SINO-RUSSIAN POLICIES IN THE CENTRE

AND PERIPHERY: A COMPARATIVE

ANALYSIS

Ph.D Thesis

Research Scholar

SAMRA SARFRAZ KHAN

DEPARTMENT OF GENERAL HISTORY

UNIVERSITY OF KARACHI

2017

SINO-RUSSIAN POLICIES IN THE CENTRE

AND PERIPHERY: A COMPARATIVE

ANALYSIS

A Dissertation Submitted

By

SAMRA SARFRAZ KHAN

For

The Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in General History

Research Supervisor

PROF. DR. UZMA SHUJAAT

DEPARTMENT OF GENERAL HISTORY

UNIVERSITY OF KARACHI

2017

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TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

It is certified that this thesis entitled “SINO-RUSSIAN POLICIES IN THE CENTRE

AND PERIPHERY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS” submitted to BASR,

University of Karachi by Ms Samra Sarfraz Khan, has been completed under my

supervision and fulfills all requirements for the award of the degree of Doctor of

Philosophy in General History.

Prof Dr. Uzma Shujaat

Research Supervisor

Area Study Centre for Europe

University of Karachi

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

First and foremost, I would like to thank Allah Almighty for giving me the courage and

determination to go successfully through my PhD thesis.

I would like to express my profound appreciation to my supervisor, Prof. Dr. Uzma

Shujaat, for being an excellent advisor and friend towards me. Her knowledge,

appreciation and guidance provided me with ample opportunities to grow as a researcher.

I would also like to thank my colleagues in the Department of History (Gen.) for their

encouragement towards achieving my goal. A special word of gratitude is due for Prof.

Dr. S.M. Taha for his unprecedented support throughout the period of my research work.

His timely help and supervision always saved my day.

I would also like to extend a very special thanks to my parents Mrs. and Lieutenant

Colonel Raja Sarfraz Khan, family and friends whose prayers helped me to sustain thus

far.

At the end, I would like to express my most sincere gratitude to my husband, Squadron

Leader Omair uddin Baig. Words cannot express the magnitude of having his

companionship in a continual cycle of tiring days and sleepless nights that continued

through these years of research, and of having his support in times when there was no one

else to answer my questions.

Samra Sarfraz Khan

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Dedicated To

My Parents

And

Husband

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CERTIFICATE iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv

DEDICATION v

LIST OF FIGURES ix

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS xii

ABSTRACT (English) xiv

ABSTRACT (Urdu) xvii

INTRODUCTION 1

Chapter 1: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE PERIPHERIES OF

RUSSIA AND CHINA

28

1.1 Problems on the Roof: China’s Presence in Tibet 29

1.2 Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Frontier 34

1.3 Problems Across the Strait: China’s History in Taiwan 40

1.4 The Fragrant Harbor: China In Hong Kong 45

1.5 Problems in the Russian Periphery 53

1.6 Chechens Identity & the Ingush Dilemma 59

1.7 Dagestani Fervor 68

1.8 Kabardino-Balkaria 78

Chapter 2: CHINA AND RUSSIA IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA 90

2.1 Chinese Periphery after 1991 90

2.2 The Last Years of British Hong Kong 98

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2.3 Uyghurs and Hans in the 1990s 104

2.4 Cross-Strait Relations: China and Taiwan During the 1990s 112

2.5 The Russian Periphery (1991-2000) 117

2.6 Russia and Chechnya Since 1991 119

2.6.1 The Second Caucasus War: Russian Invasion of Chechnya

(1994-1996)

129

2.6.2 The Second Chechen War 132

2.7 The Soviet Elite in Dagestan 138

2.7.1 A tale of two brothers: The Rise and Fall of Nadir and

Magomed Khachialev

139

2.8 Events of Insurgency in KBR 145

2.9 The Problems in Ingushetia 152

Chapter 3: WINDS OF CHANGE: THE IMPORTANCE OF SINO-

RUSSIAN TIES IN A CHANGING WORLD

159

3.1 Disturbed Peripheries of Russia and China 159

3.2 The Georgian Dilemma 168

3.3 Russia’s Return in Great Power Politics 175

3.4 The Surprise in Ingushetia and KBR 178

3.5 China’s Reign of Terror 182

3.6 Change of Tides in the Strait 186

3.7 Chains, Pearls and Road: A Chinese Trilogy 191

3.8 Sino-Russian Ties in the Post-9/11 World 199

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Chapter 4: CHINESE AND RUSSIAN COUNTER POLICIES IN THE

CONTEXT OF DISTURBED PERIPHERIES

212

4.1 Chinese Periphery And The New Geo-Political Environment 213

4.2 Russia’s Volatile Frontiers 238

4.2.1 From Ethno-Nationalism to Ethno-Secessionism 248

4.3 Sino-Russian Ties in the New Political Order 268

Chapter 5: THE STATE AND THE GOD: A HISTORY OF RELIGION

IN RUSSIA AND CHINA

272

5.1 Religion in China 272

5.2 Government And Religion: A Reactive Process 282

5.3 State and Religion In Russia 286

5.4 From Lenin to Mao: The Suppression of Religion In Russia

And China

300

5.5 The Religious Characteristic of Ethno-National Conflict In

China And Russia

303

5.6 Aides of Control: Media And Censorship in China And Russia 311

5.7 Remarks on Chinese And Russian Control on Media and

Religion

321

Chapter 6: EMERGING DYNAMICS OF SINO-RUSSIAN

PARTNERSHIP IN THE PERIPHERY: CHINA IN THE

RUSSIAN FAR EAST

323

6.1 History of the Russian Far East 324

6.2 The Soviet Years And Afterwards 330

6.3 Changing Dynamics of Russian Foreign Policy 335

6.4 A Brief Outlook of the RFE 341

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6.5 Osvoenie: Russia’s Northern Policy 349

6.6 A Brief History of the North 352

6.7 Chinese Involvement In The RFE 367

6.8 Why Russia needs China 375

CONCLUSION 377

RECOMMENDATIONS 402

BIBLIOGRAPHY 410

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure i Map of Dagestan 11

Figure ii Map of the Caucasus region 12

Figure 1.1 Map showing Xinjiang and its border territories. 34

Figure 1.2 Average annual economic growth of Hong Kong as indicated by

number of ships.

53

Figure 1.3 Average annual increase in Hong Kong’s population from 1841 to

1895.

53

Figure 1.4 Map of North Caucasus 55

Figure 1.5 Statistical illustration of the number of secular and Islamic

schools between 1904 and 1917

75

Figure 1.6 Russian military expansion in the North Caucasus (18th

and 19th

centuries)

75

Figure 1.7 Ethnic distribution in Kabardino-Balkaria 79

Figure 2.1 Hong Kong’s GDP Growth by Year 103

Figure 2.2 Private sector Producing units and Employed Persons(by district)

in Xinjiang, 2004

107

Figure 2.3 Map of Chechnya 137

Figure 2.4 Chronology of terrorist events in Russia (1999-2011) 157

Figure 3.1 Map of Russia showing the northwest Caucasus 166

Figure 3.2 China and Taiwan’s Exports 189

Figure 3.3 China and Taiwan’s Imports 190

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Figure 3.4 Taiwan’s Investment in China 190

Figure 3.5 Map showing the location of First and Second Island Chain 193

Figure 3.6 String of Pearls 194

Figure 3.7 Sino-Russian trade 205

Figure 3.8 Chinese exports to Russia 207

Figure 3.9 Russian Exports to China 207

Figure 3.10 Map of UGSS of Russia 208

Figure 3.11 Map of Sila Sibiri 208

Figure 3.12 China’s oil imports from Russia and KSA 209

Figure 4.1 Population and average income in Urumqi by ethnicity 218

Figure 4.2 Inter-provincial migration patterns of Han population 219

Figure 4.3 Map showing the Nine Dotted Line and the location of some of

the disputed islands in the South China Sea

234

Figure 4.4 Map showing the geographical location of Greater Caucasus. 240

Figure 4.5 Map showing shipment route for BTC pipeline 243

Figure 4.6 Blue Stream gas pipeline and layout for South Stream Gas

Pipeline.

244

Figure 4.7 Gas supplies via the Blue Stream gas pipeline 244

Figure 4.8 Terrorist attacks in Russia between 1st January 1992 and 31

st

December 2011

257

Figure 4.9 Statistics of the Victims in North Caucasus (2013) 261

Figure 4.10 Statistics of target types in terrorist activities (2013) 262

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Figure 5.1 Social hierarchy under the Mongols 279

Figure 5.2 Religious groups in Russia (1991-2008) 303

Figure 5.3 Top-10 Media Markets 315

Figure 5.4 Top TV Channels Audience Reach, 2012-2013 315

Figure 5.5 Top Weeklies in terms of Audience Reach (All-Russia) 316

Figure 5.6 Structural Change of the Russian Media Market 316

Figure 5.7 Daily and Non-Daily Newspapers Circulation Figures in China 320

Figure 5.8 Top Ten Daily Newspapers as of 2000 321

Figure 6.1 Map of Russia including the Russian Far East 325

Figure 6.2 Map of Russian expansion (1553-1894) 329

Figure 6.3 Far Eastern Republic in 1922 330

Figure 6.4 East Siberian-Pacific Ocean Pipeline 344

Figure 6.5 Map of Russia’s north 351

Figure 6.6 Northeast Passage 359

Figure 6.7 Northern Sea Route 360

Figure 6.8 Sailing distances between Asia and Europe throughthe Nep 363

Figure 6.9 Russia’s key trading partners in Asia ($ billion) 368

Figure 6.10 Share of China, Japan and South Korea in the RFEFD’s Trade 370

Figure 6.11 Chinese Investments in the REF-Transbaikal by Province (2011-

2012) In Millions of Dollars

371

Figure 6.12 Strategic Location of Zarubino Port 372

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ETIM East Turkestan Independence Movement

XUAR Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

TAR Tibet Autonomous Region

RFE Russian Far East

PRC People’s Republic of China

ROC Republic of China

SAR Special Administrative Region

CCP Chinese Communist Party

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

BLDC Basic Law Drafting Committee

FDI Foreign Direct Investment

SEF Strait Exchange Foundation

ARATS Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait

KBR Kabardino-Balkaria

NCCP National Congress of Chechen People

RSFSR Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic

ASSR Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic

AO Autonomous Oblast

NCBP National Congress of Balkar People

SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization

CNPC China National Petroleum Corporation

CIS Commonwealth of Independent States

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OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

ETLO East Turkestan Liberation Organization

SLOC Sea Lanes of Communication

COSCO Chinese Ocean Shipping Company

B&R Belt and Road / One Belt, One Road Initiative

CRCC China Railway Construction Corporation

CSSTA Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement

SCS South China Sea

SKFO North Caucasus Federal District

SARA State Administration for religious Affairs

KMT Kuomintang

EEU Eurasian Economic Union

RFEFD Russian Far Eastern Federal District

NSR Northern Sea Route

NEP Northeast Passage

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ABSTRACT

The thesis entitled “Sino-Russian Policies in the Centre and Periphery: A Comparative

Analysis”, shall focus on different aspects of the peripheries of Russia and China. For a

thorough understanding, a selective number of areas have been chosen from the two

states’ peripheries. The regions selected for the study of Russian periphery lie in the

northwest Caucasus, namely; Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria.

In the case of China, Tibet Autonomous Region, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,

Hong Kong and Taiwan will be discussed in detail.

The significance of the above mentioned territories lie in the unique nature of their

relationship with their respective centres. The policies devised by the centre, which lie at

notable distance from these regions, are often regarded with skepticism and doubt. The

selected Russian peripheries of northwest Caucasus, Tibet and Xinjiang, which

experience a rather uneasy relation with Moscow and Beijing respectively, also carry

huge significance for the national governments, for these regions are immensely rich in

natural resources including oil and gas. Moreover, these regions also serve as

hydrocarbon conduits, thus adding to their significance. In addition to this, the above

named territories lie in such a geographical arrangement that they become extremely

important in the respective national policy framework of the two countries. Although,

both Russia and China have colossal opportunities in these regions but the perturbed state

of affairs present both governments with immense challenges to conduct their policies in

the best interest of the country.

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While Hong Kong’s relations with Beijing are smooth and comfortable, but in the recent

past, the centre’s attempts to exercise CCP’s principles in the island territory have caused

friction in the relations between the island territory and the mainland. As for the case of

Taiwan, historical dispute between the two governments has come between, time and

again, in smooth bilateral relations across the strait, whereas comfortable relations

between the two are especially important for China’s ever growing economy.

Moreover, both China and Russia, which share a communist past, also share a similar

attitude in handling matters related to expression and religion in the above mentioned

peripheries inhabited by ethnic minorities. In addition, China and Russia, lying at close

proximity with each other share common interests and apprehensions in the context of

regional and trans-regional politics. These factors have brought the two countries together

in political and economic spheres. This thesis also discusses the potential of Sino-Russian

partnership in the region in view of regional geo-political milieu and of countering non-

regional hegemony in the region.

This research focuses on the policies of Russia and China in these disturbed peripheries.

It brings to light how measures designed in the centre for the management of these

peripheries are implemented in these regions of Russia and China and why such policies

have often failed in bringing about the desired results. It also highlights the areas of

trouble in Beijing’s and Moscow’s political framework and the policies designed by the

respective centres to counter them, as well as the commonalities and differences in these

policies. As both Russia and China occupy a significant position in world politics, it is

important to understand the problems faced by their leadership within the borders and

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also in their individual peripheries, as these challenges also have serious effects on the

two countries’ global reputation.

By using historical references and quantitative research methods, the research is a sincere

endeavor at bringing out a clearer and unbiased picture of the challenges and possible

solutions to the problems in these two similar-to-an-extent societies.

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INTRODUCTION

Both Russia and China possess a noteworthy place in world politics. However, the

economic and political might of the two giants is not without predicaments. The two

powers face serious anti-state sentiments within their borders. Majority of the research

done these days addresses the economic policies of China and Russia and their

relationship with the west. A lack of research focused on the comparative policy

challenges at home, in the periphery of Beijing and Moscow along with strategic

evolution of Sino-Russian ties must be ratified by conducting research on such and

relevant issues.

The research entitled, “A Comparative Study of the Chinese and Russian Policies in the

Centre and in the Periphery: Challenges and Opportunities” shall focus on the gray areas

involving the state politics of Russia and China. Believing that these problems cast a

serious threat to the international standing of the two aspiring world powers in the

international community, the research shall be an attempt at bringing out a clearer and

unbiased picture of the challenges and the possible solutions to the problems in these two

similar-to-an-extent societies. The research focuses on the similarities and contrasts in the

regional policies of Russia and China. It shall also highlight the uneasy factors in

Beijing’s and Moscow’s political framework and their respective policies to counter

them.

As deciding regional actors and as aspiring global powers, the international standing of

both Russia and China in world politics remains beyond question. However, it is

important to understand that both the states face serious issues within the borders and

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peripheries. As these challenges have serious effects on the two countries’ global

reputation, consequently, these problems also bring serious alterations in their respective

foreign as well as home policies. Certain factors bring a degree of similarity in the

domestic situation of the two countries. Both the states face separatist movements within

their borders. Moreover, religious element is very evident in these movements. Neither of

the two governments is ready to surrender to the local insurgents for reasons national and

otherwise. Interestingly enough, the separatist movements in Russia and China are being

experienced in regions which have huge geo-strategic, geo-political and geo-economic

significance for their respective regions in particular and for the international community

in general. Another common factor in Russian and Chinese politics is religion. In both the

countries religion; though a private matter of the citizens, is becoming more of an issue

for national politics. For example, religion is a corner stone in the separatist movement in

Tibet and Xinjiang in China and in Chechnya and Dagestan in Russia. Moreover, many

people in Russia are rapidly becoming weary of the ‘forced secularization’ and are

raising criticism against their government for the same. Another common factor is the

role and position of media in Chinese and Russian societies. The two governments follow

the policy of press and television censorship and government authorities largely control

this most convenient means of communication. The censorship also invites criticism from

national as well as international communities. The research, therefore, also looks into the

control of media and religion, and the expected results on the states’ performances.

China, an economic giant, is the topic of most of the researches done these days. But in

many of the researches the economic rise and the economic policies of China are more

bring attended to. The same gap can be felt in researches conducted on Russia. As a

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result, the domestic challenges confronting Beijing and Moscow, a question of profound

importance, seems to be neglected. This research shall fill the vacuum created by the lack

of research on such topics. The research also aims to highlight the domestic policies of

Russia. A former super power, Russia is aspiring to take the world stage yet again by the

next few years. For this purpose, Moscow has formed strategic partnership with countries

other than the traditional actors in world politics. An example in this regard is of the

economic alliance in the form of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China). The research

will also calculate the possible outcomes of such other strategic partnerships between

China and Russia and their probable effects on the regional as well as international

political order.

During the twentieth century, Russia and China followed the policy of secularization of

their respective communities for the sake of scientific and technological development.

While Marx considered religion as opium for men, Lenin saw it as a “cheap way” of

justifying human existence. However, in the course of time, there were many who

abandoned the very notion both overtly and covertly. Over the period of time it became

difficult for the Russian regimes to continue their crackdown on believers. Although

believers of all faiths were subjected to secularization but a counter retaliation was more

profoundly experienced from the Muslim section of the population. One of the

underlying causes for this phenomenon is the high poverty rate in some of the Muslim

majority areas, a growing Muslim demography and a global deepening of the various

militant networks. The gap between rich and poor regions is more than just obvious in

Russia. As a matter of fact, most of Russia’s poorest regions happen to be those

populated by Muslims. As a result of Soviet policies of confining industrial surplus to the

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Slavic inhabited areas of the country, all of the titular Muslim republics are located in the

economically poorest districts of Russia, that is, the Southern districts and the Volga

Federal Districts. The economy of the North Caucasus’s Muslim Republics is also among

the worst in Russia. (Things are comparatively better in Bashkortostan, Tatarstan and

some Volga republics).

As for China, the early decades of the twentieth century presented two inter-related

questions before Chinese nationalists; should the Chinese nation be an ethnic entity of the

Han people in the eastern provinces, or should it rather be a political entity including the

western and eastern areas, inhabited by non-Han population, which encompassed the

sovereignty of the Qing Empire. Since 1949, many changes have taken place in the socio-

economic and political spheres of the Chinese society. Reforms in the economic sector

along with the opening of trade have given many new opportunities to the ethnic groups

or minzu in China. However, many issues including the unequal exploitation of resources,

unequal development and demographic problems continue to create challenges for the

central government. The Chinese leadership, therefore, has to face conflicting reactions

from Tibet, Mongolia and Xinjiang.

In a similar context, Taiwan and Hong Kong, in addition to Tibet and Xinjiang pose huge

challenges for Beijing. While One Country Two Systems Formula forms the system of

government in Hong Kong, the public sentiments in Taiwan are highly critical of any

such formula being introduced for their region against the much aspiring wishes of the

PRC. Whereas in Tibet, neither the government nor the masses are in favor of converting

the region into a Special Administrative Region (SAR), on the model of Hong Kong and

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Macau. A considerable section of the Tibetan leadership has been quite vocal in the

demand for autonomy during the recent decades. In addition to this, Xinjiang is the most

imperative question before Beijing at the moment. A Muslim majority province, Xinjiang

is a gateway into oil rich Central Asia, which China cannot afford to lose at any cost. The

significance of the province becomes even greater in view of the New Great Game, US’s

designs in Afghanistan and the insurgency in Pakistan which shares a common border

with the Chinese province of Xinjiang.

The significance of the topic is further substantiated by the fact that China, an economic

giant of Asia, is fast taking the world stage with its strong market force, followed by

Russia which is set on the path to attain its long aspired status of retaking the super power

image across the globe. Other than ethnic issues in the Russian and Chinese peripheries,

Sino-Russian partnership is fast becoming an inevitable reality of modern world politics.

The partnership between Russia and China rests purely on economic grounds.

Nevertheless, both the states have had their share of troublesome phases of socio-

economic struggle that slowly but steadily evolved into the economic force that is today’s

Russia and China. It is for this reason that a comprehensive study be made of the various

phases in the development of the two states since.

China and Russia in a comparative mode

Throughout history, as per ethnic tensions, both Chinese and Russian regimes have tasted

more or less an equal share of utmost challenging nature. From the grassless steppes of

Central Asia to the northwestern Caucasus and from the mountainous terrains of East

Turkestan to the casinos of Macao, both Moscow and Beijing have passed turbulent

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passages in history’s timeline. Ironically enough, Russo-Chinese relations itself have

been of a rather complicated nature. The two neighboring powers experienced a tide of

changing relations, beginning from the thirteenth century up to the present time.

However, many a times, it also did happen that the two states were kept from not only

going global in their international relations but also from coming closer to each other in

face of the daunting tasks to be settled in and along their borders.

The first physical contacts between China and Russia may be traced back to the twelfth

and thirteenth centuries, for it was only then that the two civilizations were brought into a

formidable contact by the Mongol conquest of China and Russia. As the Christian church

faced a split in 1054 into the Western or the Roman Catholic Church and the Eastern or

the Greek Orthodox Church, an intense feeling of isolation and mistrust soon followed

that was to psychologically and practically keep the two halves of Europe at bay. As a

matter of fact, other than some accessional feuds along the Baltic coast, the Russians

were left largely to themselves as the northern and eastern hinterlands for the most part

remained deserted and the Byzantium Empire in the south was now convulsing in the

aftermath of the crusades and the subsequent decline of the imperial power in

Constantinople. Taking advantage of the Chinese and Russian weaknesses in the twelfth

and thirteenth century, Mongols conquered the two adjacent territories in 1234 and 1240

respectively. Stretching from Hungary to southern China, Mongols established a single

formidable empire signifying the spirit of Pax Mongolica.1 Thus were also started the

first known historical contacts between Russians and Chinese as the court of the Great

Khan housed both Chinese and Russian elements both in person and in persona. The

1. R.K.I Quested, Sino-Russia Relations: A Short History, (New York: Routledge, 1984), p.21

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installment of Ming Dynasty in China in 1368 reshaped Chinese politics whereby; links

with foreign governments were restricted to Japan, Korea, Mongolia and Southeast Asia.

Conversely, contact with Russia became a memory of the bygone days.

In Russia, the Mongol Yoke continued from 1240 to 1478 during which time the

Russians were diverted from western to an eastern or Eurasian mode of development.

From the time of its establishment in the mid twelfth century, Muscovy remained the

capital seat of Russian government. When Michael Romanov became the Czar in 1584,

he continued the process of Russian expansion simultaneously while enriching Russian

trade experiences with England and Central Asian states.2 Though trade with England

was started during the times of Ivan the Terrible, the Romanovs took special interest in

the world around them. In 1615 and 1616 envoys were sent to gather information about

the Chinese Empire and its customs. Their reports mentioned China as a “powerful,

wealthy land, rich in satins, velvets, silks, gold, silver and grains, and quite accessible to

Cossack expeditions.”3 These reports excited the Czar to send an investigation mission to

China which thus set the stage for Russian advance into the highly populated Chinese

empire of the seventeenth century.

The mission returned from Peking with not much success. For the next few decades, the

political upheavals in Central Asia, North China and Mongolia along with the challenges

before the Russian government on its western frontiers kept Muscovy from venturing into

Ming China. It was only in 1643 that the Russians reached Amur River for the first time.

This expedition was principally for the quest for more tribes to be brought under the

2. Ibid, pp.22-23, 25 3. R.K.I Quested, Sino-Russia Relations: A Short History, Op.Cit., pp.25-27

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Russian ‘fur tribute’ system. Suffering a harsh treatment at the hands of the Russians, the

locals reported Russian activities to the Manchus who had established their power in

Peking in 1644. This state of affairs continued for the next few years until in 1649 when

the local tribes once again complained the Manchus of the Russian peril and demanded

the former of either providing defense against the Russians or to allow the local populace

to accept Russian suzerainty so as to avoid the payment of tribute. This led to the

determining of the final decision of Manchus; of ridding themselves of the Russian threat

at their borders. Thus, in 1652 the Russo-Chinese battle was fought with the result going

in the favor of Russians. Almost simultaneous to these events were local rebellions and

declining health conditions in Muscovy; leading to a profound dilapidation in Russia’s

European trade. Thereafter, Czar Aleksei diverted Russian trade towards Asia.

Consequently, missions were dispatched to India in 1651 and to China in 1652.4

As for China, having made vassal states in Korea and Mongolia, the Manchus treated

foreigners with arrogant contempt. The Russian embassy sent under the headship of

Fedor Isakovich Baikov in 1653 for the purpose of settling border dispute and to establish

bilateral trade was also treated thus. As Baikov refused to bow to the Emperor, he was

forced to leave without meeting the imperial head. Though the embassy failed in its

purpose, it nevertheless provided a foundation for subsequent Russian diplomatic

attempts with China. The second Russian embassy to China under Perfil’ev left for China

in 1658 with the Russian promise of chalking out a peaceful solution to the cross-border

problems across the Amur River and of keeping the territory sans Russian soldiers.

Though received hospitably, no agreement could be achieved on Amur conflict. As a

4. Ibid, pp.29-30

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matter of fact, the conflict at Amur continued on the previous note. Nonetheless, trade

between the two sides continued unaffected and the Russian town of Nerchinsk and the

Chinese town of Naun gained international reputation for their brisk trading activities. In

the same light, Russian private and public trade caravans also frequently visited Peking.

The furthering of trade activities required the settlement of the most pertinent issues

between the two regimes; namely the border disputes. Therefore, in 1675, Nikolai

Spafarii left for Peking where he reached in 1676. This embassy, however, was also

treated with disrespect by the Manchus and the Czar’s demands to Emperor Kang Hsi for

perpetual ‘friendship, a Chinese embassy in Moscow, and the permission for Chinese

craftsmen to travel to Russia’ went unanswered.5 It was finally in 1689 that the Sino-

Chinese conflict across the Amur region was resolved by means of the Treaty of

Nerchinsk; the first formal treaty between the two empires and the groundwork for future

bilateral diplomatic relations. The treaty put an end to the conflict started as an outcome

of Cossack encroachments into the region for fur trade where the people formerly paid

tribute to the Chinese Emperor in Peking. Russians withdrew their fortifications from

Amur. However, it was trade that soon became the momentous factor in the outcome of

the treaty. The bilateral trade was thereafter conducted not only by Siberians and Chinese

but also by “Bukharans”6 who soon became important players in Russian trade and

commerce.7 This, in turn led to the making of a multiethnic blend along the Russian

borders. Through the mid-eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries, bilateral relations

5. Mikhail Losifovich Sladovskii, History of Economic Relations Between Russia and China, pp.9-12 6. A term used for Central Asians, Persians, Turkish, Greek and Indian merchants. 7. Penny M. Sonnenburg, Colonialism: An International Social, Cultural and Political Encyclopedia, vol.1, (California:

ABC-CLIO, 2003), p.412

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between Russia and China continued to develop. The Treaty of Kyakhta signed between

the two sides in 1727 had also further refined bilateral trade.8

Other then economic and border issues, Russia and China have had their share of ethnic

unrest ensuing from the territorial expansion along their borders. This was also one of the

contributing factors which kept the two empires from a regular involvement with other

nations. At a time when most of the western nations were subduing tribes and

governments of foreign realms, both Russia and China faced the additional task; and a

somewhat premature phenomenon for the age; of settling ethnic unrest in and along their

borders. Here can be noted the first hint of similarity in the states’ affairs, which

henceforth requires a comprehensive analysis of transpiring events that so brought the

two powers at this juncture of history.

For both China and Russia, the episodic expansions have been of a rather hereditary

character, passing down from one dynasty to the next, with the periodic addition of

religious, political and socio-economic problems associated with the natural disposition

of these territories. In contrast with the imperial history of other nations, China and

Russia had little choice but to assert and preserve their sovereign rights in the conquered

areas. While the acquisition of Africa or Asia served economic purposes to the colonial

masters of the early modern times, the conquerors could still very well survive without

the assistance coming from these quarters, provided an equivalent source was to be found

in a new territory, either far off or near at hand. On the other hand, when Russians

8. The Treaty of Kyakhta defined the Russo-Chinese border along the Kyakhta River in Russia and the mountain of

Orogoita on the Chinese side. It thus settled the pending border dispute, leading to a new era of political stability in the

Far East. In addition to settling the border dispute, the Treaty also settled trade concerns by determining bilateral trade

terms including the right to conduct duty free barter in Nerchinsk and Kyakhta, and permitting Russian trade caravans’

access to Beijing.

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annexed Dagestan in 1813, the strategic importance of the Republic was what made the

Czar to keep the Russian forces at arms with Imam Shamil for twenty five years of sheer

military expense, which by this time was a Russian zone of influence in Russo-Persian

relations. Furthermore, under the terms of the Treaty of St. Petersburg of 1723 between

Russia and Persia, while accepting Russian suzerainty in the Caspian Sea, the latter also

ceded Baku, Mazandaran, Gilan and Astarabad to Russia. Therefore, clearly enough,

when Russians advanced into Dagestan in the early years of the nineteenth century, it was

only after a thorough deliberation of the benefits that the Republic could offer.

Furthermore, Mazandaran and Gilan gave Russia easy access into northern Persia, and

Dagestan, in turn provided a route to these two provinces. The inspiration of all these

goals forced the Russians to enter, fight and finally subdue the Dagestanis to accepting

Russian suzerainty.

i: Map of Dagestan

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ii: Map of the Caucasus region.

Since the nineteenth century, Russians have fought a highly ambitious and expensive war

in the Republic. Russian designs have had serious repercussions for the local population

of Dagestan. It has cost them life as well as money, in addition to the staid psychological

consequences that continues to this date. The latter element has also had its effects on the

Russian forces fighting in the region. As a matter of fact, Russia has been following a ‘no

comprise’ policy in Dagestan since the past few centuries and continues to maintain a

strong Russian presence in the region through the deployment of national military forces.

Similarly, the Russian occupation of Chechnya has not only been for the sake of

glorifying Russian imperial personification. Sharing a healthy border line with Georgia

and the Russian Republic of Dagestan, Chechnya not only had the signs of becoming a

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transport route in the future, but it also could serve as a military base for Russian

advances into Dagestan and vice versa. Therefore, the Caucasus War was not an

endeavor at annexing only a state or two of the region but was in fact the reflection of

Russian aims on the entire Caucasus region for the advantages presented by the Caucasus

region becomes a fading possibility if even one of the states falls out from the Russian

grasp.

In short, the importance of the region is further attested by the fact that North Caucasus

lying at the crossroads of three powers; Ottoman Caliphate, Persia and Russia, has also

always served as Russia’s bridge to Transcaucasia, Europe and Asia. Of the four North

Caucasus regions discussed above, all the states share common borders with Georgia.

The point of importance associated with Georgia comes from the fact that this small

republic opens up into the Black Sea while it also has a common border with Turkey

which was then the Ottoman Caliphate. Not only is it important to understand that

realization of the Blue Water policy had long been sought by the Russian monarchs, but it

is also a fact that the goal could not have been achieved in all its character until and

unless the power of the Ottomans had been crushed at the hands of Russians. To achieve

this end, annexing states that lied in close proximity with the Caliphate could serve the

purposes of being used as military bases, as patrolling sites for the southern waters of

Russia, pursuing an eastward expansion of the Empire, and if circumstances allowed, as

recruitment centers of stalwart and innate warriors. The latter purpose could be achieved

only if the Russian political elite won the hearts of the local populace.

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Unfortunately, as it turned out, successive Russian regimes remained ineffective in the

latter task. Rather than adopting policies that could win over the trust of the locals, the

Czarist authorities, and afterwards the policy makers in Kremlin, could only add to the

miseries of the locals by adopting such policies as which reinforced feelings of mistrust

among the people of North Caucasus against foreign intruders. For example, the

Latinization of the alphabets of the North Caucasus’s language in the twentieth century

was a mistake on the part of the Soviet government for it only added to the detestation of

the natives against Russian government, which anyway had not yet achieved their trust

and respect. Similarly, the imperial practice of deporting the local population and

repopulating the area with new settlers has shaped such grave nostalgic feelings among

the locals that so continues to this date. In fact, the establishment of Cossack settlements

around Kuban River is regarded as the starting point of ethnic tensions between Russia

and Northwest Caucasus. An even worst episode in the history of Russian relations with

the ethnic minorities of the North Caucasus was the forced exile to Siberia and Central

Asia in the face of their alleged involvement in the Nazi attack on USSR. The death of

thousands of the exiles in the aftermath of the exile could only highly intensify the

feelings of abomination towards the Russians. Furthermore, the Soviet leaders often

made promises that were not so well kept in practice. For example, Stalin’s promise of

allowing Dagestan to retain Shar’ia courts soon proved to be a mere political lie. This

attitude has led to the creation of a common Chechen proverb of ‘to lie like the Russians.’

For the Bolsheviks, struggle against oppression by any group within the country was

justifiable so long as the Soviets regime had not been established. But once in power, any

such attempt was quelled and repressed most brutally in the name of wider national

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interests. For the policies towards North Caucasus, to many it would seem that Russian

policy makers were either ignorant of the strong psychological associations that people of

tribal culture normally keep with their social and religious customs or they were largely

sure that centre’s policies could be dictated anywhere across the lengths and breadths of

the country. The surety does not carry much justified grounds as the twenty five year long

struggle with Imam Shamil alone gave a clue as per the strong political and ideological

adherence of the tribes. In fact, Islamization of Caucasus also owes itself to the

commonly held outlook towards Christianity as the religion of the imperial forces while

Islam was viewed as the religion of resistance and freedom fighters. As it turned out, the

conventional attitude of Russia towards its ethnic minorities remained largely unchanged

for the most part of the Cold War era. Things were to get further heated in the early post-

Cold War era as will be discussed in the coming chapters.

In the case of China, the territorial expansions date back to the pre Christ era. For

instance, China’s links with Xinjiang date back roughly to 206 BCE, when the Han

dynasty established a military command for the region for the first time. With the passage

of time, Xinjiang became indispensable for successive Chinese governments as the

defense of mainland China depended largely on the security of this province. This was

due to the fact that Xinjiang shares common borders with Russia, the Central Asian states

of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and the Indo-Pak subcontinent. An attack on this

remote region of the Chinese Empire would leave the mainland open for foreign

advances. It was for this reason that the control of this area remained a prime concern for

Peking. The proximity of the province with Russian, Central Asian and Indian states

made it an active trading center thereby simultaneously adding to the economic

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importance of the region for Chinese government as well as diversifying the religious and

ethnic blend of the province. The Qing dynasty made a reasonable decision when it

decided to keep the administration of the province through Muslim officers, as by this

time, Islam had become the predominant religion in Xinjiang. However, the

experimentation with cultural tendencies in the twentieth century was an unwise decision

of the CCP. For example, following on the Soviet model, Beijing introduced Cyrillic

alphabets for the local writing system of Xinjiang. The local resentment against this

reform added strength to Uyghur demand for independence thus strengthening the cause

of East Turkestan Independence Movement (ETIM).

China has faced an equally challenging task in Tibet where its claim on the latter has

been challenged by many as having weak historical grounds. Nevertheless, losing Tibet

would have meant losing a natural wall of protection in the Himalayas. But unfortunately,

Tibetan’s experiences of Chinese rule are far from pleasant. While China continues to

send ethnic Chinese settlers for the management of new industries, and build military

bases in the region, cultural tendencies of the locals are often compromised. As a matter

of fact, Tibetans now have little choice but to live in cities which is very much against

their nomadic temperament.

The defense of the Chinese heartland includes the compulsion to maintain absolute

control on both Xinjiang and Tibet. To meet this end, Chinese policies in these quarters

have included the use of force which in turn has intensified anti-Chinese sentiments of

the indigenous population. Moreover, the discovery and exploration of hydrocarbon

reserves, minerals and metals deposits in both Xinjiang and Tibet, further adds to the geo-

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political and geo-economic magnitude of the regions for Beijing. Ironically, the major

complain coming from these regions remain the same; the major beneficiaries of new

government projects in these areas continue to be Han Chinese (who come from Han

populated areas on government orders), and that China does not take into account the

religious and cultural penchant of the locals while initiating new projects. The latter

element is similar to complains coming from the North Caucasians. As for the question of

beneficiaries, Russian experience has been different from that of Chinese. For during

most of the Soviet era, most of the industrial projects were designed for areas with a

predominant majority of ethnic Russians.

As far as the Taiwanese question is concerned, the issue has become more of a question

of China’s international prestige. The importance of Hong Kong has been of a rather

peculiar nature. The small island served as China’s window to the west in the early years

of the reversion and also when SEZs were opened along the Chinese coast. The zones

being in close proximity with British Hong Kong had much to learn from the capitalist

experiences of the latter as well as form the technological work craft of the experts in

Hong Kong. It was only because of Beijing’s complete understanding of the geo-

economic significance of the island that at the time of signing the Joint Declaration,

China prudently vowed to keep the existing social, political and economic system of the

island unaltered.

All in all, China and Russia had their share of challenges in their dealings with the ethnic

minorities in their borders. As it came out, both the powers experimented and counter-

experimented with their own sets of prophecies that they believed could best attain the

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centre’s aspirations. As the world entered a new epoch in 1991, Beijing and Moscow

were also to experience novel trends and tendencies of the new global eon not just in the

mainlands but also in the remote quarters that were now to become the headlines of

global geo-politics.

China’s peripheries and its ethnic minorities

Until the nineteenth century, the administration of the Chinese Empire was loosely

divided into three classes. The imperial government in Peking largely governed the

central agricultural territory inhabited by Han Chinese, while the tribal territories and

peripheral areas, either peacefully annexed or formally conquered, were governed under a

system of titles and ritual obligations. The tribal or inner zones of the empire carried

close ethnic and cultural similarities with the center and were thus brought into Chinese

system of governance over the period of time. On the other hand, the peripheral areas

were inhabited by people who were culturally more different from the people of the

central territory and were left out in this process of center-periphery incorporation. The

ethnic unrest in the present times is experienced in the historical outer peripheries of

China, namely; Tibet and Xinjiang. The two regions became part of the Chinese Empire

during the times of the Mongols and Manchus respectively. After 1949, the new

government launched autonomous system of governance for its ethnically populated

areas. With the launch of ethnic classification program in the early years following

Communist victory, there are now 55 officially recognized ethnic minority groups in

China and every citizen has an officially registered nationality.9This was followed by the

9. This practice was more in the like of Soviet example and against Confucian principles

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creation of ethno-regional units and prefectures; thus giving way to political orchestration

under the centre’s umbrella. In these prefectures were introduced socio-economic and

preferential measures for the promotion of these areas, along with the new method of

appointing regional heads through collaboration between the centre and the ethnic

proletariat.10

The introduction of regional autonomy also meant that henceforth, not only

the central and internal tribal zones, but also the historical outer peripheries of China

must conform to the highly centralized party leadership. Along with this, with the

evolution of Chinese socio-economic landscape, new problems have surfaced in center-

periphery relations. Beginning with the 1990s, “economic liberalization has ended

guaranteed employment and encouraged competition- leaving the lower classes socio-

economically abandoned…new policies have served to reconnect ethnic masses with

formal religious authorities consolidating ethnic identities weakened during the socialist

era.”11

In addition to religious revival among the masses, the same practice was a notable feature

in the early years of post-Mao period, state authorities renovated the religious buildings

destroyed during the Cultural Revolution. Religious figures, who were then persecuted,

were also compensated by the state. The underlying factor behind this motive was an

attempt at legitimizing religion with government aide, thus strengthening centre’s control

on religious affairs. One of the outcomes was in the form of private medressahs. The

local Uyghurs often favored these medressahs against secular schools for the education of

their children. As a result, a wave of restrictions and regulations were issued by the centre

10. Yan Sun, The Roots of China’s Ethnic Conflicts, available at http://www.oakton.edu/user/2/emann/spring2015/Chin

a%20Materials/The%20Roots%20of%20China%E2%80%99s%20Ethnic%20Conflicts.pdf 11. Yan Sun, The Roots of China’s Ethnic Conflicts, available at http://www.oakton.edu/user/2/emann/SPRING2015/C

hina%20Materials/The%20Roots%20of%20China%E2%80%99s%20Ethnic%20Conflicts.pdf

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against private medressahs; a move that was met with strong resistance from the locals,

the effects of which continue to this date.12

“Since the late 1980s, local restrictions have created demand for imported

Islamic sects in China’s black market of religions. Wahhabism, a

puritanical strain of Saudi origin previously marginalized in Xinjiang’s

mostly Sunni communities, arrived by way of Muslims returned from

pilgrimages to Mecca, visiting foreign religious groups, and newly

independent Central Asian states…Spreading through existing and new

madrassas, Wahhabism won converts…As Wahhabism spread, traditional

imams began to seem old and outdated, unable to prevail over the young

talibs trained in the underground madrassas. Local authorities initially

viewed their clashes as an intrafaith matter and refused to intervene,

leaving the new sect’s madrassas to grow uncontrolled. Less educated

youths dominated the ranks of its adherents, especially among the

unemployed, the self-employed, and students.”13

By the next few years, socio-economic frustration had badly engulfed the Uyghur society,

leading to hatred for the Han government of the centre. This has been often manifested in

social boycott of government orders and campaigns. The resulting violence in XUAR,

forced the authorities in Beijing to strengthen its religious policies. The government

started the practice of giving subsidies to appointed imams. In both TAR and XUAR, the

12. At present only a handful of medressahs function in the region. The age of attendance allowed in these medressahs

is above 18. 13. Yan Sun, The Roots of China’s Ethnic Conflicts, available at

http://www.oakton.edu/user/2/emann/SPRING2015/China%20Materials/The%20Roots%20of%20China%E2%80%99s

%20Ethnic%20Conflicts.pdf

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centre has placed several restrictions on the observation of religious practices by the

locals and has therefore received stern opposition on account of the same. The self-

immolations of Tibetan monks are one such example where Beijing had to face

international humiliation as a result of its policies towards the peripheries. However, it

must be noted that the incidences of self-immolation are observed among the monks of

Gelugpa sect of Tibetan Buddhism which is headed by the Dalai Lama. Therefore, state

control is most strict in the monasteries belonging to this sect. This, together with the

socio-economic situation prevalent in the regions, has furthered the centre-periphery gap

in China.

In Hong Kong, China does not have to confront such problems as seen in Tibet or

Xinjiang. Ever since the reunion of Hong Kong with the mainland, the small island

territory has provided no trouble to the centre. In fact, it has rather provided important

lessons in market innovation to the mainland and has continued to be China’s window to

the west. However, in the recent past Beijing has attempted at remodeling the political

apparatus to its liking. The response to these endeavors has been profound; hinting at the

probable unwanted results that could arise if Beijing must continue its endeavors in the

island, the people of which have enjoyed social, political and intellectual liberty since

ages.

China’s relations across the strait have also proved a testing venture for the central

government. It took several years for Beijing and Taipei to normalize bilateral relations in

the favor of regional trade and political balance. China also considered smoother cross-

strait ties as influential in undermining increasing US presence in the region. In the case

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of Taiwan, developing reasonable diplomatic ties with China was indispensable in view

of the magnitude of expanding Chinese market in the world. While both China and

Taiwan agree on the existence of only one China, it remains debatable where the

legitimate government lies. In fact, Taiwan has a complex history. It has a majority of

ethnic Han population that migrated from Fujian and Guangdong, while the indigenous

population makes up approximately 2% of the population.14

Kuomintang (KMT), which

has governed the island for the better period since 1949, has held a pro- One China

Principle approach. But the recent victory of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in

2016 elections has evoked serious concerns across the strait as the latter stands in firm

favor of a de jure independence of Taiwan and has also voiced its reservations against the

1992 Consensus which upholds One China Principle.

The Dagestan ASSR, Gorskaya ASSR and ethno-federalism in the Caucasus

During the early years of the twentieth century, the Southern Caucasians did not demand

independence from Russian Empire. Armenia saw Russia as a safety guarantee against

Ottomans, the Georgians lacked the middle class who could run an independence

movement, while the Azeri were caught between two options; either to remain as

Caucasian Muslims in the Russian Empire or become part of a larger Turkic statehood.

The Russian Revolution of 1917, and the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 created a

power vacuum across the length and breadth of the Caucasus region. With the February

Revolution of 1917, the provisional government in the center was presented with a

declaration of the Union of Caucasian Mountain Peoples by the people of North

14. http://www.cfr.org/china/china-taiwan-relations/p9223

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Caucasus, thus creating the North Caucasus Republic. A constitution was also drafted for

the new Republic with a bicameral parliament. The purpose of the North Caucasus

Republic was more to serve as representatives of the people of the mountains than to

serve as an independent political union. Things however changed with coming into power

of the Bolsheviks; the new Republic declared independence from Russia soon after the

ensuing of Bolsheviks in power. Moreover, the civil war between Red and White armies

had its effects on the Caucasians as well. Although the people of the region were not so

much as in favor of the White Army, but a section of the Muslim fighters were wooed by

the pledges made by General Denekin of the White Army. Thus, many administrative

posts were taken in the White sphere of influence. However, when the Red Army entered

Dagestan in 1920, the political situation in North Caucasus changed in favor of the latter.

Under the policy framework of Lenin, an appeal had already been sent in 1917 by the

Council of the People’s Commissars to the Muslim population of Russia in 1917 which

promised them the right of national, social, religious and cultural self-determination in

the new state. Therefore, in 1921, an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) for

Dagestan and a Mountain Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Gorskaya ASSR) was

formed. It included Chechen, Kabardian, Balkar, Ingushetia, Karachay and Vladikavkaz

orkugs. The Caucasians were allowed autonomy and a Sharia-based system in their

territory. The agreement was but a compromise that manifested the degree of flexibility

which the still weak Soviet government could create for the time until when the state

could exercise absolute control on its domain.

The process of bringing the entire Caucasus region under Russian control was started

during the imperial times and was completed by the USSR by bringing the whole region

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under the control of the centre. Under the rule of the Soviet Union, the region was

divided into titular administrative units. When it came to administrating the vast expanse

of the new state, Soviet Union had three main tasks: the first task was “the organization

of territorial authority. To rule an area….it must be divided into administrative units

subordinated to a central hierarchy.” The second goal was to “bind the nations….

awakened by war, revolution, and state collapse, into a common state. The third

challenge stemmed from the need to win internal and external legitimacy for the new

Soviet state.”15

The possible solution to these tasks was attained through the principle of

Soviet ethno-federalism. All important matters were designated to the centre of the

federation, while the administrative units created under titular heads were given limited

autonomy and privileges. The hierarchy under ethno-federalism comprised of the union

republics or Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs) at the top. The combination of SSRs

formed the USSR. Second in hierarchy were the ASSRs (Autonomous Soviet Socialist

Republics). The ASSRs were not always the regions that covered strategically important

frontiers, nor were they larger than the union republics. The Autonomous Oblasts (AO)

or the Autonomous regions comprised of small ethnic groups within a condensed area.

The fourth in place in the ethno-federal hierarchy were Autonomous Orkugs or

Autonomous Units comprising of small ethnic groups inhabiting a condensed area within

an oblast. The union republics were designated as sovereign states in the Russian

constitution, had their own parliament, constitution, courts of law, military, and also had

the right to form direct relation with foreign powers. The ASSRs on the other hand were

not sovereign states but national states where only Russian prevailed as the official

15. Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, The North Caucasus Barrier: The Russian Advance towards the Muslim World,

(London: C. Hurst & Co, 1992), p.24

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language. The oblasts enjoyed limited privileges and did not have the right to form

regional bureaucracy.

The system of ethno-federalism had integrated into the entire Soviet state by 1924. In the

South Caucasus, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia were awarded the status of union

republics. The South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast was incorporated in the Soviet

Republic of Georgia. In the North Caucasus, no titular nation was created. An ASSR was

established for Dagestan, along with a common ASSR for the culturally similar

Chechnya and Ingushetia. The Kabardins and Balkars, though culturally dissimilar, were

also awarded a common ASSR of Kabardino-Balkaria. In a similar context the Karachay-

Cherkessia ASSR was carved out for the Altaic speaking Karachai and the Caucasian

Cherkessia. Ossetia, inhabited by a Christian majority was divided into the North Ossetia

ASSR and the South Ossetian AO with the Georgian SSR.

Other than slight changes introduced in the post-Stalin USSR or the reforms under the

constitution of 1936, the Soviet ethno-federalism remained largely unchanged from 1936

to 1991. This system of government was, in effect, a tool for the Soviet leadership for

maximum control across the large state. However, the system had another effect which

was not quite discernible at the time. Under this system was engineered an institutional

affiliation with a prescribed territory. The institutions installed in the ethnic and territorial

groups of USSR crafted a local elite that served within the Soviet designed borders. This

was the first form of modern statehood in the Caucasus. Before the Soviet times, the

concept of nation was not so much as “institutionalized” in the North Caucasus, and even

in the South it only had weak foundations. Region, religion, and clan were what defined

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‘identity and collective action’. The incorporation of Caucasus into the Soviet Union was

a blessing in disguise for the local populace as it brought with itself the ideas of

nationhood and statehood.16

Form the medieval times to the Afghan adventure in the twentieth century, Russia’s

policy towards minority regions in general and Muslim populated areas in particular,

have been that of subduing and then winning over the local population. The leaders of

Soviet Russia reinstated the anti-religion policy of Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, and

Tsarina Anna. The policy was introduced in North Caucasus in 1924, earlier than in other

parts of Russia, where the policy was instituted in 1928. The involvement of Sufis in the

socio-political life of North Caucasus was one of the reasons why the campaign was

launched earlier in this part of the state. The leading Communist leader in North

Caucasus, Najmuddin Samurskii, made this clear when he stated in 1925 that “Revolution

in Dagestan means above all a fight with the clergy.” Nevertheless, the medressahs in

Dagestan still numbered at 1500 in 1925. To this situation, Najmuddin was predictive

enough to realize that “to close the madressahs is impossible. They will continue to exist

whatever oppressive measures are taken against them. They will hide in the canyons, in

the caves, and will then form a people who will be fanatical opponents of the Soviet

power which persecutes religion.”

The Soviet government, still continued its harsh policies, and in 1944 a considerable

population of the local Muslims was deported from their native region. During this

period, the Soviet rulers also installed a new policy in the territory of Ingushetia and

16. Ibid, pp.24-27, 31-32

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Chechnya; of containing the official structure of Islam in the region. Consequently, all

the mosques in the region were closed down until 1978. But this policy failed in face of

the strong spiritual reputation enjoyed by the Sufis in Chechnya and adjacent areas, where

the words of a Sufi were as binding as a political or religious law. An article published in

the Dagestan Journal in 1989 may very well be used as a reference for understanding the

approach of the Muslims of North Caucasus towards Sufism and Soviet rule:

“The people know that the leaders who preach atheism have an ingrained

habit of profiteering, money-grabbing and corruption. Their words do not

correspond with their deeds…. The mullahs are closer to the people and

the believers…. They are on the same level as other people, be they

scholars, rich or poor. They have a common language with everyone, they

do not offend or frighten, they only teach and preach. This is why all

believers are equal, nobody demonstrates their superiority, nobody

ingratiates themselves or grovels. Almost all believers are open to each

other, speak the truth whatever it is, and do not give bribes to the

mullahs…. That is why believers are attracted to the mullahs, not to the

Party workers. That is why, the mullahs have great authority.”17

On a larger generalized perspective, although all the Ciscaucasian republics have played

their part in the struggle against foreign designs, four of such states shall be discussed in

detail in this and subsequent chapters; Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia and Kabardino-

Balkaria.

17. Ibid, pp.6-8

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CHAPTER - 1

A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE PERIPHERIES

OF RUSSIA AND CHINA

Not only the politics in Chinese mainland have seen various ups and downs since 1949,

the domestic issues in the areas occupied by ethnic minorities have been an equally

daunting challenge since the inception of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)

government. The remoteness of these regions along with varying religious, cultural and

social elements became an obstacle against the implementation of CCP’s reforms in these

areas and thus led to continued and consistent disturbance across these quarters.

China covers a large part of the Asian continent. From the very beginning of this unique

civilization, it has been conquering the neighboring areas, and had thus enlarged its

boundaries. As a result of these foreign ventures from time to time, China has had a claim

on many areas in its proximity, some of which also slipped out of Chinese control during

various periods of the country’s imperial history. The important regions included in this

context are Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau, Mongolia, Tibet, Xinjiang and the Sipsong

Panna. In some cases, it seems as if a solution has been reached upon, in others it seems

that the state of affairs is going in the same direction as they have been going since the

past many decades. There are also regional problems, where China has evolved its policy

to meet standards of the new age. Other than the fact that suzerainty on these areas once

represented the might of the Chinese Empire, there are various other underlying facts

which today motivate Beijing to adhere to its territorial claims. In addition to how the

demands of the age might require China to act in the current circumstances, Beijing is

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also driven by its growing needs to solve these issues as best suitable for its national

interests. China’s growing power requires it to seek solutions and maintain a positive

international image simultaneously.

Analyzing the current state of affairs in the regions can be made easy by looking into the

nature of relationship that has existed in these particular regions since the very inception

of Chinese suzerainty there to the current atmosphere in China’s periphery.

1.1 PROBLEMS ON THE ROOF: CHINA’S PRESENCE IN TIBET

Often dubbed as the “roof of the world,” Tibet occupies 471, 7000 square miles of the

plateaus and mountains in Central Asia. It is surrounded by Chinese provinces in the east,

northeast and the southeast, Nepal, India, Bhutan and Myanmar to the south and Jammu

and Kashmir to the west.18

While China claims that Tibet has always been a part of China,

Tibet has a history of independence of approximately thirteen hundred years from

China.19

Political contact between the two kingdoms started in the seventh century CE,

when the King of Tibet Songsten Gampo unified the country and established a dynasty

that was to last for two centuries. He extended Tibet’s frontier to include parts of the

Xinjiang province, Kashmir, Ladakh, Kansu, Qinghai, Sichuan and Yunnan provinces.

Many of these areas were also parts of the Chinese Empire under the Tang Dynasty. Tibet

captured Changan, capital of the Tang dynasty, when China stopped paying tribute to the

former.20

In 821 CE, the two countries put an end to almost two hundred years of war.

The treaty declaring the end of war was engraved on three stone pillars, one of which still

18. Dinesh Lal, Indo-Tibet-China Conflict, (New Delhi: Kalpaz Publications, 2008), p. 105. 19. Ibid, p. 31. 20. Melvyn C. Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet and the Dalai Lama,(California: University of

California Press, 1997), p.1

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stands in the Jokhang cathedral in Lhasa. The treaty established borders between the two

countries. This shows that during this time both China and Tibet were independent

kingdoms; none being subordinate to the other.21

During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, both China and Tibet came under the

Mongol influence. China often claims today that China and Tibet became united as one

country at this point in history, as both the countries were dominated by the Mongols.

However, the claim is little convincing. Not only is the time era of the Mongol’s relations

with the two countries different, the nature of relationship that Mongols had with the two

regions also stood at wide contrast. Tibet came under Mongol influence before Kublai

Khan had conquered China. As a matter of fact, independence from Mongols also came

earlier in Tibet than in China. As for the relation between Tibetans and Mongolians, the

two developed a Priest-Patron relationship or the Cho-Yon. The Mongols converted to

Buddhism and sought the recognition of their rule and spiritual guidance from Tibetan

theocracy; in return, the Tibetans also pledged loyalty to the Mongol Empire.

In 1639, the Dalai Lama made Cho-Yon relationship with the Manchu Emperor, who

established the Qing dynasty in China in 1644. By the middle of the nineteenth century,

as the Manchu rule in China neared its decline, the dynasty’s influence in Tibet also

weakened. In 1842 and in 1856, the Tibetans appealed for Manchu help against the

Nepalese Gorkha invasions, but the assistance could not be provided by the Manchus,

and the Gorkhas were driven out by Tibetans without any help from Manchu China.

21. Ibid, pp. 31-32.

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In 1911, the Manchu dynasty came to an end in China, and so did the Cho-Yon

relationship. In 1912, Tibet declared its independence and began to administer the

country as a sovereign nation, after Nepalese help was taken in driving the Chinese out

following a series of armed conflict between the Chinese and Tibetans during the 1911

revolution. Since 1912, the government of the Republic of China (ROC), which ruled

China between 1912 and 1949, and which now governs Taiwan consisted of a Mongolian

Affairs Commission and a Tibetan Affairs Commission in the cabinet for the

administration of the two regions. Chiang Kai-shek asserted Tibet’s status as part of

Chinese territory in 1946 and again in 1949. The ROC still claims sovereignty over Tibet

and Mongolia. But after Communist victory in 1949, Tibet was once again taken under

Chinese flag.

In fact, the ROC stance is similar to that of PRC (which has ruled mainland China since

1949), which is that, Tibet has been a part of China de jure since the Mongol Yuan

Dynasty ruled China. PRC contends that according to the theory of the Succession of

States in International Law, all the subsequent Chinese dynasties and governments have

succeeded the Yuan dynasty in exercising de jure sovereignty and de facto power over

Tibet. Although the current Chinese government recognizes the cultural and linguistic

uniqueness of Tibet, this position, they believe, does not justify Tibet’s demand for

independence as China has a unique combination of 56 ethnic groups in its nation.

From 1912 to 1951, China or ROC had no effective control over Tibet; but even this

situation does not assert Tibet’s independence as many regions in China exercised de

facto independence at the time when China was internally disturbed by warlords,

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Japanese invasion and civil war. Moreover, Tibet did not receive recognition from any

country during the years of the ROC government.22

After PRC’s retake over Tibet; the

Seventeen Point Agreement was signed between PRC and the representatives from Tibet

in 1951. The agreement was the first formal Sino-Tibetan treaty after 821 CE. Under the

terms of the agreement Tibet was incorporated into China along with a guarantee by the

latter for refraining from any attempt against the alteration of Tibetan religious, cultural

and political systems and institutions. The agreement was however short-lived, as in

1959, Mao’s imposition of democratic reforms led to an uprising in Lhasa, the capital of

Tibet. In retaliation, China adopted a harsh policy to control the uprising.23

Dalai Lama

fled to India along with his followers in the aftermath of the events. Since then the

Tibetan government-in-exile has declared the Agreement invalid as the Chinese have

violated the pledges undertaken in the Agreement. On the contrary, Chinese blame

Tibetan government for having deliberately tried to sabotage the Agreement in an attempt

to “split the motherland.” Thus, even the nullification of the treaty and the resulting

political tension failed to fulfill the obligations undertaken in the Agreement. On the

other hand, the Sino-Tibetan revolts also cast light on the fact that not only were they

retaliation to the violation of the Agreement by the Chinese government, but were also an

attempt to regain independence. The 1959 conflict brought more problems for Tibet than

it did for China. The signing of the treaty had ended the so-called independence of Tibet

and had given her considerable autonomy. However, the demise of the Agreement

brought an end to the autonomy as well.

