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Volume 5, Number 8

Skepticism, Stoicism, and the Jeffersonian Model:Three Philosophical Responses to the Crisis in the

Humanities

David Wyatt Aiken, John Scott Gray and Grant Snider

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THE HUMANITIES http://www.Humanities-Journal.com First published in 2007 in Melbourne, Australia by Common Ground Publishing Pty Ltd www.CommonGroundPublishing.com. © 2007 (individual papers), the author(s) © 2007 (selection and editorial matter) Common Ground Authors are responsible for the accuracy of citations, quotations, diagrams, tables and maps. All rights reserved. Apart from fair use for the purposes of study, research, criticism or review as permitted under the Copyright Act (Australia), no part of this work may be reproduced without written permission from the publisher. For permissions and other inquiries, please contact <cg-support@commongroundpublishing.com>. ISSN: 1447-9508 Publisher Site: http://www.Humanities-Journal.com THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THE HUMANITIES is a peer refereed journal. Full papers submitted for publication are refereed by Associate Editors through anonymous referee processes. Typeset in Common Ground Markup Language using CGCreator multichannel typesetting system http://www.CommonGroundSoftware.com.

Skepticism, Stoicism, and the Jeffersonian Model: ThreePhilosophical Responses to the Crisis in the HumanitiesDavid Wyatt Aiken, Ferris State University, Michigan, USAJohn Scott Gray, Ferris State Univerisity, Michigan, USAGrant Snider, Ferris State University, Michigan, USA

Abstract: This paper examines the degree to which the relevance of an education in the Humanities hinges on our findingthe value of what we do in the classroom. Specifically, we need to reflect on what occurs in the classroom when we attemptto engage students in philosophy. What are we saying to them? Can they even hear us? What do they do with what we givethem? These questions go to the heart of what an education in philosophy entails: are we learning historic arguments, soundmethods, or life skills? Each of the three authors will call upon Hellenistic texts to frame separate responses to the ways inwhich philosophers could be thinking about these questions—questions about these possibly changing times (complacencyand cynicism) and the perceived crisis in the Humanities.

Keywords: Philosophy, Cynicism, Complacency

THOSE OF US who work in the humanitiesas professors, mentors, artists, and adminis-trators are confronted daily by the crisis inthe humanities.1 It is this crisis that served

as the theme for the 2007 International Symposiumon New Directions in the Humanities at ColumbiaUniversity. It is a crisis we hear in the confidentvoices of suspicion whenever a parent, a student, or,too often, a faculty colleague questions the contem-porary relevance of the humanities or their presencein general education requirements. Such elitist, orworse, impractical studies, one hears, serve merelyas speed bumps in the fast-lane to a “job.”Countering this impatience with the humanities,

we propose three philosophical responses. Using ashis metaphor Plato’s problematic framings of theSocratic dialectic, which is traditionally interpretedas an ideal educational model for young Athenians,Professor Aiken argues that Thomas Jeffersonprovides a defensible ‘American’ response to thecrisis in the humanities that could serve to revitalizethe area. Alternatively, Professor Gray defends amore traditional version of the Socratic life of in-quiry, contrasting Socratic ignorance with the insti-tutionalized and complacent ignorance of skepticSextus Empiricus. Finally, Professor Snider suggests(with reference to Epictetus and Pierre Hadot) thatwe should practice philosophy as a therapeutic wayof living in an effort to overcome the suspicion orcynicism of our students for which we, teachers ofthe humanities in general, are in part to blame. Allthree perspectives share a belief that the humanities

need not be saved by a pedagogical messiah fromwithout, but instead can be revitalized by returningto and reconsidering its ancient heritage. The threepositions offered in this essay each offer complement-ary, yet different, responses to the crisis in the human-ities through various ideas on how best to embracethis heritage, responding to forces of hopelessness,complacency, and cynicism.

Conversations and Conversions:Humanities in the State UniversityPresenter: David AikenIn this paper I assume the following to be the case:first, that it is predominately those areas of academicstudy leading to jobs and/or job placement that enjoyintellectual and financial institutional preference;generally speaking, fields in the Humanities do notlead to jobs; second, that there are limited academicfunding resources, all sources combined, and that,generally speaking, it is those fields of study thatlead to empirically measurable results/benefits (e.g.,science/medicine, military, economics, etc.), whichwill receive systematic funding from our universities,and those same fields that will, in turn, becomesources of funding revenue for our universities; andfinally, that modern cultural values, such as globaliz-ation, diversity, etc., must, in the final analysis, createsocieties that are fragmented and relativistic (i.e.,diversified), and that this will necessarily result inthe fragmentation of the classical or traditional (elit-ising) agenda that presently hovers around the study

1 The title of the original panel presentation was: “Three Philosophical Responses to ‘Changing Times,’ Or, ‘Can You Hear Me Now?’”

