Slavic Review 72, no. 3 (Fall 2013)

In Search of the Fourth Rome: Visions of a New Russian Capital City

Vadim Rossman

Although the emerging public debate about the need to relocate Russia’s capi-tal city has intensifi ed in recent years, it has received only scant attention among students of Russian society and urbanism. This debate is critically im-portant for our understanding of current Russian political life, the climate of opinion in the country, and the many geographic, political, and ideological aspects of Russian self-identifi cation.

Ambiguities surround the central themes of the debate. First, there is a tendency to frame the underlying issues in terms of both congestion and over-population of Moscow as well as hypercentralization in the country as a whole. Conceived in such a way, capital city relocation is seen as a technical-rational problem and a solution to Moscow’s current challenges, above all, its municipal, morphological, and infrastructural problems; hence, the central concerns of those who frame the debate in such terms are the administration and fi nancing of the proposed mega-engineering project, the role to be played by the country’s geography, and Russia’s urban hierarchy and its priorities.

It is also very common to see the capital city shift as the most effi cient and sophisticated instrument available to the state to resolve the country’s most pressing economic and geopolitical issues, despite being also the most expen-sive. Many commentators view the proposed relocation as a crucial step in the process of reconstructing and reconstituting the Russian empire, a means of preventing further disintegration of the country or of reinforcing the cur-rent political regime. The capital city serves as a hinge that is supposed to glue the country together and resolve its particular economic and political challenges.

Contrary to these common concepts and perceptions, I will off er a dif-ferent explanation of the debate. First, in the context of Russia’s current po-litical situation, the capital city relocation can acquire a political signifi cance similar to what has occurred in other countries that have transitioned from empire or colonized state to independent nation. In addition, I will provide a critique of the debate, exposing some of the problematic assumptions under-lying the arguments, revealing some of the blind spots, and pointing to some of the inadequacies and ineffi ciencies of keeping Moscow as a capital city.1

Fundamental to my analysis is the idea that the problem of capital city re-location in Russia cannot be properly understood only as a rational-technical problem, although both policy discussions and analysis are needed to justify this project and estimate its costs. Consistent with the experience of people in many other nations, Russians, more than twenty years since the collapse of the USSR, are still seeking a new self-identifi cation and feel an acute need to establish themselves as a modern political nation with a set of appropriate

1. More detailed analysis can be found in my book V poiskakh Chetvertogo Rima: Rossiiskie debaty o perenose stolitsy (Moscow, 2013).

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institutions, including a capital city. The national capital needs to represent not power as such but the nation as a whole, including all of its diverse re-gions; it needs to be inclusive in terms of both its social construction and accessibility and its iconography. Although only very few participants touch upon and recognize the nation-building dimensions of the problem, the self-identity concept looms large in the background of the debate. Russia’s future political leadership, which will eventually replace the current corrupt regime, might take some steps in the direction of establishing a new inclusive feder-alist capital city with its own iconography and symbolism, distancing itself from the pervasive imperial symbolism and hypercentralization of all criti-cal functions epitomized by Moscow. Understood in such a way, the capital city becomes, not just an instrument of the state, but rather a catalyst of na-tion building and an instrument of the nation as it constitutes and constructs itself.

To provide such an analysis, I shift the emphasis from the discussion of the diff erent cities that see themselves as candidates for this role and their geographies to the political programs animating these proposals. Aft er dis-cussing the background of the debate and the issues that originally motivated it, I examine the fi ve conceptual approaches to a new capital city and the fi ve strategies in which they are embedded. These are the concepts of an imperial capital, a forward thrust capital, a federalist capital in the west, a linear capi-tal, and a satellite administrative capital. Finally, I will critique the debate and outline some of the conditions under which one of these concepts can acquire political signifi cance and become a vehicle of important transforma-tions marking the transition from empire to nation.

Background

Most advocates of relocation focus on the defi ciencies of municipal services in Moscow, the patterns of metropolitan governance, and the overconcentration of power and resources in one city. The current intensifi cation of the debate can be attributed to two closely connected processes: many Moscovites’ dis-satisfaction with the congestion, municipal services, and infrastructure in Moscow and the grievances of the population in the rest of the country about overconcentration of political power and economic resources in the center. The specifi c issues that occupy their attention include statusnaia renta (Moscow’s ability to generate revenue from natural resources and other sources based solely on its status as the capital city), the unequal distribution of resources, and regional inequalities. In this section I will delineate and quantify some of the problems that oft en serve as reference points in the debate.

The post-Soviet decades have witnessed the unprecedented growth of the city of Moscow due to mass migration infl ows both from Russia and from many post-Soviet-states, primarily the Caucasus and Central Asian repub-lics. These processes put signifi cant pressure on the old Soviet infrastruc-ture and transportation network. By 2010 the population of this city that was originally designed for 5–7 million people, according to the original General Plan, had offi cially reached 12 million, a number that is considered grossly understated. The Ministry of Interior put an estimate of the real daytime av-erage Moscow population at around 20 million people, including migrants,

In Search of the Fourth Rome 507

guest workers, and daily visitors. All these new pressures compounded by corruption and an increasing bureaucracy have spawned painful congestion problems and an astronomical rise in the cost of living and housing prices that cannot be balanced even by Muscovites’ growing incomes, the improv-ing economy, and signifi cant oil and gas revenues. This growth in Moscow’s population is inversely related to the shrinking population of the country as a whole.

The medieval radial-concentric morphology of the city, reinforced in the Soviet period, has signifi cantly magnifi ed the existing issues. The overlap-ping location of the administrative, business, and historical functions in the center of Moscow, the defi cient infrastructure (lack of parking lots, roads and highways, recreation and green zones), the concentration of about two-thirds of all jobs in the historical center along with the growing fl eet of personal cars signifi cantly compound commuting and quality-of-life problems. Livability issues have been aggravated by the fact that Moscow has one of the lowest fractions of total urban area dedicated to roads and highways compared to most countries in Europe. The exponential growth of bureaucracy in the post-Soviet period is another contributing factor.

Some of these issues are refl ected in the international rankings of Rus-sia’s capital city provided by authoritative international and domestic agen-cies and survey companies. According to Mercer’s 2011 cost-of-living survey, Moscow was ranked as the most expensive city in Europe and the fourth most expensive in the world. The 2008 and 2010 Mercer Quality of Living Survey ranked Moscow a low number 166 out of 215 cities worldwide in terms of over-all quality of life.2

According to the IBM Global Commuter Pain Study released in 2010, the average reported delay in Moscow was 2.5 hours, the highest average among the twenty other global cities surveyed.3 Moscow was also consistently named one of the deadliest world metropolises in terms of environment, and one of the least friendly world cities. Moscow has taken 48th place out of 60 on attrac-tiveness to foreigners in a survey by Global Market Insite. The Russian Public Opinion Reseach Center (WCIOM) survey also named it the city least suitable for conducting small- and mid-size business due to high levels of bureaucracy, corruption, and high rents.4 It is only natural that these issues signifi cantly ex-acerbated Moscow’s social problems: extreme income polarization (refl ected in one of the highest city Gini coeffi cients in the world), high crime rates, lim-ited social mobility, the exodus of the middle class, and the like.5

2. Nikolaus von Twickel, “Miserable Moscow Ranks Low,” St. Petersburg Times 1381 (45), 12 June 2008.

3. “IBM Global Commuter Pain Study Reveals Traffi c Crisis in Key International Cit-ies,” Press Release, 30 June 2010, at www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/32017.wss (last accessed 31 May 2013).

4. “Bad Weather, Bad-Tempered People Scare Foreigners away from Moscow,” Kom-mersant, 30 January 2007; “What the Russian Papers Say,” RIA Novosti, 14 June 2007, at n.rian.ru/analysis/20070614/67235589.html (last accessed 31 May 2013); WCIOM Survey, “Gorod upuschennykh vozmozhnostei,” 21 April 2005, at wciom.ru/index.php?id=269&uid=1203 (last accessed 31 May 2013).