22. Dinesh Lal, Indo-Tibet-China Conflict, Op. cit., pp. 31-32,50-53,58,60. 23. An estimated 87,000 people were killed, arrested, deported to labor camps or exiled. Ibid, p. 105.

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In 1981, China offered a Five-Point Proposal to the Dalai Lama. The latter rejected by

saying “instead of addressing the real issue facing the six million Tibetan people, China

has attempted to reduce the question of Tibet to a discussion of my own personal status.”

In 1988, China was presented the Strasbourg Proposal by Dalai Lama as the basis for

Sino-Tibet negotiations. Beijing rejected the same and declared that “China’s sovereignty

over Tibet brooks no denial. Of Tibet there can be no independence, no semi-

independence, no independence in disguise.”24

The issue has taken a new shape as China has been unwilling in giving much autonomy

to Tibet, even that which was guaranteed in the Seventeen Point Agreement. On the other

hand, Dalai Lama has repeatedly refused to accept China’s sovereignty.25

Some western

thinkers and Tibetans have also demanded “one country, two systems” formula for Tibet

on the model of Hong Kong. For Beijing, the formula which will bring currency, judicial

independence, an international border with China and representatives in international

organizations, would be offering too much to Tibet. Beijing also thinks that the “one

country, one system” formula has been in practice in Tibet for the past many decades,

making “one country, two systems” formula inapplicable.

Thus, China entered the post-Cold War era with the simmering Tibetan question still at

hand, as policy makers in Beijing continued to draft plans for Tibet best suited to China’s

national interests.

24.Changqing Cao, Chang Ching Tsao, James D. Seymour, Through Dissident Chinese Eyes: Essays on Self-determination,

(New York: M.E Sharpe, Inc, 1998) , p.65 25. Ibid, pp.59-67.

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1.2 XINJIANG: CHINA’S MUSLIM FRONTIER

Covering an area of 1.6 million square kilometers or one-sixth of China’s total covered

area, Xinjiang is located towards the far north-west of China separated from the mainland

by the huge Gobi Desert. The borders of the province connect it with Russia, Mongolia,

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan.26

The remoteness

of the province becomes a further question due to the cultural and racial disparities which

separate the Uyghur population of Xinjiang or Chinese Turkestan from the other Han

population of China.27

The majority of the province’s population constitutes of the

Uyghurs, most of who are Sunnis and are related to the Naqshbandia order of Central

Asia.28

1.1: Map showing Xinjiang and its border territories.

26. S. Fredrick. Starr, Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, (New York: M.E Sharpe Inc, 2004), p.29 27. Lutz Klevman, The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia, (London: Atlantic Books, 2003), p.99 28. S. Fredrick. Starr, Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, Op.cit., p. 109

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The province, as historically recorded, has been inhabited by various tribes since ancient

times. During the time when China was ruled by the Han dynasty (206 BCE-220 CE), a

military command was set up for the management of the province, with a head quarter at

Wulei (present Luntai) in the Tarim Basin. After the decline of the Han dynasty, the

region passed down to the hands of the local Uyghur leaders.29

The period from 220 CE

to 598 CE saw large scale migrations of various ancient ethnic groups into and across

China many of whom became influential in some parts of Xinjiang. However, the

imperial revival under the Tang dynasty (618 CE-907 CE) increased the central control

on the region once again. It was also during the time of the Sui (581 CE-618CE) and the

Tang dynasty that the Turk and Tubo races started gaining considerable influence in

Xinjiang.30

As a result of trade and commerce, elements of western Asian culture were

already becoming discernible in the province by this time.

In 840 CE, Uyghurs migrated westward from Mobei (north of Mongolian plateau); where

natural disasters and internal strife had resulted in the collapse of the Uyghur Khanate, to

Xinjiang. One of the Uyghur groups settled in the present day regions of Jimsar and

Turpan in Xinjiang and laid the foundation of the Gaochang Uyghur Kingdom. On the

other hand, another sub-group of the tribe went on and inhabited the areas of Central

Asia, where they founded the Karahan Kingdom. Therefore, from this time onwards, the

areas around Tarim basin came under the rule of Goachang Uyghur Kingdom and the

Kingdom of Karahan. The local population of these areas was amalgamated into these

groups and thus was formed the Uyghur ethnic group.

29. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/546118/Xinjiang/71463/History# 30. The Turks were nomadic people who mainly inhabited the northwestern and the northern steppes of China from the

sixth to the eighth century, while Tubo were the ancestors of Tibetans.

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In 1124, an official of the Liao dynasty commanded his tribe, the Khitan, for the conquest

of Xinjiang. Having conquered the province, he established the Kingdom of Western

Liao in Xinjiang. The rule lasted some time, and was put to an end by the invading

armies of Genghis Khan in the 13th

century. Genghis Khan then passed over the

conquered territories to his children. Thus, in Uyghur was assimilated some sections of

the Khitan and Mongolian tribes.

Towards the 1760s, the government of China under Qing dynasty (1644-1911), sent

Manchu, Xibe, and Suolon troops for the defense of Xinjiang. This further added variety

to the ethnic combination and the ethnic diversity in Xinjiang. The region became even

more ethnically diverse as Tartars and Russians also entered the region. Thus, by the

close of the 19th

century, there were approximately thirteen ethnic groups in Xinjiang,

including, Uyghur, Mongolian, Kazak, Han, Hui, Kyrgyz, Manchu, Xibe, Tajik, Daur,

Uzbek, Tatar, and the Russian.

As per the geographical setting of the province, Xinjiang has been, since ancient times, a

hub of various economic, cultural, as well as religious existences. The intermingling of

foreign migrant groups with the local tribes had given rise to a unique co-existence of

Zoroastrian, Buddhist, Taoist, Manicheans, and Nestorians believers along the stretches

of the Silk Road. During the latter part of the ninth century and during the tenth century,

Islam entered southern Xinjiang through Central Asia. By the late 14th

century, Islam had

become the major religion for the Mongolian, Uyghur, Tajik, Kazakh, and the Kyrgyz

people of Xinjiang. As the 16th

century unfolded, Islam replaced Buddhism as the major

religion of the province. Although, other religions lost their presence in the province after

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this time, Buddhism and Taoism continued to exist alongside. In addition to these

religions, Catholicism and Protestantism also gained their way into this Chinese quarter

during the 18th

century. Although, the religious balance of power has shifted from time to

time, the majority of the population of Xinjiang today comprises of Uyghur Muslims.

There is, however, a simultaneous existence of Buddhism, Catholicism, Taoism,

Protestantism, and Tibetan Buddhism.

The multi-religious ethnicity of Xinjiang has made the administration of the province a

challenging task for successive Chinese governments. The Qing dynasty of China

maintained control of the province mainly through loyal Muslim officers. Under this

dynasty, farming and livestock breeding were promoted as major economic activities for

the province. Administrative problems in Xinjiang increased as the province experienced

Russian imperialistic designs in the aftermath of the Opium War in 1840. But in 1881,

the Qing forces liberated Ili from 11 years of Russian rule, and in 1884, the Western

Regions were renamed as the province of Xinjiang, which literally means; “old territory

returned to the motherland”. From this time onwards, the administration of the province

was conducted by a provincial governor, and a new capital was established at Dihua

(modern Urumqi). Although, the revolutionaries in Xinjiang set up the New Ili Grand

Military Government to mark the end of Qing control on the province after the revolution

of 1911, the ethnic groups, along with the mainland Chinese population rejoiced the

establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. With the inception of the new

government in China, a change in policy was also seen in Xinjiang. In 1955, the

government of PRC established Xinjiang as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

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(XUAR). In spite of Beijing’s efforts to industrialize the province, Xinjiang has not

remained free from ethnic tensions and political turmoil.

An active example of the unstable political situation in Xinjiang is the ETIM. The

historical origins of the movement go back to pre-1949 era, and the movement continues

to affect the province’s relations with the center. Historically, the word Turkestan

appeared in the works of Arab geographers during the middle ages. The term, which

means “land of the Turks”, was used to represent the areas lying north and east of the Syr

Darya in Central Asia. As different ethnic groups established themselves in Central Asia

one after the other, the term had already lost its import by the eighteenth century.

However, the term was revived as imperialist encroachments into Central Asia gained

momentum during the nineteenth century. A Russian official Timkovsky, used the term

Turkestan in his report about the geographical position of Central Asia. In his report, he

referred to the part of Turkestan lying in Xinjiang, that is, east of Central Asia, as East

Turkestan or Chinese Turkestan. When Russians annexed the Central Asian Khanates of

Kokand, Bokhara, and Khiva to establish the Turkestan governorship in Samarkand (then

called Hezhong) in the mid-nineteenth century; the area came to be called as the West or

Russian Turkestan.

In the early years of the twentieth century, the term East Turkestan was given a religious

and ideological color, to demand independence for East Turkestan or Xinjiang. In 1933,

Sabit Damolla, one of the founders of the movement, established the East Turkestan

Islamic Republic. The Republic, however, collapsed within a few months of its inception.

Another attempt was made in 1944 for the establishment of an independent republic, this

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time by Elihan Torae. The Second East Turkestan Republic also could not last long and

was finally ended by the Chinese army in 1949. From 1949 to date, Xinjiang has been a

hot spot of ethnic tensions and rebellions in China. The issue once again gained

momentum in the 1990s when local designers of independence started collaborating with

foreign ideological forces for the attainment of independence.31

The Uyghur demand for independence, besides other factors, takes strength from the fact

that Chinese government has often experimented against the cultural tendencies of the

region. For example, in 1953 (at a time when China followed Soviet modes of

development in its own territory), following USSR’s reform of alphabets for the Turkic

people in its territory, China introduced Cyrillic writing system in Xinjiang. As the

relations with USSR deteriorated, the Cyrillic alphabets were discarded in favor of a new

writing system for Xinjiang. Following on, in 1984, Beijing also introduced a modified

version of Arabic script.32

The ethno-religious, political and cultural factors, together with policy experimentation of

Beijing in Xinjiang contributed greatly to disturbing situation in the region. It was in

these series of events that Xinjiang entered the post-1991 epoch. The process of policy

experimentation, ethnic unrest, and counter retaliation by Xinjiang as well as Beijing

continue to this date.

31.http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2003-06/12/content_916306.htm 32 . James A. Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang, (West Sussex: Columbia University Press, 2007),

pp.235-236

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1.3 PROBLEMS ACROSS THE STRAIT: CHINA’S HISTORY IN

TAIWAN

Until 1600 there were no permanent Chinese settlements in Taiwan. Other than the

occasional visits of fishermen, smugglers and pirates, it was sometimes mentioned in the

official reports of the officers patrolling the South China Sea coast. In the seventeenth

century, however, Chinese Japanese, English, Dutch and the Spaniards all sought to settle

down in the region, establish their commercial bases and earn profit from its resources. It

was finally in 1683 that Taiwan was incorporated into the Qing Empire.33

It then

remained under Chinese rule till the end of the nineteenth century.

Taiwan lies in the southeastern coast of China, across the Taiwan Strait. The East China

Sea lies to its north, the Philippine Sea to the east, Luzon Strait to the south and the South

China Sea to the southwest. Its proximity to the states of Southeast Asia as well as its

location in the Pacific Ocean makes it an important element in terms of political and

strategic planning framework. In 1895, China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese war forced

China to cede Taiwan to Japan, which the latter surrendered following the end of the

Second World War. In 1949, with the victory of the Communist Party, the Nationalists

fled to Taiwan.34

When Jiang Kai-shek reached Taiwan in 1949, he declared that the

Kuomintang’s nationalist government or the Republic of China, now established in

Taiwan, was the sole legal government in China. Although, the Nationalist government

had acquired United States’ support against the non-democratic Communist Party, the

“free China” venture of Jiang was neither free nor democratic. When the Nationalist

33. Muray A. Rubenstein, Taiwan: A New History, (New York: M.E Sharpe, Inc. 1999), p. 85 34. www.cia.gov./library/publications/the-world-factbook/goes/tw.html

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Party secured control of Taiwan from the Japanese after World War II, the local

Taiwanese population resisted the new government, which was put down by brutal

suppression. Jiang maintained a one party dictatorship with the National Assembly

consisting only of Nationalist politicians. Interestingly enough, the democratic National

Assembly remained without any Taiwanese representation until the 1980s.35

Until the 1960s, majority of the members of international diplomatic community

supported American stance on Taiwan and maintained diplomatic relations with the

Nationalist government in the ROC. The debacle became a grave concern for President

Nixon on his way to Détente with Mao. With the Cold War continuing along the Taiwan

Strait, little or no chances were there for the pacification of relations between China and

the US. Therefore, in his meeting with Zhou Enlai in 1972, Nixon declared Taiwan as a

part of China while also asserting that there was but only ‘one China’. The sudden

shifting of contrasts in American policy gave Taiwan a profound share of embarrassment

in the international community as the latter was fully and suddenly deselected by the US

in favor of cordial relations with China. PRC’s demands for the revision of US-China

relations included the withdrawal of diplomatic relations with Taiwan, abrogation of the

Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954, withdrawal of the US Seventh Fleet, and the expulsion

of Taiwan from UNO. Serious and harsh as they were, the demands were gradually

satisfied by the US and formal relations with China were finally and firmly established by

the end of the decade.

35. Following the death of Jiang in 1975, his son Jiang Jingguo inherited the party leadership. The Kuomintang or the

Nationalist party posed itself as an alternative to communist rule and hoped that one day Taiwan would be returned to

China.

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Nevertheless, US strategic interests in the Taiwan Strait forbade it from permanently

abandoning all sorts of relations with the ROC. Therefore, a Taiwan Relations Act was

passed by the US Congress in 1979. The Act promised protection to Taiwan against any

foreign aggression as well as to maintain an unofficial diplomacy with the island.36

The

Act was perceived by Beijing as a repetition of the 1954 Treaty. To counter the Act and

to substantiate China’s claim on Taiwan, the PRC issued the Nine Point Unification Plan

in 1981which calls for;

1. Negotiations between Communist and Nationalist Party to end the national

division.

2. Provision of trade, mail, academic and cultural exchanges.

3. Autonomy for Taiwan as Special Administrative Region. Taiwan can also retain

its military forces.

4. Foreign relations, ownership of personal and private property, inheritance, foreign

investment, and social, cultural and economic systems to remain unchanged.

5. Taiwan’s population to be allowed to participate in political process.

6. Provision of subsidies by the national government for Taiwan’s finances (if

needed).

7. Government to assure safe movement of people willing to relocate from Taiwan

to China.

8. Beijing to welcome investment and business from Taiwan.

9. Every citizen to work for the promotion of national unification.37

36. David Wen-Wei Chang, China Under Deng Xiaoping, (New York: Macmillan Co, 1991), p.219 37. Ibid, pp.220-221

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The Plan was however rejected on account of reasons often cited by the ROC for its

unwillingness to trust Beijing. For example, the ROC government has been always

reluctant to trust the government in Beijing for it believes that similar promises were

made with Tibetans, which in the long run were not kept by the PRC, leading to open

destruction of religious, social and political life of the Tibetans and ultimately to the self-

exile of the Dalai Lama. Furthermore, the ROC also blames the Communist Party of not

keeping up their promises in the face of the event of 1949 when the promise to counter

Japanese invasion in 1949 was turned into a plan for the “expansion of the Red Army,”

and the peace proposal of the same year turned out to be a “demand for unconditional

surrender” and of “punishing the ROC war criminals.” In addition to these factors, the

ROC government adheres to Sun-Yat-Sen’s doctrines as the only possible solution for

China. ROC further believes that the failure of Beijing to bring about institutional transfer

of leadership adds to the feeling of lack of trust by Taiwan on China. On the other hand,

the 9 Point Unification Plan, which will reduce the island’s status to that of a province,

will be mere degradation of the ROC and another call for an absolute surrender.38

Things changed for Taiwan when diplomatic relations between China and USA were

normalized in 1972 and the suspension of US’s official relations with Taiwan in

1979.39

In spite of the breakup with USA in 1979, Taiwan’s economic ties with the

industrial powers remained unchanged. Taiwan has focused her energy on developing its

economy. ‘The result was positive as from 1960s to 1980s the GNP of Taiwan increased

from $8 billion in 1960 to $72.5 billion in 1986. The annual volume of Taiwan’s foreign

38. Ibid, pp. 221-222 39. Wayne C. McWilliams, Harry Piotrowski, The World Since 1945, (USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), pp. 366-

367

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trade rose from $2.2 billion to $100 billion between 1969 and 1988. Due to its ever

burgeoning exports, by 1988, Taiwan accumulated a foreign exchange reserve in excess

of $70 billion, second only to Japan.’40

Today, Taiwan together with South Korea,

Singapore, and Hong Kong is enlisted among the “Four Tigers” or the “Four Little

Dragons” of Asia. The four countries’ economy and industry grew rapidly in the 1960s

and 1970s and continued at the same pace in the 1980s and 1990s.41

The economic

progress also led to political modernization as the new president in 1988was Lee Teng-

hui who belonged to Taiwan. In 1989, first free multi-party elections of the National

Assembly were held; a sign of political maturity among the ROC government.42

Meanwhile the KMT, which has always seen Taiwan as part of “One China”, continued

to rule Taiwan from 1979 to 2000. Although KMT won the presidential and legislative

elections of 2008, the party has, however been facing, since 2000, some resistance from

the political parties representing the local Taiwanese population. But even this, has not

changed the anti-independence stance of KMT for Taiwan. The opposition party;

Democratic Progressive Party, was founded in 1986 and legalized in 1989. It sees Taiwan

as an independent nation and Taiwan’s sovereignty is the most important issue on the

party’s platform.43

Chinese stance of Taiwan being a part of China has some historical grounds but is rather

controversial. Before the cession of Taiwan to Japan in 1895, it had only been a province

of China for the ten preceding years, though it had been a border area of the Chinese

Empire for two centuries. The cession of Taiwan to Japan was first challenged by Jiang in

40. Ibid, p. 367 41. Robert Solomon, The Transformation of the World Economy, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1999), p. 139 42. Wayne C. McWilliams, Harry Piotrowski, The World Since 1945, Op.cit., pp. 368-369 43. www.cfr.org/publications/9233/chinataiwan_relations.html#P6

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1945 and before this in 1930s, when Mao declared Taiwan as a former colony of China.44

Tug of war as to the rightful status of Taiwan has continued down the decades as for

China, more than economic importance, acquiring Taiwan is also a matter of national and

territorial integrity.

In short, things have not changed much in the case of Taiwan’s issue. The shifting

policies of USA in particular and the international community in general continue to

make Taiwan debacle an interesting yet unsolvable tangle.

1.4 THE FRAGRANT HARBOR: CHINA IN HONG KONG

According to archaeological evidences, northern China made its influence on Hong Kong

as early as in the Stone Age. It was during the seventh century, under the Han dynasty

that the region was consolidated under Chinese rule and the demography of Hong Kong

also steadily increased. During the time of the Song dynasty (960-1279), the first major

migration from northern China to Hong Kong took place. In the case of Great Britain,

relations with Hong Kong did not begin till the early eighteenth century and it was only

after China’s defeat in the first Opium War (1839-42) that Hong Kong was ceded to

Britain in 1842 by the Treaty of Nanjing.45

Additionally, in 1860, the Kowloon Peninsula,

and in 1898 the adjoining areas; the New Territories, were acquired by the British on a

99-year lease.46

44. Christopher M. Dent, China, Japan and Regional Leadership in East Asia, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing

Ltd, 2008), p. 92 45. www.historyofnations.net/asia/hongkong.html 46. Marshall Cavendish Corporation, World and its People, (New York: Marshall Cavendish Corporation, 2008), p.192

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For a brief period, Hong Kong was occupied by Japan (1941-45) after which it was once

again controlled by the British. Developed as a trading center by the British, Hong Kong

soon became a commercial and financial hub. A large number of Chinese industrialists

landed in Hong Kong after the Communist victory in China in 1949. This together with

foreign investment and cheap labor soon boosted Hong Kong’s industries.47

In 1984,

Great Britain signed an agreement with China for the return of all of Hong Kong to

China, when the lease on New Territories ended in 1997. On July 1, 1997, China resumed

its rights on Hong Kong and the latter became Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

(HKSAR) of China under “One Country, Two Systems” formula, which gave Hong Kong

considerable autonomy for 50 years.48

For much of the eighteenth century and before, China was admired by the Europeans for

its culture, customs and arts. But it was the Chinese tea that was a major attraction for the

Europeans in the eighteenth century. Swooned with the glory of the Middle Kingdom, the

Chinese had always treated Europeans with contempt. Foreign traders in China could not

hold direct negotiations with the local government and it was only through the mediation

of the Co-Hong49

that the negotiations between foreigners and the Chinese government

could take place. The same held true in the case of Chinese treatment towards British

traders in China. In fact, the Sino-British trade of the eighteenth century was one sided.

The foreigners who imported huge quantities of tea and silk were in turn greeted by a

self-sufficient business partner who had accordingly little or no interest in foreign

47. www.historyofnations.net/asia/hongkong.html 48. Marshall Cavendish Corporation, World and its People, Op.cit., p.192 49. Co-Hong owned factories used by the foreigners. They were a source of revenue for the Chinese government. The

Co-Hong therefore imposed taxes on foreigners, while the latter could communicate with the government only through

the former.

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manufacturers. The lack of balance of payments drove the British to send two missions to

China in 1793 and 1816 under Lord McArtney and Lord Amherst respectively, with the

purpose of pursuing the Chinese to expand the bilateral trade and open more ports for

British traders. The missions, however, remained unsuccessful.

However, things changed drastically for China following the Opium War and the

consequent Treaty of Nanjing (1842). In light of the points of agreements undertaken in

the treaty, China ceded Hong Kong to the British, in addition to opening five ports for

British trade.50

British ships could also patrol Chinese waters.51

The treaty, in short, was a

humiliation for the Chinese for not only did it show cast their technological

backwardness against their British counterparts but also shifted the trade and political

balance from China to Britain.52 The Treaty of Nanjing also started the high tide of

imperialism in Chinese history. British advances were followed by Russia (in Korea and

Manchuria), France (in Indo-China) and the Japanese (in Taiwan) besides Americans,

Dutch, Portuguese and Germans who also had eyes on Chinese trade and territory.

During the later years of the nineteenth century, British extended their territories in and

around Hong Kong that thus came to be called the New Territories under a 99-year lease

from China. The sound social conditions under British soon developed Hong Kong into

an active trading center. As a matter of fact, the number of ships sailing through Hong

Kong harbor increased from 538 in 1844 to 2889 in 1860 and 4558 in 1864. As the

twentieth century unfolded, Hong Kong was widely recognized as a bustling center of

50. The ports of Xiamen, Fuzhou, Ningbo, Shanghai and Guangzhou were opened for British trade. 51. John Flowerdew, The Final Years of British Hong Kong: The Discourse of Colonial Withdrawal, (New York: St.

Martin’s Press, 1998), pp.10-11. 52. By 1895, two-thirds of Chinese foreign commerce was controlled by the British with opium and Lancashire being

the prime imports. From 1853, Chinese customs were also managed by British. The head of Chinese customs, Sir

Robert Hart, had a staff of 89 of whom, half were British officers.

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international trading activities. By 1941, population of the island had reached 1.6 million

mark. Japan’s attack on Hong Kong in 1941 lasted for three years at the end of which

period the population graph had declined to a figure of 600,000. Following the defeat of

the KMT in 1949, the CCP being grateful for the neutrality shown by British during the

Chinese Civil War, declared that the CCP would not use force for the acquisition of Hong

Kong.

Hong Kong, which means “Fragrant Harbor” is a tiny island situated at a distance of 80

miles southeast from the city of Guangzhou. Although, the island is only 11 miles east to

west and 2 to 5 miles from north to south, generally however, the name Hong Kong refers

to a large area consisting of the Hong Kong Island, the Kowloon Peninsula, and 365

square miles of the New Territories consisting of 230 islands. Although Hong Kong has

no worthwhile natural resources, it is its deep harbor with a shelter of steep granite hills

that makes it one of the most interesting places in the world. For its hot and humid

climate that runs for a major part of the year, many British colonial officers could not

help but wonder as to why their government was taking such pains at acquiring a place

such as this. Even the very people of China have always considered their southern

neighbors as inferior to themselves. For these reasons, the potential of Hong Kong was

never understood in the real sense for many years. Nonetheless, it remains beyond doubt

that Hong Kong has remained china’s “link” to the west since the time of the Mongols

and the Silk Road as the advantages offered by Hong Kong are numerous. The benefits

offered by Hong Kong can be understood as the following passage explains:

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“Until recent decades, about 90 percent of all Chinese emigrants went

through Hong Kong. From 1960s until the 1980s, Hong Kong exported

goods throughout the world. More recently, it has attained worldwide

acclaim for its innovative cinema. To people in China, Hong Kong is even

more significant for its imports. The Chinese who returned from North

America or South East Asia almost always came through Hong Kong.

Money from overseas Chinese was remitted through Hong Kong. After the

Communist Revolution of 1949, capitalist Hong Kong played an important

role in building China’s socialist economy: as a window to the outside

world, as a center for remittances from overseas Chinese that provided

valuable foreign exchange, and as a base for importing goods that China

could not produce. Hong Kong was of particular use to the Chinese during

the Korean War, as scarce goods such as gas, kerosene, and penicillin

were smuggled in during the American and United Nations embargoes.

Hong Kong investors were also responsible for China’s dramatic

economic transformation that began in the late 1970s and continues to this

day.”53

In the early post war years, the governor general of Hong Kong, Sir Mark Young, set

about making constitutional reforms that called for an active participation of the local

population in government affairs and an equal representation of Chinese and non-

Chinese. However, when Alexander Grantham came to the island in 1949 as the new

governor general, he pursued the English cabinet not to go ahead with the constitutional

53. John Mark Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong, (Maryland: Rowland and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007),

pp. 1-3

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reforms ‘until the conditions became more settled.’ As a matter of fact, the influx of

Chinese into Hong Kong following the Civil War had greatly increased population of the

island, thereby attesting London’s claim that the time was yet not ripe for a healthy

implementation of constitutional reforms. In 1971, Murray Maclehose became the

governor general of the island. On the economic sphere, during his tenure, Hong Kong

experienced an economic growth of more than 9% per year.54

With the softening of US-

China relations followed by China’s entry into the UNO in 1972, China’s ambassador to

UNO then demanded that Hong Kong to be excluded from the list of colonial countries

on the ground that the settlement of the issue of Hong Kong and Macao lie within

China’s sovereign rights. The demand was accepted by the British; a silent indication that

the year of expiry of lease might happen to be an apt date for the recovery of the region

by Beijing.55

In fact, the creation of a SEZ in Shenzhen (near the border of Hong Kong)

manifested Beijing’s interests in the island territory and its desire to learn from British

capitalist experiences.

It was in 1982, that China publically put forward its plan, the16 Character Solution for

Hong Kong. Under the plan China vowed to recover Chinese sovereignty in the island,

keep the social systems in Hong Kong unchanged, to have the local populace govern the

island, and to preserve stability in Hong Kong. The talks over Hong Kong continued for

some time between China and Britain, until finally the Joint Declaration was signed by

the two sides on 19th

December 1984 in Beijing. The process was mainly delayed due to

54. Maclehose promoted health, education and housing in Hong Kong. A sophisticated system of infrastructure, roads,

railways, ports and airports was achieved during his time in office (1971-1982). Mass Transit Railway (MTR) best

suited Hong Kong’s congested conditions. To a large extent, Maclehose also ended corruption in politics and civil

service. 55. Ibid, pp.24-28

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China’s claim of complete sovereignty over Hong Kong and British argument of

endowing sovereignty to China while leaving administration in British hands. The Joint

Declaration was the final episode in the settlement of the question of Hong Kong. It

returned sovereign rights as well as complete administration of Hong Kong and the New

Territories to China. The news of the Declaration was well received in Hong Kong as the

prime concerns of the island’s business community were well addressed. The major

provisions of the Declaration can be summarized as under:

1. Hong Kong’s social and economic system, as well as the common-law legal

system shall be preserved.

2. Joint Declaration to have legally binding effect.

3. Agreement on liaison between China and Britain after the conclusion of the Joint

Declaration.

4. Trade policies, status of free port, manufacturing and trade economy, and property

ownership will be preserved.

5. Hong Kong’s representation in international organizations shall continue as

before.

6. Fiscal policy, freedom to move capital as well as a convertible currency will also

be maintained by the government.

7. Education system of Hong Kong will also remain unchanged.

8. The rights and freedoms of Hong Kong citizens will be preserved and

maintained.56

56. Ibid, pp.40-41

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As a matter of fact, Hong Kong’s linkage with the west was also the reason why the

Communist government of PRC adopted a pragmatic view of the British presence in the

island; deciding it not to be a threat for China but an opportunity to maintain “profitable

economic relations with the west.” Hong Kong developed as major financial, commercial

and insurance center. In the 1980s its industry also developed. The healthy business

culture attracted investors from the west and Japan and the economic growth further

grew. By 1987, its average annual growth rate had increased to 13.5 percent. However,

the economic growth had faced a threat in the face of the fact that it was to return to

China in 1997. International investors were also anxious about their money which they

had invested in huge sums. A peaceful transition of power was desired more than

anything else. Similarly, China wanted to maintain the economic strength of Hong Kong

as the island was an important factor in China’s international trade and economic

development plans. After the agreement between China and Britain for reversion had

been signed, about fifty thousand people from Hong Kong migrated to Canada, Australia,

and the United States against fear of Chinese rule. A large proportion of these people

belonged to wealthy and educated families. Nevertheless, provisions of the Joint

Declaration answered the concerns of natives and thus reduced the anxiety associated

with the transfer of sovereignty. Therefore, in spite of the exodus, Hong Kong’s economy

still flourished steadily even as the date for reversion was slowly nearing, thus making

the process of transfer easier for all; Hong Kong, Beijing and London.57

57. Wayne C. McWilliams, Harry Piotrowski, The World Since 1945, Op.cit., pp. 371-372

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YEAR NUMBER OF SHIPS SAILING HONG KONG

HARBOR

1844 538

1860 2889

1864 4558

1.2: Average annual economic growth of Hong Kong as indicated by number of ships. Approximately 400 new ships

sailed the Hong Kong harbor each year from 1844 to 1864.

YEAR POPULATION

1841 4350

1862 123,511

1895 248,498

1.3: Average annual increase in Hong Kong’s population from 1841 to 1895. Hong Kong saw an annual increase of

approximately 6970 new persons every year from 1841 to 1895.

Centre’s policies in these crucial areas of China’s periphery have continued with

adjustments from the times of the Cold War, post-1991 era and into the twenty first

century. The strategic principles governing the administration of these areas in the new

millennium shall be elaborated in the coming chapters.

1.5 PROBLEMS IN THE RUSSIAN PERIPHERY

As a result of the multi-national character of Russian society, the government in Russia

has always had a tough time handling the domestic affairs of the state. The variety of

ethnicity in the country resulted in a variety of reforms being introduced and

consequently resisted; for very often the cultural trends in a particular race seemed all but

ready to adapt to the emerging situation in the country. As a matter of fact, many a times

the need to reform the Russian society and politics contradicted with the norms and

values of the ethnic minorities. Therefore, the government authorities had to retort to a

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forceful method of application; for the government there was no alternative to public

compliance to its orthodox ideologies, and for the ethnic minorities on the other hand,

compromising their religio-cultural principles against the secular ideas of the Russian

policy makers was equally impossible. Thus, from the Soviet times (and even before that)

to the present, the Russian government has been caught against an aggravating situation

in those regions of the state that are inhabited by ethnic minorities. Among these areas are

included the internal and external peripheries in southern Russia. The three Trans-

Caucasian states which have experienced Russian influence for centuries and are now

listed as Russia’s outer periphery, include the Republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia and

Georgia.58

The internal periphery of southern Russia, along the northwest Caucasus,

consists of eight ethnic republics (also called Ciscaucasian states): Kalmykia, Dagestan,

Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Adygea, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachayevo-

Cherkessia.59

58. Turkey and Iran are also partially included in the Transcaucasus states. 59. H.J. de Blij et al., The World Today: Concepts and Regions in Geography, (West Sussex: John Willey & Sons,

2010), p.111

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1.4: Map of North Caucasus

While normally Caucasus is referred to as a region only, it is first and foremost a

mountain range stretching from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea. The North Caucasus is

divided into three parts; the western part stretches from Elburs to the Black Sea while the

eastern part is bordered by the Caspian Sea and the Terek River in the east and west

respectively. The Central part of Northern Caucasus is the highest part of this

mountainous range. Dagestan, Ingushetia and Chechnya lie in the eastern part, while

Kabardino-Balkaria and Ossetia inhabit the central part. In Greek mythology, Caucasus

was the prison abode of Prometheus where he was ordered to be expelled when he and

his family disobeyed Jupiter’s orders. According to legend, on Prometheus’s defiance,

Jupiter ordered to give life to the clay woman Pandora, who thus became the first living

woman on earth. She was sent as trickery to Prometheus. The latter sensing the trap,

refused to marry her. But his brother, Epimetheus, carried away by the woman’s charms,

married Pandora and opened the box that she had brought along. The box, told of

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containing beautiful gifts, in fact was filled with woes and miseries that so entered the

world. Jupiter then ordered to send Prometheus to Caucasus where he was tied to a rock

and a vulture fed on his liver.60

Referred as Koh-i-Kaaf in the Arabian Nights, Caucasus remained the boundary between

Eastern and Western Europe and also between Europe and Asia during medieval times.

This unheard of all places was brought to the limelight in the nineteenth century, when

the Russian Czarist forces launched series of obstinate attacks on the region that became

famous as the Caucasus Wars. The history of Caucasus, in fact, has been a history of

periphery empires of Russia (lying north of the Caucasus), Persia (lying southeast) and

the Ottomans (lying southwest), competing for territorial influence in the region, much

like the miseries that followed the unlocking of the Pandora box. Although the

geographical and the harsh climatic features of North Caucasus made it a rather difficult

and costly task for any invading army, the Arabs nevertheless entered Dagestan via

Derbent in 642 CE, and named it, as per its strategic significance, as the Bab-al-Abwab,

meaning the “gate of gates”.61

In comparison to the North Caucasus, the South Caucasus on the other hand was more of

a transit region for invader and migrants. These movements also carried cultural and

religious elements from the north into south. A profound Russian entrance in the region is

recorded in 1783, when Irakli II of Georgia signed an alliance with Catherine the Great of

Russia. Shortly afterwards, in 1801, Alexander I of Russia annexed Georgia and by the

1820s, the entire southwestern Caucasus was absorbed into the Russian Empire. Having

60. http://www.ewpnet.com/elbrus/caucasus.htm 61. Christopher Zucher, The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus, (New

York: New York University Press, 2009), pp.12-14

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attained a footing in South Caucasus, the Russians then attended to the northern belt to

maintain a secure land route to the South Caucasus. Until the 1850s, the western and

eastern parts of North Caucasus remained disturbed by war and turmoil. The Russians,

therefore, conciliated with central Caucasians who either made alliance with the Russians

or did not offer much resistance against them. During the nineteenth century, the

territories of eastern North Caucasus, which today comprise of Dagestan, Ingushetia and

Chechnya, struggled against the Romanovs’ designs of expansion into the North

Caucasus, which besides territorial advance, also included the forceful conversion of the

local population into Christianity, and deliberate settlements of Slavic people in the

region. It was during this time that Islam became the uniting block for the struggle

against Russian imperialistic designs by the inhabitants of this region who otherwise had

diverse ethnic and linguistic traditions. The local warlords became the principal forces

and organized the local defense ‘in the name of Islam’62

against the Russian imperialists.

Many of such leaders are still remembered as national heroes in view of their valiant fight

against Russians, for example, Imam Shamil and Sheikh Mansur. The North Caucasus

Wars ended in 1864. The harsh policies adopted by Russians had dismantled local

resistance. However, even after the defeat of the local population in the war and the

establishment of Russian rule, the region remained unstable and the native population

rebelled from time to time. As a matter of fact, the nationalistic fervor that engulfed the

Russian Empire during the latter part of the nineteenth century also reached the South

Caucasus. The situation in this part of Caucasus was different from that of the northern

half. In the south, the approach towards Tsarist Russia was conceived differently by the

62. Ibid, p.17

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rural and urban population. While the rural population sought to break free from the

Russian control, the urban compatriots acknowledged the benefits of sticking with the

Empire. The thriving tobacco industries in Batumi, the emerging factories in Tbilisi and

the oil-rich city of Baku, all stood in favor of the Russian Empire. In the case of Armenia,

Russia was a natural ally against the Islamic forces in Ottoman Empire. The Armenians

living in Ottoman provinces faced serious economic problems, whereas those living in

Russian Armenia were on an economic upswing under the Czar. As a matter of fact, most

of the traders in the Caucasus were Armenian in origin; they enjoyed being chief traders

in Tbilisi, while the professional workers in the oil factories of Batumi and Baku were

also largely of Armenian origin. In view of the conditions of Armenians in the Ottoman

Empire, ‘a cultural autonomy in Russia’ was a more preferable option for the Armenians.

The Armenian Revolutionary Party or the Dashnaktsutiun thus formed in 1890, and

which became a formidable political force in the course of the twentieth century,

demanded autonomy for Armenians in not only the Russian Empire but also for

Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire.

As for the North Caucasus, though the Arabs could not maintain a firm rule in Dagestan

or the area around Southern Volga, they nonetheless left behind an Islamic bequest that

continues to this age. The Islamic elements soon traversed into Chechnya and Ingushetia.

After the Mongol invasion of the region in the 13th

century, Islam penetrated further west

of Caucasus and by the 17th

century North Caucasus was, if only ostensibly, Islamized. A

thorough institutional Islamization of the region had however not been achieved as yet;63

as an institutional Islamic political structure was still missing from most of the picture.

63. Ibid, p.14

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The process of religious transformation, at social and political levels, occurred at a time

when the region was largely safe from high handed imperial encroachments. Though,

periodic events of such adventure continued, but the people of the Caucasus or the

mountaineers were, for the most part left to their own, that in turn fashioned the

atmosphere needed for a religious transformation of their society; segregated from the

outside world and unanticipated of any power show for a socio-cultural change. This fact

alone is sufficient to explain the strong adherence of the Caucasians to their religious and

socio-political customs. Things, however, started to change, especially in the nineteenth

century when Russia embarked on its journey of subduing its southern periphery for the

accomplishment of the center’s policies of regional dominance (southward as well as

eastward drift towards the crumbling Ottoman Empire). As it happened, the entire

population of North Caucasus stood up in resistance against the Russians, a yen that

continues to this date.

1.6 CHECHENS IDENTITY& THE INGUSH DILEMMA

The Chechens are a troubled nation in Chechnya itself where momentous quarrels have

preoccupied the Chechens and Moscow alike for hundreds of years. The Chechens are

predominantly Sunni Muslims. Nevertheless, the Islamization of Caucasus that started in

the nineteenth century brought Sufism into parallel existence with the Wahabi faction of

Islam that is most popular in the region until today. During the high tide of Russian

imperialism, starting from the start of the nineteenth to the early years of the twentieth

century, Chechens were vigorously against Russian designs in the Caucasus. The

Chechens remained successful as long as the Russians occupied themselves with the

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complexities of the Crimean War. However, the end of the war, and the defeat of Imam

Shamil led to the consequent establishment of Imperial rule in the entire region of

Caucasus including Chechnya. When the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917, the North

Caucasian Republic, which initially aimed at representing the interests of the North

Caucasians in post-1917 Russia, declared independence in December 1918. However, the

Bolsheviks won over the local trust through promises of self-determination and thus the

Chechen Autonomous Oblast (region) and the Ingush Autonomous Oblast were created

in 1920. The two were merged together in 1934 to form the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous

Oblast. However, by 1936, the status was changed into that of an autonomous republic

namely; Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ChI ASSR).

The Chechen landscape is divided into three regions; the south where the Greater

Caucasus forms the southern boundary, the second region is the foreland constituting the

important Terek and the Sunzha rivers, while the third or the northern part consists of the

Nogay steppe. The Terek River also served as a defensive fence against outsiders until

the later part of the nineteenth century. Chechnya, like other Caucasus regions has a

mixed cultural arrangement. The majority of the population in Chechnya has a Chechen

ethnic background, whereas Russians and Ingush form a minority in the land. The

Chechens and Ingush not only form the Muslim population of Chechnya, but they are

also one of the races in the North Caucasus which use the Nakh group of language.

Though Islam had been introduced in Caucasus in as early as the seventh century, but it

was only in the 17th

century that Islam was truly adopted by the Chechens and

Dagestanis. The slow rate of transformation owed to the strong social structure shaped by

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the centuries’ old practice of heathen traditions. The Russians first entered the Chechen

landscape in the 1720s when Peter the Great sent an expedition to Dagestan. The army

travelled inward into the area and was encountered by the mountain warriors who forced

the former to retreat. Before this, an attempt had been made at annexing North Caucasus

in 1606, albeit defeated. Peter I made a second attempt in 1772 but met the same end. In

the history of Caucasus, there are a number of iconic characters whose fight against

Czarist forces carry a legendary air around them, for they fought with extraordinary valor

and showed invincible astute. The first of such figures is the Chechen Ushurma Aldinsky,

famous by the name Sheikh Mansur Aldinsky.

The Sheikh, belonging to the aoul (village) of Aldi, became a keen reader of Islamic

ideas at an early age. The word soon spread about him and his good deeds; “calls people

to personal purity and justice and who exemplifies these virtues in his life.” 64

Beginning

from a small number of followers, Sheikh Mansur soon united people of almost the entire

Caucasus region under his command. He understood the perils that awaited the natives if

Czarist forces were to annex the territory into their Empire. But he also understood that

uniting different tribes required a binding force that could keep the combatants well

knitted. The fighters who united in his command were unified under the ideology of

Islam. Following Sheikh’s victory in the Battle of Sunzha River, the ground was set for

the training and organization of mountaineers into an army fighting for the sentry of

Caucasus against Russian adventurism. Col. Peiri, who was sent to arrest Sheikh Mansur,

suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Sheikh’s army.65

Sheikh Mansur was

64. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=31403 65. Brig. Syed A.I Tirmazi, Chechnya: Tragedies and Triumphs, (Islamabad: Services Books, 2000), p.7

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finally arrested in 1791 on the orders of Catherine II, and remained imprisoned in the

Shlisselburg Castle until his death in 1794.

Sheikh Mansur was to become a mentor for the generations to come. Imam Shamil,

Khazi Mullah and Sheikh Uzun-Khaji Gotsinsky followed the path laid down by

him.66

Khazi Mullahwas the first Imam of the North Caucasus. He led the gazavat (jihad)

against the Russian troops in1830.67

Imam Shamil was a disciple of Khazi Mullah and

was with him in the fierce battle of 1832 when the former died at the hands of Russian

soldiers. Though Muslims of North Caucasus lost the war and Imam Shamil had to flee to

re-gather his forces, the battle nevertheless, ignited a resolve in the Muslims who

continued the display of utter resistance against the Russians for the next three decades

under the command of Imam Shamil.

Imam Shamil, the third Imam of the North Caucasus Muslims introduced guerilla warfare

techniques in the mountaineers’ army and also established a systematic government in the

states of Caucasus under his command. In fact, a major part of the Caucasus Wars (1817-

1864) was fought under his able command. The elite section of Imam Shamil’s army

comprised of Chechen murids (disciples). After a long and formidable struggle, Imam

Shamil surrendered in 1859. The Caucasians had remained unbent in their loyalty to

Imam and in their determination to achieve marsho (freedom). The fact is attested by a

statement made by General Aleksei Yermolov: “there has been no precedent yet of

someone being able to force a Chechen to fight its co-tribesmen; but the first step towards

this has already been taken and it has been stressed upon that this will always be

66. Adherence to the teachings of religion was brought to open attestation following Sheikh Mansur’s arrest when the

search of his house yielded a fortune of two bulls and two horses. 67. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=3122

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demanded of them.”68

It was only natural for the destitute families of war and hunger

stricken mountaineers to join the Russian side in the hope of finding not only peace, but

also bread, and security of life, respect and property. In 1859, Imam Shamil along with a

handful of his murids surrendered to Field Marshal Prince Bariatinsky. The last of

Shamil’s strongholds, the Cherkessk state fell to the Russians in 1864, thus drawing

curtains on the prolonged Caucasus Wars.69

The Soviet years proved as disappointing for Chechnya as for the rest of the region.

During the years of World War II, the Chechens and Ingush were alleged of conspiring

with the Nazi invaders. Fearing that the Chechens might welcome Nazis for the

attainment of an independent Chechnya, Stalin ordered mass deportations of the locals to

Central Asia and Siberia. Different estimates have been made to calculate the exact

number of the deportees. According to some equations, as many as 400,000 to 800,000

people were deported; with approximately 100,000 of them dying in face of harsh

conditions.70

Christopher Zucher gives a recorded figure of 387,229 Chechens and 91,250

Ingush who faced deportations. Although the People’s Commissariats of Internal Affairs

reported about at least 60,000 of such Chechen fighters who were waiting for an

opportunity to join Nazis against Soviet forces, the Russian military records tell a

different story. More or less 29,000 Chechen soldiers, including volunteers, were fighting

with the Soviet army against Nazi forces. In spite of this, the Chechens could not be

saved from forced deportation. This is one of the primary reasons why Chechen

nationalism and anti-Soviet sentiments have been the strongest of all the ethnic minorities

68. John Russell, Chechnya: Russia’s ‘War on Terror’, (New York: Routledge, 2007), p.31 69. Brig. Syed A.I Tirmazi, Chechnya: Tragedies and Triumphs, op. Cit., p.88 70. http://www.globalissues.org/article/100/crisis-in-chechnya

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against Russia. Following Stalin’s death in 1953, the deportees were repatriated and the

republic was also re-established in 1957. But even this did not show cast the trust of the

centre towards the people of this republic. The locals found the manifestation of this

mistrust in the fact that, rather than giving the post to a Chechen, the ‘first secretary’ of

the republic was always a Russian. Ironically, all the leading politicians of Chechnya who

directed the Chechen question in the 1980s and ‘90s were born in exile (in Kazakhstan).71

For most of the period of anti-Russian struggle, Chechen stance was not for an

independent republic but it was rather aimed at expelling foreign attacks on the region.

During the years of Civil War in Russia, many Ingush and Chechens supported the

Bolsheviks. In face of the collectivization policy, an uprising began in the Chechen-

Ingush Oblast in 1929 and ended only in 1934. In 1936, Soviet forces arrested

approximately 10,000 people from Ingushetia and Chechnya for the purpose of

‘eliminating anti-Soviet elements.’ As a result of the difficulty and humiliation faced by

the Ingush and Chechens during the course of forced deportations, the mountains of

Chechen Ingush Oblast saw a rebellion with a new force in 1944. Though the rebellion

was almost completely eliminated by the mid-1950s, the mountaineers however

continued to vent counter attacks on Soviet military units whenever possible.

The political life of North Caucasus, particularly Chechen-Ingush Oblast did not change

much during the Cold War years. The Perestroika which began in 1985 had its first

serious effects on the Chechen-Ingush landscape in 1987 when historians from Dagestan

criticized the works of Professor Vinogradov that propagated the ‘voluntary inclusion’ of

71. Christopher Zucher, The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus, Op.Cit., pp.

73-74

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Chechnya-Ingushetia into the Russian Empire. This event was to set the stage for leading

the opposition into action against Soviet plans. Another pretext was provided by the

announcement of the construction of the Gudermes Biochemical Plant in Grozny. By

1988, the opposition organized itself into the Popular Front of the Chechen-Ingush

ASSR. The Popular Front remained the most active opposition party in ChI ASSR until

the demise of the USSR.72

The Chechen Revolution’s foundations were also prepared

during this time but will be elaborated in the coming chapters.

Chechen resistance against Russia has been one of its kinds for it was often expressed in

matters relating to law, identity, and religions. “Older Russians relate that, after the Stalin

era, no Chechen was ever brought before a Soviet court of law charged with a serious

crime. Instead, law was administered by the traditional legal canon, the adat, and

enforced by the clans.” Although there are high chances of exaggeration in such

narrations, but they surely explain the height of extent to which traditional and religious

ideas of law were followed even during the Soviet times. The adat system which has an

Islamic base was also the primary reason for the resentment against the atheist based

political adventurism of the center in the region. This in turn also establishes the fact that

Islam has always remained an indispensable element of Chechen identity; even during

times when complying with religious obligations was not an easy affair.73

Moreover, on

the other hand, the adat system led to the creation of two parallel systems running in the

same region. The two systems were highly contrasting in their nature and theory. Adat

system, based on oral traditions, was used by the people of North Caucasus as a common

customary law. When Islam spread in the region, Islamic law or the sharia was adopted

72. http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/full_text_search/AllCRCDocs/95-5.htm 73. Ibid, p.74

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by the natives in solving their disputes, but adat however, continued to exist alongside

sharia. Furthermore, a new brand of legal code was introduced when the Russians

acquired control of the region.74

This too, continued to exist in theory and in practice

along with adat and sharia.

The cornering out of Chechens from civil opportunities further embedded the traditional

legal systems in Chechnya as the native population grew more and more distant from the

centre and vice versa. According to some writers, finding a career in USSR, with a

Chechen identity was a hard chore. Even being a republic did not give the Chechens due

access to political and economic opportunities which many would have hoped for at the

time of the establishment of the autonomous republic. This slowed down the chances of

formation of a ‘Chechen-Soviet elite’ and therefore a noticeable lack of such policy

makers was lacking in Chechnya in 1991, who in other cases would have curtained a

smoother transformation in the Soviet republics and avoided a destabilization of the

Soviet political map.75

Lying between Chechnya in the east and North Ossetia in the west, the Republic of

Ingushetia shares a considerable border with Georgia in the south. The Chechens and

Ingush, because of their close geographical proximity, inter-related history, and close

religio-cultural contacts, are sometimes conveniently dealt as a single populace. But in

reality, they are distinct people with their own historical accounts and cultural tendencies.

Up to the sixteenth century, Ingush people were settled in the middle and highland areas

74. Moshe Gammer, ed. Ethno-Nationalism, Islam and the State in the Caucasus: Post-Soviet Disorder, (New York:

Routledge, 2010), p.20 75. Christopher Zucher, The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus, Op. Cit.,

p.74

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of the valley of Assa, but climatic changes and Russian encroachments drove the people

to the plain areas through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This drive of

migrations brought the Ingush and Chechens into closer contacts. Both the classes have

been highly influenced by Qadria and Naqshbandiatariqas, while some numbers of

Ingush and Chechens also converted to Salafite Islam in the twentieth century.76

The

Ingush like most of their neighbors were resistant to foreign rule. The social hierarchy

consisted of a family, sub-clan, and a clan based confederation. The Ingush people were

saved from foreign religious influences for a considerable time and it was not before the

latter half of the nineteenth century that paganism was finally wiped out from the Ingush

landscape. Though a similar religious transformation from paganism to Islam (and

Christianity) could be observed in contemporary North Caucasus, but the pace of change

in Ingushetia particularly was rather slow.77

With the beginning of Russian imperialism,

the process of Islamization quickened as more public support was forwarded for Sufi

brotherhood across the northern Caucasus.78

The Czarist authorities, however, calculating

the challenge that the spread of Islam had for the center, launched series of reforms in the

North Caucasus so as to curtail the religious transformation and also to increase the

number of Christian subjects in the region. The people of Ingushetia also signed an

agreement with the Czar in 1810 (the year when Ingushetia was brought under Russian

rule) whereby they pledged to stop Islamic missionary activities in the region.

Nevertheless, the harsh methods adopted by the Russians in the North Caucasian

periphery soon turned Ingush people in favor of Islam that appeared a more reasonable

76. T. Lokshina, As if they Fall from the Sky: Counterinsurgency, Rights, Violations and Rampant Impunity in

Ingushetia, (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2008), pp.12-13 77. Oliver Bullough, Let Our Fame be Great: Journeys among the Defiant Peoples of the Caucasus, (New York: Basic Books,

2010), p. 254 78.Suzanne Goldenberg, Pride of Small Nations: The Caucasus and Post-Soviet Disorder, (London: Zed Books, 1994), p. 191

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option in the context of local resistance against the center. Ingush support could be well

discerned in the gazavat launched against the Russian forces.79

When Ingushetia became an autonomous district of Russia in 1924, the political and

intellectual elite of the region was deported on government’s orders. In 1934, Chechnya

and Ingushetia joined together to form the Chechno-Ingushetia region and by 1936, the

status of the region had been upgraded to that of an ASSR. The Ingush, along with

Chechens, faced mass deportations following the alleged involvement in Nazi’s attack on

USSR. During the years of deportations (1944-1956), the region was legally abolished80

and western Ingushetia was incorporated into North Ossetia. On their return home during

Khrushchev’s time, they found their territory inhabited by the Ossetians.

The seeds of resentment sown during this time continue to show their after effects even

after an autonomous Ingushetia was established in 1992.81

1.7 DAGESTANI FERVOR

The geography of the Russian periphery has played a noteworthy role in setting its

geopolitical scenario. Dagestan located in the Northern Caucasus, consists of

mountainous terrain as well as coastal areas. In fact, the term Dagestan is itself translated

as ‘land of the mountains’. The capital of Dagestan, Makhachkala opens into the Caspian

Sea, while sharing common borders with Chechnya, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. Although

popular opinion attributes the strongest resistance against Russian expansion to

79. Michael Khodarkovsky, Bitter Choices: Loyalty and Betrayal in the Russian Conquest of the North Caucasus, (Ithaca:

Cornell University Press, 2011), p.17 80. T. Lokshina, As if they Fall from the Sky: Counterinsurgency, Rights, Violations and, Op.cit., p.12 81. Simon Richmond, Russia, (London: Lonely Planet, 2009), p.529

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Chechens; but it was Dagestan which cost Russians the most, both in life and in capital.

The social custom of Dagestan; blood revenge, was as important a factor as the

geography of the state with its mountainous landscape in a successful resistance against

foreign forces for a long time. The obligation to social customs in Dagestan is considered

to be more orthodox in practice than in any other part of the Caucasus. Moreover, it was

the Muslim leaders of Dagestan (Imam Shamil, Khazi Mullah) who formulated the

Caucasian resistance against Russian imperialistic designs. After putting up a valiant

fight for twenty five years, Imam Shamil finally surrendered to the Russian forces in

1859, thereby ending a half-century long struggle of North Caucasians against Czarist

Russia. Following the imposition of Russian rule in Dagestan, the Dagestan Oblast was

established in 1860. In spite of the defeat, the Dagestani population, especially the Avars,

who constitute the majority of the Muslim population in modern Dagestan, obtained a

strong boost in their reputation in the Muslim world for putting a major fight against

Czarist forces.82

The history of Dagestan, the birth place of Imam Shamil, like most of the North Caucasus

republics, is a history of centuries’ long struggle against foreign infringements. The

Arabs who first came to the Caucasus via Derbent were resolutely defeated by the

Dagestani mountaineers in 652 CE. The combative nature of the population proved to be

a major concern for the Arabs. According to Michael Reynolds,

“Dagestan, in short proved to be a difficult place to rule: geographically isolated,

topographically rugged, and unrelentingly hostile. The Arabs and their

82. Gordon M. Hahn, Russia’s Islamic Threat, (London: Yale University Press, 2007), pp. 94-96

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chroniclers repeatedly expressed exasperation with the warlike North Caucasian

infidels: Suraqa bin Amr described the torment of fighting the mountaineers in

verse, and Al-Masudi’s angry description of a local Dagestani chieftain as a

“host of robbers, brigands and malefactors” hints at the Muslims’ frustrations”83

Even after seizing control of Derbent in 686 CE, the Muslims could not keep a resolute

command of Dagestani affairs. Nevertheless, the Arab conquest left behind an Islamic

legacy that was to bring the population of Dagestan and of the North Caucasus into its

folds. By the eighth century, Sufi Islam entered Dagestan. The effects of Sufism were

becoming particularly prominent by the eleventh century when Qadria tariqa appeared

on the Dagestani horizon. The Naqshbandia tariqa followed into the region from

Anatolia in the fifteenth century and became particularly prominent among the Avars,

Kumyk and Dargin populations. In the eleventh century, Derbent acquired the reputation

of a center of Sufism along the “northern boundary of the Muslim World”. The murids

were trained as ghazis (Muslim warriors) by their masters or sheikhs and were dispatched

on the mission to bring the restless heathen mountain warriors to Islamic teachings. The

resistance encountered by the murids from the mountaineers was similar to that meted out

to the Arabs in the seventh century. Therefore, the conversion of the non-Muslim

population to Islam was achieved in centuries. By the fourteenth century, the largest

ethnic group of Dagestan; the Avars, had been converted to Islam and towards the end of

the fifteenth century, majority of the Dagestani populace conformed to the Sha’afi school

of Islamic thought. The process of Islamization continued through the sixteenth and

83. Robert Bruce Ware, Enver Kisriev, Dagestan: Russian Hegemony and Islamic Resistance in the North Caucasus,

(New York: Routledge, 2010), p.5

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seventeenth centuries whereby Chechen and Ingush people came in contact with Islamic

principles.84

Besides the Arabs, Mongols also tried their chances in the Caucasus. The result was not

much different from the Arab experience. Try as they might, the Mongols failed to defeat

the mountaineers’ spirit and were ultimately forced to pay tribute to the latter so as to

prevent consequent raids by the highlanders. Although Tamerlane had seized Dagestan in

1395-1396, he nevertheless moved on to the southern flank of the Caucasus and did not

establish a likewise presence in the north. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw

similar ventures by the Ottomans and Safavids in the northeast of Caucasus. They too

were no more successful than the predecessors. The Safavid intrusion was particularly

put down by the Dagestani leader Haji Daud who claimed to have been sent by God to

save the Caucasian Sunnis from the Shiite Persians.85

By 1721, the Persians had been

expelled not only from Dagestan but also from north Azerbaijan. All the more, even

Nadir Shah could not achieve his dream of conquering Dagestan and was forced to retreat

in 1745, three years after the first attack.