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THE HUMANITIES,VOLUME 5, NUMBER 8, 2007

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of Humanities. These assumptions address, to somedegree at any rate, several of the stated ‘Problems inthe Humanities’ proposed by this conference venue,which are 1) that the Humanities are intellectuallymarginalized in our institutions; 2) that funding forHumanities programs is constantly threatened; and3) that there are tensions between classical or tradi-tional Humanities & the more recent cultural & crit-ical orientation of some Humanities programs. Nowquestions of funding aside (#2)—although they arecertainly not unrelated to the arguments of this pa-per—if it seems apparent that scholars engaged inthe various disciplines of Humanistic studies aredesirous of harmonizing the Humanities, i.e., of de-fining an overarching and common agenda for thestudy of Humanities in America (# 1 & #3), it wouldseem equally obvious that most of these traditionalattempts will end in failure. It shall be the task of mycontribution to explain why this must be so.I propose both as an argument against and meta-

phor for at least some elements of the present crisesin the Humanities, the various “FAILURES” of thegreat ethicist Socrates, and especially those failuresdramatically represented by Plato in the Euthyphro;for where Socrates failed formerly, I see little hopeof success presently. Using as a springboard, then,James Arieti’s rather original and certainly provocat-ive readings of the dialogues as drama (InterpretingPlato, Rowman&Littlefield (MD), 1991), I suggestthat in the Euthyphro Plato stages for our considera-tion the inevitably unsuccessful dialectic betweenthe flexible spirit of inquiry (Socrates) and theadamantine cocoon of willfully ignorant belief (Eu-thyphro), a confrontation that frames and re-presentsin fact the aporia underpinning the assumptions Isketched out at the beginning of this paper. As adialogue in philosophy, Plato’s audience is entitledto suppose that an honest attempt is being made bythe protagonists in the Euthyphro to dis- or un-coversome truth concerning the discursive subject: pietyand the gods. Yet we are not so fortunate; for theEuthyphro is ultimately, and very obviously, incon-clusive. Socrates is unable to bring Euthyphro to‘see’ his ignorance concerning the gods, whichmeans that Euthyphro will not, and if we may anti-cipate upon his future, will probably never questionthe piety of his own suit against his father for impi-ety. Thus, in following out the metaphor of our argu-ment, Socrates’ failure to persuade the willfully ig-norant Euthyphro also foreshadows his inability topersuade the jury at his own trial for impiety, whichalso confirms us in concluding that the second chargeMeletus brings against Socrates during his trial (viz.corrupting the youth of Athens), is highly implaus-ible.As we step back, then, in an attempt to get Plato’s

‘big’ picture concerning the importance of Socrates

as a philosophical teacher, and to understand howthe successes and failures of Socrates might applyto us today as we attempt to solve the problems wesee evolving in the varous types of social discoursein which the Humanities engage, we, the audience,are encouraged to suppose that, in reality, Socrateshad nomore general success in corrupting the mindsof the Athenian youths than he had, specifically, ingetting Euthyphro to see the obvious errors in histhinking about piety and the gods. Secondly, in theEuthyphro Plato seems to problematize the specificfutility of an inquiring Socrates trying to reason withan ‘un-inquiring’ Euthyphro, and so seems perhapsto suggest the general futility of attempting to engagein honest inquiry with anyone of faith. At the end ofthe drama, the audience is left wondering what goodSocrates has really accomplished in the polis, andwhether, in fact, we may not conclude that his lifewas really, at least in terms of its philosophical im-port, a series of failures— failure to find philosoph-ical answers to philosophical questions concerningpiety and the gods, failure to encourage Euthyphroto a clearer and more appropriate way of reasoning,failure to persuade the jury of his innocence, failurefinally either to teach, or even to corrupt, the youthof Athens. Upon this reading, does not Plato lead usto the conclusion that genuine “Socratic” dialectic,which should, ideally, lead us to intellectual conver-sion (cf. Stoicism) and which should, ideally, makeof us wise men, is in fact futile when confronted withan audience that is disposed neither to conversionnor to wisdom? And by extension of our metaphor,are we not lead to the same conclusion of futilitywhen we consider that the same insurmountableobstacles that faced, and finally crushed Socrates,continue to face those who engage in the modernhumanistic pursuits?Now, assuming the plausibility both of the meta-

phor and of our argument, there are, obviously, avariety of possible responses to the question of howthe Humanities might position themselves vis-à-vischanging times; but for the most part these responsesare, I suggest, ultimately unsatisfactory. There are,for example, metaphorical responses tomymetaphor,one of which might be derived from a dramaticreading of Plato’s Theaetetus. The hopeful optimismof the Theaetetus is that there will inevitably be somesearching, inquiring minds ‘out there’, and that wemust persevere in the Humanities for the sake ofthose few who may one day come along, such as thehumble Theaetetus, in their search for truth-in-the-world. This hopeful optimism is ubiquitous in theHumanities, and is reflected famously in Nietzsche’sforward to the Antichrist: “Dies Buch gehört denwenigsten. Vielleicht lebt selbst noch keiner vonihnen. (This Book belongs to the very few. And itmay well be that none of them are even alive yet.)”

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However, if we actually and publically dare to for-mulate this elitising argument in our various Human-ities disciplines, then wemust surely also be preparedto accept that, given the democratic accessibilitygenerally underpinning entrance to America’s univer-sities, and the P.C. environment of the modern intel-lectual and cultural arenas, the vast majority of ouruniversities, distaining this unacceptable discourse,must and will continue to consider Humanities de-partments second class intellectual citizens, and thatthey will continue to throw us only the crumbs offinancial support.However, leaving behind otherwise unsatisfactory