5. B. Nemtsov, Nezavisimyi ekspertnyi doklad “Luzhkov. Itogi” (Moscow, 2009); Bill Bowring, “Moscow: Third Rome, Model Communist City, Eurasian Antagonist—and Power

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Dissatisfaction with Moscow as the capital city was stimulated by the growing overcentralization of all government and economic functions, further restrictions on regional and local autonomy under the government of Vladi-mir Putin, and Moscow’s near total monopoly in all of the most vital spheres of life beyond politics and economics such as culture, science, defense, com-munications, land and air transportation, education, sports, and religion. The underdevelopment of regional transportation networks and the histori-cal prevalence of vertical over horizontal ties turned Moscow into the major logistics and transportation hub. According to some estimates, two-thirds of all domestic air traffi c currently goes through Moscow. Offi cial estimates put the city’s population density close to 12,000 people per kilometer compared to 3,000–4,000 in most European capitals. Since the early 1990s Moscow’s gross regional product GRP has been steadily growing relative to the national gross domestic product; in 2010 it was close to 23 percent of Russia’s total. Accord-ingly, by 2004, the workforce in Moscow had increased from 5 percent of the total Russian fi gure to 9 percent.

Half the banks registered in Russia are in Moscow, and they control about 85 percent of the total capital of the country. Moscow headquarters 37 of the 50 largest corporations (74 percent) plus the top management of an additional 8; it attracts over 50 percent of all foreign investment. In addition Moscow houses 22 percent of all scientifi c organizations and at least 25 percent of all Rus-sian theaters (154 out of 541); 80 percent of all national publishing houses and 80 percent of all national journals and magazines are published in Moscow.6 According to some estimates, 60 percent of the entire country’s research and scientifi c potential is located within the capital city. It is the place of work of the most infl uential people, including 30 percent of scientists and 80 percent of billionaires (71 out of 101).7 In addition, Moscow is the place of residence of the Orthodox Patriarchy, all federal ministries and agencies, the Academy of Sciences, the General Staff , the administration of the Moscow Region, and, until recently, even the headquarters of the Russian Navy.

In contrast to many other countries, most regions in Russia do not have any strong political identity; thus, the main political cleavages are much more infl uenced by the center-periphery division than any kinds of regional divides determined by their specifi c loyalties, economic interests, or political com-mitments. The low level of interregional mobility and the limited access to the capital due to high domestic airfare and transportation costs, oft en con-trolled by regional monopolies, also challenge the legitimacy of Moscow as a capital.8

The perception of conspicuous consumption in the capital and the sta-

as No-Power?” London Metropolitan University Human Rights and Social Justice Research Institute, Polis, 2005/2006.

6. M. Shvydkoi, “Rukopisi v virtual΄nom mire,” Rossiiskaia gazeta, 13 October 2010.7. V. Rossman, “Perenos stolitsy: Skhema analiza,” Predstavitel΄naia vlast : Zhurnal

gosudarstvennoi Dumi (March 2010).8. Many people living in Siberia have never been to their capital city and cannot af-

ford to go there; during the recent population census many of them referred to this fact to explain their choice of identity as Siberians rather than Russians. V. Antipin, “Grazhda-nin Sibiri,” Russkii reporter, 22 February 2011.

In Search of the Fourth Rome 509

tusnaia renta have given rise to extremely negative national perceptions of Moscow as a parasitic city. Moscow’s increasing isolation from the national urban system, its growing international orientation, and regional disparities have contributed to the construction of an image of the capital as a country within a country. All the above-mentioned grievances were oft en transmuted into politics with explicit anti-Muscovite resonance. According to WCIOM na-tional public opinion polls, 75 percent of the citizens dislike Muscovites, and in 2009, 82–85 percent of respondents believe that Moscow lives at the ex-pense of the regions.9

This situation invites diff erent responses. Moscow offi cials have argued that rankings of the city are unfair, while acknowledging that Moscow might need to work harder on its international public image, but many members of the expert community have proposed increasing economic development and autonomy throughout the rest of the country. Some minority groups have suggested a capital city relocation option, referring to the experience of other countries, primarily Brazil and Kazakhstan. In the late 1990s, however, these ideas were most oft en considered extravagant and unrealistic.

In recent years, though, the appeal of relocation has signifi cantly inten-sifi ed. The drastic change in public sentiment relative to the capital transfer option is well illustrated by comparing the survey of important celebrities and public intellectuals that Kommersant vlast΄ conducted in 1999 with a similar survey in the same format conducted by the popular magazine Itogi in 2011.10 In both cases the public fi gures surveyed included prominent politicians, movie actors, writers, and the like; several people interviewed by Itogi were the same as those consulted for the Kommersant vlast΄ survey. Back in 1999 most of the celebrities surveyed found the idea of relocation outlandish and extravagant and attributed the emergence of this issue to the young age of Bo-ris Nemtsov whose proposal provoked the debate. The vice-mayor of Moscow, Vladimir Resin, called the idea “insane,” while the governor of St. Petersburg, Valentina Matvienko (currently the Speaker of the Russian Duma), called the debate itself “extremely detrimental.” By 2011 the focus of the discussion had already shift ed from the relevance and legitimacy of the topic itself to the most auspicious location for the new capital city; by then the opponents of capital city migration in the survey constituted a small minority group.

The proponents of relocation can be divided into fi ve distinct groups on the basis of the diversity of their arguments and their respective political agendas. In some cases it is diffi cult to draw a line between diff erent groups as their arguments oft en converge and overlap, but the distinction is still use-ful if only for epistemological purposes.

The historical and intellectual background of this debate, including the intriguing history and logic of capital city relocations in Russian history, the most prominent of which was the transfer of the capital to St. Peterburg and then back again, goes beyond the scope of the current analysis. This topic also

9. “Moskvichei v Rossii nenavidiat uzhe dve treti sograzhdan,” Newsland, 18 Febru-ary 2009.

10. “Kuda by stolitsu perenesti?” Kommersant vlast , no. 17 (4 May 1999); “Chetvertii Rim,” Itogi, no. 1 (10 January 2011).

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involves several unrealized proposals and intellectual refl ections found in the works of Nikita Muravev, Konstantin Leont ev, Fedor Tiutchev, Petr Semenov-Tianshanskii, Dmitrii Mendeleev, Nikolai Fedorov, and Petr Struve, among others, and merits a special dedicated study.

A New Imperial Capital

The most common idea about the future capital city involves a reorientation of Russian politics through the migration to the east. This idea is oft en grounded in the ideology of the Eurasian movement that was revived in post-Soviet Rus-sia. The ideologists of Eurasianism believe that Russia’s future lies in the east and in opposition to Europe and the west in general. They insist that Russia has better political and economic prospects to the east of the European part of Russia, where it will be surrounded by more congenial neighbors and civiliza-tions. Their visions of Eurasian politicians and intellectuals refl ect the per-spectives and methods of the newly fashionable focus on geopolitics and are concentrated on empire-building goals as well as security considerations.

Aleksandr Dugin is the leader and the main ideologist of the neo-Eurasian movement. In his article “Tret΄ia stolitsa Evrazii” (The Third Capital City), he proposed Kazan, the current capital of Tatarstan, as a new capital city of Rus-sia. Dugin describes Kazan as an emblematic Eurasian capital, emphasiz-ing its role in strengthening the alliance between Slavic and Turkic peoples. Dugin views the shift of the capital as a means of reinforcing the close historic ties the Russian people have with Turkic and Muslim peoples, as an antidote against Tatar nationalism, and as a move to demonstrate the antiwestern ori-entation of new Russian politics.11 Oleg Morozov, the vice-speaker of the Rus-sian Duma, also supported the candidacy of Kazan. Remarkably, this idea was immediately rebuked and dismissed by the Tatar political leadership as an attempt to interfere in Tatar aff airs.

