addressed to

human beings for the sake of guiding them to receive benefits and prevent themselves from

harms (Kamali, 2008; Zedan, 2005). Although sometimes it is used interchangeably with the

Islamic Law, shari‘ah is a broader term and more comprehensive (El Fadl, 2014) since, it addresses

also moral dimensions, humans’ intentions and personal actions related to this world and

hereafter (Zedan, 2005). Thus, the hudud (plural of hadd) laws under which apostates are

prosecuted constitute only one aspect of the shari’ah.

This study has much to add to our understanding of imams’ dealing with apostates in general and

the way Muslims treat them. By conducting this research on apostasy, as one of the controversial

topics in the modern world I had a number of aims. First, to make a contribution to the existing

literature on apostasy in Islam by studying, sociologically, the way imams in Sydney deal with

7

apostates rather than studying this topic purely from a theological or jurisprudential perspective.

Second, to examine how Sunni imams in Australia deal with apostates in a way that is based on

shari’ah while, at the same time, does not violate the freedom of religion that exists in Australia.

Third, to understand how Australian imams contextualize the issue of dealing with apostates in

shari’ah. This is to say, how imams read the contexts and apply their understandings of shari’ah

in the West regarding apostates.

The importance of my research is that I collected, through interviews, the opinions of Sunni

imams on how Muslims should deal with apostasy and how they (imams) themselves deal with

it. I selected Sunni imams for interviews because Sunni Islam is the largest denomination in the

world and Australia. Consequently, Sunni imams are the majority of imams in Australia. Collecting

data from imams on such a controversial topic has significant value because of their influential

role in the Muslim communities. Imams lead prayers, deliver khutbah (sermons) every Friday at

the mosque, teach adults and children about Islam, present public lectures, counsel and conduct

other socio-religious activities in their respective communities. Their opinions may, therefore,

influence the views and behaviours of other Muslims in understanding apostasy and dealing with

apostates. This will help us obtain a greater understanding concerning the ways Sunni imams deal

(and influence other Muslims to deal) with apostates. My research is sociologically, rather than

theologically, oriented. Instead of questioning whether Islam orders killing apostates or not, I will

ask imams how they, as Muslims living in Australia, address the issue of apostasy. Therefore, the

research question explores how do imams in Australia deal with apostates and advise other

Muslims to respond or react. The study shows that the imams follow and advise Muslims to

follow shari’ah regarding how to deal with apostates, however, they take into account their

Australian context, which is a secular liberal democracy. Therefore, the imams argued that in

dealing with apostates, individual Muslims should act within the realm of their responsibilities,

which is giving advice, having a dialogue with apostates who do not insult Islam and treating them

kindly. They argued, however, that Muslims in Australia should socially boycott apostates who

insult Islam and crusade against it. The present study argues that this contextual and situational

management of apostasy comes into play because although Muslims are obliged to practise

shari'ah, they are also permitted to suspend the implementation of many of its laws such as

8

hudud laws under necessary conditions, including when Muslims find themselves governed

under a non-shari’ah legal system. Hence, since Australia is not a shari'ah-ruled country, any

capital punishment against apostates described in shari'ah cannot be applied. Furthermore, the

imams' call for situational dealings with apostates was based on shari'ah since, in the latter,

Muslims should evaluate the potential consequences of their actions and prioritise benefits over

harms.

9

CHAPTER 2

TERMINOLOGY AND LITERATURE REVIEW

I have divided this chapter into three sections. In the first, I discuss apostasy and its complexity

in general from a sociological perspective. In the second section, narrowing down the topic, I

present different definitions of apostasy in the Islamic jurisprudence and analyse them. In the

third section, to make it easily reviewable, I generally categorise the literature written on

apostasy in Islam into two general types: studies that deal with apostasy in Islam from a

theological perspective and studies that examine apostasy among Muslims from a sociological

perspective.

2.1 Sociological Complexity of Apostasy

One of the problems that a social researcher faces is how to define and clearly distinguish the

social phenomenon that he or she studies from other social phenomena. Apostasy, as a social

phenomenon, is complex and multifaceted. Sociologically speaking all apostates perform some

form of exit (Cottee, 2015). Ebaugh (1988) says that every “ex” involves two processes, namely,

dis-engagement and dis-identification. She defines the former as “the process of withdrawing

from the normative expectations associated with a role”, while the latter is a “process of ceasing

to think of oneself in the former role” (Ebaugh, 1988, pp.3-4). Therefore, apostates disassociate

themselves from the rights and responsibilities that are linked to the members of their former

religion, and those people no longer identify themselves with that religion and its members.

Ebaugh (1988) also argues that dis-identification is a natural result of dis-engagement. That is

because the more apostates withdraw themselves from the rights and obligations of their former

religion, and do not engage and participate in, for example, the collective religious rituals, the

more their identity shifts. Therefore, they start to think of themselves apart from the persons

that were in the previous role (Ebaugh, 1988).

Two points are important here. First, the processes of dis-engagement and dis-identification are

not sudden. Apostates gradually, rather than suddenly, dis-identify themselves from the religion.

10

Second, just as those two processes are not sudden, they are also complex rather than simple. It

is not easy to say that someone disengages and dis-identifies himself or herself from his or her

religion in all its aspects, since, many of the religious practices and rituals have become part of

the cultural, political and nationalistic identity. Thus, apostates may participate in numerous

events that were originally religious but which have subsequently become symbols of their

nations and societies. Therefore, total disengagement has not taken place. Apostates may still

value certain aspects of their former religions such as its arts, rituals, places and historical figures.

Moreover, they may still feel an attachment to those experiences, which they grew up with. Thus,

they have not disengaged nor dis-identified themselves entirely from their former religions.

Therefore, sociologically, it is not easy to label someone an apostate, in the sense of leaving a

religion in its entirety. Some sociologists argue that leaving religion is not a stage that a person

reaches (Enstedt, Larsson & Mantsinen, 2020). Instead, leaving a religion is a complex and

continuous process. The religious transformation process is not linear. It has been found that

many apostates experience moving in and out of Islam - an “in-betweenness” (Nieuwkerk, 2018,

p.4). Leaving a religion is not a sudden and complete change, “as if there were some electronic

switch that one can flip, jettisoning years of experience with a single gesture” (Rambo, 1993, p.

54). Since religion is mingled with culture, history and lifestyle, detachment from it, at once, is

not feasible. Therefore, it is difficult to define what “leaving” entails. It does not mean forgetting

it, or its total absence in the life of the apostate. That is because, for example, when a person

“leaves” a religion, he or she continues to retain memories that may colour the life of the ex-

member. Hervieu-Léger (2006, p.48) explains such an attitude as “a distant shared memory,

which does not necessitate shared belief, but which – even from a distance – still governs

collective reflexes in terms of identity”. For example, an ex-Muslim may still avoid drinking

alcohol or eating pork. Therefore, the memory of his or her former religion is still present even if

it is only in the sense of expressing anger against it and demonstrating extreme behaviours that

are opposite to the principles of their former religion or group, such as changing sexual

orientation (Enstedt, Larsson & Mantsinen, 2020).

In addition, some people claim to believe but not to belong (Davie, 1994). Those people may

continue to believe in God and religion while no longer practising it, for example, they no longer

11

attend religious gatherings, thus, being culturally irreligious. Others, however, claim to belong

but not to believe (Mountford, 2011). Those people still value their religious heritage such as

languages, rituals, arts and moral compasses and occasionally participate in religious gatherings,

however, they no longer believe in God at all; at least as accepted by institutional religion. Thus,

while they are intellectually atheists or heretics, those apostates remain culturally religious.

Therefore, apostates are not a homogenous group since the process of their disengagement with

their former religions and the social characteristics of their apostasy(s) significantly differ (Hood,

Hill & Spilka, 2009).

Just as it is difficult to find a generalizable and accurate definition of apostasy in sociological

terms, theologically, this is also the case. Enstedt, Larsson and Mantsinen (2020) claim that

theologians of any religion have never agreed on a specific definition of apostasy because what

is considered apostasy is debatable. Are actions included or only thoughts? The definition of

apostasy in Islam is not exempted from this either. This is the point discussed in the subsequent

section.

2.2 What is Apostasy in Islam?

Semantically in the Arabic language, the Muslim medieval scholar, al-Isfahani [d. 1108] in his

famous dictionary of Quranic terms, says that the words of ridda and irtidad mean, “Turning back

to the way which one has come from” (al-Isfahani, 2009, p. 349). While the former (ridda), al-

Isfahani argues, is used exclusively in a religious sense, the latter (irtidad) is used for others as

well. However, the Quran mentions none of these two terms in the form of a noun rather being

used instead, as verbs, yartadid and yartadda (turns back). Also, the Quran and the hadith do not

define who is clearly an apostate and what is accurately considered apostasy except in terms of

abandoning Islam in general. Throughout Islamic history, this absence of a clear-cut definition of

apostasy has caused disputes and heated debates among Muslim scholars on what is considered

leaving. Not finding any scriptural definition, one has to look at the Islamic juristic literature to

understand how apostasy is defined.

12

There are various definitions of apostasy from the Islamic perspective. Chronologically

considering some of these definitions in the four major schools of Islamic jurisprudence, we find

that in the Hanbali school, Ibn Qudamah, [d. 1223] defines an apostate as the one “who turns

away from Islam to kufr” (Ibn Qudamah, 1997, p. 264), meaning moving away from Islam to non-

belief or associationism. For Ibn Juzayy [d. 1340], in the Maliki school of jurisprudence, apostasy

is “voluntarily turning away of an accountable person (mukallaf) from Islam either with a

declaration of kufr with a speech that implicates it or an action that entails it” (Ibn Juzayy, 2013,

p.600). In the Shafihi school, al-Shirbini [d. 1570] defines apostasy as “cutting [relationship with]

Islam by intention or uttering of kufr or acting of it with ridicule or stubbornness or belief” (al-

Shirbini, 1997, p. 173). In the modern period, Ibn Abidin, the leading jurist in the Hanafi School

of jurisprudence [d. 1836], defines apostasy as “turning away from Islam by someone uttering

kufr after having faith” (Ibn Abidin, 2003, p.354).

The last definition is general and does not mention the causes that lead to apostasy nor the

conditions that must be met by a person to be considered an apostate. The first definition

mentions only one cause, namely, uttering kufr by someone who is a Muslim, however, it ignores

other causes and conditions. The Hanafi definition is obscure and does not explain whether

someone who acts against Islam, for instance, by burning the Quran, is considered an apostate

or not. In addition, someone can reject Islam internally without expressing it. Will this person be

considered an apostate although his or her apostasy is unexpressed? The Shafihi definition solved

the last limitation of the Hanafi’s, as the intention to leave Islam is met even if it is not expressed

publicly. The Shafihi definition also adds action against Islam as a cause. Lastly, the Maliki

definition of apostasy is more inclusive as it also adds the conditions such as the person who

commits ridda must be mature (baligh) and free without being forced to apostatise.

Most of these definitions do not state that apostasy means only renunciation of the Islamic faith

by utterances. Instead, they show that actions against Islam are also considered apostasy. These

definitions agree on one point; committing kufr leads to the apostasy of its perpetrator despite

their disagreement regarding the inclusiveness of the conditions and the causes. These

disagreements between the definitions are more technical issues rather than actual disputes

among the scholars of Islamic jurisprudence. That is because, for instance, it is claimed that

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Muslim jurists agree that ridiculing or denying a word from the Quran is kufr if its perpetrator is

a mature Muslim who knows and has the intention to do what they are doing (al-Mausuha al-

Fiqhiyyah, 1984, p.251).

Combining many elements from the juristic definitions above, Peters and De Vries (1976) provide

an articulate and a comprehensive definition that will be used in this thesis. They define apostasy

as “turning away from Islam…. [Whether it is] materialized by expressions of unbelief, specified

as words implying unbelief [and] deeds implying unbelief” (Peters & De Vries, 1976, p. 2-3).

2.3 Two Types of Studies on Apostasy in Islam

2.3.1 Apostasy in Islam: Theological Perspective

Most of the studies written on apostasy in Islam fit into this category. Ahmad (2009) criticizes

Western scholarship on apostasy in Islam on the basis that the scholars tend to generalize the

punishment of a few cases of apostasy and regard them as paradigmatic and unchangeable

Islamic law in dealing with apostates, without considering the contexts where this law was

applied. Also, the Western scholarship, Ahmad continues, ignores the opinion of many

contemporary Muslim scholars who state that shari’ah does not execute mere apostates.

Ignoring this opinion of many modern Muslims scholars by the Western scholarship is because

the later considers this modern opinion as essentially non-Islamic. Therefore, the Western

scholarship criticises modern Muslim scholars and argues that their support for freedom of

religion commenced only under the influence of the West rather than being a naturally

acceptable change of opinions in Islam (Ahmad, 2009). Among the biased studies on apostasy in

Islam in the Western scholarship is a book written by the American missionary and orientalist,

Zwemer (1924) in the first half of the twentieth century. Zwemer, in the preface of his book,

states that the purpose of his book is to show that “it is necessary to abrogate this law [death

penalty against apostates among Muslims], or modify it, that there may be liberty of conscience

and freedom to confess Christ” (Zwemer, 1924, p. 8). Throughout his book, Zwemer demonizes

Islam and Muslims. He disagrees with some modern Muslim scholars who argue that shari’ah

does not order killing mere apostates. He presents an essentialist and violent image of Islam and

14

attempts to prove that the Quran orders the killing of apostates. Yet, if one reads the entire

Quran, one cannot find a verse to support such a claim. When he could not find an explicit verse

to support his claim, Zwemer relied on the exegeses of some medieval commentators of the

Quran who, while commenting on some Quranic verses related to apostasy, mention that

apostates are killed in Islam. Zwemer calls these exegeses “standard”, as long as they serve his

goal.

Another work, which appeared in the second half of the twentieth century, is by Peters and De

Vries (1976). This study presents both classical and modern opinions on the death penalty against

apostates. In the first part of the article, Peters and De Vries (1976) present the classical

jurisprudential opinions concerning apostasy from Islam in the Shia and the four Sunni schools of

jurisprudence, namely, Hanafi, Maliki, Shafihi and Hanbali. In addition, they mention the

conditions for being an apostate in Islamic jurisprudence. In the second part, they present a

modern opinion of some of the Muslim scholars who argue against killing apostates. Then, they

examine the application of the classical rules against apostates in the Muslim world's modern

legal system, particularly the Egyptian one.

One issue with this study is that it does not contextualize the classical and modern opinions on

the death penalty against apostates. Furthermore, Peters and De Vries (1976) do not provide

socio-political explanations behind Muslims’ attitudes towards apostates in the pre-modern and

modern worlds in terms of the relationship between religion and state. Instead, Peters and De

Vries argue that the Islamic law against apostates was active and unchanged until the latter half

of the 19th century under the influence of the West through its colonization process, when the

principle of freedom of religion began to circulate among Muslims. Peters and De Vries (1976),

like Zwemer, present an essentialist image of Islam. They conclude that the classical law against

apostates, which was the death penalty, was “exclusively based on the Koran and Tradition”

(Peters & De Vries, 1976, p.24). What Peters and De Vries (1976) claim is that Muslims could not

find evidence from their traditional sacred texts to support freedom of religion until the

Westerners educated the Islamic World and pushed Muslims to change their beliefs and

behaviours.

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In the first part of their study, Saeed and Saeed (2004) theologically defend freedom of religion

in Islam. They argue that Islam does not order killing apostates except those who, in addition to

their apostasy, fight against Muslims. To support this position, they provide verses from the

Quran and the traditions of the Prophet Mohammad. In the second part of their study, Saeed

and Saeed (2004) analyse, politically and jurisdictionally, religious freedom in Malaysia. They

argue that strict Islamic law has social and economic ramifications in Malaysia because of the

country's multiracial and multi-religious nature.