“Theaetetian” rejoinders to my Euthyphro-as-meta-phor argument, there are also other, certainly morepractical interpretations of the role of the Humanitiesin the modern intellectual arena.What if we assume,for example, that the type of dilemma Plato framesin the Euthyphro does not speak to the current issuesaddressing the Humanities, in contrast to what I havesuggested? What if the over-arching purpose of theHumanistic discourse is in fact rather more practicalthan philosophical or theoretical? An illustration ofsuch a practical interpretation is the archiving roleof the Humanities as suggested by, inter alia, RayBradbury’s Fahrenheit 451 or Ayn Rand’s Anthem.From this point of view it may be said that thebroader picture of what we do in the Humanities isto encompass, to archive, and to transmit all facetsof human experience and knowledge, both empiricaland beyond. And while this is clearly an accuratedepiction of what happens in the various disciplinesof Humanitistic studies, nonetheless, to consider theHumanities solely, or even only largely, under theseauspices still fails to provide adequate answers forthe difficult questions posed by this conferencevenue: viz., why that the Humanities are intellectu-ally marginalized; why funding for Humanities pro-grams is constantly threatened; and why there aretensions between classical or traditional Humanities& the more recent cultural & critical orientation ofsome Humanities programs.Finally, there are obviously philosophical re-

sponses to our Euthyphro-as-metaphor argument.Pierre Hadot is to a large degree responsible in themodern generation for the rekindled idea of philo-sophy as an exercise that frames the philosophicallife. Following in the tradition of the Stoics, the earlyChristians, Ignatius of Loyola, et al, Hadot suggestsa “stoic” impetus that sees value in the practice of alife lived philosophically, and argues that the philo-sophical practice of life is persuasively sensible be-cause the life of the mind is the sole means for theindividual to arrive at happiness. From among theplurality of life-options in societies that are bothfragmented and relativistic, the philosophical lifemust certainly be more desirable than the life of men

lived as brute beasts. This response is certainly inkeeping with traditional interpretations of the dramaof Plato’s Theaetetus, where both the humbleTheaetetus and the wise Socrates fail to solve theaporia concerning human knowledge, but wherePlato’s audience is left with the idea that the dramaticaction of life does not necessarily lie in understand-ing or interpreting and resolving specific intellectualproblems, but lies rather in the simple philosophicalpractice of coming together to reason (vaguely) andto speak (without hope of true discovery) aboutreality and the human experience. At the very least,one argues, this process increases human understand-ing about the human condition. However, this ideal-isation of human inquiry as the goal of the humanit-ies, especially when the student of ideas begins tounderstand that on this reading human inquiry doesnot lead necessarily to increase in knowledge, stillfalls short of addressing meaningfully the hardquestions posed at the outset of this conference ven-ue.While no interpretation of Plato’s dramatic So-

crates may provide a totally unequivocal descriptionand response to problems presently confronting theHumanities, and especially in the AmericanAcademy, there does yet remain an American re-sponse to our difficult questions. One persuasive re-sponse to the questions of this conference, which isat once meaningful, intellectually satisfying, andrelevant to the specifically American evolution ofstudies in the Humanities, is the principle of educa-tion proposed by Thomas Jefferson of Virginia. Un-like the philosophical exercise of wisdom tradition-ally embraced by the western and profoundly platon-ized intellectual tradition, in this new experiment inself-governance called America, argues Jefferson,the people need to be generally educated in order towatch over and safeguard the orderly outworking ofgovernance by the people—the people need to beeducated in order to protect against the corruptionof political power into tyranny. “The most effectualmeans of preventing [the perversion of power intotyranny]”, suggests Jefferson, are,

to illuminate, as far as practicable, the mindsof the people at large, and more especially togive them knowledge of those facts which his-tory exhibits, that possessed thereby of the ex-perience of other ages and countries, they maybe enabled to know ambition under all itsshapes, and prompt to exert their natural powersto defeat its purposes (Thomas Jefferson: Diffu-sion of Knowledge Bill, 1779. FE 2:221, Papers2:526).

Quite distinct from the paideia of the Greeks, thetype of education to which Jefferson alludes consti-tutes in fact the bedrock of a distinctly American

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liberal education, namely politics, history, and thestudy of philosophy for virtue. Even more broadlyconceived, though, Jefferson speaks of a people thatis at once wise and honest, happy and virtuous.

Lawswill bewisely formed and honestly admin-istered in proportion as those who form andadminister them are wise and honest; whenceit becomes expedient for promoting the publichappiness that those persons whom nature hasendowed with genius and virtue should berendered by liberal education worthy to receiveand able to guard the sacred deposit of the rightsand liberties of their fellow citizens...(ThomasJefferson: Diffusion of Knowledge Bill, 1779.FE 2:221, Papers 2:527).

So, although the metaphors and criticisms that havebeen suggested in my argument do not necessarilyelucidate the varied problematic of Platonic interpret-ation, they yet serve the purpose of demonstrating,by a consideration of Socrate’s dramatic dialogues,the insufficiencies of classical western thought tosolve the difficulties presently confronting AmericanHumanities. This allows us to consider in perhaps anew light the radical educational propositions ofThomas Jeffersion of Virgina, and to envision a Jef-fersonian response to the questions we are presentlyhere asking concerning the role, and value, and pur-pose of the study of the Humanities in the Americansociety. At the very least, such a response must in-clude the idea that all teachers of the Humanities inAmerica must be engaged in the struggle to ensurethat the Humanities, through a Liberal education, fi-nally and definitively constitute the core requirementof all education in America. Jefferson did not con-ceive of an America in which the study of the HumanSciences would be in crisis, in which the Humanitieswould have to skirmish with the “hard” sciences forinstitutional approval and funding dollars. In present-day America, among the very first subjects to befunded are in the harder sciences, and among thoseto be cut in times of budget deficit, subjects in theHumanities and the Arts. In Jefferson’s vision ofAmerican, however, the education of the people liesnot in the furtherance of the hard sciences; but in thegeneral improvement of the individual gatekeepersof democracy, which has always been the interestand specific goal of the Humanities.