Dugin’s fellow travelers from the political movement Young Eurasia sug-gested a diff erent symbolic place for a new Russian capital. The fi rst candidate for this role, proposed by Pavel Zarifullin, the founder of this movement, is the newly discovered megalithic city of Arkaim, located in the southern Urals close to Cheliabinsk.12 Pavel Zarifullin calls it “the sacred and spiritual energy center of the world.” His colleague from the same movement, the artist Aleksei Gintovt, suggests that the transformation of this old city into a new and idyllic capital, “all made out of wood,” should involve the construction of wooden skyscrapers in the suburbs, the Kremlin in the center, and folk Russian towers

11. A. Dugin, “Tret΄ia stolitsa Evrazii,” in N. Kirabaev, A. Semushkin, and S. Nizh-nikov, eds., Evraziiskaia ideia i sovremennost΄ (Moscow, 2002), 228–44.

12. Since its discovery, Arkaim has attracted signifi cant public and media attention. It is said to be the most enigmatic archaeological site within the territory of Russia, and, as with many archaeological discoveries, many confl icting interpretations have emerged. In order to gain publicity, the early investigators described Arkaim as “Swastika City,” “Man-dala City,” and the ancient capital of early Aryan civilization, as described in the Avesta and Vedas. For more details on the myth of Arkaim in Russian nationalist ideology, see V. Shnirelman, “Strasti po Arkaimu: Ariiskaia ideia i natsionalizm,” in M. B. Olkott [Ol-cott] and Il΄ia Semenov, eds., Iazyk i etnicheskii konfl ikt (Moscow, 2001), 58–85.

In Search of the Fourth Rome 511

on the sides.”13 In an unexpected turn, Zarifullin also remarks that the estab-lishment of a new capital will involve the incorporation of Kazakhstan into the territory of Russia due to Arkaim’s proximity to the Kazakh border.

Vadim Tsymburskii, the late theoretician of geopolitics, developed a more sophisticated theory that addresses Russia’s new status and its geopolitical position. According to him, aft er the collapse of the USSR, Russia found itself surrounded by limitroph states (a pejorative term for most of the former Soviet states) and ethnic groups and was transformed into a virtual island. Tsym-burskii describes limitroph states as “geopolitically unstable spaces between civilizational platforms.”14 This new geographic profi le calls for an alternative geopolitical strategy and the establishment of a new capital city. In his article “Zaural skii Peterburg: Al ternativa dlia rossiiskoi tsivilizatsii” (Petersburg Beyond the Urals: An Alternative for Russian Civilization), published in 1995, he described this new vision and his rationale in greater detail.

Any sound geopolitics, Tsymburskii claims, should take into account Rus-sia’s three distinct geographic zones and the need to integrate them into a single whole with a new center. These are Euro-Russia (the European part of Russia that is most densely populated), the Ural-Siberian region, and the Far East. Based on this assumption, Siberia is the central and most critical of these parts as it provides all the natural resources and is uniquely qualifi ed to consolidate these three, otherwise dispersed, geographic regions. The choice of Siberia is determined by its potential to prevent separatist tendencies and to secure the country’s economic base. Hence, Tsymburskii claims, contrary to popular belief, the core area of the country is southern Siberia, not the European part of Russia. This territory is critical as it provides Russia with ac-cess to the ocean and to the Far East, with the communication infrastructure through the transportation networks of Transsib, and with alternative routes to Asia. The vulnerability of the Volga region, which borders on the Turkic autonomous regions and the Central Asian republics, also underscores the special geopolitical importance of south Siberia. This critical but vulnerable area, he argues, should be strengthened by the establishment of the capital city in this region. Moscow, by contrast, has lost its legitimacy as the national capital in the eyes of most Russians, for it simply serves as a gateway to the whole of Eurasia for transnational corporations and governments.

The real goal of all recent capital city relocations, according to Tsymbur-skii, is the integration of the peripheral, oft en neglected, parts of the coun-tries: for example, the forests of Brazil; north Kazakhstan, where the infl u-ence of ethnic Russians was predominant; eastern Germany; and Asia Minor in the case of Turkey.

In contrast to these international precedents, the debate about relocating Russia’s capital city is currently controlled by special interest groups and spe-cifi c regional elites who are trying to redistribute national resources in favor of their own regions and political cliques. By contrast, Tsimburskii sees this

13. Both cited in “Ekspert: V sluchae perenosa stolitsy Rossii Kazakhstan pridetsia prisoedinit ,” Rosbalt, 26 February 2009.

14. V. Tsymburskii, “Zaural skii Peterburg: Al ternativa dlia rossiiskoi tsivilizatsii,” Biznes i politika, 1995, no. 1: 57.

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shift as a means “to undo the damage of the liberal reforms,” that is, as an ele-ment of counterreform that will take the geopolitical considerations outlined in his books as a starting point. Capital city shift , he envisions, will come about as a natural result of disappointment in liberal reforms and the turn to the East, supported by the united regional elites’ opposition to the liberal dictates of Moscow.

In contrast to most other members of this group, Vladimir Iurovitskii, a prolifi c writer on the topic, proposes moving the capital to the Far East. But the antiwestern sentiments that animate his arguments bring him very close to the Eurasian ideologists described above. He bemoans the loss of full-fl edged access to the Black and Baltic Seas as a result of the collapse of the USSR.15 Establishing a new capital city in the Far East in the area of the Sea of Okhotsk will mimic Peter the Great’s relocating the capital to St. Petersburg, in Iurovit-skii’s view; it will help Russia to simultaneously marginalize Europe, ostra-cize and punish the Baltic republics that discriminate against ethnic Russians and export Russian natural resources through their territories, and help to establish a political base and a Russian national identity in the Pacifi c region. This new Pacifi c identity will help integrate Russia into the most dynamic economic zone in the world. Iurovitskii suggests naming the new capital city “Vladimirograd,” “to honor all the Vladimirs who have contributed to the grandeur of Russia,” perhaps also to add a personal note in his appeal to the current leadership.16

The idea of national unity around a new capital city that is opposed to the west also struck a chord with the leadership of two conspicuous opposition parties, Other Russia and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR). The leaders of both parties opt for incorporated capitals, as their proposed capitals refl ect their irredentist claims for northern Kazakhstan, which is populated by ethic Russians. Eduard Limonov, a controversial writer and the eccentric leader of Other Russia, has propsed Omsk as the new capital. In an article in 2008, Limonov articulated the political mobilization aspects of this project and called the relocation of Russia’s capital a new national idea that Russia desparately needs, stressing south Siberia’s critical importance. He sees the capital relocation as a response to the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the west and the threat of China in the south. By moving the capital to the east, Russia will “turn its back on Europe,” thus showing its new identity and political orientation.17

Vladimir Zhirinovskii, the notorious leader of LDPR, supports shift ing the capital city to Orenburg in the Urals region.18 In both cases the choice of loca-tion was motivated by the idea of incorporating northern Kazakhstan. Both

15. V. Tret΄iakov, “Nuzhno li, a esli nuzhno, to kuda perenosit΄ stolitsu Rossii?” Chto delat΄? on the TV channel Kultura), 24 June 2007. The guests on the program included Maksim Dianov, Dmitrii Andreev, Iurii Krupnov, Vladimir Iurovitskii, and Mikhail De-liagin. V. Iurovitskii, Rossii nuzhna novaia stolitsa (Moscow, 2005).

16. Iurovitskii, Rossii nuzhna novaia stolitsa, 67.17. S. Korableva, “Eduard Limonov: ‘Rossii nuzhen novyi natsproekt—perenos stolitsy

strany v Omsk,’” Novyi region, 21 January 2008.18. “Zhirinovskii: Sdelaem iz Orenburga Washington,” Novyi region, 28 September

2010, at www.nr2.ru/moskow/302349.html (last accessed 31 May 2013).

In Search of the Fourth Rome 513

Limonov and Zhirinovskii are known for their irredentist sentiments toward northern Kazakhstan. In 2005, Kazakhstan declared Zhirinovskii persona non grata on the territory of his historical homeland, due to his statements calling northern Kazakhstan the “south Russian steppes.” It is noteworthy that Orenburg used to be the capital of Kazakhstan in the 1920s. Apparently Limonov’s choice is linked to his earlier irredentist proposals to turn Altai into the base for the reconquest of northern Kazakhstan.