2.3.2 Apostasy in Islam: Sociological Perspective

In Western academic scholarship, there are numerous academic publications on how Islam, as a

religion, deals with apostates. However, there is a lack of academic studies on how Muslims,

especially those who live in the West, deal with apostasy, let alone examining how Australian

Muslims deal with it. Cottee (2015) conducted lengthy interviews with 35 ex-Muslims in Britain

and Canada. Cottee carried out a sociological study on their lives. He says that most of his

interviewees tended to be “highly secretive”. Because they concealed their apostasy from their

families, the apostates did not want to be interviewed in their homes. Cottee mentions that his

interviewees were all ordinary ex-Muslims rather than “career apostates” who are “crusading

activities against their former groups” (Cottee, 2015, p.9). He asked them how they became ex-

Muslims and what they experienced after their apostasy. Many of the apostates interviewed by

Cottee reported that if they publicly declared their renunciation of Islam, they would face

punishments by their families and the Muslim community (Cottee, 2015). Some of the ex-

Muslims who announced their apostasy to family members claimed that they have faced harsh

criticism and "vehement castigation" and have been threatened with “social death”, hence, they

feel shame, humiliation and are stigmatised (Cottee, 2015). With regard to their friends, Cottee

says, most of the apostates claimed that the disclosure of their apostasy weakened, if not

destroyed, their friendships. However, none of these ex-Muslims claimed to have faced any

physical violence because of their renunciation of Islam. Cottee concludes that apostasy among

Muslims in the West is not a legal or political problem since freedom of religion is guaranteed.

Rather, Cottee argues, it is a moral issue that incurs stigma, shame and emotional difficulties.

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However, Cottee’s study focused only on the ex-Muslims he interviewed and their stories of how

they had been treated by Muslims around them. Cottee’s study does not focus on how Muslims

in the West themselves report the way they treat apostates. The purpose of my research is to fill

this gap in the literature. To do so, I collected and analysed the way Sunni imams in Sydney,

Australia, deal with apostasy.

Khalil and Bilici (2007) examined the testimonies of English-speaking ex-Muslims in Western

Europe and North America. However, they did not conduct interviews with these apostates.

Instead, they collected their narratives from published books and websites. Pulcini (2017) studied

cyber-apostasy and its impact on interfaith dialogue between Islam and other religions. Pulcini

concluded that online apostasy advances the interaction and reciprocity between Islam and other

faiths in the “marketplace of religions”. Also, apostates in their blogospheres can express their

views in a way that they were never able to do so in mainstream contexts.

Sociological studies that present the ways imams perceive apostasy and deal with apostates in

the Western world are rare. One exception was a study conducted by Larsson (2018a). Larsson

(2018a) interviewed six imams in Sweden to explore how they understood apostasy and how

they perceived the right of Muslims to choose and discard Islam in the Western context. He

selected his participants purposefully to represent different ethnic backgrounds and various

organizations from both Sunni and Shia sects of Islam. Larsson states that his participants

revealed to him that freedom of religion guaranteed by the Swedish law is compatible with the

essence of Islam. Larsson concludes that imams are more liberal and open than they are

portrayed in the media. However, as Larsson admits, the sample was small and it should be seen

only as a “snapshot on how Swedish imams understand apostasy” (Larsson, 2018a, p. 400).

Another problem Larsson raises in his findings was that, given the sensitivity of the issue, imams

may have said something different in the interviews from what they say to Muslims.

Larsson (2018a) also stated that the claim made by the ex-Muslim who outspokenly criticise Islam

that they face threats in Sweden is hard to prove on the ground. That is because, Larsson (2018a)

argues, the data on hate crimes collected by the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention

does not record any crimes related to leaving religion. However, he says it is likely that such data

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may be underreported. Something that Larsson’s study did not address was how ex-Muslims are

dealt with and treated by imams in daily social interactions. For example, how imams’

relationships with apostates formed and unformed before and after the act of apostasy. It is not

easy for any imam to say that apostates should be killed in the West as this goes against the law.

A more practical focus would be the imams’ social relationships with apostates in the actual

world, and how they advise the Muslim community to deal with apostates. Thus, Larsson’s

(2018a) fear of being unsure whether what his interviewees (imams) revealed to him matched

what they say to Muslims or not, can, to some extent, disappear. This is what I wanted to discover

in my research by asking my participants first how they deal with apostates then, how they advise

Muslims to do so.

Ali (2017) discusses the role of imams in Australia in general but does not explore their role in

dealing with a specific issue such as apostasy. Krayem and Ahmed (2017) have studied how

imams in Australia deal with disputes between Muslim husbands and wives. However, they have

not examined how imams deal with the issue of changing religion; when a Muslim wife or

husband leaves Islam. Black and Hosen (2009) discussed the role of the fatwa, which is issued by

imams and some Islamic organisations, among the Muslim communities in Australia. However,

they did not focused on the role of imams' fatwa in dealing with a specific issue such as apostasy.

Therefore, my study focused on the management of apostasy by Australian Sunni imams. If there

was a case, for instance, where a person in the Muslim community, renounced Islam, I was

interested in understanding how the imams dealt with it and how they advised ordinary Muslims

to deal with people who forsake Islam. I explored their viewpoints on and their management

approach in dealing with apostasy; how imams convey to Australian Muslims, who seek advice,

the message that Muslims cannot apply the Islamic law, regarding apostasy since Australia is a

liberal and democratic country where people are free to follow any religion. Sociologically, this

exploration is worthy of attention.

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CHAPTER 3

THEORITICAL APPROACH

3.1 Shari’ah and its Main Sources

In this thesis, shari’ah is used as the theoretical framework to understand how imams deal with

apostasy. That is because, methodologically, the imams I interviewed based their opinions on

shari’ah, and their arguments were derived from its main sources, using the tools and the

concepts in the Islamic legal tradition developed by the Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence.

Therefore, shari’ah as an internal Islamic framework to understand the imams’ perceptions of

and approaches towards apostasy is used. Linguistically, Ibn Manzur (n.d, p.2238) states that

shari’ah means “the place where people can easily drink and permanently extract water from”.

Here, Shari’ah is used as a metaphor to indicate that it is a way of life. Therefore, shari’ah “refers

to commands, prohibitions, guidance and principles that God has addressed to mankind

pertaining to their conduct in this world and salvation in the next” (Kamali, 2008, p. 14). Zedan

(2005), a contemporary Muslim jurist, assumes that the name shari’ah for God’s rules and

guidance comes from being, metaphorically, similar to the watering-place in the sense that, as

the later saves the humans’ physical lives, the former preserves their spiritual, intellectual and

social lives.

Thus, shari’ah, as understood by the scholars of Islam, is categorized into two broad spheres:

spiritual laws (ibadat), which do not change with the changing of time and place and civil laws

(muhamalat), which consider the vicissitudes of the contexts in which they emerged and are

applied (Kamali, 2008). The former sphere contains the relationship between human beings and

Allah, while the latter includes, and deals with, the issues of human beings with each other.

However, in shari’ah, there is fluid interchangeability between the ibadat and the muhamalat

since the absolute disconnection between ritual/moral and legal practices is the production of

modern law in the secular state (Hallaq, 2010). For Hallaq (2005, p. 155), shari’ah “originally

represented a complex set of social, economic, cultural, and moral relations that permeated the

epistemic structures of the social and political orders”. Shari’ah, Hallaq argues, is not only a

19

judiciary system and a legal principle whose role is to regulate social life and settle disputes. It is

also a system that “structurally and organically tied itself to the world around it in ways that were

vertical and horizontal, structural and linear, economic and social, moral and ethical, intellectual

and spiritual, epistemic and cultural, and textual and poetic" (Hallaq, 2005, p.156). This

understanding is important because it presents shari’ah in its comprehensiveness since it

contains spiritual, moral, social and legal dimensions and addresses human actions related to this

world and the hereafter. Thus, Islamic criminal laws constitute only one aspect of shari’ah.

Scholars in Islam differentiate between shari’ah and fiqh (El Fadl, 2014). The former is related to

the realm of divinity. This is while the latter is concerned with the realm of humanity. Shari’ah is

considered by Muslims as rules of Allah to humans through the Quran and the Sunna. Fiqh, on

the other hand, is the production of human endeavour to reach the practical rules of shari’ah

(Kamali, 2008). As shari’ah is not always self-evident in the Quran and the Sunna, Muslim jurists

use the technique of ijtihad (scholarly effort) to derive Islamic law or rules from the sources of

shari’ah (Weiss, 1978). El Fadl (2014) argues that the following four elements are recognised by

the major Sunni schools of jurisprudence, as the sources of shari’ah.

3.1.1 The Quran

The first source of shari’ah is the Quran, which, for Muslims, is the word of God to the Prophet

Mohammad for humanity. Muslims believe that the Quran was revealed to the Prophet

Mohammad more than fourteen centuries ago. They do not question the reliability of the Quran

in the sense that it has been preserved throughout centuries as it was revealed to Mohammad

(Kamali, 2002). The Quran, Kamali (2008) argues, is not a legal or constitutional document in the

modern sense although a small portion of it directly deals with legal issues, which are called

verses of legislation (ayat al-ahkam). The Quran calls itself the book of guidance (huda), light (nur)

and remembrance (zikr) rather than law or canon. With regard to their clarity, the Quranic verses

are divided into two major categories: decisive (muhkamat) and polysemantic (mutashabihat)

verses. While the former category contains verses that are not subject to various interpretations

because of their clarity, the latter one carries verses that are interpreted differently by Muslim

scholars (Malekian, 2011). The verses that contain decisive legal commandments are not subject

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to abrogation (naskh) while others are. The commandments of decisive verses are generally

applicable, and their application is not affected by or specific to, their circumstances. However,

for the verses that are not decisive, their applicability could be affected by their circumstances

(Malekian, 2011).

Owing to the fact that a large portion of the Quran is open to interpretations (Kamali, 2008), for

the majority of Muslim jurists literalistic explications of the Quran the Sunna are not accepted, El

Fadl (2014) argues. Thus, in the process of legal derivation from the Quran, Muslim scholars

consider the issue of abrogation (naskh) and occasions of revelation (asbab al-nuzul) since there

are verses that are no longer applicable or they are specific to a particular group in a specific

condition. The Quran was completed, piecemeal, over 23 years. The Quran presents the rationale

of the graduality of its revelation (tanjim) as follows: “The disbelievers also say, ‘Why was the

Quran not sent down to him all at once?’ We sent it in this way to strengthen your heart

[Prophet]” (Alfuqan: 23:32). Bek (1967) provides another explanation for the gradual revelation

of the Quran. He argues that as it regulates the life of people, the Quran did not impose laws

upon people at once, thus, allowing them to gradually become accustomed to new legislation.

3.1.2 The Sunna

Sunna comprises the words, the actions and the decisions of the Prophet Mohammad, which are

normatively biding (El Fadl, 2014). Kamali (2008) claims that Muslim jurists unanimously agree

on the Sunna being the second source of shari’ah. However, while they agree on the authenticity

of the entire Quran, Muslim jurists do not give the same recognition to the whole corpus of the

Sunna (El Fadl, 2014) since the latter was not officially collected or written during the life of the

Prophet (Brown, 2009). For them, many prophetic traditions were fabricated after the death of

the Prophet Mohammad. Therefore, Muslim scholars employed methods of the chains of

transmission science (ilm al-isnad) to differentiate between the authentic (sahih) and the

fabricated prophetic tradition (mauduh) (Brown, 2009). Moreover, Muslim jurists did not

consider all the reliable traditions from the Prophet to be normatively binding. That is because,

El Fadl (2014) claims, the hadith of Mohammad as a prophet and that of him as a human being

are distinct from each other in the sense that the former is sacred while the latter is temporal

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and not binding. Thus, it is argued, that the prophetic tradition should not be viewed with

monolithic lenses since it has been divided into the legislative and non-legislative Sunna (Shirinov,

2008). However, Muslim scholars disagree among themselves on the categorization of

Mohammad’s tradition into the prophetic one and the personal one since there is not a clear-cut

criterion to determine what belongs to the former and the latter (Shirinov, 2008).

The Quran states, “We have sent down the message to you too [Prophet] so that you can explain

to people what was sent for them [Quran] (A-Nahl, 16:44). However, the status of Sunna is not

only to explain the Quran, although it is one of its mission (Kamali, 2008). The Quran states,

“Whoever obeys the Messenger obeys God” (Al-Nisa, 4: 80). Therefore, scholars of Islam

considered Sunna as a separate source of Islamic law. Throughout Islamic history, Brown (2009,

p.3) says, the Sunna has ruled over the Quran, “shaping, specifying and adding to the revealed

book”. Thus, Sunna has three major tasks in its relation to the Quran: reiteration, explanation

and addition. An example of the last task of Sunna is the death penalty against apostates.

Although the Quran does not mention any worldly punishment against apostasy, however,

because the Sunna sheds light on this issue, majority of the Muslim jurists argued that in shari’ah,

leaving Islam is considered a crime for which its perpetrator deserves death (Saeed & Saeed,

2004).

3.1.3 The Consensus (Ijmah)

In addition to the Quran and the Sunna as direct sources of shari’ah in their own right, Muslim

jurists added two supplementary sources: ijmah (consensus) and qiyas (analogical reasoning). Al-

Shafihi [d. 820] concludes from the following verse of the Quran the validity of ijmah (Ibn Kathir,

2000). The Quran states, “if anyone opposes the Messenger, after the guidance has been made

clear to him, and follows a path other than that of the believers, We shall leave him on his chosen

path – We shall burn him in Hell, an evil destination” (Al-Nisa, 3: 115). Muslim scholars also

conclude the validity of ijmah from the prophetic tradition: “My ummah [Muslim nation] will

never agree upon an error” (Sunan Ibn Maja Tradition, No. 3950).

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Theoretically, ijmah means unanimous agreement among Muslim scholars. Beyond this

fundamental idea, Muslim scholars disagree on numerous points regarding the creation of ijmah,

such as whose consensus matters, whether time decides when a consensus is achieved and how

to assure that a consensus practically exists (El Fadl, 2014). Kamali (2002) argues that obtaining

ijmah, in an absolutely practical sense which is finding an agreement of every Muslim jurist in the

world throughout Islamic history on a particular issue that is not mentioned in the Quran and

Sunna, is difficult to prove. It is argued that universal ijmah can only be obtained in cases where

there are decisive and unambiguous texts (Kamili, 2002). If this is so, Kamali (2002) comments,

the consensus becomes redundant since there is a decisive text. However, having a text and a

consensus on a particular issue could mean, for Muslims scholars, that the latter interprets the

former in a specific way and determines its meaning. To give an example of a claimed consensus

on a particular interpretation is the ijmah on the meaning of a hadith for dealing with apostates.

Ibn Qudamah (1997, p. 264) argues that there is ijmah on killing Muslims who leave Islam based

on the hadith when the Prophet says, “Whoever changed his religion, kill him” (Sahih al-Bukhari

Tradition, No. 6922). The hadith does not specify killing apostates from Islam alone. The apparent

meaning of the hadith orders the killing of anyone who changed their religions, even if they are

Christians who converted to Islam. However, ijmah has specified the meaning of the hadith to

apostates from Islam, not vice versa.

3.1.4 The Analogy (Qiyas)

According to the Muslim jurists, qiyas or analogy means “concluding from a given principle

embodied in a precedent that a new case falls under this principle or is similar to this precedent

on the strength of a common essential feature called the ‘reason’ (‘ilia)” (Rahman, 1966, P.71).

By using qiyas, a rule of shari’ah, which is derived from the Quran and the Sunna, is extended by

the jurist to similar cases where shari’ah is silent on giving any rule. That is because the rationale

(illa) that led to a given law for a particular issue in the textual sources also exists in similar cases.

Muslim jurists argue that since the direct rules from the Quran and the Sunna are limited, while

cases are infinite, qiyas becomes a necessity to find rules of shari’ah for new affairs of humans

(Gomaa, 2006). Hallaq (1986) argues that except for a small portion of Islamic law formulated

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directly from the Quran and the Sunna, the majority of Islamic law is derived using qiyas. This

doctrine is based on the idea that shari’ah is rationally constituted (mahqulat al-mahna).