The value of science [i.e., general knowledge]to a republican people, the security it gives toliberty by enlightening the minds of its citizens,the protection it affords against foreign power,the virtue it inculcates, the just emulation of thedistinction it confers on nations foremost in it;in short, its identification with power, morals,order and happiness (which merits to it premi-

ums of encouragement rather than repressivetaxes), are considerations [that should] always[be] present and [bear] with their just weight.(Thomas Jefferson: On the Book Duty, 1821).

To a very large degree indeed, the continuity of anation’s political, social, and cultural heritage is es-tablished and guaranteed by the ties that bind stu-dents to their teachers. So to enable a Jeffersonianvision, which strives after the ongoing improvementof democracy’s gatekeepers, we teachers of Human-ities must continue to insist upon the study of thosesubjects that keep our eyes riveted upon Power ofall sorts, and upon the subtle permutations of powerinto tyranny. We need to study history, and politics,civics and current events in order to keep before oureyes the political institutions whereby Men defineand govern themselves; and we need to study foreignlanguages, philosophy, religions, mythologies andliteratures, and all the sciences in order to understandthat it is through various and diverse languages and“stories” that we as a people initially begin to frame,and then to flesh out, our political and social institu-tions, which in turn become reflections of the intel-lectual life of the American demos. Why do we dothis? Because, "[i]f the children are untaught, theirignorance and vices will in future life cost us muchdearer in their consequences than it would have donein their correction by a good education" (ThomasJefferson to Joseph C. Cabell, 1818. FE 10:99).

The Crisis of the Humanities: Skepticismand the Rattling of Cages in the NewMillenniumPresenter: John Scott GrayThis section of the essay argues that the assertion

that there exists a crisis in the humanities has beenoverblown. While the face of higher education is achanging one, as the call to assessment and thebusiness model of education stress quantifiable res-ults now, this critic asserts that the humanities con-tinue to maintain a central role in the educationaldevelopment of future generations. Over the nextfew pages, this essay briefly discusses the criticismslodged against the humanities (in particular philo-sophy), both fromwithout and fromwithin. In termsof these internal criticisms, this essay considers inparticular the criticism lodged by the skeptic SextusEmpiricus that philosophy damages thosewho under-take its practice by preventing the possibility fortranquility, a claim which could easily expand to allareas of the humanities that attempt to question andunderstand humanity and our surrounding environ-ment.Literature, Philosophy and the Fine Arts have tra-

ditionally carried the torch as central components of

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a Western liberal arts education. To be consideredwell-rounded one was expected to have groundedtheir particular interests in the great ideas and greattexts of the Anglo-European culture. Criticisms,however, have continued to be lodged against theHumanities, with some well-founded (criticisms thatpoint out the misogynistic and ethnocentric natureof many courses that were taught within these depart-ments) and some perhaps more open to debate. Forexample, some college administrators question thevalue of Humanities programs in aiding the develop-ment of students whose career path in areas outsidethe humanities has already been determined, (forexample, can taking philosophy courses help anursing major become a better nurse?) The askingof questions about the meaning of life, the universe,and everything else, as well as the tireless search foranswers, seems, at least in the eyes of many, to belosing its luster.This phenomenon is compounded by a post-9/11

world that seemsmore inclined to embrace a dualismthat divides the world into clear and distinct compart-ments, (you’re with us or you’re with the terrorists,stay the course or cut and run, Bush is an excellentleader or he’s entirely and completely incompetent).The Humanities have traditionally been concernedwith investigating the gray area of meaning betweenand beyond the “realities” that our society providesas our social/cultural given. It seems as if the middleground of understanding and compromise has be-come increasingly lost, giving way to the dogmatismof the extremes, even within the ivory tower itself.Hellenistic skeptics of the Pyrrhonian mold, such

as second century A.D. thinker Sextus Empiricus,were also critical of the practice of philosophy, butfor slightly different reasons. According to Sextus,the constant raising of questions and the search fortheir answers leaves one in a continuous quest forsomething that cannot, in the end, be discovered –unequivocal and unquestioned truth. For Sextus, in-vestigations of this type prevent ataraxia (translatedas untroubledness or tranquility). Instead of insistingupon the method of doubt common to more moderninterpretations of skepticism, Sextus suggests thatthe proper response to philosophical questions anddilemmas was to adopt the attitude of aporia, whichbasically entails admitting that one is at a loss, aconcept further explained by commentator BensonMates as the state of being “baffled, perplexed,puzzled, stumped, stymied,” (The Skeptic Way, pg.30-31). Once we accept the fact that the various op-tions and arguments leave us at a loss, we allow at-araxia to occur. According to Sextus, “[s]uspensionof judgment is a standstill of the intellect, owing towhich we neither reject nor posit anything. Tranquil-ity is freedom from disturbance or calmness of soul,”(Outlines of Scepticism, pg. 5). Sextus Empiricus is

right in his assertion that doing philosophy (and bydoing I mean joining the process of asking questionsand using reasoning to seek out acceptable answers)may disturb and at times baffle us, interfering withthe ability to achieve ataraxia.The problem that faces the university, and the