In a similar vein, Sergei Okara, a political analyst and prolifi c essayist, proposed Kiev as the new capital. He argued that in the contemporary world only empires can have real political weight. The reintegration of the two coun-tries, freed from past Russian domination and an unequal relationship, can be solidifi ed by the transfer of the Russian capital to Kiev.19 Kiev’s candidacy as a new Russian capital was also proposed by Evgenii Fedorov, a Duma dep-uty and the head of the Economic Policies and Entrepreneurship Committee.

Conceived in such a way, capital relocation is not only a solution that can solidify control over certain territories and ethnic groups, typical for many historic empires; it also provides a political statement about the country’s cul-tural identity and its allies and foes. Europe and the west in general are viewed as hostile civilizations; relocation aims to physically separate Russia from the west and its deleterious infl uences. The members of this group are primarily concerned to prevent the country’s further disintegration and to reintegrate or incorporate the sovereign states that are considered a part of Russia.

Forward-Thrust Capital in Siberia

Another conceptual view of capital relocation sees this project less as a ges-ture and a political statement than as a vehicle of economic development. The relocation proposals of members of this group are geared toward enhancing regional development, serving as a means of alleviating regional disparities, and reversing the processes of depopulation in the east via migrations to the west by pulling populations away from the dominant cities in the European part of the country. Some of these politicians and intellectuals can be seen as champions of the growth pole theory, although they never use such a term. They oft en emphasize the importance of the balanced development of the country and the critical role of new eastern growth poles in this process. Many of them envision this new capital as a forward-thrust capital and an economic engine that will spread its velocity and economic potential from the east to the rest of the country. They oft en disagree about the exact location of such a growth pole, however. The unfavorable climate in the eastern parts of the country is oft en cited as a side-benefi t of an eastern capital city as it would discourage career-seeking bureacrats from moving there.20

The more radical extension of this strategy involves Russia’s geoeconomic reorientation via its new capital city. The proponents of this strategy believe

19. “V poiskakh imperskoi perspektivy: Suzhdeno li Kievu stat tsentrom post- vizantiiskoi tsivilizatsii,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 25 October 2000.

20. V. Tretiakov, “Rossia: Poslednii pryzhok v budushchee,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 24 February 2000.

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that the country needs to make better use of its far eastern regions and en-hance its political and economic presence there. Iurii Krupnov, a leader of Dvizhenie razvitia (Movement for Development) affi liated with the Institute of Demography, Migration, and Regional Development and one of the most energetic proponents of shift ing the capital eastward, suggested that Russia needs to move its capital to Svobodnyi in the Far East, on the border with China. As he sees it, Russia can take greater advantage of the opportunities in the Asia-Pacifi c economic zone if it moves its capital and positions itself as a player in this most dynamic world market. He also stresses the role and potential of commercial links with Japan, South Korea, and the Asian tigers, on the one hand, and other emerging economies of the region, on the other.21 Marat Guelman, a Guelman gallery owner and a public fi gure in Russia, has suggested Perm΄ for this role, arguing that it will bring Russia closer to the Asian Tigers’ economies, will help to develop the national transportation net-work by creating a new hub, and will provide opportunities to produce a new iconography for the nation.22

Some prominent Russian tycoons, noteably Aleksandr Deripaska, once the richest person in Russia, along with Gleb Pavlovskii, a political advisor close to the Kremlin and to the pro-government youth organization Rossiia Molodaia, support choosing Novosibirsk as the new Russian capital. By di-versifying Russian economic life, they envision a more balanced economic development throughout the country in the future.

By contrast with the Siberian relocation proposals, those advocating mov-ing the capital city to the Volga region have more moderate goals, specifi cally the economic development of the distressed regions. Some believe that it will create many new jobs, attract migrants, and stimulate the development of the areas in the Volga basin that have been neglected.23 In line with these ideas, several proponents of relocation suggest cities like Nizhnii Novgorod, Kazan, and Ul΄ianovsk. In rare cases such proposals are augmented by the classical growth pole theory arguments, which anticipate the spread eff ects of the new capital and are supported by some economic impact estimates.

The concept of a relocated capital as a locomotive of economic growth ne-glects the experience of other countries, however. In many cases such projects have been shown to be long on hype and short on results, rarely delivering on their economic promises. The growth poles oft en remain stand-alone settle-ments that fail to ignite the expected level of economic activity in the remote regions. The concept of a Siberian capital also neglects the realistic need for good connectivity and communications that can be especially taxing for an overextended country with a sizable bureaucracy, a harsh climate, and a defi -cit of demographic resources even in the European part of the country.

The Federalist Capital in the West

The politicians and intellectuals who favor establishing a federalist capital in the west most oft en are primarily concerned about the political autonomy of

21. I. Krupnov, Solntse v Rossii voskhodit s Vostoka (Moscow, 2006).22. “Chetvertii Rim.”23. V. Milov, interview, Moscow, February 2011.

In Search of the Fourth Rome 515

the subjects of federation. In contrast to the fi rst group they tend to stress Rus-sia’s European identity and have an anti-imperialist agenda. Many of them believe that Moscow’s monopoly on power has produced a style of governance that stifl es the autonomy of the regions, with their distinctive political identi-ties, undermining the principles of federalism. In some cases their visions have led to a radical reassessment of Moscow’s role in Russian history. The less positive aspects of Moscow’s role are revealed in the suppression of the princedoms of ancient Russia, the introduction of extreme authoritarian rule, and the Mongolian traditions of statecraft . The current levels of hypercentral-ization exhibit continuity with this centuries-old tradition.24

According to their version of history, Moscow inherited the worst practices of governanace from the Mongols. Indeed, in their view, previously insignifi -cant Moscow rose to power thanks to its servile attitudes, collaboration with the Mongols, and strict adherence to their orders. The subjugation of Tver΄ and Riazan , the cruel and bloody suppression of the free republics of Novgorod and Pskov that were ransacked by Ivan the Terrible, and the story of Nizhnii Novgorod acquire a special signifi cance for these intellectuals as emblematic events in the narrative of Russian history. The capital shift signifi es for them the political and cultural emancipation of the country from a centuries-long yoke and internal colonization. Hence, their choices for the new capital city refl ect the symbolic geography of Russian history. Extremely important, in their minds, is the legacy of the ancient Russian republics of Novgorod and Pskov, which are seen as the cradle of Russian liberty and native democratic traditions.25

Aleksei Shiropaev, a writer and historian, has recommended Novgorod, a member of the Hanseatic League of free trading cities and the epitome of integration with Europe, as the new Russian capital. The return to old Novgorodian traditions would provide an antidote to Asianism (aziatchina) and the backward Mongol political traditions inherited and spread by Mos-cow.26 Vadim Shtepa, another prolifi c essayist, also emphasizes the need to establish a nonimperial capital, as a way of promoting the confederation of Russian republics. He advocates naming the city Kitezh aft er a magnifi cent old Russian fairy tale.27 Some of these theorists also view St. Petersburg, the capital founded by Peter the Great, as a manifestation of the spirit of old Novgorod. Such is a stance of Vladimir Mozhegov, who recommends spread-ing the capital city functions among the various older Russian cities.28 Several other prominent members of the Soiuz pravikh sil (Union of Right Forces), including Boris Titov, have suggested transfering the capital city westward to Tver , justifying this choice by reference to Tver ’s symbolic republican value as the city that lost in its historical competition with Moscow and to the pres-ence of a developed transportation infrastructure there.

Although the general tendency of the members of this group is to situate

24. A. Shiropaev, Ot Rossii k Rusi: Stat΄i, ocherki, esse (Moscow, 2003); Vladimir Mo-zhegov, “O novoi gardarike i moskovskikh pirogakh,” APN, 17 August 2006.