According to Reynolds, besides the physical and psychological attributes of the

mountaineers, the existence of local leaders’ political elite was enough to put off foreign

invasions. As a matter of fact, until the nineteenth century, “there was neither much

incentive nor a socio-cultural basis for the formation of a state or other political-

administrative structure that would embrace the North Caucasus as a whole.”86

84. Ibid, p.6 85. Ibid, p.7 86.Ibid, p.8

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The first direct Russian military action against Dagestan was ordered by Peter the Great

in 1722 with Persian alliance. The problems at home, however forced Peter to recant his

troops, and in 1732, he ceded Dagestan to Persia.87

It must be remembered that Russian

intrusions did not only carry territorial repercussions but also economic and religious

corollaries. The Cossacks who entered the region pushed the highlanders further up the

mountains where there was less suitable land for agriculture. Furthermore, on the

religious front, centre’s policy of converting the local Muslim population to Orthodox

Christianity was a threat to the religious beliefs and practices of the locals. The process of

Russian efforts to occupy the region nevertheless continued and ultimately in 1813, by

the Treaty of Gulistan with Persia, Russia finally acquired the control over Dagestan

(though Derbent had been annexed in 1796). The Russians then busied themselves in

establishing their military presence in the region. The military consolidation was a testing

time for the locals particularly due to the brutal tactics adopted by General Aleksey

Petrovich Yermolov. Yermolov’s strategy which included scorching of grounds and

fields, deportations, and forced starvation. According to Ware and Kisriev, the tactics in

today’s world would rather be characterized as ‘genocide’. For example, (in Chechnya

particularly), by establishing military fortresses and Cossack settlements, he pushed the

highlanders and their communities towards the mountains where there was not enough

land to grow crops to feed themselves. Then, every autumn, he would destroy maze fields

of the Chechens just when the time of harvest was near; so as to starve the population and

force them to submit. Moreover, his policy was of ‘collective punishment; if an

individual was found involved in an anti-Russian campaign and if his village refused to

87. Ibid, p.14

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hand him over, the entire village was leveled down.88

When criticized by the Czar or by

his contemporaries, Yermolov justified his actions by responding that “gentleness in the

eyes of the Asiatics is a sign of weakness”. 89

During the nineteenth century, Russians sought to accommodate Czarist administrative

models in juxtaposition with the traditional models of socio-political structure pertaining

to cultural influences of Islam and the adat system. Bureaucratic appointments were often

made in the favor Christian Caucasian officers from Georgia and Armenia who in turn

patronized the local nobility. Moreover, Russians confiscated lands and redistributed

these among those members of local nobility who consented to cooperate with the

center’s policies. While this new political model raised the levels of the pro-Russian

elements in Dagestan and North Caucasus, it significantly declined the statues of jamaat

populations who were now faced with forced labor. Since the local population was left to

choose among the new political structure or ‘armed resistance’, it gave way to an

amalgamated unity of egalitarian, self-reliant, Islamic, and clan based factors. The

traditional murid warriors of Sufi lifestyle were once again taking arms to fight for

Islamic political ideology. In1824, Kazi-Magomed from Gimri became Imam of the

Muslims of Caucasus and declared jihad against Russians. After his death in a battle field

in 1832, Gamzat-Bek was elected Imam.90

The latter was succeeded by Imam Shamil

who fought a twenty five year war with Russians at the end of which period; Caucasus

was brought under the control of imperial Russia. Many parts of Dagestan saw anti-center

revolts in 1861, 1862, 1866, and in 1871. The revolt of 1871 under Imam Gadzhi

88. Moshe Gammer, Ethno-Nationalism, Islam and the State in the Caucasus: Post-Soviet Disorder, Op. Cit., p. 104 89. Robert Bruce Ware, Enver Kisriev, Dagestan: Russian Hegemony and Islamic Resistance in the North Caucasus,

Op. Cit., p.15 90. Ibid, pp.17-20

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Magomed was suppressed. “Gallows were erected in Derbent and Gunib, where about

300 leaders of the resistance, including Dagestan’s foremost religious leaders were hung

in front of thousands of people who had been especially chosen to represent their jamaats

as witnesses.”91

In addition to this, approximately 5000 people (men, women and

children) were exiled to remote areas. It was only natural to see Dagestan is and

Chechens once again at arms against Czarist forces in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877.

Another zealous movement in Dagestan erupted in the early years of the twentieth

century when the local population rose up in resistance against the Czar’s policy of

introducing Cyrillic alphabets in the written script. The record books had previously been

maintained in Arabic by Kadis (Qazis) who too were replaced by new Russian speaking

clerical appointees of the center. Following the arrest of political envoys, the whole

region of Dagestan stood in open resistance against the center by mid-1914. The center

had to thus postpone the reform and was eventually cancelled at the start of the First

World War. During the years of civil war in Russia, the Muslim people of North

Caucasus established an independent state; the United Mountain Republic. But the

Bolshevik leaders were able to amalgamate the independent state into the USSR in return

of promises for self-determination. The republic was thus changed into the Gorskaya

Autonomous Republic (GAR). The eventual formation of the Autonomous Soviet

Socialist Republic for Dagestan was the first autonomous republic to have been formed in

USSR.

91. Ibid, pp.22-23

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Although the region of Dagestan has not played a key role in the political development of

the country, but the Muslim political figures of the oblast occupied important positions in

the first Muslim political party of USSR. Akhmad-kadi Akhtaev, the chairman of the

Party of Islamic Rebirth or the PIV (Partiya Islamskogo Vozrozhdeniya) was also from

Dagestan.92

Thus, Dagestan has at times also served to link the region with the centre.

The people of the Caucasus in general and of Dagestan in particular put little trust in the

central government, for many a times pledges made by the latter have not been kept in

spirit. For instance, Stalin assured the Dagestan is that USSR would not forbid Sharia law

and also ascertained government’s help for the implication of the same.

YEAR Medressahs & Maktabs Secular Schools Number of Students

1904 685 ____ 5118

1914 743 ____ 7000

1917 2711 183 45000

1.5: Statistical illustration of the number of secular and Islamic schools between 1904 and 1917

Year Region

1763 Mozdok (North Ossetia)

1793 Vladikavkaz

1806 Kabarda

1806 Derbent

1818 Grozny

1818 Nalchik

1844 Petrovsk (Present Makhachkala)

1.6: Russian military expansion in the North Caucasus (18th and 19th centuries)

92. Gordon M. Hahn, Russia’s Islamic Threat, Op.Cit., pp.96-97

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But shortly afterwards in 1921 District Shariat Legislative Department was created as a

new center of vertical political power. In 1923, eleven District Shariat Courts were

created with very authoritative religious heads to serve as intermediaries between jamaats

and the republic. Moving forward, in April 1927, Central Executive Committees and the

Soviet of the People’s Commissars of Dagestan decreed the abolishment of jamaats and

District Shariat Courts and also ‘criminalized the practice of shariat.’ As a matter of fact,

from 1928 onwards, mosques were shut down. In the same year, more than 800 religious

elders were exiled to Archangelsk (near Arctic Circle). The practice of repressing Islam

continued during the Soviet period with many tariqas being forced to go underground.93

On the other hand, better means of life in the face of electricity, education and health care

were also brought in Dagestan by the Soviets but the anti-religion policies of the Soviet

leaders overshadowed these achievements and the resentment against the center therefore

continued.

After making it a part of the USSR, in 1938, the Soviet government ordered to Latinize

the alphabets of the North Caucasian language in an effort to further incorporate the

people into national framework. These and other dealings proved Bolshevik promises to

be merely political tactics as the regime under Stalin frequently inflicted harsh policies

towards the people of the region. For example, in 1944, a large number of Chechens of

Dagestan, Chechens, Balkars, Karachais, and other ethnic minorities were deported to

Central Asia and Siberia against their alleged involvements in Nazi assault of USSR.

Their return to their native homelands in 1950s led to an outbreak of inter-racial conflicts.

For when the Akin branch of Chechens returned from Central Asia, they settled

93. Robert Bruce Ware, Enver Kisriev, Dagestan: Russian Hegemony and Islamic Resistance in the North Caucasus,

Op. Cit., pp. 29-31

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themselves in the areas inhabited by Avars, Dargin and Dars. The struggle erupted among

these groups for the control of an area, “where good land was scarce”. Moreover, the

North Caucasus, in addition to the deportations and inter-ethnic conflicts among the

inhabitants, faced serious shortage of economic and social development projects. The

staunch Islamic principles in the lifestyle of the locals were also attacked by Soviet

policies, whereby hundreds of Muslim clerics were killed and maltreated. In some cases,

the clerics were made accountable to the state to answer the issues of non-conformity of

the local population to Soviet philosophy.

As per the ethnic composition in Dagestan, approximately thirty-two ethnic groups have

been reported to inhabit the region. Muslims form an over whelming majority of the

region, the ratio exceeding 90%, while the minorities include Christians, and Mountain

Jews among others. The traditional Islam that has been in practice in Dagestan for scores

of years is based on Sunni Sufi heritage.94

Furthermore, there are three more divisions in

Dagestan based upon language. The Muslim populace of the region is divided into two of

these linguistic groups. The Avars, Dargins, Lezgins, Laks, Tabasarans, and Chechens

belong to the Dagestani-Nakh wing which uses Ibero-Caucasian language, which is also

the language of the majority in the republic. The second group consists of the Kumyks,

Nogais, and Azeris whose language is derived from the Turkic group of Altai languages.

The third linguistic group of Dagestan, comprising of Russians, Tats, and the mountain

Jews, is the Indo-Iranian group which speaks a language close to Persian.

94. http://www.martinfrost.ws/htmlfiles/sept2008/dagestan-republic.html

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Even though ethnicity is a matter of profound political and social importance for not only

the republic’s inhabitants but also for the central government, another factor adds to the

complexity of Dagestan’s politics; the jamaat system, which stands for an assembly of

adjoining villages united by their tribes or tukhumy. This structural framework of

Dagestan makes it a unique example among other North Caucasian regions.95

Some

scholars are of the opinion that the jamaat system adds to the problems of Moscow in its

periphery, as the jamaats serve as a socio-political carrier within a community that can

best spread both religious sentiments and political fervor. According to this view, jamaats

are thus equally influential in spreading radical or jihadist sentiments among the people

of the region. With the passage of time, an inter-ethnic conflict shaped in Dagestan,

between the mainstream Naqshbandia order and the Chechens and Wahabis; though it

remained potentially obscure whether it arose on purely ethnic grounds or for reasons

otherwise. This inter-ethnic conflict in the republic casts a further challenge to Moscow

for this may very well be an opportune chapter for strengthening foreign radical groups

by means of race based recruitment in Dagestani ethnic groups.96

1.8 KABARDINO-BALKARIA

The political destabilization, evident in Chechnya and Dagestan, has not remained

confined to a few republics; it has rather affected almost the entire Caucasus region. An

important region in this regard has been Kabardino-Balkaria (KBR) which is gateway to

the northwestern Caucasus. Northwest Caucasus constitutes three Muslim republics;

KBR, Karachaevo-Cherkessiya (KChR), and Adygea, and two Muslim ethnic groups; the

95. Gordon M. Hahn, Russia’s Islamic Threat, Op. Cit., p.98 96. Ibid. p.99

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Circassian and the Balkar-Karachai. The Kabardins, Cherkess and Adygeis titular heads

belong to Circassians, whereas the Balkars are more closely related to the Karachais. The

Kabardins, however, remain a majority in the republic.

Kabard49%

Russian 32%

Balkar9%

Ukrainian2%

Ossete1%

Other7%

1.7: Ethnic distribution in Kabardino-Balkaria

The Muslim population of Kabardins and Balkars though different form each other in

language and culture; nevertheless, form the majority in KBR. The incorporation of the

Greater Kabardia, as it was called in medieval times, was achieved against the threat of

enforced conquest by the Russian rulers. As a matter of fact, for the Russians, the

incorporation of Kabardia was the easiest of all the Caucasian conquests. Following the

defeat of the Golden Horde by Ivan the Terrible, and the consequent incorporation of the

Kazan Khanate into Russia, many Kabard princes are reported to have asked for

Moscow’s favor which was thus granted. Ivan’s marriage with a Kabard princess further

associated Kabards with the Russian state. The Treaty of St. Petersburg (1657) also

declared Kabardia as a protectorate of Moscow, and as of this time, the Kabardins, unlike

other North Caucasian Muslim communities, did not resist the Russian imperial

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encroachments into the Caucasus from 1824-1856, nor did they join the Dagestanis and

Chechens in the anti-Bolshevik revolt during 1920-1921.

The Northwest Caucasus, home to the three Muslim republics, is engrossed in the

memory of different Russian groups; all from different perspectives.

“For the Greeks and Armenians, the Northwest Caucasus is the land to which

their ancestors fled to escape Ottoman oppression; for the nomadic Nogais it is a

land of exile to which they were deported in the 1950s to clear land for

petroleum development; for the Russians, it is the home form which they have

been forced to flee since the fall of the Soviet Union to escape ethnic

discrimination and violence; for the Chechens, it is the refuge to which they

have fled to escape war in their homeland; for the Meskhetians, it is a stopover

on their long journey back home from Georgia from their Stalin-imposed exile

in Uzbekistan which ended with the pogroms of 1989, leaving them a stateless

people with no rights anywhere in the former Soviet Union; and for the

Cossacks, it represents a land that was earned at great sacrifice during the long

struggle on behalf of the Russian Imperial government, and from where they

were deported in the 1920s to make room for peoples Bolsheviks considered

more trust worthy.”97

The Circassians and Karachai-Balkars see the region from a rather tragic perspective.

Even today, the people of this region live under an impending fear of violence and

conflict as Moscow continues to ignore this, one of the most improved regions of the

97. Walter Richmond, The Northwest Caucasus: Past, Present, Future, (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), p.4

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Russian Federation. Although the Northeast Caucasus, (Chechnya and Dagestan) has

attracted global attention during the turbulent years of the past decades, Northwest

Caucasus has remained relatively missing from the center of international interest.

Nevertheless, the region has strong historical and ethnic roots. The Adyghe-Abkhaz

people are generally reported as the most ancient inhabitants of the region who split into

four sub-groups before 500 CE. The largest ethnic composition in Northwest Caucasus is

of Adyghe or the Circassian group. As for Kabardins, the group developed itself into a

feudal state with strong linguistic and cultural foundations by the 16th

century

CE.98

Though archaeological and linguistic heritage of the region dates back to the

Paleolithic and Greek era, the first documented historical evidence of Circassians reports

the arrival of Greek Christian missionaries at the end of the third century CE. According

to these sources, missionaries sent by Emperor Justinian travelled to the North Caucasus

in conformation with Byzantium designs of controlling the resources of the region.99

The

Circassians came under significant Turkic influence when the Khazars, who had entered

and established themselves in the North Caucasus region by the 6th

century CE,

subjugated the Bulgars back to Azov region and thus conquered the Circassians in the 8th

century CE.100

The Alans, who after the Hun invasion had taken refuge in the mountains,

transformed into a well-organized society by the 5th

century CE. With the establishment

of the Alan kingdom, simultaneous existence of Islam, Judaism, Christianity and pagan

traditions could be observed across the region.

98. Ibid, p.8 99. Ibid, p.13 100. Ibid, p.14

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The end of the eleventh century saw the establishment of Genoese colonies along the Sea

of Azov and also along the Black Sea Coasts. The center of Genoese community was

Caffa. This period saw extensive trade activities in the region by Greeks, Tartars,

Circassians, Italians, Abkhazis, Armenians and Slavs. Moving forth, beginning from the

invasion of Dagestan in1222, the North Caucasus came under a series of attacks from the

Mongols. It was in 1277 that the Circassians were finally defeated although small pockets

of local administration could still be observed here. Uzbek Khan’s attack of Circassia was

followed by the weakening of Mongolian power in North Caucasus. In 1295, Timur

began his ventures in the area. His campaign against the Circassians, Abazas and Alans

reduced the already declining figures of the indigenous population. Furthermore, his

attacks on North Caucasus also disconnected the region from the Silk Route and ended

links with Central Asia and Caffa. The Alans, who survived the Mongolian ordeals,

retreated to the mountains and laid the genetic foundation of modern Ossetians and

‘probably also of Karachai-Balkars.’ Circassians were least affected by these nomadic

intrusions. They thus extended their territories to almost twofold of its previous size and

so became the dominant ethnic group in Northwest Caucasus. This state of affairs

continued until the 19th

century when their existence came under grave threat at the hands

of the Czarist forces.101

The origin of Karachai-Balkars, on the other hand, is highly debatable. There are a

reported number of 24000 Karachais and 9000 Balkars in 1858. According to historians,

the first mention of Balkaria comes in a report presented by the Russian commander I.A

Dashkov in 1629. The report talks of ‘Chereks’ who according to Circassian historian

101. Ibid, pp. 16-17

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Shora Nogma, considered themselves as the descendants of Bulgars. According to

Nogma, it is perhaps for this reason that Dashkov spoke of the region as Balkaria. As for

Karachais, they are often linked to the chieftain Karachai or Karcha who led his people

‘to the present homeland’. One theory talks of Karachai’s return to mountains following

the defeat at the hands of Circassians. A second theory postulates the Karachais as

members of Timur’s army who remained in the northern Caucasus.102

Somewhere between 1429 and 1430, Khaji-DevletGirei was proclaimed as the Khan of

Tartars taking refuge in Crimea. He declared the Crimean Khanate free from the Golden

Horde. However, by 1475, Ottomans had captured colonies lying along the Black Sea

coast and now threatened Circassia. North Caucasus was of indispensable strategic value

for the Ottomans owing to their conflict with Persia. As the power of the Golden Horde

and that of the Crimean Khanate subdued under Ottoman authority a most contesting

struggle ensued between Ottomans and Russians for the control of the Caucasus region.

The period of Ottoman and Crimean control over Northwest Caucasus contains episodes

of forced conversion of the local population into the Islamic faith. According to Walter

Richmond, “the Crimeans regularly occupied Circassian and Kabardian auls (villages)

for months on end, during which time they would burn all the Christian texts they found

and either kill the priests or drive them into the mountains. In some cases, the occupiers

would build mosques and remain for as long as fourteen years to assure the population

was fully converted.”103

102. Ibid, p.19 103. Ibid, p.39

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By the middle of the 16th

century, Kabardins had developed as the most powerful

Circassian tribe and leaders of the North Caucasians. The feudal society of Kabardia was

the best developed in the Northwest Caucasus. Moreover, its proximity with Daryal Pass

made it an important travelling route. As a result of these factors, Kabardia occupied an

important position in Russian political framework. This was manifested in 1557 with the

conclusion of the first treaty between Czarist Russia and Kabardia. The marriage of

Kabardian prince TemriukIndarko’s daughter with Ivan IV further brought the two

societies close to each other.104

Russians and Kabardins fought together against Crimeans

in 1567 and against Ottomans in 1569. However, Russian interests in North Caucasus

changed in the coming years in contrast with the spirit of the treaty signed in the earlier

decades. With tensions escalating in the South Caucasus between Russians and Ottoman

Empire, Russian approach towards North Caucasus changed from that of allies to that of

regal subjects since St. Petersburg now attended the warrior Cossacks with more interest.

Future events in Kabardia portrayed Russia as much reliable as it had been reputed of

being in Chechnya and Dagestan. For example, during the Russo-Turkish War of 1711,

Peter I promise to Kabardin pshis (princes) of granting them the status of independent

rule ‘exempted from taxation’ could not be delivered as Russian help did not come for

Kabardin’s rescue when the latter were attacked by Crimean Khanate in 1720.

Consequently, Kabardins agreed to pay tribute to the Crimean Khanate. The Russians

thus lost Kabardins’ loyalty in a mere matter of few years.105

During this time, the issue of Cossacks was also evolving into a deciding profile. The

Cossacks, governed by their elected leaders, were a support base for Russian military.

104. Ibid, p.42 105. Ibid, p.46

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The Cossack uprising of 1670 and 1707 had rung alarm bells in St. Petersburg in face of

the potential dangers that this community could cause. In the 1707 uprising, Ottomans

had also assisted the Cossacks to capture Azov. However, at the home front, lack of

central authority among Cossacks gave Russians an edge over the former to subdue them.

By the mid-eighteenth century, Cossacks were sternly subordinated to the Czar’s.

Through the eighteenth century, Cossacks were deliberately settled across the Kuban

River (from Kabardia and Circassia). Not only Cossacks, but Russian settlers could also

be seen in the North Caucasus as early as in 1711.106

The Russian-Persian-Ottoman

struggle for the control of Caucasus also continued during this time. The Treaty of Resht

(1732) between Persia and Russia, while giving some powers to the Persians also became

the prelude for renewed Ottoman attacks on the Northwest Caucasus. By 1732, Ottomans

were given a free hand in Northwest Caucasus by Persia, and in 1735, a Crimean army

had invaded Kabardia. These events were followed by a Russo-Turkish war in 1736 that

ended in 1739 with the Treaty of Belgrade. Although the treaty recognized Kabardia’s

independence, it also postulated that if Kabardins “give cause of complaint to either of

the two powers, each will be allowed to chastise and punish them.” Though it remains

debatable as to what nature of “complaint” could be created by the small state, it is

nevertheless beyond doubt that the independence of Kabardia only put it at a defenseless

state against every kind of foreign aggression as a matter of fact, Kabardia encountered

repeated attacks from the Crimean Khanate through the 1740s.107

Power struggle in the Caucasus continued unabated through the eighteenth and nineteenth

centuries. Kabardia in particular and North Caucasus in general were greatly affected by

106. Ibid, p.47 107. Ibid, p.48

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the Caucasus War and the Crimean War. By the time Crimean War broke out in 1853, the

Caucasus region was a center of international attention, especially that of the British in

the context of an apprehended alteration in the balance of power in the eastern

hemisphere of Europe. This could take place in the face of a much likely Ottoman defeat

at the hands of Russians. By 1859, Circassian resistance had been broken by Russians.

The latter also decided to deport Circassians to the Ottoman Empire and resettle their

lands with Cossack community. As it happened, years following 1859 saw mass

deportations of Northwest Caucasians into the Ottoman Empire. According to estimates,

the deportations reduced the population by 94% of the region that was to become the

Kuban Oblast. A Russian official, I.A Drozdov, in 1862, explained the events of

deportations as thus:

“The mountain was covered with the corpses of the hemmed in enemy….

Unable to withstand this brilliant and unusual attack the mountaineers turned

around and broke into total flight, abandoning their weapons, horses, and

wounded on the road…. This went on for days on end; the corpses lying under

the Caucasus sun for two days were already decomposing and emitted such a

stench around the camp that it was impossible to breath.”108

Once the Russians were infirm procession of the North Caucasus imperial policy reforms

were implemented; for a better administration of the region; or at least so it was thought.

The center’s approach towards bringing reforms covertly coincided with their attempt to

force the local population to migrate to the adjacent non-Russian territories. It was

108. Ibid, p.76-77

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ascertained to make such reforms as to bring the entire periphery of North Caucasus

under the center’s absolute control. The most important policy in this regard was of

Russianization or Russification and Christianization of whatever numbers remaining of

the indigenous people.109

For this end, St. Petersburg appointed those officers who would

act likewise. North Caucasian counter policy was to launch an Islamic based educational

system that also incorporated local customs and traditions.110

This together with the fact

that Russian land reforms in the region included the confiscation of lands of local people

and redistributing them among Cossack settlers strengthened the feelings of mistrust

against the Czarist authorities. The lands left for locals’ share was often unsuitable for

agriculture.111

In 1921, Kabardia was separated from the GAR and launched as an Autonomous Oblast

(AO) in 1921. In 1922, the Balkar and KChR AOs were separated from the GAR, and the

Kabardino and Balkaria AOs were joined together to form the Kabardino-Balkaria AO. It

was later upgraded as an ASSR in 1936. For a brief time, after the deportation of the

Balkars in 1944, the republic was renamed as the Kabardiniyan ASSR. However, during

Khrushchev’s tenure, the Balkars were rehabilitated and the region was once again re-

established as the Kabardino-Balkariya ASSR. During World War II, like most of the

North Caucasians, the Balkars and Karachais suffered deportations and consequent

deaths.112

However, as many as 19,000 Karachais and Cherkess are reported to have

fought against Nazi invasion. In addition to this, in spite of the anti-Soviet feelings in

109. In 1843, the Caucasus Spiritual Consistory was established in Stavropol and the city thus became an active center

of missionary activities. Society for the Establishment of Orthodox Christianity was established in the region by the

Orthodox Holy Synod in 1863. 110. Ibid, p.88 111. Ibid, p.102 112. Gordon M. Hahn, Russia’s Islamic Threat, Op.Cit., pp.133-136

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KBR, Balkar women wrote letters to the Soviet regime; requesting them for the

permission to fight alongside the Soviet forces.113

They too were later rehabilitated

during the term of Khrushchev. Even though KBR regained its status but problems for

the republic continued, for example, the Nogay steppe was taken from KBR and was

allocated among Dagestan, Chechnya-Ingushetia and other areas. As a place of

significant economic importance, the loss of Nogay created dissatisfaction among the

KBR population, which proved a stimulus for the conflict between KBR and the

neighboring territories. This, along with the fact that the motive behind merging

Kabardins and Balkars was to separate the larger Ciscaucassian groups from each other,

has led to the drafting of the notion that autonomous regions that came down from the

USSR to Russia are ‘artificial, arbitrary and illegal territories’. During the late 1980s and

the early years of the decade of 1990s, a sort of nationalist movement was seen in the

region to form a “Greater Adygea” or Circassia with the inclusion of Ciscaucassian

nationalities in the Georgian Abkhazia.

One difference from other Caucasian groups comes in the degree of religious devotion of

the KBR Muslims. Since the earliest Arab invasions did not affect Northwest Caucasus,

KBR remains, up to this date, least radical of all North Caucasus Muslim groups. When

Muslim resistance did emerge in this region, it came as retaliation against Soviet policies.

For example, “Vis Haji” a Qadria brotherhood, emerged in the 1950s against the post-

World War II deportations of the mountaineers.114

113. Walter Richmond, The Northwest Caucasus: Past, Present and Future, Op. Cit., p. 113 114. Gordon M. Hahn, Russia’s Islamic Threat, Op. Cit., p.138

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In the face of the episodes that have so shaped the history of North Caucasus, the

situation in the region remains an excruciating task for the Russian center as well as the

periphery. Events of the post-1991 era have had their own share in further complicating

the state of affairs. In this regard, the Russian Federation adopted a series of policies as

measures to curb the threats simmering in the North Caucasus which backfired in the

form of an unmanageable resistance. Of this, the subsequent chapters shall attempt to

present a clear and detailed picture of the socio-political scenario in Russia, China and

their respective peripheries.

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CHAPTER - 2

CHINA AND RUSSUA IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

2.1 CHINESE PERIPHERY AFTER 1991

The year of the tiger; 1976, in China was followed by years of rapid changes in the

Chinese political landscape. A number of goodwill gestures, such as the releasing of

prisoners and giving of visas to foreign Tibetans to visit Tibet, were made under the new

Chinese government. As early as in 1978, informal meetings had started between the

representatives of CCP government and Gyalo Thondup; the Hong Kong based elder

brother of the Dalai Lama. In the next year, Thondup was invited to Beijing by Deng

Xiaoping and assured that all matters, except the issue of independence, could be

deliberated upon. Deng Xiaoping also proposed for the Dalai Lama to send missions to

Tibet to inquire the social conditions there. The Chinese government believed that both

the progress made under China as well as the fact that Dalai Lama had been living in

exile for twenty years were enough reasons for the latter to readily seek a rapprochement

with the former. The Dalai Lama soon responded by sending three missions to Tibet. In

Beijing, the central government had been repeatedly assured of the sound political

condition in the region as well as the solid support of the local population by the CCP’s

first secretary in Tibet, Ren Rong. But when the delegates of Dalai Lama visited the

Qinghai province and the city of Lhasa, the outward welcome meted out to the delegation

was as supporting to the former as it was embarrassing to the CCP’s members

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accompanying them.115

The attitude of the populace along with the overt conditions of

the region was enough for the delegations to understand how the socio-economic

progress in Tibet under CCP had remained minimal and the cultural and religious

deterioration at the hands of the same had been accomplished largely. The expression of

affection by the Tibetan masses also attested their ideological loyalty to the Dalai Lama

against the false claims of Beijing.

While these events boosted the confidence of the exiles it also brought the CCP

administration to revise their Tibetan policy and for the first time in many years the issue

was addressed seriously by the centre and a Tibet Work Conference was held in Beijing

in early 1980. By the mid of the same year Hu Yabong (secretary of CCP) and Vice

Premier Wan Li toured Tibet where the conditions witnessed by them presented an even

grim picture then what they had anticipated. Therefore, Hu Yabong announced a reform

program for Tibet which included the following proposals:

1. “To exercise national autonomy in the region fully- that is to say to let

Tibetans really be the masters of their own lives.

2. A commitment by the Central Government to relieve and reduce burdens of

the people, exempting from agricultural and animal husbandry tax over the

next three to five years in order to allow the Tibetan people a chance to

recover.

115. Melvyn C. Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama, Op. Cit., pp.61-62

(92)

3. To adopt a special policy to revive the Tibetan economy, including the

adoption or a system of private economy in line with Tibetan

circumstances…

4. To make great efforts to develop agriculture and animal husbandry as well as

the manufacture of consumer goods, in order to promote economic

prosperity and enrich people’s lives.

5. To make efforts to develop Tibetan science, culture and education, and to

prepare for the establishing of the University of Tibet.

6. To implement the policy on minority nationality cadres correctly, to

strengthen the unity between the Han and Tibetan cadres, and to transfer a

large quantity of Chinese cadres who had worked in Tibet for many years

back into the interior”116

Though, the CCP realized the importance of the ethnic dimension in Tibetan affairs and

sought to adjust the same with Tibetan appointees in local cadres along with the

adjustment of the socio-economic conditions of the population through means of tax and

quota reforms, it was in no way ready to allow the installment of a separatist government

in Lhasa and therefore the plateau was to continue to live under CCP administration.

While this unified leadership pattern, as Hu Yabong called it, was acclaimed to safeguard

Tibetan religion and culture, it also guaranteed minimal control to the local populace for

governing their affairs which they could only undertake through Tibetan Communist

cadres running under the center’s patronage. The period following 1980 saw active

implementation of Yabong’s proposals; religious practices were once again permitted

along with the opening of monasteries and the recruitment of child monks, travelling to

116. Wang Yao, Hu Yaobang’s Visit to Tibet, May22-31, 1980: An important development in the Chinese Government’s

Tibet Policy, available at http://www.claudearpi.net/maintenance/uploaded_pics/1980HuavisittoTibet.pdf

(93)

and from Tibet was made easier for the natives, the ratio of Tibetan officials in offices

was increased and the use of Tibetan language was also henceforth mandated for officials

in their public dealings. CCP’s negotiations with the Dalai Lama continued during this

time, who sent a letter to Deng Xiaoping in 1981 stating that:

“The three fact finding missions have been able to find out both the positive and

negative aspects of the situation in Tibet. If the Tibetan’s people identity is

preserved and if they are genuinely happy, there is no reason to complain.

However, in reality over 90% of the Tibetans are suffering both mentally and

physically, and are living in deep sorrow. These sad conditions had not been

brought about by natural disasters, but by human actions. Therefore, genuine

efforts must be made to solve the problem in accordance with the existing

realities in a reasonable way….In order to do this, we must improve the

relationship between China and Tibet as well as between Tibetans in and outside

Tibet…. we must try to develop friendship Tibetans and Chinese in the future

through better understanding. The time has come to apply our common wisdom

in a spirit of tolerance and broad mindedness to achieve genuine happiness for

the Tibetan people with a sense of urgency….”117

Mild as the tone of the letter was, it nevertheless dealt with Tibet as a separate unit from

China. The Chinese response was a 5 point proposal on the foundation of which

negotiations with the Dalai Lama were to be held and which presented the question of

Tibet as a feud between the Dalai Lama and China rather than as a row between China

117. Letter to Deng Xiapoing From His Holiness The Dalai Lama (Dharmasala, India: March 23, 1981), translated

from Tibetan, available at http://www.claudearpi.net/maintenance/uploaded_pics/LetterToDengXiaoping.pdf

(94)

and Tibet. This proposal was forwarded after a meeting between Yabong and Thondup in

1981, the salient features of which were:

1. “The Dalai Lama should be confident that China has entered a new stage of

long-term political stability, steady economic growth and mutual help among

all nationalities.

2. The Dalai Lama and his representatives should be frank and sincere with the

central government, not beat around the bush. There should be no more

quibbling over the events in 1959.

3. The central authorities sincerely welcome the Dalai Lama and his followers

to come back to live. This is based on the hope that they will contribute to

upholding China’s unity and promoting solidarity between the Han and

Tibetan nationalities, and among all nationalities, and the modernization

program.

4. The Dalai Lama will enjoy the same political status and living conditions as

he had before 1959. It is suggested that he not go to live in Tibet or hold

political posts here. Of course, he may go back to Tibet from time to time.

His followers need not worry about their jobs and living conditions. These

will only be better than before.

5. When the Dalai Lama wished to come back, he can issue a brief statement to

the press. It is up to him to decide what he would like to say in the

statement.”118

118. Melvyn C. Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama, Op. Cit., p.68

(95)

While the return of the Dalai Lama was to have huge political advantages for the Chinese

authorities; as it would not only cast a legal color on the Chinese stance on Tibet and thus

end the global discourse on the question but would also sway the Tibetan population into

acknowledging their status within the political domain of China, it nevertheless stood as

open challenge to the Dalai Lama and his followers as to how to respond, in the context

of an international audience, to the pacific proposals of China which included everything

but independence for the subject of table talks between the two parties. The Tibetan

leadership in exile, at a meeting with Beijing’s authorities in 1982, rather persisted on the

notion that if the One Country Two Systems Formula could be offered to Taiwan, Tibet

should be offered even more. Disappointed by the exile government’s attitude, Beijing

however continued to allot funds for development projects in Tibet. A major

manifestation of this was seen in the Second Tibet Work Conference in 1984 which

approved 42 construction projects for TAR thereby extending Beijing’s ‘open door’

policy to the autonomous region.

In another meeting between Beijing and the exile government, the latter asserted their

demand for an autonomous Greater Tibet that was to be a demilitarized zone. The CCP

however, not complying by these demands, continued its internal strategy of developing

Tibet through state funds. Furthermore, in the mid-1980s, the head of the party in Tibet,

Wu Jinghua, was also from a minority Yi nationality rather than a Han Chinese. These

along with Jinghua’s own policies were symbolic gestures intended to win over the

Tibetans’ confidence.119

But as the hopes of the approval of his terms from the Chinese

side stood minimal, the Dalai Lama turned his attention westward for the publicity of

119. Ibid, pp.72-74

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Tibetans’ demands. In a speech at the Congressional Human Rights Caucus in September

1987, the Dalai Lama asserted the independent status enjoyed by Tibet at the time of the

Chinese invasion in 1949. Other than turning US attention towards human rights abuses

in Tibet, he once again laid down the plan for an autonomous demilitarized zone of Tibet.

The speech of Dalai Lama led to an amendment in US Foreign Relations Act which from

now onwards was to address special importance to the conditions of Tibetan people in

future Chinese-American dealings. Even though this amendment had less to do with

practical implementation, it nevertheless provided a psychological stimulus to the morale

of the Tibetans at home and those in exile.

On the Chinese front, the repercussions of the speech were to be more severe. Suspected

dissenters from Lhasa were arrested. According to some estimates, about 30 monks were

beaten on the streets and arrested on 1st October. Ordinary citizens gathered outside the

local police stations to demand the release of the demonstrators. The protest soon turned

into a riot. Public property was set ablaze. Much for Chinese shame, the events were

given coverage by international media. In Beijing, the happenings were considered as a

result of Yao’s liberal policies to control which counter measures had to be brought in. In

response to Deng’s invitation to Dalai Lama to live in Tibet on the condition that the

latter gave up his ideology of Tibet’s independence, the latter responded by addressing

the European Parliament in Strasbourg and laying down his plan for an autonomous

united Tibet. On the other hand, protests in Lhasa continued and on 5th

March 1989,

martial law had to be declared in the plateau to control yet another riot. To make it worse

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for Beijing, the same year saw the Tiananmen Square protests and the conferring of

Nobel Prize for Peace to the Dalai Lama.120

The years following these events were a continuous struggle between Beijing and the

Dalai Lama, and this particularly involved the selection of the eleventh Panchen Lama121

.

In September 1993, the Dalai Lama publicly declared relations with China to have broken

down. The next year, the central government adopted significant harsh measures in the

Third Forum on Work in Tibet. The representatives at the Forum stated Tibet’s

independence Movement as a “serpent” which must be beheaded so as to end the Dalai

‘clique’. The monasteries, which provided open access for the Dalai clique to infiltrate

China, were to be henceforth, more closely patronized for the number of monks and nuns

to be curtailed in addition to their compulsion to receiving sessions on patriotic

education. As per the frozen relations between Beijing and the Dalai Lama, the selection

of the Panchen Lama was condemned by the former in 1995.

The second half of the decade of 1990s clearly saw Chinese migrations into Tibet, along

with state invested projects coming in the region. The “floating population” of ethnic

Chinese in Tibet became a major factor in the ethnic distribution of the plateau and the

exile government of Tibet alleged the center of scheming to change the ethnic milieu of

the TAR. The economic prosperity brought about by Chinese settlers and Chinese

investment also created further hostility among the Tibetans. This was particularly

120. Ibid, pp.316-318 121. Since the eighteenth century, Beijing has nurtured Panchen Lama as a counter weight to the position enjoyed by the

Dalai Lama. Following the death of the tenth Panchen Lama in 1989, the CCP intended to keep the Dalai Lama

completely out of the process of selecting the eleventh Panchen Lama against the previous practice of at least having

the former ratify the appointment of the latter made by the CCP. But in view of the arguments of the abbots of

Tashilunpo that since the appointment had always been ratified by the Dalai Lama, therefore, it should only continue

this time.

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evident following premier Jiang Zemin’s Xibu Da Kafa (Open Up the West) in 1999

which included not only investment projects but also missions were sent to examine and

calculate the potential of Tibet’s natural resources.122

Thus, while the post-Mao period gave a promising start to China in socio-economic

spheres, the Tibetan picture continued to look grim. The dogmatic demand of Dalai

Lama, together with foreign support for his cause along with the apprehension at home;

all led to an escalation of uneasiness between the CCP and Dalai Lama. CCP’s program

for development of its western regions coincided with some of the most turbulent years of

Tibet’s unrest. Thus, the beginning of the new millennium has seen an assertion in all;

Tibet’s independence movement, western criticism and concern for the same, pumping of

money into TAR by China and resulting friction among the locals. This state of

circumstances has made Tibet’s issue even more complicated in the new century as shall

be explicated in the subsequent chapters.

2.2 THE LAST YEARS OF BRITISH HONG KONG

The last main chapter of the country’s empire should not end in a shabby way.

(Douglas Hurd, British Foreign Secretary)

In the tiny island territory of Hong Kong, the optimistic atmosphere created by the Joint

Declaration was put to serious test in the wake of Tiananmen Square incident in 1989.

The protests in Beijing were supported by mass rallies in Hong Kong on the stance that a

democratic environment in the island could be made possible only if the same

122. Ibid, pp. 320-322

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phenomenon was guaranteed in the Chinese mainland. The British government responded

to these events by passing a Bill of Rights for Hong Kong which offered the citizens:

The assurance of democratic process in Hong Kong

The granting of British nationality and full rights of residence in the UK to

selected citizens of Hong Kong.123

Beijing was quick to respond and soon had London informed that the former retained the

right to repeal the Bill of Rights if it in anyway contradicted the spirit and principles of

the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law. As a matter of fact, in December 1989, the

Basic Law Drafting Committee (BLDC), having a majority of representatives from the

mainland, introduced some more laws aimed at strengthening the center’s position in the

island territory. The clauses included:

Prohibition of subversion acts against the central government.

Prohibition of foreign political groups in the island territory and proscription of

contacts of political groups in Hong Kong with foreign groups.

No law to be given status above other laws of Hong Kong.

As for electoral reforms, the BLDC allowed 18 seats in the new SAR government that

were to be elected directly (later on increased to 20 on account of diplomatic pressure

from Beijing), 12 seats to be elected by an electoral committee and another 30 seats to be

elected by the functional constituencies. In addition to this, the number of seats elected

123. In the face of unemployment in Britain reaching 3 million mark and the thus anti=mass migration stance of the

Labor and Conservative parties; it was therefore decided to issue British passports to no more than 225,000 people

from Hong Kong or 50,000 qualified households.

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directly was to increase to 24 along with a reduction in the number of seats designated for

elections by the electoral committee.124

Other than the above mentioned reforms of the Chinese government, a major outcome of

the pro-Tiananmen movement in Hong Kong and which Chinese considered as a British

collusion of the same, was that the mainland government became highly suspicious of the

latter’s intentions. The hard-line stance of the Chinese government adopted in the context

of a British funded airport and infra-structure projects in Hong Kong show casted the

same tendency, and the ultimate compromise by the British government also signaled at

an increased Chinese involvement in the island’s affairs while the latter was still under

British control. In the meantime, the first direct elections were held in Hong Kong on 15

September 1991. Democrats won the majority of seats while no pro-Beijing candidate

was able to win a seat in the elections that had a 39.1% turnout. Many claims and counter

claims were made by the pro-democracy leaders and the Chinese contestants against the

low turnout and the overall results. But many scholars attribute the success of democrats

in 1991 elections to that generation of Hong Kong which had been born and raised in the

island territory, had received sound education, had access to international press and

media and enjoyed better living standards than the previous generations. The

development of political insight among Hong Kong citizens was not as much a problem

for London as was the Chinese non-bending attitude, which many in British circles,

alleged on the soft-liner Hong Kong Governor David Wilson. Therefore, in 1991, British

government announced the sudden retirement of Governor Wilson. In his place, Prime

124. John Flowerdew, The Final Years of British Hong Kong: The Discourse of Colonial Withdrawal, Op. Cit., pp,67, 69-70

(101)

Minister John Major elected Christopher Patten as the new British governor of the island

territory.

Throughout his tenure as the governor of Hong Kong, Patten’s policy centered around

asserting the significance of an accurate implementation of One Country Two Systems

Formula, the process of democratization in Hong Kong and the need for cooperation

between China and Britain. In his Policy Speech of 7 October 1992, in addition to the

assertion on the basic principles of rule of law, social welfare, democracy and minimum

state intervention in economic matters, Patten highlighted plans for constitutional

development in Hong Kong. The constitutional package included the following

proposals:

Voting age to be lowered to 18

Single vote, single seat system for geographical constituencies (against the double

member constituency system used in 1991 elections)

Number of functional constituencies to be increased from 21 to 30 (as planned in

the Basic Law)

Corporate voting to be replaced by individual franchise in functional

constituencies

Election Committee members to be directly elected from district boards.

Although well received by Hong Kong citizens, the electoral reforms consisted of at least

one major flaw; Patten had believed that each voter would only get a single chance to

vote in his functional constituency but it rather proved otherwise when voters got double

chances to vote; one in their functional constituency and the other in their geographical

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constituencies. As a matter of fact, China itself resisted Patten’s reforms on account of

them diverging from the principles and spirit of the Basic Law and Joint Declaration. The

battle over the constitutional package continued between Beijing and London in the

following years. However, the September 1995 elections of Legislative Council (Legco)

showed a 35.8% and 39.2% turnout in the geographical and functional constituencies

respectively.125

Patten’s reforms had already been approved by Legco in April of the

same year while China had already clearly stated that the reforms would be disbanded

following the handover of the island community to the former. But in spite of the

continuous ups and downs in China-Britain relations during the 1990s, the transition to

handover continued with the year 1996 witnessing the election of the first Chief

Executive for Hong Kong named Tung Chee-hwa; a very much pro-Beijing figure.

As the political developments continued in Hong Kong, the economic cycle of the island

continued undisturbed. Unlike most Asian economies, where a major share goes to either

state-supervised industries or foreign enterprises, the island territory owes a large part of

its economic development to SMEs besides government’s non-intervention policy. As a

matter of fact, as per estimates, by the end of 2002, SMEs provided 60% of total private

employment and constituted 98% of the enterprises in Hong Kong. On the other hand,

infrastructure, urban and public housing are those areas of Hong Kong’s economy which

have seen an ambition by the local government during the lease period. Other than this,

education was also given prime importance during this period. Though free education

was not provided for until 1971, but owing to the rapid construction of schools, 99.8% of

school age children were already attending primary school by 1996.

125. Ibid, pp. 81, 109-110, 166

(103)

Following China’s Open Door policy, the period from 1978-1997 vigorous trade between

Beijing and Hong Kong with the former’s direct involvement in Guangdong calculated at

US $48 billion in late 1997 (80% of total foreign direct investment in Guangdong).

Moreover, business community in Hong Kong also shifted to China to benefit from the

cheap labor cost. The economic development of Hong Kong showed another remarkable

aspect in its development of the service sector sans faltering growth rates. The average

unemployment rate also remained stable at 2.5% from 1982-1997. While employment

rate in the service sector increased from 52% to 80% from 1981 to 2000 that in the

manufacturing sector declined from 39% to 10% during the same period.126

2.1: Hong Kong’s GDP Growth by Year127

As the time for the handover drew nearer, a severe financial crisis hit the Asian continent

in 1997. A sharp increase in unemployment rate enveloped Hong Kong. But relatively,

126. Catherine R. Schenk, Economic History of Hong Kong, available at

http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/schenk.HongKong 127. www.wsj.com

(104)

China being less affected by the crisis, gave hope to the people of the island while also

adding to the importance of closer ties with the center for Hong Kong.

Following the handover to China in 1997, the island territory of Hong Kong has given

little trouble to the mainland. As a matter of fact, Hong Kong has added greatly to the

economic uplift of the mainland as Beijing had much to learn from the island’s economy

governed for almost a century by a leading industrial power of the time. Henceforth,

Hong Kong has been of great economic importance to China. Other than small episodes

of demonstrations and campaigns in favor of transparency (as will be discussed in next

chapter), this small island has only added to political and economic advantages of

Beijing.

2.3 UYGHURS AND HANS IN THE 1990S

The dissolution of USSR in the early 1990s provided China with serious but equal

degrees of risks and opportunities in the context of the Northwestern province of

Xinjiang. At one hand, Beijing could use the province’s historical and cultural linkages to

strengthen ties with the natal states of Central Asia, but on the other hand, the province’s

proximity with some very volatile quarters of the region (including Central Asia, Pakistan

and Afghanistan) was a rather pitchy question in Beijing’s policy making framework. In

addition to this, the resource potential of this far off region of China could never be

ignored by the central government, especially so in the wake of the new socialist market

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economic tendencies adopted in the post-Mao era. Simultaneous to these emerging

factors were the ethnic disturbances that had been affecting the region yet again by the

late 1980s. As the last decade of the previous millennium unfolded a new epoch in world

history, Beijing launched its ever grand policy of “Open Xinjiang to the World

Community”. Economic zones were created, mass investments were brought in and new

trade agreements were concluded to facilitate the implementation of the new policy. As

per estimates, the investment in Xinjiang in 1994 had reached the mark of ¥16.5 billion

from the previously recorded level of ¥7.3 billion in 1991. Moreover, during the three-

year period from 1991to 1994, the province’s GDP had also increased from ¥7.5 to ¥15.5

billion.128

In spite of Chinese performance in the region, there still was present a second angle to the

picture. As a matter of fact, a wide contrast exists between the northern and southern

hemispheres of Xinjiang. Since the communist victory in 1949, the major ‘Chinese

colonization’ or immigration of Han population has occurred in the north. The north also

happens to enjoy maximum state funded development and investment initiatives. Urumqi,

the capital of Xinjiang, also happens to lie in northern part of the province. As for the

south, the region is largely underdeveloped and also inhabits an overwhelmingly small

Han population in contrast to the demographic situation of the north. Accordingly, the

standard of living also substantially drops as one crosses the Tianshan mountain range

into southern Xinjiang. According to Nicholas Becquelin, when the average rural income

for Xinjiang was ¥684 per head in 1998, that in southern part of the province reached

128. Nicholas Becquelin, Xinjiang in the Nineties, The China Journal, No. 44 (July 2000), University of Chicago Press,

available at www.jstor.org/stable/2667477, pp.66-67

(106)

only ¥200 mark.129

Other than this, there are also some factors that distinguish Xinjiang’s

economic situation from the rest of China. For example, most industries in Xinjiang

remain to be state owned. In fact, in 1996, 84% of the province’s industrial assets were

under publicly ownership, giving the highest ratio in China. In addition to this, the rate of

foreign direct investment (FDI) in Xinjiang remained quite low. Another point of

importance was the fiscal reform program of 1994 which thereby reduced taxation on

manufactured products and increased that on raw materials. Although the new measure

was undertaken so as to facilitate the redistribution of revenue among the provinces and

thus lessen the gap between coastal and interior regions of the country; the policy

however proved disastrous for Xinjiang which largely produces raw materials and earns

its income thus.130

129. Nicholas Becquelin, Xinjiang in the Nineties, Op.Cit., p.69 130. Ibid, p.72

(107)

2.2: Private sector Producing units and Employed Persons (by district) in Xinjiang, 2004.131

Furthermore, Beijing is often also criticized of investing in such projects as best suited to

the centre rather than being largely beneficial for the province itself. For example, during

the 1990s, two of the most important projects, started from Han dominated regions, rather

facilitated in consolidating center’s control over Xinjiang. These included, the

131. Tyler Harlan, « Private Sector Development in Xinjiang, China : A Comparison between Uyghur and

Han », Espace populations sociétés, 2009/3 | 2009, 407-418.

(108)

Taklamakan Highway (completed in 1995) and the Korla-Kashgar rail link (completed in

1999), the Taklamakan Highway assisted in north-south transport across the desert

whereas the latter project is an extension of the Southern Xinjiang Railway that so

connects the major cities and towns of the northern Tarim Basin.132

Almost simultaneous

and consistent with this policy has been a government backed influx of Han population in

the region. According to a State Council report of the mid 1990s, Beijing’s policy of Han

migration is explained as thus:

“In order to regulate and push forward the development of the arid and

poverty stricken western region…..we propose the implementation of a

plan to attract migration….a new challenging system, designed to

establish migrant settlements, to manage and open the desert and build

China’s desert agriculture.”133

Another point of criticism in centre’s management of Xinjiang comes against the Xinjiang

Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), often labeled as a party-government-army unit

and which happens to miss clearly outlined institutional structure. The XPCC enjoys control

over its own administrative, legal and commercial structures, which also maintain an

independent system of police, militia, schools, prison cells and health centers. Moreover, it

enjoys a budget independent from the local government of Xinjiang.

“It has jurisdiction over 740,000 hectares (48% of the area of the

province)…..in 1997 it contributed 14% of the province’s GDP and one-

fifth of its foreign trade. The Corps produced 10 per cent of Xinjiang’s

132. http://People.com.cn/GB/14838/22117/30561/2195687.html 133. Nicholas Becquelin, Xinjiang in the Nineties, Op.Cit., p.75

(109)

industry, including 40per cent of its textiles, and 24per cent of its

agriculture, including 40per cent of its cotton.”134

The security wing of the Corps is also highly influential and active in provincial affairs

particularly those involving counter-separatist operations. To strengthen the position of

the Corps, not only has Beijing given it the status of a corporation, namely the Xinjiang

New Construction Corporation, but also it has been brought under the direct regulation of

the State Council since 1990 against the practice of previously being under several

ministries.135

As for the economic growth of Xinjiang, the province’s economic growth particularly in

the context of cotton production has been sizeable. But even here, the policy of Han

migration for cotton manufacture continued unabated and it is one of the reasons why a

significant proportion of Xinjiang’s cotton comes from the Corps which enjoy the right to

deploy workers in large agricultural fields. Xinjiang remains the biggest cotton producer

in China. As the textile industry from the east of the country has shifted to Xinjiang to

compliment the booming cotton industry of the province, so has increased the Han

migration from mainland China. But attention must also be paid on population disparity

between the north and south of Xinjiang. While the north of Xinjiang has seen a major

influx of Han population, the impoverished south houses a majority of almost 90% ethnic

Uyghurs.136

134. Ibid, p.78 135. Ibid, p.79 136. Nicolas Becquelin, Staged Development in Xinjiang, The China Quarterly, No. 178, June 2004, p.359, Cambridge

University Press, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/20192338

(110)

The 1990s campaign of Open up to the West helped in opening up Xinjiang’s links with

the Central Asian region. As a matter of fact, the very development in Xinjiang is

described as ‘staged development’. According to Becquelin, several processes together

make up the ‘staged development’ the first stage was that of ‘state building’ whereby

centre’s policies complemented the geo-strategic significance of the province and its

huge potential of serving as the supply base of raw materials to the PRC. A vast majority

of Xinjiang’s industrial assets are state controlled. The state apparatus in Xinjiang is

largely also involved with the ethnic separatist threat that often engulfs this resource rich

strategic quarter of the Chinese periphery. As a point of fact, owing to the importance of

the region, decisions pertaining to the region are conducted by a political structure

appointed by Beijing.137

The second stage of ‘staged development’ came in the form of infrastructure projects. For

example, the 10th

Five Year Plan (2001-2005) allocated US $51 billion for the

development of the province with special attention being given to infrastructure projects.

A further step in the ‘staged development’ and in many ways a part of the second stage

was the west to east pipeline for natural gas at an investment of US $15 billion, running

from Lunnan (Tarim Basin) to Shanghai at an area of 4200 KM. A further part of

infrastructure development includes the rehabilitation of the Tarim Basin which had dried

up during the 1980s due to unchecked urbanization and irrigation.

The works and duties of the Corps also serve the ambitions of the Open up the West

Campaign as its major tasks lie in curbing ethnic unrest in the region, maintaining

137. Ibid, p.362

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extensive farmlands and strengthening political and economic position of the center in

Xinjiang. This in turn compliments the Sinicization of the province which is another part

of the Open up the West Campaign. According to the 2000 national consensus, Han

population grew by 31.6% from 1990-2000.138

The Chinese government has long

perceived the ultimate solution of Xinjiang’s problems as lying within Han migration or

‘settler colonization’ in the province through which region’s primary industries shall be

well taken care of by the more experienced Han Chinese.

A close study of Chinese rule in Xinjiang, especially during the latter part of the

twentieth century, shows that the maximum resistance meted out to Beijing in

consolidating its government in the province came from southern Xinjiang. One such

example is the April 1990 unrest in Baren near Kashgar. The Baren incident, led by

Zeydin Yusuf, was in fact an attempt at establishing an independent East Turkestan

Republic.139

The Baren incident that involved the use of high-tech weaponry, in addition

to the ideological and organizational sophistication resulting in scores of deaths, over

awed the security forces of the country. This also led to the wide spread notion of foreign

involvement in the ethnic unrest that so engulfs the geo-strategically important region.

Therefore, one of Beijing’s primary tasks was to assure international diplomatic

community in helping forces to counter separatist challenge in its borders. The creation of

Group of Five (China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Russia) aimed at

providing a foundation for security and economic cooperation in the region. It is often

also attributed to Beijing’s desire of winning international confidence to its side against

138. Ibid, pp.364-365, 367-369 139. East Turkestan Information Bulletin, Vol.3, No. 2, (April 1993), published by East Turkestan Union in Europe,

available at http://caccp.freedomsherald.org/et/etib/etib3_2.html

(112)

the separatist element in Xinjiang. Thus, at the start of the century, China was standing at

the same political threshold as it had been in the past years on the question of Xinjiang.

The grievances of the Uyghur population, whether they were in political, religious or

economic aspects, were only aggravated in the post-Cold War era. The new epoch was to

be a testing time for Beijing in handling the affairs of the XAR as even the slightest of

manhandling could prove to be ruinous for both the center as well as the periphery.

2.4 CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS: CHINA AND TAIWAN DURING

THE 1990S

In spite of the two separate governments operating on either side of the Taiwan Strait, the

stance of both regimes on the status of the motherland has been the same; One China

Principle. Both the governments agree on the fact that Taiwan is an inalienable part of

China. Following the major change brought about by Deng Xiaoping in Chinese policy

making framework including the policy of ‘peaceful reunification’. As per the spirit of

this policy, China committed itself to

Not resort to use of force,

promote people to people contacts,

promote economic and cultural interchanges,

start direct trade, postal, air and ship services,

the application of One Country Two Systems Formula following the reunification,

and

political solution of China-Taiwan issue without foreign invasion

(113)

Taiwanese government also adheres to the One China Principle. This side of the picture

changed with the accession of Lee Teng-hui as the head of the Taiwanese government in

1998. And since 1990s, Lee diverged from One Country Two Systems Formula in favor

of Two Governments Two Reciprocal Entities. It is one of the reasons why Lee is often

held responsible for a rapid increase in the pro-independence elements in Taiwan for Lee

maintained that “Taiwan is already a state with independent sovereignty…. At the present

stage, the Republic of China is on Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China is on the

mainland.”140

The new approach of peaceful reunification was also addressed by chairman of the

Standing Committee of NPC (National People’s Congress) Ye Jianying in his Nine Point

Proposal for peaceful reunification in 1981. Other than proposing direct talks between the

CCP and the KMT, his proposals also included:

santong (transport, commercial and postal service links)

siliu (academic, economic, cultural and sport exchanges)

Deng’s policy of peaceful reunification was brought out strikingly clear in 1995 when

President Jiang Zemin in his Eight Point Proposal called for officially ending state of

bilateral antagonism so as to accomplish the goal of peaceful reunification.141

The

proposal of One Country Two Systems Formula for Taiwan includes the right for the

latter to keep its administrative, legislative and judicial structures along with maintaining

140. The One China Principle and the Taiwan Issue, 21 February 2000, Released by the Taiwan Affairs Office and the

Information Office of the State Council. 141. Qi Luo, Relations Between Mainland China and Taiwan: Co-Existence of Economic Cooperation and Political

Rivalry, The Journal of East Asian Affairs, vol. 13, No. 2 (Fall/Winter 1999), Institute of National Security Strategy,

p.486, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/23255538

(114)

its own armed forces and continuing its own cultural and commercial ties with foreign

countries. For Beijing, the One Country Two Systems Formula was to be an instrument

of peaceful coexistence rather than a mainland takeover of the disputed region. Earlier in

1991, the Taiwanese government had issued the Guidelines for National Unification to

serve the basis for its relations with Beijing. The Guidelines, which also asserted

Taiwan’s status as a separate political entity, its rights in international diplomacy and the

need for non-violence policy for cross-strait relations, proposed a three step unification

with China;

Short-term phase (mutual exchanges and reciprocity)

Mid-term phase (mutual trust and cooperation)

Long-term phase (consultation and reunification)142

As far as Beijing’s proposals were concerned, the ROC President Lee Tang-hui

responded with his Six Point Proposal, which was rather a counter measure against

China’s theory of One Country Two Systems Formula for Taiwan. Lee’s Six Point

Proposal called for the summoning of cross-strait negotiations on the principle of equality

for in his view, China and Taiwan are two separate political entities and therefore it was

only prudent for the talks to be held on the basis of equality. Despite the striking contrast

found between the two governments regarding the status of Taiwan, it has been

indispensable for the two sides to regulate active socio-economic contacts across the

strait. In fact, a Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) and an Association for Relations

across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) had been established in Taiwan and China

142. Ibid, p.487

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respectively for the management of cross-strait relations. The ice over cross-strait

diplomatic ties finally melted in April 1993 when the heads of SEF and ARATS met in

Singapore; the first such meeting between the two rival governments since 1949.

