Social Charity and the Just Social Order: Catholic Social Doctrine and Aquinas on Friendship

© John C. Sikorski, 2014

Social Charity as the Soul of the Just Order

Catholic Social Doctrine and Aquinas on Friendship

John Christopher Sikorski

Seminar Paper for

Dr. Mary Keys (2008)


There exists among both political theorists and moral theologians a strong critique of

charity as a political or social virtue. Among political theorists, especially contractarian thinkers

such as John Locke, charity is afforded a limited role, usually defined by a certain responsibility

to share one’s goods with the less fortunate in order to ensure the proper and efficient

functioning of the whole economic and political realm. Locke writes, “Charity gives every man

a title to so much out of another’s plenty, as will keep him from extreme want, where he has no

means to subsist otherwise.”1 As Steven Forde summarizes, Locke’s political theory can at most

speak of charity in cases that “are at once extreme and easily remedied: dire need on one side and

readily available relief on the other.”2 A similar limited role is afforded to charity among certain

Catholic moral theologians, who critique a primacy of charity to the detriment of justice. Daniel

C. Maguire concludes that while the Catholic moral tradition as a whole afforded charity a

central place, “justice was assigned an inferior status.” A primary focus on charity in the social

order,

…talk of love and friendship, can be a prescription for disaster. There justice is

the closest one can get to friendship. Justice is incipient love, and in the political

order it is the only form that love takes. Privatistic talk of love is at that level

unavailing, naive, and ultra-conservative in effect. Ironically, love-talk in the

social-political sphere provides an ideological veil for injustice…3

Charity is therefore represented as that attitude which either leads one to share one’s goods with

those less fortunate than oneself, or as a private virtue that relates persons to one another (and to

God) without significant effect on the social order. In both cases, justice governs political and

social relations, while charity can be an additional element that plays a good but ultimately

limited role in the social sphere.

While for Locke, charity is reduced to a kind of altruism, Maguire argues that a central

emphasis on charity can serve as a legitimization or prolongation of unjust political or social

structures. Both these political and theological understandings of charity assume its separation

from the virtue of justice, particularly social justice, and part ways with a more traditional notion 1 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government. Edited by Peter Laslett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Here, First Treatise, 42. 2 Steven Forde, “The Charitable Locke.” The Review of Politics (2009), 71: 428-458. 3 Daniel C. Maguire, “The Primacy of Justice in Moral Theology.” Horizons, (1983), 10/1: 72-85. See pp. 73-74.


of charity as developed by scholastic theologians. It will be the task of this paper to show that

such a separation of social charity from social justice has not taken place within the tradition of

Catholic social doctrine, and that while social charity may remain only broadly defined within

this tradition, one can look to the social thought of St. Thomas Aquinas to gain a more

comprehensive understanding of charity as an indispensable element for the political and social

sphere, and as a virtue inseparable from and supportive of justice.

The Catholic Social Tradition

While Maguire seeks to illustrate a marginalization of justice in favor of charity

throughout the tradition of Catholic moral theology, Servais Pinckaers, O.P. argues to the

contrary, that the entire structure of post-Tridentine manuals of theology was built on the edifice

of justice. In analyzing a manual of Juan Azor, S.J., typical of post-Tridentine Jesuit moral

formation, Pinckaers concludes:

…the moral teaching of the manuals can be compared to a building resting on

four foundation stones: human or free action, law, conscience, and sin. The

columns are the commandments of God and of the Church, and these indicate the

obligations, which mark off the boundaries and provide the furnishings of moral

theology, so to speak. The overarching roof is justice, the legal virtue…which

crowns the whole edifice and maintains it with the force of obligation.4

The manuals exemplify a focus on the virtue of justice, which has been separated from

discussions of charity, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and the role of grace. In addition to the

manual tradition, the tradition of Catholic social doctrine has employed the term “social justice”

since the beginning of its modern articulation. Thus, justice has been given a central role in at

least one important area of the Catholic moral tradition. Pope Leo XIII, in Rerum Novarum, the

encyclical that gave rise to the modern Catholic social tradition, speaks of “justice” at least

twenty-three times, while the next major encyclical of the tradition, Pius XI’s Quadragesimo

Anno, speaks of the virtue at least forty-four times. Given both the manual and social doctrine

4 Servais Pinckaers, O.P. The Sources of Christian Ethics. Translated by Sr. Mary Thomas Noble, O.P. Washington,

D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995, p. 257.


traditions’ emphases on justice, it is difficult to agree with Maguire’s assessment. While both

Maguire and Locke might see a place for at least private “charity,” a survey of the Catholic

social tradition will reveal the importance of social charity in relation to social justice. It is first

therefore necessary to investigate what the tradition has in mind when speaking of “social

charity.”