question that troubles the philosopher who repliesto Sextus, deals with the degree to which Hellenisticataraxia develops into 21st century complacency.There are three kinds of tranquility that we shouldconsider; first, the tranquility that comes from bury-ing one’s head in the sand (a condition that involvesan ignorance of ignorance), second, the tranquilityof ataraxia Sextus spoke of that comes from the ac-ceptance of ignorance, and third, the tranquility thatcomes from, as a colleague of mine in graduateschool used to call it, knowing the score and embra-cing the challenge. The challenge of ignorance canbe the basis for its own tranquility as it allows oneto better assess their place in the universe, as well asoffer the starting point for a method of improvingtheir position.This is the lesson of Socrates and the examined

life that has been taught a million times in introduc-tion to philosophy courses around the world. In theApology, Socrates seems to not be concerned withthe quest for certainty modernity has provided uswhen he remarks that, “it is the greatest good for aman to discuss virtue everyday.” Just the undertakingof the discussion itself is a victory in Socrates’ mind,regardless of where it might lead. This is the pointof the Euthyphro – not frustration at the inability ofthe conversants to define piety, but the hope thatcomes from the realization of uncertainty itself. So-crates, in effect, desires to rattle Euthyphro’s cage,moving him from the ignorance of ignorance towardthe challenge of ignorance. While they may end theconversation at a loss, the question that haunts mymind reading the Euthyphro is not ‘what is piety’but instead, what happens next in the life of Euthy-phro. Does he return to his prosecution of his father,or is his dogmatic certainty so shaken by the conver-sation with Socrates that he finds himself re-evaluat-ing his actions, and his life as a whole?My curiosity at the future of Euthyphro mirrors

my curiosity at the futures of the students that findtheir way into my classroom. The dogmatic tranquil-ity that comes with having one’s head buried in thesand, like all dogmatism, does not allow an opportun-ity for growth. The same can be said for the accept-ance of ignorance that Sextus appears to present. TheHumanities, in all its various forms, desire the men-tal, spiritual, and cultural growth of the students thatwe face in the classroom. Our students, as they ma-ture, become increasingly aware that existence bringswith it difficult questions regarding how to live andwhat to value. These difficult questions are not

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solved by throwing up our hands and admitting thatwe are at a loss, nor are they addressed by dogmatic-ally maintaining that we already have acceptableanswers.Returning to the nursing student mentioned earlier,

while his or her nursing program might provide thatstudent with the procedures of their practice (teachingone how to do their job properly), a broader educa-tion that includes the Humanities can help that stu-dent understand at a deeper and more fundamentallevel how to do that job well, or better yet how tolive well while doing that job well. This process,however, does more than serving to help the studenttransition from matters of pure theory to practice,but instead seeks eupraxia, or the well being thatcomes through good practice. General education re-quirements that call for courses that endeavor tocover topics such as cultural enrichment andgender/racial understanding admit and embrace thebroader education that underpins these concepts, andcourses in the Humanities have and still play a centralrole in this education.Turning our attention to an issue currently troub-

ling many in this country, we should consider per-haps the defining issues of our time -- the War in Ir-aq, as well as the larger War on Terrorism. A discus-sion about these issues might not be found in aMBAprogram, a Survey Engineering Department, Chem-istry courses, a Pre-Law program or in a School ofNursing. TheHumanities, however, fromLiterature’swritings, History’s lessons, Philosophy’s justifica-tions, and Art’s expressions of the human condition,provide an unparalleled opportunity to discuss theseconflicts. These issues will not be solved or evenunderstood with any depth or sophistication bydenial or dogmatism. Students may, like Euthyphro,believe that they understand these conflicts, as wellas what should be done about them, but is that beliefgrounded on sound reasoning and considered argu-ments crafted in the context of a dialogue with theviews of others? The deaths of U.S. servicemen andwomen occurring in Iraq and Afghanistan, as wellas the political unrest gripping the new Iraq, will notsimply disappear. Having covered the philosophy ofwar and terrorism in my ethics course (as a topic se-lected by my students, I might add), I can attest thata deeper, systematic consideration of the situation,as well as the events that precipitated it, often leaveus with more questions than answers. Yet thesequestions about the value of life, when to put life atrisk, and our understanding of death, are questionsthat our students, in particular our nursing student,must thoughtfully consider. These questions and theresulting conversations help to move our studentsfrom the ignorance of their own ignorance to, at thevery least, an enlightened awareness of the challengeof ignorance as a starting point that can serve in part

to prevent complacency. As Socrates himself fam-ously remarked, it is this awareness of our ignorancethat is perhaps the greatest knowledge, in large partbecause it presents us with the challenge that hopesfor a higher standard of discourse. It also appearsthat Jefferson would agree with these assertions be-cause the awareness of our limitations can serve tohelp prevent the perverse transition of power intotyranny.Of course, on these points I perhaps risk preaching