The Wang-Koo talks, as they are referred to (after chairman of ARATS, Wang Daohan

and Koo Chen-fu, head of SEF), ended on a note of consensus between the two sides for

carrying out practical implications for bi-strait political dialogues. Unfortunately,

President Lee’s visit to US in June 1995 clogged the route to reconciliation as Beijing

responded to the visit by postponing the second session of Kang-Woo talks scheduled for

the coming month of the same year. Since then, the world saw a swift and brisk corrosion

of cross-strait relations. A serious manifestation of Beijing’s approach of containing ‘pro-

independence forces in Taiwan’ was the series of ballistic missile tests over the Strait of

Taiwan in July and August of 1995 and again in March of 1996. The gravity of these tests

can be understood by the fact that some of these missiles fell in waters within a range of

20 to 50 nautical miles of the ports of Kaohsiung and Keelung, Taiwan’s largest and

second largest ports respectively. To make matters worse, the victory of the DPP; a pro-

independence party, in 1997 elections further increased the friction between the two

states. Therefore, since then China repeatedly asserts the notion of One China Principle at

every forum, making it clear that PRC would settle for nothing less than the reunification

of the island with the mainland. Beijing enjoyed the upper hand in the post 1996 era. The

pressure from Clinton regime forced the two sides to resume the Wang-Koo talks in

1998. Even though the meeting addressed issues other than the most pressing issue of

reunification, it was still considered that the talks melted some of the ice set by the

Chinese proscription of further negotiations following President Lee’s visit to USA in

(116)

1995. The Four Point Consensus drawn between the two parties was a commitment of

continuing the progress of bilateral talks in the future.143

Followed by President Jiang

Zemin’s meeting with Koo Chen-fu, both Beijing and Taipei regarded the meeting as the

landmark in cross-strait relations since 1949. But the fact of the matter is that Beijing

would not step back from its stance of One China and Taipei would settle for nothing less

than talks on the basis of equality.

Beijing believes economic engagement as the best instrument for keeping Taiwan closely

linked with the mainland and to thus minimize its chances of the much sought after

independence. Therefore, the resumption of santong and siliu would also facilitate

Beijing in upholding One China policy. Consequently, for Taipei the major point of

concern in its mainland policy has been to seek a balance between national and economic

interests. The “restraining rush, exercising patience”144

policy of Taiwan adopted since

1996 aims at minimizing investments from Taiwanese companies in China. However, an

increased tendency of Taiwanese investment in the mainland could be seen in the late

‘90s when the former were mainly appealed by the cheap land and labor force, accession

to the large Chinese market and the easy availability of natural resources. As a matter of

fact, the trade between China and Taiwan shifted from indirect trade of 1970s and 1980s

to direct trade in the 1990s. During the decades of 1970s and 1980s, the major part of

bilateral trade was dominated by re-exports from Hong Kong whereas in 1990s, an

increased volume of trade could be seen in direct trade between China and Taiwan. The

net cross-strait trade increased from US $76 million in1979 to US $22,511 in 1998 with

an average growth rate of 30% per year which is remarkable in terms of bilateral trade

143. Ibid, pp.488-491 144.ibid, p.493

(117)

between any two states. As per estimates, the Beijing had approved 40,846 Taiwanese

projects by the end of 1998145

. Nevertheless, it is often also reported that many

Taiwanese businessmen invested in China without bringing it into the notice of their

governments lest their investments be considered illegal as per Taiwan’s laws and

sometimes also to avoid taxes.

While the strait neighbors continued the tug of war on political issues including the

question of the status of Taiwan, neither could defy the implication of each other’s

importance in the context of regional stability and economic development. Undermining

Beijing’s political status resulted in the serious missile crisis in the mid-1990s while the

same had serious repercussions for the former as quick to come to Taiwan’s assistance

was the help from Washington. Thus, the 1990s, was in fact a rather continuation of the

lessons of the previous decades for the two regimes. Use of force and defiance of talks

were not to be used as options by both the regimes as this carried serious threats for

national sovereignty for Taiwan, and risks; in face of western favors for Taiwan, against

the equation of regional balance of power for China. As the world entered the new

millennium, Taiwan and China had much to learn from these experiences in terms of

socio-political, economic and regional milieu and thus act accordingly.

2.5 THE RUSSIAN PERIPHERY (1991-2000)

Although nationalism was proclaimed to have had no real foundation during the years of

Marxist Russia, and in the world of modern reformers who believed nationalism to be

slowly falling against the idea of a global village. The end of the Cold War once again

145. Ibid, pp. 494-497

(118)

gave birth to the idea of nationalism, especially along the borders of former Soviet bloc

and within the Russian territory itself. The ethnic tensions that simmered in Russia

throughout the course of 1990s were not sudden events; they rather involved years of

internal strife, social and economic inequality, and strong ethnic and cultural

concentrations being subdued by means of force. As a matter of fact, modern theorists

take the help of various analytical tools to determine the causes of violence in any

particular region. These include economic and social inequality, political stability in a

state, ethnic milieu and the level of people’s association with the same.

Since the early twentieth century, the Union republics of Tajikistan, Azerbaijan,

Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, along with the autonomous

republics, with the exception of Tatarstan had been granted minimum chances of

industrial development so as to minimize their political influence in the capital. In the

post-Soviet Russia, the gap between the rich and poor section of the society had become

obvious over the years. The same difference could be seen in the urban and rural areas of

Russia. Ironically, most of the Muslim inhabited regions of Russia also happen to be the

poorest in the country. The titular Muslim states of Russia non-coincidentally constitute

the poorest regions of Russia. This is largely the result of Soviet policies which sought to

restrict industrial production to the Slavic dominated regions of the USSR. This policy

backfired after the dissolution of USSR as the economically underdeveloped regions

sought to take lead from the newly independent states of Central Asia to fight their case

for equal rights.

(119)

2.6 RUSSIA AND CHECHNYA SINCE 1991

The years following the end of Cold War opened Chechen society to new episodes of

ethnic havoc; Islamic threats leading to state run military operations and counter-

retaliation from the local population. Ironically enough, the Chechens in spite of being

one of the oldest nations on earth, made a bold demand for a separate independent state

only in 1991. As it stands, the Chechen national ideology was shaped only after the

populace evolved through historical courses containing episodes of self-defense, exiles

and the Chechens’ ‘struggle for integrity, security and lifestyle’. Moshe Gammer has

prudently categorized this history into the ‘memories of grievance, memories of success’

and ‘memories of multicultural existence’. ‘Memories of grievance’ refer to the collective

Chechen memories of persecution by the Russians and the ensuing violent resistance

against the same. Caucasus Wars, Stalinist deportations, and forced collectivization are

included in this cadre of memories. ‘Memories of success’ are related to Chechens’

combined participation in ‘wars, modernization and industrialization’ or those historical

events which the Chechens look back to with pride and conceit. As for the ‘memories of

multicultural existence’, the notion refers to the “memories of daily routine in the

multicultural setting of the pre-war Chechen republic.”146

During the 1980s, the political movements in Chechnya had become more mature than

they had been in the past. This gradually shifted the Chechen collective approach into a

modern future oriented course of action. The beginning of this process is often associated

with the appointment of Doku Zavgayev as the head of Supreme Soviet of the Chechen-

146. Moshe Gammer, Ethno-Nationalism, Islam and the State in the Caucasus: Post-Soviet Disorder, (New York:

Routledge, 2008), p.104

(120)

Ingush ASSR in early 1990. This was the first time when an ethnic Chechen had been

chosen for this post. The appointment was naturally received with great public

enthusiasm. Bearing the reputation of a moderate nationalist, the painful history of

Chechen people was brought into open public debate by Zavgayev and from there

onwards the issues of Chechen history and ethnicity became the simmering topic of the

republic’s media. It was soon followed by forceful social demand for bringing to

justification the truth underlying the painful histories of Chechen resistance, forced

occupation and annexation into the Czarist Empire, joining the USSR, the mass

repressions (1930s and 1940s) and the deportations of 1940s and 1950s.

However, it must be remembered that the nationalistic revival in Chechnya did not carry

a separatist agenda at first. It was in fact, a part of the glasnost process which encouraged

an open discussion of problems that were not so well conferred in the past. Groznenskii

Rabochii regularly published columns under the titles of Blank Spots of History and

Pages of History in which intellectuals and historians discussed important historical, but

previously tabooed subjects. The Groznenskii Rabochii issues of 1989 to 1990 regularly

contained a page that listed the names of Chechens and Ingush who had been repressed

during 1930s to 1940s and also during the 1950s. These events stimulated an

unprecedented and an almost unexpected ignition of people’s sentiments for past

grievances and mistreatments along with a public realization of injustice that had been

inflicted on them for centuries. Together with the national revival and the open debates,

the need for change and the demand for access to equal means of livelihood added an

ethnic element to the whole affair.

(121)

In addition to this, the Chechens settled in other parts of the USSR when visited

Chechnya during these times, were enthralled by the growing public political maturity

and many a times would extend their vocational trips. To this they added the important

elements of national ideological consciousness and the ideas for the attainment of

nationalistic goals so prevalent among other ethnic nations of the Soviet Union. During

Soviet era, many Chechens took education and became professionals outside their native

soil. Had it not been for the economic collapse of the USSR, these Chechens would have

continued along this line of cosmopolitan lifestyle. But as it happened, the demise of the

Soviet Union in 1991 significantly altered the socio-economic positions of the ethnic and

non-ethnic Russians alike, which in the latter case led to the culmination of harsh

conflicts between the center and federal subjects. As a matter of fact, two prominent

ideological sets could be discerned among the Chechens at this time. First of such groups

backed the right of self-determination and sovereignty for the Chechens while remaining

within the USSR. On the other hand, the second school of thought advocated an

independent Chechnya free of the Russian rule. There was also another group that

believed in the Chechen-Ingush union or the “Vaynakh polity”.147

Of the first two

ideologies, the former school of thought can be said to have been in the policy framework

of Doku Zavgayev, while the second ideology was promoted by Dzhokhar Dudayev.

Dzhokhar Dudayev, who had served in the USSR Army and had risen to the rank of

major-general, was the thirteenth son of his family which had faced deportation in 1944,

only to return to Chechnya in 1957. In 1991 Dudayev resigned and came to Grozny and

was elected as the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the unofficial National

147. Ibid, pp.111-113

(122)

Congress of Chechen People (NCPP).148

It was the Vaynakh Party that invited Dudayev

to head the national movement under NCPP.

The political history of this period is divided among the moderates who advocated close

relations with Russia and the radicals who stood for a cession from Russia and a merger

with the Muslim Republics of North Caucasus. Moscow at this time considered the aim

of Dudayev and his movement as attempting at self-dissolution of the Supreme Soviet of

the Chechen-Ingush Republic, conducting new elections and then creating a sovereign

national state. But according to the reports on the declassified documents of the Central

Committee, the center was concerned with the demands being made by the Ingush

political leaders for the “restoration of the autonomous region [avtonomii] of the Ingush

people and its original historical borders.” The Communist regime was more fearful of

the conflict between Ingush and North Ossetians over Prigorodnyi and its likely

consequence for the Russian settlers. As for the situation in Chechnya, rather than

calculating the direct threat posed by Dudayev, the Central Committee preoccupied itself

more with Zavgayev’s proposals formed in reaction to the former’s demands. Following

the unsuccessful putsch against Gorbachev in August 1991, the position of pro-Russian

elements in Grozny majorly declined. This was due to the fact that Zuvgayev and his

followers had not given condemnation for the schemers of the coup plot who in turn

wanted to reverse most of the President’s reforms including his offer for a Union Treaty

that was to replace the currently centralized system of confederation with a much

decentralized confederation of states to succeed the USSR. Their lack of condemnation

148. http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/117231/

NCPP was formerly called the Chechen National Congress. The name was changed in the second session of the

Congress on 8-9 June 1991. Dzhokhar Dudayev was elected as the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the

Congress in the same session.

(123)

for the plotters of the putsch defamed them not only in the eyes of the nationalist and

moderate nationalist Chechens but also in front of Boris Yelstin’s whose contribution for

crushing the coup made him a hero in Russian political and public spheres.149

This was

soon followed by mass protests against Zavgayev in Grozny demanding the resignation

of the republic’s leader. On 6 September, the building of the republic administration was

stormed forcing Zavgayev to resign. Dzhokhar Dudayev was then proclaimed the

President of the “sovereign” Chechen Republic. This episode of Chechnya is called the

Chechen National Revolution or also as Dudayev’s coup d’etat.150

It however remains

disputed as to how pervasive the demonstrations were;

“Valerii Tishkov reports that the demonstrations in Sheikh Mansur Square

(formerly Lenin Square) in Grozny did not have an obvious political

objective. “These were not political actions, but rather a demonstration of

solidarity, free spirit or libertarianism, and militancy, mobilized and

directed by local leaders.” Demonstrators were apparently paid “100

rubles per day (at that time a rather significant sum); livestock was

specially slaughtered and meat was constantly being prepared in the

Square. Men who were not otherwise employed (there were few women at

the Chechen demonstrations)- basically the older generations- were the

backbone of the demonstration and guaranteed its spirit by performing the

traditional zikr dance. On Russian television the same faces kept appearing

149. Matthew Evangelista, The Chechen Wars: Will Russia go the Way of the Soviet Union, (Washington D.C:

Brookings Institution Press, 2002), pp.16-17 150 . Moshe Gammer, Ethno-Nationalism, Islam and the State in the Caucasus: Post-Soviet Disorder, Op. Cit., p.114

(124)

at the demonstrations, ostensibly directed at the remnants of Soviet

power.”151

In the meantime, Ruslan Khasbulatov, Chair of the Russian Supreme Soviet, a

parliamentary deputy of Chechno-Ingushetia and an ethnic Chechen by origin, had come

from Moscow to persuade Zavgayev and other members of the Chechno-Ingush Supreme

Soviet to resign from their positions in favor of an interim council that would govern the

region until the time that new elections could be held as per schedule on 17 November.

Nonetheless, no sooner had Khabulatov returned to Moscow that Dudayev’s camp

attempted to seize power from the council. They stormed into the KGB’s republic’s

headquarters and also managed to grab control of the weapons. This was the time when

Moscow started thinking of promoting Dudayev so as to lure him away from the freedom

movement of the Chechens. Khasbulatov “spoke with Yelstin about adding one or more

star to Dudayev’s shoulder strap and returning him to the army.”152

Petr Deinkin, the

Chief of Russian Air Force also proposed to promote Dudayev to a higher command.

Dudayev is reported to have answered that the ‘highest position for him was that of an

ordinary Chechen.’ Moscow’s stance towards Zavgayev and Dudayev during this time

was that of abandonment of the former and a silent support for the latter. According to

some Russian political analysts, Yelstin’s government had a major share in bringing the

“radical elements” to power in Chechnya without truly understanding the exact ethnic

and political movements in process in the North Caucasus; and are therefore also

responsible for the Chechen Wars.

151. Matthew Evangelista, The Chechen Wars: Will Russia go the Way of the Soviet Union, Op. Cit., pp.17-18 152. Ibid, p. 18

(125)

It is also reported that many in Chechnya were not in an all-out support for Dudayev’s

actions, for on 25 September 1991 a round table conference was organized by ten

Chechen nationalist organizations against an apprehended dismantlement of the

temporary council by Dudayev. Nevertheless, the NCPP declared itself the sole authority

of the Chechen Republic. Thereafter, Boris Yelstin, addressed the NCCP leaders

demanding them to surrender their control of the government infrastructure, armed

formations and weapons and “hold elections as per schedule on 17 November.” However,

the NCCP organized the parliamentary and presidential elections on 27 November and

Dudayev declared himself the President of the republic on the grounds that of the 85%

votes had been casted in the favor of Dudayev and that of the eligible voters 77% had

turned out on the day of the election. On the other hand, according to Tishkov, the

elections were held in 70% of the 360 electoral districts of Chechnya with a mere 10-12%

turnout. Soon after the elections, Dudayev issued a declaration of independence for

Chechnya; breaking off from the joint republic of Ingushetia and declaring the republic

independent of Russia. Consequently, in early November, the Congress of People’s

Deputiesdeclared the elections illegal and announced a state of emergency in the

republic. 25,000 Russian troops were sent to Chechnya. Dudayev reacted by declaring

martial law and mobilizing the Chechen forces for republic’s defense. As a matter of fact,

most of Dudayev’s opponents also joined him against the fears of a Russian invasion.

Mikhail Gorbachev, the President of USSR under which authority Chechnya still lay, was

hesitant of using force in the republic; against the wishes of Yelstin. The Russian

parliament ordered the withdrawal of troops from Chechnya. The withdrawal of also

proved to be the final element in adding to the character of Dzhokhar Dudayev as a

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national hero. Yelstin-Gorbachev rivalry can also be considered as the reason behind an

almost stagnant state of affairs in the context of center-periphery relations thereby leading

to the Chechen separation quagmire. Other than this, the dissolution of USSR itself had a

profound psychological effect on not only the Soviet leaders but also on the nationalist

elements in Chechnya; adding to the confidence of the latter. Taking advantage of

Yelstin’s preoccupation with the consolidation of power after his final victory over

Gorbachev and with the affairs of the 15 new states coming out from the former Soviet

Union; Dudayev consolidated his own political and military power in Chechnya so as to

minimize chances of Russian invasion. The formation of national guards overawed the

remainder of the Russian army in Grozny. By February 1992, the national guards had not

only entered the military quarters but had also started to “control the activity of the

Russian troops.”153

To this was added the final consent by the Russian Defense Minister

Gen. P.A. Sokolov in May 1992 to leave half of the weapons (that had formerly belonged

to the USSR’s forces) with Chechnya.154

According to analysts, it was an attempt by

Russian government so as to cover up the fact that almost all the weapons had been lost

by the Russian army while others believe the control of weapons was achieved against

bribes paid by Dudayev to the members of Yelstin’s administration.

The lack of an organized military structure in Chechnya resulted in the dispersal of

weapons among local rival gangs, inclined more towards crime than national defense.

The perception that Chechen linked crimes originated in Chechnya is somewhat

misleading as “most Chechen gangs were originally part of networks based in Moscow

153. Ibid, pp. 18-20 154. The Chechen forces inherited 40,000 automatic weapons and machine guns, 153 cannons and mortars, 42 tanks, 18

Grad multiple rocket launchers, 55 armed personnel carriers, 13000 grenades, and many training aircrafts and

helicopters.

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and dominated by Russians.” And according to the journalist David Remnick “there was

no more criminal city in Russia than Moscow itself…. Moscow was lousy with hit men

and racketeers, millionaires who made their money out of protection scams, thugs who

evicted old ladies from the apartments to ‘hasten privitazation.” Furthermore, as Remnick

puts it; a Chechen mob was reported to be present in Moscow but it was only “one clan of

many that had turned the capital into a kind of criminal bazaar.”155

Even after Russian forces withdrew from Grozny in 1991, efforts from Moscow to regain

control over the republic never formally ceased. However, an ostensible lack of

communication could be seen between Yelstin and Dudayev. According to Col. Victor

Baranets, the period from 1992 to 1994 witnessed about five visits from Yelstin to the

Caucasus and though these visits included everything from ‘swimming, hunting, wine-

testing and tennis’ it was only a cross-table talk with Dudayev that was missing from

these trips. Nevertheless, some of Moscow’s important and influential politicians

conducted this task with members of Dudayev’s government. There were times of high

chances for the conclusion of formal agreements between the two sides. Unfortunately

enough, the fact that Moscow often shifted towards a forceful solution together with the

fact that Dudayev was declined to meet Yelstin personally, kept the Chechen leader at

unease and therefore the two sides could never develop mutual interest and thus no

ultimate agreement could be achieved.156

In the absence of the much needed communication, things were fast moving towards a

dead end. The most important events in this context were those of hijacking and

155. Matthew Evangelista, The Chechen Wars: Will Russia go the Way of the Soviet Union, Op. Cit., 21-22 156. Ibid, p. 24

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kidnapping (happening outside Chechnya) such as the one in July 1994 when a few

armed men hijacked a bus near Minaeral’nye Vody. These episodes showed Dudayev’s

and his administration’s failure to control the Chechen militants; a much logical excuse

for the center to step in and take control of affairs. On the other hand, some scholars are

of the opinion that these events were fostered by the “Russian agents to provide an

excuse for intervention.”157

The latter perception can be calculated as the reason behind

Dudayev’s refusal, in contrast to his cooperation in the previous hijackings, to let either

the Russian forces or the hijackers into Chechen territory against the fear that Russia

might try to occupy at least a part of the Chechen republic. Russian intervention however

could not be resisted for long for on 26 November 1994, opposition forces in Grozny

seized control of the city. They were routed by the Dudayev’s forces and a large number

of them were taken as prisoners. In response to Dudayev’s threat to execute the prisoners

(that included 70 Russian officers and soldiers) if Moscow did not acknowledge its

support for the opposition, Yelstin responded by issuing an ultimatum for all the Chechen

forces to lay down arms, ceasefire, and release all of the prisoners. In the meeting of the

Security Council on 29 November, the members of the Council endorsed a decision that

had been made by the President; for rather than discussing the matter first, the Council

was to vote on the “force option”. Finally, on 30 November 1994, Yelstin made the

formal decision for war, approving the use of direct military force.

157. Ibid, p.30

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2.6.1 The Second Caucasus War: Russian invasion of Chechnya (1994-1996)

The Russian invasion and control of Chechnya, as planned by Defense Minister Gen.

Pavel Grachev, was to be accomplished in three stages:

Stage I (November 29- December 6, 1994): Russian forces to prepare and secure

locations from which future operation would be conducted,

Stage II (December 7-9, 1994): Russian troops to advance Grozny from five

directions; encircle the city as well as the republic,

Stage III (December 10-14, 1994): Assault on Grozny; Russian forces to capture

key governmental buildings including the Presidential Palace, TV and Radio

stations.

On a more serious understanding of the situation in Chechnya; had the Russians

understood the nature of defense of Grozny and the readiness of the Chechen volunteers

to defend the homeland; they probably would not have attacked the republic, at least not

in 1994. Grachev nevertheless expected minimal fight. But his plan of occupying Grozny

in three stages had started to slow down from the start. Though the Russian Air Force had

not much trouble in putting down the Chechen aircraft, the Russian troops however, did

not proceeded until 11th

December. The resistance meted out to them as they entered the

North Caucasus further slowed down the progress and the forces finally entered the city

on 26th

November. As the ground realities continued to turn against Russian plans, the

6000 Russian forces attacking Grozny on New Year’s Eve were met by an army beyond

what Russians had calculated. Not only were they well equipped but their large numbers

also bypassed Moscow’s expectation. As early as within the early hours of the battle,

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Russian troops were trapped within their now destroyed vehicles as the Chechen fighters

continued to shoot from both the upper and lower stories of nearby buildings. As had

happened in Berlin, half a century earlier, entire columns of tanks were left motionless

owing to the immobility of the leading and trail vehicles. A two-fold problem lay with the

Russian forces in Grozny. Many of the troops were inexperienced and had not much

experience of urban warfare. As for the experienced members of the regiments; the

soldiers and officers had not had any field drillings since 1992. Furthermore, there was an

adequate shortage of supplies and hardly any regiment could have been believed to be at

full strength.158

On the Chechen front, sources report that preparations for battle had been in place for

about three to four months before the Russian invasion, during the course of which the

Chechens had drafted war strategy and had also made preparations for effective

communication and had trained their fighters. As the war opened in Grozny, Russian

military and MVD (Russian Interior Ministry) troops entered the republic followed by

heavy bombardments both through air as well as through artilleries. These episodes

resulted in heavy civilian casualties in addition to damages on public buildings such as

hospitals and orphanages. According to press reports, “there were up to 40,000

detonations an hour at the height of the winter campaign against Grozny.”159

In spite of

the almost complete destruction of Grozny by Russian forces, the Chechens, using

guerilla warfare, still controlled major parts of the republic. As per reports, at least 2000

Russian troops were killed during the first few days of the battle. By the start of January

158. Olga Oliker, Russia’s Chechen Wars: 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), pp.

9-10, 13-14 159. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/chechnya1.htm

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Russian forces were “fighting house by house. Helicopter gunships attacked

neighborhoods and jets bombed the parliament.” By mid-January, Russian Prime

Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, attempted to conclude a ceasefire so as to make possible

the burial of the dead ones but reinforcement supply continued to land at nearby bases;

the ceasefire attempts went in vain and the battle for the Presidential Palace continued.

The Palace was finally seized on 19th

January but the Chechens remained far from

defeated and the war continued as afore. According to a BBC report, the Russian forces

faced a double dilemma of fighting an often ‘unseen enemy’ and facing a population

which hated them. These proved to be strong factors in the demoralization of the Russian

troops. As two-thirds of the republic went under Russian forces by May 1995, Chechen

fighters changed their strategy to the use of terror (for example, hostage taking) to

achieve their ends.160

The most important of these attacks was the one conducted under

Shamyl Basayev when the Chechen forces held a hospital under hostage in

Budyonnovsk. 1000 people were held as hostages, around 100 of whom were killed.

Following two unsuccessful attempts by Russian forces to release the hostages, Prime

Minister Chernomyrdin had to make a humiliating agreement of Basayev’s and his men’s

return to Chechnya. This was followed by Moscow’s final submission to Chechen

demands for peace talks. However, a major victory for the Russians was in April 1996

when Dudayev was assassinated by Russian aircraft.

Dudayev was succeeded by Aslan Maskhadov who had also served in the Soviet military.

Soon thereafter, in August, Chechen forces captured Grozny and a successful negotiation

of a ceasefire conducted by Yelstin’s security advisor Gen. Alexander Lebed with

160. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/482323.stm

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Maskhadov. The ceasefire; the Khasav-Yurt Accord, ended the First Chechen War; a

formal peace treaty was concluded in May 1997 titled as On Peace and the Principles of

Russian-Chechen Relations and also called the Moscow Peace Treaty. The treaty granted

de facto independence to Chechnya and postponed the question of the republic’s status

until December 2001. The fact that Chechens were not stopped from their ‘claim for

sovereignty’ became the major issue in the coming years. For the international

community the treaty was indirect admission of defeat by Russia for not only Moscow

agreed to withdraw troops from ChRI but also to compensate for losses inflicted upon the

republic by the war. In fact, the granting of de facto independence to Chechnya was

enough evidence to attest Russian defeat and ChRI victory in the First Chechen War. The

story of Russian-Chechen conflict certainly did not end in 1997 for the last years of the

twentieth century were to see another bilateral confrontation that was to continue through

the first decade of the new millennium.

2.6.2 The Second Chechen War

Even after the war, peace in Chechnya was far from reality. Not only was there unrest

between the center and the Chechen periphery but episodes of stiff political competition

could be very well discerned in the war torn Chechen landscape itself. For example,

Basayev and Maskhadov continued to be close contenders in the events following the

Khasav-Yurt Accord. In the elections of 1997, Maskhadov won by 66% against the 23%

of Basayev’s votes (in spite of the latter’s plans to make Chechnya a moderate Islamic

state within the CIS; serving as a link between Russia and the Muslim World). For the

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next year and a half, Basayev continued to be in and out of the cabinet.161

Most of the

time, he adopted a harsh disposition towards Maskhadov for in his opinion, the latter was

too lenient in his approach towards Moscow. As it happened, Basayev slowly joined the

camp of those demanding a separate Islamic state in the North Caucasus.

Though allowed to rebuild itself during this time, Chechnya was forbidden any foreign

help. In fact, the very aid coming from the Russian Federation was lost before it made its

way into Chechnya. In August 1997, after a meeting with the Chechen President, Yelstin

admitted that of the $100 million destined for Chechnya “the devil only knows where the

money is going.” He also admitted that out of the $138 million amount apportioned to

Chechnya for that year, only $21 million made way to the Bank of Chechnya.162

Chechnya had been in a severe economic crisis ever since the dissolution of the Soviet

Union. The situation worsened during the first half of 1990s owing to the Russo-Chechen

confront. The years of the First Chechen War brought the economic crisis to an apex

which only worsened on the account of corruption in the dispersal of official funds. That

Chechnya housed unemployed youth who were quickly losing faith in Maskhadov’s

regime only added to the simmering unrest in the republic. Of these unemployed men,

many found logic in the separatist ideology of Basayev and Khattab. Amir Khattab, a

Saudi by origin, had become a close ally of Shamyl Basayev during the First Chechen

War. Together they pursued the creation of an Islamic state in the North Caucasus by

uniting the Chechen republic with the nearby Muslim republic of Dagestan. The same

reason was given to justify the second Russian invasion of Chechnya on 26 August 1999.

161. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1069740.html 162. http://www.csmonitor.com/1997/0819/081997.intl.intl.2.html

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After the peace treaty of 1997, a wave of kidnapping events was seen in Chechnya, most

of which was blamed on “criminal gangs” operating in the region. Most of the hostages

were military officers, journalists and in some cases also foreigners. In March 1999,

Russian Interior Ministry General Gennady Shpigun was kidnapped in Grozny leading to

the deployment of more Russian troops along the Chechen border and the threat of the

use of force if the hostage was not released. In the later part of the same month, an

explosion in Vladikavkaz, the capital of North Ossetia killed 60 people.163

In August

1999, Basayev led a force of 2000 men to invade Dagestan so as to assist the people of

the region to draw a system based on sharia. Although Islam in Caucasus had been

fashioned on a model contrary to the Wahabischool of thought, that is, it was more of a

moderate form based on sufi mystic traditions; a faction resented by the more orthodox

Wahabisect that originated in the Saudi peninsula. But over the period of time, especially

following the foreign Muslim aid coming for Chechens’ assistance, not only did faith

become a binding component of the conflict but also the society in general and the

fighters in particular became more rigid as per their ideological beliefs.164

Wahabism

became further influential in the region owing to the works of Arab missionaries. The

young population was fascinated by the philosophy of Wahabism which teaches “high

social solidarity and mutual material support, along with the chance to jump the

traditional barrier of seniority and achieve prestige and riches while still young.”165

The

influence of the Islamic factor can be discerned by Aslan Maskhadov’s announcement in

early 1999 to transform the existing Chechen law into a sharia based law. While this was

163. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/chechnya2.htm 164. Baylis, Wirtz and Gray, Holding a Decaying Empire Together:The War in Chechnya, (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2011), available at http://global.oup.com/uk/orc/politics/conflict/baylis_strategy5e/student/cases/ 165. Christopher Zurcher, The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict and Nationhood in the Caucasus, Op. Cit.,

p.89

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primarily done to save his position from the more popular Islamic rivals, it put his

relations with Kremlin in question for this was but a healthy option for the latter.166

Furthermore, in 1998, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, who had become the acting president

following Dusayev’s death; set up the Supreme Sharia Court with the intention of seizing

governmental powers from the parliament. On the other hand, Vice President Vakha

Arsanov, an arch rival of Maskhadov started working on the formation of a State Shura

that would have the powers to instruct the parliament and the president on various

matters. The Presidential decree of February 1999 by Maskhadov called for the

immediate implication of sharia in the republic and dissolved the powers of the

parliament. The opposition refused to accept the authority of this shura and established

one of their own shura which housed members such as Vakha Arsanov, Zelim khan

Yandarbiyev, and the field commanders Sulamn Raduyev and Shamyl Basayev. Thus by

early 1999, Chechnya was a republic that had a president void of powers, a non-

responsible parliament, a presidential shura and an oppositional shura and also did not

possess a constitution as it had been suspended by the President for the implementation of

the February decree.167

Basayev’s invasion of Dagestan, though not so much a success, added to Russian

concerns over the serious threat that came with an independent Chechnya. Simultaneous

to this event were the series of September bombings that occurred in Dagestan, Moscow

and Volgodonsk. Though it remains obscured as to the plotters of the September

bombings in Russia, the events together with Shamyl’s invasion of Dagestan in 1999,

166.Baylis, Wirtz and Gray, Holding a Decaying Empire Together: The War in Chechnya, Op. Cit 167. Christopher Zurcher, The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict and Nationhood in the Caucasus, Op. Cit.,

pp.88-89

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gave Vladimir Putin; the formerly unknown head of FSB who had ascended to the post of

Prime Minister on 16 August by replacing the sacked Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin,

the pretext to launch a counter operation into Chechnya.168

The forces of Basayev and Khattab met resistance from the local Dagestani population.

The Russian army, backed by public support from Dagestan drove the invading forces

back into Chechnya. Following the September bombings in Russia, the operation inside

Dagestan turned into a full-fledged war against Chechnya. The Russian forces entered

Chechnya in October 1999. Russia, this time, did not send untrained personnel to the

battlefield. In fact, the second Chechen war saw excessive use of heavy artillery, high

scale bombing and skilled aviation in the republic. With heavy losses of infrastructure

and human life, Russian forces had captured major stations including Grozny by March

2000. This was countered by guerilla fighting form the local combatants who continued

to target Russian security and government personnel and pro-Moscow officials. In mid

2000, the first event of suicide bombing occurred in Chechnya169

whereby since this time,

not only has suicide bombing become a customary part of the war against Kremlin but

the very war has further strengthened the hold of Islamic influence in the republic.170

168.Baylis, Wirtz and Gray, Holding a Decaying Empire Together: The War in Chechnya, Op. Cit 169. A young woman by the name of Khava Baraeva hit her truck loaded with explosives into a Russian military

checkpoint. 170. Christopher Zurcher, The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict and Nationhood in the Caucasus, Op. Cit.,

pp.93,96

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2.3: Map of Chechnya

As the world celebrated the twenty first century, Chechnya was echoing with attacks

from the well-equipped Russian armaments; as the latter continued its operation against

the separatist forces. Through the first decade of the new century, events in Chechnya and

Russia continued with not much alteration until finally in 2009 when the war was

officially called off by the Russian president.

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2.7 THE SOVIET ELITE IN DAGESTAN

Introduced to Islam in the eighth century and brought under Russian Empire in the

seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; the people of Dagestan encountered cultural

manipulation under the Soviet rule. This included the rewriting of the local history by

Soviet authorities and making Azeri language the official language of the republic. The

Dagestani people, especially the Dargins (one of the major ethnic group of Dagestan),

were resistant to Russian rule. This was made clear in the 1970s when a profound Islamic

and cultural revival spread through the region. Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost

encouraged the people, especially the Dargins, to assert their distinct national identity.

The group also formed a nationalist organization called Tsadesh and forced the people to

take part in the first non-communist elections of the country.171

Like most of the other areas of the Soviet Union, Dagestan also had a handsome share of

the intricacies arising out of the collapse of the USSR in 1991. Facing severe poverty,

underdevelopment, and a dangerously unique blend of ethnic composition; Dagestan was

preconditioned for violent episodes for the coming future. In addition to this, Dagestan’s

geographical location in a “bad neighborhood”172

put the region into easy access for the

trickle down effects of the conflicts in its periphery. For example, thousands of Chechen

refugees found their way into Dagestan during the First Chechen War. The situation

became even alarming in 1999 when Shamyl Basayev crossed into the republic with the

mission of uniting it with Chechnya so as to create a united Islamic state. Although,

171. James B. Minahan, One Europe Many Nations: A Historical Dictionary of European National Groups, (Westport:

Greenwood Press, 2000), pp.213-214 172. Christoph Zurcher, The Post Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict and Nationhood in the Caucasus, Op. Cit., p.

188

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extending help to the Islamic elements under attack by Russian forces in the villages of

Kadar, Karamakhi and Chabanmakh seemed an opportune tactic for the Chechen fighters

crossing into Dagestan; the local populace put up a strong resistance against Basayev’s

forces, giving strong moral and strategic grounds for the Russian forces to push the

Chechen fighters on a back foot and by 24th

August Chechens had retreated to Chechnya.

2.7.1 A tale of two brothers: The Rise and Fall of Nadir and Magomed Khachialev

In contrast to the events of violent unrest that the region has experienced in the near past,

Dagestan’s political situation during the 1990s presented a rather different picture. In the

words of Christopher Zurcher,

“Dagestan, however, had shown its resistance to destabilizing overspill

and refuted the grim predictions of conflict theory. Despite state weakness

and political instability at the center, as well as wide availability of small

arms and thousands of unemployed young men, the political elite of

Dagestan managed to avoid secessionist politics, came to terms with

ethnonational aspirations among some of the largest ethnic groups within

Dagestan, proved resistant to overspill from the Chechen war, contained

radical wahabism, and successfully co-opted potentially oppositional

elites.”

One particularly important episode during this time was the rise and fall of Nadir and

Magomed Khachilaev; famously known as the Khachilaev brothers. As the Dagestani

society attaches great importance to sports activities, it was therefore only natural for

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Magomed, a national karate master to win love and respect for himself and his family in

Dagestan. The Khachialev brothers were reported to have become involved with criminal

organizations in Makhachkala and Moscow. Like Basayev, the brothers also collected

huge profits through the imports of computers from Russia. When Dagestan was being

influenced by nationalist tide during the 1980s, a movement by the name of Tsubarz (new

moon) was launched which like many of contemporary national movements was aimed at

preserving and upholding local traditional values. Tsaburz mainly addressed the national

concerns of Laks (a large ethnic group in Dagestan). The Laks who stood in open conflict

with the Chechens over land issues following deportations of the latter in 1944, the

movement provided a foundation for the political career of Khachilaev brothers who too

belonged to the same ethnic group. Patronizing the movement, the brothers formed a

paramilitary force of hundreds of men and concluded an agreement with the ‘Chechens

that was favorable to the Laks’. The Tsaburz movement under the lead of Khachilaev

brothers became the strongest in Dagestan where the paramilitary forces were an

apprehension for the local ruling elite. Meanwhile Khachilaev brothers extended and

strengthened links in the Arab world.

The influence of Khachilaev brothers further increased when Nadir Khachilaev became

the leader of the Russian Union of Muslims. Nadir, in public addresses, started

demanding an Islamic state in Dagestan. The Chechen War was a catalyst to the already

rising prestige of the Khachilaev brothers. As a matter of fact, Nadir Khachilaev was a

prominent mediator in the peace settlement between Russian and Chechnya at the end of

the First Chechen War Nadir’s political career mounted even higher levels with his

elections as the Deputy to the Russian parliament in 1996. In the meanwhile, Magomed

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had occupied one of the most profitable position in Dagestan, that of the State Fishery

supervisor.173

Up to this point, the brothers had conducted their political activities without

disturbing the state apparatus. But in 1996, Magomed started overt opposition against the

local ruling elite. In May 1998, around 2000 armed followers of Khachilaevs stormed in

and occupied a government building in the capital. Destruction and chaos followed

leaving five death casualties among the Dagestani police. The brothers tried to give a

religious color to the conflict and hoisted the green Islamic flag over the building. They

also attempted to present the conflict as a political remonstration by calling for the

formation of a presidential regime which they had rejected only a few weeks before.

Nevertheless, negotiations between government authorities and the brothers broke down

the tensions and the Khachilaevs retreated.174

The May 1998 events were a prologue to the decline of Khachilaev brothers since the

ruling elite of Dagestan, along with the center’s support, started pressurizing the brothers

to a political surrender. In November 1999, Nadir was ‘stripped of parliamentary

immunity and arrested’.175

In 2000, Nadir and Magomed were sentenced to one and a half

and three years in prison respectively.176

Thus, in the end, the Federations’ authority,

through concessions, compromises and the use of force, prevailed over that of the

Khachilaev brothers.

In contrast to the Chechen case where Dudayev forcibly replaced the Soviet government,

the contemporary Soviet Dagestani elite not only remained intact but also continued to

173. The position gives immense control over the highly rewarding caviar trade. 174. Christoph Zurcher, The Post Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict and Nationhood in the Caucasus, Op.Cit.,

p.191 175. Ibid, p.190 176. Ibid, p.191

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attract more members into its structure. In fact, the continuation of the Soviet elite in

Dagestan during years of absolute conflict in neighboring Chechnya is largely due to the

“non-confrontational relations”177

between the ruling elite of Dagestan and the Soviet

authorities throughout the seven decades of Soviet rule. It must also be remembered that

for most of the Soviet tenure, local positions in Dagestan were occupied by locals.178

For

example, the period following World War II saw all the chairmen of the Council of

Ministers, First Secretaries of the Communist Party and the chairmen of the Supreme

Soviet were Dagestani officials. “While making appointments to these posts, care was

taken to ensure that these three officials belonged to different national groups…..the

responsible politics of ethnic balancing heightened acceptance of the Soviet system and

strengthened the Dagestani Soviet elite.”179

This Soviet elite of Dagestan successfully

incorporated the challenging newly emerging class of entrepreneurs; thus, further

strengthening the system. Moreover, the unique ethnic composition of Dagestan,

consisting of more than 30 ethnic groups, minimized the probable effects of a nationalist

tide in this part of the Russian Federation. The call for an independent Republic of

Dagestan required a consensus among a wide array of nationalities. As for example, in

1991, 15 out of 53 Dagestani Soviets voted against the creation of such a republic.

Moreover, in Dagestan, most of the ethnic groups feared that a sovereign republic would

but only strengthen the already dominant four ethnic groups.

177. Ibid, p.192 178. As per rule, the local cadres in Dagestan’s elite were appointed from four of the largest ethnic groups of Dagestan,

namely, 179. Christoph Zurcher, The Post Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict and Nationhood in the Caucasus, Op. Cit.,

p.192

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On the other hand, not only did Chechnya miss the creation of Soviet Chechen elite that

could associate their interests with the USSR, but also Soviet career opportunities were

severely limited for Chechens. Another point that shapes Dagestan in sharp contrast with

Chechnya is the unique identity that the people of Dagestan carry with them. As per a

survey report of 2001, 75% of Dagestanis identified themselves with Dagestan against

the five available options of Dagestan, Russia, ethnic group, religion and community.180

According to a Dagestani sociologist Enver Kisriev, the minor role played by ethnicity in

Dagestani society has strong historical grounds. As it stands, the Dagestani society has

been governed by jamaats for the past many centuries. A jamaat denotes a combination

of single large or two to three smaller villages. Consequently, the variable number of

families living in the village (or villages) constitute a jamaat the heads of the families

make up the jamaat’s Council of Elders. Adat remains the law of jamaats in social,

political and economic matters. Since jamaats were formed as a result of the

amalgamation of different families; ethnic orientation could not play a significant role as

there stood equal chances for the members of jamaats to belong to either a single or a

variety of ethnic groups.181

In the words of Edward Walkers, Dagestani society is best

understood as follows:

“Dagestani society is thus characterized as a complex set of mostly nested

cleavages. Unlike, for example, most of the cleavages separating

Armenians from Azeris, they are not conterminous. Other than the

relatively weak identity of being a citizen of multinational Dagestan, or

180. Ibid, p.194 181. Ibid, pp.194-195

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the even weaker identity of being a citizen of the Russian Federation, few

cleavages intersect ethnic, jamaat, or family loyalties in ways that would

unite, for example, a highlander Avar from a particular jamaat with a

lowlander Kumyk, let alone an Urban Russian. Instead, salient cleavages

are generally nested one within the other, like a Russian matrioshka doll-

for example, Muslim, highlander, Avar or sub-nationally, jamaat, clan,

village, and family. Moreover, identities and political loyalties tend to

intensify as the unit of identification gets smaller, with most political

activity organized around jamaaty.”

Furthermore, the Dagestani constitution of 1994 has also helped to keep the political

structure intact. For instance, according to Article 88 of this constitution, “any one

national group can only have one representative in the State Council” (gossovet), that

comprises of fourteen members and makes the highest executive body. The most

important contribution of the constitution remains the fact that it strengthens the jamaat

system. “All deputies are elected in single-member constituencies by a majority

vote…..At the local level, the electoral law prevents two candidates of different

nationalities from competing against each other.182

Centre’s support was also one of the

most counting elements for the success of Dagestani political elite. Ever since the

Chechen intrusion in 1999, and keeping in view the strategic location of Dagestan,

Moscow provided national support to the mountain republic.

182. Ibid, p.197

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2.8 EVENTS OF INSURGENCY IN KBR

When Northern Caucasus became part of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic

(RSFSR) as the Mountain ASSR (Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic), Kabarda and

Balkaria were designated as separate orkugs with their administrative centre at Nalchik

and Dolinsk respectively. Previously, both Kabarda and Balkaria had been northern and

southern parts of the Nalchik orkug. Similarly, Karachai, previously the western part of

the Nalchik orkug was carved out as a new orkug. In 1921, Kabarda withdrew from the

Mountain ASSR and established itself as an Autonomous Oblast (AO). The precedence

was followed by the Balkar leadership who soon sent a letter to the RSFSR’s People’s

Commissariat of Nationalities; drawing attention towards the need of creating a Balkar

AO. The proposal was approved by the Commissariat on 6th

January 1922 but three days

afterwards, it was decided to revise the 6th

January decision and “to acknowledge as

advantageous the exclusion of territories inhabited by the Balkars form the Mountain

ASSR and to join it to Kabarda and establish a united Kabardino-Balkar Autonomous

Oblast linked directly to the RSFSR”183

with the administrative centre at Nalchik. The

board’s decision stood contrary to the Constitution of RSFSR of 1918 which stated that:

“Aiming at the establishment of a truly free and voluntary, and following

that a fuller and more solid union of the toiling classes of all the nations of

Russia, the Third Congress of the Soviets limits itself to the establishment

of the basic principles of the federal Soviet republics of Russia [and]

presents the workers and peasants of each nation with the freedom to make

183. Moshe Gammer, Ethno-Nationalism, Islam and the State in the Caucasus: Post Soviet Disorder, Op. Cit., p.74

(146)

an independent decision in its own plenipotentiary congress: do they want,

and on which principles, to take part in the federal government and the

other Soviet institutions.”184

In August 1922, Kabarda and Balakria were decreed to be united and were also forbidden

to establish separate ispolkoms for the two regions against the resolution of All Russian

Central Executive Committee (VTsIK). “On the whole the power structures liquidated the

two territorial units and supported the creation of self-governing bodies of the Balkars

and Kabartay. The results have been felt up to this day.”185

The Kabardino-Balkar AO

was raised to the status of ASSR in 1936 and a new constitution was framed in the

following year. The constitution again underpinned the “unitary form of the national-state

structure of the republic which resulted in a sans defense and security situation for both

nationalities.

Like their Chechen counterparts, Balkars had faced deportations in 1944. According to

some estimates, some 37,713 people in 14 trains were deported to Central Asia. The

Kabardino-Balkar ASSR was officially changed into Kabarda ASSR; some of the Balkar

lands were amalgamated with Georgia while some were inhabited by people who were

‘short of land’ in other areas of the republic. Even the properties and belongings of the

Balkars were confiscated on state orders. It was only in 1956 that the Balkars were

allowed to return and the Kabardino-Balkaria ASSR was re-establish a year later in 1957.

Unfortunately, hard times had not yet ended for the Balkars for their return did not restore

their political rights nor was their executive and territorial integrity reinstated. As it could

184. Ibid, 185. Moshe Gammer, Ethno-Nationalism, Islam and the State in the Caucasus: Post Soviet Disorder, Op. Cit., p.75

(147)

be calculated, the painful memories of Soviet years began to show face among the

Balkars especially during the 1980s with Gorbachev’s introduction of perestroika. By this

time, national movements could be observed in Kabardino-Balkaria ASSR which clearly

showed the pattern of ethnic, social and political situation of the ASSR. A movement by

the name of Tore- the Balkan forum- mainly focused on the economic, legal and political

“rehabilitation” of the Balkars but it soon turned into a political organization as the forum

started deliberating issues related to self-government.

Some positive indications were also given by the Soviet regime as per the rights of the

Balkars. For example, in early 1988 a decree on the subject of the victims of 1930s,

1940s and 1950s entitled On Additional Measures to Reinstate Justice to the Victims of

the Repressions, was issued by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (SS) of the USSR.

This was followed by the decree of 1989 of use of force against the people by the by the

previous Soviet regimes as “illegal” and “criminal”.186

In August 1990, a decree by the

Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the KBASSR announced to establish a “system of

measures to fully and unconditionally reinstate the rights of the Balkar people” and also

to establish a commission to make suggestions for the reinstallation of raions (districts)

of Balkars in its borders of 1st January 1994. However this could not make the

transformation from paper talk to practical implementation.

On 19 August 1990, the deputies of the Balkars held a conference. The resolution of the

conference asked from RSFSR to consider Balkars as a separate national and political

element within the federation and also called for the constitution of KBASSR into a

186. Ibid, p.76

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sovereign federal state within the RSFSR. The Declaration of the State Sovereignty of the

KBSSR in 1991further attested the rights of both Kabartay and Balkar “as the sovereign

subjects co-founders of a united republic, enjoy the inalienable right to self-

determination, up to the secession from the republic and the establishment of an

independent statehood.”187

But the Supreme Soviet of the KBSSR in September 1991

passed a law On the Election of the President of the KBSSR which thus set back the

political change in the republic. As a result, during the First Congress of the Balkar

People, the members showed consent for the declaration On the Proclamation of the

Republic of Balkaria and the National Sovereignty of the Balkar People and also decided

to give no participation in the upcoming presidential election of KBSSR. In November

1991, the SS of the KBSSR announced to support the resolution adopted in the First

Congress of the Balkar People that called for the assertion of the national sovereignty of

the Balkar people and the creation of a republic of Balkaria within the RSFSR. As a

matter of fact, under a referendum held among Balkars in 1991, 94.8% population voted

in favor of a separate republic of Balkaria. Even many members of the Congress of the

Kabartay People and Adyghe Kh’ase also supported the resolution of the First Congress

of the Balkar People, for it stood in close call with the idea of a single Adyghe republic.

However, the following events turned out to be in sharp contrast with the stance of the

SS. A presidential regime was established in the republic and an election campaign was

run from late ’91 to early ’92. The Balkar national movement’s participation in election

was carried on the guarantee for the chances of a Balkar to occupy the post of president

and the solution of administrative and territorial problems associated with the restoration

187. Ibid, pp.76-77

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of raions of Balkaria as they were in 1944 along with the rehabilitation of the Balkar

people. On 9 January 1992, a Kabartay was sworn in as the president of the KBR. The

very next day, a congress of the Kabartay people, organized by the Adyghe Kh’ase,

called for the re-establishment of the republic of Kabarda. Later, on 20 February 1992, all

the political and apolitical organizations of the KBSSR attending a round table in Nalchik

supported the respective resolutions of the Congress of Kabartay People and that of the

Balkars to establish independent states.188

Nevertheless, the Kabardino-Balkar ASSR was renamed as the Kabardino-Balkar

Republic on 10 March 1992. The time from 1992 to 1993 saw repeated pledges by the

Balkar leadership to recant from the claim of separate republic of Balkaria if their

demands on the adjustment of Balkar raions and on equal opportunity in government

bodies were respected. The demands, however, went unanswered. By early 1994,

comprising of the Tore, Women of Balkaria, At (The Oath), the Council of the Elders,

members of intelligentsia and clergy; a new organization by the name of the Popular

Political Centre of the People of Balkaria was established. The aim of the Centre was to

create a separate republic of Balkaria. The chairman of the National Council of the

Balkar People (NCBP), Suffayan Beppayev, in an interview said:

“We have come to the conclusion that the leadership of the KBR has no

intention of solving our problems. That means we have to solve them on

our own. We would suggest alternatives for the full rehabilitation of the

Balkars: to establish within the KBR three national districts- a Kabartay, a

188. Ibid, p.77

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Balkar and a Russian- or a confederation of two republics- Kabarda and

Balkaria. If the leadership of the republic agrees with none, we shall have

no choice but to establish a sovereign Republic of Balkaria.”189

Beppayev was confident of securing consent for the republic of Balkaria in the centre as

had been secured among the neighboring states. Nevertheless, in the mid of July 1994,

the KBR government rescinded the decisions made by the Congress of the Balkar and

Kabartay people in 1991 and 1992. The government of KBR also organized a referendum

in November 1994 for the Balkar people according to the results of which, more than

95% of the Balkars opposed the division of KBR.190

In the meantime, measures were

undertaken by the KBR leadership to honor the demands of the Balkars.191

But on 30

January 1997, the Supreme Court of the KBR was informed by the prosecutor that the

activities of Tore had been prohibited. Moreover, in early August 1997, a commission

was formed by the KBR the chairman and chief secretary of which were Kokov and

Beppayev, who thus decreed that the decisions made on the Rehabilitation of the Victims

of Political Repression were rather made by the Congress in an “emotional state of mind”

and that they were not “fully thought through and absorbed”.192

However, the beginning

of 1998 saw the creation of another political organization by the Balkar intelligentsia by

the name of Malkar Auazy (Balkar rebirth). The organization carried joint activities with

the authorities under Beppayev’s command. From 2000 to 2001, Malkar Auazy and Alan

189. Ibid, p.78 190. ibid, 191. This included the reinstatement of administrative raions. Furthermore, on 23 November 1996, Valerii Kokov, the

president of KBR, ordered to establish a commission to inspect the allocation and usage of the federal budget (1992-

1996) designated for the development and rehabilitation of the Balkar land and people. The ‘Socio-Economic

Development and National Cultural Revivla of the Balkar People, 1996-2000’ was also initiated by the centre. 192. Ibid, p.79

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(Karachai organization) coordinated their activities particularly in the cultural context so

as to find solutions for socio-political, economic and religious problems. But the SS of

the KBR dismantled the Congress of the Kabartay people in August 1997 in face of

contradictions between the Congress’s program and the state legislation. Following this,

the Adyghe Kh’ase also split in the year 2000 as a result of internal disputes. This was

followed by a defeat of the leadership that stood in opposition to the authorities of the

centre. The result was unearthing of Islamic tendency in the areas where opposition

forces assembled themselves. The phenomenon may be well understood in the words of

Gammer:

“But this has also its historical analogies. After First World War, when the

Paris Peace conference did not recognize the Independent Democratic

Republic of the Mountain Peoples of the Northern Caucasus, the peoples

of the Caucasus tried to achieve independence on theocratic principles- in

the form of the Emirate of the Northern Caucasus (1919-1920). The

Chechen republic Ichkeria having gained no recognition went in 1999

along the road of an Islamic republic. The results of all these attempts are

well known. But dunya kozuudu (the world alternates) and dunya bylal

turmaz (the world is changeable) state Karachai-Balkar proverbs.”

As a matter of fact, the 1996 events in KBR were not the result of a sudden and abrupt

misunderstanding. The events, along with the idea of independent Balkaria owe their

existence to years of work of political organizations such as Tore, NCBP and their like

and yet their inability to meet the goals. Furthermore, the highly rich ethno-religious

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makeup of the Caucasus and the coinciding Russian and international predicaments, all

had their share in the turbulent events of the 1990s.

2.9 THE PROBLEMS IN INGUSHETIA

The dispute between Chechnya and Ingushetia is as complicated as simple it is. The

Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Oblast was converted into the Chechen-Ingush

Autonomous Republic in 1936 of which Sunja raion was also a part. In the early years of

the Soviet period, Sunja raion had been an autonomous Cossack territory and annexed to

the Chechen AO in 1929. When the Chechen-Ingush Republic disintegrated in 1991, and

when the Chechen republic declared its independence, the Ingush people raised voice for

a separate Ingush republic within Russia. This was also the time when people living in

the Chechen-Ingush border land asserted their identity of being the descendants of the

Orstkhoy; a tribe among the Vaynakh, who had supported Imam Shamyl during the

Caucasus War. The defeat of Imam Shamyl had led to a consequent decline of Orstkhoy

who then migrated to the Ottoman Empire. Those who stayed behind integrated with the

Chechen and Ingush people, and branded themselves as either Chechen or Ingush and

spoke the respective language. As for today, a majority of Orstkhoy lives in the raions of

Nazran and Malgobek of the republic of Ingushetia, Achkhoi-Martan raion of Chechen

Republic and also in the Sunja raion which also happens to be the bone of contention

between Chechnya and Ingushetia.

In the wake of 1991 events, the very threat that “a state border between Chechnya and

Ingushetia would make them into a divided people caused them to claim that they were a

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separate ethnic group.”193

The emerging rivalry between Chechens and Ingush over Sunja

raion added strongly to the Orstkhoy tendency of asserting separate ethnic identity. In

1989, the Ingush leaders listed Sunja raion as part of the expanse constituting the future

Ingush republic. On the other hand, Chechen leadership asserted their rights over this

territory. Following Chechen independence, many Ingush who regarded themselves as

Orstkhoy stood in opposition against the inclusion of Sunja land into the Chechen

republic. The same propensity was witnessed in Chechnya where the Orstkhoy

population saw themselves and their taips as part of the Chechen landscape. These

Chechen Orstkhoy traced their lineage to Nakhshi; the legendary ancestor of the Chechen

people, and also claimed their language was Chechen and not Ingush.

In an appeal made to the Ingush people in December 1991, the Ingush leaders proposed

the establishment of a united Vaynakh republic to counter the threat of a disintegrating

Vaynakh people.194

But in January 1992, Chechen parliament passed a decree entitled On

the Reorganization of the Sunja Raion and the Formation of the Border between the

Chechen Republic and Ingushetia. The decree was, in fact, a revision of the pre-1934

border as per which Sunja raion made part of the Chechen Autonomous Region. The

decree itself and the ensuing Ingush reaction (the Ingush assertion of including

Malgobek, Nazran, Sunja and Prigorodnyi raions, in addition to the right bank of

Vladikavkaz)became the basis of the wave for the renewal of Orstkhoy identity. The

Orstkhoy asserted their separate ethnic identity, Sunja as their ancestral homeland and the

need for the unification of the Vaynakh people. A major event of the simmering tensions

193. Ibid, p.140 194. The Vaynakh norod (people) consists of five narodonsti (groups), namely the Chechens, Ingush, Orstkhoy, Melkhi

and the Aki Chechens.