The first encyclical in the tradition of Catholic social doctrine, Leo XIII’s Rerum

novarum, has makes little mention of charity. Leo notes the call addressed to Christians to

imitate the charity of Christ, who addressed himself primarily to the poor, and to imitate his

charity in their own lives.5 Charity is primarily identified as the domain and work of the Church,

and is not to be identified with a state’s “relief system” for the needy.6 Thus, while

administering justice is the role of the state, charity is seen to be mostly the role of the Church,

the ministry of which serves the social order through extending the charity of Christ.

In the next encyclical of this tradition, however, one begins to perceive a development of

the understanding of charity. Whereas “charity” is identified by Leo as the domain of the

Church, Pius XI adopts, but also broadens the virtue by arguing for its social application. The

term “social charity” first appears in Quadragesimo Anno, which was written to commemorate

the fortieth anniversary of Rerum novarum. In this encyclical, Pius writes in light of the rise of

socialism and fascism in Europe, and argues for the re-establishment of a social order that

respects the rights of workers, justice in relations, and the moral order. After having provided a

discussion of particularly pressing concrete issues, such as strikes and labor reform, he appeals to

the “loftier and nobler principles” of “social justice and social charity.”

Hence, the institutions themselves of peoples and, particularly those of all social

life, ought to be penetrated with this justice, and it is most necessary that it be

truly effective, that is, establish a juridical and social order…Social charity,

moreover, ought to be as the soul of this order, an order which public authority

ought to be ever ready effectively to protect and defend.7

5 Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum, 24.

6 Ibid, 30.

7 Pius XI, Quadragessimo Anno, 88.


He critiques any social order that is not governed by these principles, and especially challenges

Catholics who “are almost completely unmindful of that sublime law of justice and charity that

binds us not only to render to everyone what is his but to succor brothers in need as Christ the

Lord Himself.”8

Pius XI therefore makes clear the distinction and relation between social justice and

social charity, while leaving much undefined. While justice ensures that one renders to each

what is due, charity brings about a more perfect unity in society. “Admittedly, no vicarious

charity can substitute for justice which is due as an obligation and is wrongfully denied. Yet even

supposing that everyone should finally receive all that is due him, the widest field for charity will

always remain open.”9 Thus justice can regulate the relationships of debt between members of a

society, therefore mitigating conflict, but it cannot bring about a “mutual bond of minds and

hearts”10

that Pius argues is essential to any healthy society. Social charity is necessary because

all persons are united as “one great family” united by a “single common good.”11

This theme

will be developed by the subsequent popes.

The theme of a society based on a single common good continues in the encyclicals of

Blessed John XXIII, who argues that a truly just society can only be based on the truth.12

For

Pope John, there is an inseparable relationship between justice, truth, freedom, and love. A

society can only be just to the degree that it is based on the truth about the human person, whose

relationships must be governed by mutual love, and whose decisions must be effected by

authentic freedom. A just social order can only be brought about if it “is an order that is founded

on truth, built up on justice, nurtured and animated by charity, and brought into effect under the

auspices of freedom.”13

Thus, while Christians are called to practice charity in their individual

8 Ibid, 125.

9 Ibid, 137.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 John XXIII, Pacem in Terris, 149.

13 Ibid, 167.


lives, Pope John argues on a broad scale that economic relationships will never be just unless the

entire economic enterprise is “governed by social charity.”14

Pope Paul VI continues to explore the interrelationships between social justice and social

charity. Following Pius XI’s insistence on social charity as the “soul” of the social order, and its

inseparability from social justice, and John XXIII’s insistence on the relation of social charity to

freedom, truth, and justice, Pope Paul VI argues for a “universal charity” that ought to be the

motivation to build a “more humane world.”15

Christians and non-Christians are called to “Blaze

the trails to mutual cooperation among men, to deeper knowledge and more widespread charity,

to a way of life marked by true brotherhood, to a human society based on mutual harmony.”16

Paul introduces such a social order as the “civilization of love.” This civilization is the only kind

that can establish peace, respect the dignity of the human person, and sustain mutual cooperation

among people of different races, cultures, and religions.17

It is clear that, by the time of Paul

VI’s teachings, “charity” is no longer identified as solely a theological virtue that Christians are

to exemplify in imitation of Christ’s concern for the poor and suffering, but rather, that charity

possesses a social dimension, and is the kind of virtue or attitude that provides the foundation for

a socially just order.