to the choir. We in the Humanities answer our criticsas we continue to broaden the scope of our workbeyond the traditional western texts of the greatbooks and great works, diversifying our intellectualportfolio through a consideration of underrepresentedvoices. Regardless of the philosophers or texts stud-ied and the questions considered, Philosophy and theHumanities must return to its roots and embrace ourrole as having the ability to serve as a window intothe human condition. With that being said, assess-ment and the business model are not to be feared,for the things that take place in our courses can mostcertainly be assessed. Although this assessmentmightbe undertaken in ways other than the pedestrian preand post tests used by some departments, we shouldcontinue to seek out ways to uncover and demon-strate the effect of our classroom practices on ourstudents. Perhaps onemodelmight involve a programthat questions returning alumni regarding whichcourses they found had the greatest impact in theirpersonal and professional development.My intuitiontells me that many of our courses would do surpris-ingly well in this regard. After all, the methods ofphilosophy and the tools presented in the Humanities,can last a lifetime. As Pierre Hadot points out in“Spiritual Exercises,” Socratic dialogues are “acombat amicable, but real. . . it is necessary to makeoneself change one’s point of view, attitude, set ofconvictions, therefore to dialogue with oneself,therefore to struggle with oneself,” (Philosophy asa Way of Life, pg. 20). In conclusion, I assert thatthe solution to the “so-called” crisis of the Humanit-ies is to recognize that there is no crisis if we onlychoose to re-visit and re-assert the importance of re-flection, examination and struggle in the developmentof good careers, good people and good lives.

The Price of Tranquility: Stoic Therapyin an Age of CynicismPresenter: Grant SniderAnother way to describe the crisis facing the hu-

manities is to say that students and others view ourenterprise from a perspective of cynicism, a sort ofdisbelief or even distrust of what we do for a living.Contemporary and classical versions of cynicism,although they should never be conflated completely,

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do encourage a brand of disengagement with the so-cial and political world: Diogenes, after all, was thefirst “cosmopolitan,” a person without a specifichome in the cosmos—someone unburdened by aneed to remain attentive to the specific ethical orpersonal needs of the other. (Some readers see thisas worldliness, others as an act of exile.) One mightargue that Diogenes and the contemporary cynic bothabsolve themselves of becoming caring citizens. Atbest, theirs is a politics of satire or transgression. Inmy view, though, the danger of cynical thinking isthat one may become so disengaged from "the com-monwealth [of] the whole world," to borrow a phrasefromDiogenes (Davenport 58), as to become irrelev-ant in this cosmopolitan, exiled state. What is ironicto me is that philosophers, at least we teachers ofphilosophy, have for some time enjoyed our ownexiled position within the academy—serving as ac-complices in our own isolation by the way we teach.Some basic tenets of Stoicism--and more so itsmethods as chronicled by Pierre Hadot and MichelFoucault--offer us a chance to rethink what we doin the name of philosophy, and offer us some hopeof reclaiming a relevant role in the academy and inthe world alike. A quick quotation from Nietzscheis instructive: “We want to serve history [we couldsay the humanities] only to the extent that historyserves life: for it is possible to value the study ofhistory to such a degree that life becomes stuntedand degenerate” (59). The question we should askis how effective have we been in making the human-ities serve the lives of our students, to what extentare we making ourselves relevant to and engaged inthe lives of our students.Such a question arose in my own reflections two

years ago when I was teaching a course called Livingthe Good Life in which students were reading selec-tions from The Handbook of Epictetus. This was myfirst time teaching this work, and I was unsure whatresponses it might generate from the students. I couldnot have imagined the number of Stoic conversionsthat took place. Granted, a few students already hadread Meditations by Marcus Aurelius, but nothinghad prepared me for what happened in this course.Students often used his phrases in their hallwayconversations with friends. One student, notably,was so taken with his approach to living that whena relative passed away, the student sent her mourningrelatives sympathy cards filled with quotations fromEpictetus. I told myself at the time that somethingabout his version of Stoicism was resonating in thelives of these students.In retrospect, it was not simply the specific tenets

of Stoicism that excited the students, it was the verymethods of doing philosophy—philosophy as a wayof life—that had captured them: the course actuallyhad assigned the spiritual exercises—what Hadot

calls “psychagogic exercises” or soul inspiring“therapeutics” (Hadot 21, 84), and it was these thathad made philosophy serve life. The methods em-ployed in that course, having students actually en-gage in spiritual exercises, required students to livephilosophically in the sense detailed by Hadot in hisbook Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exer-cises from Socrates to Foucault. To teach philosophyafter this book is to shift from a pedagogy of inquiryto an engaged therapeutics (a psychagogy) of living.This shift is what can make philosophy, and perhapscanmake the humanities in general, relevant and vitalagain.Hadot details too many therapeutics for us to in-

clude here, but he does offer an instructive overview:

Thanks to Philo of Alexandria, however, we dopossess two lists of spiritual exercises. They donot completely overlap, but they do have themerit of giving us a fairly complete panoramaof Stoico-Platonic inspired philosophicaltherapeutics. One of these lists enumerates thefollowing elements: research (zetesis), thoroughinvestigation (skepsis), reading (anagnosis),and indifference to indifferent things. The othernames successively: reading, meditations (me-letai), therapies of the passions, remembranceof good things, self-mastery (enkrateia), andthe accomplishment of duties. (84)

While it is clear that some of these elements arepresent in a pedagogy of inquiry (research, reading,investigation), there are other elements often absentin the philosophy classroom (therapies of the pas-sions, remembrance of good things, and meditation).It is these latter elements that allow one to see thevalue of philosophy for living.Students in our courses can be asked to demon-

strate some skill at the application of this materialthrough something as simple as keeping a “spiritualexercise journal.” Rather than merely serving as amedium of emotive student writing (as is often thecase in journal projects) this version draws uponpractices Hadot generalizes from the likes of Galenand Aurelius: “First thing in the morning, we shouldgo over in advance what we have to do during thecourse of the day, and decide on the principles whichwill guide and inspire our actions. In the evening,we should examine ourselves again, so as to be awareof the faults we have committed or the progress wehave made” (qtd. in 85). The journal serves as thevehicle for those meditations, and students can assessthe relative success andmerits of applying philosoph-ical principles to their own lives.While any number of elements of Stoicism and

therapeutics might be discussed here, there are threeelements that make this approach work. In terms ofthe specific tenets of Stoicism, a la Hadot, we can