25. Mozhegov, “O novoi gardarike i moskovskikh pirogakh.”26. A. Shiropaev, Tiurma naroda: Russkii vzgliad na Rossiiu (Moscow, 2001).27. S. Kornev and V. Shtepa, “Posle Tret ego Rima—Kitezh (Otryvok iz futurologiche-

skogo proekta ‘Evropa ot Kitezha do Aliaski’),” Zavtra, no. 1–2 (18 January 2000).28. Mozhegov, “O novoi gardarike i moskovskikh pirogakh.”

516 Slavic Review

the new capital city to the west of Moscow, some of them recommend diff erent regions and give preference to small unpretentious towns. The requirement is that the new capital should not be pompous and can safeguard other cities and regions from centralized opression.

A proposal presented by the former mayor of Moscow, Gavriil Popov, ex-emplifi es this attitude. His candidate is the small town of Zhiguli in the Volga region. It is a neutral place relative to currently important urban centers, he argues, similar to Washington, D.C., in the United States. This city’s small size and the prohibition against large corporations moving there will insure the lack of lobbying activity and promote a corruption-free environment.29 In a similar vein, Stanislav Belkovskii, a renowned political analyst, has sug-gested moving the capital city to Sochi. This proposal is motivated by the sig-nifi cant savings that would accrue due to the gigantic federal infrastructure investments Sochi has already received in preparation for the Olympic games. The new capital city could utilize this infrastructure.

The political ideas of those advocating a federalist capital in the west are far from uniform. Shiropaev’s rhetoric is tainted with references to Aryan cul-ture, his concept of the nation is cloaked in ethnic rather than civic terms, and his vision of the Union of Russian Independent republics excludes eth-nic republics and lends itself to ultranationalist interpretations. Popov and Belkovskii, on the other hand, can be described as liberal intellectuals. While Shiropaev, Mozhegov, and Shtepa stress the importance of authentic Russian republican traditions, Popov and Belkovskii do not discuss historical issues. All of them, however, share a profound distrust of highly centralized institu-tions and large and imposing capital cities and consider federalist principles of governance to be a solution to current problems. Although they fall short of off ering a well-articulated federalist agenda, their concerns, expressed in their proposals, bring them close to federalist political ideals and can be con-strued as a call for a broad redefi nition of Russian polity.

Futuristic Geometries of a New Capital City

Many of the ideas about and projects for the new Russian capital, especially those developed by artists and architects, assume an original, futuristic, and forward-looking character. They tend to emphasize technological, architec-tural, and transportation solutions to the current urban and political prob-lems. They attribute the current failures of Moscow, both as a global city and as a national capital, to the failures of the current urban network, its old com-munication systems, and an outdated urban morphology and infrastructure.

The idea of the “linear city” is credited to a group of architects who origi-nally developed it in the 1960s. Today, Il΄ia Lezhava and Mikhail Shubenkov, both members of the Town Planning Division at Moscow University of Archi-tecture, have elaborated this idea into the concept of a “linear capital city.” The country as a whole and Moscow as its capital city still rely on the outdated concentric radial type of infrastructure that does not allow any natural de-

29. E. Bychkova, “Gavriil Popov: Korruptsiiu v rossiisskoi stolitse mozhno pobedit ,” Argumenty i fakti, no. 40 (6 October 2010).

In Search of the Fourth Rome 517

velopment of alternative city centers. This backward city morphology needs to be replaced by a linear structure. They argue that the new generation of urban networks relying on modern communication and transportation tech-nologies, along with an electronic system of governance, will displace the old urban hierarchy and eliminate or make irrelevant many current political and economic arrangements.

The new model of the linear city, suggested by Lezhava and Shubenkov, de-fi es the distinction between capital and provinces and can help to consolidate the country and remedy other current maladies. “The old radial- concentric pattern of spatial organization dominant both in Moscow and in the rest of the country not only creates logistical problems but underlies many political problems, such as access to government offi ces and the center-periphery rela-tionship. High-speed trains, similar to Japanese bullet trains, will connect the dispersed network of cities and situate them on a single line. The traditional geometry of power as embodied in network confi gurations and architecture needs to be replaced by an open-ended parabola. The transformation of the prevailing transportation infrastructure will allow the capital to develop as a polycentric settlement.”30 The construction of SibStream and the creation of a “bed of settlements” along the high-speed train line will be part of the solution.31

Although an original and visionary solution for the current connectivity issues in a country as vast as Russia, the linear capital concept does not ad-dress any of the political concerns raised in the debate. It is also plain that the proposed transportation network is very expensive to build, to operate, and to use and can be a feasible solution only in the distant future. Yet even as a long-term futuristic proposal, it ignores or underestimates the location problems that persist even in the best-connected countries. Eff ectively this solution declares political and social problems to be a function of speed and distance, thus framing the essentially political issue as a transportation and speed problem. While this visionary solution obviously fails to resolve political concerns, it does identify the unique challenges of connectivity in Russia and provides an intriguing vision of possible future transportation integration.

The Satellite Administrative Capital Solution

For many years, urbanists and politicians have bemoaned the strict admin-istrative boundaries between Moscow and the Moscow Region that hindered the prospects for the natural expansion of the capital city. The creation of a Capital Federal District and the elimination of the artifi cial boundaries be-tween the two entities, according to these critics, would alleviate current con-gestion problems in the historical center, allow the operation of an integrated transportation network, and address other common problems as well.

The origins of the satellite town concept arose in 1986 when a group of

30. I. Lezhava and M. Shubenkov, “Kontseptsiia lineinoi sistemy rasseleniia Rossii v 21 veke,” IV Rome (online journal), 14 April 2010, at www.ivrome.ru/2010/04/koncepciya-linejnoj-sistemy-rasseleniya-rossii-v-21-veke/ (last accessed 31 May 2013).

31. Ibid.

518 Slavic Review

Russian architects under the direction of Evgenii Pkhor submitted a plan to relocate all government agencies and several other functions outside Moscow to a group of existing satellite towns 40–50 kilometers away. The plan recog-nized Moscow’s limitations and suggested transformating the Kremlin into a museum. The satellite towns were expected to house all the ministries and the embassies.32 The most vocal current proponent of this plan today is Mikhail Khazanov, the vice president of the Russian Union of Architects.

In summer 2011, plans to create a new administrative capital and to ex-pand the boundaries of Moscow were adopted by the president Dmitrii Med-vedev. The mayor of Moscow, Sergei Sobianin, and the governor of the Mos-cow Region, Boris Gromov, formed a joint working group tasked with lauching plans to merge parts of the Moscow Region with the capital and to move the administrative functions of the federal and state agencies to the satelite city.

The critics of these plans aptly point out that the expansion of Mocow will attract many new migrants from the regions, further contribute to Moscow’s primacy, and create additional demographic pressures on Moscow and imbal-ances in the country.33 It is also likely, critics argue, that the satellite admin-istrative capital will only aggravate the current level of traffi c congestion as government offi cials will probably stay in Moscow and commute daily to the administrative capital, contributing to traffi c jams.34

A more ideological strand of objections points to the hidden agenda of relocation and relates these plans to the current social unrest and protest movement in the capital. According to this Machiavellian interpretation, the government is trying to marginalize social protest by isolating the adminis-tration in a satellite city, detached from possible venues for public protest and turmoil.35

Indeed, the concept of an administrative capital is narrowly motivated by private interests and tactical metropolitan governance considerations and neglects the national dimensions of the problem. Though this solution is not uncommon (satellite administrative capitals have been established in such countries as Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and the United Arab Emirates), it is hardly suitable for a large country like Russia. In this solution the organization of territory within the center itself takes precedence over other pressing issues and will only reinforce the current patterns of hypercentralization. The satel-lite capital concept does not address any of the national challenges involved in the capital city debate: the disproportional development of the regions, the crisis of national symbols, and the legitimacy of Moscow as a national capital.

32. A. Trifonov, “Perenos stolitsy neobkhodim, ia eshche v 1986-m predlagal stroit΄ gorod mezhdu Moskvoi i Piterom ,” Izvestiia, 30 June 2011.