Blessed John Paul II and Benedict XVI develop the emphasis on social charity in the

Catholic social tradition, both by continuing to identify it with social justice, and by associating

it with related virtues that are necessary for civil society. In his second social encyclical,

Solicitudo Rei Socialis, Blessed John Paul II examines the relationship between the “social and

moral virtue” of “solidarity,” and the virtue of charity. He recognizes the growing

interdependence of peoples within modern society, and between nations, and notices that

“solidarity” is needed to sustain the proper relations in the political, economic, social, and

cultural spheres. Solidarity is not “a feeling of vague compassion or shallow distress at the

14

Pope John XXIII, Mater et Magistra, 39, 120. 15

Pope Paul VI, Populorum Progressio, 44. 16

Ibid, 85. 17

See Paul VI, “Christmas Homily,” December 25th

, 1975; also “Message for World Day of Peace,” January 1st

, 1977.


misfortunes of so many people, both near and far. On the contrary, it is a firm and persevering

determination to commit oneself to the common good; that is to say to the good of all and of

each individual, because we are all really responsible for all.”18

Solidarity ensures that persons

see one another individual and free acting subjects who cannot be used as mere objects of

another’s profit or gain. Authentic interpersonal relationships that are sustained by solidarity

bring about social peace, which “will certainly be achieved through the putting into effect of

social and international justice, but also through the practice of the virtues which favor

togetherness, and which teach us to live in unity, so as to build in unity, by giving and receiving,

a new society and a better world.”19

Thus, while social justice seeks to regulate relations to bring

about stability and order, it remains incomplete if it is not sustained by the virtue of solidarity.

Solidarity is therefore the political manifestation of the virtue of charity. “In the light of

faith, solidarity seeks to go beyond itself, to take on the specifically Christian dimension of total

gratuity, forgiveness and reconciliation.”20

The kind of actions and attitudes that flow from

Christian charity can be understood as “solidarity,” the virtue necessary for bringing about

“togetherness” in society, which sustains socially just and peaceful relations. “The ‘evil

mechanisms’ and ‘structures of sin’ of which we have spoken can be overcome only through the

exercise of the human and Christian solidarity.”21

While John Paul distinguishes carefully

between charity and solidarity, he nevertheless illuminates the Catholic social tradition’s

previous insistence on the necessary relationship between social justice and social charity.

By the time of John Paul’s writings, social charity is identified with concrete human

attitudes (gratuity, solidarity, togetherness, reconciliation), which allow charity to function in a

manner broader than solely a theological and specifically Christian virtue. In Centesimus Annus,

John Paul notices Pius XI’s use of the term “social charity” and Leo XIII’s insistence on

“friendship,” and again identifies these virtues with the “principle of solidarity.”22

18

John Paul II, Solicitudo Rei Socialis, 38. 19

Ibid, 39. 20

Ibid, 40. 21

Ibid. 22

Centesimus Annus, 10.


Benedict XVI continues to develop John Paul II’s identification of social charity with

specific political virtues and attitudes, in order to show the need for social charity in sustaining

social justice. He identifies “charity” as the “principal force at the service of development,”

which requires that each person mobilize himself at the “level of the heart” in working for social

justice.23

However, many networks, structures, and relations exist that make it difficult for

solidarity to function at the interpersonal and social level.24

There is an urgent need to reform

laws and systems in such a way as to enable more “human” relationships to occur; however,

simple reforms of laws and structures will not establish social justice. “Today we can say that

economic life must be understood as a multi-layered phenomenon: in every one of these layers,

to varying degrees and in ways specifically suited to each, the aspect of fraternal reciprocity must

be present.”25

In order for “fraternal reciprocity” to function, social relations ought to be

governed by an ethic of “gratuitousness.” “While in the past it was possible to argue that justice

had to come first and gratuitousness could follow afterwards, as a complement, today it is clear

that without gratuitousness, there can be no justice in the first place.”26

In a forceful statement, Benedict XVI argues that, “The marketplace of gratuitousness

does not exist, and attitudes of gratuitousness cannot be established by law.”27

What is needed to

sustain authentic interdependence and a “fully humane” economic and social sphere are

individuals who are “open to reciprocal gift.” Rather than giving out of obligation or duty

imposed by external demands such as law, or giving out of one’s excess as a result of a vague

feeling of compassion for the less fortunate, Benedict argues that charity, exercised socially,

establishes and sustains relationships between individuals which are neither utilitarian nor simply

altruistic, but which are able to bring about a deeper communion that is necessary for the full

flourishing of the human political, social, and economic order.28

Charity, which leads to

23

Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, 13, 20. 24

Ibid, 25. 25

Ibid, 38. 26

Ibid. 27

Ibid, 39. 28

See CV, 37-42.


communion, is proposed as the necessary social virtue that ensures the authentic development of

society and pursuit of legitimate and just temporal ends.