Therefore, a jurist probes a particular law to find the rationale behind its emergence so he or she

can apply it to the cases where the same rationale exists but lacks direct rules in the textual

sources. For Muslim jurists to accurately extend shari’ah of a case where the law is given in the

textual sources to that which the Quran and the Sunna are silent, the rationale that constitutes

the law must be clear and should not be hypothetical (Gomaa, 2006). Muslim scholars argue that

some essential principles must exist in the process of qiyas. First, the source (asl) where the law

is extended. Second, the case (farh) where the shari’ah is silent. Third, the law (hukm al-asl) to

which qiyas must be made. Fourth, the rationale (illa) contained in the law (Gomaa, 2006).

3.2 The Objectives of Shari’ah (Maqasid al- Shari’ah)

Al-Shatibi, [d. 1388] argues that “purposes are the spirits of shari’ah” (al-Shatibi, 1997, p.44). The

idea of maqasid is that there is wisdom behind the rules of shari’ah. It is argued by Muslim jurists

that the purpose, lying behind the rules, the regulations and the recommendations of shari’ah, is

to accomplish benefits (masalih) for and remove harms (mafasid) from human beings (Opwis,

2017; Hallaq, 2011). Al-Ghazali (1997b, p. 416) generally defines maslaha or benefit as "a matter

of bringing benefit or eliminating harm". However, he then goes on to argue that this definition

is not what is meant by masalih in shari’ah since bringing benefits or eliminating harms is the

purpose of all people, Muslims and others. What is meant by masalih, from the Islamic

perspective, Ghazali continues, is the protection of shari’ah purposes. And these purposes are

hierarchically classified into three levels: necessities (daruriyyat), essentials (hajiyyat) and

embellishments (tahsiniyyat). It is claimed that the agreed-upon necessities in shari’ah among

Muslim jurists are five: religion, life, mind, offspring and property of people (al-Raysuni, 1997).

Therefore, anything that protects these purposes at the level of necessity, complementary and

embellishment is a benefit (maslaha), and anything that damages them is harm (mafsada) (al-

Ghazali, 1997b).

Al-Zarkashi [d. 1392] presents examples of the protection of the five purposes of shari’ah. He

says, in shari’ah, religion is safeguarded by the implementation of the death penalty against those

24

Muslims who leave Islam and become apostates so the aim is hindering others who may want to

quit Islam. Life is protected through the implementation of the death penalty against murderers

therefore, the purpose is deterring homicide. The mind is preserved through the prohibition of

alcohol and flogging drunken Muslims. Offspring is maintained through stoning or flogging those

committing adultery. Finally, personal properties are protected since people who rob them are

punished with amputation (al-Zarkashi, 1992, p. 209).

Opwis (2017) observes that some modern Muslim jurists have enlarged the scope of maqasid and

added other elements beyond the five purposes of shari’ah. For instance, Ibn Ashur (2006) argues

that, among others, equality and freedom are two of the purposes that Allah wants people to

establish among themselves through the rules of shari’ah. Al-Qaradawi (2008) argues that the

purposes of shari’ah are more than those introduced in the pre-modern Islamic juristic literature,

expanding them to include freedom, equity, solidarity and fraternity.

Therefore, such a new movement in expanding the underlying purposes of shari’ah is clearly

resonated in a definition of maqasid provided by Auda (2008). Auda (2008, p.1) defines maqasid

as “the group of divine intents and moral concepts upon which the Islamic law is based, such as

justice, human dignity, free will, magnanimity, facilitation, and social cooperation”. Whatever

they are, the purposes of shari’ah are multifaceted, and some of them are more fundamental

than others (Hallaq, 2011). For instance, al-Raysuni (1997) argues that there is considerable

agreement among Muslim jurists that, in shari’ah, the protection of religion has priority over the

other purposes of shari’ah. Therefore, when the goals of shari’ah contradict each other, religion

is prioritized. However, this is in general because there are cases where the preservation of life

has priority over that of religion. For instance, if a Muslim is under threat to commit kufr

(disbelief), he or she is allowed to protect his or her life, as it is stated in the Quran (Al-Nahl,

16:106).

Sunni Muslim jurists claim that what people consider maslaha might not be so in shari’ah (al-

Raysuni, 1997). That is because, for Muslim jurists, masalih and mafasid should be seen through

the light of sacred Islamic texts, the Quran and the Sunna. This is not to say, al-Raysuni, (1997)

argues, that Islamically finding pure maslaha and pure mafsada in practical life is easy, so the

25

former is preferred over the latter since finding pure maslaha or mafsada in practical life is scarce.

Al-Duraini (1984), a contemporary Muslim jurist, following some Muslim jurists in the Middle

Ages, claims that it is inductively proven that there is no maslaha that does not contain some

elements of mafsada or vice versa. Therefore, al- Wakili (1997) argues that to be able to

accurately evaluate masalih and mafasid and to correctly prefer the former over the later, one

needs the jurisprudence of reality (fiqh al-waqi). That is, to understand the context where the

process of evaluation and prioritization between conflicting benefits and harms is carried out,

thus one can properly apply shari’ah and reach its goals (al- Wakili, 1997). Understanding the

context is crucial here since differences between places, times, people and situations could affect

the way the rules are applied in shari’ah (Karbuli, 2008). For example, Islamic law against crimes

is not implemented in the West since shari’ah is not adopted officially. Al-Wakili (1997) argues

that the deeper one understands the reality of the context (al- waqi), the better one’s application

of shari’ah is and the more appropriate one’s evaluation and prioritization of the conflicting

maslaha and mafsada will be.

3.2.1 Evaluation between Benefits and Harms

With regard to the implementation of shari’ah in a specific context, Muslim jurists argue that one

must examine the implications that a particular application of Islamic law brings, and one has to

evaluate also between the benefits (masalih) and the harms (mafasid) that emerge (al-Raysuni,

1997). Al-Suswah (2004, p.13) defines the evaluation (muazanat) of the benefits and the harms

in shari’ah as a:

Set of principles and criteria that control the process of weighing between conflicting maslaha (benefits) and

mafsada (harms) or between both to decide which of the two benefits is more advantageous so to be

preferred and which of the two harms is more dangerous so to be avoided. By these principles and criteria,

the inclination towards the harm or the benefit _ when they contradict each other _ will be recognized, and

it will be concluded whether the thing is beneficial or harmful.

Al-Qaradhawi (2004) states that, in the light of the process of evaluation in shari’ah, one finds a

way to compare a situation with another, prefer a condition over another and balance between

gains and losses in the short and the long terms, and at the individual and the collective levels.

26

One then chooses what he or she considers as being closer to bringing benefits and avoiding

harms.

3.2.2 Prioritization of Benefits over Harms

The result of this evaluation (muwazana) is prioritization (awlawiyya), which is defined as "placing

everything in its order with justice, whether related to rules, values or actions. Thus, the most

important one will come first, based on the correct shari’ah standards guided by the light of

revelation and reason" (al-Qaradhawi, 2004, p.9). Hence, al-Qaradhawi (2004) claims that

unimportant things are not prioritized over the important ones nor the important ones over the

most important ones, nor the less preferable ones over the more preferable ones, nor the most

harmful ones over the less harmful ones. Based on shari’ah, necessities (daruriyyat) such as the

five purposes of shari’ah are preferred over essentials (hajiyyat), and the latter is preferred over

embellishments (tahsiniyyat). Karbuli (2008) argues that the state of evaluation of masalih and

mafasid comes before the prioritization between them. That is because, Karbuli continues, a

Muslim evaluates two things while considering the purposes of shari’ah. Then, he or she gives

priority to the one that is preferred by the shari’ah.

3.2.3 The Criteria for the Evaluation between Harms and Benefits

Al-Qaradhawi (2004), as a leading theorist in this field, proposes the following to assist one to

meticulously evaluate between harms and benefits and appropriately prioritise the former over

the latter:

1. When masalih contradict each other, the higher ones are preferred over the lower ones;

2. Collective masalih are prioritized over individual ones;

3. Future masalih, namely, those that are likely to exist into the long-term are preferred over

the immediate ones that have a short term;

4. Fundamental masalih are preferred over peripheral ones;

5. Certain masalih are preferred over uncertain ones; and

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6. Big masalih are preferred over small ones.

Just as benefits (masalih) are not equal and are of different degrees, harms (mafasid) are also

not equal, thus, having different degrees. Al-Qaradhawi (2004) argues that when Muslims are

confronted with a situation where they must choose between two mafsada, the lesser of them

is taken. Also, a particular mafsada is taken to avoid a general one.

In the cases where masalih and mafasid contradict each other:

1. A small portion of mafsada is permitted to produce a great portion of maslaha;

2. A temporary mafsada is allowed to generate a permanent maslaha; and

3. A genuine maslaha cannot be abandoned for a probable mafsada.

Al-Raysuni (1997) argues that in shari’ah, it is vitally important to evaluate the harms and benefits

of taking any approach when dealing with complicated and sensitive issues, for instance,

apostasy. This process of evaluation between benefits and harms in shari’ah and then prioritizing

the former over the later, as constructed by the Muslim jurists, help us understand the

complexities of imams’ dealings with apostates to reach the objectives (maqasid) of shari’ah.

3.3 Legal Opinion (Fatwa)

Legal opinion (fatwa) exhibits the practical side of shari’ah as mufti (the issuer of fatwa) responds

to questions posed by Muslims regarding ongoing human affairs (Masud, Messick & Powers,

1996). Masud, Messick and Powers (1996) argue that the basic feature of fatwa is demonstrated

in the first source of shari’ah, the Quran, when Allah, repeatedly, recommends Mohammad,

“When they ask you regarding something …..Say….” (Al-Baqara, 2:219; Al-Isra, 17: 85). Fatwa is

an Islamic legal opinion that a jurisconsult (mufti) issues on practical and particular cases that

occur at different times and places (Kamali, 2008). A mufti is asked by an individual to explain the

rules of shari’ah as they relate to particular issues. The rule that a mufti arrives at is often based

on his or her interpretations of the Quran, the Sunna and the general principles of shari’ah.

Therefore, while giving a fatwa, a mufti is not required to provide direct evidence from the Quran

and the Sunna to the questioner (Kamli, 2008). This is so, especially in the complex cases where

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direct evidence from the sacred texts does not exist. Therefore, to reach the rules of shari’ah,

many times a mufti use scholarly effort (ijtihad) such as analogy (qiyas), juristic preference

(istihsan) and public interest (istislah) to reach an opinion that is based on the overall framework

of shari’ah. In the absence of a clear text, a mufti may also base his or her fatwa on the norms

and the customs of the society that are considered acceptable under the general rules of shari’ah

(Kamali, 2008).

Since it “is meant to keep the shari’ah in tandem with social reality” (Kamali, 2008, p, 177), a

fatwa in shari’ah, Ibn al- Qayyim [d. 1350] argues, “changes with the change of time, place,

customs and circumstances” (Ibn al- Qayyim, 2002, p. 114). The contemporary jurist, al-Qaradawi

(2007), adds some other elements. Changing them, for al-Qaradawi, affects the change of fatwa

in the modern world, such as the change of information, opinions, thoughts, capabilities, needs

of people and political, social and economic circumstances. However, as Hallaq (2010) observes,

the legal maxim that fatwa changes upon changing the previous elements does not indicate that

the rules of shari’ah can be changed or abrogated by the mufti in the modern notion of change.

It only states that “a working principle of accommodation and malleability” is considered (Hallaq,

2010, p. 172). Since shari’ah is based on purposes (maqasid), argued by Muslim jurists, a mufti

should consider the appropriateness or the otherwise of any particular rule (hukm) in shari’ah

while dealing with individual cases on the ground (al-Qaradawi, 2007).

Therefore, Muslim jurists argue that a mufti should not give a fatwa until he or she has carefully

studied and holistically examined all the aspects of the case that they are asked about to explain

the rules of sharia (al-Qaradawi, 2007). Bin Bayyah (2018) states that a fatwa is the production

of multiple elements such as the evidence, the context or the reality (waqih) and the relationship

between the numerous aspects of the former and the complexities of the latter. Fatwa, Bin

Bayyah argues, is about precision, syntax and the transition from the singular to the complex and

from the simple to the complex. He calls this process fatwa manufacturing (sinaha al-fatwa) (Bin

Bayyah, 2018).

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3.4 Consequences of Apostasy in Shari’ah

To address the issue of apostasy from shari’ah as the framework for this study, we find that it is

argued that the vast majority of pre-modern and modern Muslim scholars believe that the death

penalty in shari’ah for apostates is hadd or unalterable divine punishment (al-Alwani, 2017;

Kamali, 2019; Saeed & Saeed, 2004). The Muslim scholars who argue for this opinion rely on two

major sources of shari’ah, the Sunna (the prophetic tradition) and ijmah (the consensus among

Muslim scholars). From the Sunna, it is narrated that the Prophet Mohammad stated, “Whoever

changed his religion, kill him” (Sahih al-Bukhari Tradition, No. 6922). Using/referring to ijmah, Ibn

Qudamah [d. 1223] states that “Muslims scholars agreed on killing apostates, and this is narrated

from [the companions of the Prophet such as] Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, Ali, Muadh ibn Jabal,

Abu Musa, ibn Abbas, Khalid and others. And no one said otherwise. This opinion, thus, became

ijmah [consensus among scholars]” (Ibn Qudamah, 1997, p. 264). Consensus on killing apostates

is reported, also, by other Muslim scholars such as al-Ghazali [d. 1111] (al-Ghazali, 1997a), Ibn

Taymiyyah [d. 1328] (Ibn Taymiyyah, 2004), al-Sanhani [d.1768] (al-Sanhani, 2000) and al-

Shawkani [d.1834] (al-Shawkani, 1988). And in the principles of Islamic jurisprudence (usul al-

fiqh), the majority of Muslim scholars agreed that consensus (ijmah) is a source of shari’ah and a

categorical evidence that Muslim jurists who come after the agreement cannot revoke it (Kamali,

2002).

For these Muslim scholars, apostasy is a crime in itself, regardless of being accompanied by

rebellion or not. That is because, al-Qaradawi (1996) argues, belief in Islam is not a personal

matter. Instead, having Islamic faith indicates that a Muslim is faithful to the Islamic state.

Therefore, rejecting the Islamic faith involves the abandonment of loyalty to that state. For al-

Faruqi (1984, cited in Saeed & Saeed 2004, p. 92), there is a nexus between the acceptance of

the Islamic faith and the loyalty to the Islamic state. Whoever abandons the former would

necessarily reject the later, consequently deemed a political traitor. For these scholars, Islam is

equated with the state (Saeed & Saeed, 2004).

However, some modern Muslim scholars disagree with the above opinion. They argue that

shari’ah does not order killing Muslims who have committed mere apostasy (ridda mujarrada)

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(al-Alwani, 2017; Abduh & Rida, 1947; al-Raysuni, 2013; Mahmassani, 1979; Rahman, 2006;

Saeed & Saeed, 2004; Shaltut, 2001). For them, shari'ah only orders killing Muslims who have

committed grave apostasy (ridda mugallaza), meaning they have engaged in destructive activities

against Islam and Muslim communities and have become rebellious. These modern Muslim

scholars argue that as long as apostates are not involved in any malicious act and commit treason

against the Muslim community, shari’ah does not inflict any worldly punishment against them

(al-Alwani, 2017; Rahman, 2006; Kamali, 2019).

This modern opinion largely relies on the first source of shari’ah, the Quran. Al-Alwani (2017)

argues that the Quran is silent on stating any specific worldly punishment against apostates,

although reverting from Islam (irtidad) is reported in many verses in the Quran. For these Muslim

scholars, the Quran is not only silent regarding an earthly punishment against apostates, but it

also affirms the freedom of religion (Kamali, 2019). The Quran states, “now the truth has come

from your Lord: let those who wish to believe in it do so, and let those who wish to reject it do

so” (Al-Kahf, 18:29). Moreover, the Quran, in many verses, states that religion should not be

imposed upon people. It is stated in the Quran that “there is no compulsion in religion” (Al-

Baqara, 2:256) since compulsion will not bring anything except hypocrisy (al-Raysuni, 2013).