33. S. Belkovskii, “Dorogaia moia stolitsa, zolotaia moia N΄iu-Moskva . . . : Komu vy-goden perenos federal΄noi vlasti v gorod-sputnik na pustyre?” Moskovskii komsomolets, no. 25686 (7 July 2011).

34. Ibid.35. “Mikhail Deliagin: Stolitsu nuzhno perenosit΄ v zakholust e,” 19 April 2012, on

Priamaia rech, Mir TV, at www.mirtv.ru/programms/4390776/episode/4886262 (last ac-cessed 31 May 2013).

In Search of the Fourth Rome 519

Critics of Capital Shift Ideas

Critics of the project to relocate the capital express skepticism and urge cau-tion. Many are concerned about the tremendous fi nancial and social costs as-sociated with this eff ort. Back in 2002, to discourage further discussion of the issue, Iurii Luzhkov quoted $150 billion as the best estimate of the possible cost of the relocation project. In 2011 Iosif Diskin, an economist, a member of the Public Chamber and co-chair of the Council for National Strategy, esti-mated the cost at a whopping $300 billion.36

Other critics suggest that regional economic development, especially the natural growth of Russian megacities with populations greater than 1 mil-lion, will gradually reduce the pressure on the capital and attract signifi cant migration streams and investment fl ows from Moscow, where the investment climate, level of productivity, and the cost of living are getting prohibitively high. The growth of these megacities will counterbalance current levels of hypercentralization and will gradually reverse these trends toward a concen-tration of power in the center.37

Some critics also question the feasibility of decentralization eff orts aimed at shift ing the capital city and propose devolution and fi scal decentraliza-tion as alternatives. This devolution should involve direct federal invest-ments in the regions, delegation of authority, fi scal decentralization, and special promotional strategies. These alternative strategies were proposed by some prominent geographers, sociologists, urban planners, and political activists, such as Ol ga Kryshtanovskii, Viacheslav Glazychev, and Sergei Stankevich.38

In a more cynical vein, some critics have attributed the fuss about the issue to the preelection campaigns and expressed concern that only interest groups close to the government will take full advantage of this megaproject. According to Valeriia Novodvorskaia, the transfer of the capital would not bring any substantive changes. Evgenii Iasin, the former minister of econom-ics under Boris El tsin, relegated the very topic to the realm of speculation and called it an attempt to fi ll an ideological vacuum. In a similar vein Aleksandr Tsypko, a renowned political analyst, dismissed the project as an element in the existing pattern of rhetoric about pseudoreforms, pseudomodernization, and the renaming of diff erent government agencies.39 Some also argue that capital relocation will allow the government to decrease Moscovites’ income thus making them more complacent, referring to the political theory of Adam Przevorskii, according to which higher incomes lead to higher levels of pro-

36. “Perenos stolytsy,” 22 January 2011, on Pravo golosa, hosted by Roman Babaian, Channel 3. The participants included Iurii Krupnov, Sergei Stankevich, Aleksandr Tsypko, Marat Gel΄man, Iosif Diskin, Igor΄ Volgin, Evgenii Minchenko, and Boris Mezhuev.

37. O. Wite, “Stolitsa versus okraina: Cherez 10 let Moskva perestanet byt΄ edinstven-nym gorodom v strane,” Interview with Petr Miroshnik,” IV Rome (online journal), 24 Au-gust 2010, at www.ivrome.ru/2010/08/stolica-vs-okraina/ (last accessed 31 May 2013).

38. “Perenos stolytsy”; V. Kurennoi, “Tiagotenie k tsentru: Razvitie makroregional -nykh stolits,” Politicheskii zhurnal, no. 43 (19 December 2005).

39. “Perenos stolytsy.”

520 Slavic Review

test.40 Other critics (Irina Hakamada) have charged that, although relocation could be a part of a viable renovation strategy, in the current climate of ex-treme corruption it will inevitably degenerate into an excuse for government offi cials and well-connected developers to embezzle most of the funds allo-cated to this project.41

In general, many academics and politicians consider the capital city re-location project to be a utopian idea that is extremely untimely. Some also refer to the negative experience of capital city relocations in other countries, emphasizing that many of these projects went over budget, took longer than planned, and produced fewer positive results.

The Conservative Critics

Another group of critics, oft en those who celebrate the notion of Moscow as the “Third Rome,” dismiss all proposals regarding relocation on religious and other conservative grounds. In the minds of many of these critics, both consti-tutional legitimacy and transcendental validity affi rm Moscow’s status as the capital city. In contrast to St. Petersburg, “a man-made capital,” Moscow is of-ten described as a natural and even divinely inspired capital. To use the words of Rustam Rakhmatullin, a historian of Moscow, it is the promised city.42 In this urban mythology, Moscow stands for Russia in general, and even as a “chosen” city, at once the new Jerusalem and the new Rome, it represents all of Russia. The idea of “the promised city” emphasizes the symbolic paral-lels between Moscow’s topological features, on the one hand, and those of Rome and Jerusalem, on the other, in the spirit of the medieval chronicles in which all the events in the New Testament had been prefi gured in the Old Testament.43

Another proponent of the sacred capital, Arkadii Maler, the chair of the Byzantium Club and the founder of the Katechon group, has argued, in a self-assured style typical for these critics, that “Moscow is the capital of Russia not because of somebody’s preference or desire. . . . There is simply no alternative to it. It is the natural, organic center of Russian civilization. Moscow itself provides legitimacy to any political power. That is the law of Russian political geography.”44

The conservative critics’ antimodern stance prevents them from engag-ing in any rational discussion of this topic. They tend to see all capital city

40. P. Prianikov, “Poka rossiiane bedny, demokratii v strane ne budet,” Tolkovatel , 3 March 2012, at ttolk.ru/?p=9884 (last accessed 31 May 2013).

41. Irina Hakamada cited in “Kuda by stolitsu perenesti?”42. R. Rakhmatullin, Dve Moskvi, ili Metafi zika stolitsi (Moscow 2008), 15–16.43. Many capitals of the medieval European kingdoms modeled themselves on Rome

or Jerusalem. Nuremberg, one of the capitals of the Holy Roman Empire, was considered the reincarnation of Jerusalem and had topological similarities to Jerusalem (e.g., Olive Hill and the like). The same holds for the medieval Russian capitals Moscow and Kiev. See R. Stupperrich, “Kiev—das zweite Jerusalem,” Zeitschrift für slavische Philologie 12 (1935). Rakhmatullin is primarily interested in the parallel landscape features of Moscow and Rome (seven hills and the like).

44. A. Maler, “Otstupat΄ nekuda—pozadi Moskva!” Russkii zhurnal, 25 January 2007.

In Search of the Fourth Rome 521

relocation proposals as eff orts to undermine the traditional values of Russian civilization. Predicated on the anachronistic idea of a sacred ritual capital and couched in mystical tones, their pronouncements do not provide any fruitful basis for deliberation and debate.

Critique of the Debate

This brief overview of the post-Soviet debates concerning capital city reloca-tion leads to several observations about the assumptions made by the par-ticipants, some of their systematic oversights, and their preoccupations. Each group identifi ed above expresses valid concerns and highlights the most pressing issues facing the Russian polity based on their own particular vi-sions: the questions of ethnic relations; the problems of political constitu-tion and the relationship between the subjects of the federation; the issues of hypercentralization, geographic inequity, and regional development; large distances and outdated infrastructure and transportation systems; municipal problems, urban infrastructure, and congestion in the case of the administra-tive capital. For each group, the relocation is seen as a solution to the prob-lems it identifi es.

In many cases, however, the reasons given for capital city relocation com-promise the project’s declared goals. These contradictions and perplexities reveal some of the false assumptions about the nature of the function of a capital city that underlie their arguments. Somewhat paradoxically, the belief that relocation can solve most political problems reveals not only the interest in decentralization but also a deep-seated belief in the power of the central government to resolve all economic problems by political means. Some other preconceived notions and consistent misconceptions about the function of a capital city include the implicit assumption that capital cities should be large and magnifi cent metropolises, projecting an image of largess and imperial grandeur; that capital cities are the main engines of economic growth and should be located in the most economically active parts of the country; that economic effi ciency requires the territorial expanse to be matched and bal-anced by demographics.