From this brief examination of social charity in the Catholic social tradition, a few

themes become evident. First, from the beginning of the tradition, a relationship between social

justice and social charity is proposed. In the earlier documents, charity is primarily identified

within the domain of the Church, as a theological virtue that inspires individual Christians to

seek justice, rooted ultimately out of their adherence to Christ. Over time, however, the tradition

seeks to develop a more robust meaning of “social charity,” which is first proposed by Pius XI as

inseparable and necessary for social justice. Secondly, there is an increasing recognition that

social charity can function as a legitimate social virtue, and while being rooted in the Gospel, it

can nevertheless function without strict recourse to a Christian framework. This argument is

developed by identifying it with moral virtues such as solidarity, fraternity, forgiveness, and

responsibility. Thus, social charity comes to be a principle that does not require full acceptance

of the Gospel in order to function socially, and which is necessary for true social justice.

We have seen that while there has been a long tradition of emphasis on the virtue of

justice in the Catholic tradition, modern Catholic social doctrine, while not decreasing the

importance of social justice, has increasingly sought to place a central emphasis on social

charity. Yet, apart from recent identifications with other virtues in the past two decades, the

concept of “social charity” itself has remained surprisingly underdeveloped. While Pius XI

argues strongly for the inseparability of social justice and social charity, he does not provide an

unambiguous and concise definition of it. Following Quadragesimo Anno, the term does not re-

appear in the tradition for nearly forty years. Given an increasingly central emphasis on social

charity, accompanied by this surprising lack of development of it by the tradition, it would be

helpful to inquire into the Catholic theological tradition to seek a more comprehensive

understanding of how charity might function as a political and social virtue.


St. Thomas Aquinas on Social Charity

Saint Thomas Aquinas is the most commonly cited authority in the Catholic social

tradition, after references to Scripture and prior papal encyclicals. It is important therefore to

turn to his thought, specifically to his last major work, the Summa theologiae, regarding the

virtue of charity and justice, and their related parts, in order to gain an insight into how charity

can function as a social and political virtue, as the Catholic social tradition insists. In particular,

it is necessary to examine friendliness and friendship and their relationship to justice and charity

in order to understand how social charity sustains social justice. Prior to a particular examination

of these virtues, however, it is important to place justice and charity in their proper contexts.

Aquinas’ treatments of justice and charity in his Summa theologiae are found in the

secunda secundae pars, where he first treats of the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity,

and their related gifts, prior to turning to a discussion of the cardinal virtues, and their related

parts. A primary distinction between charity and justice is therefore evident. Charity is treated

within a specifically theological framework, and is identified, along with faith and hope, as an

infused theological virtue as a result of grace.29

Justice, on the other hand, falls within the

treatment of the cardinal virtues along with prudence, temperance, and fortitude. However, a

general examination of these four cardinal virtues reveals a theological framework, and none of

the cardinal virtues are treated completely apart from or without reference to theology.

At the end of each of Aquinas’ treatments of the cardinal virtues, he discusses the given

virtue in relation to the Law and Gospel. Thus, toward the end of his treatment of prudence,

Aquinas argues, “All the precepts of the Decalogue are related to prudence, insofar as it directs

all virtuous acts,”30

and since the Gospel is the doctrine of perfection, it “behooved the Gospel

teaching to also contain precepts of prudence.”31

Similarly, since “men while tending to spiritual

goods may be withdrawn from them by corporal dangers, precepts of fortitude had to be given

29

See St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I-II.62.1, corpus. 30

Summa theologiae, II-II.56.1, corpus. 31

Ibid, II-II.56.1, ad.2.


even in the New Law that they might bravely endure temporal evils.”32

These precepts of

fortitude are needed, since the “end of the Divine Law is that man might adhere to God.”33

Although this is the “end of the Divine Law,” adherence to God does not begin after one’s death,

but is practiced temporally through “love of God and neighbor.”34

Thus, the Decalogue contains

the precepts of the dual love commandment, including a prohibition of “vices opposed to

temperance,”35

for these vices are contrary to charity. While temperance is a virtue in itself, “as

regards a certain moderation of things pertaining to man himself,” its effects may regard the

“love of God and our neighbor.”36

It is clear that each of the cardinal virtues, for Aquinas, while

being a human virtue, is also placed within a theological framework as a result of his attempt to

synthesize the insights of ancient philosophy with revelation, and specifically the Decalogue.