Also, the supporters of the modern opinion question the existence of the claimed ijmah on killing

apostates. They argue that there was no absolute ijmah on killing apostates, since there were

individual Muslim scholars in Islamic history who opposed this opinion (al-Alwani, 2017; Kamali,

2019; Mahmassani, 1979; Saeed and Saeed, 2004). They also argue that the hadith used by the

supporters of killing apostates in shari’ah is problematic since its apparent meaning contradicts

the above verses from the Quran that state freedom of religion. Furthermore, there is another

hadith that can explain the first hadith. It is narrated by al-Bukhari (No. 6878) and Muslim (No.

1676) that the Prophet Mohammed stated that the blood of a Muslim is sacrosanct except, in

three circumstances. And one of these circumstances is when “a person forsakes Islam and leaves

the Muslim community (almufariqu lil-Jamaha)”. And leaving the Muslim community during the

time of the Prophet involved joining the abode of war and becoming the enemy of Muslims (al-

Alwani, 2017).

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Furthermore, it is argued that considering apostasy a crime is a socio-political by-product of the

early days of Islam (Saeed & Saeed, 2004). Since societies have changed in the modern world,

and the states mostly have been separated from religions, the death penalty against apostates is

no longer applicable. Saeed and Saeed (2004) argue that the purpose of executing apostates at

the beginning of Islam was to protect the embryonic community of Muslims from internally

falling apart. Since societies have changed in the modern world, the death penalty against

apostates no longer fulfils the historical purpose. Based on that, one can argue that the

traditional opinion was based on the evaluation of harms and benefits. Since leaving Islam could

endanger the Muslim community and cause great harm, the freedom of religion for apostates

was denied. Therefore, when contradicting each other, the collective benefit for the Muslim

community, which was its protection in the time of the Prophet Mohammad, was prioritised over

the individual benefits for apostates, which was their freedom of religion.

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CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

In this chapter, I outline the methodological framework of this research study. The research

methodology is “a way to systematically solve research problems” or the “science of studying

how research is done scientifically” (Kumar, 2008, p.5). Crotty (1998, p.3) defines methodology

as a “strategy, plan of action, process or design lying behind the choice and use of particular

methods and linking the choice and use of the methods to the desired outcomes”. The difference

between methodology and method is that the former's scope is wider than the latter's (Kumar,

2008). Methodology, such as qualitative research study, encompasses the whole process of

conducting research, from outlining and conducting the study to drawing outcomes (Marczyk,

DeMatteo & Festinger, 2005). In methodology, the researcher adopts specific steps in conducting

his or her research problem along with the logic behind them (Kothari, 2004). However,

"method" is the technique that researchers instrumentalise for conducting research and

collecting data such as questionnaires, interviews or analysis of documents (Kothari, 2004).

"Method" might also refer to the mechanisms employed for analysing data or excerpting themes

from unorganised data (Bryman, 2008). Therefore, the research method forms only a part of the

research methodology. In other words, methodology is the whole, and method is a part within.

4.1 Qualitative Approach

Qualitative research techniques were used in this research to accomplish its aims. Qualitative

research, as defined by Bryman (1988, p.46), is “an approach to the study of the social world

which seeks to describe and analyse the culture and behaviour of humans and their groups from

the point of view of those being studied”. Based on this definition, it becomes clear how

appropriate this methodology is to obtain information on how the imams deal with apostates.

That is because, in qualitative studies, researchers study the meanings that people attach to

things in their daily lives (Taylor, Bogdan & DeVault, 2016). In qualitative methodology, the

researchers also study a group of people in their social settings holistically without reducing them

to variables (Yin, 2011) since the “research is conducted in natural settings rather than in

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controlled ones” (Rossman & Rallis, 2017). Furthermore, as Tewksbury (2009, p.38) argues, the

data obtained through qualitative studies are "more informative, richer and offers enhanced

understandings compared to that which can be obtained via quantitative research”. Based on

this understanding, this research study maintains that the imams' approaches for dealing with

apostates are better analysed by employing a qualitative methodology. Since the central focus

of this research is on religion in a particular social context, quantitative approaches that

numerically record the data (Tewksbury, 2009) were less appropriate. I, by no means, argue for

the superiority of the qualitative approach over the quantitative one since both have advantages

and disadvantages (Kumar, 2011). My adoption of the qualitative approach was only because it

was more suited to this particular study and its purposes. The qualitative approach enabled the

study of imams in their natural settings, allowing me to discover how their understandings and

applications of Islamic law in dealing with apostasy were shaped by their socio-geographical

context, namely, Sydney (Hennink et al., 2011).

The nature of a qualitative approach is flexible since its techniques deal with human experiences,

values and beliefs, thus, rigorous and reproducible data are unattainable (Kumar, 2011).

Furthermore, in a qualitative approach, a small number of participants is purposively selected

(Hennink et al., 2011). In my study, I conducted interviews with only 12 participants who were

Sunni imams, rather than just any members of the Muslim communities. Therefore, the goal of

this study was not obtaining generalizable data. That is because, as Mason (2010) argues, a

qualitative approach focuses on “meaning and not making generalized hypothesis statements”

(p. 2), as it is the case with a quantitative approach. A qualitative method enables the researcher

to investigate participants' views and experiences in depth. Qualitative research also helps the

researcher to gain descriptions and analyse the quality and the substance of the experiences of

humans in detail (Marvasti, 2004). It also provides better grounds for researching areas with

scarce previous studies (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008). Therefore, it helps me as a researcher

to discover how imams perceive and deal with apostasy, an area that has not been studied well

in Australia and the West generally (Larsson, 2018a).

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4.2 Semi-Structured Interview

Having already outlined a methodology for the study, the next step was to determine what type

of method to apply to collect the data. To conduct a genuine study and to ensure reliable findings

from the research, it is essential to choose a method for the data collection process that satisfies

the requirements set by the research questions and the goals of the research (Kumar, 2011). A

method is a “technique or procedure used to gather and analyse data related to some research

question and hypothesis” (Crotty, 1998, p.3). There are various qualitative research methods

implemented in research studies. An interview, among others in the qualitative approach, is

regarded as one of the most appropriate data collection methods in the social sciences (Crouch

and McKenzie, 2006). The semi-structured interview is a useful method for studying a particular

religion. Since the perceptions of Muslims in dealing with social issues are diverse and

multifaceted, a semi-structured interview helps us to collect deep, complicated and nuanced

data (Bremborg, 2011). McGuire encourages researchers to study and comprehend religion as it

functions and is experienced by individuals in their complex and dynamic world:

Realizing the complexities of individuals’ religious practices, experiences, and expressions, however, has

made me extremely doubtful that even mountains of quantitative sociological data (especially data from

surveys and other relatively superficial modes of inquiring) can tell us much of any value about individuals’

religions (2008, p.5).

In my study, I sought to answer the questions posed on how Sunni imams deal with apostasy and

how, in their understanding, shari'ah is applied to apostates in different social contexts. The use

of semi-structured interviews was suitable for that purpose. I used this method for the collection

of the data since it is “sufficiently structured to address specific topics related to the

phenomenon of study while leaving space for participants to offer new meanings to the study

focus” (Galletta 2013, p. 24). This method is less rigorous than the structured interview, which

does not allow interviewees to divert because of its predetermined set of questions (Bryman,

2012). Since a semi-structured interview focuses on a specific theme by asking a general

question, participants can freely express their opinions in their own words, thus, their

perceptions and motivations become easy to discover (Wengraf, 2001). This method also allows

35

reciprocity between the researcher and the participants as there is direct and individual contact

between them. As they fully engage with the segments of the interview, participants reveal new

perceptions, share more ideas and details and discuss other things that are considered to be

relevant to the main topic. The researcher, thus, is able to ask more questions related to the

central question and probe deep into participants’ responses for clarification, meaning-making

and critical reflection (Galletta, 2013).

Mason (2002) argues that a semi-structured interview has some distinctive features. The first is

"the interactional exchange of dialogue" that may happen between two or more people whether

it takes place face-to-face, over the phone or in other ways (Mason 2002, p. 62). The second, "a

relatively informal style", permits flexibly and differently asking and responding to questions

instead of delivering and answering inflexibly, a set of formal and unchanged questions (Mason

2002, p. 62). Through a semi-structured interview, my respondents could easily express their

views in a way that suits them best. By contrast, a structured interview does not enable

participants to explain in detail their points of view and discuss what they consider to be related

to the main subject since it “is more used in survey approaches” (Edwards & Holland, 2013, p.2).

That is because of the rigidity of the structured interview in which the researcher has a pre-

established set of questions and expects the participants to provide specific answers (Galletta,

2013). By then, qualitatively analysing the data, we can obtain rich themes developing from the

participants' conversation rather than reducing the responses to quantitative categories (Smith,

1995).

Because of its less predetermined boundaries, the semi-structured interview was particularly

important for collecting the data in my research since the participants had diverse opinions, and

their responses could not be categorized into yes or no responses. The flexibility of our method

allows the participants to explain their particular responses and how they justify them. The semi-

structured interview is particularly useful for studying sensitive or personal issues that

participants might find difficult to reveal in a focus group, for instance. Based on this, I feel that

the method used in this study helped my participants to frankly discuss the issue of apostasy and

present their viewpoints on how it should be dealt with in the community (Longhurst, 2009).

36

Despite its benefits in my research, the semi-structured interview also has its pitfalls. It may make

the interviewer less able to direct the conversation to reach the pre-established research aims if

they are distracted by other things mentioned in the interview. It takes a considerable amount

of time and energy to transcribe the interviews. Furthermore, the interviews are difficult to

analyse since each of them contains many aspects, even contradictory opinions and statements

(Smith, 1995).

4.3 Purposive Recruitment

In this study, participants were selected using purposive sampling. In that process, the

participants have specific characteristics concerning criteria that enable the research problem to

be solved (Bryman, 2012). Therefore, I decided to select Sunni imams among the Muslim

communities in Australia. Initially, I planned to interview only the imams who could communicate

in English. However, this would make my work harder since many imams were not born in

Australia, and English is their second language (Hussain, 2010). Although most of my participants

could communicate in English very well, half of them preferred the interviews to be conducted

in English, and the rest in Arabic. The most likely reasons were that it was easier for the imams

to communicate in their first language, and the sensitivity of the topic made them feel that they

may not be able to express themselves as they wanted if the interviews were in English.

All of the participants were male. This was something out of my control since, in Islam, imamate

(leadership) has been traditionally the role of males only (Wessinger, 2020). Therefore, in

Australia, there are no female imams, unlike in other parts of the Western world (Petersen,

2019). Furthermore, all but two of my participants were from an Arab background. Of those two,

one was Fijian and the other Pakistani. My initial plan was to choose imams from different

ethnicities such as Turkish, Indian and Afghan. However, I could not recruit them, as some refused

to participate while others could not, because of the language barrier. I also preferred conducting

interviews with imams who were appointed to specific mosques and Islamic centres rather than

with “freelance imams” who are not appointed but occasionally give sermons on Friday (mostly

when the appointed imam of the mosque is absent) and present lectures in different Islamic

centres (Cherribi, 2010, p. 123). Therefore, although most of the imams interviewed claimed to

37

have academic qualifications and religious training, I dealt with imamate as a position in the

mosque rather than being based on the imam’s Islamic knowledge.

I conducted 12 semi-structured interviews of 35-45 minutes with Sunni imams in the

metropolitan area of Sydney. All of the interviews were conducted face-to-face. Eight of them

were conducted online, using ZOOM, while the rest took place in the mosques where the imams

were appointed. After receiving consent from the participants, I recorded the interviews. Half of

the interviews were conducted in Arabic, and the rest in English. After each interview, I

transcribed the recording and sent a copy to the relevant participant to get an accurate

transcription of the interview, so he could correct, add or remove any part of his speech and

return it to me. Then, I worked on the modified copies.

4.4 Why Imams?

I selected imams for interviews for several reasons.

First, in the West and Australia in particular, academic studies on imams and their perceptions of

and dealings with controversial topics of Islam such as apostasy are scarce compared with the

attention paid to these issues by the media. An academic study that applies scientific tools to

deal with these issues is always needed. The present study intended to interview Sunni imams in

their natural settings on how they deal with apostasy and advise fellow Muslims to do so.

Second, imams in Australia are influential in their respective Muslim communities as they lead

regular prayers, deliver the Friday sermon (khutba) at the mosque, teach adults and children

about Islam, present public lectures, religiously counsel families and couples and conduct Islamic

marriage ceremonies and funerals (Saeed, 2003). Macfarlane mentions the multifaceted roles of

a typical imam in the West saying:

The imam, in the West, is expected to be a one-stop-shop, a marriage counsellor, prayer leader… [the one

who is] seeking assistance for families and individuals and trying to deal with conflicts with teenagers,

arguments with families and neighbours, disputes with landlords over rent, problems with obtaining welfare

benefits, and marital issues (2012, p.82).

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Although, in Australia, they do have variant roles cross-culturally and among Muslims from

different schools of thought, imams are most effective among their followers, mosque

congregations and in their inner circles (Ali, 2017).

Third, it was assumed that imams have more knowledge regarding shari’ah than ordinary

Muslims, as most of the participants I interviewed had gained academic qualifications from

bachelor’s degrees to doctorates in Islamic studies. Based on the idea that knowledge is power,

the messages that imams deliver in the mosques can influence the congregations. Thus, how

imams deal with apostates may affect the way ordinary Muslims deal with them too.

4.5 Ethical Considerations

Before conducting the interviews, I had to apply for ethics clearance to ensure that the research’s

benefits were increased and its risks of harms were reduced. The Human Research Ethics

Committees (HRECs) approved the application (number H13672). After receiving approval, I

immediately searched for participants. Before conducting any interviews, I explained to my

participants the purposes of the study and how the information would be dealt with

confidentially. I informed my participants that I want to record the interviews and received their

consent. Regarding confidentiality, the recorded interviews were stored and protected in a

computer with a password. I protected the personal identities of the participants by using

fictitious names. I have not mentioned the names of the mosques and the Islamic centres where

the participants are active. Therefore, I anonymized the identities of the participants as much as

I could because I am aware of the sensitivity of this study since Muslims and Islam often are linked

to cruelty, barbarity and terrorism in the mainstream media. Furthermore, I explained to my

participants that their participation was voluntary and that they could withdraw from the study

at any time, unconditionally (Longhurst, 2009).

4.6 Data Analysis

I used thematic analysis, which is a “method for identifying, analysing, and interpreting patterns

of meaning (‘themes’) within qualitative data” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 79). Braun and Clarke

39

(2006) argue that thematic analysis renders a flexible and effective research tool that can provide

a rich and comprehensive yet complicated account of data. In my study, the thematic analysis

involved searching through the transcribed interviews to discover repeated patterns of meaning

or themes.

To analyse the data, I followed the six steps proposed by Braun and Clarke (2006). First, to be

familiar with the data, I recorded and transcribed the interviews, so nothing important was left.

In this stage, reading and re-reading the data was necessary to get initial ideas. Second, I coded

the transcribed interviews. Coding is the process of defining what the data include. It entails

producing pithy labels for essential passages of the data related to the research question. The

codification of data helps us achieve meaningful and manageable codes, “thus, reduce and

structure a large text into a few tables and figures" (Kvale, 1996, p. 192). Third, I searched for

themes. Themes are important patterns in the data that enable researchers to find answers to

the research question (Braun & Clarke, 2006). This process required classifying the various codes

into potential themes and organising all the associated coded data passages within the classified

themes. Fourth, I reviewed the themes. I had to return to the transcribed interviews for further

analysis to confirm the thematic patterns. I started refining those represented themes as some

were not themes because there was not sufficient data to support them. Some were combined

into one theme, while others were classified into separate ones. Fifth, I defined and named the

themes and further redefined them. This involved “identifying the ‘essence’ of what each theme

is about (as well as the themes overall) and determining what aspect of the data each theme

captures” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 92). Sixth, I wrote the final analysis of the data. This step was

the integral component of the data analysis. The whole process was intended to construct the

data in a meaningful way and give a consistent and compelling narrative about the data

(Jorgenson, 1989).