The libertarian critics of the project, on the other hand, tend to exaggerate the power of market mechanisms to resolve hypercentralization and under-estimate how the path dependence, political pull, and gravitational force of Moscow distorts the market mechanisms that are expected to resolve these problems. Under conditions of extreme political overcentralization, these market forces are most oft en disabled or incapable of performing their normal regulatory functions. As several researchers have pointed out, the economic benefi ts produced by the capital city’s status and conferred upon its citizens are quite signifi cant even in much less corrupt countries.45 The blind trust

45. S. Turner and R. Turner, “Capital Cities: A Special Case in Urban Development,” Annals of Regional Science 46, no. 1 (February 2011): 19–35; Ronald L. Moomaw and Mo-hammad A. Alwosabi, “An Empirical Analysis of Competing Explanations of Urban Pri-macy: Evidence from Asia and the Americas,” Annals of Regional Science 38, no. 1 (March 2004); Horst Zimmermann, “Do Diff erent Types of Capital Cities Make a Diff erence for Eco-

522 Slavic Review

in the ability of market mechanisms to naturally rebalance the overconcen-tration of resources—the idea found in the proposals of some economists—appears to be naive given the current levels of pervasive corruption.

Symbolic considerations also play an important role in the debate. The cardinal geographic directions oft en acquire pronounced symbolic, ideologi-cal, and political connotations and the declared direction of the move oft en serves as a statement of political orientation. Oft en the participants are either looking for historic connections that will help the political system retrieve its perceived lost glory, harmony, and power (Kiev, Arkaim, Kazan, Novgorod all off er these historic connections) or for a new purpose-built city.

The relevance of social and political problems—fi rst and foremost the problems of inclusion and exclusion, social mobility, personal and regional inequality, defi ciency of civil liberties—is oft en ignored or underestimated. Many of these problems are closely related to the capital city’s privileged sta-tus and the scope of its primacy.

The rational and valid concerns outlined above are oft en tarnished with geopolitical speculations, far-fetched ideas about civilizational boundaries, and the metaphysics of history, celebrated at the expense of a comprehensive social, political, and economic analysis of the situation, based on statistical data, comparative studies of federalism, and the best practices in capital cit-ies’ relocation. It is striking that most approaches evaluating new capital city choices are not informed by any external perspectives or by the existing body of literature on capital city relocations and capital planning.46

The participants are also most oft en unaware of the existing research methodologies currently employed by the students of capital city shift s, such as dynamic systems approach, growth pole theory, world-systems analysis, urban ecology, centrography, multidisciplinary network theories, and spatial economics focusing on the social and economic costs of urban primacy; thus, discussions of historical precedents in world history are oft en lopsided and impressionistic rather than analytic.47 The interpretations of these experi-ences and the perceptions of their successes or failures oft en depend on the particular preferences and political agendas of the participants rather than on systematic analysis.

The propensity to engage in various pseudoscientifi c arguments is oft en equal to the paucity of theoretical perspectives and methodologies employed in the analysis. For this reason, the debate is oft en tainted by the appeal to

nomic Dynamism?” Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 28, no. 5 (2010): 761–67.

46. Jean Gottman, “Capital Cities,” in Jean Gottman and Robert Harper, eds., Since Megapolis: The Urban Writings of Jean Gottman (Baltimore, 1990), 63–82; David L. A. Gordon and Mark L. Seasons, “Administrative and Financial Strategies for Implementing Plans in Political Capitals,” Canadian Journal of Urban Research 18, no. 1 (Summer 2009); Peter Hall, “The Changing Role of Capital Cities: Six Types of Capital City,” in John H. Taylor, Jean G. Lengellé, and C. Andrew, eds., Capital Cities International Perspectives/Les Capitales Perspectives Internationales (Ottawa, 1993).

47. On the dynamic systems approach, see Man-Hyung Lee, Nam-Hee Choi, and Moon-seo Park, “A Systems Thinking Approach to the New Administrative Capital in Korea: Bal-anced Development or Not?” System Dynamics Review 21, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 69–85.

In Search of the Fourth Rome 523

such preposterous methodologies as sacred geography, mysticism of space, numerology, anagrammatic readings of toponyms, the mythology of super-session in the context of theological and historiosophical speculations, and even astrology.48 Although I have not discussed these methodologies here, they are oft en representative of the style and character of the current state of the debate. These notions and imagery occupy the minds of less-sophisticated participants, but they also tarnish the debate and give it a coloration and aft ertaste of a competition in extravagant and eccentric ideas, discrediting somewhat the very concept of relocation.

The concern that lies at the root of all strategies involving relocation—with the exclusion of only the satellite administrative concept—is the fear that, without a change, Russian space will disintegrate and its social consti-tution will collapse. In essence all strategies are geared to provide remedies against disintegration, with each suggesting diff erent connections, transpor-tation solutions, or economic projects that are expected to glue together the disparate and depopulating parts of the country. But these solutions tend to point to the symptoms rather than to the real reasons for such disunity. They off er unifi cation from above and see capital relocation as an instrument of such integration. None of these problems in and of itself—congestion, hyper-centralization, ethnic tensions—provides suffi cient rationale for a capital re-location solution.

This does not mean, however, that the capital city relocation debate is a futile exercise in eccentric and utopian ideas. Each group raises important and relevant concerns, and in a diff erent conceptual frame the debate can be more meaningful and fruitful. The signifi cance of this debate can be clarifi ed by understanding the peculiar path of Russian national development; some cues can be found in the lack of a cohesive Russian nation.

The Capital and Nation Building

In his provocative study, the British historian Geoff rey Hosking has empha-sized the broken and painful path of nation building in Russia.49 According to Hosking, the Russian political nation has never emerged; nation-building aspirations were suppressed under the imperial ambitions of Russian state-hood. Ksenia Kas ianova, a sociologist, who has dedicated several studies to this issue, aptly calls the formation of Russian nationhood the longest, and still incomplete, “construction-in-progess” (dolgostroi) project in history.50 While most modern European nations entered the stage of empire building as modern nation-states, Russia has never had a chance to develop itself as a civic and political nation distinct from its territories. In contrast to modern

48. One curious example will suffi ce. V. P. Patrakov produced a whole book, where he proposed a numerological way to study the genealogy of new capital cities and their relo-cation based on the poetic metaphors of Velimir Khlebnikov, a Russian avant-garde poet. See V. P. Patrakov, Rozhdenie stolits: Ot proshlogo k budushchemu (Kharkov, 2008).

49. Geoff rey Hosking, Russia and the Russians: A History from Rus to the Russian Fed-eration (London, 2001).

50. Ksenia Kas΄ianova, “Rossiia perezhivaet period perekhoda k natsional΄nomu go-sudarstvu,” in Kas΄ianova, O russkom natsional΄nom kharaktere (Moscow 1994), 16.

524 Slavic Review

European empires, the nation-state never lay at its heart; the titular nation-ality was ill-defi ned and was oft en oppressed by the center as much as the ethnic minorities. As a result, the nation-building drive in Russian history was oft en superseded by the concern for territory, its organization and expan-sion. The very low density of Russian towns, spread across an enormously large territory, was among the contributing factors preventing such a develop-ment. The unfulfi lled needs of nation building manifested themselves in the diverse fi elds of self-discovery that involved politics, economics, and culture. This quest for self-understanding also expressed itself in the search for a new capital city.

The obsession with geopolitical positioning, defense, and security issues most vividly displayed in Eurasianist capital city concepts confi rms the sense of vulnerability associated with the fragmentation of the Russian empire. In-stead of looking for common integrative interests, the proponents oft en look for ways to reinforce and redefi ne the empire, inventing imagined enemies in the process. In other cases large government megaprojects are expected to provide this sense of a lost unity. Thus, these concepts are self-defeating.