In a manner similar to the treatment of the other three cardinal virtues, Aquinas also ends

his discussion of justice with theological references, which will create an opening for a

discussion of the relation between charity and justice. In a treatment of the precepts of justice

(II-II.122.1), Aquinas argues, “the precepts of the Decalogue pertain to charity as their end,

according to 1 Tim 1:5, ‘the end of the commandments is charity’: but they belong to justice,

inasmuch as they refer immediately to acts of justice.”37

Thus, while the precepts of the

Decalogue pertain to the acts of justice, their end is charity. In other words, for one who follows

the first specifications of the natural law,38

one acts in accordance with their end, which is the

love of God and love of neighbor. Aquinas again emphasizes, “The precepts of the Decalogue

32

Ibid, II-II.140.1, ad.1. 33

Ibid, II-II.140.1, corpus. 34

Ibid, II-II.170.1-2. 35



Ibid, II-II.122.1, ad.4. 38 Aquinas has established already, previously in the Summa, that the Decalogue contains the most basic rational

specifications of the first precept of practical reason, to do good and avoid evil. See I-II.100,1, co.: “These moral precepts, distinct from the ceremonial and judicial precepts, are about things pertaining of their very nature to good morals. Now since human morals depend on their relation to reason, which is the proper principle of human acts, those morals are called good which accord with reason, and those are called bad which are discordant from reason. .. For there are certain things which the natural reason of every man, of its own accord and at once, judges to be done or not to be done: e.g. “Honor thy father and thy mother,” and “Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal”: and these belong to the law of nature absolutely.”


are directed to the love of God and of our neighbor.”39

It becomes clear, therefore, that even

structural analysis of the trajectory of Aquinas’ discussion of each cardinal virtue suggests that

he seeks to direct one’s attention to the relationship between these virtues and the insights of

revelation. If the end of justice is the love of God and neighbor, then what virtues will need to be

associated with justice, the principal virtue, in order to bring such love about? Are these kinds of

virtues only able to exist in a Christian society, which explicitly accepts and seeks to build the

social order upon the insights of Christian revelation?

A critical component of understanding the relation between social justice and social

charity, I would argue, lies within Aquinas’ discussion of affabilitas, at the end of the “treatise

on justice” (II-II.114). Within this treatment, Aquinas is discussing a human virtue, but at the

same time, exhibits a “theological shift.” First, a textual analysis of this question reveals that the

majority of Aquinas’ objections to “affability” as a special virtue attached to justice are taken

from philosophical sources, particularly Macrobius and Aristotle. His responses, however, are

overwhelmingly scriptural, with references to the Psalms, Ecclesiastes, Romans and 2nd

Corinthians. Certainly, the textual citations themselves do not prove any specific “theological

shift,” since Aquinas as a scriptural theologian uses scripture throughout the Summa for both his

objections and his responses. However, a close analysis of Aquinas’ argument demonstrates his

conscious parting of ways with philosophical sources in the treatment of this question.

Prior to turning to a discussion of affability itself, it is necessary to place it within the

context of the Summa. Earlier in the treatise on justice (II-II.80.1), Aquinas begins his

discussion of the “potential parts of justice,” and he enumerates nine virtues that belong to this

category.40

These are virtues that “have something in common with the principal virtue [justice]”

but which by themselves “fall short of the perfection of that virtue.”41

They can fall short either

with respect to equality, as religion, for example, renders to God what is due, but can never fully

39


II-II.80.1, corpus. He lists religion, piety, observance, truth, gratitude, revenge, liberality, affability, and epikeia. 41

Ibid, II-II.80.1. co.


render to a superior nature that which is inferior.42

The virtues annexed to justice can also fall

short of the perfection of justice through not rendering the just due. The “just due” is either the

legal due, which is “that which one is bound to render by reason of legal obligation; and this is

chiefly the concern of justice, the principle virtue.”43

The “moral due,” however, is that which

one is obliged to observe on account of the rectitude of the principal virtue. Aquinas proposes

affability as one virtue that falls into this category. Here, he parts ways with Cicero, who had

omitted affability because there is “little of the nature of anything due” in it. Aquinas, however,

will strongly insist on affability as that part of justice by which one is enabled to render a moral

due.

In beginning his treatment of affability itself, Aquinas recalls that any virtue is ordered to

the good, which consists in order, and that the maintenance of order in just relations requires that

members of a society “behave towards one another in a becoming manner.”44

Affability, or

friendliness, is not the same as friendship, and Aquinas is quick to distinguish that one is not

required to develop an affection or “special friendship” with all members of society, but that

friendliness consists in “outward words or deeds” that would express a “becoming manner”

toward those with whom one is in contact.45

Affability is rather the special virtue that

maintains the becomingness of order, and Aquinas quotes Psalm 132:1, “Behold, how good and

pleasant it is, for brethren to dwell together.” It therefore becomes immediately apparent that

affability is necessary, according to Aquinas, to strengthen social relations by bringing about

unity through rendering the “moral duty” required for the greater rectitude of justice.