4.7 Validity and Reliability

When a qualitative approach is employed in any research, questions are always raised regarding

its reliability and validity. Reliability refers to the issue of whether the findings of a study are

replicable by other researchers or even by the same researcher at different times, places and in

40

different circumstances (Bryman, 2012). It is difficult to achieve reliability in qualitative research.

The reason is that people’s interaction with their surroundings is not static, and it is impossible

to freeze natural settings and the circumstances where the initial study was conducted (Bryman,

2012). Taylor et al. (2016) argue that in qualitative studies 'perfect reliability' cannot be obtained

as long as researchers want to understand the real world as it is experienced by people. In

qualitative research, the emphasis is on the meaningfulness of human experience rather than

reducing it to statistical equations that are probably reproducible when a quantitative approach

is employed (Taylor et al., 2016). In qualitative interviews, the data generated is "a reflection of

the circumstances under which the interview is conducted" (Pole & Lampard, 2013, p. 127).

Therefore, replicating the same data in future studies might not be easily accomplished. This is

not to say that reliability, in any form, is impossible since this leads to the philosophy of Heraclitus

when he stated that the world is in infinite flux. Such an understanding would render any

systematic study impossible as it indicates that we are unable to see any solid properties in the

social world (Silverman, 2006). Therefore, to carry out a reliable qualitative study, Silverman

(2006) proposed that the research process should be transparent with a detailed research

strategy and data analysis. Thus, other researchers can follow the steps when replicating it. This

approach was adopted in this research. Moreover, Silverman (2006) proposes that readers of the

research should be able to reach the concrete statements made by the participants rather than

summaries made by the researcher. This was also adopted in this research since direct quotes

are provided.

Validity is concerned with the “ability of a research instrument to demonstrate that it is finding

out what you designed it to” (Kumar, 2011, p. 184). In other words, validity is accurately

investigating what was intended to be investigated. To enhance the validity of this study, I took

every step to ensure that the method accurately investigated what it was supposed to investigate

(Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). In qualitative research, carefully recording the data and continuously

verifying it can also enhance its validity (Cypress, 2017). Following this recommendation, I

recorded and transcribed everything said by the participants. Then, to verify the data, I sent the

transcribed interviews through emails to my participants to ensure the accuracy of the data.

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CHAPTER 5

RESEARCH FINDINGS AND RESULTS

In this chapter, I present the emerging themes from the interviews with the Sunni imams in

Australia on how to deal with apostasy. To do this accurately and reliably, I have provided

quotations from the interviews for each of the emerging themes. From these interviews, five

themes and four sub-themes emerged. The first theme shows how apostates are treated based

on their particular contexts. The second theme demonstrates that the imams treat apostates

kindly and respectfully, for instance, by having dialogue and working on the hidden causes of

their apostasy. The third theme presents how relationships change with apostates, especially

those who publicly criticize Islam and those who are married. The fourth theme demonstrates

how imams evaluate harms and benefits while dealing with apostates in complex situations. The

fifth theme shows that responsibilities regarding how shari’ah deals with apostates are

distributed among three bodies: imams and scholars who explain the rules in shari’ah on this

issue, Islamic judges who issue law-abiding decisions against apostates and Islamic

states/governments that implement the verdicts issued by the second body.

5.1 Context-Based Dealing with Apostates

Contextually dealing with apostates was one of the emerging themes in the interviews with the

imams. The majority of the imams argued that dealing with apostates changed based on the

contexts. Bakr clearly presented this point when he said:

Apostasy in the Islamic societies is different, from the point of responses and counter-responses than

apostasy in non-Islamic societies. That is because the law and the customs are different, so dealing with

apostasy changes depending on the society and based on the context.

For many of the imams, in a country where shari’ah is applied by the government, the apostate

faces hadd or unalterable divine punishment implemented by the government/state only. That

hadd penalty is clearly explained by Mahir, who said, “In shari’ah, there are specific rulings, like

[an apostate] will be asked over three days to come back to Islam, repent and have any

misconceptions or doubts answered and cleared. If not, he will be killed”. Burhan advises people

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in a shari’ah-ruled country to report apostasy cases, and then the Islamic court will deal with it.

This is in a country where shari’ah is implemented. However, as Jamal and Bilal argued, currently

this shari’ah-ruled country does not exist, although it existed in Islamic history.

However, in the countries where shari’ah is not officially adopted, such as Australia, there was a

consensus among the participants that Muslims cannot apply shari’ah to prosecute people.

Therefore, any physical punishment cannot be applied to apostates, whether they publicly

criticize Islam or not. Khalil said, “In some Islamic countries where shari’ah is applied, a Muslim

judge makes a verdict and applies hadd against [apostates]. But, in Australia, all we can do is give

advice and having a dialogue”. For Jamal, as situations vary from place to place, it is unfair to

equally call for the implementation of hadd against apostates without differentiation between

the contexts where apostasy cases occur. He says:

You cannot compare the laws of ridda [apostasy] in an Islamic society where the Muslims are everywhere,

where Islam is dominant, where Islamic teaching is clear to a situation in Australia where people do not have

a correct understanding of Islam. And Islam is not dominant, people see that Islam is weak; people see that

Islam is backward…There are so many mechanisms in the Western world especially that would not encourage

someone to be a Muslim.

Bilal and Qadir stated that, in Australia, they advise Muslims to abide by the Australian law since

they have accepted living under the law of this country and Muslims who do not respect the

Australian laws and desire a country where hadd against apostates is applied should leave

Australia and reside in such a country. Bilal said that “As long as I am in Australia or a similar

country, it is [an obligation] upon me, not just an option, to follow the rules as long as they do

not contradict shari’ah. The imams mentioned that people in Australia are free to follow

whatever religion they choose. Burhan said, “[Australia] is a free country. Anyone can choose any

religion. We cannot impose…. [But] ‘Invite to the way of your Lord with wisdom and good

instruction’”. ” He reiterates what the Quran says “Invite to the way of your Lord with wisdom

and good instruction” (Al-Nahl, 16:125). When they argued for the freedom of religion for the

people of Australia, imams provided the following verses from the Quran to justify their

arguments. The Quran states, “There is no compulsion in religion” (Al-Baqara, 2:256). “You have

your religion, and I have mine” (Al-Kafirun, 109:6). “Say, ‘Now the truth has come from your Lord:

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let those who wish to believe in it do so, and let those who wish to reject it do so” (Al-Kahf, 18:29).

The imams said that we do not harm nor advise Muslims to harm any apostate. Tahsin said, if an

apostate abandons Islam, “we say to him that is your choice. And we don’t cause mischief nor

[do] we harm him”. Imams argued that Muslims have to find a way to work with apostates with

dialogue, so Islam is clearly shown to them, “not through hitting or killing [or]... Hurting or

threatening”, argued Hazm.

5.2 Dealing with Kindness, Mercy and Mutual Respect

The most pervasive theme that emerged in nearly all the interviews was dealing with apostates

with kindness, mercy and mutual respect. All except one of the imams I interviewed stressed the

point that Muslims should treat apostates who are not hostile towards Islam with kindness and

respect. The imams argued that if an apostate was treated justly and with mercy, there is a high

probability that he or she will come back to Islam. Khalil says, “If someone has left Islam, we will

treat him with respect, kindness and mercy. [Consequently], he, most likely, will come back to

Islam”. Although showing kindness towards apostates is primarily for the sake of convincing

apostates to come back to Islam, Jamal stated that Muslims are required to treat apostates kindly

even if they do not re-embrace Islam. Tahsin calls on Muslims to be “easy and moderate”, to

respect apostates, give them their individual rights and voice and listen to them.

However, it appears that imams show and advise Muslims to show kindness only to those

apostates who have non-hostile attitudes towards Islam. Burhan said, “In non-Islamic countries,

if someone has left Islam, people should be kind with him as long as he is not attacking Islam”.

Othman supports his claim with a Quranic verse, “He does not forbid you to deal kindly and justly

with anyone who has not fought you for your faith or driven you out of your homes: God loves

the just" (Al-Mumtahana, 60:8). Murad considered this type of communication with non-hostile

apostate as a two-way process. He said,

Even apart from the case of apostasy, if someone treated you well, treat him well. This is justice. If someone

shows peace to you, show him peace. If someone shows enmity towards you, treat him in the same way but

within the framework of societal peace.

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If apostates criticize Islam publicly and propagates their ideas, the imams argued that we have to

respond on the same level. Musa argued that the response and the reactions should be on the

same level because:

If the apostate is still on the silent level, and not propagating we should not propagate. We do not go and

announce to people [his apostasy]. If it is on a personal level so the reaction should be on the personal level

by explaining and dealing with him personally. But if he propagates and advertises, we should react on the

same way but gently and nicely [as Allah says] “with wisdom and good instruction.

That is because the imams argued that it is their responsibility to protect the Islamic faith of

Muslims by responding to apostates rationally. However, for Bakr, “good treatment and advice

stay always in dealing with them.”

5.2.1 Dialogue with Wisdom and Good Advice.

Part of the process of dealing with apostates kindly and respectfully for the imams is having a

dialogue with wisdom and good advice. Ten out of twelve imams argued that they call apostates

to have a dialogue and respectful discussion on Islam. Many imams used the following verses

from the Quran as evidence for their dialogue with apostates. The Quran says, “[Prophet], call

[people] to the way of your Lord with wisdom and good teaching. Argue with them in the most

courteous way” (Al-Nahl, 16:25).

Mahir said, “Whenever we get a case about [apostasy], we always offer them [apostates] to come

and to see the imams. Always. And we say whatever they want to ask. They are more than free

and more welcome to ask”. Hazm said apostates do not meet with people of Islamic knowledge,

and if they do so, they will return to Islam.

Many imams argued that using wisdom and giving good advice while having a dialogue with

apostates is the best way to make them re-embrace Islam. Hazm said that he advises Muslims to

rationally talk to apostates. If they do so, Hazm argued, “you see the apostate will come back

with choice….He will come back when you go with him, step by step… But, this is, if you do not

try to tell him just to accept your opinion and follow you”.

45

The main reason for the imams’ call for dialogue was guiding apostates, convincing them that

they are wrong, refuting their accusations against, and dissipating their misconceptions about

Islam. Othman said, “I try to have a dialogue with [the apostate] to know why he has left Islam.

If there are doubts, [I] convince him if he let me do that”. Othman said that the following verse

from the Quran shows that “dialogue is the solution” And the Quran has taught us this, “and

‘[One party of us] must be rightly guided and the other clearly astray” (Saba, 34:24). Othman said,

“Although Quran is the book of truth, without any doubt, it says to the opponent, let us assume

- this is only the Assumption-Based Argumentation - that Islam is not true, [then] show me the

truth that you have if I find it, will follow it”. Therefore, for Othman “dialogue is the first and the

last”.

Bakr said that he personally met apostates and ate with them. He also debated and had dialogues

with them using wisdom and kindness. Bakr said, that although as Muslims:

We have a definite belief that what we believe is the truth…we give others [chance] to express what they

believe. But it is a duty upon us to use peaceful, rational and convincing methods also wisdom and good

advice with non-believers as the Quran and the Sunna require us to do so.

Bilal argued that whatever doubts apostates have, they are free to question and ask. Bilal also

claimed that “Islam has taught us that people should be given time to address the doubts and

misconceptions they have. Shari’ah allows them time to seek answers for their questions”.

However, Bilal said that he will continue having a dialogue with the apostate if he or she is

genuinely concerned, [and] has genuine questions and is serious. Otherwise, Bilal said, “I have no

time to waste”.

Murad summarizes the nature and the purpose of the dialogue with apostates:

We try to show the truth. And our job does not go beyond explanation, advice, guidance and meaningful

discussion that is meant to bring true understanding and remove misconceptions and reveal the causes that

led this person to leave Islam… And there is no other way of dealing with apostates except dialogue, debate

and academic discussions.

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5.2.2 Working on the Underlying Factors of Apostasy.

Another sub-theme, which emerged in the interviews, is that eight out of twelve imams claimed

when encountering an apostasy case, they attempt to understand the hidden factors that led a

person to leave Islam. What the imams were looking for is that there could be personal,

psychological, sociocultural or economic rather than intellectual factors that make a Muslim

abandon Islam. Knowing the underlying factors makes the imams’ task easier since they know

where the issue lies. For instance, Tahsin said that he approaches the apostate and attempts to

find whether the apostate “was harmed in any way by Muslims, which is known; there are

extremists out there. Was he hurt in any way? I would feel sorry for him rather than being angry

with him”. Being mistreated by other Muslims was considered by many imams to be one of the

factors that made some Muslims leave Islam. Mistreatments raised by the imams included such

matters as the apostate was raised in a family where rituals were imposed on the members,

experienced domestic violence, or is (or was) living in an unjust society that his or her rights were

denied. Bakr said that a woman may leave Islam because her husband treated her unjustly. Bakr

further said that he personally knows some young people who have left Islam because of the way

their parents treated them. He said, therefore, “I will advise [the parents] to find a solution and

fix the problems in a way [that can] bring their child into the family circle”. As the factors of

apostasy are various, treatments should be different too. Qadir said, dealing with apostates is

similar to treating “a person who has a fever and was brought to a doctor…The doctor should

know where the fever comes from. Therefore, every case should be dealt with separately

because you cannot cure many cases with one treatment”.

Hazm mentioned that there are people who leave Islam only to get out of poverty. They migrate

to the Western countries and claim to the authorities that, in their countries, they were

persecuted for abandoning Islam. When I asked him how do you advise Muslims to deal with

such apostates, Hazm said that since the reason for such apostasy is economic deprivation,

apostates should be financially supported by giving them some amount of zakat (obligatory alms).

Hazm makes an analogy (qiyas) claiming that if in the shari’ah, people who are new Muslims can

47

receive zakat to make them remain on their new faith, why those who want to leave Islam cannot

receive zakat for the same reason, namely, not leaving Islam.

Mahir said that many young people are attention seekers who want to get more attention from

their families by rebelling against family norms. Therefore, for Mahir, it is a psychological issue,

and if it is left unresolved, the situation becomes worse, whereas “if you keep them close and

you start to fix the problems that they actually have, you explain to them and you show them the

better way usually, these people get over whatever doubts they had”. Confirming the same point,

Qadir and Hazm argued that apostates have psychological problems, therefore, should be

provided with help and care as sick people. Hazm said, “We have not seen a doctor hits an ill

person. Usually, an ill person hits the doctor, and the later does not react. We have to treat

apostates, understand their illness and attempt to cure them so make them come back to their

natural state of mind”.

5.3. Evaluation of Benefits and Harms

Another theme, which is overarching and can be observed throughout the interviews with the

imams, is that Muslims in their dealings with apostates should evaluate situations and prioritize

benefits over harms. Among all the benefits, the protection of and the invitation to Islam has

priority over the others from the perspectives of the imams. Murad said, for Muslims, “The issue

of religion is sacred…. It is more valuable than human life, lineage and property. Of course when

the sacredness of Islam is assaulted it has consequences”.

Understanding each case of apostasy, the evaluation of the harms and benefits of each type of

treatment and the consideration of the consequences were important for the imams. Therefore,

when they were asked about how a family should deal with one of its members who has become

apostate, attacks Islam and attempts to influence the other members, imams provided different

answers based on their understanding of what type of dealing is more beneficial and less harmful

in their view. For instance, for Khalil, even if a son has left Islam and demonizes Islam, the parents

should not expel him from home and cut their relationships with him since the situation becomes

even worse and he becomes firmer with his apostasy. Instead, they should retain him as part of

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the household because “the more they treat him with respect; he will be affected by that… [And]

one day, he will repent to Allah”. This is the same advice that Tahsin and Burhan give to Muslims.

Then, Tahsin said, the father can protect his children from the influence of their brother or sister

who has become an active apostate by educating them according to Islam and warning them

against apostasy and its implications. However, if the apostate leaves the house, the family loses

him or her, and for Tahsin, this complete loss of a member is worse. That is because if this

apostate remained in the house, was treated nicely with respect, he or she will be changed and

may return to Islam.