(154)

occurred on 4 June 1992, when the Russian government issued a decree On the

Establishment of the Ingush Republic that set the border issue aflame. Orstkhoy reaction

was a meeting of ethnic intelligentsia, religious and political leadership in Sunja in July

1992 and the establishment of the Public Movement for the Revival of the Orstkhoy

Ethnicity (PMROE). Of the major points deliberated in the conference included the

demarcation of lands included in the former Orstkhoy territory (from Dagestan to North

Ossetia) and the Orstkhoy experience of two genocides in their history (the post-

Caucasus War migrations and Stalin’s deportations).

Furthermore, the leaders also stood in firm opposition to any division of their lands and

therefore pressed the need to unify Chechen and Ingush into one group. The demands

presented in the meeting included:

Establishment of a single Vaynakh republic

Recognition of Orstkhoy identity

Recognition of territorial integrity of Sunja raion

Restoration of self-designation of Orstkhoy people

Revival of the pre-Caucasus War names of Orstkhoy villages

That Chechen-Ingush territorial confronts led to the revival of Orstkhoy identity is very

much attested by the above stated demands of the Orstkhoy socio-political leadership as

well as by the fact that the First Congress of the Orstkhoy People held in august 1993

renamed Sunja as the Orstkhoy raion and demanded an official recognition for the raion

as the Orstkhoy historical homeland or the Ortskhoy-Mokhk. Also the Orstkho published

by the PMROE since 1992 was renamed as Vaynakh. The third Congress of the PMROE

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held on 31st July 1999 in Grozny further asserted the idea of Vaynakh unity. The

Congress delegates coming both from Chechnya as well as Ingushetia objected to any

idea of creating a border between the two republics and once again called for a united

Vaynakh republic.195

The demand differed from the previously made demands in the

context that it now came with the idea of an Islamic based Vaynakh state.

Following the Chechen parliament’s decree of 1992, the Chechen media attempted at

undermining the Orstkhoy stance, blaming it as a mere Ingush tactic to take away

Chechen territory into Russia. During 1992, both Chechnya and Ingushetia continued to

assert their claim over Sunja. It also included attempts to convince people to “change

their nationality records in their internal passports.” Things eased down somewhat after

the Chechen and Ingush elite signed a treaty on the Principles of Demarcating the

Borders of their Territories. However, the border demarcations could not be implemented

upon and in mid-1999, the Chechen President Maskhadov decreed the renaming of some

villages, including some of those following in the Sunja raion. This was interoperated as

an encroachment into the Ingush territory by the latter. Thus, the Chechen-Ingush conflict

including the Orstkhoy case continued in the successive years.

Although the idea of a single Vaynakh republic sounded appealing to the centre as this

was expected to provide a solution for the problem of Chechen refugees living in the

Sunja raion, but according to a survey conducted among the Ingush people in 1999-2000,

majority of the Ingush people strongly opposed the idea of Chechen and Ingush

unification. Not only did two of the former Ingush presidents, Ruslan Aushov and Murat

195. Ibid, pp.141-142

(156)

Ziazikov shared the sentiments of Ingush majority but even, Ahmad Kadyrov; the former

pro-Russian Chechen president had publicly stated Chechnya and Ingushetia as separate

republics “even though the Chechen and Ingush were a single Vaynakh people.”196

Thus,

the Orstkhoy problem, and the Chechen and Ingush border dispute has continued into the

twenty first century and has presented Moscow with a pressing task of addressing the

sensitive issue without letting hearts run over minds.

196. ibid, p.144

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DATE PLACE EVENT CASUALTIES

19 March 1999 Kaspyisk

(Dagestan)

Bomb explosion in airport 64 killed

31 August 1999 Moscow Bombing in shopping area 20 injured

Septenber 1999 Moscow,

Buynaksk,

Volgodonsk

Bombings in apartment

block

More than 200 killed

2-3 June 2000 Chechnya 5 suicide bombings in

police stations and

Russian military bases

Approximately 55

killed

08 August 2000 Moscow Bombing in an underpass 13 killed, 90 injured

24 March 2001 Karachay-

Cherkessia

3 bomb explosions in cars 28 killed

9 May 2002 Kaspiysk Bomb explosion in a

military parade

41 killed

23-26 October 2002 Moscow Moscow theatre seizure 41 Chechen guirellas

and 129 of 700

hostages killed

12 May 2003 Znamenskoye

(Chechnya)

Bombing in government

building

59 killed

05 July 2003 Moscow Suicide bombing by 2

women bombers

17 killed

01 August 2003 Mozdok Suicide bombing in

military hospital

50 killed

05 December 2003 Yessentuki

Station

Train explosion 46 killed

09 December 2003 Moscow (near

Kremlin)

Suicide bombing 06 killed

06 February 2004 Moscow Suicide bombing in

underground train

39 killed

09 May 2004 Grozny Bomb explosion 07 killed including

Ahmad Kadyrov

22 June 2004 Ingushetia Seizure of Interior

Ministry building

92 killed

24 August 2004 Moscow, Bombings on 2 passenger 90 killed

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Rostov-on-

Don

trains

31 August 2004 Moscow Suicide bombing 10 killed

01-03 September

2004

Beslan School hostage 331 killed

21 August 2006 Moscow Bomb explosion in market 10 killed

13 August 2007 Moscow-

St.Petersburg

Bombing in train 30 injured

17 August 2009 Nazran Suicide bombing 24 killed

27 November 2009 Nevsky

Express

Bomb explosion in train 26 killed

06 January 2010 Dagestan Bombing at traffic police

depot

07 killed

29 March 2010 Moscow Bombing in metro station 40 killed

31 March 2010 Dagestan Bomb explosion 09 killed

26 May 2010 Stavropol Bomb explosion in

concert

08 killed

09 September 2010 North Ossetia Suicide bombing 18 killed

24 January 2011 Moscow Suicide bombing in

Domodedovo Airport

35 killed

2.4: Chronology of terrorist events in Russia (1999-2011)197

197.http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/24/us-russia-blasts-worst-idUSTRE70n3z320110124

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CHAPTER - 3

WINDS OF CHANGE: THE IMPORTANCE OF SINO-RUSSIAN

TIES IN A CHANGING WORLD

3.1 DISTURBED PERIPHERIES OF RUSSIA AND CHINA

China is neighbor to fourteen countries including North Korea, Russia, India, Pakistan,

Nepal, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Mongolia, Bhutan, Myanmar, Afghanistan,

Vietnam and Laos. While a major part of China’s eastern border opens into the ocean,

thus connecting China with the Asia-Pacific region, the western borders constitute of

areas bearing harsh climatic and geographical conditions.198

As for the north and south,

China shares its borders with Russia and India respectively, regarding which Chinese

foreign policy has made significant adjustments since the past twenty years or so.

Nevertheless, China has to counter problems from within its borders before taking up

foreign challenges. It is towards the western and northern borders that China faces serious

issues. Tibet and Xinjiang are two of the five administratively demarcated autonomous

regions of the PRC and have received much international attention on account of the

independence movements operative in these areas.

Bordering with Russia, Pakistan and the three Central Asian states is the Chinese

province of Xinjiang. It is separated from mainland China by the vast Gobi Desert. The

mountainous terrain of Xinjiang has played a significant role in the history of the

198. Gregory Veeck, Clifton W. Pannell, Christopher J. Smith, Youqin Huang, China’s Geography: Globalization and the

Dynamics of Political, Economic and Social Change, (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2011), p.10

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province. The province rich in natural resources including, oil, natural gas, gold, zinc,

lead, grasslands, and forests; also yields a good produce of cotton and rapeseed growth.

In fact, not only the best cotton in China comes from the Tarim Basin of Xinjiang but

also the bulk of export quality Chinese cotton is produced in Xinjiang.199

The region also

caters China’s growing concerns for water supply. “Xinjiang has an annual runoff of

some 88 billion cubic meters of surface water together with 25 billion cubic meters of

exploitable groundwater. Glaciers covering 24,000 square kilometers lock away over

2,580 billion cubic meters of water.”200

Out of the total resources in China, Xinjiang is

estimated to harbor 30% oil, 34% natural gas and 40% coal. While at present coal is the

main source of energy in China, its distribution is highly uneven. 76% of coal resources

are located in north and northwestern China while 70% of local coal demand comes from

the east. Since, transporting coal via rail links from Xinjiang to east China would bear

huge costs, therefore the alternate method heretofore adopted by Beijing is to produce

electricity from coal and then transfer it through a power grid to eastern consumers. This

not only reduces energy costs but also significantly aides managing pressure on China’s

busy railway industry. Even if China shifts from coal to gas or oil; the link with Xinjiang

would still remain indispensable. Moreover, in regards to the importance attached to

Central Asian countries for huge proven reserves of hydrocarbons, China as well as

Russia has been endeavoring to improve their ties with these states using the podium of

Shanghai Corporation Organization (SCO). China, here has the added advantage of using

cultural and ethnic proximity between Central Asia and Xinjiang which serves as a

199. Yue-man Yeung, Shen Jianfa, Developing China’s West: A Critical Path to Balanced National Development,

(Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2004),pp.252, 254-255 200. http://www.china.org.cn/english/MATERIAL/139230.htm

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corridor for the transport of Central Asian hydrocarbons to China.201

XUAR202

also

happens to be the site of China’s largest national gas reserves. In addition to this,

Xinjiang has an estimated 21 billion tons of oil reserves; constituting one fifth of China’s

total share of the same. Moreover, new discoveries are still being made and huge

developments with colossal outcomes are also underway. In 2104, on the northwestern

edge of Dzungarian Basin was unearthed one billion tons of oil. It is also expected by the

Ministry of Land Resources that by 2020, Xinjiang’s oil production will deliver 35

million tons of crude oil; a 23 percent increase since 2012.203

In general, China’s economic growth demands huge supplies of hydrocarbons. Karamay

in Xinjiang have some of the largest oil fields in China and the region is also the

country’s largest natural gas producing area. Besides, the XUAR also serves as a trade

conduit to the resource rich Central Asian states. Already, the Chinese National

Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has developed a number of gas pipelines in XUAR that

deliver gas to industries across the country. It is here that China can have extended access

to the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf through Pakistan. It is this route that China is

trying to develop as an alternative import channel for hydrocarbons and thus reduce its

reliance on the Indian Ocean route. But due to unrest in XUAR, the task is not without its

challenges, especially since the nearby TAR also keeps the PRC administration on its

toes.

201. Jonathan H. Ping, Brett McCormick ed, China’s Strategic Priorities, (New York: Routledge, 2015), p.7 202. Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 203.http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/21/world/asia/china-invests-in-xinjiang-region-rich-in-oil-coal-and-also-strife.htm

l?_r=0

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Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) is the least populated but one of the largest areas

within China. Sharing borders with Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar and India; it is a region rich

in forests, mineral resources and freshwater. Tibet is considered as the Chinese heartland

for it lies between two Asian archrivals; India and China thus making it the latter’s

heartland. Therefore, Beijing must maintain the security of TAR at all costs. Chinese

withdrawal from Tibet can easily make it an extension of the Indian frontier. Though,

from a military point of view, the rugged mountains of the plateau make Tibet an in-

traversable territory but the common border with India in the south cause serious threats

to what is China’s anchor in the Himalayas. Moreover, concerns of cross-border

migration and state sponsored factionalism from across the border also add to Chinese

concerns in the TAR. The concerns gain strength in view of Delhi’s support for Dalai

Lama.

Other than military importance of the region, TAR is highly rich in water and mineral

resources including uranium. It is, in fact, the world’s largest repository of freshwater

after the Arctic and Antarctic. China aims to double hydropower usage by 2020 for which

it is necessary to build dams on Tibetan rivers. A number of world’s very important rivers

flow from the plateau. China, on the other hand, is an arid country. One quarter of the

country’s landmass consists of deserts. A huge problem before Beijing remains the

adequate supply of freshwater to its citizens for domestic as well as commercial use. To

meet this purpose, Beijing has constructed a number of dams that divert the flow of rivers

coming from Tibet and thus feed the mainland. The electricity generated from these dams

feed the burgeoning metropolitans of Shanghai, Guangzhou etc. Tibet’s wealth also

comes from the huge deposits of gold, silver, copper and lithium. As Tibetan religious

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customs discourage mining in view of disturbing the earth, China has vast bonanzas to

explore in the plateau.

China is not unique in its share of geographical, geopolitical and strategic advantages.

Nor is it unique in facing dissent and unrest from within its borders. Lying at the north of

China, Russia meets Iran and Turkey at the Caucasus. It is squeezed between the Black

and Caspian Seas. “Of all the regions in the world, this one is among the most potentially

explosive. It is the most likely to draw in major powers.”204

Two important mountain

ranges of the region are the Greater Caucasus Mountains and the Lesser Caucasus

Mountains; the former serve as Russia’s southern frontier. Northern Caucasus is one of

the seven federal regions of Russia, created by Vladimir Putin. In the North Caucasian

Federal District are included the republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria,

Karachay-Cherkessia, North Ossetia-Alania, Chechen Republic and Stavropol Krai.

North Caucasus is the smallest of Russia’s federal districts and it is the only district

where non-ethnic Russians constitute a majority. At an estimate, the district is inhabited

by forty different ethnic groups.205

An important factor in the security apparatus of the Caucasus remains the unity of the

Caucasus region including, North, South and Trans-Caucasus. The Caucasian population

which forms one of the world’s most diverse ethnic and cultural races is strongly

interconnected. Not only ethnic and cultural similarities have an effect on the regional

landscape, but the political occurrences in one corner carries strong likeliness of

engulfing the region. For example, the South Ossetian conflict in Georgia during 1991

204. George Friedman, The Caucasus Cauldron, Geopolitical Weekly, 27 July 2010, available at https://www.stratfor.co

m/weekly/20100706_caucasus_cauldron 205. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/russias-north-caucasus-region/

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had a profound effect on the Russian republic of North Ossetia. Similarly, the 1992-1993

Abkhazian conflict also created tensions in the North Caucasian republic of Adyghe

which is ethnically related to the former. In result, the events have had strong

destabilizing effects on Moscow as the situation in North Caucasus deteriorated in face of

these upheavals.

Nevertheless, the significance of North Caucasus for Kremlin has increased since 1991 as

any adverse situation in the region directly reflexes Russia’s access to shorter sea routes.

Moreover, although North Caucasus has been an important trade route and source of

Caspian hydrocarbons, Russian approach towards the region surpasses the single concern

of oil transportation and carries a more complex geopolitical perspective. The use of non-

Russian route for transporting Azerbaijan’s oil to western market challenges Russian

regional sway and is therefore unacceptable to the latter.206

Therefore, Russia seeks to

maximize the potential of its Caucasian share of trade routes and hydrocarbons.

Dagestan accounts for two-third of Russia’s Caspian shelf. Makhachkala, the capital of

Dagestan, opens into the Caspian Sea. As at the time of the Republic’s annexation in

1813, Dagestan’s importance lied not only in the fact that it was a gateway to the Caspian

Sea but also to the states lying across this north Caucasian Republic, such as Azerbaijan

and Georgia, and from there onwards to western Europe and, if luck sided with Russians,

into the Black Sea. It remains beyond doubt as to the importance of Caspian Sea for

landlocked Russia. Although considered as a landlocked body of water itself, the access

to Caspian Sea in the nineteenth century provided for much of the Russian ambitions for

206. Emmanuel Karagiannis, Energy and Security in the Caucasus, (London: Routledge Curzon, 2002), p.54

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its admission in warm waters, while today the hydrocarbon potential of the Caspian adds

another dimension to the strategic importance of the region.

Bordering with Azerbaijan, Iran, Georgia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, Dagestan lies

at the junction between the continents of Asia and Europe. It has thus been an economic

route for Russia in the context of trade contacts with these states. Furthermore, it also

shares a border with Chechnya, thereby adding to its military significance for the Russian

confronts with Chechens. Mention must be made of the natural resources lying in

Dagestan which add to the significance of the Republic for Russia. Russian stance on

Dagestan therefore remains unchanged as ever for the loss of this southernmost state of

Russia could lead to the loss of the entire North Caucasus territory for Moscow which is

not only a gateway to the Trans-Caucasus states but holds huge military, strategic,

economic and geopolitical significance for Moscow.

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3.1: Map of Russia showing the northwest Caucasus207

Sharing common borders with Georgia and Dagestan, Chechnya, at the time of its

conquest not only showed promising signs of a potential transport route for trade and

commerce but it could also serve as a military base for Russian designs in Dagestan. In

addition to the strategic geographical location of Chechnya, industrialization and the

exploration of oil in Chechen fields had started as early as the nineteenth century, thereby

adding to its significance. Historically, Chechnya ranked amongst the earliest producers

of petroleum. Beginning with oil extraction from shallow wells in 1833, oil production at

commercial levels started in 1893. Before the Revolution, Grozny contributed healthily in

Russian oil production. In 1932, this level reached a record high of 154,000 b/d

amounting to one-third of Russia’s total oil production. However, owing to the turbulent

years of Soviet history, by 1990 Chechen oil production stood at a mere 84000 b/d. In

short, Russian politics in respect of Chechnya and Caucasus are explained as below:

207. www.bbc.com

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“the cause of the Chechen conflict lies in Caucasian geography:

Azerbaijan has the oil, Russia has the claims to match and Chechnya

stands squarely in the middle. Unlike Kazakhstan, where oil can be

pumped directly to incontestably Russian territory, oil transports from

Azerbaijani Caspian shelf wind through Grozny.”208

Another factor of particular historical importance comes in Chechnya’s common border

with Georgia which could have served to provide a possible route to the Black Sea. A

similar spirit of conquest was evident when the Russians advanced into KBR and

Ingushetia. Ingushetia’s common borders with Georgia, Chechnya and North Ossetia-

Alania are some of the facts that can never be underestimated by Russian regimes.

Providing a passage to Eastern Europe through Georgia, the Republic (containing oil and

gas reserves and various metals and minerals), allowed an easy footing into the

resourceful, yet war ridden Chechen Republic and the equally resourceful territory of

North Ossetia. KBR was acquired after signing the Treaty of Kuchak-Kinardji with the

Ottomans in 1774, while Balkaria was annexed in 1827. The setting up of fortresses soon

afterwards by Russian military was enough of evidence as to the perceived possible

aspirations associated with the acquisition and control of KBR. It provided routes for

entrance in Ingushetia, North and South Ossetia, as well as Georgia. Entering the latter

territory; Georgia, could also fulfill Russian dream of navigating the ‘warm’ ‘blue’

waters of the Black Sea.

208. Ibid, p. 62

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In short, the republics of North Caucasian Federal District provide Russia with the much

sought after corridor for the transportation of Caspian hydrocarbons to the world market.

The region has also catered to Russian aspirations of warm water. In the case of China,

Tibet and Xinjiang constitute the largest and most resourceful areas within China. They

also serve as buffer zones between China and India, and China and Central Asia.

Maintaining state suzerainty in these remote, strategic areas remains a factor, to date, that

directs policy actions in Moscow and Beijing.

3.2 THE GEORGIAN DILEMMA

The new millennium began with its own sets of challenges for the Russian and Chinese

governments. Other than Hong Kong where a smooth transition of power had been

successfully achieved, the Chinese periphery did not present a very pleasant picture.

While cross strait relations had been rather uncertain following the 1995-1996 missile

crisis, the situation in Xinjiang and Tibet was deteriorating with each passing year. As for

Russia, the Second Chechen War continued into the twenty first century with large-scale

disturbances in the neighboring state of Dagestan. The Chechen-Ingush border problem

along with the threat to Kabartay-Balkar coexistence had remained largely unaddressed.

History was repeated when Russian ambitions in the Caucasus overflowed and trickled

down to South Caucasus. But in addition to the domestic problems faced by the two

powers, the global setting soon also altered the geopolitical situation of the region. The

9/11 attacks on USA was a prelude to the emerging international political trend for the

coming years, for Washington’s response to the attacks was the launch of the global war

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on terror. This war has been in fact a counter measure against terrorist threats across the

world. For this, USA was joined by most of the NATO and non-NATO members.

Situated at a close proximity to Afghanistan, both Russia and China have experienced

serious effects of the war on terror. In some cases, the effects have been favorable while

at other times this has not been so. When the Second Chechen War entered the new

century, the 9/11 incident significantly altered Russians’ approach towards the Muslim

population. The attacks in fact provided Putin and his administration with a pretext to

justify their long standing claim that the west was underrating the ‘plague of the twenty

first century’ and was as well underestimating the existence of an ‘arc of Islamic

fundamentalism from Kosovo to the Philippines.’ In March 2000, the Kremlin

spokesman for Chechnya was quoted by Agence France Presse to have said that “the

west does not understand the circumstances of terrorism in Russia. No country has

confronted terrorism on such a grand scale.”209

After the completion of the first two phases of the second war in Chechnya from

September to November 1999, the Russian military launched the third phase of the war in

late November of the same year. The two-fold aim of the third phase was to destroy

insurgent groups in the mountains as well as to re-establish order in the region for an easy

return of the refugees. In the opinion of many critics, Russian plan aimed at demolishing

rather than invading Grozny and following this, to declare the second major city of

Chechnya; Gudermes as the capital. However, by December 1999, Chechen fighters had

started putting up severe resistance against Russian forces. The sternest resistance came

209. John Russell, Chechnya: Russia’s War on Terror, Op. Cit., p. 90

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from the Chechen towns of Argun and Urus-Martan where the fighters often switched to

guerilla tactics; a much unwanted strategy for the federal forces. Moscow, at this time,

was gravely criticized by the international community for its ‘leave or die’ ultimatum

issued through pamphlets, intimidating the citizens to vacate Grozny latest by 11

December 1999 else those left behind would be considered as ‘terrorists and bandits’ and

to be thus controlled by ‘artillery and aviation.’ By 11 December, the Russian forces had

taken control of the cities of Urus-Martan and Shali and by 14 December the centre’s

troops were forcing their way into Grozny. As intense fighting continued into February of

the following year, the Chechen fighters made a costly retreat whereby large numbers of

the fighters were either killed or critically wounded. Shamyl Basayev was also reported

to have lost a leg.210

The war dragged on through the next year with scores of casualties

on both sides and Chechen residents fleeing to take refuge in neighboring Ingushetia.

2002 and the years following witnessed the Chechen War taking acute and appalling

phase with the avenging tide turning from the battlefield towards civil population. The

Moscow Theatre siege was one such incident whereby the Chechen fighters sought to use

human shield in an attempt to seek central government’s agreement in favor of their

demands.

From the beginning, the Chechen conflict had carried an international color to it as

Russia accused states in its periphery of stimulating unrest in its republic. In a letter to the

world leaders in 2002, President Vladimir Putin accused the neighboring state of Georgia

of harboring insurgents who were creating violence in Chechnya. Moreover, Russia is

also alleged to have assisted the overthrow of Zviad Gamsakhurdia from the presidency

210. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/chechnya2-6.htm

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in 1991. Moscow rather viewed Gamsakhurdia as a “Russophobe” and also as a potential

threat to Russian dominance over the Caucasus for the former envisaged a United

Caucasus or a “Common Caucasian Home”. The threat posed by Gamsakhurdia became

all the more apparent following an alliance signed with Dudayev’s independent Chechen

republic. As a matter of fact, following the deposition, Gamsakhurdia chose Chechnya as

his place for asylum and also organized the first All Caucasian Conference during this

time. Following the post-Gamsakhurdia period, the Military Council that enjoyed

majority of the powers became highly unpopular due to its severe oppression of pro-

Gamsakhurdia elements. Therefore, in 1992, the Military Council invited Eduard

Shevardnadze who was first elected as the Chairman of the Parliament and later on, as the

President, following the enforcement of a presidential constitution in 1995.211

However, the west, during 1990s had no special interest in the ‘near abroad’ of the

former Soviet Union. In fact, the administration of Bush Sr. rather welcomed the creation

of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as it kept Moscow at a bay from the

more important Balkan states. Although Georgia did not join the CIS, the move did not

do much to subside Russian influence in the country. For example, the headquarters of

the Russian Transcaucasian Military District (ZAKVO) still existed in Tbilisi and

Russian army remained the largest weapon supplier not only to the state army of Georgia

but also to the Abkhaz and Ossetian secessionists. Georgia’s borders with Turkey were

still patrolled by Russian forces. As a matter of fact, many paradoxes that emerged in the

Russo-Georgian relations are often blamed on the underhandedness of the Georgian

statecraft itself. The military defeat in Abkhazia and the following civil war in Georgia

211. Svante E. Cornell, S. Frederick Starr, ed., The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War in Georgia, (New York: M.E

Sharpe Inc, 2009), pp.30-34

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were also attributed to the government’s impractical approach towards such issues as the

highly complicated geopolitics of the region. The civil war was ultimately put to an end

when Tbilisi acquired Russian military help to put off the Zviadist forces. This was

followed by Russian forwarded terms and thereby Georgia entered the CIS in 1993 and

the Collective Security Treaty in 1994212.Tbilisi also signed an agreement whereby

Moscow was given;

four military bases in the former territory

the right to appoint defense, interior and security ministers in Tbilisi

protectorate rights over Georgia

Georgia however tried in vain to gain Moscow’s confidence by supporting Russian stance

in the First Chechen War and also allowed the usage of Georgian air space for Russian

aircrafts. Conversely, the partnership did not reap the expected results for Tbilisi. As

Russian activities of dominance and quasi-vassal approach in the region remained largely

unchanged, Georgia welcomed the emerging western interest in the Caucasus in

particular and Central Asia in general. The post-Soviet years were those of close

calculation by the western circles of the energy resources of the Central and Eurasian

sphere. It was during this time when the Great Game transformed into the New Great

Game.213

However, by 1995, Tbilisi had well calculated that a healthy bilateral relation

with the Kremlin was far from reality. Many concerns were voiced by both the

212. Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is a military alliance established as a successor to the Warsaw Pact. 213. The term Great Game was coined in the nineteenth century to describe the Anglo-Russian rivalry which erupted as

a result of the fears of Russian diplomatic presence in Afghanistan as an encroachment on the British interests in the

Indian sub-continent. Whereas, the New Great Game is a conceptualization of modern geopolitics where USA, UK,

NATO and Russia are involved in fierce competition over the resources of Central Asia, Caucasus and the Caspian Sea

along with an active participation from China, Iran and Pakistan.

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governments on the alleged involvement of the other in the troublesome situation within

its borders. For example, while Moscow considered Shevardnadze as one of the main

“gravediggers” of the USSR, Tbilisi charged Moscow with involvement in upheavals in

Javakheti and Adjara. Consequently, enough, Tbilisi could but only welcome the

emerging western attention in the region. Shevardnadze also saw the benefits that could

probably emerge as a result of a strategic partnership with the west in place of the

previous quassi-vassal relationship with Russia.

Under these circumstances where Georgia had become completely western oriented in its

policy making framework, and was sweating to join NATO, together with EU’s eastward

expansion; Russian offensive on Georgia served a tri-colored purpose. Firstly, it was to

answer border encroachments from the opposite side; secondly it was to be a

demonstration of Russian military strength; and thirdly, there could be nothing more

vocal than a Russian attack on western backed Georgian government to prove the latter’s

defeat in isolating Russia in the strategically important Trans-Caucasian periphery of

Moscow.

South Ossetia, a province of Georgia, has a history of separatist attempts that date back to

as early as the 1920s. When the Russian empire was extending its boundaries in the

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Ossetians did not follow the example of their

Caucasian counterparts in putting up fierce resistance against the Czarist forces and

remained pacific citizens of both the Russian empire and as well as of the Soviet

Union.214

Following the demise of the Russian Empire, Ossetia was governed by All

214. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18269210

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Ossetian United Committee which coordinated the United Ossetian National Council in

the north and the South Ossetian National Council in the other half of the province. This

state of affairs continued until the final shape of Russian state craft had been drawn.

When the decree on Georgian independence was adopted in May 1918, the Ossetian

territories were also claimed as part of Georgian state and South Ossetia was soon

occupied by Georgian and German armies (Georgian ally at that time). Keeping in mind

that “there is no South Ossetia, but there is a single Georgia”, the Georgian forces

destroyed the South Ossetian National Council in 1919. In context of the resolutions

passed in a series of four congresses of the Ossetian people held in 1917, which not only

reaffirmed the integrity of the Ossetian territory but also attested the region as part of the

Russian state, the South Ossetians resisted against Georgian intrusion in 1920.The

Georgian response flared to what has been called genocide against Ossetian population.

The strategies thus used by Georgia included burned land, intimidation and ethnic

cleansing (deportations). These strategies were most successful in re-inhabitation of the

territory by Georgian population. More than five thousand Ossetians were either killed or

deported between 1918 and 1920. In 1922, South Ossetia was included in the Georgian

Soviet Socialist Republic as South Ossetian Autonomous Region,215

thus finalizing the

division of Ossetia into a Georgian South Ossetia and a Russian North Ossetia. For the

following years many voices were raised in South Ossetia for a reunion with the Russian

state. In 1989, South Ossetia once again endeavored for either a union with the Russian

North Ossetia or self-rule. A Russian sponsored ceasefire in 1992 following the 1991

Georgian-South Ossetian armed conflict resulted in multi-ethnic peacekeeping units in

215. http://rt.com/politics/south-ossetia-and-georgia-historic-roots-of-the-conflict/

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South Ossetia comprising mainly of Russians, North and South Ossetians and Georgians

besides a patrolling force provided by the OSCE (Organization for Security and

Cooperation in Europe).216

Since the demise of the USSR, the province had enjoyed de-facto independence. On the

night of 7th

August 2008, Georgian forces responded to the local secessionists’ battering

of civilian areas. The Kremlin which had supported South Ossetian independence for a

decade responded within 24 hours and by the next 48 hours Russia had largely defeated

Georgian forces and had secured their position in the province. Russians also

strengthened their position in Abkhazia (another secessionist province in the northwest of

Georgia). The Russian advance did not cease and soon the Russians were at a mere

distance of 40 miles from Tbilisi. By the end of the Five-day war, Russia recognized

Abkhazian independence and that of South Ossetia thus casting a further blow to the

international prestige of Georgia.

Russo-Georgian War of 2008 was the first of such episodes where Moscow asserted its

sphere of influence in the post-Soviet periphery after battling close and open competition

with the west.

3.3 RUSSIA’S RETURN IN GREAT POWER POLITICS

More than being an armed conflict, the Georgian War had profound and long standing

implications on Moscow and Tbilisi in particular and the region in general. For example,

while many believed that a US backed and NATO oriented Georgia had high chances of

216. Savante E. Cornell, S. Fedrrick Starr, The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War in Georgia, Op. Cit., p.35

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a military victory in South Ossetia; Russian resistance and ultimate victory turned the

tables in favor of the latter as NATO was now viewed in the east as unreliable and

vacillating in disposition while Russia on the other hand won the image of being a

formidable power and of being militarily more effective. As a matter of fact, Georgian

attack on South Ossetia could not have come sans a green signal from the US as the

former relies on military and diplomatic assistance from Washington. The US

intelligence either missed the presence of Russian forces on the South Ossetian frontier or

miscalculated Russian potency. The latter case was not unique to Washington alone as

many in the west still saw Russia as a weak and shambled state of the 1990s. On the

contrary, Moscow had silently but steadily strengthened its position in lines with the shift

of the global geo-political landscape. Russia was also simultaneously building itself

against the rising western influence in the region. For instance, the Orange Revolution in

Ukraine was viewed by Kremlin as a CIA funded intervention in regional affairs. Not

only did the 1998 and 2004 NATO expansion into Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and

the Central European and Baltic states rung alarm bells in Russian circles but a matter of

even graver concern was Washington’s proposal to include Georgia into the expanding

orbit as well. As this situation brought the west deeper into the Caucasus, the Russians

viewed it as an attempt to ‘encircle and break’ Russia.

A close study of these events of NATO expansion in Central and Eastern Europe, along

with the Kosovo crisis, chalks out the strategy behind Russian reaction in South Ossetia.

While NATO expansion into Eastern Europe and the Caucasus region was seen a means

to encircle and break Russia, Europe’s and Washington’s boldness to grant independence

to Kosovo against the wishes of Kremlin was a prelude to Russia and the west taking

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opposite sides in regional as well as international affairs. For Moscow, an all-out western

support for Kosovo’s independence from Serbia would mean a similar reaction in case of

demands for autonomy and independence from within Russian borders. Forced to

surrender against western wishes in Kosovo, Moscow’s chance to retaliate came in the

Georgian attack on South Ossetia. A Russian sponsored South Ossetian and Abkhazian

independence could balance the power graph that had been disturbed following western

aided Kosovo’s independence. Moreover, Russian response in South Ossetia served a

dual purpose; it provided an opportunity to re-establish the Russian sphere of influence

and secondly it attested the fact that a western aided operation in the periphery of Russia

would in no means prove fruitful if it came without Russian guarantee.

Thus, the early years of the twenty first century created an environment for Russia

whereby it could return to play a decisive role in global politics. In short, Russia firmly

attested its place in trans-regional politics through the Georgian episode. But while the

Russian government was highly criticized by the global community during the course of

the First Chechen War, the same tendency could be observed in the early years of the

second war in Chechnya. However, soon thereafter, following the 9/11 tragedy, the

international order, particularly the western circles shifted their sides in favor of Moscow

for now onwards the Russian war in Chechnya was seen as a drive against

fundamentalism in the Caucasus that also held the world community in danger.

Moreover, the western circles could also have been expected to welcome lessons coming

from the experienced Russian state craft in matters pertaining to fighting global

radicalism. Not only did the military operation in Chechnya find justification this way but

also similar occurrences around the globe would have found rationalization in the face of

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9/11 attacks. The issue of Xinjiang for instance, was also absorbed in the façade of

international terrorism and a similar western outlook could be anticipated in the TAR.

3.4 THE SURPRISE IN INGUSHETIA AND KBR

The rise of extremism in KBR217

was more than unexpected for the region has a long

history of not only peaceful co-existence with Russia but also many Kabartay nobles

happened to have served in the Russian Czarist army. Unlike Chechnya and Dagestan,

these regions of northwest Caucasus did not witness Islamic fundamentalism. Even

during the last decade of the twentieth century, while Chechnya descended into chaos and

anarchy, taking Dagestan along; KBR remained peaceful. One reason for the peaceful

coexistence of KBR owes to the fact that the only ethnic group of the region with a

grievous history and that could thus create ethnic conflict is the Balkars who constitute

approximately 10% of the population. Most of the Balkars returned to their original

homelands following their return from Central Asia. Therefore, chances of a conflict on

the KBR soil remained grim. Furthermore, the absolute control of President Valeri Kokov

put down any chances of an ethnic disruption.

Another reason that can be rightly attributed to the much peaceful environment in KBR is

the peculiar Islamic tradition particular to this region alone. Unlike the northeast

Caucasus where prevails the Sha’fai school of thought, Islam in the northwest of

Caucasus was influenced more by the Ottomans and thus the population adhered to the

comparatively lesser conservative Hanafi ideology.

217. Kabardino-Balkaria

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During the period from 1995-2000, an unspoken religious revival could be felt in the air

of KBR. It was during this time that one by one appearance of mosques and religious

centers was seen in almost every village along with a surfeit of registered Islamic

organizations. These organizations were generally referred as jamaats. Many villages had

more than one jamaat. The imams of the organizations were roughly divided into three

categories:

Elderly imams; acquainted with the fundamentals of Islam and a few Islamic

prayers, had mostly acquired their education while in exile in Central Asia,

Young imams; had received Islamic training during the early post-Soviet period,

Another young group of imams; had received basic teaching at religious centers in

Russia and later had received training from religious institutions in the Middle

East.218

The older imams often considered the younger foreign trained imams a threat to their

power and thus the latter found it difficult to get employment and demonstrated the

‘flaws’219

or their concerns against the Wahabi preaching of the former. As these imams

had not been given sufficient opportunity to spread the fundamentals of ‘canonical’220

Islam, Wahabi missionaries, well organized and well-funded, were able to present their

interpretations as true form of Islamic teachings. The imams in the Islamic establishment

had neither the training nor the public confidence to counter the Wahabis successfully.

Disagreements among the various schools of thought and among groups of imams

contributed greatly to radicalization tendencies in KBR.

218. Moshe Gammer, Ethno-Nationalism, Islam and the State in the Caucasus: Post-Soviet Disorder, Op. Cit., p.93 219. Ibid, p.93 220. Ibid, p.93

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“Many mosques in the region came under persecution due to disagreements

between the official interpretation of Islam and Wahabi versions. In 2000, the

government of Kabardino-Balkaria passed a law on religious groups that banned

educational activities in mosques. By 2003, the authorities had effectively closed

down a number of mosques by allowing them to function only on Fridays and

only for short periods of time.”221

The early signs of Chechen conflicts’ spill over in the northwest Caucasus were seen in

such attacks as those in Beslan School and other government installations. As the

Chechen fighters lacked enough resources by now to counter state operation in the

republic, the idea of escalating the conflict from a Chechen separatist struggle into a

Caucasian Islamist insurgency served to engage national forces at a wider scale. In 2005,

Basayev announced to open a Caucasus Front to spread the anti-Moscow drive in the

entire North Caucasus. With Basayev’s death in 2006, the task of Caucasus based

movement was left to Doku Umarov who was vice president of the Republic of Ichkeria

at the time. Umarov abolished the republic in 2007 in favor of an Islamic state under the

name of Caucasus Emirate222

which were to include “all historical Muslim lands within

and beyond the Caucasus.”223

Umarov managed to acquire pledges from most of the

North Caucasian jamaats. From then onwards, levels of insurgency across the region

reached unprecedented levels; “from August 2008 onward, the levels of violence

recorded in Chechnya were either less than or equal to the violence levels in its

221. Elena Pokalova, Chechnya’s Terrorist Network: The Evolution of Terrorism in Russia’s North Caucasus,

(California: Library of Congress, 2015), p.152 222. The Caucasus Emirate is a militant group active in Russia. The main purpose of the group is to expel Russians from

the North Caucasus and to establish an independent Islamic emirate in the region. 223. Huseyn Aliyev, Socio-Political and Socio-Economic Causes of Conflict Escalation in the North Caucasus, Ethno-

Political Papers, June 23, No. 25, p.7, available at http://www.ethnopolitics.org/ethnopolitics-papers/EPP025.pdf

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neighboring republics of Ingushetia and Dagestan; indeed, Chechnya’s numbers even

dropped below those of Kabardino-Balkaria in 2010… the levels of conflict-related

violence almost doubled in Ingushetia and tripled in Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria

from 2008 to 2010. The Beslan School siege of 2004, Nazran raid of 2004 and Nalchik

raid of 2005 in Ingushetia and KBR respectively had been orchestrated by Shamyl

Basayev. The events signaled the consolidation of militarism spanning beyond Chechnya

and Dagestan and thus spreading across the North Caucasus.

In this state of affairs, the Moscow bombings of 1999 had the same effect on Russian

public opinion as the 9/11 tragedy had on the American public. The public opinion in

Russia was enough of a green signal for Putin’s counter terrorism strategy in Chechnya.

As a matter of fact, while the 1992 Russo-Chechen conflict was a “war”, the 1999 feat in

Chechnya was a “counter terrorist operation”. In 2001, Russia became a major US ally in

the war against terrorism. Quick to make necessary adjustments, Moscow soon contoured

links between Chechen fighters and Osama bin Laden. It was also claimed that “800

fighters from the Middle and Far East had been in Chechnya”224

at the outbreak of the

second Chechen War. However, not only was this claim denied by the Chechens

themselves but also by journalists covering the war. The latter estimated the figures of

Arab fighters in Chechnya at that time to be no more than 300. Russian policy in North

Caucasus showed signs of hastiness as it only produced very short living results.

Attempting to eliminate militancy by the solo use of armory could only force the fighters

into hiding and thereby strengthen public sympathies for the same. It lacked the more

rational approach as KBR President Arsen Kanokov acknowledged in 2005; “Law

224. John Russell, Chechnya: Russia’s War on Terror, Op. Cit., p. 98

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enforcement agencies really did act in excess… This problem cannot be solved through

prohibition alone. It needs to be won through ideological means…if we do not do this,

the situation will only worsen if we continue to ban their [Wahabi] services and force

them underground- where it is much harder to control them.”225

Insurgency in northwest Caucasus is also prone to be affected by the global turn of

events. For this reason, while Russia gave a mixed reaction to the Arab Spring, its policy

in Syria has been bold and adamant. Kremlin has been a resolute supporter of the regime

of Bashar Hafez al Assad in Damascus. Moscow fears that if a model like that of Libya is

imposed in Syria, Russia would lose its closest ally and thereby its footing in the resource

rich Middle East. Russia, in its current geopolitical environment cannot afford to let the

Middle East slip into a solely US backed bloc. The reason for this approach by Russia

lies in the fact that not only has Russia tried hard for many years to gain a footing in the

highly resourceful region but also because of the fact that the extremist drift in the

Caucasus has been influenced by such and similar activities in the Middle East.

Moreover, a spillover of such trends as the Arab Spring in the Caucasus will only further

hamper Russia’s already difficult position in its inner periphery.

3.5 CHINA’S REIGN OF TERROR

The changes following Georgian war carried positive signals for Moscow. The earlier

concerns against NATO expansion into Central and Eastern Europe was not only counter

settled by the five-day war but the same episode also changed international approach

225. Elena Pokalova, Chechnya’s Terrorist Network: The Evolution of Terrorism in Russia’s North Caucasus, Op. Cit.,

p. 152

(183)

towards Moscow for now the latter’s military might and regional supremacy was

acknowledged by regional and non-regional actors likewise. In addition to this,

international political scenario was first significantly altered in the aftermath of the 9/11

attacks. While the bombings on the World Trade Centre (WTC) partially legitimized

Beijing’s stance in Muslim dominated Xinjiang, the same event also changed US-China

relations. In the former case, a handful of separatists of the recent past were now fully

established “terrorist organizations.” The Chinese government, having become an ally in

the US-led war against terrorism issued a document in 2002 entitled East Turkestan

Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity. The document which asserted Chinese

influence on Xinjiang since earliest times was the first ever public acknowledgement of

the degree of unrest in the XUAR. Although a study of the document gives an insight into

not only restlessness in the region but also provides an indication as per the decline in the

regional violence since 1998; the same document however remains dubious in its

authenticity as many questions are yet to be answered. Moreover, a lack of systematic

approach makes it difficult for the reader to understand weather the acts of violence were

committed by a separatist group or by any other organization that simply uses the term

‘East Turkestan’ to identify these groups. “The document thus implies that there is a

unified East Turkestan terrorist organization of considerable strength.”226

Despite the very lacking of the document, Washington attested the given signals. For

example, in 2002, the US ambassador in China, using much of the language as applied in

the PRC document, declared ETIM227

as an Al-Qaeda associated terrorist organization,

accusing it of the casualties arising from terrorist attacks. “In doing so, the US spokesman

226. James Millard, Violent Separatism in Xinjiang, (Washington: East-West Centre, 2004), p.13 227. East Turkestan Independence Movement

(184)

thus attributed to ETIM specifically all the violent incidents of the past decade in

Xinjiang that the PRC document itself blamed on unnamed groups or an ETLO”228

(East

Turkestan Liberation Organization).Taking advantage of this development, Chinese

reports coming in response to the ambassadorial declaration regarding ETIM stated that

the US had publicly affirmed East Turkestan movement (including both violent and non-

violent groups)as a terrorist based lobby.

Of the many groups alleged of violent acts in the XUAR, the most influential one remains

to be the ETIM. The group enjoys special US attention in relation to its reported

involvement with Al-Qaeda. Although, Hasan Mahsum, the leader of ETIM has denied

any involvement with Al-Qaeda, the UNO included the organization’s name in its list of

terrorist organizations in 2002. Later in 2003, Pakistani authorities declared that Mahsum

had been killed in a raid along the Pak-Afghan border. Similarly, the ETLO is also

accused of violent acts both inside and outside China. The organization has also been

alleged of arms smuggling. However, Mehmet Emin Hazret, the leader of ETLO has

denounced any links with ETIM or of ETLO’s part in atrocious incidents. According to

Hezret, ETLO’s only purpose is to secure independence for East Turkestan through

peaceful means, but “to show our enemies and friends our determination on the East

Turkestan issue, we view a military wing as inevitable.”229

Another of such groups fighting for liberation in the XUAR; the Uyghur Liberation

Organization (ULO), not to be confused with ETLO was founded in the mid-1990s by

Hashir Wahidi. The 2002 document of PRC, along with Kyrgyz official reports, hold the

228. Ibid, p.13 229. Ibid, p.13

(185)

ULO responsible for terrorist incidents in Kyrgyzstan in 2000. Some Kyrgyz sources also

blame ULO of the murder of Nigmat Bazakov.230 In 2001, ULO and URFET (United

Revolutionary Front of East Turkestan) joined together to form the Kyrgyzstan based

Uyghuristan People’s Party.

As a result of US condemnation of ETIM and support of the 2002 PRC document,

Beijing furthered its Strike Hard campaign in Xinjiang. Secondly, as a contribution to the

war against terrorism and out of the fact that religion has profound impact on terrorist

organizations, religious institutions, ideologies and even religious figures have come

under close attack from the Chinese authorities. The Strike Hard campaign in the post-

9/11 scenario is aimed more at purging opposition to Chinese rule rather than curtailing

terrorist groups’ activities in Xinjiang. As for the US, though it remained the most vocal

supporter of human rights in the international arena, it has nevertheless not done much

for the practical implementation of the same in Xinjiang. But as the Congress has often

criticized China of human rights abuses within its borders, the result is a growing unease

between the two powers. While the US sees China as a power with rising influence that

challenges American presence in the region, China on the other hand suspects the former

of trying to undermine Beijing’s place in regional politics by supporting such elements as

the Tibetan and the Taiwan question. The uneasy relation between the US and China is

also an outcome of Beijing’s increased links with the regional states which itself is a

counter policy against the growing anti-China sentiments among the various ethnic

groups that so effect security situation in the region.

230. Second president of Ittipaq; a Uyghur Cultural Organization affiliated with Kyrgyz People’s Kurultay (Congress).

(186)

3.6 CHANGE OF TIDES IN THE STRAIT

In addition to the convergence of Chinese policies within the mainland, the post-9/11

scenario has also had its implications on the status quo of Taiwan. While the PRC

remained engulfed with settling hard chores at home, it nevertheless simultaneously

produced smooth and gradual growth in its economic graph. As a matter of fact, the last

decade of the twentieth century has shifted geo-political trends around the globe. In the

post-USSR world, China is seen as a major competitor to US hegemony in the world

market. The former is a power that the US must deal with cautiously for there stand high

chances that Beijing might alter the uni-polarity of the existing world order. Moreover,

the peculiarity of China’s rise to power, that is, its use of economic statecraft, makes it

difficult for its rivals to settle the apprehension in their favor. In fact, Chinese integration

into the international community in general and to the western markets in particular

makes it ratheran errand for the western circles to contain Beijing as was done in the case

of Kremlin during the Cold War years. PRC is an economic partner that cannot be

negated from the equation nor can its military potency be defied which has but only

escalated since the Operation Desert Storm (1991) and the 1998 US’s ‘accidental’

bombing on Chinese embassy in Belgrade.

In view of close competition arising at both ends, both China and US seem to have

conceded at the fact that maintaining the present status quo in Taiwan serves best the

interests of all parties involved. For this, while Taipei must not seek “de jure”231

independence, it must also remain a close associate of Washington in humanitarian

231. M.J Vinod, ed, The Taiwan Factor: Security Challenges in the Asia Pacific Region, (New Delhi: Viva Books, 2009), p.67

(187)

assistance activities. On the other hand, accepting the status quo in Taiwan must also not

be taken as Beijing’s abandonment of the One China Principle. In addition to this,

Taiwan must also adjust its strategy towards the PRC for either confrontation or

cooperation. As the military and economic balance has shifted in China’s favor in the

past years, the most prudent option for Taiwan remains that of cooperation. This is also

due to the realization that US, in spite of its military presence in the Pacific region would

want to avoid confrontation with two competitive powers. Nevertheless, confrontation is

not completely off the list of available options for Taiwan as China’s future politics in the

straits remain uncertain. Therefore, in case of a military threat from the PRC, the

government of Taiwan must also strengthen its own military as well as form ties with

such states as those experiencing threat from China’s rise.An important strategy in this

regard can be to develop trade links with other countries specially so through signing

Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) which will then facilitate in making Taiwan a free trade

zone and thus establish the ROC as Asia Pacific Operation Centre. This itself would

mean harboring ties with the two most influential economic giants of the world namely

China and the US.

As China continues to adhere to the One China policy, it has designed a benign roadmap

that asserts its political paradigm. This includes a peaceful economic growth and use of

diplomatic channels to isolate Taiwan in the international arena. The latter plan is

achieved by developing economic and military ties with not only the developed world but

also with countries otherwise ignored by the west on such grounds as human rights

violation, lack of democratic infrastructure and absence of the rule of law. Beijing, in this

regard, renders its economic assistance and arms support to such states unabated, and

(188)

henceforth succeeds in winning over partnerships that will in the long run, leave its

competitors with lesser votes. So far, the biggest diplomatic victory for China lies in the

fact that it has been able to silently neutralize (partially if not completely) US stance on

Taiwan; that Taiwan should not seek de jure independence in response to US economic

and military assistance. As a matter of fact, President Ma Ying mainland policy

comprises of the Five NOs and the Five DOs. The Five NOs stand thus:

NOT to declare independence

NOT to include the “state-to-state” doctrines in the constitution

NOT to change the name of the country

NOT to hold referendum on issues related to independence

NOT to abolish the National Unification Council

The Five DOs are as under:

DO accept the consensus of 1992232

DO reach an agreement on peace for 30 to 50 years

DO promote all-around economic and trade exchanges with China

DO end a zero sum game in international politics

DO enhance cultural and educational interchanges233

China continues to use the prowess of economic partnerships for closer diplomatic ties

with the outside world. In addition to the Shanghai Corporation Organization (SCO),

China uses the platform of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

232. The 1992 consensus calls for negotiations and for reaching a peace agreement with China. 233. Ibid, p.65

(189)

countries to further economic collaboration. Moreover, China also uses the podium of

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to penetrate into the

economic sphere of South Asia. FTAs and CECAs (Comprehensive Economic

Cooperation Agreements) are particularly significant in the context of China’s trade and

economic linkages with the developing economies. Not only has this, but China’s trade

with Taiwan itself, seen a steady growth in the recent years which has made cross-strait

relations much comfortable for the PRC, ROC and their foreign counterparts.

3.2: China and Taiwan’s Exports (2001-2011)

(190)

3.3: China and Taiwan’s Imports (2001-2011)

3.4: Taiwan’s Investment in China

(191)

3.7 CHAINS, PEARLS AND ROAD: A CHINESE TRILOGY

Western onslaught on China in the nineteenth century aroused in the Chinese leadership

the need for modernizing its defense mechanism, including its navy; a memory that still

has fading glimpses in Chinese minds today. Despite China’s apparent aims at

maintaining peaceful atmosphere across the straits and in spite of US stance of engaging

with China, Beijing continues to see its military technological advancement as

indispensable. The most active evidence in this regard comes from the Three Island

Chains maritime security strategy of the People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N)

conceded by Admiral Liu Huaqing in the 1980s.Combined with Beijing’s economic

struggle after liberation, Admiral Huaqing’s notion stands thus; China’s expanding

maritime trade and the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) is evidently based on its

capability, influence and domain extension from its littoral (brown waters); extending

economic zones (green waters); oceanic and extended domains (blue waters).234

Therefore, designing chains of island in its waters and neighboring seas will promise

trade influx and economic competition with the world markets as well as defend the

mainland security. For this Admiral Huaqing proposed the following island chains:

The First Island Chain extends from Ryuku islands to Taiwan to Philippines. The

Taiwan Straits, Bohai Channel and Qingzhou Channel Islands are crucial for

China’s security policy. Naval operations here will be conducted from the

Chinese coast in international waters.

234. M.J Vinod, ed, The Taiwan Factor: Security Challenges in the Asia Pacific Region, op.Cit., p.41

(192)

The Second Island Chain implies naval activities extending from Ogasawa-Gunto

Islands to the Io-retto islands to the Mariana islands in the East pacific. In this

Chain, PLA-N would build up anti-access strategy against external incursions

from 2010-2020/25.

The Third Island Chain extends beyond Hawaii islands and into the West Pacific.

(193)

3.5: Map showing First and Second Island Chain235

Other than maritime security strategy, the economic rise of China and its use of the same

to isolate Taiwan and a close coordination between PLA-N236

and the Chinese Overseas

Shipping Corporation (COSCO) is seen by the west as the String of Pearls Strategy, that

is, the quest for economic, military and geo-political influence, and littoral access into the

First and Second Island Chains. An example on this regard is of China’s engagement

with Pakistan in the Gwadar port. While China is funding the development of a naval

base in Gwadar, it is reciprocated by docking rights to the PLA-N along with chances of

235. http://www.globalsecurity.org/ 236. People’s Liberation Army-Navy

(194)

acquiring rights to station its flotilla here in the future. For Pakistan, Gwadar serves not

only a transit route between Central Asia and the Middle East but also provides a

converging route for oil and gas pipelines of India and Iran through the Pakistani

territory, thus providing the latter with a corridor leading to the New Great Game.

Gwadar project also allows Beijing to maintain a steady pressure against Indian

adventurism in the region. Similarly, China’s development projects in Hambantota and

Coco Islands not only support COSCO presence but also provide patrolling opportunities

for PLA-N ships in the Indian Ocean.237

The String of Pearls Strategy has in fact no

parallel among other powers of the world.

3.6: String of Pearls

Starting with the Island Chain strategy, followed by String of Pearls, the latest maritime

strategy of Beijing is the Maritime Silk Road; part of the One Belt and One Road

Initiative by the PRC government. The two pronged One Belt and One Road Initiative

237. Ibid, p.47

(195)

(B&R) aims to achieve economic integration between China and the world through land

based Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road that will

connect China with other nations through sea communication. B&R has historical links in

the Ancient Silk Road built by the Han dynasty of China that connected East and West by

means of network of road communications. The new plan which is a prominent feature in

Chinese 13th

Five Year Plan (2016-2020) will be an absolute modernization of the ancient

route. Catering to the needs of the twenty first century trade and commerce, the B&R will

connect China and the world via networks of roads, railways, oil and gas pipelines and

sea routes. With ‘made in China’ commodities flocking markets across the globe, it

comes as no surprise that the Chinese, in the recent past have very well learned how to

implement projects that shall leave unprecedented histories. Although China is not the

first state to have dreamt of cross-continental trade ties, it is certainly the first country to

invest seriously and generously on such a thought. Years before China conceived B&R

plan, a number of attempts similar in character had been made in other quarters of the

world. Some of these included:

Transport Corridor Initiative Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) was established

in 1993 involving the European Union (EU), Armenia, Bulgaria, Moldova,

Romania, Georgia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan,

Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Turkey.

The New Silk Road initiative by the USA in 2011 aimed to integrate Central Asia

and Afghanistan as a transit region between Europe and East Asia.

(196)

On the other hand, Chinese leadership has been very vigilant and very active in securing

funding for the giant program that will thus ensure a decent completion of the Chinese

dream. For example, in contrast to the marginal attention received by the above

mentioned western programs for the revival of historical trade routes to meet modern

demands, by 2014, Beijing had concluded $30 billion worth of deals with Kazakhstan,

“$15 billion with Uzbekistan, and $3 billion with Kyrgyzstan, in addition to

spending $1.4 billion to help revamp the port of Colombo, in Sri Lanka. By November

2014, China had announced the creation of a $40 billion Silk Road Fund.”238

China also

has assured influx of funds by developing such institutions as the AIIB or Asian

Infrastructure Investment Bank (more than 50 member counties including US’s allies

from the EU) and the China Development Bank (CDB) with 65 member countries.

In late April 2016, China Construction Bank (CCB) and the International Enterprise of

Singapore signed an MOU under the terms of which China pledged to provide US $ 22.2

billion to support infrastructure projects in Singapore under the B&R project. The terms

serve to strengthen Singapore’s position in the region while also providing CCB with a

fresh start of providing basic infrastructure investments services outside China. During

the same month, UAE; also one of the founding members of the AIIB, announced to

expand Dubai Ports (DP) World’s business in China under the Belt and Road

program.239

Similarly, COSCO purchased the port of Piraeus from Greece in the same

month. The purchase is cited as a great achievement for Beijing in terms of B&R as the

port signals the start of China’s Maritime Silk Road navigation in Eastern Europe.

Moreover, for the past few years China has been actively involved in connecting Greece

238. http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/building-new-silk-road/p36573 239. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-04/17/c_135287351.htm

(197)

with other countries of Eastern Europe through high speed railways. Shortly after the

Piraeus deal, Serbia announced to renovate and modernize the railway line with Greece

with Chinese help.240

With China shifting to the policy of slow and sustainable growth, B&R serves the

purposes well. It is because of the fact that some of the projects conceived under B&R

umbrella will pass through a number of underdeveloped provinces and cities inside

China. On the other side, increased maritime connectivity through MSR in the already

burgeoning eastern coastal cities of China will cross through the mainland, to the western

borders and into Central Asia and Europe. This increased connectivity between the

developed western and underdeveloped eastern provinces of China, provided by the

B&R, will help in achieving economic integration within the borders. As for MSR routes,

many critics associate this road with the String of Pearls strategy, that is, the development

of friendly bases in the Indian Ocean littoral. Since the ever expanding economy of China

depends on smooth and regular supply of hydrocarbons to its production centers, the

current option of supplies coming via the strait of Malacca in the Indian Ocean in close

Indian presence falls short of Beijing’s liking. But with the implementation of B&R,

China will have closer access to hydrocarbon supplies sans Indian proximity. One of the

suitable options for China will be the port at Gwadar in Pakistan that lies at a short

distance of 386 KMs from the strait of Hormuz from where 30% of world’s oil shipments

pass daily.241

240. http://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/china-establishes-its-silk-road-in-greece-by-purchasing-the-port-of-piraeus/ 241. Dilip Hiro, Beijing’s Maritime Silk Road Passes Through Islamabad, available at http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/conte

nt/beijing%E2%80%99s-maritime-silk-road-passes-through-islamabad

(198)

Given 10,250 nm coastline, Chinese preoccupation with maritime strategies is

understandable. In addition, China has seven of the world’s largest ports, including the

port of Shanghai which is the largest port of the world.242

Since the 1980s, Beijing can be

seen to have been preoccupied with its economic and military innovations. As a matter of

fact, “relationship among national naval power, economic development, and international

relations underlies Chinese maritime strategy, currently framed by the “near seas,” the

Yellow, East China, and South China Seas; the “middle sea,” …Philippine Sea; and the

“far sea,” …outside the second island chain.”243

Although China has succeeded in developing a very formidable naval power but the

Island Chain and the String of Pearls strategy has not yet been implicated. The latest

Chinese maritime strategy in the form of MSR has yet to give results. The reason for

deficient implication of previous maritime strategies can be seen in the larger interests of

China which remain to consolidate its economic might across the globe. The same reason

has motivated Beijing to invest more quickly and generously in B&R than it has done in

the previous policies; a measure which can have huge impacts on regional, trans-regional

as well as Sino-Russian ties as the same B&R plan has also outpaced the Russian

generated Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).244

242. http://www.ship-technology.com/features/feature-the-worlds-10-biggest-ports/ 243. Bernard D.Cole, Reflections on China’s Maritime Strategy: Island Chains and the Classics, EMC Chair Conference

Paper, presented at the National War College 244. The Eastern Economic Union came into force in 2015. It is an economic union of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,

Belarus and Armenia.