Yet, how can affability be due to another? The virtue is based on a “certain general love”

which is shown even to those who “are strangers or unknown to us.”46 While justice directs one

to another person, or to the society as a whole, it can be lacking in its fullest sense if it is simply

42

Ibid. 43

Ibid. 44

Ibid, II-II.114.1. co. 45

Ibid, II-II.114.1 ad.1. 46

Ibid, II-II.114.1.ad2.


based on a legal due or a debt arising out of a favor received.47

Such manifestations render the

legal due or legal obligation, but are incapable by themselves of bringing about the social unity

which Aquinas believes to be essential for the perfection of justice. In replying to the objection

that friendship is not a virtue, since it simply pertains to behaving agreeably toward others, and

therefore does not pertain to any kind of equity or debt, Aquinas associates the agreeable

behavior with a particular debt. Affability is based on a “debt of equity,” [debitum honestatis]

namely, that “we behave pleasantly to those among whom we dwell…because man is a social

animal he owes to his fellow man, in equity, the manifestation of truth without which human

society could not last.”48

At this point, it is clear that Aquinas is not only proposing what virtues are necessary for

a society to simply exist justly, but is seeking to describe the kind of virtues necessary for a

society to flourish in the rectitude or perfection of justice. Certainly, strict justice can maintain

and uphold the legal obligations and duties between members of a society, but in order for this

society to be characterized by “brethren dwelling together,” it needs the virtue of affability,

which imposes itself as a moral duty. Thus, a “natural equity” obliges a person to live agreeably

with others, and one could not “live in a society without truth” and “without joy, because…no

one could abide a day with the sad nor the joyless.”49

At this point, it is clear that Aquinas has

proposed affability as a special part of justice which is needed to ensure the full flourishing of a

just society, and which can be pursued without an explicitly Christian framework. However, his

citations of scriptural authority, his references to the “moral due,” and his introduction of joy into

this argument reveals a close relationship between the perfection of the virtue of justice and the

virtue of charity. It will become clear that underlying his argument about affability is a

suggestion that, while one does not need a Christian framework for the excise of affability, such

a framework is conducive to the flourishing of justice which he proposes here.

47

Ibid, II-II.114.2 co. 48

II-II.114.2, co, ad.1. 49

Ibid, 114.2,ad.1.


Within the treatment of affability, Aquinas makes reference to charity twice, as well as to

joy, which he has shown to be a fruit of charity.50

As we have seen, he argues for affability as a

natural friendship based on a “certain natural love” among those who co-exist in a society. As

such, affability “has not the perfect nature of friendship, but bears a certain likeness thereto.”51

Thus, Aquinas’ argument itself necessitates a discussion of charity, as he distinguishes between

affability and the friendship of charity. In the beginning of the treatise on charity (II-II.23.1),

Aquinas proposes charity as “the friendship of man for God” which is based on a “certain mutual

love” and “communication” between the two parties.52

Friendship is that “love which is together

with benevolence when…we love someone so as to wish good to him.”53

If one has friendship

for another, one’s friendship extends to someone in respect of another; thus, when one has

friendship “for a certain person, for his sake he loves all belonging to him.”54

Since Aquinas

identifies charity as a theological virtue, and therefore as being infused into the soul with

habitual grace,55

it is a “form superadded to the natural power, inclining it to the act of love,”

which causes that power to “act with ease and pleasure.”56

Applied socially, therefore, charity

allows the one possessing the virtue to act with ease and pleasure toward others, and to see

“loving one’s neighbor” as a participation in divine charity.57

Having therefore described charity as a superadded form that is infused into one’s soul,

and as the friendship of human beings for God, by which they love God and love others as a

participation in the divine love, Aquinas turns to an explicit discussion of the charity as a virtue.

He recalls that the nature of moral virtue is to act in accordance with right reason, and that its

nature consists an attaining God; therefore, charity is a virtue, since it is precisely the virtue that

50

ST, II-II.25. 51

Ibid, II-II.114.ad.2. 52

Ibid, II-II.23.1. 53

Ibid. 54

Ibid, II-II.23.1, ad.2. 55

See ST, I-II.62. 56

Ibid, II-II.23.2, co. 57



“unites us to God,” and which is founded on the “goodness of God.”58

In this discussion,

Aquinas argues that, whereas “justice is about works to be done in respect of another person,

under the aspect of the legal due…friendship considers the aspect of a friendly and moral duty,

or rather that of gratuitous favor.”59

Thus, Aquinas employs the same language (of a moral due)

in his discussion of charity, which was employed in a discussion of affability. Just as affability

concerned the moral due out of desire for unity, joy, and truth, so also the friendship of charity

concerns the moral due, and can even give rise to the notion of gratuitousness.