The most perceptive and keen participants in the debate, the proponents of the federalist capital, are better equipped to recognize the national implica-tions of the new capital concept and are more aware of the political risks of current regional inequalities, demographic trends, and the political implica-tions of Moscow’s dominance. Unfortunately, they do not off er a sustained and punctuated program where this federalist and nation-building agenda is fully fl ashed out. Their federalist ideas, however, freed from the obsessive demonization of Moscow and some xenophobic overtones and augmented by nation-building targets, have a potential to be developed in a more viable social and political program. Needless to say, such a program can only be developed within the context of reforms and other policies designed to en-hance the autonomy of the regions, the contractual basis of the new bonds, decentralization, and devolution. In such a framework, capital relocation can serve as a catalyst for nation building as was the case in western Europe and elsewhere.

The capital city relocation scenario also has the potential to support the original goals of political and economic reforms. Established in the early 1990s by young reformers, these goals involved a threefold transition: from empire to nation, from planned economy to market economy, and from authoritar-ian to democratic rule. Understood as an element of a more comprehensive strategy, the capital shift can lay the groundwork and establish the broader framework in which these reforms can be realized. The spatial separation of economic and political centers can facilitate the shift to a market economy, freeing the economic mechanisms from the political pull of Moscow and abat-ing the prevalent collusion between business and government. The construc-tion of the new capital based on federal principles and the broad consensus of the regions can facilitate the transition to democracy. Moving the capital away from Moscow, which epitomizes the imperial legacy of Russian statehood and internal colonization, will facilitate the transition to a nation-state. Modern-ization through the reconstruction of the currently skewed urban hierarchy, centered around the dominant city, can be viewed as the fourth critical pillar

In Search of the Fourth Rome 525

of the reforms, reinforcing and providing a measure of stability to the original three targets.

The capital city not only creates new public spaces but also provides the environment in which national symbols and imagery can be displayed. The very concept of the capital—its size, its position, the scope of its functions, its geography relative to other centers and regions—is part and parcel of the built institutional environment that animates the processes of nation building. In the proper context, the spatial organization of the country can facilitate trends in its institutional development.

The establishment of a new inclusive federalist capital city as a national project might also help to heal the trauma of alienation from the center and from power suff ered by citizens in large segments of the country. Moscow’s current hegemonic status and the concentration of political and economic power there obstruct the emergence of the federalist nation with its own sym-bols, iconography, national paraphernalia, and capital, serving and repre-senting the interests of all regions.

The legitimacy of this new capital could be solidifi ed by the development of proper procedures, consensus-building eff orts through open competition among diff erent programs and proposals, and broad participation by the citi-zens in the public debate and deliberation about the location of and the ra-tionale behind the capital city shift . This consensus-building process and the choice of procedures and decision-making instruments are no less critical and essential than the fi nal choice of location.

Russian Capital Shift in a Global Perspective

The peculiar path of national development discussed above can also help to place the Russian case study in a comparative perspective. Capital relocation is now contemplated in such diverse countries as Iran, Indonesia, Venezuela, Mongolia, and Taiwan. Some countries are already building their new capitals (for example, New Kabul) or are taking some administrative, legal, and orga-nizational steps in this direction (Japan and South Korea). Experts believe that this option was most typical for postcolonial countries, especially in Af-rica, and was motivated by specifi c postcolonial nation-building needs.51

Russia has never been a colony. Yet the weakness of Russian nationhood as outlined by Geoff rey Hosking makes its current concerns similar to those of many postcolonial nations. The nation-building potential of a capital city shift has been unraveled in a penetrating and insightful paper by Edward Schatz, analyzing the experience of Kazakhstan.52 In many countries the capital cities served as laboratories of national imagination and symbolism. The peculiar paths of development of Russian nation- and statehood also make the post-Soviet political situation somewhat similar to the postcolonial countries in Africa and Asia, many of which have chosen to shift their capital cities to dis-

51. Deborah Potts, “Capital Relocation in Africa: The Case of Lilongwe in Malawi,” Geographical Journal 151, no. 2 (July 1985): 182–96.

52. Edward Schatz, “What Capital Cities Say about State and Nation Building,” Na-tionalism and Ethnic Politics 9, no. 4 (2004): 111–40.

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sociate themselves from their colonial past.53 Both the diverse experiences of these countries and the original history of nation building in Europe illustrate the important role capital cities play in nation-building processes. They are not only the results of these processes but also their powerful catalysts.

Some students of recent capital city relocations paint a history of these experiments as a grim chain of urban catastrophes, expensive mistakes, and arbitrary decisions feeding the megalomaniac excesses of autocratic rulers.54 Experts’ assessments of these projects, however, are far from being uniform. More sanguine students of relocation take a more balanced and discreet ap-proach, pointing to both positive and negative elements in this experience, identifying their risks and successes.55 Many exhibit some ambivalence in their attitudes, as was the case with a prominent Russian historian of the nine-teenth century, Nikolai Karamzin, who famously described Peter the Great’s decision to relocate the capital to St. Petersburg as a “brilliant mistake.”56

Indeed, there is a whole range of implementations, budgets, and out-comes of these projects—the good, the bad, and the ugly. The experience of Germany, Kazakhstan, Brazil, Turkey, and Malaysia are very diff erent from those of Nigeria, Tanzania, and Malawi. But all of these experiments in urban planning and the social and political transformation of existing urban hier-archies, including the negative ones, off er good lessons for countries contem-plating such a move or those that have started to build their new capitals. The sweeping generalizations about the catastrophic consequences of relocation, oft en predicated on the economic costs and benefi ts, ignore the national and state-building agendas that have motivated them. A better measure of success or failure is the ability of these projects to integrate the nation, to balance diff erent interests, to appeal to broader sectors of society, and to set the politi-cal goals and symbols of a new nation. Far from being universalizable, these experiences give us some cues about the most pertinent features and motiva-tions of such projects; in retrospect, nation-building targets and consensus-building eff orts have contributed the most to the success of such projects.57 The debate in Russia will defi nitely have its impact on several other postcom-munist countries that are also eyeing such an option, including Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Georgia.

The Russian case presents its unique challenges, risks, and opportuni-ties. Moscow is the largest capital in Europe, and Russia is one of very few federalist countries with an oversized capital. Its iconography and its struc-

53. Rhoads Murphey, “New Capitals of Asia,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 5, no. 3 (April 1957): 216–43; (1957); J. C. Nwafor, “The Relocation of Nigeria’s Fed-eral Capital: A Device for Greater Territorial Integration and National Unity,” GeoJournal 4, no. 4 (1980): 359–66; Potts, “Capital Relocation in Africa,” 182–96

54. “The Pros and Cons of Capital Flight,” The Economist, 13 August 2004; Simon Akam, “Not Such a Capital Idea aft er All,” Independent, 24 February 2011.

55. Harry W. Richardson, “The Location and Relocation of National and State Capitals in North America and the Rest of the World,” in Korea Planners Association, A Planning Policy for Korea’s New Capital City (Seoul, 2003), 119–30.

56. N. Karamzin, Zapiska o drevnei i novoi Rossii v ee politicheskom i grazhdanskom otnosheniiakh (Moscow, 1991), 159.

57. Kenneth E. Corey, “Relocation of National Capitals: Implication for Korea,” Inter-national Symposium on the Capital Relocation (Seoul, 2004), 42–127.

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ture remain largely Soviet, and this ideology is deeply ingrained in its urban morphological design. The cost of massively reconstructing Moscow will not only be a very pricey endeavor, commensurate with the cost of building the capital de novo, but will also jeopardize the historical architecture that re-mains in the city and will not resolve most of the larger national issues identi-fi ed in the debate. The size, the imperial legacy, and the ingrained ideological symbolism of Moscow make it unfi t for the role of a new federalist capital that can provide integrative symbols and epitomize the transition from empire to federalist nation.

One can hope that the Russian debate on the new capital city will de-velop more calibrated and constructive ways of addressing the country’s unique challenges and will provide capital city concepts to inspire not only geographic but also institutional transformation, incorporating the nation-building needs so vital for both social and political reconstruction and for the belated transition from empire to nation.