(199)

3.8 SINO-RUSSIAN TIES IN THE POST-9/11 WORLD

Chinese and Russian relations, particularly in the economic sphere have undergone

several stages in nearly past three decades. With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the

two neighbors became increasingly involved in their local affairs. China, during this time,

was heads down in conceiving results of its new market strategy. Russia, on the other

hand, was engulfed with the struggle for economic survival and maintaining national

unity simultaneously. But it was also during this time that the almost forgotten markets of

RFE found new customers in the neighboring Chinese provinces and economic activity in

the remotest part of the Russian Federation slowly received a visit from stork. After the

Tiananmen incident, when an arms embargo was placed on China, Russia was the only

weapons market available to China. While this was an increasingly significant

partnership for both states, the early 2000s saw a decline in Sino-Russian arms trade. It

was, in reality a result of growing Russian apprehension against growing market

competition from the Chinese, military escalation of PLA through the sale of Russian

weapons and the Chinese practice of replicating Russian weapons. Nevertheless, Putin

and Hu Jintao’s terms in office during the same time also saw bilateral developments that

have since then not only shaped but also guaranteed steady and long-term cooperation on

multiple fronts by both sides. This included the Treaty of Friendship, solving long held

territorial dispute and the formation of the SCO.245

Although, trade between China and Russia increased thereafter, but Moscow, being

nervous of Chinese designs for investment in the RFE limited Chinese business activity

245. Alexander Gabuev, A “Soft Alliance”? Russia-China Relations After the Ukraine Crisis, Policy Brief Europe Council On

Foreign Relations, p.2

(200)

in the RFE. Russian gas and oil markets were also very slow in opening to China.

Negotiations on cross-border oil pipeline that started in 2001 broke down slowly

thereafter. As for the gas pipelines, the situation can be summarized as thus:

“In 2006, Putin visited Beijing and announced ambitious plans to

construct two gas pipelines – a western route from Western Siberia

through the Altai Mountains, providing 30 bcm a year and an eastern route

from the Kovykta and Chayanda fields from Eastern Siberia providing 38

bcm a year – to be completed by 2012. But the idea of an “energy

alliance” was meant mainly to send a strong message to European

customers after the Russian-Ukrainian gas war in 2006. After European

customers signed new contracts with Gazprom, the plan was informally

dropped. In frustration, China turned instead to Turkmenistan. At the time,

Moscow was concerned only about its dominant position in the EU

market. As long as the China-Central Asia gas pipeline (the first line was

launched in 2009) was removing potential volumes of Turkmen gas from

the EU-backed Nabucco project, Russia was happy.”246

Therefore, at a time when Russia’s approach towards China was mainly driven by the

need to contain EU and USA, Beijing had a free hand to play in the Central Asian fields.

But in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, Russia faced low revenues as a

result of deescalating oil prices. As a result, in the latter half of 2009, Transneft and

Rosneft borrowed $25 million from China in return for 15 million tons of oil per year

246. Ibid, p.3

(201)

from 2011 to 2015. The deal also included the construction of a pipeline extending from

Siberia to the Pacific Ocean in addition to a land based pipeline.247

The shift in Russian

policy in regards to China did come only as a result of economic crisis of 2008. But what

quickened the pace many times was the crisis in Ukraine whereby China, the pivot of

Asia also became the pivot for Moscow. According to Gabuev,

“By the end of 2009, China was Russia’s biggest trading partner, second

only to the EU as a whole... More importantly for Russian decision

makers, Russia’s GDP fell about 9 percent while China’s GDP grew 8.7

percent. One Russian official says: “This time the leadership got the

message: we need to be serious about Asia.” After 2009, Russian state-

owned financial institutions such as Vnesheconombank and VTB ran to

Beijing for cheap loans, and the largest aluminum producer, Rusal,

launched the first Russian IPO on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange

(HKEx). Other milestones include the creation of a joint investment fund,

a joint venture between China Investment Corporation and the Russian

Direct Investment Fund and the signing of an ambitious program of

regional cooperation between the Far East and China’s north east by Hu

and Medvedev in 2009.Nevertheless, there were still unofficial limits for

Chinese companies, which, for example, were not allowed to buy into oil

and gas deposits regarded as “strategic” by the Russian government. The

Russian authorities also opposed Chinese participation in large

infrastructure projects and the presence in Russia of Chinese carmakers.

247. Ibid, p.3

(202)

As the economy slowed – in 2013, GDP growth was 1.3 percent despite

the optimistic government target of 5 percent at the beginning of the year

– Russian companies began increasingly to look east. But it was only with

the start of the Ukraine crisis and the first round of sanctions that

Moscow’s attitude changed dramatically. The “pivot to Asia” that Putin

announced in 2012 in his speech to the National Assembly, when Russia

held the presidency of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC),

was turning into a “pivot to China”.248

Western reaction in response to the crisis in Ukraine moved the Kremlin in

acknowledging its sheer energy and technological dependence on western consumer

market. In case of impending Russian sanctions, the only favorable option left for

Moscow was to accommodate Beijing much deeper in its policy framework. On the other

hand, while Russian stance on self-determination in Crimea could have created trouble

for Beijing at the home front (for example in Xinjiang), the opportunities were more

tempting than the feared possibilities. For example, as Russia chose to distance itself

from the west; the only viable partner available to Kremlin in Asia would be China,

which could very easily lead China into securing an upper hand in bilateral ties.

Moreover, as west remains preoccupied with the Ukrainian crisis, the focus on Chinese

activities in the Asia-Pacific and South China Sea would substantially shrink.

Following these developments, the pace of Russian and Chinese bilateral cooperation

gained a quick pace. The most important deal between Russia and China was the gas deal

248. Ibid, p.3

(203)

of 2014 signed between Gazprom and CNPC. The deal stated the delivery of 38 bcm of

gas annually to China till 2030 via the Sila Sibiri (Power of Siberia) pipeline. Thus, a gas

pipeline deal initiates in the first decade of the century was materialized much later in the

wake of the Ukraine crisis.

Sila Sibiri or the Power of Siberia is part of Russian plans to build a modern gas network

that connects its remote Siberia and the RFE with the Unified Gas Supply System

(UGSS) running in the country.249

The gas transmission system in Russia totals 170.7

thousand kilometers. Along with 250 compressor stations with the aggregate capacity

of gas compressor units equaling 46.1 thousand MW are being used for gas

transmission.250

The Western route stipulates the delivery of gas to China from fields in

Western Siberia. The Eastern route provides for the delivery to China of gas from the

Yakutia and Irkutsk gas production centers through the main gas pipeline; Power of

Siberia or Sila Sibiri.

While deepening energy ties between the two neighbors, the Ukraine episode was also a

prelude to closer financial ties between Moscow and Beijing. After the 2014 sanctions on

Russia by western circles, the former was forced to find alternate partners in Asia. To

meet this purpose, a high-level meeting was held between Chinese and Russian

counterparts in May 2014 to discuss the possible replacement of western financial

institutions with Chinese institutions. The meeting ended with Chinese promise of

opening the Shanghai Stock Exchange to foreign companies, increasing the use of local

249. The UGSS represents a unique engineering complex encompassing gas production, processing, transmission,

storage and distribution facilities in European Russia and Western Siberia. The UGSS assures continuous gas supply

from the wellhead to the ultimate consumer. 250. http://www.gazprom.com/about/production/transportation/

(204)

currencies in Sino-Russian trade so as to minimize dependence on euro and dollar for the

same and increasing loans to Russian companies from Chinese banks. As a result, within

the first three quarters of 2014, Chinese export and imports to Russia had increased by

10.5 and 2.9 percent as compared to the figures of the previous year.

Chinese and Russian partnership has also increased in the spheres of infrastructure and

technology. Russia, against fear for competition for local companies and an influx of

Chinese workers, remained informally prohibited from bidding on large infrastructure

projects for more than a decade. But after 2014, this situation also changed in favor of

Chinese Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC) for the construction of new railway

tracks in Russia. Moscow also approached Chinese companies to fill the technological

vacuum left by western companies in areas such as offshore drilling, advanced refining

equipment and in military and aerospace industry. For instance, Roscosmos, the federal

space agency of Russia has made contacts with the China Aerospace Science and

Industry Corporation (CASIC) to purchase various apparatuses.251

251. Bjorn Alexander Duben, Banking on Beijing: What the Ukraine Crisis Means for China-Russia Relations, Strategic

Update 15.3, LSE Ideas, July 2015, available athttp://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/IDEAS-SU15.3-

ChinaRussia.pdf

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3.7: Sino-Russian trade252

Similarly, since western credit companies suspended their credit card services for Russian

banking institutions, Russia has created its own payment system joined with Union Pay

of China. Similarly, the Yuan-Ruble trade has grown very fast since its inception.

Between 2014 and 2015, the Yuan-Ruble trade showed an increase of 800 percent.253

Moreover, Moscow is now also welcoming the idea of increased Chinese presence in

Central Asia, a region always perceived as its sphere of influence by Kremlin. A strong

economic presence of China is only beneficial to sanctions stricken Russia. Therefore, it

was for this reason that Putin assured that Trans-Siberian and the Baikal-Amur Mainline

252. Source: Russia’s Ministry for Economic Development, 2013, available at www.rt.com 253.https://www.rt.com/business/254305-russia-china-trade-business/

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(BAM) railway would be a strong part in Xi Jinping’s proposed program of Silk Road

Economic Belt.

It can however not be negated that Russia is viewed as much a significant partner as vice

versa. While Chinese cooperation was an indispensable requirement on the Russian front

in view of the impending sanctions against the crisis in Ukraine, a partnership with

Russia not only promises massive supplies of hydrocarbons but it can also help in

distracting western attention from Chinese activities in the South China Sea. This, in fact,

is one of the unique elements of Sino-Russian partnership where the two emerging

powers resort to the more viable of option of mutual bilateral profits rather than moving

along a closed tunnel towards individual profit. For example, on the one hand, the 2014

gas deal between Moscow and Beijing states to provide 30 bcm of gas annually for 30

years254

to the latter while on the other hand, the deal also ensures Chinese monetary

assistance to the former for the construction of the pipeline.

254. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/china-russia-sign-400-billion-gas-deal/2014/05/21/364e9e74-e0de-

11e3-8dcc-d6b7fede081a_story.html

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3.8: Chinese exports to Russia255

3.9: Russian Exports to China256

255. www.tradingeconomics.com 256. www.tradingeconomics.com

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3.10: Map of UGSS of Russia257

3.11: Map of Sila Sibiri258

257. http://www.gazprom.com/f/posts/15/301731/ugss-map-en-2016-01-29.jpg 258.http://www.gazprom.com/f/posts/74/805991/2014-06-26-map-sila-sib-en.jpg

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3.12: China’s oil imports from Russia and KSA (in barrels per day)259

Thus the smooth and gradual growth of Chinese economic and military might in the past

decades has significantly altered the regional balance of power on the one hand and has

provided a counterforce to US dominance elsewhere. On a similar note, an increased

Russo-Chinese partnership has also had its effects on the New Great Game. In many

ways the shifting political trends in the later part of the twentieth century has altered

international partnerships. This has also been the case for China and Russia where the

Kosovo episode was resented in the political circles of both the states. This was

particularly due to the fact that an all-out western support for pro-separation elements in

Muslim populated Kosovo had chances of being used as precedence in Chechnya or

Xinjiang with a similar western support coming for these two regions of Russia and

China respectively. Such events, as per the view held by the Chinese and Russian

259.Source: General Administration of Customs of China

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counterparts, only supported spirit of secessionism elsewhere. Although many hostilities

remain to be settled; there have been positive indications of a strategic partnership

between the two powers particularly so since the early years of Vladimir Putin’s

presidential term in 2000. In a meeting between the two heads of states in 2000, the

Chinese premiere Jiang Zemin while assuring of Chinese assistance in fighting off

terrorist threats in the neighboring state, asserted the issue of Chechnya a domestic affair

of the Russian Federation and that no foreign power had the “right to interfere in the

matter”.260

In spite of burgeoning hostility against Chinese economic influence in Russia, the process

of co-existence and strategic collaboration between the two states has been continuing.

One such example is the 2001 Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation.

The treaty calls for trust building measures especially around the border areas along with

“maintaining forces at a level of reasonable military sufficiency.” In addition to this, the

treaty also calls upon mutual response to any threat provoking factors.261

Border issues

between the two states, also addressed in the 2001 treaty, were sped up in the 2004

summit between the two leaders as the Beslan tragedy hovered and eclipsed the bilateral

dialogues. As a result, not only was the border demarcated but also an agreement on the

patrolling of Tarabarov and Bol’shoi islands was duly reached. Having settled the more

important issues; namely those related to border demarcations and navigations, the

260. Natasha Kuhrt, Russian Policy towards China and Japan: The El’tsin and Putin Periods, (New York: Routledge,

2007), p.112 261. Joint Russo-Chinese Declaration of 2nd Dec, 2002, DV no. 1, 2003, p.16/Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and

Friendly Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation, available at http://www.fm

prc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t15771.htm

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summit held in 2005 focused on deepening and expanding bilateral ties that thus required

concrete steps.

Thus, as tides of international politics have stirred since the demise of the Soviet Union,

so have its relations with its communist neighbor. As the once crawling dragon of the

nineteenth and twentieth centuries now stands with utmost reverence in global politics,

the Kremlin has no choice but to lean closer to its geographical neighbor as the western

skepticism on Moscow increases in the aftermath of events such as the Ukraine Crisis.

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CHAPTER - 4

CHINESE AND RUSSIAN COUNTER POLICIES IN THE CONTEXT

OF DISTURBED PERIPHERIES

That geographical proximity sometimes defeats political speculations and predictions is

perhaps best explained in the divergence seen in Caucasian geopolitics in the course of

soviet and post-Soviet times. The immediate period falling the fall of the USSR heard

many such prophecies as the Caucasus falling into the western camp and of Russia being

withdrawn from the regional equation. However, the preceding decades proved

otherwise; Russia remained a volatile force in the regional and trans-regional politics of

the Caucasus while the west drifted further away in the post-Soviet years. Nevertheless,

Russian exercise of unilateral hegemony here has not been a swift excursion. The North

Caucasus, in particular, with its diverse potpourri of ethnic groups, has witnessed violent

attempts at acquiring the rights for self-governance and self-determination on religio-

economic and socio-political grounds.

The twenty first century has been an extension of the hydrocarbon race among world

powers. The Russian and Chinese peripheries, that either serve as conduits of

hydrocarbon trade, reserves, or both, have seen a brisk amplification in this sector. The

Russo-Chinese gas agreement in mid-2014 is but only a continuation of Putin’s and

Jinping’s energy policies that have since the past few decades become a concern for the

western policy makers. The bilateral gas deal signed in mid-2014 calls for an

unprecedented thirty year gas engagement worth $400 bn. In addition to this, some very

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important hydrocarbon agreements signed among Rosneft, Gazprom, Novatek and the

CNPC since 2013 signify policy drifts in the Russian quarters. The agreements speak of

Moscow’s eastward shift in hydrocarbon politics following a decline in Europe’s demand

for Russian gas in the wake of the economic crisis of 2009 and more recently following

the rift between the former and the western circles over the crisis in Ukraine.

Simultaneously, the hydrocarbon deals between Russia and China also substantiate

Russo-Chinese partnership which the two powers have deciphered as indispensable in the

context of regional and trans-regional geopolitics.

4.1 CHINESE PERIPHERY AND THE NEW GEO-POLITICAL

ENVIRONMENT

In the case of Beijing, hydrocarbon métier is evolving as more tiresome than it was in the

late twentieth century. International political milieu with an involvement of increased

number of players is making the situation more intricate for China. With the onset of the

US-led War against Terror, countries lying on the outer periphery of China have been

greatly challenged. These particularly involve the Central Asian states lying across

northwestern Afghanistan; the battlefield of western allies of the War. China’s concern is

twofold; not only does western presence in Afghanistan and the War’s repercussions on

Central Asia poses a challenge for Beijing’s political influence in the region but

instability in any of these states, including Afghanistan, directly effects China for the

latter is joined with most of these republics at Xinjiang’s border. The XUAR itself, along

with Central Asia, is indispensable to Beijing in terms of economic development which

relies heavily on hydrocarbon supplies coming from and through Central Asia and

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Xinjiang. Xinjiang alone has one-third of China’s oil and gas reserves and 40 percent of

coal reserves, not to mention its place as transit corridor for energy supplies coming from

Russia and Central Asia. Exports from Central Asia, amounting to almost half of China’s

total gas consumption “rely heavily on Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline bringing

Turkmenistan natural gas through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and two smaller

Kazakhstani pipelines.”262

All of these imports reach mainland China via XUAR.

Besides, the economy of Xinjiang itself is highly dependent on Central Asia. For

example, while 30 percent of the province’s economy comprises of trade, more than half

of Xinjiang’s exports go to Kazakhstan alone. The cross border movement does not only

serve the purpose of trade, in fact, it rather serves as a transit route for religion based

instability from Central Asia to China.

As the western troops withdraw from Afghanistan, the newly proclaimed terror groups in

the Middle East and Africa are gaining Washington’s attention. In such a situation, a

declined attention to Kabul’s affairs has high chances of reinvigorating Taliban regime in

the country. This in turn would favor the central Asian based groups, such as, Jund-al-

Khilafat (Kazakhsttan), Islmaic Movement of Uzbekistan or IMU, to expand their

activities in the region, thereby afflicting Chinese geo-economic interests. Already, the

Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) enjoys the services of hundreds of fighters in addition to

having close links with other militant groups in Central and South Asia. This situation

worries both China and Russia:

262. Gordon Hahn, China and central Asia after Afghanistan’s ‘Kabulization’, Islam, Islamism and Politics in Eurasia

Report (IIPER), 14 October, 2013, No. 67, p. 5, available at https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy

_files/files/publication/131014_Hahn_IIPER67.pdf

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“It should be noted that Uighur fighters are likely to travel with Uzbek,

Caucasus, Tartar or other fellow-jihadis to Syria and further both their

training and global jihadi networking, as one Chinese official claimed in

July has already happened after the arrest in the XUAR of Memeti Ali, an

Uyghur who allegedly fought in Syria. This would also put TIP Uighurs in

greater contact with the CE and other global jihadist groups, because most

mujahedin in Syria from abroad fight under the…Jeish Muhajjirin va

Ansar or JMA which is led by amir Umar al-Shishani, an ethnic Chechen

from Chechnya. Such Uyghurs returning from Syria…would do so with

greater fighting capacity and even material resources.”263

The extremist threat from Central Asia is an added security concern for Chinese

leadership as ethnic unrest in Xinjiang directly affects national economy. As a matter

of fact, the continuing violence in the province in the recent past gives a strong hint

at ethnic and religio-political turmoil. The economic factor of XUAR and TAR’s

population puts it in close comparison to North Caucasus. These remote regions

either lack employment opportunities or fall short of the expectations of the local

populace. A common grievance in TAR and XUAR against the centre continues to

be limited work opportunities and those too mostly offered to ethnic Han Chinese at

the expense of the locals.

No comparison can be made between Hong Kong, in spite of the protests against the

central government in the island, and the autonomous regions of Tibet and Xinjiang.

263. Ibid, pp.8-9

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Nevertheless, the deteriorating situation in the island can be related to Beijing’s policy of

assimilation. The policy, more evident in XUAR and TAR also casts shadows on the

PRC’s approach in Hong Kong. The policy of assimilation attempts to minimize cultural

differences between the ethnic minorities and the Han population. In Tibet and Xinjiang,

the first steps for assimilation were in the form of promoting Han settlements in the

remote provinces. A more recent initiative at diffusing ethnic tension through

assimilation has been the promotion of inter-ethnic marriage. The program that became

effective in August 2014 gives ¥10,000 to mixed race couples in addition to medical,

healthcare and housing facilities.264

Other than affecting their culture, the local population in both the provinces is highly

critical of Han presence in their territory as it results in the most acute economic

discrimination. As discussed in earlier chapters, employment and jobs in poverty stricken

quarters of Chinese periphery are overshadowed by Han workers while ethnic Tibetan

and Uyghur population remains deprived of work opportunities despite the provinces

being centers of Chinese mineral and natural resource wealth. In 1949, there were only 6

percent Han Chinese in Xinjiang. But according to the census of 2010, the Hans make up

41 percent of the province’s population against 43 percent Uyghurs.265

The demographic

change has escalated ethnic tensions. Regardless of the region’s economic growth,

economic disparity has only widened with the positive economic indicators only profiting

the Han population of Xinjiang. In addition, the transition from a multilingual to a mainly

monolingual system of education has affected the ratio of both Uyghur students as well as

264. China Offers Cash for Marriage to Promote Assimilation in Xinjiang, Radio Free Asia, 29-08-2014, available

athttp://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/scheme-08292014122418.html 265. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-AaG-538966-China-Assimilating-or-radicalising-Uighurs-FINAL.pdf

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teachers in the province. In 2002, the universities of Xinjiang ceased instructions in

Uyghur language and Mandarin (standard Chinese language) has been the medium of

instruction in schools. Besides, the PRC has also revised its family planning policy for

Xinjiang; enforcing one child policy for the region thereby ending the relaxation for

urban and rural Uyghurs to have two and three children respectively.

All these policies are planned and executed after deliberations within the leadership in

Beijing. That is, the larger recipients of the policies are neither included in policy making

nor are the possible responses from the locals kept on table. The result is increased

mistrust, unrest and wider gap between the Uyghurs and the Han government. Even the

European Parliament has urged China to involve the local Uyghurs in governance

resource management and economic development and to “respect rather than dilute

‘cultural elements such as language and religion’….the Chinese government will not

achieve lasting stability in (…) Xinjiang (…) through forcible assimilation, cultural

destruction or repressive police and security methods, but only by seriously addressing all

indigenous complaints in order to create genuinely shared responsibility for the well-

being of [the] “autonomous” [province].”266

266. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-AaG-538966-China-Assimilating-or-radicalising-Uighurs-FINAL.pdf

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4.1 Population and average income in Urumqi by ethnicity267

267. Anthony J. Howell, Chinese Minority Income Disparity in the Informal Economy: A Cross-Sectoral Analysis of

Han-Uyghur Labor Market Outcomes in Urumqi’s Formal and Informal Sector Using Survey Data, China: An

International Journal, Vol.11, No.3 (December 2013).

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4.2: Inter-provincial migration patterns of Han population268

268.Anthony J. Howell, Chinese Minority Income Disparity in the Informal Economy: A Cross-Sectoral Analysis of

Han-Uyghur Labor Market Outcomes in Urumqi’s Formal and Informal Sector Using Survey Data, China: An

International Journal, Vol.11, No.3 (December 2013).

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The situation in XAR has particularly deteriorated since 2012. The 2014 Central Work

Forum on Xinjiang summarized party policy in Xinjiang to four main points:

improving employment and income levels among Uyghurs in Southern

Xinjiang through new round of investment,

encourage urbanization and inter regional migration,

curb the three evils; separatism, extremism and terrorism,

strengthening state education and bilingual medium so that all youth is well

conversant in the national language.269

The policies, old as they are, center on the “free mingling” of Chinese citizens. Similarly,

as the cry for ethnic policy reform continues, Hu Angang and Hu Lianhe of Tsinghua

University, an influential Chinese think tank, propose the a set of reforms addressing

economic, social, political and cultural sides of the current unrest in Chinese minority

inhabited periphery. For the political aspect, the two Hus propose to set up balanced

administration of the territories based on population and ethnic mix. They also propose to

remove ethnic categories form identification cards and other official documents. For

economic sector, the two argue that though the regions have had heavy investment

pouring in and have been the “greatest beneficiaries of China’s economic reforms in

terms of GDP and Human Development Index (HDI)…but more is now required to

remove institutional barriers to the free flow of capital, goods, information, and labor;

increase competition, creative forces and entrepreneurial initiatives; and reduce

inefficiencies and regional gaps.” The cultural disparity must be filled by respecting and

269. James Leibold, Xinjiang Work Forum Marks New Policy of ‘Ethnic Mingling’, China Brief, 19 June, 2014,

Volume 14, issue 12, p.3, available at https://jamestown.org/program/xinjiang-work-forum-marks-new-policy-of-

ethnic-mingling/

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accepting the differences that exist among the 56 ethnic groups of the country and

creating a common cultural identity. Similarly, China must adhere to the ongoing trend of

globalization and must remove barriers against the passage of people across

administrative boundaries. Free flow of people, it must be understood, is key to flow of

information, ideas and cross cultural communication. A combination of these factors is

needed to create a vibrant society in a globalized world.

A basic lack in Chinese policy framework is its inability to accommodate ethnic

minorities in the mainstream. Even though the Chinese constitution grants a number of

liberties for its minorities, but the CCP has rather kept itself from providing its minorities

with the same. Among these liberties are;

“the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written languages,

preserve and reform their own ways and customs,

regional autonomy in areas where people of minority nationalities live in compact

communities.”

If implemented, the practice of these policies would have been a follow up to a tri-corded

policy including the identification of ethnic groups, system of regional autonomy for

ethnic minorities, and special policies for the treatment of minorities. During the 1950s,

the central government dispatched ethnologists around the country to identify and

catalogue ethnic communities of the country. The process continued until 1980s at the

count of 56. Ethnic origins were to play an important role in the lives of ordinary Chinese

citizens as even today the people of China “have their ethnic category clearly marked on

their personal identification cards and must include this information on all official

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documents.”270

As for minorities’ privileges to regional autonomy, the PRC first codified

the rights in the 1956 constitution, and then became part of the national legal code when

the Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy was passed in 1984. By 2005, approximately 71

percent of Chinese ethnic minority population inhabited more than 1300 administrative

autonomous units that cover around 64 percent of Chinese territory. Similarly, the state

also boosts of offering investment, employment, higher education facilities, tuition

waivers and stipends to its ethnic minorities.271

Until recently, the minority groups were

also free from the state binding on One Child rule.

Despite state sponsored protection for minorities promised by PRC’s constitution, the

minorities are behind the Han Chinese in education, health, welfare and income. As a

matter of fact, more than 50 percent of officially labeled poverty stricken regions lie in

rural areas with high concentrations of non-Han population. Failure of ethnic policies

results in extreme unrest among the ethnic minorities that is often seen in the form of

protests (peaceful and otherwise), strikes and attacks on security forces, government

employees and Han citizens. The most violent of such incidents was recorded in Urumqi

on 5th

July 2009, also dubbed as China’s 9/11. The 7/5 incident started as a peaceful

protest against the killing of two Uyghur workers in response to an alleged rape of a

female Han worker in Xuri Toy Factory in Guangdong. Soon enough, the peaceful

demonstration turned violent as Uyghur demonstrators killed Han residents of the region,

looted shops and set vehicles ablaze. 272

The 7/5 incident, the 2008 Lhasa riots or the self-

immolation of Tibetans is all a reflection of the failure of Chinese policies towards its

270. James Leibold, Ethnic Policy in China: Is Reform Inevitable, (Honolulu: East-West Center, 2013), p. 7 271. Ibid, p.7 272. http://www.economist.com/node/13988479

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minority groups. The gravest misfortune for Beijing is its unwillingness to acknowledge

governments’ shortcomings in the policy making sector pertaining to ethnic minorities.

The former TAR chairman chose to negate the gravity of the situation by stating “in the

entire world, it’s difficult to find ethnic policy as exemplary as ours.” Furthermore, the

party’s White Paper on ethnic minority released shortly after 7/5 incident claimed that

“sixty years of experience have proved that China’s ethnic policies are correct and

effective and are in keeping with China’s actual conditions and the common interests of

all ethnic groups.”273

The situation in Tibet remains the same. Inhabited by ethnic minority, the Tibetan plateau

serves as home to raw materials and mineral wealth to the country besides being a

security buffer against the Indian threat. (Details of Tibet’s geopolitical and geostrategic

significance and the core causes of conflict between the centre and Tibet have been

elaborated in earlier chapters) As in the case of Xinjiang, Hanification or Siniciztion of

the region adds another degree to the inter-state conflict. The Chinese government rightly

claims that the billions of dollars investment in the region have increased the standard of

living in Tibet to exemplary levels. It has been the state funded investment that helped

increase the TAR’s GDP by up to 28 percent between 1978 and 2003. Moreover, from

2006 to 2010, there has been an annual 13 percent per-capita GDP increase in rural Tibet

that inhabits about 80% of the region’s population. Nevertheless, local grievance remains

the same; most of the improvement has benefitted the Han population that has migrated

into the region thus undermining the local culture and religion along with political

freedom. Consequently, as in the case of North Caucasus, the turnout of dissenters on

273. http://www.bjreview.com/Cover_Story_Series_2010/2009-10/13/content_240835_10.htm

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streets in both XUAR and TAR comprises mainly of frustrated, unemployed and

economically deprived youth. Not only is it difficult for Tibetans to find jobs in their own

region, furthermore as of 2010, of the 1300 shops and restaurants in Lhasa only 300 are

owned by Tibetans. 85 percent of Tibetans still live in absolute poverty.274

With the accession of Xi Jinping, in view of the close links between his father and the

Dalai Lama and of his wife being a committed follower of Tibetan Buddhism, many in

China believed a reform in China’s Tibet policy would be underway. But much cannot be

expected from the Premiere for his Chinese Dream leaves little room for a new state

policy for Tibet. With public opinion being almost equally critical as it is supportive of

the ethnic policies of China, some in the elite circles press upon a dire need for revision

of the same. An example in this regard is of Gen. Liu Yazhou, political commissar of the

National Defense University. Liu believes reform is inevitable if China wants to avoid the

fate of USSR and Yugoslavia. However, his recommendation is not without

complications. Liu proposes a Go West strategy for China as the mineral natural wealth

of the country lies in Xinjiang and Tibet. According to the general, TAR and XUAR must

be broken into smaller administrative units so as to cripple separatist forces, improve

ethnic discriminations and encourage more Han migrations into these regions.275

The Tibetan alienation towards Beijing and vice versa is another crucial element in the

Sino-Tibet conflict. On one hand, Tibetans consider Beijing’s economic exercise, Han

presence and business activities in China a danger to the local culture and religion.

Beijing’s assimilation of Tibetans into the broader Han culture has been far from

274. Dustin Stokes, Conflict Over Tibet: Core Causes and Possible Solutions, available at http://www.beyondintractabili

ty.org/casestudy/stokes-tibet 275. James Leibold, Ethnic Policy in China: Is Reform Inevitable, Op. Cit., p. 46

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acceptable. On the other side of the fence, many Han Chinese working in Tibet find a

”lack of gratitude” among the locals against a “sincere and effective effort by their

government to raise the standard of living of Tibetans.”276

In fact, there are many in

China who would disagree with most of the policies of the CCP but will have a common

consensus with the center’s policies in Tibet. As for the feeling of alienation and unrest

among Tibetans, the appointment of a Han Chinese from the Communist Party as TAR’s

governor adds to the woes of the region’s population. The governor, according to

Tibetans, works for the interest, both economic and political, of the centre rather than for

the plateaus’ larger interests. The appointment of a Han Chinese from the Communist

Party for the region’s administration, as felt and seen in Tibet, only designs such policies

as to accommodate Hans in the region and to encourage economic entrepreneurship at a

level limited to the same group.

Though the Tibetans still receive much support from the west and even from India, but

the situation is quite different from what it was in the 1950s and 1960s. The primary

reason behind giving support to the Tibetan cause; dismantling a newly emerging

communist China, has long been purged. The color of the cat has changed and China has

shifted from communism to socialist market economy, the communist bloc ended with

the demise of the USSR, and China is a chief trading partner with the west. In face of

these developments, Tibet is no longer as critical for USA’s interests as it was in the early

decades. Nevertheless, USA can still play an important role in bringing the parties to

table. For China, winning over Tibetans’ hearts and minds must be given priority in

national framework. This is particularly because of the fact that whether western interests

276. Dustin Stokes, Conflict Over Tibet: Core Causes and Possible Solutions, available at http://www.beyondintractabili

ty.org/casestudy/stokes-tibet

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in Tibet alter or remain the same; Tibet’s geo-strategic significance for Beijing cannot be

undermined. Tibet has long been a security buffer for Chinese security. Moreover, as

“India has, very discreetly, created a Tibetan border force of 10,000 Tibetan high-altitude

soldiers,”277

it becomes indispensable for China to create loyal-to the-center Tibetans.

Alienating Tibet leads to aggravated anti-Chinese sentiments and thus increase risks

within and outside the country as anger and hatred for Beijing grows unabated. Similarly,

Chinese economic interest can also be at stake in view of Chinese approach towards

Tibet. China can certainly not afford a Cold War with the western markets. As west

remains the key trading partner with the PRC and the latter gaining colossal profits from

the resource rich plateau, the situation of ethnic and political unrest in the TAR must soon

be addressed by Beijing on merit for the concern human rights violation has become a

cornerstone in western foreign policy making.

In the words of Robert J. Barnett, an easy way for the solution to Tibet issue can be as

easy as this:

“The easy way for the Chinese to solve it, if they wanted to, is to break the

Tibetan problem into two kinds of issues. They should separate the

difficult talks about autonomy and the Dalai Lama's status, which they're

nervous about, from the easy issues, which are about religion, and

migration, and development. Lots of Tibetans in Tibet have told them,

"Stop demonizing the Dalai Lama, allow people to practice religion, and

277. Interview, Can China’s Tibetan Crisis be Resolved? Robert J. Barnett Director of the Modern Tibetan Studies

Program, Columbia University Interviewer: Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor, CFR.org, March 6, 2009, available

at http://www .cfr.org/china/can-chinas-tibetan-crisis-resolved/p18707?breadcrumb=%2Fregion%2F278%2Ftibet

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regulate the migration of non-Tibetans into the area." That's pretty

straightforward. Every other country in the world does that almost

normatively. So these are the easy ways it could build up huge political

capital very very quickly in Tibet, and that would be welcomed… It's

unsustainable, keeping one-third of your country under military garrison

every so often. So [change on those easy issues] will come, but it would be

much healthier if it would come fast, and not late.”278

Firstly, the Chinese government should seek to end, or pacify at least, the Tibetan conflict

at ground level. That is, serious attempt must be made at ameliorating poverty in the

region by designing more Tibet-centric policies in place of the current mode of policies

that mainly benefit Han immigrant population of the region. Giving access to local

political structure will bring the Tibetans in closer contact with the economic policies

designed for the region and thereby get the chance of voting against such economic

initiatives as tax incentives that attract Han immigrants into the TAR. This would cream

out those Hans who are really sincere in developing Tibet’s economy. Equally important

is the execution of the PRC’s constitution pertaining freedom of language and religion in

its actual essence, for even if Beijing finds the implementation of western version of

liberal democracy, which comes with a package of international standards of human

rights, transparency, and freedom of press, as unfavorable for its national policy, may at

least divert global attention from the simmering situation in the TAR by giving them such

rights as mentioned for ethnic communities in the constitution of the PRC.

278. Interview, Can China’s Tibetan Crisis be Resolved? Robert J. Barnett Director of the Modern Tibetan Studies

Program, Columbia University Interviewer: Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor, CFR.org, March 6, 2009, available

at http://www.cfr.org/china/can-chinas-tibetan-crisis-resolved/p18707?breadcrumb=%2Fregion%2F278%2Ftibet

(228)

China’s periphery has remained disturbed since long and the situation has hardly altered.

In addition to Tibet and Xinjiang, Hong Kong which has had a peaceful existence under

Beijing ever since its return from Britain in 1997 has also recently shown signs of unrest.

To make matters worse for Beijing, the latest case of unrest in the island has won support

from the international community. Before this the only time when the public of Hong

Kong came on streets was in 2003 when Chinese government set to pass a law that was to

cut down the civil liberties of the island’s population. In face of thousands of people

marching to the streets, the government not only had to retreat from the proposed law but

the career of Tung Chee-hwa, then chief executive of Hong Kong, also ended with the

protests. The law, if passed would have given Tung’s government the right to:

ban local groups having links with any organization banned in mainland

China,

give life prison sentences for sedition, treason and theft of state secrets,

conduct searches without a warrant.279

In the case of Hong Kong, in spite of the One Country Two Systems formula, the 2003

legislation attempt by Beijing is one of the examples of Chinese attempt at assimilating

the island into mainland politics. The PRC has almost completely followed the One

Country Two Systems formula. Though there have been attempts at assimilating Hong

Kong with mainland China mainly at economic and political levels. For example, the

designation of many of business and political elites of Hong Kong, suspicion against the

west and the introduction of Chinese symbols has been rather successful. Hong Kongers

279. http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/07/01/hk.protest/

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themselves feel weary of Chinese interference in the city’s affairs and doubt the city’s

political administration of patronizing Beijing’s interests over those of local citizens. In

2012, PRC attempt at social assimilation of the island territory by means of educational

reform remained completely unsuccessful. The ‘moral and national education’ program

containing essays on Chinese history, nationalism and the role of the CCP280

was

originally planned to be included in curriculum of all the schools in the territory by 2015.

However, a strong protest by the natives was what forced Beijing to refrain from the idea.

In terms of economic assimilation, as a matter of fact, economic disparity is also felt by

the island population. Although, state of the art transport structure, infrastructure and

tourism connects Chinese periphery with mainland, but as in the case of XUAR and

TAR, the sharing of benefits and clash of cultures brought by economic integration has

created friction between the island and the mainland. The clash of cultures occurs

between the nearly 8 million resident population of the island and the 40 million

mainland tourists coming to Hong Kong every year. Thus, the notion “the closer they are

economically, the more apart they are in terms of identity”281

holds true in the case of

Hong Kong as it does for TAR and XUAR.

As of 2014, the protestors in Hong Kong demand universal suffrage. As per the findings

of an unofficial referendum, majority of the local population rejected “any set-up for

future elections that doesn’t conform to international standards of democracy.”282

Like

the previous protests, this year’s protest was also peaceful. The protestors used their

280.http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/09/world/asia/amid-protest-hong-kong-backs-down-on-moral-education-plan.html

?_r=0 281. Minxin Pei, Hong Kong, Tibet and Xinjiang: Triple Trouble on China’s Periphery, 9 October, 2014, available at

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/hong-kong-tibet-xinjiang-triple-trouble-chinas-periphery-11433 282. Shannon Tiezzi, What Can Hong Kong’s Protests Actually Accomplish, The Diplomat, 2 July, 2014, available at

http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/what-can-hong-kongs-protests-actually-accomplish/

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constitutional right of civil disobedience. Nevertheless, as is expected of China in XUAR

or TAR, the government response to these demonstrations was the use of power which

only added to the strength to the protests and the doubts held by the islanders against

Beijing’s designs for the island for the past few years. But surprisingly enough, a week

after the incident, on Chinese National Day (1st October), no upheaval erupted.

If China can foster closer cross-strait ties with the Republic of Taiwan, settling political

and ethnic issues within its borders should not be hindered by wider geo-political

aspirations of the rising power. With the electoral victory of Ma Ying in 2008, who

favors closer ties with Beijing; relations between the two arch-rivals had grown on a

positive note. The cross-strait trade reached the mark of $197 billion in 2013. In sharp

contrast to the previous practice of meeting through unofficial organizations and retired

officials, the representatives of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council and the China’s

Taiwan’s Affairs Office met in 2014; the first ever official meeting since 1949. Similar

steps had been taken earlier in 2010 when the two parties signed the Economic

Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA).283

MA’s honeymoon period was also

considerably a result of Taiwanese realization that the world’s second largest economy,

right across the strait, could not be ignored for long. Rather, it was necessary for the

export oriented economy of Taipei to maneuver closer economic and political ties with

Beijing for a peaceful and economically stable co-existence. However, international

involvement in China-Taiwan conflict adds to the many reasons (discussed in previous

chapters) that keep the two sides from a peaceful bilateral coexistence. As recent as in

December 2014, the cross-strait relations faced a set-back in response to the US sale of

283.http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/12/world/asia/china-and-taiwan-hold-first-official-talks-since-civil-war.html?_r=0

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Perry glass guided missiles frigates to Taiwan. As seconded by Chinese authorities, such

sales pose a serious impediment in China-US relations for the former takes it as “a crude

interference of China's internal affairs, damages China's sovereignty and security interests

and goes against the trend of peaceful development in cross-strait relations”284

by the US.

Though the weapons sales to Taiwan has not caused long lasting effect on Beijing’s

relations with Washington and Taipei, it has nevertheless, caused serious resentment

from Chinese circles. Moreover, it is China’s military rise and its thrust in the politics of

the South China Sea (SCS) that furthers Taipei’s suspicions of the former. Therefore,

under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, whereby the US recognized the PRC

government in return of severing its ties with the ROC, the former is obliged to help in

preserving Taiwan’s defense.

Moreover, public sentiments in Taiwan have not been aloof of Chinese long term designs

over Taiwan under the One China Principle. For that reason, Beijing’s wooing of Ma’s

government has been viewed with skeptical eyes. Consequently, the major blow to the

honeymoon period came not from the US sales of weapons but from the Cross-Strait

Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA), one of the two planned follow-up treaties to the

ECFA, signed between the two sides in June 2013. The agreement proposes to open

various sectors to the people from both PRC and ROC, including environment, health,

telecommunication, sports, commerce, construction, culture, health, tourism, entertainment

and finance. Attractive as it may seem, Ma’s government was met with severe criticism

throughout Taiwan for accepting the terms of the CSSTA which actually allows China to

open 80 service sectors in Taiwan while the latter can establish 64 such sectors in the

284. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/19/us-china-usa-taiwan-idUSKBN0JX0NK20141219

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mainland. Taiwan’s service sector produces 70 percent of its GDP and consists mainly of

SMEs (small and medium sized enterprises). On the other hand, most of the industries in

Chinese service sector are better funded State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). According to

the Boston Consulting Group, the Chinese travel market stood at US$158.6 billion (a

major share being with three SOEs), in comparison with 3000 Taiwanese companies with

US$ 744 million in the same sector, an indicator of Taiwan’s market’s future

disadvantage in competition with their Chinese counterparts. Furthermore, while certain

barriers could keep Taiwanese engines such as Yahoo and PChome from entering China

while Chinese portals such as Taobao.com are already operating in Taiwan. The CSSTA

would also cause a sharp blow to Taiwan’s service sector employees; endangering the

livelihoods of nearly 2.85 million people.285

No wonder the Taiwanese, including the

opposition DPP, considered it a threat to the local market against Chinese competition in

addition to security implications involved in opening such sectors as telecommunication

to the PRC. The agreement was debated upon not only in the legislature, but a failure to

reach consensus within the Yuan Legislature brought the movement out on the streets. In

March 2014, students of the Black Island Youth Alliance occupied the Yuan legislature,

thus starting the 24 days long Sunflower Movement. The rift over the CSSTA shifted

from between the KMT and DPP to between the party officials of the KMT. With these

developments, MA’s second term in presidency has become the most unpopular in the

history of Taiwan. Even, the CCP officials have slowly started drifting towards their most

arch rivals; the DPP, for the quickly changing public opinion in Taiwan could probably

lead to a change in leadership in the elections of 2016. Henceforth, Beijing showed signs

285. Joann Fan, The Economics of the Cross-Strait Service Agreement, The Diplomat, 18 April 2014, available at http://

www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/04/18-taiwan-cross-strait-services-agreement-fan

(233)

of an upcoming truce with the DPP. This was particularly witnessed during director of

China’s Taiwan Affairs Office Zhang Zhijun’s visit to Taiwan in June 2014. During the

entire visit, Zhang avoided meetings with KMT’s officials and instead met with DPP’s

members, visited industrial towns and poor areas including the Kaohsiung-the heart of

Taiwan’s independence movement.286

Nevertheless, honeymoon period with the KMT or peacemaking initiatives with the DPP

cannot solve the dispute between the PRC and the ROC. In fact, in addition to cross-strait

relations, the geo-politics of the South China Sea keep not just China and Taiwan but the

entire region from a permanent or long lasting peace. Territorial squabbles over the

islands and the water of the SCS has severed relations among the countries of China,

Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei. The Nine Dotted Line or the Nine

Dashed Line also known as the “Cow’s tongue” remains the pivot of the territorial

disputes in the SCS which includes a number of islands stretching across the entire SCS.

That the region is home to natural and mineral resources along with being significant in

terms of geo-politics comes with no surprise in view of the strain the spat has caused in

relations of the involved states and that of the international actors.

286. J.R, Big Brother Comes Wooing, The Economist, 1st July 2014, available at http://www.economist.com/blogs/bany

an/2014/07/china-taiwan-relations-0

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4.3: Map showing the Nine Dotted Line and the location of some of the disputed islands in the South China Sea.

Although the SCS with several hundred islands, spans an area of 1.4 million square miles

in the Pacific Ocean stretching across Singapore and the straits of Malacca to Taiwan

Strait, going west of Philippines, north of Indonesia and east of Vietnam, the most

argumentative islands are the Spartly islands, Paracel islands, Macclesfield Bank and

Scarborough Shoal. The resources of the region particularly those in the Exclusive

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Economic Zone (EEZ)287

remain the bone of contention among the competing powers.

Hardly inhabited, these islands have no indigenous population which makes the issue of

sovereignty among the contesting states more complicated. According to the World

Bank, the SCS holds proven oil reserves of approximately 7 billion barrels and 900

trillion cubic feet of natural gas. While these reserves provide an energy security to the

burgeoning Chinese economy, they serve as economic impetus to the smaller economies

of Malaysia, Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines. As per the statistics provided by the

International Association of Ports and Harbors, 50 percent of international oil tanker

shipments pass through the SCS, “which sees three times more traffic than the Suez

Canal and more than five times that of the Panama Canal.” Besides, more than half of the

top ten international shipping ports are located “in and around”288

the SCS. Keeping these

statistics in view, it remains beyond doubt that the freedom of navigation has become an

extremely important issue for the region, including the PRC for the economy of the

country relies equally on swift navigation of the sea.

As China’s enriches its economy, its dependence on oil and gas also escalates. The

Chinese demand for imported oil and natural gas rose to the levels of 56.3% and 21.5%

respectively in 2011. The rising statistics were quoted as the primary reasons behind

China National Offshore Oil Cooperation’s (CNOOC) initiative at the corporation’s first

deepwater semisubmersible drilling platform, the HSY981, in 2012. The HYSY981 was

built with a capacity of drilling at a depth of 3000 meters. In 2014, the HYSY started its

287. An Exclusive economic Zone is prescribed by the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) over

which a state has special rights regarding the exploration and use of marine resources, including energy production

from water and wind. 288. Beina Xu, South China Sea Tensions, Council on Foreign Relations, available at http://www.cfr.org/china/south-

china-sea-tensions/p29790

(236)

operations 120 nautical miles (nm) off the coast of Vietnam, in the region of the Paracel

islands, claimed by China, Vietnam and Taiwan and that fall within a 200nm EEZ of

Vietnam. According to experts, the move is consistent with the PRC’s policies aiming at

asserting China’s rights and sovereignty over the SCS. These policies include:

“A Chinese marine surveillance vessel’s severing the cable of a Petrovietnam

seismic vessel (May 2011);

Chinese vessels gaining control of Scarborough Shoal, an uninhibited piece of

land claimed by China and the Philippines after a standoff between a

Philippine warship and Chinese commercial fishing boats (April 2012);

CNOOC’s invitation to foreign oil companies to bid for blocks in waters also

claimed by Vietnam (June 2012);

The People’s Liberation Army’s establishment of the Sansha Garrison in the

Paracels (July 2012);

Chinese diplomats preventing ASEAN from issuing a joint statement for the

first time in the organization’s 45 year history due to differences between

members over whether to mention incidents in the SCS (July 2012);

Hainan Province’s approval of new regulations establishing a legal basis for

provincial public security units to board, detain or expel foreign vessels in

waters around islands or land features that China occupies or claims

(November 2012);

The MPS’s issuance of passports with maps depicting the Spratly and Paracel

Islands as Chinese territory (November 2012);

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Chinese ships patrolling around Thomas Shoal, which the Philippines claims

is part of its continental shelf (since May 2013);

Hainan Province’s issuance of updated fishing rules which claim seas under

its administration include more than half of the SCS (November 2013)

Throughout history, the successive Chinese regimes have tried to maintain a sturdy hold

on its foreign affairs. Moreover, China is a multi-ethnic society. Every Chinese leader has

sought to relive the “China Dream” for the revival of the “Chinese Nation” or the

“Chinese Race”. As a matter of fact, Hi Jinping has often referred to the importance of

“Four Identifications” for the Chinese people;

a. Identification with the motherland

b. Identification with Chinese race

c. Identification with Chinese culture

d. Identification with the “socialist road with Chinese characteristics”289

But to many, the modernization of China seems a Hanification of China’s diverse culture

which thus harms the cultural uniqueness of the 56 ethnic groups living within the state.

A major ailment in Chinese policy graph was its blind following of the Soviet model

since the inception of the PRC. The concept of bringing all ethnicities under one common

national identity by impairing the cultural link of the minority groups was in sharp

contrast to the traditional Chinese belief of difference being an ephemeral state that could

be changed by altering one’s lifestyle. This Confucian theory was considered to be the

289. James Leibold, Xinjiang Work Forum Marks New Policy of Ethnic Mingling, China Brief, Volume 14, Issue 12,

p.4 19 June 2014, available at http://www.jamestown.org/regions/chinaasiapacific/single/?txttnews%5Btt_news%5D=

42518&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=52&cHash=e382c60e99ad9bfe6cd7453376dc25a0#.VJeYptKUf5P

(238)

very difference between Chineseness and barbarism. Singapore may be a model for

Jinping’s government as in 2012 the Chinese Central Television (CCTV) telecasted a ten

part documentary the former’s model of governance. “Singapore stresses national interest

and equality over narrow group interests and individual rights.”290

Other than this, though

every state must follow a political system that does not negate human rights but also

simultaneously conform to the pattern best suited for its social fabric, the 2014 protests in

Hong Kong can also be looked upon as means for broader political reform in China.

Giving electoral rights to the people of Hong Kong may not settle the entire set of

grievances but it will at least save Beijing from the allegation of corruption, vested

interests and bad governance in the island. If successful, the model of Hong Kong would

also facilitate in curbing questions of violence and ethnic unrest in the rest of Chinese

periphery.

4.2 RUSSIA’S VOLATILE FRONTIERS

Of all the strategically important regions of the world, Caucasus undoubtedly remains the

most volatile. Not only is it the intersection between Russia and the trans-Caucasian

republics, Asia and Europe, but it also happens to be a melting pot for the leading world

powers. This is particularly due to the geo-economic significance of the region. The

Greater Caucasus forms the southern frontier of Russia beyond which lies that heartland

of Russia which is arable and sans natural boundaries. Therefore, it has been only natural

for Russia to seek formidable control over the Caucasus to the south of which lie the pro-

US Georgia and Azerbaijan. The Caucasian mountains, along with economic advantages,

290. James Leibold, Ethnic Policy in China: Is Reform Inevitable, Op. Cit., p. 49

(239)

provide Moscow with additional security benefits. According to George Friedman, “the

Caucasus mountains are so difficult to traverse by major military forces that as long as

Russia maintains a hold somewhere in the Caucasus, its southern frontier is secure.”291

Therefore, the inclusion of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in the Soviet Union gave

Kremlin a strong and deep footing in the Caucasus; a security factor against the Turkish

and Persian Empires. When the Caucasian republics broke free in the aftermath of

USSR’s dissolution, the Russians still maintained a presence in the Caucasus. But this

position was not as profound as before for the independence of the Caucasian republics

came at the cost of Russian southern frontiers being pushed 160 to 320 kilometers

northwards.292

Ironically, the territories that now comprise of Northern Caucasus

included Dagestan, Ingushetia and Chechnya; all pandemonium of Islamic uprisings

underway.

Dagestan alone of the Caucasian republics of the Russian Federation carries profound

strategic and economic potential for the centre. Located at the west of the Caucasian belt;

three-fourth of the Caspian shoreline of Russia lies along the republic of Dagestan.

Moreover, Dagestan also shares common borders with four of the five littoral states of

the Caspian Sea- Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Iran and Kazakhstan, the fifth being Russia.

This unique feature gives Dagestan an important position in the Caucasian corridor which

has been an intensive route for cross border interaction. The Caspian hydrocarbon

reserves along Dagestan are estimated at more than 500 million tons of oil and

291. George Friedman, The Caucasus Cauldron, Geopolitical Weekly, 7 July 2010, available at http://www.stratfor.com

/weekly/20100706_caucasus_cauldron#axzz3CTGjIF4b 292. ibid

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condensate and approximately 800 billion cubic meters of gas.293

Additionally, the

republic also boosts reserves of timber, coal and minerals. Therefore, Russia under Putin

has prudently designed policies of engagement with these regions so as to extract

maximum benefits of the resource rich expanses of land which would thereby end the

feelings of alienation in the local population.

4.4: Map showing the geographical location of Greater Caucasus.

In addition to the disturbed states of Russia’s inner periphery, bordering states of the

Russian Federation also pose threats to the centre and sometimes even add to the anti-

Moscow sentiments in the periphery. In fact, North Caucasus or the so called unsettled

inner abroad of Russia is more volatile due to the disturbed South Caucasus. For

example, Georgia has been accused of encouraging the Islamist movement in Chechnya

293. http://www.export.by/en/?act=s_docs&mode=view&id=6185&doc=64

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which the former has repeatedly denied. Moreover, during the Chechen Wars, the fighters

from the Islamic state often skidded their way into the Pankisi Gorge. Russia also shares

the blame for supporting secession of Georgian regions following the demise of the

USSR. Nevertheless, Russian challenge in Georgia is twofold. Other than encouraging

separation movements, more serious threat to Russia came when Georgia became a major

US ally in the region for the western encirclement of Russia. It was one of the corner

stones for the Georgian war of 2008.

On the other hand, Russia maintains close relations with Armenia where it has heavy

military presence. The latter however has tensed relations with Turkey in view of the

1915-1916 killings of Armenians. Armenia itself is charged with the massacres of

Azerbajani population whereas Armenian operation against Azerbaijan on Nargono-

Karabakh in the 1990sleft Baku with huge refugee problems. Thus, adding to the regional

quagmire are the Russia-Azerbaijan relations. Sharing a border with Russia, Azerbaijan

poses a regional competitor to the former as the Muslim populated secular state sells

natural gas and oil to Turkey via a pipeline that passes through the Georgian city of

Tbilisi (BTC Pipeline). That former Soviet republic has been a close ally of the United

States in regional and trans-regional affairs adds to Russian apprehension over regional

geo-politics, for the BTC Pipeline though far from challenging Russian operated

pipelines and conduits, provides Azerbaijan and Georgia the opportunity to have more

direct relations with the west. In such a regional milieu, Russians would want an

unambiguous intervention in Georgian polity so as to combine this position with that in

Armenia to counter the Azerbaijani and Turkish challenge. This, in turn, would

consequently check western encroachments in the Caucasus in general and South

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Caucasus in particular which the Kremlin has long struggled to retain as a solely Russian

trajectory.

In the same context, Russia finds a chief comrade in Iran. As the US continues to have

serious confronts with the Shiite regime over nuclear issues, the partnership between the

two Caspian states continues to foster. In addition, to the inhospitable stance shared by

the two states towards the west, the predicament of Azerbaijan is another common factor

in the two states’ policy graph. In the case of Iran, in spite of sectarian commonality with

the aforementioned, the two regimes have had cold relations for many decades. This is

due to the fact that at the time of Soviet withdrawal after the second World War, a large

portion of Azerbaijan’s territory was left inside Iran; leaving Iran with more Azerbaijanis

then there are in Azerbaijan itself. As a matter of fact, Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah

Ali Khomeini also had an Azerbaijani origin. The Azeri regime often refers to the

northwestern provinces of Iran as South Azerbaijan.294

Nevertheless, it is USA that

benefits the most from the situation of Azerbaijan. A unique feature of Caucasian geo-

politics is that alliances are made not on the basis of religion and identities but on

strategic and substance centered estimation. The fact that Azerbaijan is an oil producing

state combined with the animosity with Russia, Armenia and Iran gives America a fair

share of drafting a strategic equation that excludes both Russia and Iran from the regional

hydrocarbon conduit. But, a shift in Turkish political map of shifting to a completely US

zone of influence is unlikely as the former is a chief trading partner with Russia on the

Blue Stream gas pipeline. Moreover, in order to make the BTC pipeline more productive,

294. Shireen T. Hunter, Iran’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Resisting the New International Order, (California:

ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2010), p. 174

(243)

oil must be pumped in from Kazakhstan which the political regime of Astana is less

inclined to do in favor of the much profitable route via the Russia or the Persian Gulf.

Furthermore, critics have highlighted the grave security concerns and political violations

of the project. Security concerns remain high despite the pipeline being monitored by a

special Georgian battalion and US administered UAVs. The facts that it passes through

Armenian territory which has a simmering conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh with

Azerbaijan, Georgia which too has separatist movements within its borders and through

the volatile Kurdish region of Turkey raise questions over the security status of the

pipeline.

4.5: Map showing shipment route for BTC pipeline.