We have seen that affability is needed for the greater rectitude of justice. In the treatise

on charity, Aquinas suggests that the friendship of charity, by which one loves fellow men by

extension out of love for God, concerns the same moral duty necessary for good social relations.

He continues by examining the relationship between charity and friendship. He follows Aristotle

in distinguishing between friendships based on their end: utility, delight, and virtue. Secondly,

he distinguishes between friendships based on their kinds of communion. There is the

communion of kinsmen, the communion of fellow travelers or fellow citizens, and the

communion of everlasting happiness.60

While charity, strictly speaking, concerns the

“fellowship of everlasting happiness” with God, it is important to note that Aquinas recognizes a

certain “natural communion” of fellow citizens. As has been seen, such a natural communion is

sustained by the natural virtues, such as justice, perfected by affability, which is based on the

“natural love” of fellow “social animals” dwelling together.

This natural communion, though sustained by the natural virtues, is also sustained by

charity. Drawing upon the argument he has already developed at the beginning of the secunda

pars,61

Aquinas distinguishes between man’s ultimate and principal or universal good, and the

proximate and particular good. A “simply true virtue” is that which is directed to man’s

principal good, which is the enjoyment of God. In this sense, there “can be no true virtue

58

See II-II.23.3, co; 23.7, co. 59

Ibid, II-II.23.3, ad.1. 60


See the “treatise on happiness,” I-II.1-5.


without charity.”62

However, one can speak of a true virtue if it is ordered to a good proximate

end.63

Thus, if the good in question be a particular good such as the “welfare of the state, or the

like, it will indeed be a true virtue, imperfect, however, unless it be ordered to the final and

perfect good.”64

The following diagram classifies Aquinas’ distinctions:

GOOD Virtue Category of Virtue END

Principal and

Universal

Charity Simply true GOD

Proximate and

Particular

Apparent Good “Justice” Counterfeit Ie: Miserliness

True Good (Strict) Justice Imperfect true I.e.: Welfare of State

True Good Justice informed by

Charity

Perfect true I.e.: Welfare of State,

referred to final and

perfect good

From these careful distinctions, it is therefore clear that perfect and true natural virtue cannot

exist without charity. It is important to keep in mind, however, that Aquinas does not dismiss

natural virtue lacking charity as a counterfeit virtue or a splendid vice. One might argue,

however, that there is lacking a “superadded form” to the natural virtue. For this reason, “there

can be no strictly true justice…without that due ordering to the end, which is rightly effected by

charity, however rightly a man might be affected about other matters.”65

Indeed, charity is the

root and foundation of all the other virtues “in so far as the other virtues draw their sustenance

and nourishment therefrom.”66

Having shown that charity is related to justice as its form, and as the source of

nourishment for its proper ordering, it is necessary to turn to joy as an effect of charity. In the

treatise on justice, in our examination of affability, we have seen that affability is needed “since

62

Ibid, II-II.23.7.co. 63

A virtue ordered to a false proximate end is a counterfeit virtue. See II-II.23.7.co. 64

Ibid, II-II.23.7.co. 65

Ibid, II-II.23.7, ad.2. 66



man could not live in a society…without joy.”67

Although the reference here is subtle, Aquinas

is again relating charity with justice, just as we have seen in our examination of the importance

of the friendship of charity and its similarity to affability in rendering of the moral due and

greater rectitude of justice. Aquinas identifies joy, together with peace and mercy, as an effect of

the principal act of charity, which is love.68

Aquinas attributes the primary meaning of joy to

refer to “the spiritual joy, which is about God,” and is caused by our participation in Him.69

However, he suggests that joy can also have a “political” dimension. In treating of whether

“spiritual joy can have an admixture of sorrow” (II-II.28.2), he first responds that the joy by

which “we rejoice in the divine good considered in itself is incompatible with an admixture of

sorrow.” However, the joy of charity by which we rejoice in the divine good as participated by

us “can be hindered by anything contrary to it.” Thus, the joy of charity admits of sorrow insofar

as it considers and grieves over that which hinders the participation of the divine good “in us or

in our neighbor, whom we love as ourselves.”70

This careful distinction also appears in Aquinas’ discussion of affability within the

treatise on justice. While charity effects joy, which is perfect in considering its object, this joy

nevertheless remains imperfect if it encounters that which is contrary to charity, in oneself, in

society, or on account of some suffering that requires alleviation. In treating of affability,