However, for some of the other imams, if the apostate does not respect the protocols of the

family, the parents have the right to expel him or her from the house since the apostate spreads

doubts and influences other members of the family. Bakr argued, “Islam prioritizes benefits over

harms”. And although expelling an active apostate from his family and his parents’ house is harm,

having him or her remain is greater harm since “preserving the religion of other members has

the priority over other interests”.

Othman did not explicitly state that parents should expel the apostate from the home, however,

he said:

It is the duty upon the father and it is the right of his small children, customarily, legally and Islamically to

protect their faith. If they have an apostate brother and calls them to leave Islam, it is the duty upon the

father to protect them in a good way. It is not for the son [the apostate] to make a problem for them.

Qadir said that he cannot advise the parents to do anything other than to evaluate between the

harms and benefits of expelling their apostate child from home and prioritizing the latter over

the former. However, for Qadir, only the parents decide how to evaluate the situation since they

can study the case thoroughly. Qadir said:

This [how to deal at home with children who become apostates] depends on the father’ discretion. My advice

or other’s advice does not help. Because each case will be dealt with separately. The father can evaluate the

Maslaha [interest]. If he kicks him out, will the problem be solved or will be more.

This is more or less the same point that was also made by Mahir. Although for Mahir, “the Islam

of the rest of the family is more important than the family connection of anyone”.

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When I asked Khalil how you respond to some Muslims if they said that as long as the government

does not apply the Islamic laws against apostates who actively influence members of the Muslim

community, Muslims should kill them, Khalil said, “Islam based on reason to bring benefits and

remove harms. A Muslim is aware that anything that brings harm to him or the Muslim

community is not allowed. There is no doubt that [this dealing] has a negative impact on Muslims,

and it is against the principles of Islam”. Othman and Bakr said that implementation of hudud by

individuals against apostates causes chaos in the society which “is more harmful. And we in Islam

are taught to take the less harmful one and prevent the most harmful one and obtain the best

interests. These are all logical and rational principles”. Burhan said that if individuals were

allowed to take Islamic laws against apostates into their own hands, everyone would kill the

other.

For Mahir, the benefit of getting rid of such active apostates in Australia is delusional (mauhuma),

while the harm of the implementation of the Islamic law against apostates by individuals is

genuine (haqiqyyia). That is because this implementation has numerous implications and severe

consequences for Muslims in Australia since its actual harms against Muslims exceed its imagined

benefits. Therefore, for Mahir, the killing of apostates by individuals should not occur.

5.4. Changing Relationships after Apostasy

For the imams I interviewed, changing relationships with people after they have left Islam is

normal. That is because the less two persons have in common, the less their social relationships

will be. Othman said:

Social relationships with people are determined by homogeneity, harmony and familiarity. If we harmonize

with each other, then it is from both of us. Then we love each other and want to meet each other. But when

this person changes his direction, I will not love him and I don’t want him to be my friend. And this is

something natural.

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Musa said we become friends with those we have commonalities and similarities with, such as

“speaking the same language, having the same interest or even supporting the same football

club”. For Jamal, his relationship with apostates changes, even ends, since it is the nature of his

environment and workplace to be around Muslims, most of the time. Most people that Jamal

interacts with, other than his family, are those who pray at his mosque and attend his lectures

and Islamic classes. Therefore, Jamal said, an apostate “naturally [is] not really in my life”. For

the imams, relationships with apostates automatically change.

5.4.1 Socially Boycotting the Offensive Apostates.

When I asked the imams how they advise Muslims to deal with those apostates who publicly

criticise Islam, half of them said that Muslims should socially boycott offensive apostates or make

what Bakr and Khalil call hajr or leaving. Bakr said that this is an Islamic method in dealing with

sinners. He explained, “You advise a sinner to repent if he did not, you cut your relationship with

him….Hajr does not mean you hate and ostracize him [apostate]. Rather, it is another way to

make him regret and come back to Islam”. For Jamal, Muslims should cease their interactions

with those apostates who want to convince other Muslims to leave Islam.

When Mahir said that he advises Muslims to make hajr, I asked him how Muslims should do so.

He said:

They would cut them off as if [the offensive apostates] don’t exist anymore…we call people to cut ties with

them altogether. For example, you don’t answer their phones, you don’t reply to their messages, you don’t

invite them over for events and you don’t go to their events like weddings or family gatherings. Finished, as

they don’t exist anymore until they show some change in themselves.

Khalil provides the following verse from the Quran to support this social boycotting with offensive

apostates. The Quran states, “[Prophet], you will not find people who truly believe in God and

the Last Day giving their loyalty to those who oppose God and His Messenger, even though they

may be their fathers, sons, brothers, or other relation” (Al-Mujadala, 58:22).

Murad said that he advises young Muslims not to contact those apostates who are offensive and

publicly demonize Islam. That is because provocations may lead to confrontation and become

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counterproductive. Murad makes a difference between two terms; not having Al-Mukhalata

(interaction) and doing Al-Muqataha (boycott). He said that he calls for the former, but not the

latter. Murad explained that the latter is a general term that entails “not even buying from or

selling to them”. However, in the former, Muslims can make financial transactions with offensive

apostates but not socially interact with them.

5.4.2 Nullification of Apostate's Marriage

All the imams argued that whenever a married Muslim, wife or husband, has certainly left Islam,

he or she should be separated from his or her partner in shari’ah. When I asked how they advise

married Muslims whose partners have left Islam, the imams said that they tell them that their

marriage is automatically nulled since having the Islamic faith is one of the conditions for building

or sustaining the marriage between two Muslims. Othman argued that the Quran is clear on this

point which says, “do not yourselves hold on to marriage ties with disbelieving women” (Al-

Mumtahana, 60:10). Khalil and Othman provided the following verse from the Quran to support

the nullification of apostate’s marriage. The Quran says, “Those women [Muslim Women] are no

longer lawful to the unbelievers, nor are those unbelievers lawful to those (believing) women”

(Al-Mumtahana, 60:10). Bakr explained how destroying a person’s Islam results in destroying his

or her marriage:

Every structure is based on a basis. When the basis is removed, the structure would collapse. This is something

logical. The relationship between husband and wife in Islam is based on the Quran and Sunna. So, when this

person leaves Islam, he denies the basis which their marital relationship is based on. Consequently, their

relationship is destroyed.

Although the temporary separation between the two partners is recommended by the imams,

for example not having sexual intercourse, nullification of their marriage does not occur

immediately after the act of apostasy for two reasons. The first is the verification of the apostasy,

meaning that the imams aim to be sure whether the person has left Islam or not. The imams said

that they do not easily judge that a person has left Islam. They meet with people who are claimed

to be apostates, explain to them and give them some time to think and read more. Khalil said,

“Not everyone who commits a kufr will be automatically an apostate straight away… [The person]

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should be taught and advised, and the one who is doing this should be a scholar in Islam”. Othman

said, “We will wait a lot until we say that a person is an apostate”. The second reason is that five

imams said that the wife should wait for three complete menstrual cycles. If the apostate

returned to Islam during that time, their marriage remains valid. Otherwise, it has become null.

The partners are allowed to be reunited only if they make a new marriage contract. Therefore,

the imams argued, if after all the possibilities for bringing the apostate back to Islam are

exhausted and the barriers that prevented him or her from believing in Islam are removed, and

the person does not show any change, then the advice is a total separation between the apostate

and his or her partner.

5.5. Distribution of Roles and Responsibilities.

Another theme highlighted by most of the imams was related to the distribution of

responsibilities regarding the shari’ah implementation. Responsibilities are distributed between

three bodies: Muslim scholars or imams (ulama), Islamic judges (Qudat) and Muslim rulers

(hukkam) or the Islamic government. Some imams provided the following tradition from the

Prophet Mohammad to indicate the distribution of responsibilities. The Prophet Mohammad

said, "Whoever amongst you sees an evil, he must change it with his hand; if he is unable to do

so, then with his tongue; and if he is unable to do so, then with his heart; and that is the weakest

form of Faith" (Sahih Muslim Tradition, No. 49).

Based on that, the responsibility of the first body, imams, does not extend beyond giving

guidance and advice and explaining the rules of shari’ah. Murad said, “It is not between the one

who leaves Islam and commits apostasy and us except dialogue, debate and academic

discussions”. And the imams' verdicts on particular issues are not legally binding. Hazm said, “We

are callers to Islam, not judges”. Therefore, imams argued that they cannot force anyone to act

in particular ways based on their verdicts.

The second body is Islamic judges whose task, as Murad explained, is:

Bringing the general Islamic rules and applying them to specific cases. For example, a criminal case comes to

him such as the crime of apostasy. [The Muslim judge] studies this particular case on the ground whether this

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person has become an apostate or not. Then, he renders a decision that a specific Islamic rule must be applied

against the committer of that crime. His decision is legally binding.

The third body is the Islamic rulers, whose task is the implementation of the decisions made in

the Islamic courts. Therefore, individuals, whether they are lay Muslims, imams or Muslim judges,

cannot implement any Islamic law against apostates by themselves. Imams warned general

Muslims, especially young people, to avoid judging whether some Muslims have committed

apostasy or not since this requires extensive Islamic knowledge, which is the task of Muslim

scholars, and a long process of investigation and interrogation of each case thoroughly, which is

the task of Islamic judges. Furthermore, the imams argued that Muslims should be aware that

wherever they are in Australia or a shari’ah-ruled country, they cannot kill anyone and claim that

they are implementing the Islamic criminal laws against apostates since this is exclusively the

responsibility of the Islamic state or government.

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CHAPTER 6

DATA INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS

The purpose of this study was to investigate how Sunni imams in Australia deal with (and advise

Muslims to deal with) apostasy. From the themes that emerged from the data, I found that the

imams methodologically followed and based their arguments on shari’ah when dealing with

apostasy and taking into account their context, Australia. The general aim of this chapter through

the analysis of each of the emerging themes is to demonstrate how the application of shari’ah by

the imams promote a better understanding of the phenomenon of apostasy in Islam. It is argued

that the Sunni imams in Sydney situationally and contextually dealt with apostasy. And they

cautiously combined and incorporated the application of shari'ah, as they understood, and the

consideration of their context, which is secular. The imams, thus, provided a complex process of

dealing with apostates that, although methodologically based on shari'ah, did not violate

people's freedom of religion in the Australian secular society. That is because in shari’ah,

although Muslims have to implement the Islamic laws and follow its rules, this is only in the realm

of their responsibilities and within the scope of their abilities. To explain this point: the

implementation of the hudud is, only, the responsibility of the government. When, in secular

states, such as Australia, the government does not implement hudud, it is not the responsibility,

nor in the legal capacity, of individual Muslims living in this context to implement them.

Therefore, Muslims are permitted, in such a necessary condition, to suspend laws in shari'ah.

Based on shari'ah, Muslims should consider the context and carefully evaluate their decisions

when dealing with sensitive issues such as apostasy so the harm is minimised and the benefit is

maximised.

As detailed in Chapter 5, five main themes and four sub-themes emerged in the interviews. It is

found that the first and second themes are connected, and the last two themes are connected

to the third one. Generally, two major themes encompass all the other themes, and these are

the first and the third ones. In this chapter, I analyse each of the themes in light of the theoretical

framework of the study and attempt to identify any correspondence between the emerging

themes and the existing literature on apostasy.

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6.1 Different Contexts - Different Dealings

The imams’ opinion that apostates face hadd or unalterable divine punishment is only applicable

in a country ruled completely by the shari’ah, which currently, for imams, does not exist. Since

Australia is a secular country where people are free to follow any, or no, religion, Islamic law

against apostates cannot be applied. One cannot conclude that the imams contradict themselves

for saying that apostates in shari’ah face hadd, while, at the same time, in Australia, they are free

and hadd cannot be applied against them. That is because, in shari’ah, when the circumstances

and the contexts differ, the implementations of the Islamic rules differ, too, since the conditions

of the latter need to be met (Kamali, 2019). Hallaq demonstrated that in shari’ah:

Muslim jurists were acutely aware of both the occurrence of, and the need for, change in the law, and they

articulated this awareness through such maxims as “the fatwa changes with changing times”…Or through the

explicit notion that the law is subject to modification according to “the changing of the times or to the

changing conditions of society (2001, p. 166).

The way apostates should be dealt with has changed from the perspectives of the imams

compared with Muslim scholars in the past. The reason lies in the nature of the contexts that

these imams live in, which is different from that of the pre-modern Muslim scholars. Because a

condition of applying hadd against apostates is the presence of the Islamic rulers to implement

in a shari’ah-ruled country (Abdalla, 2012), and since this condition is absent in Australia, Muslims

cannot execute apostates claiming that they are implementing shari’ah. This is consistent with

the findings of a study in Sweden with six imams being interviewed (Larsson, 2018a). Larsson

found that the imams in Sweden argued that killing apostates is not applicable in non-Islamic

contexts since the state should be ruled by shari’ah and the apostate must be interrogated with

in the Islamic court, and the Islamic judge decides the punishment. In the Western world,

however, these conditions are not met (Larsson, 2018a).

This is in line with shari’ah as the theoretical framework of this thesis. Bin Bayyah (2018) states

that from the shari’ah perspective, Muslims living in a non-Islamic country are not obliged to

establish rules of shari’ah regarding financial, civil and political matters or anything related to

social order since these rules are beyond their abilities. The Quran states, “God does not burden

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any soul with more than it can bear” (Al-Baqara, 2:286). And this has been repeatedly stated in

the Quran and the Sunna. Therefore, from these two major sources of shari'ah, Muslim scholars

have derived an Islamic legal maxim (qahida fiqhyyia) that states, “Hardship begets facility”

(Zakariyah, 2015, p.136). Applying this maxim to the Australian context, Abdalla (2012) argues

that Muslims in Australia are obliged to follow only the rules of shari’ah that are related to

personal matters, while the juridical obligations, such as the hudud, which are only enforceable

through formal sanction by the courts, are not the duty of ordinary Muslims to implement

(Abdalla, 2012). Muslims, thus, under necessary conditions can suspend laws in shari'ah that their

implementation is beyond the scope of their powers.

The imams’ argument can be analysed as follows. In a country where Islam is not separated from

the state and shari’ah is the legal system, the government should implement Islamic law against

apostates. However, in countries where the state is not religiously based, such as, in Australia,

and shari’ah is not officially part of the legal system, leaving Islam becomes a personal issue.

Drawing on this qualitative study of how imams in Australia deal with apostasy, I found that

imams argue that any hadd cannot be applied against apostates, even if the latter are active

against Islam since Australia is not a shari’ah-ruled state. This helped us understand how imams

held two opinions simultaneously, namely, shari’ah orders hadd against apostates and

inapplicability of this part of shari’ah in Australia. The imams, thus, do not aim to nostalgically

restore and implement the shari’ah’s dealing with apostates without considering their socially

dynamic world that has new structures of authority, power and law. Haj (2009) argues that

Western liberalists cannot accuse shari’ah of being inherently stagnant and claim that only

fundamentalists who have extreme views are "true" practitioners of Islam, whereas the imams

and Muslim scholars who consider the contexts for the application of hudud (plural of hadd) and

deal with apostates in civilized ways are influenced only by Western ideas.

The imams, furthermore, based their arguments for not using any violence against apostates on

the Quran, the first source of shari’ah. This finding demonstrates that the imams aim to meet

their current challenges through their continuous adaptation of the Islamic sacred texts.

However, the imams quoted verses from the Quran to support their argument for the freedom

of religion only in the contexts where shari’ah is not part of the legal system, such as in Australia.

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Therefore, the imams did not generalize the meanings of the verses to argue for giving freedom

of religion to apostates even in a shari’ah-ruled country. Because of the uniqueness of their

Western context, the imams I interviewed realized that they needed to make a synergy, in dealing

with apostasy, in Australia, between their belief of shari’ah in dealing with apostates and the

freedom of religion that people enjoy in the country.

In the present study, the imams in Australia argued that since they have accepted the laws of the

country, Muslims must abide by these laws, as was the case with the study conducted by Larsson

(2018a) in Sweden. This finding is consistent with the theoretical framework since the Quran

states, “Honour your pledges: you will be questioned about your pledges” (Al-Isra, 17:34). The

scholars of Islam also mentioned that Muslims must follow the laws of the countries they live in,

as long as these laws do not prevent them from practising Islam personally (Abdalla, 2012). This

opinion shows the inaccuracy of the idea that pictures shari’ah as a free-floating body of laws

that Muslims must implement wherever they are and without consideration of time and place.