29DAVID WYATT AIKEN, JOHN SCOTT GRAY, GRANT SNIDER

show our students how to achieve a state of tranquil-ity. The most basic teaching of Stoicism is “somethings are up to us and others are not” (Epictetus287). Helping our often anxious students understandthat while much of the world shows little respect forour desires, our own internal responses, judgments,and reactions are within our control—and that wecan craft them in an intentional way. This lesson canhelp us achieve the sort of tranquility and reducedworry promised by Stoicism.A second Stoic tenet, prosopa (Gill xxii) answers

a potential criticism to the apparent detached (stoic-al?) reaction to the suffering of others, and it providesa way for philosophy and our students to engage inthe world directly, personally, and meaningfully. Inthe Handbook, Epictetus suggests:

When you see someone weeping in sorrow atthe departure of his child or the loss of hisproperty, take care not to be carried away bythe impression that he is involved in externalsthat are bad, but at once be ready to say, ‘It isnot what has happened that afflicts this person(for it does not afflict another), but his judgmentconcerning it.’ As far as words go, however, donot shrink from sympathizing with him, andeven, if the opportunity arises, from groaningwith him; but be careful not to groan inwardlytoo. (292)

The point here is that while we should internallyunderstand that we face challenges in living that arebeyond our control (the loss of a loved one), weshould stay committed and supportive in our roleswithin family and social structures (offering comfortto those who have lost the loved one). Students areattracted to this tenet, I believe, because it gives thema way to engage the world around them that is imme-diate and effective when they would otherwise turnaway from discussions about political or civic re-sponsibility. Prosopa can lead to that engagement,to be sure, but students do not seem as quick to reactcynically about the Stoic approach to that engage-ment. The concept of Prosopa (responsibility to asocial role) makes philosophy attentive to the other,to ethics, to being-with others—the Jeffersoniandream, perhaps.Third, the specific and detailed therapeutic prac-

tices described by Hadot are consistent with currentbest-practices in learning-centered teaching. Thepractice of philosophy as a way of life (reinforcedthrough spiritual or pyschagogic exercises) makesphilosophy serve life: makes it relevant, necessary,useful, and personal—all of the best traits suggestedin research on student learning. Students will respondto this approach, and they will see the value ofphilosophy, and they will ask for more of it fromtheir institutions.

A few words here at the end about cynicism.Would anyone ever use Diogenes in the same com-forting waymy student had used Epictetus to comfortmourning relatives? Why not? Perhaps cynicism inits various forms cannot serve life. After all, Dio-genes reminds us, “no one can live with me as acompanion: it would be too inconvenient” and “ofwhat use is a philosopher who doesn’t hurt anybody’sfeelings?” (Davenport 39-40) So long as teachingpractices in the humanities remain exiled, on a cyn-ical island of the blessed, unwilling to engage in thedebates about student learning and assessment, orunwilling to stoop to justifications about relevance,the humanities will continue to lose their all import-ant offerings to life.Considering the themes raised by my colleagues,

the assertion made here regarding the tools ofStoicism clearly connects with the Socratic treatmentof pedagogy. This Stoic-Socratic approach to philo-sophy as a way of life is consistent with philosophyas an open-ended process, and like the Jeffersonianalternative, emphasizes the growth of responsiblecitizens. The Stoic-Socratic method of engaging lifeat the most personal levels provides students a re-sponse to their lived need for philosophy. It alsoprovides us a caution against waiting for the perfectphilosophy, against waiting for a perfect approachto education, a caution even against demanding animmediately responsible citizen. Here is Epictetusin direct yet forgiving terms:

What sort of teacher, then, are you still waitingfor, that you should delay setting yourself rightuntil he comes? . . . . now is the time of thecontest, and the Olympic games have arrived,and that you cannot defer things any longer,and that it rests on a single day and a single ac-tion whether your progress is lost or maintained.That was how Socrates became theman he was,by heeding nothing but his reason in all that heencountered. And even if you are not yet a So-crates, you should live as one who does indeedwish to be a Socrates. (Epictetus 305, italicsadded)

Our students hunger for a Socrates in our classrooms.One of the best things we can provide them is spir-itual exercises that foster an awareness of the So-crates already available and accessible within them-selves.

Concluding RemarksWhat is shared in these three responses to the “crisisin the humanities” is a belief that an apologetics for“the humanities” based on the search for absoluteswill not convince in this age of distrust in Truth. Thefirst response here confronts the Socratic tradition

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with respect to its failure to convert young Atheniansto the ways of philosophy. This response also encour-ages us to consider the hopeful Jeffersonian ideal ofan educated citizenry to justify the Humanities toanyone who cares to listen to arguments of justifica-tion. The second response shares the belief that theHumanities should no longer ground its defenses onthe establishment of Truth; rather, we should em-brace the Socratic tradition as a process of rattling

the cages of complacency that hinder our citizens’potential to engage the world in intentional and re-flective ways—all with no guarantee that we willsee significant immediate results. The third responsebuilds upon the second. It affirms specific Stoic-So-cratic practices that work effectively with cynicalstudents who yet ironically confess a need to thinkphilosophically about their worlds and lives.