Aquinas cites Romans and Ecclesiastes, “If, because of thy meat, thy brother is grieved, thou

walkest not according to charity…Be not wanting in comforting them that weep, and walk with

them that mourn.”71

Here, he explicitly shows a direct relationship between charity and the role

of friendliness in society. Furthermore, he argues that at times, friendliness requires that one

cause sorrow to some in order to avoid some evil. Joy is lacking where charity is imperfect, and

charity is imperfect where there is a lack of participation in the divine good. Friendliness (a part

of justice), requires that one encourage participation in the divine good. Thus, “we should not

67

Ibid, II-II.114.2, ad.1. 68

See II-II.28 (Joy), 29 (Peace), 30 (Mercy). 69


Ibid. 71

II-II.114.1,ad.3.


show a cheerful face to those who are given to sin, in order that we may please them, lest we

seem to consent to their sin, and in a way encourage them to sin further.”72

It is clear, therefore, that an analysis of charity and joy accounts for what one might

initially find to be a surprising statement in the analysis of affability as a part of justice:

Affability consists in “signs of friendship” in “outward words or deeds” that are to be shown to

even those who are strangers or those who are unknown; yet, those who sin are to be caused grief

and be brought sorrow, and are not to be shown outwards signs of civic friendliness. These two

attitudes, the demonstration of affability and the causing of sorrow, which would initially seem

contradictory, are consistent with one another when seen in light of the bonds of friendship

established by charity and manifested in joy, and in light of the bonds of civic communion

sustained by affability. Where the evildoer does wrong, charity is lacking, and therefore joy is

imperfect, and the bonds of civic communion are broken. Without this civic communion based

on affability, “the pleasures of fellowship” are diminished.73

Conclusion

It is clear from this discussion that Aquinas intricately and closely relates social justice

with charity. What further emerges from his discussion are the political ramifications of charity.

While charity is a theological virtue, infused with grace, and ordered to the attainment of eternal

participation in the divine good, it functions derivatively in a political or social manner. By

identifying charity with friendship, Aquinas establishes many similarities with and relationships

between justice and charity, and shows therefore how charity can, in a sense, take on a social

dimension. First, charity is not an individual moral feeling of altruism, nor does it only extend to

certain most vulnerable members of a society. Rather, it extends to all members of a society and,

on an interpersonal level, establishes friendships between members of a society. These common

bonds of friendship contribute to the creation of the social unity required for the full flourishing

of the just order and of the common good. Secondly, charity is thus related closely to the

72

Ibid. 73

II-II.114.2,ad.3.


perfection of justice, which cannot consider solely the legal obligation and due, but which must

take into account the moral due. This moral due is partly made manifest in friendliness, which

sustains truth and joy among individual members of a society. Affability, as a part of justice,

however, remains imperfect if it is not ordered by charity, which can even transform a moral due

into gratuitousness. Although perfect justice cannot be had in the temporal sphere,

gratuitousness begins to function when social charity, identified as friendship, and social justice,

as sustained by affability, can lead members of society to “share their honest pleasures” with

those “among whom they dwell.”74

Such an account is not limited to a Christian state; indeed,

affability is based entirely on a discussion of justice without much reference to revelation, and

justice can function truly, albeit imperfectly, without reference to the universal and principal end.

However, our discussion has shown how a Christian framework, through the virtue of charity,

sustains and nourishes social justice, by founding it upon social charity.

Our analysis of the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas suggests that he would agree with

Benedict XVI in assessing that “without gratuitousness, there can be no justice in the first

place.”75

The thought of Aquinas is therefore indispensable to understanding the trajectory of

Catholic social doctrine, especially in identifying more accurately and clearly the relationship

between social justice and social charity. Aquinas’ identification of charity with friendship

allows him to extend this seemingly private and individual virtue to the social plane, and invites

one to consider whether social justice can be truly perfected, sustained, or realized without

reference to social charity. For this reason, the thought of Aquinas lends both valuable insights

into Pius XI’s proposition that “social charity” ought to be the “soul” of the socially just order,

and can also encourage further reflection on the role of social charity in relation to social justice

within the Catholic social tradition, especially in light of recent developments which place

greater emphasis on the importance of the ethics of social charity and gratuitousness.

74

Ibid, II-II.114.1, ad.3. 75

Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, 38.

Social Charity and the Just Social Order: Catholic Social Doctrine and Aquinas on Friendship

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