6.2 Handling Apostasy in Civilized Ways

The imams argued that apostates should be dealt with respectfully and kindly. The Quran states,

“He [Allah] does not forbid you to deal kindly and justly with anyone who has not fought you for

your faith or driven you out of your homes: God loves the just" (Al-Mumtahana, 60:8). The imams

generalized the advice from the verse to be applied to apostates too, not only to originally non-

believers in Islam although, one cannot find an exegete from the well-known commentaries on

the Quran who states this. For the traditional exegetes on the Quran, apostates were exempted

from being treated kindly, unlike the original non-believers, who did not fight against Islam and

Muslims since the former faced death in shari’ah, as traditionally understood. My analysis of the

use of the above verse by the imams to treat silent apostates kindly is that the imams thought

that as long as apostates are not killed in non-Islamic countries, dealing kindly, as advised by the

verse, with non-believers remains the standard that can be applied to apostates in states where

shari'ah is not part of the legal system.

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One can observe, here, the link between the current theme and the previous theme. That is

because, through the analysis of the imams' management of apostasy, it is observed that dealing

with apostates kindly is exclusive to the secular and non-Shari’ah based contexts. However, in a

shari’ah-ruled state, apostates face hadd if they do not re-embrace Islam.

One point should be mentioned, here which is that the imams differentiated between shari’ah-

ruled states and Muslim majority countries. For the imams, these two types of countries are not

identical. Some of the imams argued that barely any current Muslim majority countries

implement shari’ah entirely. Based on this opinion, the imams' dealing with apostates in secular

states such as Australia can be generalized in the present Muslim majority countries since

shari'ah is not implemented completely in either of them (secular and the current Muslim

majority countries). However, Schirrmacher (2016) claims that imams in the Muslim majority

countries exercise their social power as they encourage Muslims to kill apostates. The problem

with Schirrmacher’ study is that she did not undertake any sociological research on the ground

to substantiate her claim. Contrary to her claim, I have found that imams in Sydney, Australia

argued that they call for treating apostates justly and kindly and engage in dialogue with them.

The interviews with the imams revealed that it is only through dialogue and having conversations

that the contesting parties may understand each other and have a meaningful discussion on their

points of disagreement. And this is based on the shari’ah’s first source, the Quran. The Quran

states, “Say, ‘People of the Book, let us arrive at a statement that is common to us all: we worship

God alone, we ascribe no partner to Him, and none of us takes others beside God as lords’” (Al-

Imran, 3:64). However, one can observe that this Quranic call is not for a dialogue that may lead

to compromising some points in Islam by Muslims. Instead, it is a debate that one has to win over

another, and it is about Muslims correcting and educating others, non-believers. Most of the

imams revealed to me that they want to have a dialogue with apostates to show them where

they went wrong and to present them with the real picture of Islam. The dialogue with apostates

that the imams want to engage in is not a collaborative one in which both parties engage in the

process of giving and receiving to achieve a common understanding. Instead, what appeared in

the interviews was that imams want to correct misconceptions about Islam that made apostates

no longer embrace their religion.

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Therefore, what the imams call for is debate rather than dialogue and debate, as Fecho (2011, p.

17) writes, “Mostly about destruction. Debaters listen to the other team, not necessarily to learn

from them, but, instead, to dispute, refute, and ultimately defeat their argument. Instead of ideas

comingling and transacting, a debate proclaims a winner and a loser”. In the debate, both parties

desire to refute each other, while in dialogue, they want to understand each other. In the former,

they work against each other, while in the later, they work with each other (Kakabadse, 2015).

However, we should not forget that “a debate has potential to generate dialogue across

difference and aid participants in arriving at new understandings” (Clifton, 2017, p. 39, emphasis

in original). Based on that, debates between imams and apostates, if they occur, may lead to the

creation of a new environment where the parties can meet and listen to each other in a civilized

way. The difference between dialogue and debate, therefore, is not an important point here, as

long as the imams use a language for their communication with apostates that adopts peaceful

argumentation and rational persuasion, rather than inciting violence.

For the imams, another way of dealing with apostates, which is undertaken through dialogue, is

the search for hidden factors that cause apostasy and, then, the attempt to find solutions to it.

Without denying intellectual causes for some people’s apostasy, eight imams argued that

psychological, social or economic factors might lead a Muslim to apostatise, although apostates

might demonstrate that their leaving Islam has other causes. This is what Zuckerman (2012)

found in his study with apostates arguing that the causes apostates provide for their apostasy

might not be the real factors that made them leave their religions. That is because, Zuckerman

continues, although many people have gone through the same experiences, which were

considered to be the cause of his or her apostasy, they do not leave their religions. It has long

been studied by social psychologists that, other than a commitment to intellectualism, apostasy

may occur in response to numerous experiences that a person is going through in his or her life

(Enstedt, 2020 Messick & Farias, 2020).

One notable point can be made from the above management of apostasy: the imams call Muslims

from the family of the apostates and the wider Muslim community to accept the responsibility

of restoring the Islamic faith of apostates and bring them back to Islam. The imams, thus, aim to

expand the circle of dialogue and discussion to include other Muslims, not only imams and

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apostates, when dealing with apostasy. This management by the imams helps us understand that

apostasy is a complex phenomenon that has multiple causes. Therefore, a multifaceted approach

is required in dealing with apostates.

6.3 Weighing up Benefits and Harms in Shari’ah

Evaluation of the benefits and harms when dealing with apostates was one of the pervasive

themes emerging from the interviews with the imams. This theme demonstrates that imams

consider the contexts and situations when they deal with or advise Muslims to deal with

apostates. This idea is consistent with the theoretical framework that, in shari’ah, Muslims should

evaluate the benefits (masalih) and harms (mafasid) of a particular action in a given context (al-

Raysuni, 1997). When the imams argued for their specific opinions on how to deal with particular

cases of apostasy, there was always a concern for prioritizing benefits over harms. And this is

consistent with the theoretical framework of this thesis, since the purpose of shari’ah (maqsad

al- shari’ah), as claimed by Muslim scholars, is to achieve benefits and eliminate harms (Auda,

2008).

However, realizing what is more beneficial and what is less harmful depends on the discretion of

the imams when examining particular cases (al-Qaradhawi, 2004). The imams agreed that the

protection of Islam, as the most fundamental purpose of shari’ah, always comes first. This

opinion is in line with what al-Raysuni (1997) claims to be the unanimous opinion among the

Islamic schools of jurisprudence. As al-Raysuni (1997) states, how to correctly realize it, once

again, depends on the person’s examinations in complex situations. This is because, when they

deal with sensitive and complex issues, such as apostasy, on the ground, the imams may not be

able to find a pure benefit and prioritize it or, a pure harm and, therefore, reject it. Therefore,

the imams need the jurisprudence of reality (fiqh al-waqi) (al- Wakili, 1997), meaning, first, to

understand the context and, then, make ijtihad or a scholarly effort to evaluate the situation and

prioritize the less harmful over the more harmful and the greater benefit over the less benefit

(al-Qaradhawi, 2004).

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Through the analysis of the disagreement among the imams on how Muslim families should deal

with their members who insult Islam and call for their ideologies, one can notice that the

evaluation, here, is between a definite and more harmful action and a probable and less harmful

action. Forsaking such apostates completely by their families will make them stay firm on

apostasy since they see themselves as victims who have been treated unjustly for their exercise

of freedom of religion. Thus, they attempt to influence others outside the family and reach the

wider Muslim community. However, staying within the family is less harmful since their activities

are now in a smaller circle, and their influence on other members is only a probability. However,

other imams argued that families should expel and isolate such apostate members since their

apostasy is contagious as they spread it at home. Therefore, when such apostates are expelled

from home and isolated, the Islamic faith of the rest of the family is protected, although a family

member is lost. My analysis here is that the evaluation, here, is between a greater benefit (the

protection of the family’s faith) and a lesser benefit (retaining the apostate at home). Because

preferring the former is obligatory in shari’ah, these imams prioritize it over the latter.

Al-Raysuni (1997) argues that in shari’ah, it is always necessary to evaluate the harms and

benefits of taking any approach when dealing with complicated and sensitive issues. This process

of evaluation of benefits and harms, in shari’ah, and the prioritization of the former over the

later, as presented by the Muslim jurists, helps us understand the complexities of imams’ dealings

with apostates to reach the objectives (maqasid) of shari’ah.

6.4 Changing Relationships with Apostates: An Order from Shari’ah

For the imams, socially boycotting offensive apostates is fair treatment since kindness is a two-

way process; people only respect those they respect them. And this is consistent with shari’ah

since the imams based their argument on and derived it from the first (Quran) and the fourth

(qiyas) sources of shari’ah. From the Quran, the imams generalized the meanings of the following

verses and applied them to apostates who publicly criticize Islam. The Quran states, “God forbids

you to take as allies those who have fought against you for your faith” (Al-Mumtahana, 60:9). In

addition, the Quran states, [Prophet], you will not find people who truly believe in God and the

Last Day giving their loyalty to those who oppose God and His Messenger, even though they may

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be their fathers, sons, brothers, or other relations (Al-Mujadala, 58:22). The imams, next, used

analogy (qiyas) to argue for boycotting the apostates. In shari’ah, Muslim scholars state that

Muslims can cut their social relationships (hajr) with people who publicly commit sins and evil

actions even if they are Muslims (Ibn Muflih, 1999). The reason for this is first to make those

sinners deter and second to warn Muslims from being influenced by them. Therefore, the imams

used the same rationale (illa) to be applied in the case of cutting social relationships with

apostates who publicly criticize Islam and call Muslims to apostatise.

With regard to dealing with offensive apostates who criticize Islam publicly through their

crusading activities, those termed as “career apostates” (Bromley, 1998), the imams combined

cutting their relationships with them and advising Muslims to do so, on the one hand, and

responding to their criticisms against Islam with logic and wisdom, on the other hand. Taking

these two approaches simultaneously has two main purposes. The first is to protect the faith of

the Muslim community that the imams consider themselves responsible for. That is, through

building a barrier and destroying the social bridge, social relationships, between ordinary

Muslims and the doubts that offensive apostates aim to spread. This is approached by advising

Muslims not to communicate and socialize with those people. In addition, by responding to the

criticisms against Islam made by those apostates, the imams aim to remove the doubts that may

affect the faith of Muslims. The second purpose is to show the offensive apostates, through

cutting their relationships with them, that the imams and Muslims, in general, do not agree with

their activities against Islam. This social boycott wielded by the imams is a weapon to put pressure

on these apostates to either return to Islam or abandon their attempts to apostatise Muslims.

This social boycott by the imams with apostates publicly criticizing Islam is consistent with the

literature on apostasy. Schirrmacher (2016) claims that apostates among Muslims lose their jobs

since no one employs them. Cottee (2015) found in his interviews with ex-Muslims in Canada and

Britain that some of them claimed to have been threatened by their families with “social death”

if they do not re-embrace Islam. Cutting social relationships with apostates is not exclusive to

Muslims. Inge (2017) and Özyürek (2015) found in Britain and Germany, respectively, that those

people who convert to Islam face marginalization by the mainstream society. Usually, the group

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that a person leaves does not normalize the exiting any of its members. Instead, it will treat and

consider their ex-members as dangerous (Baumeister, 1999).

For the imams, one element of cutting the relationship with apostates, silent or offensive, is the

nullification of an apostate’s marriage. This dealing is consistent with shari’ah since a person who

is an apostate (murtadd) cannot marry or remain as husband or wife with a Muslim (Peters & De

Vries, 1976). The Quran states, “They [disbelievers] are not lawful wives for them, nor are the

disbelievers their lawful husbands” (Al-Mumtahana, 60:10). Moreover, the marriage of an

apostate becomes void without disagreement between the schools of Islamic jurisprudence, if

he or she did not re-embrace Islam (Ibn Qudamah, 1997, p.39). Furthermore, when some imams

mentioned that apostasy of a person does not nullify his or her marriage immediately, and the

partners, instead, are given some time, their opinion is based on some schools of jurisprudence

in shari’ah. For Shafihi and Hanbali, if a person leaves Islam, he or she has given a period of three

menstrual cycles (idda), usually, three months, to be investigated and to repent to Islam. If the

apostate returns to Islam during this period, his or her marriage remains intact. If not, then the

marriage is considered null from the time of committing apostasy. This is while in the Hanafi and

Maliki schools, this marriage immediately becomes null (faskh) (Ibn Qudamah, 1997).

As the imams consider themselves loyal to shari’ah, their advice to a married Muslim, whose

partner has left Islam without returning to it, is separation. This finding is consistent with the

literature on imams in Australia. Buckley (2019) found in her interviews with Muslims that imams

in Australia, in the case of marriage and divorce, offer advice and provide information based on

classical Islamic jurisprudence.

One can find that the current theme is connected to the third theme, which is weighing up

benefits and harms in shari’ah. That is because kindly treating “silent” apostates who do not

insult Islam, and socially boycotting offensive apostates who crusade against Islam, are two

opposite ways that are meant to produce two different outcomes. The purpose of kindly treating

apostates who do not offend Islam is to make them re-embrace Islam. Thus, the harms and

benefits of boycotting silent apostates are compared to those of treating them kindly. The later

dealing is prioritised over the former one since, for the imams, kind treatment will probably make

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“silent” apostates return to Islam. Even if they do not return to Islam, their harm is minimal and

exclusive to themselves. However, the purpose of socially boycotting offensive apostates is to

protect the Muslim community from their influences. Thus, the harms and benefits of boycotting

offensive apostates are compared to those of treating them kindly. The former dealing is

prioritised over the later one since, for the imams, boycotting offensive apostates will make them

unable to spread their ideologies among Muslims since they are no longer able to communicate

with Muslims.

6.5 Jurisconsults (Muftis), Judges (Qudat) and Rulers (Hukkam)

The imams differentiated between three groups of people regarding responsibilities towards

applying shari’ah in the lives of Muslims, namely, Islamic jurists (ulama), qudat, (judges) and

Muslim rulers (hukkam). A mufti is any Muslim jurist or scholar who is consulted to issue fatwa

and explain the rules of shari’ah regarding particular issues and practical matters (Kamali, 2008).

A fatwa that a mufti state is not legally binding, unlike the decision that an Islamic judge (qadi)

makes in the shari’ah court, although both deal with the everyday issues and conflicts and explain

the rules of shari’ah (Masud, Messick & Powers, 1996). The role of Muslim rulers is the

implementation of the verdicts issued in shari'ah courts. One can observe that the issue raised

by the imams of non-implementation of hudud (plural of hadd) in non-Islamic countries

corresponds to the theoretical framework of this study since in shari’ah, having an Islamic ruler

for the enforcement of hudud is a necessary condition (Abdalla, 2012; Kamali, 2019).

The distinction between a mufti’s or an imam’s fatwa and a qadi’s decision is important since, in

the absence of shari’ah courts and qudat (plural of qadi), Muslims may consult imams and

scholars of Islam on the issues related to shari’ah. For instance, since Islamic laws are not

integrated into the Australian legal system, Muslims cannot report cases of apostasy, as shari’ah

courts are not officially established to decide the implementation of Islamic law against

apostates. Therefore, since in Australia fatawa (plural of fatwa) are issued by imams from local

mosques (Whyte, 2017), Muslims may ask imams, as their muftis and religious advisers, to seek

Islamic legal opinions on how to deal with apostates. However, imams cannot advise Muslims to

implement the death penalty against apostates in Australia nor any other countries, since, in

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shari'ah, the implementation of hudud is exclusively the role of the government (Ibn Muflih,

2003). This finding is consistent with the opinions of pre-modern Muslim scholars. Ibn Rushd

[d.1198] argues that Muslim jurists unanimously agree that hadd implementation is the

responsibility of the Islamic authorities, not ordinary Muslims (Ibn Rushd, 2000, p.535). Thus,

individual Muslims, imams or laypeople are not allowed to take hudud into their own hands and

kill a person who is apostate or accused of being so. Since Australia is not a shari’ah -based state,

implementing hudud against apostates is impractical.