ReferencesArieti, John. Interpreting Plato. Rowman & Littlefield: MD, 1991.Davenport, Guy. Trans. Herakleitos and Diogenes. Grey Fox Press: San Francisco, 1999.Epictetus. The Discourses, The Handbook, and Fragments. Trans. by Robin Hard. Everyman: London, 1995.Gill, Christopher. “Introduction.” The Discourses, The Handbook, and Fragments by Epictetus. Trans. by Robin Hard.

Everyman: London: 1995.Hadot, Pierre. Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault. Trans. by Michael Chase.

Blackwell Publishing: Malden, MA. 1995.Jefferson, Thomas. Diffusion of Knowledge Bill, 1779. FE 2:221, Papers 2:526; On the Book Duty, 1821; Thomas Jefferson

to Joseph C. Cabell, Jan. 4, 1818. FE 10:99; http://etext.virginia.edu/jefferson/quotations/jeff1350.htmMartin, Luther H., Gutman, Huck and Patrick eds. Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault. University

of Massachusetts Press: Amherst, 1988.Mates, Benson. The Skeptic Way: Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Oxford University Press, New York, 1996.Nietzsche, Friedrich. Untimely Meditations. Ed. Daniel Breazeale. Cambridge University Press, 1997.-----. Antichrist. Nietzsche Werke. Herausgegeben von Karl Schlechta. Mit der Biographie von Curt Paul Janz, Bd. 2, 1163,

S. 7896. Digitale Bibliothek Band 31, Directmedia: Berlin, 2000.Plato, The Complete Works, edited by John M. Cooper. Hackett Publishers: SF, 1997.Sextus Empiricus. Outlines of Scepticism. Trans. by Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes. Cambridge University Press, New

York, 1994.

About the AuthorsDr. David Wyatt AikenDavidWyatt Aiken. Doctorat D’Etat (1995) from the University of Nice in Philosophy, Comparative Literature,History of Ideas; Doctorat de Troisième Cycle (1981), from the University of Strasbourg in Philosophy; Pro-fessor of Humanities, Philosophy, and Religion at Ferris State University, Michigan, USA; Research Interests:Hermeneutics; Philosophies & Religions of the ancient world; Publications: “Nietzsche’s Zarathustra. TheMisreading of a Hero,” in Nietzsche-Studien, (Band 35, 2006); “History Undone. The Appropriation ofThucydides.” in Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte (ZRGG, 57, 4 (2005) J. Brill); “Nietzsche andhis Zarathustra. AWestern Poet’s Transformation of an Eastern Priest and Prophet,” in Zeitschrift für Religions-und Geistesgeschichte (ZRGG 55, 4 (2003), J. Brill) ; “Hermeneia. An Anatomy of History and Ab-wesenheit,”in The Library of Living Philosophers (LLP) volume on The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer. Open Court:Chicago, 1997.

Dr. John Scott GrayJohn Scott Gray earned his PhD in Philosophy at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale. He originallyearned a BA in Philosophy and Political Science at Furman University in Greenville, SC, moving on to BaylorUniversity where he earned aMasters in Philosophy, writing on Nietzsche's Political Philosophy. His dissertationand recent publications focused on same-sex marriage, and related issues in the philosophy of sex and genderare also an interest of his. His current research interests focus on the various areas of applied philosophy, includingbioethics, environmental ethics, and business ethics, as well as political and social philosophy.

Dr. Grant SniderGrant Snider earned a PhD in English from Purdue University with an emphasis in Critical Theory. He alsoholds a Masters degree in American Literature/Creative Writing from Kansas State University and a Bachelorsdegree in English from Northern Arizona University. Dr. Snider has taught courses in philosophy, literary criti-cism, and utopian literature. His research interests include Stoicism, the overlap between psychology and

31DAVID WYATT AIKEN, JOHN SCOTT GRAY, GRANT SNIDER

philosophy, and the philosophy of the good life. Currently, he is Academic Head for the Department of Human-ities at Ferris State University.

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THE HUMANITIES, VOLUME 532

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THE HUMANITIES

EDITORS

Tom Nairn, RMIT University, Melbourne.

Mary Kalantzis, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, USA.

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Patrick Baert, Cambridge University, UK.

David Christian, San Diego State University, California, USA.

Bill Cope, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, USA.

Mick Dodson, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia.

Hafedh Halila, Institut Supérieur des Langues de Tunis, Tunisia.

Ted Honderich, University College, London.

Paul James, RMIT University, Australia.

Moncef Jazzar, Institut Supérieur des Langues de Tunis, Tunisia.

Eleni Karantzola, University of the Aegean, Greece.

Bill Kent, Monash Centre, Prato, Italy.

Krishan Kumar, University of Virginia, USA.

Ayat Labadi, Institut Supérieur des Langues de Tunis, Tunisia.

Greg Levine, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia.

Fethi Mansouri, Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia.

Juliet Mitchell, Cambridge University, UK.

Nikos Papastergiadis, University of Melbourne, Australia.

Robert Pascoe, Victoria University, Melbourne, Australia.

Scott Schaffer, Millersville University, USA.

Jeffrey T. Schnapp, Stanford University, USA.

Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Columbia University, USA.

Giorgos Tsiakalos, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece.

Siva Vaidhyanathan, New York University, USA.

Hortensia Beatriz Vera Lopez, University of Nottingham, UK.

Chris Ziguras, RMIT University, Australia.

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