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4.6: Blue Stream gas pipeline and layout for South Stream gas Pipeline295

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Total supplies

to Turkey,

billion cubic

meters

19.9 23.4 23.8 20 18 26 27 26.7

Supplies

to Turkey via

Blue Stream,

billion cubic

meters

7.5 9.5 10.1 9.8 8.1 14 14.7 13.7

4.7: Gas supplies via the Blue Stream gas pipeline

However, it must not be concluded that Azerbaijan enjoys a win-win situation in

American policy making. In fact, in 1992, the strong Armenian lobby in the US Congress

made a successful attempt at the realization of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act

which states that:

295. http://www.gazprom.com/about/production/projects/pipelines/blue-stream/

(245)

“United States assistance under this or any other Act (other than assistance

under title V of this Act) may not be provided to the Government of

Azerbaijan until the President determines, and so reports to the Congress,

that the Government of Azerbaijan is taking demonstrable steps to cease

all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and

Nagorno-Karabakh.”296

The Act is often considered as Russian triumph at maintaining unpredictable and unstable

situation in the region to serve the Russian goal of being the prime broker in cross

country negotiations and the consequent hydrocarbon trade. The ethnic based separatist

movements that ensued following the demise of the USSR have served the same purpose

for Russia. Two of such events occurred in Georgia shortly after the dissolution of Soviet

Union; in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. These were profitable episodes for Russia on

strategic and economic grounds. While the Abkhazian location on Black Sea provided

Russia with the chances of expanding its sea access, the South Ossetian territory lied on

the very route connecting northern part of the Caucasus with the south. The geographical

proximity of the two states was a further aid to Russia for easy provision of aid to the two

groups.

The complexity of the Caucasus geopolitics has been intensified by the crises that

engulfed the region particularly in the aftermath of USSR’s dissolution. With the

ideological umbrella gone, the issues that had thus been swathed now broke free to affect

the political scenario. The concept of crises is often defined as a situation where “the

296.http://fas.org/terrorism/at/docs/s2532-102-sec907.htm

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traditional equilibrium of a system undergoes radical changes resulting from the

involvement of new factors.”297

As the new factors become increasingly more important,

the old system comes under threat; adding to the intensity of the crises. In this context,

the resurgence of ethnic identities and the claims of historical territorial rights became an

eminent factor in shaping the regional politics of the former Soviet territories in general

and the Caucasian region in particular. To add to the distress of Russia, Moscow, in view

of preoccupation with its own domestic affairs, could not play as effective a role as

required in the region. Consequently, not only the regional tension deepened, the trans-

regional powers found their opportunity to encroach into a previously untrespassable

territory. While the involvement of western powers was seen by many in the Caucasus as

an assurance against a Russian re-take of the region, the inter rivalry among the

Caucasian states on the other hand left the west at a perplexity as to the most suitable

foreign policy for this region.

The 9/11 incident was a testing time for both Russians and the Americans. While the

Central Asian states of Turkmenistan and particularly Uzbekistan were USA’s

indispensable allies for a successful military campaign in Afghanistan where significant

numbers of American forces were deployed; the South Caucasus states were equally vital

for western interests. Azerbaijan and Georgia served as logistic bases for the NATO

forces. Russia on the other hand agreed for the use of its airspace for humanitarian and

logistic purposes but refused access to the same for US aircrafts. Later in time, Russian

decision to militarily intervene in the Georgia in 2008 signified that the former was once

again ready to take the role of protector for Caucasian peace and stability. However, the

297. Dr, Mahmoud Vaezi, Geopolitical Changes and Crises in the Caucasus, Strategic Studies Group, July 2009,

available at http://www.csr.ir/departments.aspx?lng=en&abtid=07&&depid=74&semid=1953

(247)

years following the war saw the North Caucasus republics falling into a similar

pandemonium, only this time did the canvas spread beyond Chechnya. According to a

BBC report, Kabardino-Balkaria also became a victim of regional instability and “to the

contagion of conflict in nearby Chechnya.”298

As a matter of fact, “the levels of violence

recorded in Chechnya were either less than or equal to the violence levels in its

neighboring republics of Ingushetia and Dagestan; indeed Chechnya’s numbers even

dropped below those of Kabardino-Balkaria in 2010.”299

This must not be taken as an indication of stability in Chechnya, rather it hints at the

intensity of chaos and instability that now engulfs the Northern Caucasian region. It was

Ingushetia that suffered the most severe instability following the Georgian War.

Kremlin’s appointment of Yunus-bek Evkurov in place of Murat Zyazikov as the Ingush

president did not bring much improvement nor did the appointment of Magomedsalam

Magomedov in the place of Mukhu Aliev bring much positive changes in the violence

embedded republic of Dagestan. In fact the only change that the Ingush people did see

come with the arrest of Ali Taziev alias Emir Magas300

in 2010. As for Dagestan, in face

of the increased cases of suicide bombing, President Dimitry Medvedev in 2010

approved the plan for the establishment of Dagestani military detachments based on the

Chechen model to counter insurgents in the republic. The model called for the

recruitment of ethnic Dagestanis in the detachments to be incorporated into the Russian

298. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-20594299 299. Andrew C. Kuchins, et al, The North Caucasus: Russia’s Volatile Frontier, A Report of the CSIS Russia and

Eurasia Program, (Washington: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2011), p.3 300. Ali Taziev alias Emir Magas is the former leader of the Ingush Jamaat and the military wing of the Caucasus

Emirate. He worked as a sub-commander under Shamyl Basayev and participated in both the Chechen wars, and

attained the rank of captain in the Ingush Interior Ministry Police during the period from the end of the first Chechen

War to the beginning of the second war.

(248)

troops’ structure. Like their Chechen counterparts Sever and Yug, the creation of

Dagestani units was part of Moscow’s policy to indoctrinate the locals with pro-Russian

ideology and to create jobs for the heavily unemployed population of this remote

region.301

In the year 2010, the most alarming factor for Russian authorities was not the

rise of violence in Dagestan but the escalation of the same in KBR. The Interior Minister

Rashid Nurgaliyev had to admit that the “highest level of terrorist threat among the

republics of the North Caucasus is marked in Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria” and that

while the number of terrorist activities in Dagestan increased 1.4 times, the attacks within

KBR in 2010 were six times more than the levels recorded in 2010.302

The escalation in

KBR’s violence is sometimes associated with the death of Anzor Astemirov, head of the

local jamaat. He is believed to be following a policy of covert insurgency so as to prevent

Russian intervention and a consequent fragmentation of the republic. Askar Dzhappuev

who took the position as the head of the jamaat following Astemorov’s death was more

violent in his approach. This understandably led to an increase in violence activities in

the region to the extent of it being given formal status as the most unsafe North Caucasus

republic in 2010.

4.2.1 From ethno-nationalism to ethno-secessionism

Of particular importance here is the factor that the struggle in the republics of North

Caucasus is more ethno-nationalistic in nature rather than being ethno-secessionist as was

seen in the case of Chechnya during the First Chechen War. Indeed, the transitory

301. Valery Dzutsev, Suicide Bombings and Attacks on Infrastructure Increase Volatility in Troubled Dagestan, North

Caucasus Analysis, Vol, 11, Issue 5, available at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news

]=36872#.VH7EndKUf5N 302. http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20101118/297968385.html

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independence attained at the end of the first war served so far as to create a power

vacuum that thereby led Chechnya to the status of a failed state with negative

repercussions for the neighboring territories of North Caucasus.

This ethno-nationalist trend is evident even in KBR and Chechnya itself. However, since

Caucasus happens to be a potpourri of Islam and its various sub-sects; religion has played

an important role in the political turmoil that engulfs the region today. Although, Arabs

entered the region in the seventh century bringing with them the form of Islam that

existed then, the primary version of Islam adopted by the Caucasians was Sufism; the

branch of Islam that is the most liberal and the most tolerant of cross-cultural differences.

Nevertheless, things are steadily changing for worse. The North Caucasus people who

once loved Sufism to the extent of abhorring extremism are now following the same as

ethnic unrest brought about by mass poverty, unemployment and alienation from the

centre grows every day. As Moscow remains unable to settle the historical grievances of

the Caucasians, people of this part of the Caucasus see radicalism, or worse, secession, as

the only means to settle scores with the centre. It must not be forgotten that the region, as

cited by the President himself, “has the highest share of young people in Russia” with the

official rate of unemployed youth in the Chechen Republic alone standing at 40

percent.303

The youth when unable to find employment turn to extremism in frustration

over government failure of providing them elemental requisites of life, must not come as

a surprise. In the recent past, a trend is observed among various Muslims groups of

seeking to establish an Islamic caliphate through jihad. This is often associated with

Salafism, a movement that actually originated in the later nineteenth century and has

303. Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Grand Kremlin Palace, Moscow, 12

November 2009, available at http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/297

(250)

since then evolved into various sub-types including that which sees jihad as the ultimate

solution to injustice against Muslims. This has given shape to militant Salfism, seen

particularly in the Caucasus. The tendency, observed palpably in Chechnya and Dagestan

during the Chechen Wars is becoming increasingly popular in the North Caucasus. The

situation is particularly worrisome in Dagestan, where Salafis are reported to be opening

their businesses in Makhachkala.304

Not only does this provide earning incentives to the

unemployed population but also inculcates their ideology in the social fabric. In the

past, it seems, Moscow has shied away from ground reality and has sought to hush the

uproar by following a straight forward policy of state sponsored repression. Nevertheless,

the situation is far from ignorable. The implementation of sharia law, the basic goal of

the Islamicized mindset of society, has gained popular support whereby a majority of the

populace considers it to be the only workable solution to the socio-economic problems of

the region. Striking enough for Moscow is the fact that parts of sharia are already

executed in Dagestan and other areas. For example, instead of paying taxes to the local or

central government, zakat is submitted to the local jamaats.305

The penetration of Salafi

ideology in the local society started more profoundly during the inter-war period in the

North Caucasus (1996-1999) when the Salafi ideology became popular among the

masses due to the economic problems and the “simplicity and understandability of the

Salafi ideas”.306

This was also the time when Islamic Jamaat of Dagestan became

extremely popular in Dagestan.

304. Andrew C. Kuchins, et al, The North Caucasus: Russia’s Volatile Frontier, A Report of the CSIS Russia and Eurasia

Program, Op. Cit., p.8 305. Ibid, p.8 306. Ariel Cohen, Russia’s Counterinsurgency in North Caucasus: Performance and Consequences, (Carlisle Barracks:

United States Army War College Press, 2014), p.64

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In the case of Ingushetia, the anti-Russia sentiment is based entirely on the issue of

Prigorodny district which they believe to be their rightful settlement. Returning to their

homes in 1950s, after spending years in exile, the Ingush found their territory occupied

by the Ossetians. The Ingush have since then tried to reclaim the territory. The worst

episode of the dual occurred in 1992 when many Ingush were forced to flee from

Prigorodny and Russian troops took control of the region with a presidential declaration

for the district to remain a part of North Ossetia. However, it is generally seen as a pro-

Ossetian stance by Moscow. (The conflict has been discussed in earlier chapters.)

Evkurov’s decision not to seek Ingush rights in Prigorodny ought not to be taken as a

final solution to the Ingush-Ossetian dilemma by Moscow. Not only does the problem of

1992 refugees remains unanswered, but the Russian involvement in the Georgian War

and the subsequent recognition of sovereignty of Abkhazia and South Ossetia has stirred

debates on the issue of Prigorodny District. Furthermore, Ingush resentment is not only

anti-Moscow but also anti-Grozny, for in a major part of Soviet history, the republic

enjoyed only a decade long status of autonomous oblast (1924-1934). Afterwards it was

joined with Chechnya in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Oblast (1934-1936) and

finally into the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. While both the ethnic groups shared a common

fate when they were exiled to Central Asia; the fate of Ingush changed much after their

return in the 1950s. Although the Chechen-Ingush ASSR was restored in 1957,

approximately one-sixth of the former Ingush territory was not given back to the ASSR

and was rather mostly transferred to North Ossetia. The largest area in this regard, that is

the former Ingush area that became part of North Ossetia in 1957, was the Prigorodny

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district. The Ingush made 90% of the District’s population in 1944. By 1959, the

population of Prigorodny was 63% Ossetian, 19% Russian and 12% Ingush.

As part of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, the Ingush have lived under the shadow of the

Chechen Big Brother, much to their disliking. Throughout the time from the creation of

the ASSR to the Chechen declaration of war in 1992, Ingushetia remained deprived of

major industries, higher education and other major public facilities as they were mainly

located in Grozny. Following the Chechen declaration of independence in 1991,

Ingushetia chose to remain part of the Russian Federation. However, the two preceding

laws; “On the Formation of the Ingush Republic as Part of the Russian Federation” and

“On the rehabilitation of Repressed People,” did not settle the issue of demarcation of the

administrative borders for the region nor did they lay down a course of action for the

return of the territories. To make matters worse, Georgian claim on South Ossetia created

refugee problem as a vast majority of ethnic Ingush had to leave North Ossetia following

an armed conflict in Prigorodny District. Other than creating refugee problem, this

episode, on one hand, inculcated ethnic awareness among the Ingush, and on the other

hand also severed anti-Chechen resentment as the latter, busy in their post-independence

affairs, did not give any help to the Ingush in face of refugee problem and the Ossetian

border closure.

Since the 1990s, Ingushetia has gone through shifting times of calm and disturbance.

Shortly after the Ossetian episode, Ruslan Aushev, the newly appointed president of

Ingushetia, ignited a new political trend for the region. Not only did he acquire the status

of privileged economic zone for Ingushetia, but a union of fourteen oil and gas

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companies, Ingushneftegazkhimprom, had also started operating in the republic.

Nevertheless, this period of progress was short-lived as in 1994 the First Chechen War

broke out and with it another influx of refugees entered the already demographically

disturbed region. Following in quick succession was the Second Chechen War whereby,

at rough estimates, approximately 350,000 people left Chechnya. Although, the Russian

authorities had ordered the closure of all internal borders to stop the influx of refugees;

Ingushetia alone refrained from following the national order. Consequently, the agitators

from within Chechnya were now to be seen in Ingushetia as after 2002, there were anti-

Russian attacks from Ingushetia. Since, it is hard to differentiate between Chechens and

Ingush, many Ingush fell to oppression at hands of the Russian troops. This, in general,

led from an anti-Chechen to a more general anti-Vainakh attitude. As a result, in a matter

of few years, the attacks on federal troops were conducted jointly by Chechens and

Ingush from Ingushetia.

In the same year, that is, in 2002, Aushev resigned from his post and Murat Zayzikov,

supported by Moscow, was elected in his place. But the most stunning turn in

Ingushetia’s political history occurred in June 2004, when Shamyl Basayev and his men

captured various areas of the republic including the cities of Nazran and Karabulak.

Shortly thereafter, active participation by the Ingush was reported in the Beslan school

siege in September. As clashes between federal troops and insurgents became extremely

common along with the inefficiency of Zayzikov in bringing social and economic

stability in the coming years, a vast majority of Ingush people migrated from the republic.

Zayzikov also had to withdraw from his post in 2008 on account of a presidential decree

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and Yunus-Bek Yevkurov (native of Ingushetia) was installed as the new Ingush

President.307

To control the rising insurgency in Ingushetia, a Special Preventive Operation began in

the republic in 2007. Despite the deployment of 2500 troops from the Russian Ministry of

Internal Affairs and dozens of armored personnel carriers, the operation remained largely

unsuccessful as the additional troops happened only to become extra targets for the

insurgents. Attacks by the insurgents continued almost on a daily basis throughout 2007

and 2008. The Human Rights Watch reported mass violations of rights throughout the

tenure of the operation. In its report of 2008, it mentioned attacks on government officials

as well as parliamentary acknowledgement of the violations, stating that:

“2007 saw a dramatic rise in insurgent activity. The beginning of the year

was marked by assassination attempts on the mufti of Ingushetia and two

other religious leaders, and an attack on a military convoy in the part of North

Ossetia’s Prigorodny district populated by Ingush. The attack on President

Zyazikov’s family residence in the village of Barsuki on July 16, the alleged

shelling of President Zyazikov’s motorcade on July 21, as well as the attack

on FSB building and Presidential palace in Magas on July 2007 received

particularly broad media coverage. While in 2006 there were 37 attacks on

law enforcement personnel….in 2007, according to statistics provided to

Human Rights Watch by Ingushetia Minister of Internal Affairs Musa

Medov, 86 attacks were made on members of law enforcement

307. Varvara Pakhomenko, Ingushetia Abandoned, 16 August 2009, available at https://www.opendemocracy.net

/article/email/ingushetia-abandoned#_ftn2

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agencies….Medov’s statistics show another 28 attacks on members of law

enforcement agencies during the first three months of 2008.”308

The report cites parliamentary acknowledgement of human rights violation as thus:

“Ingushetia’s parliament has acknowledged the abusive nature of

counterterrorism efforts in Ingushetia. A Temporary Parliamentary

Commission was formed in Ingushetia to analyze the human rights situation

and released a report in February 2008, stressing that the lawless

comportment by law enforcement and security largely contributed to the

overall deterioration of the situation in the republic. The commission noted,

in particular, that from 2004 through 2007, 149 individuals were subjected to

extra judicial executions in Ingushetia. The commission also stated this figure

was based on information it received from law enforcement bodies.”309

As the terrorism and counter terrorism activities continued in Ingushetia, the distrust

between government and local population widened. While government authorities link

the wave of attacks on non-Ingush residents of the republic to the insurgent activities,

many Ingush refuse to accept the notion and rather perceive it as an FSB tactic for

creating ethnic differences within the citizens of the republic. Nevertheless, the link is

greatly endorsed in light of the official press releases of the insurgents claiming

successful “retaliatory” operations against the FSB, “including against the Russian in the

308. T. Lokshina, As if they Fall from the Sky: Counterinsurgency, Rights, Violations and Rampant Impunity in Ingushetia,

Op. Cit., pp.20,21 309. Ibid, p.24

(256)

North Caucasus, (including Ingushetia)” as the Russians are now viewed as “military

colonists, with all that this implies for their consequences.”310

The once pacific republic of Ingushetia, along with the rest of North Caucasus has seen

escalating figures of terrorism activities particularly since 2002 when insurgents’

operations started from within the republic. According to official statistics, a total of 576

attacks in 2008 were reported while 786 attacks were carried out in “North Caucasus and

neighboring provinces in the first eleven months of 2009”, whereas the total number of

attacks in the entire North Caucasus “doubled in the first eleven months of

2010.”311

Moreover, the tendency of suicide bombing which had completely withdrawn

since 2005 reappeared in 2008 when 17 casualties from two such attacks were reported.

The Dagestani president Magomedsalam Magomedov tried to curtail the violence by

offering young fighters economic incentives and relaxed sentencing and a “liberalized

policy towards Salafis”312

in return for their voluntary surrender. However, the

presidential replacement of Ramzan Abdulatipov as the new president reversed this

liberal policy and since then Salafis have been arrested and persecuted. Unfortunately

though, central policies have failed to bring about stability as violence and counter

violence continues in the republic.

310. Interview of Emir Magas by Kavkaz Center correspondent , available at http://kavkazcenter.com/russ/conten

t/2006/05/17/44511.shtml 311. SimonSaradzhyan, "Russia's North Caucasus, The Terrorism Revival." International Relations and Security Network,

December 23, 2010, available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/20636/russias_north _caucasus_the

_terrorism_revival.html 312. Zachary Laub, Instability in Russia’s North Caucasus Region, available at http://www.cfr.org/russian-federation/

instability-russias-north-caucasus-region/p9021

(257)

(258)

4.8: Terrorist attacks in Russia between 1st January 1992 and 31st December 2011313

313. Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

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A prudent decision by the Kremlin should be to settle the Ingush-Ossetian dispute on

pure merit. This can be the only reasonable promenade to an almost decade long strife.

Not only this, but settling the issue on merit while remaining impartial towards neither

side may pacify situation in at least one quarter of the conflict ridden North Caucasus.

Medvedev’s speech in Makhachkala in June 2009 marked the first head of the state

admission of the conflict in the North Caucasus stemming out from internal problems

such as corruption, poverty and unemployment rather than blaming external forces for the

situation.

Russian decision to end the decade long Chechen War or the counter terrorist operations

or the kontrterroristicheskaya operatsiya (according to the Russian version) was not only

seen as an apparent improvement in the security situation of Chechnya but also as an

underlining of Moscow’s willingness to fraternize the strife-torn region with the centre by

means of socio-economic development as it remains the most important challenge for the

Kremlin. President Dimitry Medvedev’s referred to the same in his presidential address

of November 2009:

“...for what I consider to be our most serious, domestic political problem,

the situation in the North Caucasus…. I have already said that the situation

in the North Caucasus would not be so acute if there were some real socio-

economic development. It is obvious that the source of many problems lies

first and foremost in economic backwardness and the fact that many of

people there lack normal life prospects. Let us speak frankly, the level of

corruption, violence and cronyism in the North Caucasus is unpreced-

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ented. Therefore, we will give priority attention to resolving the socio-

economic problems of our citizens there.”314

In spite of the allocation of a federal budget worth more than 26 billion rubles for South

Russia and the Chechen Republic in 2009, and 32 billion rubles for the development of

Ingushetia over the period from 2010 to 2016, the years following cessation of

kontrterroristicheskaya operatsiya (KTO) saw an escalation in violent activities in

Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia. Putin’s nomination of himself as the head of the

government’s commission for socio-economic development of North Caucasus itself

indicates at the centre’s unsuccessful misfortune in the region. A report by the CSIS

quotes the situation as follows:

“The year after the cancellation of KTO, 292 people were killed.

Moreover, as a result of terrorist attacks and acts of sabotage, 685 people

in Dagestan were killed or wounded in 2010. A local KTO regime in

Dagestan was introduced that year 22 times. In Ingushetia, local KTO

regimes were proclaimed seven times in 2010. For the first time in the

Caucasus post-Soviet existence, a big hydroelectric power plant (Baksan,

Kabardino-Balkaria) was targeted by terrorists in July 2010. That year

local KTO regimes were introduced in Kabardino-Balkaria twice. There

are daily attacks on police, kidnappings and abductions remain a frequent

occurrence, regional government officials are attacked, human rights

activists are targeted, and the insurgency seems to be spreading and

314. Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Grand Kremlin Palace, Moscow, 12 November

2009, available at http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/297

(261)

4.9: Statistics of the Victims in North Caucasus315

315. The Caucasian Knot: http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru

(262)

(263)

4.10: Statistics of target types in terrorist activities (2013)316

intensifying its attacks-all of which suggest that the situation is far from

under control. Indeed, the fact that Putin appointed himself as head of the

Russian government’s commission for the socioeconomic development of

the North Caucasus in December 2010 illustrates the Kremlin’s failure to

bring the region peace and stability,”317

Although the region receives a handsome share of centre’s assistance, the money is

largely embezzled “even by Russian standards.”318

That the taxpayer money is being

wasted on the North Caucasians consequently leads to profound disaffection among the

ethnic Russians who often regard the former as culturally alien to themselves. Therefore,

not much is left on Moscow’s policy graph for North Caucasus. The current model of

development and suppression of militancy reaps high economic and political costs for the

centre. On the other hand, if Moscow is to recant from the state sponsored monetary

316. The Caucasian Knot: http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru 317. Andrew C. Kuchins, et al, The North Caucasus: Russia’s Volatile Frontier, A Report of the CSIS Russia and

Eurasia Program, (Washington: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2011), p.2 318. Jeffrey Mankoff, The North Caucasus in 2012, available at http://valdaiclub.com/politics/41240.html

(264)

assistance; high chances remain for the region going back under the shadow of instability

and criminality, that too at the expense of Moscow’s regional influence. Nevertheless,

reform and sustainable development are the only promising options for an economically

and culturally integrated North Caucasus. In addition to the afore mentioned problems

faced by the Russian government, special attention must also be addressed in exercising

security policies so as not to pump further militancy in the region. For instance,

Kadyrov’s counter militancy measures though bringing facial rest to the republic of

Chechnya has fueled militancy across the borders into the previously placid Karachay-

Cherkessia where activities of the Caucasus Emirate are now reported across the republic.

As a matter of fact, Doku Umarov, the leader of the Emirate claimed responsibility for

the Moscow Airport bombings of January 2011 and even indicated that ‘nobody is safe in

Russia’ for his organization plans to bring the secessionism based terrorist activities to

the very heart of the country. The tragedy and Umarov’s message following it was a stark

reminder to the fact that unlike the 1990s and early 2000s, the violence that then engulfed

North Caucasus in general and Chechnya in particular had now spread beyond the inner

abroad and into the very centre of Russia. A five-fold increase in violence in the KBR

region, the attacks on Mt. Elbrus ski resort, the Beslan school tragedy and the Moscow

theatre and airports bombings are some of the few examples in this regard.

Another important element in the central government’s financial relations with the

disturbed periphery is the developing uneasiness of citizens and government officials

alike as these regions fail to meet the indicators set out by Moscow. In 2010, the central

government announced the establishment of North Caucasus Federal District (SKFO)

including all the republics of North Caucasus. In doing so, Moscow separated the North

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Caucasus republics form the Southern Federal District for addressing the problems

related particularly to North Caucasus. But moreover, the establishment of the North

Caucasus Federal District also attempted at establishing the region’s “financial

independence from Moscow.”319

Four of the seven highly subsidized regions lie in the

North Caucasus (Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Karachay-Cherkessia). The other three

are in Siberia and the Far East. In July 2014, the chairperson of the Audit Chamber

(Russia’s state budget watchdog agency), Tatyana Golikova quoted the subsidized

regions being unable to carry out a “significant number of indicators that are described in

these agreements [between the central government] and the regions.”320

The statement is

one of the recent examples of Moscow’s exasperation at the financial burden on the

centre. Not only these four republics but Kabardino-Balkaria, Adygea and North Ossetia

also receive high subsidies from the centre. Approximately 60% of their incomes are

provided by Moscow’s financial aid. Commercial electricity in the North Caucasus

receives 50% state subsidies (the only other region getting subsidized electricity for

companies is Tyva in Southern Siberia). The plan to reach market prices by January 2015

might not receive timely execution as the State owned agency Rossetti fears “the shock

would be too painful for the North Caucasian republics”321

and therefore should be

postponed until 2025. In view of Russia’s recent imperialistic gamble in Ukraine as well

as economic pressures faced by the government, many in Moscow would want to cut

319. Ibid, p.17 320.Valery Dzutsev, Russian Official Proposes Cutting Financial Aid to the North Caucasus, North Caucasian Analysis

(volume 15, issue 5), available at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d6 9d0be

3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews%5Bany_of_the_words%5D=kabardino-balkaria&tx_ttnews%5Bpointer%5D=2&t

x_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42717&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=b168f9749230977a120c3c5fcd3c3016#.VI

k66dKUf5M 321. Valery Dzutsev, Russian Official Proposes Cutting Financial Aid to the North Caucasus, North Caucasian Analysis

(volume 15, issue 5), available at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0b

e3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews%5Bany_of_the_words%5D=kabardino-

balkaria&tx_ttnews%5Bpointer%5D=2&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42717&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=

b168f9749230977a120c3c5fcd3c3016#.VIk66dKUf5M

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down financial aid to the North Caucasus. However, it might be a flattering option for the

Kremlin to lull and subsidize the separatist North Caucasus at the expense of ethnic

Russians who harbor no such demands. Nonetheless, pulling money out from the region

also remains the most convenient option with minimum risks for the fact that the region

has long had separatist tendency in contrast to the regions dominated by ethnic Russians.

Another initiative by Moscow was the appointment of Alexander Khloponin as the

President’s Plenipotentiary Representative in the SKFO. Unlike past examples, rather

than choosing an army veteran Kremlin appointed an ex-governor and entrepreneur for

the regional administration of Caucasus. Khloponin’s appointment show casted a broader

vision of the government that signified economic growth to be the tool for bringing peace

in the region instead of the use of force. Unfortunately though, the security of SKFO has

only deteriorated since then and the economy fails to show much signs of improvement.

In 2010, Khloponin announced the construction of ski resorts in five of the republics only

to be later replaced by smaller projects. The quality of the project and his retreat from the

same showed Khloponin’s alienation from the ground reality. In fact, the establishment of

SKFO has only added another layer of corrupt bureaucracy discontentment against which

would only increase violence.

One thing remains clear; Russia’s attempts to stabilize the region through financial

assistance and counter terrorism policies remain ineffective to date. A primary obstacle in

this context pertains to the social fabric of the mountainous periphery. The clan system of

the Caucasians has kept the local populace from integrating into the Russian socio-

political structure and there is already a foreboding at the region joining the fraternity of

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the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). To this, the Russian perception of

Caucasus as the inner abroad adds fuel to fire. Khloponin’s reform and sustainable

development initiatives can work but only if the corruption involved in their execution is

checked and after a complete integration of North Caucasus in the national socio-political

and economic mainstream. President Medvedev had himself acknowledged the failure of

government funded development programs in the region in his presidential address where

he declared that “the sums available for North Caucasus region are significant. However,

the effectiveness with which they are spent leaves much to be desired. Moreover, part of

these funds is stolen quite shamelessly by the officials…therefore mass poverty in the

Caucasus has reached alarming levels.” He also labeled the problem to be more severe in

Ingushetia where “more than half of the economically active population is

unemployed.”322

Nevertheless, Kremlin cannot settle issues of the region by means of subsidies and

financial aids. The most important task for the centre remains conflict resolution that has

historical roots in mismanagement, ethnic discrimination and socio-economic injustice.

Even today, many in Russia believe the calmness of Karachay-Cherkessia as compared to

the turmoil of Kabardino-Balkaria owes much to the attitude of law enforcement

personnel in the two republics. The former has hardly any group to claim vast ethnic

majority. The Turkic speaking Karachay constitute 41% of the population while ethnic

Russians form 32% of the local population. The police and federal troops are more

reasonable in Karachay-Cherkessia and profoundly violent in Kabardino-Balkaria which

has well defined Wahabi majority.

322. Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Grand Kremlin Palace, Moscow, 12

November 2009, available at http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/297

(268)

That the “inner abroad” is physically and emotionally away from mainland Russia is

evident. That Islamization of the region in such situation will only serve to strengthen the

feeling of alienation is what deserves timely realization from the Kremlin.

4.3 SINO-RUSSIAN TIES IN THE NEW POLITICAL ORDER

At high time of the tensions with the west in face of the Ukraine crisis, came the 30 year

gas deal between Gazprom and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) in the

first half of 2014. The agreement is a prelude to meeting the Russo-Chinese bilateral

trade target of $200 bn in ten years.323

The deal is an attestation of Moscow’s eastward

strategy against the much apprehended western sanctions that are sure to surface in view

of issues of the like of Ukraine. Similarly, with the contest on the islands of the cow’s

tongue intensifying, a strong arrangement with Moscow would be the most favorable for

CCP. On a similar note, it is in the best interests of Beijing and Moscow to quest for

common goals in Central Asia. Other than an anti-terrorism drive, the two powers have

common interests in matters relating to regional stability, enhanced role of the Shanghai

Corporation Organization (SCO) and to minimize the role of trans-regional actors from

the region. It is in this situation that the two regimes drafted Twenty Proposals for

Economic, Scientific and Humanitarian Partnership. The proposals include:

1.“Strengthen the continuity of Sino–Russian humanitarian scientific

cooperation.

2. Step up the process of creating joint Sino–Russian scientific and educational

centers.

323. http://www.bbc.com/news/business-27503017

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3. Increase the transparency of youth exchange programs.

4. Declare 2016–2017 the reciprocal years of education, science and innovation.

5. Expand the mutual recognition of educational and scientific achievements,

including revising the lists of Chinese higher education and research

institutions whose diplomas are recognized in Russia and establishing

cooperation on scientific citation databases.

6. Intensify efforts to translate modern literature from Russian into Chinese and

to develop joint Sino–Russian projects in the cinema and other arts.

7. Revise the priorities of Russian regions for cooperation with China to include

European and southern Russian regions.

8. Direct cooperation to economically developed regions and rich cities of

China with a special economic status.

9. Consider the Issue of a Visa-Free Regime for Chinese and Russian tourists.

10. Coordinate efforts to ensure the safety of Chinese and Russian citizens and

create the image of a tolerant and multicultural Russia in China.

11. Strengthen the climate of trust in military-technical cooperation by

encouraging joint research and development projects with Chinese

investments.

12. Attract more Chinese investments into infrastructure-building in Russia,

especially the construction of high-speed railways.

13. Use economic opportunities to export Russian agricultural produce to China.

14. Take mutual interests in the energy field into account.

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15. Coordinate efforts to reduce financial risks and ensure financial security in

order to increase the volume of direct trading between the Yuan and the

Ruble.

16. Strengthen and promote joint efforts to protect the environment.

17. Project a more humane image of Russia and its leaders.

18. Take a responsible attitude to strategic cooperation on key international

issues.

19. Adjust Russian projects in the field of public diplomacy to the interests and

expectations of the Chinese audience.

20. Refocus the work of various international forums from political to economic

aspects.”324

Thus, it can be concluded that in the current geopolitical milieu, both Russia and China

are left with important roles. As the two countries struggled for self-sufficiency in the last

decade of the twentieth century; the twenty first century, has shaped new opportunities

for the two powers. It is beyond doubt that a continued existence of certain challenges

remain for Moscow and Beijing, nevertheless, the opportunities can take over the set of

challenges. Even more important is the fact that the two states have various areas of

common interests that serve in the best interests of the two nations. It is for this very

reason that Russia and China, keeping their differences, even those related to historical

territorial disputes behind, have decided to engage in areas of mutual interests chiefly

those pertaining to hydrocarbons, transport and infrastructure.

324. http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=4952#top

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The development of Sino-Russian partnership may very well be dreaded by the policy

makers in the west, it has been, nevertheless, in swift development. The much

apprehended pacification of Russian and Chinese ties is a story much older than might be

calculated. The process does not go back only a few years in history but it is rather almost

two decades old. From the very onset of the emergence of the Russian Federation in the

early 1990s, the two countries have wisely and steadily established a coherent policy for

strategic co-work.

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CHAPTER - 5

THE STATE AND THE GOD: A HISTORY OF RELIGION IN

RUSSIA AND CHINA

5.1 RELIGION IN CHINA

Religion is one of the fundamental rights decreed to Chinese citizens under the PRC

Constitution. “Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious

belief. No state organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe

in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may anyone discriminate against citizens who

believe in, or do not believe in any religion.”325

In spite of liberty of religion set out in the

national constitution, believers of different religions in China have experienced otherwise

at the hands of the central government. This is particularly evident in the case of

followers of Islam, Christianity and Tibetan Buddhism. The practice of religious

persecution is largely attributed to the traditional Marxist theory where religion is

unwelcome and is supposed to rather diminish in face of national development and

progress. The Constitutional freedom to “not to believe in any religion” may also be

regarded as a privilege of the PRC’s government whereby it uses state control over

education policies to at best minimize religious beliefs from the society. The constitution

also authorizes the center to discriminate between “normal” activities and those that

might disrupt social order; “the state protects normal religious activities. No one may

make use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of

325. Article 36, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China

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citizens or interfere with the educational system of the state. Religious bodies and

religious affairs are not subject to any foreign domination. As to what and how would

religious activities be defined as normal, the Religion Affairs Bureau monitors all such

activities across the state. In the legal parameter, religious practices are permitted at

specific public places that are more accessible for state monitoring. In fact, religious

activities can only be conducted after receiving government’s recognition and under

administration of officials approved by the center. Secondly, freedom of religious belief

as set out in Article 36 is permitted to five state approved religions namely; Buddhism,

Taoism, Catholic and Protestant Christianity and Islam. Even the traditional Chinese folk

religion is excluded from government recognition for being a “feudal superstition” and

“unworthy of recognition.”326

Moreover, the extent of state control on religion and its

practices is such that the government determines the “boundaries for acceptable religious

doctrines,” disapproving such beliefs as those that accentuate the belief in the

supernatural or salvation doctrines for they challenge the government’s policies of

representing China as one and unified society under the Communist Party’s regime.327

Afore gone in view, Chinese resistance to religion has its roots in a strongly fanticized

Hanified China, that is, a China with purely Chinese principles. Traditional Chinese folk

religion is the only religion that has Chinese origins. Of all the other major religions

practiced in China today, all entered China via foreign routes. Buddhism, which happens

to have the largest following in the country arrived in China as late as in the fifth century

CE from India. Transcriptions of this new religion were in the Indian language namely

326 . Xiaowen Lu, Richard O’Leary and Yaojun Li, Who Are the Believers in Religion in China, p.49, available at

https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/files/32297712/FULL_TEXT.PDF 327. Jason Kindopp, Carol Lee Harmin, God and Caesar in China, (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2004),

p.3

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Sanskrit, which was completely alien to the people of China. But the primary assenting

feature of Buddhism; its flexibility of adapting into local customs and beliefs, was what

made it the most favorable religion in China. For example, the chief contrasting element

between Chinese beliefs and those of Islam and Christianity was the former’s practice of

polytheism. Buddhism with its own set of deities allowed ample space for the

amalgamation of Chinese gods into the new religion. Similarly, the new religion often

adopted Daoist religious terms to explicate its own philosophy along with various

religious ceremonies and practices of the native religion.328

The unique set of Chinese

self-centric culture and philosophy were adapted by the new religion. Thus, Buddhism in

China developed with its own unique features that are sometimes different from the

practice of the same religion elsewhere in the world. Even, Tibetan Buddhism differs

from the Buddhism of the mainland in its language, some of the deities and the

appointment of a spiritual head named the Dalai Lama.

In the case of Christianity in China, though the religion had arrived as early as the first

century CE, the number of followers remained thin until the arrival of Protestantism in

the nineteenth century. With the creation of the PRC in 1949, the CCP set out such

policies as to marginalize religion in the country. The establishment of the Religious

Affairs Bureau in 1951, [later renamed as the State Administration for Religious Affairs

(SARA)] was a manifestation of this policy. The Bureau was to supervise five officially

approved religions in China and separate organizations were installed for the monitoring

of each religion. These organizations are:

328. Grant S. Gilreath, Government and Religion in China, university of Tennessee, Honors Thesis project, p.5 available

at http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_chanhonoproj/1184

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Buddhist Association of China

Chinese Taoist Association

Islamic Association of China

Three Self Patriotic Movement

Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association

During the time of the Cultural Revolution when places for religious worship remained

largely closed for more than a decade, the SARA and its subordinate organizations were

also closed down. However, following the end of the Mao period and Deng’s revised

policies of shrinking state control on various social sectors, both Christianity and Islam in

China have seen a steady revival. Deng’s period saw the reopening of SARA and its five

sub-organizations. Christianity has also been under swift consolidation. As of 2006, there

were 50,000 registered Protestant churches in China. There has nonetheless been a

proliferation of unregistered or homegrown churches which has added to the unease in

the center. The homegrown churches are particularly gaining popularity among Chinese

Christians in view of the registered churches being under close government watch. As

recent as of 2014, there have been more than 230 officially declared “illegal structures”329

in the country.

Although working alongside religious groups can benefit China in strengthening the

party’s monopoly, the risks associated with Christianity carry more threats than perceived

benefits. The primary doctrines of Chinese Christians teach them to separate church from

the state, that is, headship of the church by Jesus, salvation through faith in Jesus,

329. Cracks in the Atheist Edifice, The Economist, 21 November 2014, available at http://www.economist.com/news/bri

efing/21629218-rapid-spread-christianity-forcing-official-rethink-religion-cracks

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Biblical prophecies, militant evangelism and the indoctrination of children.330

In

summary, most of the beliefs of Chinese Christians are rather incompatible with the

CCP’s policies. For many Chinese Christians, Christianity carries the essence of western

political philosophy, whereby such principles as democracy and social justice may be

established in China. In addition to western association of Christianity, the religion is also

highly associated with the destruction of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe.331

Furthermore, religion has strong associations in the separatist movements running in

China’s periphery areas of TAR and XUAR. This increases CCP’s concerns against

Christian followers further more. But the growth of Christianity in China has maintained

a swift pace since the 1980s. With a 10% growth in Christian Church since the decade of

1980s, the Christian population in PRC might reach 250 million mark by 2030.332

In such

a situation, the Three Self Patriotic Movement conducts state’s assigned task of

monitoring every aspect of religion as the organization is entitled to assign the place of

worship, select a religious leader for the believers, and allow certain activities for a

particular geographical area.333

It is for this reason that many in China choose to attend

congregations in unregistered places. As home grown churches pose a serious danger to

Beijing, the latter assures local religious material is made under close scrutiny of the

SARA and that all foreign made Christian material (print and electronic) is banned from

entering the country. The center has also placed restrictions on locals’ interaction with

330.Grant S. Gilreath, Government and Religion in China, University of Tennessee, Honors Thesis project, p.5 available

at http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_chanhonoproj/1184 331. Jason Kindopp, Carol Lee Harmin, God and Caesar in China, (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2004),

p.9 332.Cracks in the Atheist Edifice, The Economist, 21 November 2014, available at http://www.economist.com/news/

briefing/21629218-rapid-spread-christianity-forcing-official-rethink-religion-cracks 333.“Regulations for the Management of Religious Activities in Qinghai Province, Article 10, p.85, see also Provincial

Regulations for the Registration and Management of Places of Religious Activity in Fujian, Chinese Law and

Government, vol.33, (May-June 2000), pp.30,33

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foreign Christians, whereas most of the Christian schools built by Protestant missionaries

in the nineteenth century have been converted into regular schools imparting state crafted

education to the students. Consequently, many Christian leaders are rather ignorant of

basic Christian principles as their training lacks a profound teaching from their western

counterparts.

While Christianity is considered as a foreign and dangerous religion for the center, Islam

is looked upon in mainly the same way. It is foreign. And it is dangerous. Dangerous; not

as a carrier of western political philosophies, but as a bonding agent for the separatist

movement in Xinjiang. Islam has rather been considered a religion of ethnic minority

living in western China separated from the mainland by the vast Gobi Desert. Although

Islam had entered the province as early as the seventh century, the influence of the new

religion was minimal as the Arab and Persian Muslims entered the region largely for

trade and commerce and were grouped, along with other foreigners, as the fan ke

(barbarian guests). As intermarriages increased among the Muslims and locals, their

progeny became known as the tusheng fan ke (autochthonous barbarian guests). By the

sixteenth century, Islam had replaced Buddhism as the major religion of the province.

The history of Islam in Xinjiang has gone through contrasting phases. During the Yuan

dynasty, Muslims enjoyed the best imperial treatment. It was also due to the fact that

Mongols, under Kublai Khan, who formally established the Yuan dynasty in China in

1271, were the first to make a social hierarchy of four classes of people.334

334. Dru C. Gladney, Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People’s Republic, (Massachusetts: Harvard

University Press, 1996), pp.17,18

(278)

It was during the time of Yuan rule that Islam made strong roots in China with the

establishment of places for worshipping and Islamic systems in the society. The time of

the succeeding Ming dynasty was the “Golden Age of Islam in China.”335

Muslims

received religious privileges and high positions in military and government during this

time. The famous Chinese Muslim navigator Zheng He also commanded naval

expeditions to Africa during Ming rule. As a consequence of increased coordination

between the Muslims and the Chinese, the former became exceedingly incorporated into

the Chinese society. Even Muslim nomenclature, attire, and other customs underwent a

substantial synthesis with the Chinese culture. Muslims in China now regarded Islam as

their religion and China as their home. By the same token, faith in religion and its

customs was what kept a complete Muslim integration into the Chinese culture at bay.

335. Arabinda Acharya et.al, Ethnic Identity and national Conflict in China, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 23

(279)

5.1: Social hierarchy under the Mongols

From the seventeenth century onwards, Sufism replaced the influence of Sunni sect from

Chinese society. Muslims faced the toughest time during the time of the Qing dynasty

who worked on the divide-and–rule policy that concentrated on keeping the Hans,

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Muslims, Tibetans and Mongolians in conflict with each other. Moreover, the policy of

assimilation that the Qing or Manchus started in the eighteenth century not only initiated

a neo-educational system to favor assimilation against the traditional system practiced

heretofore, it also restricted the construction of mosques, worship and pilgrimage to

Makkah. The ensuing Muslim agitations lasted for centuries, particularly between 1648

and 1878. A new wave of Islamization entered China during the Republican period when

several inter-Muslim and Muslim-Han conflicts occurred in regions with high

concentrations of Muslim population where the government had allowed more autonomy

and vast areas had come under Muslim warlords’ control.336

With the CCP’s victory in

1949, the Islamic Association of China (IAC) was created as part of the new

government’s administrative structure in 1953. The work of the IAC was transcribed as:

“To assist the people’s government in its implementation of the policy of

freedom of religion; to carry forward the fine tradition of Islam; to cherish

the motherland; to unify Muslims in participating in the socialist

construction of the motherland; to develop friendly relations with Muslims

in other countries; to maintain world peace; [and] to collect and correct

historical data about Islam.”

Until recent times, the term Hui was used to refer to all Muslims in China regardless of

their ethno-linguistic background and was later officially institutionalized under the

Nationalist government. The locals however used helpful terms to distinguish among the

various Muslim groups. The term Chantou Hui was used to refer to the Uyghur Muslims

336. Ibid, pp.23-27

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who wore turbans, thus the term Chantou Hui which translates into turban Hui. Other

Muslim groups present in Xinjiang were the Wei Hui, Dongxiang Hui, Sala Hui and the

Han Hui who were culturally more close to the Hans. After 1949, Chinese Muslims were

categorized into ten Muslim nationalities; the Hui, Uyghur, Kazak, Dongxiang, Kirghiz,

Salar Tajik, Uzbek, Baoan and Tatar.337

The official figures attributed Islam as the religion of ten ethnic minorities of China with

a total population of 18 million followers. As of current, the tasks of IAC are

administered by 16 Muslim religious leaders whose purpose is to make a “correct and

authoritative interpretation of Islamic creed and canon.338

The philosophy and principles

of Islam stand in sharp contrast to the culture of China. Therefore, the religion had to face

multiple hindrances from the center and thus adapt likewise. A Chinese version of Quran

was issued during the time of Ming Dynasty in an attempt to accommodate the religion

with the Chinese culture. Similarly, Muslims also adopted Chinese names, holidays and

calendars to further integrate into the mainstream tradition of the country. However, the

differences between the local philosophy and that of Islam are too striking to

accommodate one another. Unlike Buddhism that readily found its place in the Chinese

society, not only monotheism alienates Islam from Chinese principles but the fact that

Islam addresses every aspect of life, including politics, sets a greater challenge for

Beijing. Islam provides its own system of administration under the Sharia law that

pertains to judiciary, finance and governance. On the other hand, Buddhism mainly

attends to correct moral degradation of mankind. The challenge becomes particularly

troublesome in view of the distribution of Muslim population of China. More than half of

337. Dru C. Gladney, Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People’s Republic, Op. Cit., pp.18,19 338. Committee to Spread True Koran, available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/11767.htm

(282)

Chinese Muslims are concentrated in the western region of Xinjiang, which shares a

common border with Pakistan, Russia and three Central Asian republics. Historically, the

region has been inhabited by a majority of non-Han population. As a matter of fact, when

the CCP came into power in 1949, the province of Xinjiang had a mere 5% Han

population whereas, 90% of the province’s population constituted of Uyghurs339

who also

happened to have a history of independence from mainland China between 18, 1931-

1934, and 1944-1949. In the light of these facts, state control of Islam is but only

indispensable. The IAC conducts the duty of controlling Islamic literature. More

importantly, the center takes strict measures to curtail the practice of religion by focusing

on children below the age of 18, thus restraining the parent-to-child transfer of religion.

Children below the age of 18 are banned from entering mosques, disallowed from fasting

during Ramzan and wearing hijab in schools is forbidden for under-18 girls.340

5.2 GOVERNMENT AND RELIGION: A REACTIVE PROCESS

Given the set of circumstances during the course of Chinese history, Beijing’s stance

towards religion is as hereditary as it is understandable. The Middle Kingdom, based on

the Mandate of Heaven, enjoyed absolute loyalty from the people, and in no way could

any other person or persona have the benefit of demanding the same from the populace.

Thus, as and when foreign religions entered China, they had to encounter stiff resistance

from the authorities. Furthermore, that new religions threatened to upset center’s control

over its realm was proven time and again in face of religious uprisings, the history of

339. Dru C. Gladney, Muslim Chinese:Ethnic Nationalism in the People’s Republic, Op. Cit., p. 38 340. Report on International Religious Freedom, 2007, US Department of State, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/r

ls/irf/2007/90133.htm

(283)

which go back to as early as the second century CE. The communist regime of China

inherited a turbulent religious past. This factor, combined with Marxist ideology that

considers religion as opium for mankind, substantiated CCP’s approach towards religion

whereby religion was strictly controlled by the CCP.

Nevertheless, a transition is seen among the believers in China particularly since the post

Mao period. This period made some relaxations on the dispersal of religious texts. While

the sale of Bible is forbidden outside churches, books related to Biblical characters and

stories are publically available. Since the 1980s, religious texts were permitted to be

translated into vernacular languages. As a result, the Chinese youth who grew up

inculcated by staunch ideals of Communist and Marxist ideology have access to

simplified versions of classic religious texts. These texts propagate philosophies that

stand in sharp contrast to Communism or Marxism. On the other hand, in many cases

translated texts are the state adapted versions of particular religions. For example, in a

survey conducted by Zhe Ji in 1994 in University of Shanghai, about one hundred

students who showed interest in Buddhism mentioned sixty different books on the

religion which they had read. Of these only six were original Buddhist classics

(mentioned by 20 individuals).341

Of particular interest here is the revival of Chan in China since the late 1980s. According

to some sources, the articles and books published on Chan since the 1990s are 12 and 300

times more than the recorded rate of relevant publications between 1949 and 1980.

Though, Chan refers to one of the branches of Buddhism in China and is even

341. Zhe Ji Non-Institutional Religious Re-Composition Among the Chinese Youth, (London: Sage Publications, 2006),

p.538

(284)

synonymous to the Buddhist religion in the country, the revival of Chan had less to do

with religion. The return of Chan fervor was a byproduct of the cultural trend of post-

Mao era; the vehemence of traditional culture. “The rediscovery of traditional Chinese

culture was actually a result of the attempt of Chinese intellectuals to rehabilitate the

broken tradition and to define an appropriate Chinese identity in the process of

globalization.” The propagation of the text and ideas of D.T Suzuki, whose purpose of

writing was to promulgate Chan in the west, was highly influential during this time as it

served a twofold purpose; that “Chan is a part of the Chinese tradition” and is popular in

Japan and the west “which are the models of modernization for China.” It thus

complimented the state driven campaign for modernization and opening China to the

world. Nevertheless, the association between Chan and Buddhism cannot be completely

washed out. Since Chan is a vague combination of way of life, philosophy and culture,

the chances of its acceptance by society have been high. And since Chan remains a part

of Chinese Buddhism, an arousing inquisitiveness in the same became the very ground of

youth’s increasing interest in Buddhism albeit religion. During the decades of 1990s and

1980s, the top brass of Chinese Buddhists; being meticulously aware of the connection

between the Chan and Buddhism, used the Chan zeal to restore Buddhism in the Chinese

society. The result was increased participation by the Chinese youth in Buddhism.342

In addition to the foregone, there are some other religio-cultural practices that are viewed

as participles to the religious revival among the Chinese despite government constraints.

These include:

342. Ibid. pp.539-540

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Qigong: having a history of more than two thousand years, qigong refers to such skills as

that aim to control an individual’s breath, behavior and spirit so as to achieve physical

and mental comfort. In many ways Qigong represents a religious sect. “Millions of

Chinese adhere to the various organizations of qigong. A lot of them believe in the

supernatural power of their master and consider their practice of qigong as a way of

salvation…some lineages of qigong declare that their techniques are inspired by

Buddhism or Taoism…. To a certain extent, qigong thus introduces its followers to

traditional religion.”343

Diexian: The Diexian or the practice of summoning spirits of the deceased is common in

China as it is in various other cultures. However, the discerning feature in Chinese

society is the use of the symbols of yingyangyu and bagua; which are actually the

symbols of the order of the cosmos in Taoism and some other folk religions in China.

Moreover, some other principles involved in diexian (such as the inclusion of at least one

female participant as per the philosophy of yin and yang, and the practice of conducting

the invocation only during night time) also attribute to the theories of Chinese religions

and Taoism.

Christmas: During the recent past, there has been a recorded upsurge in citizens’

involvement in Christmas. Unlike the traditional and national festivals of China, the

youth in China does not have to celebrate Christmas. Strengthening national, cultural and

familial bonds remain the cornerstone in the celebration of the former festivals whereas;

Christmas is viewed by many as an “occasion to relax.”344

For the Chinese youth,

343. Ibid, p. 541 344. http://culture.sina.com.cn/view/xmas/index.html

(286)

Christmas is a festival to “enjoy themselves, because there is no authority and custom

which define how the celebration should proceed.”345

Additionally, the close association

between west and modernity in Chinese mindset inclines the Chinese towards a profound

absorption of Christmas which is seen as a festival of the modern western world.

Of the state recognized religion mentioned above, it is Chinese Buddhism that has seen

the best treatment from Chinese authorities and must not be confused with Tibetan

Buddhism. Regarded as a Chinese religion, Buddhism enjoys some benefits that

otherwise lack in Chinese Islam and Christianity. For instance, not only does central

government promote tourism at Buddhist sites but also while the CCP members are not to

adhere to any religion, adopting Buddhism may very well go unnoticed.346

5.3 STATE AND RELIGION IN RUSSIA

“If Russia is not your mother, God cannot be your father”

(Metropolitan Ioann of St. Petersburg)

Of the four official religions in Russia, Orthodox Christianity remains the religion of an

overwhelming Russian majority. Ironically, Islam, which is followed by approximately

5% of the society against 75%population following Orthodox Christianity, has an older

history in Russia than the latter. Moreover, the conversion of Rus into Christianity, also

referred to as the Baptism of Rus, in 988 CE did not imply a necessary eradication of

pagan rituals and beliefs that hereto governed the lives of its people. In fact, during the

early decades following the conversion, Rus had a “double faith with Christian ritual and

345. Zhe Ji Non-Institutional Religious Re-Composition Among the Chinese Youth, Op. Cit., p. 545 346. The same does not hold true for Tibet where foreigners living in China cannot enter freely.

(287)

ceremony overlaying pagan holidays and festivals.”347

In the period of consequent

centuries, Christian principles heretofore largely adhered by the upper strata of society,

significantly declined in spirit as more indigenous rituals found their way into the official

religion. But over the period of time, as intellectual insight of the clergy declined, level of

religious (Christian) observance among the masses increased.

Moreover, few important political changes; decline of Constantinople, Muscovy

becoming the new capital of Russia in place of Kiev, and the subsequent conquest of

Constantinople by the Turks in 1453, further affected religion in Russia during this time.

The unfruitful results of the ecumenical Council of Florence (1431) at bridging the Great

Schism completed the transformation of the Russian Church into an autocephalous

religious body. In addition to this, in view of Rome falling to the Corruption and heresy

of the Pope, the same fate befalling Greek Orthodox Church; Russian Church now

viewed itself as their successor or the Third Rome. In spite of attaining autocephalous

status, Russian church strongly retained principles of the Eastern Christendom. This can

generally be considered as justifications for the adamant upholding of religious principles

in medieval Russia where the slightest difference on religious grounds was seen as

foreshadow of yet another schism. A legacy of the Eastern Orthodox Church that Rus

adopted was the place of the Patriarch in the political context. Unlike an absolute figure

of the Pope, the Patriarch of the Eastern Church and later, that of the Russian Church was

subordinate to the state. In fact, the very appointment of the Patriarch was regulated by

the king himself. Now that Rome was under the administration of heretic clergy and

Constantinople had been conquered by the Turks, it was enough evidence of God’s wrath

347. Jerry Pankhurst, Religious Culture: Faith in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia, Centre for Democratic Culture,

University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 2012, p.5

(288)

on the institution for a fifteenth century Russian mind and enough ground for submission

to a higher political authority; the Czar.

Moreover, the wide gap between the eastern and western hemispheres of Europe kept the

western influences of religious hierarchy at bay.348

While western civilization underwent

the tides of change in the form of Renaissance and Reformation, religious and socio-

political landscape of Russia remained unaltered. Therefore, the modernization of

Russian state and religion later brought about by Peter the Great only furthered the

political control of church and society. Church’s convergence with the state was

manifested time and again in the canonizations of various princes and czars at the

position of saints. Of particular importance here is the fact that most of the canonized

personalities were statesmen and warriors who fought for the expansion and integration

of the Russian nation rather than for the Russian church. With the establishment of the

Holy Synod by Peter in 1721, the transfer of control of the church from the former to the

state was thus complete. In addition, in 1722 Peter decreed the establishment of the post

of uber procurator (chief procurator) of the Synod that was to be administered by a direct

appointee of the Czar.349

Thus, the symphonia or harmony between the government and

religion which remained a miracle of the previous Czarist regimes throughout the early

history of Rus was brought to an end in the early eighteenth century. From this time until

348. Ibid, p.8 349. Christopher Marsh, From Atheism to Establishment: The Evolution of Church-State Relations in Russia, p.22,

available at http://www.academia.edu/2568553/From_Atheism_to_Establishment_The_Evolution_of_Church-State_

Relations_in_Russia

(289)

the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 “the church structure was an arm of the government

bureaucracy and the popular faith languished in its seventeenth century form.”350

On the other hand, foreigners who were often invited for the reform of Russian military

and economy brought with them Catholic and Protestant beliefs and ideas which slowly

could infiltrate the Russian mind. They were therefore settled in segregated areas but the

ideas slowly entered the local religious mindset. This together with the nineteenth century

development among the Russian intelligentsia of welcoming western philosophical

debates on religion, culture and politics divided Russian intellectuals into the Slavophiles

and the Westernizers; one unwilling to adieu orthodox ideas and the other willing to

adopt secularism as the ultimate resolution. Therefore, at the dawn of the twentieth

century, when socio-political turmoil hit the Russian masses at its worst, the religio-

political divide proved too costly as the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks finalized the

convulsion of the state dependent Church.

Like the latter constitution of the PRC, Soviet constitution also granted local autonomy;

autonomy that was always subject to central authority. While Lenin believed all Soviet

nationalities to eventually merge into one, he pressed for the formation of a federation

comprising of nations enjoying equality amongst them. Stalin’s ideals of a making a

unified Russian nation with only one language and culture was attempted to be achieved

through dogmatic state measures such as language reforms in schools and even the exile

of local communities. The death of Stalin put Nikita Khrushchev as the Russian Premier.