The imams’ argument for the division of responsibilities in dealing with apostates is based on a

prophetic tradition that states, " Whoever amongst you sees an evil, he must change it with his

hand; if he is unable to do so, then with his tongue; and if he is unable to do so, then with his

heart; and that is the weakest form of Faith" (Sahih Muslim Tradition, No. 49). Based on this

hadith, many Muslim scholars hierarchically divided Muslims' duty in commanding right and

forbidding wrong. They said that, in general, the rulers’ role is to change wrong in the society

with the hand, for example, punishing wrongdoers physically, whereas the responsibility of

Muslim scholars (ulama) is to change wrong in the society with the tongue (Meijer, 2014). This

classification means that the role of ulama is only explaining the rules of shari’ah and advising

people to abandon wrong actions.

This division of responsibilities is not explicated in the Quran and the Sunna (Cook, 2001),

however, Muslim scholars structured this hierarchy to prevent chaos in society because, as Ibn

al-Arabi [d.1148] argued, allowing everyone to act physically against wrong actions leads to

greater harm than that it was intended to remove (Ibn al-Arabi, 2003). And this goes against the

maqasid or the purposes of shari’ah. For instance, if, because of lack of order and not dividing

the responsibilities, any Muslim from his or her own side is allowed to accuse people of

committing apostasy without scholarly study and having credentials to do so, allowed to decide

without jurisdictional investigation of each case, and then authorised to implement hadd against

apostates, the society faces disorder and destruction. Therefore, from the maqasid perspective,

the harm intended to be removed by implementing hadd against apostates outweighs its

benefits. Through this analysis, one can observe the connection between the third theme and

the fifth one. That is because the distribution of responsibilities is only a method to reach the

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goal that was intended to accomplish in the process of evaluation between harms and benefits,

which is preventing the former and achieving the latter. Thus, one can conclude that the purpose

of dividing responsibilities between the three bodies mentioned above regarding how to deal

with apostates is to maximise benefits and minimise harms.

Furthermore, although the purposes of shari’ah are hierarchically three: necessities (daruriyyat),

essentials (hajiyyat) and embellishments (tahsiniyyat), and in the first level, generally, the

protection of the Muslims’ religion is prioritized. However, implementing a hadd that an Islamic

government has to implement to reach the goal of protecting the faith of Muslims must be

evaluated to maximise the benefits and minimise the harms. For instance, it was mentioned in

the theory chapter that, in shari'ah, the purpose of capital punishment against apostates was to

protect the religion of Muslims. However, in shari'ah, this hadd should be implemented in a way

that does not lead to harm that outweighs the intended benefit. Therefore, the implementation

of capital punishment against apostates by individuals may not bring the purpose that was

intended to bring instead, contradicts a very fundamental purpose of shari'ah, which is the

protection of lives, since this creates chaos in the society that may lead to killing each other. The

implementation of hudud, thus, is not the responsibility of individuals.

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CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

There are many studies on apostasy in Islam however, most of them are from the theological

perspectives. Sociological studies to examine how Muslims ‘on the ground’ deal with apostasy

are rare (Cottee, 2015; Larsson, 2018a). The purpose of this thesis was to explore how imams

manage and understand apostasy among Muslims living in secular contexts and in the countries

that are not ruled by the shari’ah. To attain this goal, I conducted semi-structured interviews with

12 Sunni imams in Sydney. I asked the imams how they deal with and advise Muslims to deal with

apostasy. I used shari’ah as the theoretical framework to analyse the data that emerged from the

interviews. In this chapter, first, the main findings from the study are summarized with their

analysis. Second, the limitations of this study are demonstrated with the recommendation for

future research to enrich our understanding of the phenomenon of apostasy in Islam.

7.1 Summary of the Main Findings

Consistent with shari’ah, as the theoretical framework of this study, five themes and four sub-

themes emerged following the interviews.

Firstly, since Australia is a secular rather than a shari’ah-ruled country, apostates do not face the

punishment ordered by shari’ah against them. This demonstrates that, for the imams, dealing

with apostates changes based on particular contexts.

Secondly, and following the first point, Muslims in Australia, and in the contexts where shari’ah

is not officially adopted, should treat apostates with respect and kindness since the

implementation of hadd against apostates is impractical. The first sub-theme that emerged here

was a dialogue with wisdom and good advice since, for the imams, this is part of treating

apostates kindly. I found that the purpose of making such dialogue was educating apostates,

correcting their misunderstandings about Islam and inviting them to re-embrace Islam. The

second sub-theme was working on the underlying causes such as psychological, social and

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economic factors that led some people to forsake the Islamic faith. By doing so, the imams

enlarged the scope of dialogue to include the families of the apostates and the Muslim

community to explain that their responsibility towards apostates was to bring them back to Islam.

Thirdly, the imams advise Muslims when they deal with apostates, especially in handling

complicated cases of apostasy such as whether to expel offensive apostates from home or not,

to evaluate the benefits and the harms of each action that they might take and prioritise the

former over the latter. For the imams, preservation of Islam should always be Muslims’ main

concern.

Fourthly, changing relationships after the occurrence of apostasy, which, for the imams, was

normal since, by the nature of their work, imams mostly communicate with people who share

commonalities with them, such as Islam. The third sub-theme was that the imams argued that

Muslims should boycott those apostates who aim to influence other Muslims by their crusading

activities against Islam. The purpose of this social boycott was to protect the faith of Muslims and

put pressure on the apostates to re-embrace their faith or stop their hostile activities against

Islam. This dealing with offensive apostates is part of weighing up benefits and harms in shari’ah.

Boycotting apostates may lead to the protection of Muslims' faith while communicating with

them helps these apostates spread their ideologies among Muslims. Therefore, for the imams,

the former approach should be prioritised over the latter one. The fourth sub-theme was the

nullification of an apostate's marriage. The imams argued that part of their duty to explain the

rules of shari’ah to people is to advise married Muslims, where one of the partners has left Islam,

to separate from each other since their marriage according to shari’ah is no longer valid.

Fifthly, the distribution of roles and responsibilities. The imams argued that their responsibility

and that of Muslim scholars is only to explain shari’ah and give advice to Muslims, while the

responsibility of the Islamic rulers is to implement hudud. Based on such a division of

responsibilities, individuals cannot implement hadd against apostates, irrespective of the

contexts, since this is exclusively the role of the executive body, namely, Islamic rulers in a

shari’ah-ruled country. It was found that the reason for distributing responsibilities was the

prevention of chaos in society. If individual Muslims were allowed to kill or physically harm

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anyone who is claimed to commit apostasy, killing people arbitrarily would occur. Thus, the

disorder and insecurity would spread. And this is against the purpose of shari’ah which is the

preservation of life.

By analysing the above themes, it was argued that although they methodologically followed

shari’ah and their arguments were derived from its main sources on how to deal with apostates,

the imams called for situational and contextual dealing with apostasy. That is because in shari’ah,

dealing with complicated issues change with the change of the contexts. Therefore, from the

shari’ah perspective, the imams cannot call for the implementation of any hadd against apostates

in secular contexts such as Australia, since it is not in their ability, nor it is their responsibility, to

apply hadd. The reason for such contextual management is the evaluation of benefits and harms.

Thus, Muslims have to maximise the benefits and minimise the harms that result from their

approaches when dealing with sensitive issues such as apostasy. Thus, the imams provided

complex management and understanding of apostasy in Islam.

7.2 Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research

This study focused on understanding how a small and particular group of Muslims, Sunni imams

in Sydney, Australia, deal with apostasy and advise ordinary Muslims to do so. The size of the

sample of this study was small, being only 12 participants. Future research should focus on

conducting interviews with more participants to enhance reliability. Another limitation is the lack

of diversity within the sample since most (10 out of 12) of my participants were from an Arab

ethnic background and were Sunni imams residing in Sydney. Future research should include

more imams from different ethnic backgrounds, other sects of Islam (such as Shia) and other

cities and states of Australia. As I have used purposive sampling in this study, the focus was on

imams only. Therefore, generalization of the findings cannot be claimed (Bryman, 2012). Future

research should consider also studying ordinary Muslims, especially those who have ex-Muslims

in their families. The purpose would be to explore how ordinary Muslims deal with ex-Muslims

and how their imams advise them on this issue. Thus, such findings could be compared with those

70

of this study to detect matches and mismatches between them. In other words, we can study

imams' influences on ordinary Muslims when they deal with controversial issues such as apostasy

and identify the extent to which what imams told me in my research about how they advise

ordinary Muslims corresponds to what these Muslims say that they have been told by imams.

71

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Appendices

Appendix 1 Details of the Imams

80

Name

Age

College Degrees or/and Traditional Islamic Certificates (Ijaza)

Bakr 39 B.A in Islamic studies from Al-Azhar university

Bilal 39 Ijaza of Efta (issuing legal Islamic opinion) from Darul Uloom

Deoband university, which is equal to M.A

Khalil 38 M.A in Islamic Studies from Al-Madinah International University

and Ijaza in Quranic recitations and Ijaza in hadith

Othman 38 B.A in Islamic studies from Al-Azhar university

Mahir 29 B.A in Islamic Studies from Al-Madinah International University

Jamal 36 B.A in Islamic Studies from Islamic University of Madinah and

Master in Engineering in Australia

Tahsin 39 Ph.D. in Islamic Studies from Damascus University

Musa 38 M.A in Islamic Studies from Al-Azhar university

Murad 52 Master in Computer Science from Western Sydney University

and Ijaza in Quranic recitations and Islamic studies

Qadir 68 Ph.D. in Islamic Studies from Al-Azhar university

Hazm 74 Ijaza of Ifta (issuing legal Islamic opinion) and Ijaza in hadith

Burhan 59 Ph.D. in Islamic Studies from Jamia Uloom-ul-Islamia, Karachi

Appendix 2 Consent Form

81

Project Title: Sunni Imams’ Dealing with Apostasy in Australia: A Sociological Study

This study has been approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee at Western Sydney

University. The ethics reference number is H13672

I hereby consent to participate in the above named research project.

I acknowledge that:

• I have read the participant information sheet (or where appropriate, have had it read to

me) and have been given the opportunity to discuss the information and my involvement in the

project with the researcher

• The procedures required for the project and the time involved have been explained to

me, and any questions I have about the project have been answered to my satisfaction.

I consent to:

☐ Participating in an interview

☐ Having my information audio recorded

Data publication, reuse and storage

This project seeks consent for the data provided to be used in any other projects in the future.

To make reuse of the data possible it will be stored under Western Sydney University’s Open

Access Policy.

I understand that my involvement is confidential and the information gained during the study

may be published but no information about me will be used in any way that reveals my

identity.

I understand that the researcher intends to make the non-identified data from this project

available for other research projects.

I can withdraw from the study at any time without affecting my relationship with the

researcher, and any organisations involved, now or in the future.

Signed:

Name:

Date:

What if I have a complaint?

82

If you have any complaints or reservations about the ethical conduct of this research, you may

contact the Ethics Committee through Research Engagement, Development and Innovation

(REDI) on Tel +61 2 4736 0229 or email humanethics@westernsydney.edu.au.

Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated fully, and you will be

informed of the outcome.

Appendix 3 Participant Information Sheet

Project Title: Sunni Imams’ Dealing with Apostasy in Australia: A Sociological Study

Project Summary: You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Mohammed

Othman Abdulraheem, a student enrolled in the Masters of Research degree at Western

Sydney University, under the supervision of Dr Jan Ali from the School of Humanities and

Communication Arts. The research attempts to find out how Australian Sunni imams deal with

apostasy and what challenges and complexities they face.

Apostasy is a very complex issue in Islam but at the same time is not discussed sufficiently on a

sociological ground; how Muslims deal with it. This project seeks to understand if Australian

Sunni imams encounter cases of apostasy among Australian Muslim communities and if so, how

they deal with it. This study will compare the concept of apostasy in Islamic jurisprudence and

classic scholarship with the way contemporary Muslim jurists and scholars deal with it in

everyday living and assist Muslim populations understand and come to terms with apostasy.

The study will conduct semi-structured interviews with 12 Australian Sunni imams over nine

months. The interviews will be conducted via zoom or phone. The interviews will take

approximately 30 minutes each.

The outcome of this research is expected to provide a deeper understanding of a variety of

ways Muslim population, as well as Muslim scholars, deal with apostasy in a context like

Australia where Muslims are a minority group and the state guarantees its citizens the freedom

of religion.

83

How is the study being paid for?

The study is funded under the Australian Government Research Training Program (RTP).

What will I be asked to do?

This study involves participating in an interview that will be conducted in venues mutually

acceptable by you and the researcher to protect your confidentiality. You will be asked to

describe your management approach in dealing with apostasy. You will also be asked to discuss

if there is a case, where a person, in the Muslim community, renounces Islam, how you deal

and call the Muslim community to deal with it. With your permission, the interview will be

digitally recorded and typed up.

How much of my time will I need to give?

The interview will take approximately 30 minutes.

What benefits will I, and/or the broader community, receive for participating?

Participants are not guaranteed they will receive any benefits from the study. Although

participation in this study may not benefit you directly, the information you provide may

influence the way other Muslims deal with the subject. The information provided will also be

made available in the public domain for Sunni Muslims to develop their understanding of how

to deal with apostasy.

Will the study involve any risk or discomfort for me? If so, what will be done to rectify it?

It is not expected that this study will involve any risks or discomfort for participants. You will be

free to withdraw from the study at any time if you wish, and will always have the right to refuse

to answer any questions which you may not be comfortable with (for any reason).

How do you intend to publish or disseminate the results?

It is expected that the results of this research project will be published and/or presented in a

variety of forums. In any publication and/or presentation, the information will be provided in

such a way that the participant cannot be identified, except with your permission.

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Confidentiality will be maintained by de-identifying the data collected, for example, through

using pseudonyms (different names) for participants and removing references to characteristics

that may make it possible for others to identify individuals.

Will the data and information that I have provided be disposed of?

No. Your data will be used as per Western Sydney University’s Open Access Policy. This means

that data collected from this study can be made available online and worldwide in perpetuity.

Can I withdraw from the study?

Participation is entirely voluntary and you are not obliged to be involved. If you do participate

you can withdraw at any time without giving any reason.

If you do choose to withdraw, any information that you have supplied will be destroyed.

If you do wish to withdraw, please contact the researcher or the academic supervisor to inform

them of your decision (contact details below).

Can I tell other people about the study?

Yes, you can tell other people about the study by providing them with the researcher’s contact

details (below). They can contact the researcher to discuss their participation in the research

project and obtain a copy of the information sheet.

What if I require further information?

Please contact Mohammed Othman Abdulraheem should you wish to discuss the research

further before deciding whether or not to participate:

19196262@student.westernsydney.edu.au Phone: 0422110847

You can also contact Dr Jan Ali jan.ali@westernsydney.edu.au Phone: 61 2 9772 6126

What if I have a complaint?

If you have any complaints or reservations about the ethical conduct of this research, you may

contact the Ethics Committee through Research Engagement, Development and Innovation

(REDI) on Tel +61 2 4736 0229 or email humanethics@westernsydney.edu.au

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Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated fully, and you will be

informed of the outcome.

If you agree to participate in this study, you may be asked to sign the Participant Consent Form.

The information sheet is for you to keep and the consent form is retained by the researcher/s.

This study has been approved by the Western Sydney University Human Research Ethics

Committee. The Approval number is H13672.

Appendix 4 Interview Questions

1. How old are you?

2. What is your level of education and where did you receive your qualifications and Islamic education from?

3. How do you deal with a person who leaves Islam?

4. How do you advice the Muslim community to deal with apostasy?

5. In your view, how social relations are formed and unformed during and after the act of apostasy?

6. How do you convey to Muslims who consult you on this issue, the message that Islamic criminal law in the case of apostasy cannot be applied by individuals or organisations because Australia is a liberal democracy in which freedom of religion is guaranteed?