With this change ended some of the harshest Soviet policies. The attempt at merger of

350. Jerry Pankhurst, Religious Culture: Faith in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia, Op.Cit., p.13

(290)

nationalities however continued. This has been in sharp contrast to the constitution of the

USSR which gives equal status to all languages and allows for all languages to be used

freely. Nevertheless, owing largely to demographic composition and Soviet designed

policies, Russian consequently became the leading language in the country and has been

a mandatory language in Russian schools since as long as 1938.

As for religion, Soviet policy has been based on the ideals of Marxism.

“Man makes religion, religion does not make man…. Man is the world of

man, the state, the society. This state, this society, produce religion, a

reversed world-consciousness, because they are a reversed world.

Religion is the general theory of that world…. It is the fantastic

realization of the human essence because the human essence has no true

reality. The struggle against religion is therefore mediately the fight

against the other world, of which religion is the spiritual aroma….

Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless

world, just as it is the spirit of a spiritless situation. It is the opium of the

people. The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is

required for their real happiness. The demand to give up the illusions

about its condition is the demand to give up a condition which needs

illusions. The criticism of religion is therefore in embryo the criticism of

the vale of woe, the halo of which is religion.”351

351. Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, On Religion, (New York: Courier Corporation, 2012), pp.41-42

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Nevertheless, Lenin chose to combat religion rather wisely for he believed that in

combating religion “some people cause a lot of harm…by offending religious feelings.

We must use propaganda and education.”352

Therefore, in the initial phase, Soviet policy

towards religion focused mainly on the separation of religion from the state and the

confiscation of ecclesiastical lands. As early as in 1918, following the decree On the

Separation of the Church and the State and the Schools from the Church, the Soviet

regime set about nationalization of church and confiscation of church lands. Within two

years of Bolshevik government, “more than 2.3 million acres of monastery and convent

lands had been appropriated by the state.”353

The Soviet leaders associated religion with nationalities. The matter has been particularly

vulnerable if the community adhered to a foreign influence (such as the Pope in the case

of Christians or holy places in the case of Muslims and Jews). Jewish councils,

responsible for the maintenance of synagogues, were closed down in 1919. But Soviet

attitude towards Islam was not as straight forward as was the case in other religions.

During the early medieval period, there was hardly any significant Muslim community

among the Slav dominated population. Relationship between the Slavs and Muslims was

minimal and constituted mainly of trade activities. Up till the eighteenth century, Islam

that spread in the Eurasian plains came with Sunni merchants from Iran and Central Asia.

As reaction to imperial orders issued for conversion of the reverted Muslim population

back into orthodox Christianity, revolt broke out in Kazan in 1556.354

This led Ivan IV to

352. V.I Lenin, the Attitude of the Workers’ Party to Religion, Proletary, No.45, May 13 (26), 1909, available at

https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1909/may/13.htm 353. Christopher Marsh, Religion and the State in Russia and China: Suppression, Survival and Revival, (New York:

Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011), p.58 354. Iran became a Shia regime in the sixteenth century. The conversions of Turkic population of Siberia and Volga

were voluntary as per the sharia that forbids forced conversions. According to Glenn Roberts, “at no time was military

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destroy all mosques in the city along with official orders forbidding Muslims from

residing within the very city. In 1592, all the mosques in Muscovy were destroyed and no

new ones were to be constructed.355

The harsh policy of the Romanovs against Muslims

continued and a new effort at the conversion of Muslims was made in the eighteenth

century. Catherine II established the Office of the New Converts in 1740 entrusted with

the task of overseeing these conversions. On the orders of the Czarina, the converts were

offered three years’ relaxation from military service and an exemption from taxes if they

embraced Christianity. The policy showed some aspired outcomes. The government also

set about to “baptize whole villages of Tartars and other Volga people at gun point.”356

500 mosques were destroyed on imperial orders in 1743.

It was during the same century that the philosophy of enlightened despotism gained

popularity in Russia. Desiring to be an enlightened despot herself, Catherine not only

abolished the Office of the New Converts but also allowed limited practice of religion to

her Muslim subjects. In 1773, Catherine issued the Edict of Religious Toleration which

allowed Muslims the right of residence in Kazan along with the imperial permission to

construct mosques. The Edict also forbade proselytizing of Muslims and Christians. In

spite of the drive for enlightened despotism, the Russian policy for Islam remained the

same underhand. Reverted Tartars were still exempted from service and taxes. Russian

Muslims were disallowed from travelling to Makkah. While conversion of a Christian

subject remained burning at the stake, Muslims converting to Christianity were forgiven.

power sufficient to force conversion of the nomadic peoples north of the Oxus or the Amu Darya…where Muslim rule

was secure, rulers on occasion forbade conversion to Islam in order to continue collecting jizya…Conversion to Islam

often occurred despite prohibitions on order to avoid this tax.” 355. Glenn L.Roberts, The Evolution of Soviet Muslim Policy, (Houston: Rice University, 1990), p.156 / Zenkovsky,

pp. 15, 135 356. Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii,first series, 1649-1825,Available at

https://openlibrary.org/books/ol17233425m/polnoe_sobranie_zakonov_rossiiskoi_imperii_-_index. /Glenn L.Roberts,

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The policies however changed in the coming years as Catherine II liberalized her policies

further.

The imperial government funded the construction of mosques,

Medrassah for each mosque was subsidized by the state,

The government paid for the text books of the medrassahs,

In 1776, all trade restrictions on Volga Tartars’ activities in Asia were removed,

In 1780, Muslims were allowed travel rights to Makkah,

In 1782, the Orenburg Border Commission was set up in Orenburg to extend

Russian power into the Kazakh steppes (the Tartars of middle Volga would

propagate Islam to the Kazakhs. The latter would settle down, thus making a

buffer zone against the unfriendly Khiva and Bukhara)

Likewise, Christianity, to ensure that Islam remained subservient to the imperial center,

Catherine established Muslim Spiritual Assembly (Musulmanskoe Dukhovenstva

Sobranie) under the patronage of a Mufti appointed by the Interior Ministry and on

government payroll.357

But the annexation of Crimea in 1783 and the Persian invasion of

Georgia in 1795 once again created friction in Muslim-Czar relations. The latter event

was a prelude to Russian expansion into the northern Caucasus which was achieved not

before 1865 only after defeating the Caucasian legendary warrior Imam Shamil. The

below average performance of the Russian soldiers and the severe resistance of the tribal

warriors crushed Russian confidence on one hand (the defeat in Crimean War completed

the collapse of Russian confidence) while simultaneously seeding a feeling of mutual

357. The Evolution of Soviet Muslim Policy, (Houston: Rice University, 1990), pp.156-157

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mistrust that has lasted centuries and was nurtured by such events in the succeeding years

as the Serbian Revolt of 1875, the Turkish War of 1877, and the Naqshbandiya led revolt

in Fergana in1898. Such incidences were sufficient to revoke Russian suspicion of the

Muslim population of the empire. Therefore, at the turn on the nineteenth century until

the revolution of 1917, the center applied such restrictions on the Muslims so as to

minimize their political activities in the empire.

Thus, when the reins of power shifted from the Romanovs to the Bolsheviks; the party

policy of secularization was to be achieved covertly in the case of Muslims. Soviet

authorities allowed limited religious activity in the Muslim republics of the USSR with

the simultaneous support for atheism undergoing a steady pace with the number of

mosques decreasing from 25000 in 1917 to 500 in 1970s. The creation of autonomous

Muslim republics is also seen as a sequel to the Soviet design of nurturing atheism among

the Muslim population; for this allowed a separate culture in each of the republics. Soviet

policy towards Islam was not as simple as that towards Christianity and Judaism. Starting

with the Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia, which granted equality to all

Russian citizens along with their right to self-determination “up to secession and

formation of an independent state”358

, Lenin and Stalin signed the Appeal of the

Sovnarkom to the Muslims of Russia and the East in 1917. The document endorsed:

“Moslems of Russia, Tartars of the Volga and the Crimea, Kirghiz and

Sarts of Siberia and Turkestan, Turks and Tartars of Trans-Caucasia,

Chechens and Mountain Cossacks! All you, whose mosques and shrines

358. Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia, available at https://www.marxists.org/history/ussr/government

/1917/11/02.htm

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have been destroyed, whose faith and customs have been violated by the

Tsars and oppressors of Russia! Henceforward your beliefs and customs,

your national and cultural institutions, are declared free and inviolable!

Build your national life freely and without hindrance. It is your right.

Know that your rights, like those of all the peoples of Russia, will be

protected by the might of the revolution, by the Council of Workers’,

Soldiers’, and Peasants’ Deputies!”359

During this time, Russian Muslims gained strength and influence and by late 1917, Tartar

Muslims had declared an Islamic state of Idel-Ural Republic. As the Bolsheviks

consolidated their position, their attitude towards the Muslim population also changed

and by the following year Tartars were seen as a potential threat by the Bolsheviks.

Together with this, the tide seemed to be going against the Bolsheviks’ aspirations for a

Russified Russia as things continued to slowly take awkward turn in the Russian

periphery.360

In addition, the Shamkhor event in Azerbaijan, resulting in the death of

hundreds of Russian troops at the hands of Pan-Islamic separatists, called for significant

changes in Soviet policy framework. Therefore, in 1918, the Declaration of Rights of

Toiling and Exploited People was issued which clearly laid out:

“The Russian Soviet Republic is established on the basis of a free union of

free nations, as a federation of national Soviet republics…the workers and

peasants of each nation to decide at their own plenipotentiary Soviet

359. Jane Degras, ed, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, 1917-1924, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951),

p.16 360. The revolt of Social Democrats in Finland against Finnish Whites resulted in the intervention by German troops.

The Tartars of Crimea had chosen to affiliate with the Ottoman Turks who were already referring to the Black Sea as

the Ottoman Sea. The Caucasian periphery was under the embroil of Turks expansionism as the latter deliberated with

their German counterparts over the future status of the soil.

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Congress whether or not they desire, and if so in what conditions, to take

part in the federated government and other federal Soviet institutions.”361

Thus, it was made clear that self-determination must only be an “instrument in the

struggle for socialism and must be subordinated to the principles of socialism.”362

To

keep religion from driving the masses against the center, Bolshevik party passed the

Decree on Separation of Church from State in 1918. With the accession of Stalin to

power the center practically took measures at annihilating religion, destructing churches

and arresting and executing clerics. By 1929, not only Church activity was limited to

performance of religious services alone but the constitution of USSR was also amended

so as to replace freedom of worship to freedom of religious worship. Together with this,

the no-religious-teaching policy in schools was replaced with anti-religious instruction.363

The pervasive attack on churches continued during Khrushchev’s period and that of his

successors. Significant changes in Soviet religious policy started occurring when

Gorbachev introduced perestroika and glasnost. The state of affairs between the church

and the state altered at a rapid pace henceforth. In 1988; the year of millennial

anniversary of the Baptism of Rus, Gorbachev met with Patriarch Pimen and his five

bishops and announced a new law on freedom of religion which not only guaranteed

freedom of belief but also reflected the interests of religious organizations. Moreover, the

Russian Premier also recognized church as a legal public institution. This hallmark step

symbolized end of state attacks on the church.

361.Declaration of the Rights of Toiling and Exploited People, available at http://community.dur.ac.uk/a.k.h

arrington/decright.html 362.Glenn L. Roberts, The Evolution of Soviet Muslim Policy, Op.Cit., P.14 363.Christopher Marsh, From Atheism to Establishment: The Evolution of Church State Relation in Russia, p.4, ,

available at http://www.academia.edu/2568553/From_Atheism_to_Establishment_The_Evolution_of_Church-State_

Relations_in_Russia

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With the start of the new decade, the political landscape of USSR underwent colossal

changes; including the disintegration of the USSR and the emergence of fifteen

independent states. The emerging Russian Federation was to be a country with religious

freedom for all its citizens. The law on Freedom of Religious Belief and Conscience was

the most liberal state document on religious freedom in Russian history, granting

religious liberty to its people and separating church from state by proclaiming the

prohibition of a government council to regulate religious affairs.

The effect of the law on Russian society was not as expected for it brought with it the

bandwagon of New Religious Movements (NRMs); a new field of religious competition

to a nation that had been distant with religion for decades. “The presence of Hare

Krishnas, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Mormons along the streets of major Russian cities

was not what people had expected when they had taken to the streets themselves years

earlier in support of democracy.”364

Attempts by the parliament to persuade Yelstin to

sign a bill establishing four traditional religions eligible of state sponsorship went in vain

in the early 1990s,but the President finally agreed to sign the law “On Freedom of

Conscience and on Religious Associations in 1997. Of the provisions of the 1997 law

establishing four official religions in the Russian Federation, other important clauses

indicated as follows:

“…Basing itself on the fact that Russian Federation is a secular

state;….Recognizing the special contribution of orthodoxy to the history

of Russia…Respecting Christianity, Islam, Buddhism and Judaism and

364. Ibid, p.26

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other religions which constitute an inseparable part of the historical

heritage of Russia’s peoples;….Freedom of conscience and freedom of

creed are guaranteed in the Russian Federation including the right to

confess,…any religion or not to confess any, and the freedom… to act in

accordance with them….Citizens of the Russian Federation are equal

before the law….Actions hindering the realization of the right to freedom

of conscience and freedom of creed…and threats of such actions are

forbidden and are to be prosecuted by law.”365

To some critics, other than forwarding discriminatory approach to other religions, the

1997 law was of critical importance as it placed Russian Orthodox Church “more than

just first among equals in Russia.”366

Nevertheless, with state sanctions on religion

loosening, a rapid shift was seen among Russians. According to a survey, the number of

people who considered themselves religious shifted from 18.6 percent in 1988, 34 percent

in 1991, 46 percent in 1993 and 47 percent in 1996. According to the readings of a 2010

survey, the same number had risen to 60 percent, whereas, in 2006, only 3.9% of

Russians stated themselves as “convinced atheists.”367

An important clause of the 1997 law was the requirement of all religious organizations to

re-register with the state by 1999. This would allow these organizations to continue

operating in the country, failing to abide was to result in forced dissolution by the court.

The registration deadline was later postponed until the end of the year 2000. And by

365 . “On Freedom of Conscience and on Religious Associations.” Available at http://www.cesnur.org/testi/Russia.htm 366. Christopher Marsh, from Atheism to Establishment: The Evolution of Church State Relation in Russia, Op. Cit.,

p.30 367. Christopher Marsh, Religion and the State in Russia and China: Suppression, Survival and Revival, Op. Cit., p.119

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2006, 22,513 organizations were working legally in Russia.368

Ironically enough, many of

the churches that failed to re-register were Orthodox in addition to 39 of Stavropol’s 49

mosques having been denied registration on arbitrary grounds. By 2009, religious liberty

seemed a long fetched idea in the Russian Federation. The Jehovah’s Witnesses have

been under attack so have been the Muslims reading commentaries of Quran by Said

Nursi, a Turkish theologian convicted of writing “extremist literature” by Moscow

District Court in 2007. As a matter of fact, intolerance against minority religions has

continued throughout the recent past. From 2006 to 2008, official data reports 248

murders and 1,561 beatings “attributed to racist and neo-Nazi groups.” In such cases,

because of bias and prejudice, minority citizens are very less likely to report such

incidents to law enforcement agencies.369

Nevertheless, the acceptance of four traditional

religions in Russia is by far a victory for the Russians against forced secularization that

had been the status quo for decades. Though, the picture look might grim at date, it must

be kept in mind that it has only been a fraction more than quarter of a century since

religious perestroika was introduced in the country. It was a matter of centuries before

symphonia with the church was attained by the Russian Czar. Neo-symphonia with

minority religions of the country also may gradually be accomplished. The prospects of

neo-symphonia have high chances of becoming Moscow’s prime concern in view of the

new geo-political milieu encompassing western designs on Syria, Yemen and Saudi

Arabia.

368. Ibid, p.131, 369. Ibid, p.132,137

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5.4 FROM LENIN TO MAO: THE SUPPRESSION OF RELIGION IN

RUSSIA AND CHINA

After the liberation of China, the CCP likewise in other policy matters turned to Soviet

model for state control on religion. As discussed earlier, China has a history of religious

upheavals dating back to antiquity, the need to suppress the same thus demanded

immediate attention of the natal government. Furthermore, that religion was symbolic to

imperialism along with Marx’s interpretation of religion as opium of the people was

rhetoric to Beijing’s justification with state control of religion for the number of

missionaries had taken a dramatic rise following Chinese defeat in the Opium War

against Britain. This, in the eyes of the Chinese it was enough of an example of the

ultimate relation between religion and imperialism. This is one of the primary factors

why CCP’s confrontation with religion has not come in the face of popular resistance

against the government as has been the case in the Soviet Union. Therefore, the CCP

devised three tiered policy for controlling religion; self-governance, self-propagation and

self-support. The Three Self Movement was an epic implementation of this policy. Thus,

whereas it took the USSR decades before a coherent strategy aimed at culminating

religion could be chalked out, in China , within the first ten years of liberation, along with

the creation of the Bureau of Religious Affairs, the center had established state controlled

bodies for regulating official religions of the country, namely; the Buddhist Association

of China, Chinese Taoist Association, Islamic Association of China, Chinese Catholic

Patriotic Association and the Three Self Patriotic Movement.

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Since the post-Mao period the Chinese leadership has had a comparably tolerant stance

on religion. The 1980s marked an important era in state-religion relations in China. The

government scheme of socialist modernization was met with unrest from Tibet and

Xinjiang, coupled with pro-democracy movements leading to Tiananmen Square

incident. The CCP’s Central Committee’s Document 6, issued in 1991, laid down

government’s willingness to co-opt religion while discouraging challenges to party

power. The document accentuated increased control over religious activities. It laid out

that “implementing administration of religious affairs is aimed at bringing religious

activities within the bounds of law, regulation, and policy, but not to interfere with

normal religious activities or the internal affairs of religious organizations.” The

document also authorized relevant state authorities to take actions against those involved

in using religious activities to “engage in disruptive activities,…endanger public safety,

and weaken the unification of the country and national unity...collude with hostile forces

outside the country to endanger China’s security.”370

In spite of official measures,

religion revived rather swiftly during the 1990s. Beijing, on the other hand continued

devising such policies as necessary for strengthening state control over religious affairs.

Administrative sanctions were imposed on all such religious activities which “opposed

the Party and the socialist system…or infringe on the legitimate interests of the state.”371

The White Paper on Freedom of Religious Belief in China, released by the State Council

in 1997 firmly laid out that religious activities must lie “within the sphere prescribed by

370 . Pittman B. Potter, Belief in Control: Regulation of Religion in China, The China Quarterly, No. 174, Religion in

China Today, pp. 320-321 371. China: State Control of Religion, Human Rights Watch/Asia, Human Rights Watch, 1997, available at http://hrw.or

g/reports/1997/china1/

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law and adapt to social and cultural progress.”372

The same points were repeated by Jiang

Zemin in 2001in the National Work Conference on Religious Affairs.

Throughout the campaign of altering religion as per national interests, the center has kept

a larger portion of its attention to the periphery territories of Tibet and Xinjiang. Beijing’s

method of controlling religion in Tibet revolves around Buddhism and the figure of Dalai

Lama himself. This includes control over education, the re-education of monks and the

ban on display of Dalai Lama’s photographs and posters. In Xinjiang, the publication and

distribution of religious literature is strictly controlled while the training of clerics is

allowed only for approved groups in the province. In the case of Chinese Christians,

Chinese Conference of Catholic Bishops and the Three Self Patriotic Movement regulate

Catholic and Protestant faiths. In the case of unrecognized religions, however, severe

suppression methods are applied for the prosecution of activists.

The collapse of the USSR was followed by a sharp rise in religious affiliations among the

Russian masses. According to a survey by the Pew Research Center, the number of

Russian adult citizens identifying themselves as Orthodox Christians rose from 31% to

72% between 1991 and 2008. During this same period that is from 1991 to 2008, the

number of non-believers in Russia declined from 61% to 18%. However, the statistics

must not mislead to a relation between religious affiliation and church attendance which

has remained at the lower end of the graph with 2% church attendance in 1991, 9% in

1998 and 7% in 2008.373

372. Pittman B. Potter, Belief in Control: Regulation of Religion in China, Op. Cit., p.322 373. Russians Return to Religion but Not to Church, 10 February 2014, Pew Research Center, available at http://www.

pewforum.org/2014/02/10/russians-return-to-religion-but-not-to-church/

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5.2: Religious groups in Russia (1991-2008)374

5.5 THE RELIGIOUS CHARACTERISTIC OF ETHNO-NATIONAL

CONFLICT IN CHINA AND RUSSIA

The post-Soviet space as well as the Chinese land mass has been under disturbing waves

of ethno-nationalist conflict. While many approaches are attributed to the ongoing battles

between the center and periphery, primary factor among these remains the religious

factor. It is no coincidence that the disturbed peripheries of Russia and China happen to

be inhabited by ethnic minorities that adhere to particular sets of religion and customs in

contrast to those followed by the wider population. As a matter of fact, ethno-nationalism

is described as a form of nationalism where a nation is defined in terms of a shared

374. Russians Return to Religion but Not to Church, 10 February 2014, Pew Research Center, available at http://www.

pewforum.org/2014/02/10/russians-return-to-religion-but-not-to-church/

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ethnicity (common ancestry, language, religion, customs and tradition). Moreover, ethno-

national conflicts generally involve a clash of interests on the rights of land ownership,

language, autonomy, access to resources, economic deprivation, freedom of religion, and

preservance of ethnic identity. In Russia and China, religion has been the underlying

factor in the ongoing ethno-national conflicts. As in other cases, the hostile character of

conflict owes much to the discrimination vented out to minorities by the center. In

pluralistic societies, ethno-nationalist conflicts arise mainly out of political differences

and a political solution must be sought for the resolution of the same. Nevertheless, some

other underlying factors in an ethno-nationalist conflict are:

Weak structures of the state leading to security lapses within the society

Discriminatory attitude of the political authorities

Discriminatory economic system

Discrimination against minorities

While many scholars attribute the disintegration of the USSR as the ultimate reason for

the outburst of ethno-nationalist struggles in Russia and its extended periphery, it must be

noted that the disturbances had long been there even before the Revolution of 1917. More

than the weakening of the USSR, it was the glasnost that brought out nationalistic

feelings of minorities that had been suppressed for long either under the communist

dictatorship or the totalitarian Russian empire before that. Similarly, in the case of China,

the opening up to the west by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s largely altered the Party policy

held heretofore. This, in turn stirred the masses, particularly those belonging to ethnic

minorities, to open expression of ethno-nationalism. The point of discussion should

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therefore focus on reasons pertaining to the hostile character that ethno-nationalism

adopted in the wake of the events of post-Communist world, which brings the researcher

back to the clash of interests discussed above. Moreover, the fact that even almost quarter

of a century later both the Chinese and Russian leadership has remained unable to fill the

wide economic gap between Hans and Russian dominated areas and those inhabited by

ethnic minorities has fueled the conflict in these resource rich peripheries.

In contrast to democratic societies where tolerance is shown towards resentment coming

from opposite camps, totalitarian regimes like Russia and China are more likely to use

force to suppress opposition. This, in turn, escalates feelings of discrimination among

already insecure minorities. In the case of both Russia and China, the governments have

not given up suppressive modes of treatment towards minorities despite claims being

made in the name of religious freedom. This tendency, as discussed earlier, is evident

particularly, in the Caucasus, Tibet and Xinjiang. In the case of China, the terrorist

attacks in Xinjiang and self-immolations in Tibet have seen a rise since 2008. The

center’s policy towards Uyghur minority is provocative in the context of the above

mentioned discriminatory attitude of the government. As stated by an observer,

“To be Uyghur, at least, is to be constantly confronted by the state. It’s to

be told that your traditional meetings are forbidden, that your history is not

your own, that your intellectuals are terrorist sympathizers, to have the

veil forcibly ripped from your face, and to be made to keep the time of a

capital 2,000 miles away. It intrudes even into small things; Uighur names

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are too long to fit into Chinese ID cards, for instance, and so end up being

butchered Sinified versions.”375

China has long sought to administer these groups that have a distinct history and were for

long referred to as nationalities until the word ethnicity was coined for referring to these

groups about twenty years ago. The move was a further attempt at countering any rights

to political or territorial claims by these groups that may arise in the wake of usage of the

former word that carries larger rights with it. The PRC tried to win the confidence of its

ethnic minorities through programs of rapid economic development. But until the

concerned ethnic groups have a say in the designing and implementation of minority

related policies, raising income levels among these groups would not yield the much

needed results of national assimilation. Therefore, the results have rather been on the

contrary for these programs have benefitted migrated Han workers more than the local

masses who continue to live in the same deplorable conditions. The consequent cry for

larger autonomy and, in the case of Tibet, freedom, has shaped the western part of China

into a constant state of pandemonium and chaos. A closer look shows the situation taking

the next level where many young Uyghurs find justification in joining armed groups

fighting against the “Chinese colonizers;” as they appear to the Tibetans and Uyghurs.

Chinese response to this situation comes in the form of severing suppression of critics.

The most vivid example in this case is the life imprisonment of Beijing’s Minzu

375. Are Ethnic Tensions on the Rise in China, 23 June 2015, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/03/c

hina-ethnic-tensions_n_4892675.html

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University’s professor and the punishment of Professor Iham Tohti, an Uyghur human

rights activist.376

The events of 2009 which left close to 200 dead in Xinjiang and other such events in the

province depicts an ongoing unrest in the western part of China that is crucial to center’s

geopolitical interests. Similar is the case in Tibet where cases of self-immolation give a

gruesome picture of Chinese administration in ethnically populated areas. On the other

hand, Beijing portrays events in Xinjiang as terrorist threat fueled by Islamic jihadists.

Furthermore, Beijing claims that the unrest in the XUAR during the recent past has been

carried out by Uyghurs who received training and fought in the Syrian civil war.377

However, the erudition of Xinjiang attacks does not prove Beijing’s claim but rather

show them as a reaction to state run projects in the region. These projects which serve the

purpose of China’s economic partnership with South and Central Asian states include

mass urbanization, large scale investments and construction of roads and transportation

networks. Although aimed at developing Xinjiang for Chinese partnership abroad, the

programs bring an influx of Han workers along with government designs of Hanification

of the region by forced attempts at assimilating the local population with Chinese culture.

This, in turn, has escalated resentment against the center among the local population.

Nevertheless, Beijing continues to implement its policy of development in XUAR to

serve its economic and hydrocarbon interests. Already, a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan

and an oil pipeline from Kazakhstan; both passing from Xinjiang have been constructed.

In addition to this, talks on rail links with Central Asia and Pakistan are underway.

376. Karrir Kossel, Religious Freedom and restriction in China, 14 October 2014, available at http://berkleycenter.

georgetown.edu/responses/religious-freedom-and-restriction-in-china 377. Dr. Sean R. Roberts, Killig Burga Kanat, China’s Wild West: A Cautionary Tale of Ethnic Conflict and Development, 15

July 2013, The Diplomat, available at http://thediplomat.com/2013/07/chinas-wild-west/?allpages= yes

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Although, the center is planning the construction of Special Economic Trading Areas in

Xinjiang on the model of SEZs on the coastal belt of China, Uyghur resentment remains a

major obstacle in the realization of Chinese aims in the region since the beneficiaries

would remain Han migrants rather than the local Uyghurs. China plans to develop

Xinjiang into a financial and commercial hub with Central Asia and Pakistan serving as

transit points; making China the indisputable geopolitical power of the region in the

coming future. The realization of this plan would be difficult to achieve unless China

maintains peace in Xinjiang for which China must adapt itself to the local cultural needs.

Ethno-nationalist conflict in the province has been fueled by marginalization of native

Uyghurs and the forced eradication of their culture. A prudent act by the Chinese

leadership would be to accommodate the local culture and norms in its policy making

framework lest the violence in the region take the shape of civil war as in the case of

Caucasus.

Ethnic conflict and the rise of ethno-nationalism in the Caucasus are driven primarily by

the same factors as observed in TAR and XUAR. Lying at a distance of thousand miles

from Moscow, the region which lies at a crossroad between Asia and Europe has long

been alienated from mainstream politics. The regional indigenous population’s cry for

independence in the recent past has been due to economic deprivation more than for

religious reasons. The latter excuse is used by the rebel forces of Caucasus to inspire and

motivate the emotional driven youth into joining the armed camps in the name of

religion. However, the Chechen War started on political grounds rather than religious

grounds. The Chechen-Ingush conflict is also largely a territorial conflict. Like other

ethnic minorities of the Caucasus, the Chechens have suffered greatly at the hands of the

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Russian rulers. In addition to political, social and economic depravity among Chechens,

Balkars, Ingush and Dagestanis, the profound association with the past is an additional

factor in their resentment against the center. According to Russian ethnographer, Sergei

Arutiunov,

“…as for every Caucasian, to be a man is to remember seven generations

of paternal ancestors: the father, grandfather, great grandfather and

seventh great great-grandfather; and not only their names, but the

circumstances of their deaths and the places of their tombstones. This

constitutes an enormous depth of historic memory, and in many cases the

remembered deaths occurred at the hands of Russian soldiers-under

Catherine the Great; under Nicholas the First; under Stalin. So for every

Chechen, there is a Russian soldier or general who is viewed as evil

incarnated, as the devil himself.”378

Nevertheless, the post-Soviet government of Russia has kept a close eye at the social life

of the Caucasians. As one moves from Moscow to the Caucasus the separation of state

and religion takes a contrary form as the two phenomenon are closely aligned in this part

of the Russian Federation. The extremism law of 2002 is a major government aide in

controlling religion. The law sanctions religious extremism “which it defines as

promoting the exclusivity, superiority, or inferiority of citizens based on religion.” The

Russian court’s decision to ban Quranic commentaries by Said Nursi in 2007 was an

example of manifestation of the above mentioned law. The ban was imposed as Nursi’s

378. Sergei Arutiunov, et al, Ethnic Conflict and Russian Intervention in the Caucasus, Institute on Global Conflict and

Cooperation Policy Paper, p. 16, University of California, San Diego, 1995, available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/ig

cc/PP/PP16

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commentaries assert the exclusivity of Islam. The law therefore can trap peaceful

members of a religious group who defend or sympathize with those charged of promoting

“exclusivity, superiority, or inferiority of citizens based on religion.” This was seen in the

above mentioned case as fifteen readers of Nursi’s commentaries were put to trial and

five such readers served the maximum three year prison term in relation to extremist

charges related to banned literature. Most alarming was the fact that the Russian

authorities wanted a psychiatric treatment for a Nursi reader named Amir Abuyev;

casting “a chilling throwback to the Soviet era.”379

The application of the same law is

seen in Crimea following Russian annexation in 2014. After taking military control of

Crimea, the Russian authorities ordered registration of religious groups in the territory

with Moscow. The authorities also placed fines on the procession of Islamic and

Jehovah’s texts in addition to repeated raids on mosques, synagogues and Christians’

homes.380

The plight of ethnic minorities in Russia and China become even more challenging as the

vast majority of citizens living in mainland Russia and China remain ignorant of the

situation. While distance plays its role, government policies of absolute control on major

institutions of the country play the bigger part in keeping the news from disturbed

peripheries from reaching observers in mainland or abroad. Media, which is by far the

most influential tool in modern world of news proliferation, is under strict guard of

Chinese and Russian governments. In both the states, the center has kept a close watch on

379. Russia’s Failure to Protect Freedom of Religion, 01 August 2012, The Moscow Times, available at http://www.

themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/russias-failure-to-protect-freedom-of-religion/462957.html 380. Thomas J. Reese, Daniel I. Mark, Losing Their Religion in Crimea, Russia's Restrictive Religion Laws Take Their

Toll, 15 April 2015, available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2015-04-15/losing-their-

religion-crimea

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respective print and electronic media. It is for this reason that many cases of violence and

unrest in Russian and Chinese peripheries either go unnoticed or even when given

coverage, do not receive the due share in media. The same policy is partly responsible for

exaggerated versions of violence related incidents being reported in foreign media. For an

offshore observer, in the absence of local coverage of the incidents, the only available

choice remains following reports coming from foreign media which many a times do not

depict the complete picture. In face of state policies of control and censorship, it is at

times difficult to determine the true extent of unrest in these countries.

A brief history of Chinese and Russian media and modes of control on the same are

discussed below.

5.6 AIDES OF CONTROL: MEDIA AND CENSORSHIP IN CHINA

AND RUSSIA

1960s is a landmark decade in the history of the Soviet media. It was during this time that

the Russian Premier Nikita Khrushchev, considering television as an important means for

the national cultural development and modernization, decreed the establishment of

Moscow broadcasting company. Prior to this, the Communist elite maintained contact

with the populace through means of radio and the printing press.

The USSR entered the modern media age after the Second World War. Unlike the west,

Soviet Union has a long history of censorship and was therefore only slow in adapting to

the liberal trends of western European media. In Western Europe, censorship has a

history as long as that of the states themselves. However, Renaissance, Reformation and

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Enlightenment greatly restructured the European society and in the process changed

censorship trends in press which later defined freedom of speech in electronic media. As

for Russia, the only time when reforms were carried out was during the reign of

Alexander II (1855-1865). Press enjoyed great freedom during this time. But with the end

of his reign, censorship laws were re-imposed in 1866. It was only in April 1917 that all

censorship laws were abolished by the new government for a short time until October of

the same year. This was the beginning of an era of strict censorships that lasted

throughout the communist rule. In addition to this, the Soviet system of censorship

implied on the satellites states as well. The Soviet media theory had its roots in the

theories of Marx which propagates the abolition of private ownership of media in favor of

state ownership of the same to serve the interests of the state and to create greater

strengths of workers.

But with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the country’s media underwent major

makeover. The Law on Mass Media was passed in 1991, establishing independence of

media and freedom of speech and expression. This was followed by partial privatization

of Russian media. As the country was under severe financial crisis, the state funding of

media was largely cut down. Simultaneously, driven by forces of free market, many new

private media companies were established while many old ones were privatized. By the

mid-1990s, as the country recovered some stability in political and economic domain,

while the media enjoyed relative freedom from state control, the political and business

elites saw media as an influential means for gaining political benefit. Olga Khvostunova

states,

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“During this period the struggle among the elite clans was often reflected

in the media in the form of “black” and “grey” PR and kompromat wars.

The elites seemed to recognize the advantages of the media in this struggle

and aspired for converting these advantages into concrete benefits and

moves in the power play. But the media could provide even more leverage

for political purposes. Election campaigns…. would be impossible to win

without the support of the media.”381

The struggle for political power was best reflected in 1996 elections’ standoff

between Boris Yelstin and Gennady Zyuganov. The resulting victory of Yelstin is

often attributed to the new and liberal Russian media which backed the President.

Among these media were the NTV and Kommersant; owned by influential Russian

oligarchs Vladimir Gusinsky and Boris Berezovsky (advisor to Yelstin) respectively.

With the accession of Vladimir Putin to presidency in 2000, the Russian media went

a step further in its evolution. Putin changed polycentric system of administration as

set by Yelstin to a mono-centric mode of control thereby establishing control over

the parliament, judiciary and media. In early 2000s, “many state agencies took

financial or managerial control over 70 percent of electronic media outlets, 80

percent of the regional press, and 20 percent of the nation al press.”382

This ensured

the place of Russian media in aiding political control under the supervision of a

closely knitted circle loyal to the Russian President; in contrast to the previous

381. Olga Khvostunova, A Brief History of the Russian Media: A Complete Guide to Who Controls the Russian News,

The Interpreter, 26 December 2013, available at www.interpretermag.com/a-brief-history-o-the-russian-media/ 382. Olga Khvostunova, A Brief History of the Russian Media: A Complete Guide to Who Controls the Russian News,

The Interpreter, 26 December 2013, available at www.interpretermag.com/a-brief-history-of-the-russian-media/

(314)

practice of being distributed among competing political forces. It was also during

this time that the Russian media became part of the global media community;

whereby the gaps left by political discourses in the media were filled by advertising

and entertainment industry which became another form of economic inflow for the

media. In face of constrained political environment, the Russian media had little

choice but to give in to the pattern set out by the political elite; of avoiding

engagement in political discourses and letting the gap being filled by entertainment

sector. In fact, Russian media is divided into two groups; one that is state controlled

and the other which is purely commercial and provides entertainment material.

In spite of the decline in political journalism and investigation, Russia ranks 9th

among the top ten media markets of the world. This is particularly due to the capital

coming from entertainment industry that has filled the gap left by political programs.

As for the Russian press, the market is dominated by dailies, weeklies, newspapers

and magazines. The weeklies and dailies are mostly business oriented and have

thinner readership while magazines with entertainment content presently dominate

the Russian market. Moreover, the Russian media is also undergoing changes as

internet is becoming widely popular among the population. Nevertheless, the center

continues to monitor all forms of media for its best interests. The government has not

altered its policy of strict control over media ever since the fall of the Soviet Union.

Although, Russian media policy is many times softer than the policy adopted for the

same in the USSR, but it still does not correspond with the modern standards of

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freedom of speech and expression as propagated by other developed countries of the

world.

Ranking

(2013, est.) Country

Growth Rate

(2012*)

Growth Rate

(2012**)

1 United States +4% +3%

2 China +6% +7%

3 Japan +3% +3%

4 United Kingdom +4% +3%

5 Germany -1% 0%

6 Australia -1% +1%

7 Brazil +13% +9%

8 France -4% 0%

9 Russia +13% +12%

10 Italy -12% -5%

(* Compared to 2011; ** Compared to 2012)383

5.3: Top-10 Media Markets

5.4: Top TV Channels Audience Reach, 2012-2013384

383.Aegis Global Report.

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Newspaper

Audience Reach

(thousands of people) %

1 Argumenty i Fakty (Arguments and Facts) 6389.3 10.6

2 Komsomolskaya Pravda 5287.1 8.8

3 Teleprogramma 4890.1 8.1

4 777 4399.0 7.3

5 Orakul (Oracle) 2230.7 3.7

6 Moya Semiya (My Family) 1806.0 3.0

7 Moskovsky Komsomolets (MK + TV) 1744.6 2.9

8 Zhizn (Life) 1710.1 2.8

9 MK Region 1532.2 2.5

10 Express Gazeta 1250.4 2.1

5.5: Top Weeklies in terms of Audience Reach (All-Russia)385

The above table proves that Russians have a lack of interest in political issues. All

the top ten weeklies with the largest audience reach are publications with mass

appeal.

5.6: Structural Change of the Russian Media Market386

384. Aegis Global Report 385. TNS Russia, NRS, 2012 386. Aegis Global Report.

(317)

Developed in the 1890s, media in China was transplanted from the west. As the

foreigners gained influence in the country following Chinese defeat in the Opium War,

western models of media entered into the Chinese society. During this time, majority of

the newspapers were operated by missionaries and businessmen from abroad. As a

general trend of the age, many young Chinese students would travel to the west and come

back with their ideas of western inspired media for China. The May Fourth Movement in

1919 was an indication of intellectual liberation of the Chinese society and was followed

by the circulation of independent newspapers in China. However, following KMT’s

accession to power, the newly founded media was suffocated by Nationalists’’ censorship

policies.

Nevertheless, KMT’s policies towards media were less intolerant towards media than the

latter policy drafted by the communist regime of China. From the onset of CCP’s

government in 1949 until the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, the government

contended itself with ceasing private ownership of newspapers and turning the media into

a party organ. The worst phase of CCP’s policy towards media was witnessed during the

days of the Cultural Revolution when almost all the newspapers ceased publications. The

provincial newspapers of the CCP tried to imitate the “correct page layout of the People's

Daily and most copied, on a daily basis, the lead story, second story, number of columns

used by each story, total number of articles, and even the size of the typeface. In secret

and after the Cultural Revolution, the public characterized the news reporting during the

Cultural Revolution as "jia (false), da (exaggerated) and kong (empty)."387

387.http://www.pressreference.com/Be-Co/China.html#ixzz3eciFOTM6

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The media expanded at a rapid pace following Mao’s death. According to unofficial

statistics, there were 27,000 newspapers in China in 1997. As of 2000, the number

remains limited to 2,160. Among the most read newspapers are the People’s Daily, the

subscription for which is mandatory on all working units, the Beijing Youth News and

the Cankao Xiaoxi which includes commentary on news from Taiwan, Hong Kong and

the west. Following China’s opening to the west campaign by Xiaoping, Chinese

newspapers at most became financially independent from the state. The change has come

as not only a response to public demand but also as a result of demands from foreign and

local enterprises (that entered China during opening to the west campaign) for effectual

advertising channels.

With the onset of Deng Xiaoping’s policy of opening to the west that introduced large

scale reforms in the country; the media also underwent an unprecedented reform.

Emergence of independent newspapers and codification of media laws were few of such

examples. In addition to this, the state cut down subsidies to promote independent

financing of media agencies leading to larger economic independence of the media

sector. The changes were however short-lived for the Tiananmen Square incident

triggered state crackdown on media. The demonstrations for democracy and end of

corruption were joined in by media professionals. The Centre accused media of anti-

government campaigns and of nurturing unrest in the country. The call for media reforms

suffered a serious setback. Following this episode, the media has been kept from political

coverage while maintaining media commercialization. This led to the “mix of party logic

and market logic that is the defining feature of the Chinese news media system

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today.”388

Several agencies exert state control over the media in China. In addition to the

State Administration of Radio, Film and Television, Ministry of Information Industry,

Ministry of Public Security, State Secrecy Bureau and the General Administration for

Customs that play their part in monitoring media, the General Administration for Press

and Publication (GAPP) has the responsibility of screening print materials and implying

restraints if necessary. The GAPP enjoys the authority of issuing a license to a company

as well as of withdrawing it. In a similar context, the Central Propaganda Department

foresees and filters publications for contents related to the government, and it directs

publishers and editors as to the type of information that can be published.

In addition to this, People’s Daily, which remains the largest circulated and widely read

newspaper in the PRC, also serves as a control tool for the center. While the paper reports

current trends in economy, it does not address such issues as human rights, environment

protection and social justice. This facilitates the central government to “cultivate a new

elite urban consumer class in China by constructing a consumerist culture” which

“supplies a lucrative market for transnational corporations and Chinese businesses.”389

In

this way, the People’s Daily and other newspapers serve Chinese economic interests by

turning a blind eye to the many serious issues prevalent in the country.

As for cyberspace, Beijing seeks to monitor data trafficking of its citizens. Ever since

internet found its way into China, the government has realized the innumerable

advantages associated with it for promoting Chinese business. But to ensure effective

388. Zhao, Yuezhi. Media, Market, and Democracy in China: Between the Party Line and the Bottom Line,(Chicago:

University of Illinois Press, 1998), p.2 389. J. Yin, China’s Second Long March: A Review of Chinese Media Discourse on Globalization, Review of Communication, 6,

p.36

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control, Beijing has drafted strict regulations for Internet Service Providers (ISPs).

Similarly, since 2002, the government has banned the use of Google across the country.

The center and ISPs use softwares that search the internet for words or a combination of

words related to such sensitive issues as Tibet, Taiwan, Falun Gong and Tiananmen

Square.

Overall, as in the case of Russia, media in all its form in China remains highly controlled.

By banning particular websites and by using special softwares, the government ensures

swift monitoring of internet usage of its citizens. As for television and press, Beijing

follows the same policy of strict screening of content to be published or broadcasted lest

it contains material that might stand in contrast to government policies. The Great

Firewall of China aides the center in blocking internet content. Nonetheless, a similar

non-virtual firewall can be seen in other media sectors, thus maintaining a resolute

control over the content to be given for public viewership.

Genre 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

Number of Daily Newspapers 647 697 740 816 NA

Circulation of Dailies (000) 41,757 43,948 44,348 50,000 NA

Number of Non-Daily

Newspapers

1,516 1,524 1,313 1,344 NA

Circulation of Non-Dailies (000) 137,015 138,639 137,759 138,000 NA

5.7: Daily and Non-Daily Newspaper Circulation Figures in China390

390. World Association of Newspapers and Zenithmedia. World Press Trends 2001. Pp 6, 10, 17 19 Note: NA stands for

not available

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Newspapers Circulation

People’s Daily 2,500,000

Xin Ming Evening News 1,800,000

Yangchen Evening News 1,300,000

Yangzi Evening News 1,100,000

Beijing Evening News 900,000

Jie Fang Daily 800,000

Economic Daily 700,000

Beijing Daily 800,000

Guangzhou Daily 700,000

Jin Wan Bao 700,000

5.8: Top Ten Daily Newspapers as of 2000391

5.7 REMARKS ON CHINESE AND RUSSIAN CONTROL ON MEDIA

AND RELIGION

Religion in the two states has suffered stiff oppression by the ruling elite. The Cathedral

of Christ the Savior in Moscow (the largest cathedral in Russia), built over a span of forty

years in the nineteenth century to commemorate Russian victory over Napoleonic army,

was destroyed in a single day on the orders of Joseph Stalin. The Cultural Revolution

destroyed numerous Buddhist monasteries dating back to earliest periods of the religion

to rubbles across China. However, there is a positive side of the picture that is slowly

surfacing. Religion while still facing resistance from the center, is also gaining some

strength. Since the mid-1990s, there has been a massive program by the Chinese

government for the restoration of Buddhist sites destroyed during the Cultural

Revolution. The Niujie Mosque in Beijing, built in 996 CE and later destroyed by the

391. World Association of Newspapers and Zenithmedia. World Press Trends 2001, p 60

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Mongols was rebuilt in 1442 and has had numerous renovations since the mid-1990s.

The Cathedral of Christ the Savior, robed in white marble with a lustrous golden dome

adorning its top, is visible throughout central Moscow. Similarly, the Qolsharif mosque

built in 16th

century Kazan was destroyed during the ruinous campaigns of Ivan IV.

Today, the mosque, rebuilt in the 1990s and inaugurated in 2005, remains the jewel in the

crown of the city’s architectural history.

Thus, state control of freedom of expression and religion are undoubtedly severe in China

and Russia; against the modern principles exercised by western nations. However, it is

safe to say that the trend in these two countries will gradually change in view of increased

exposure to western ideas through improved means of information and communication.

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CHAPTER - 6

EMRGING DYNAMICS OF SINO-RUSSIAN PARTNERSHIP IN

THE PERIPHERY: CHINA IN THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST

God being too high and the czar too far.392

Moscow has been warned, by the Russian Federal Migration Service, against Chinese

becoming the largest ethnic group in the Russian Far East (RFE) by 2030s. The concern

has particularly risen in view of a recent homestead act by Moscow whereby anyone

willingly moving to the RFE would be awarded with free land for building private homes

as well as for commercial and agricultural projects.393

Though aimed at populating the

remotest resource rich quarters of the country, the move has stirred public criticism as the

plan has received due attention across the border in China. The original plan prevents the

resale of lands to foreign individuals or companies. Nevertheless, China Daily has

predicted an increased number of Chinese migrants taking advantage of the policy by

leasing the land from its new owners.

In spite of the circumspection cited by the Russian Federal Migration Service and despite

the new plan being designed to encourage repopulation of the land by Russian citizens,

Moscow directs an encouraging stance towards Chinese partnership in the development

of the RFE. Covering a landmass of approximately 6.2 million square kilometers, the

RFE has a population of fewer than 6.3 million with population density of one person per

square kilometer. In addition to this, more than three quarters of the total population of

392. The Story of Russia and the Far East: Being a Series of Papers Contributed to the Shanghai Mercury, During the latter part

of the year 1899, with Five Additional Papers added in October, 1902 (Shanghai: Shanghai Mercury, 1902), p.13 393. http://www.rt.com/politics/227763-russia-free-land-bill/

(324)

the region is settled in urban areas. Since the beginning of times, Russian rulers had to

lure their citizens into settling in the eastern most quarters of the realm. The new plan

comes in response to the government’s realization of the need to populate rural areas of

RFE. Ever since the first occupation of this remote region by Russians, Moscow realized

its true resource potential as late as in the later years of the twentieth century.

When Russians first crossed Lake Baikal, the only things taken into observation were the

icy winter skies and snow veiled steppes engulfed by freezing northern winds. Little did

they notice that under the ice cloaked roofs of the east would lay a region rich in natural

resources needed to feed the coal and gas run chambers of Russian commerce.

6.1 HISTORY OF THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST

The Russia Far East, bigger than the continent of Australia, together with Siberia and the

Urals Federal District span eight different time zones. “From Moscow to Vladivostok via

the Trans-Siberian railroad is a distance of 9000 kilometers (5,592 miles) and takes more

than a week to travel even when the trains are running on time.”394

The unprecedented

distances have contributed the most in the lack of regions’ economic exploitation and

development as well as in the scarcity of human habitation. Most importantly, the

enormous distance of time and space has always been a huge obstacle in center-periphery

relations. The story of Russian conquest of the far eastern region, known as Siberia for

centuries goes back to 1582 when Ian IV sponsored a Cossack adventurer Yermak

Timofeevich to sail eastwards across the Urals. This was a sequel to a series of missions

394. Alan Wood, Russia’s Frozen Frontier: A History of Siberia and the Russian Far East: 1581-1991, (New York:

Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2011), p.4

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sent by Ivan III to Siberia from 1483 to 1500. When the world had not yet seen the

discovery of Christopher Columbus, when England had yet to settle dynastic struggles

and when travelers from Italy had yet to see the splendor of the Middle Kingdom, did the

Russians made their first advances to a land that as of today remains the farthest quarter

of human population.

6.1: Map of Russia including the Russian Far East

Until the thirteenth century, most of the land lying across the Urals was swarmed by the

Mongols under the leadership of Chengiz Khan and later by his descendant Batu Khan.

Under the latter, the Mongols overtook the small princely states of Kievan Russia and

thus was transformed this part of Russia from Slav to Tartar yoke. But in the fifteenth

century, with decline of the Golden Horde of the Mongols and the establishment of the

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Grand Principality of Moscow as the center of the Russian state, the history of Eurasia

was significantly affected. What started as fur acquisition in the thirteenth and fourteenth

centuries, ended with the Far East being explored for trade and commerce in the fervor of

geographical discoveries of the age. In 1582, Yermak’s fleet left for Siberia. Though

initially, Cossacks gained victory in the region, the ensuing guerilla wars lasted some

years before the final surrender of the Tatars. By the 1640s, Russians had reached the

Pacific littoral states of Russia and had established the garrison of Okhotsk from where

lay the sea route to Kamchatka.395

Enthralled by stories of the Siberians which told of a

river “that was supposed to take its source from the heart of China and flow through

marvelous rich country into the huge ocean that bounded the continent at its easternmost

extremities”396

the Cossacks reached the river Amur in quest of its riches in 1646. The

Cossacks thus established Russian control over the territory, collecting tribute in furs

from the local tribes. The second half of the seventeenth century saw rapid exploration of

the areas lying to the east of Lake Baikal. It was during this time that the areas of

Kamchatka and Chukotka were explored, along with the four Siberian rivers; Amur,

Yenisei, Ob and Lena. In addition to this, the Siberian coast and the strait between Russia

and America (Bering Strait) was also discovered by Russian explorers.

At almost the same time, a political change occurred across the border that was to alter

the political landscape of farthest corners of Russia for times to come. The Qing Dynasty

came in power in the Middle Kingdom. The Qing rulers pursued an expansionist policy

in the North whereby they captured Mongolia, and Manchuria. The policy of Qing

Dynasty in the periphery brought conflict with Muscovy which followed a similar policy

395. Alan Wood, Russia’s Frozen Frontier: A History of Siberia and the Russian Far East: 1581-1991, Op.Cit., pp.26,27 396. Leo Pasvolsky, Russia in the Far East, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922), p.11

(327)

in the area. After a series of unsuccessful ambassadorial attempts at bridging bilateral

relations and indecisive military ventures, the Treaty of Nerchinsk was signed in 1689

which laid down,

Russo-Chinese border from the Sea of Okhotsk,

Demanded the dismantling of the fortress of Albazin (the bone of contention in

earlier Russo-Chinese wars) and

Prohibited the Chinese from colonizing the west bank of Amur River (the right to

collect tribute was however retained).397

In spite of all Russian demands not being accepted, the Treaty of Nerchinsk was a

landmark in not only Russo-Chinese relations, but also in the political history of Russia

for it secured international recognition of Siberia as a part of Russia. The question of

border dispute was further settled by the Russo-Chinese Kyakhta Peace Treaty (1721)

which also laid down the procedure for Russo-Chinese trade.398

The pacification in Sino-Russian border relations did not bring healthy prospects for the

Russian Far East as Russian ambitions in the early modern period were concentrated for

the better part in its European neighbors on the western front. For most of the eighteenth

century, Russian ambitions were dedicated to the situation in Poland and Sweden.

However, the appointment of Nikolai Mouravieff as the governor general of Eastern

Siberia significantly added to the pace of Russian advances in the east. By 1852, the

Russians had established a post at Mariinsk. “Nothing but the lethargy of the Russian

397. Igor V. Naumov, The History of Siberia, (New York, Routledge, 2006), p.68 398. Ibid, p.85

(328)

Foreign Office, and the looming of the war cloud in the west, prevented the vigorous

advance of Russian advance in the East.”399

Nevertheless, the Crimean War while a

defeat for the Russians in Europe was also a prelude to Russian advance in the East.

Chinese preoccupation with the Taiping rebels also favored Russia’s eastward drive.

Thereby, starting from 1854 until 1856, three successful expeditions were sent to the

Amur and by 1860 the strategic city of Vladivostok was captured by the Russians.

Expansion in the east continued and brought the Russians in contact with the Japanese. In

1875, the Japanese gave up the Kurile Islands in exchange for the Pacific Long Island.400

A rather more important event in the history of Russo-Japanese relations as well as in the

Russian evaluation of the strategic importance of the RFE was the war between China

and Japan in 1894. By virtue of this war did Russia realize the emerging situation in the

orient; taking place of the decaying power of the once mighty Chinese realm was the

island kingdom of Japan.

The consequent support of China against Japanese encroachments was one of the first

actions in a series of strategic policies against Japan. The revoked zeal in the construction

of Trans-Siberian Railway was another reaction to counter the strategic threat from

Japan. Until this time, the railway was seen mainly as a catalyst for colonization and

commerce. But henceforth, it became a strategic module for far eastern affairs.

399. The Story of Russia and the Far East: Being a Series of Papers Contributed to the “Shanghai Mercury”, During the

latter part of the year 1899, with Five Additional Papers added in October, 1902, Op.Cit., p.21 400. Ibid, p.23

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6.2: Map of Russian expansion (1553-1894)

In the early twentieth century, the Bolshevik Revolution affected Siberia as it did the rest

of Russia. By January 1918, Soviet authority was established in the RFE. Nevertheless,

the history of independence quest in Eastern Siberia dates back to roughly the same time.

During the Russian Civil War, local groups in the Far East controlled the territory,

cooperating with the Whites; the political opponents of the Bolsheviks. However, in

1921, four territories agreed to unite into the Far Eastern Republic. At the time, Soviet

Russia exercised authority west of Lake Baikal, while Japan occupied most of the Pacific

coast including the Vladivostok, Sakhalin Island. Therefore, Lenin conceived the creation

of Far Eastern Republic with its capital in Chita to act as buffer state between Russia and

Japan. After 1922, following Japanese withdrawal, the Far Eastern Republic was formally

merged with the USSR.

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6.3: Far Eastern Republic in 1922

The ensuing years brought little change to the socio-economic conditions of the Republic.

It was not until the twentieth century that the far east of Russia managed to enter policy

books in the Kremlin.

6.2 THE SOVIET YEARS AND AFTERWARDS

During the Soviet era, a huge scale military complex was maintained in the RFE. The

territory largely served as a military outpost and raw material base for the rest of the

country. The Far East witnessed and was directly influenced as and when tensions

escalated in its foreign neighborhood. Russian hostility with Japan, American presence in

the Pacific, Korean War and Cultural Revolution in China, all manifested the

vulnerability of the region. Kremlin had stationed half a million troops in the region.

(331)

“The Soviet military deployed hundreds of intercontinental and intermediate-range

nuclear missiles in Siberia and the Far East, complemented by over 200 strategic bombers

and thousands of fighter aircrafts.”401

Other than the aforementioned facts, the RFE also

served as Soviet Union’s labor and exile camp. It was only during the tenure of

Gorbachev, that Moscow proposed to open RFE to international investment and

development. In 1987, the Russia politburo approved 223 billion Ruble Long Term

Program for the Comprehensive Development of the Far Eastern Economic Region.

Nothing, however, came out of the proposed program. Therefore, “as a result of the

command system, the RFE entered the reform era with a distorted structure of costs and

production. Its economy, dominated by the primary industries of fishing, military

equipment, timber, non-ferrous metals, and diamonds had been linked to the western

Soviet Union in a pattern of forced integration.”402

The region, which serves a pivot for Trans-Siberian Railway, has been highly dependent

on trade with foreign countries. But, for many decades, the RFE had failed to occupy the

attention of Russian leadership. During years of Soviet rule and the time following the

demise of the USSR, not much was done for the development of the region. As a matter

of fact, even the military facilities in the RFE suffered heavily from Moscow’s lack of

attention, whereby, the former military producers now seek “foreign orders or delivered

crop harvesters on credit to the local collective farms.” This, in return has alienated the

region’s population from the center as the living conditions of the latter remain in stark

comparison to those enjoyed by western Russia. The gap left by Russian involvement in

the region was filled by the neighbors as much as to make the Russian president stop at

401. Judith Thornton ed, Russia’s Far East: A Region at Risk, (University of Washington Press, 2002), p.5 402. Ibid, pp.5-6

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Blagoveshchensk, on his way to G-8 summit in Okinawa in 2000. President Putin, on that

occasion admitted RFE’s “colossal distance and alienation from the center” and that if

serious efforts for the development of RFE were not made, very soon the “Russian

population will be speaking mainly Japanese, Chinese, and Korean.”403

Since the start of the new millennium, Putin’s administration has been trying to bring the

RFE into national policy framework. In 2001, cooperation treaties were signed with

Beijing and Pyongyang. Moreover, economic recovery seemed a rather more probable

task in 2001 that it had been in years. High oil prices made it easier for the Russian

government to increase duty on oil, petroleum and mineral exports. Tax collection

brought the federal budget revenues to 17% of the GDP for 2000. In addition, the

industrial output and total investment increased 9.6% and 17.7% in comparison to the

figures of 1999 and Russia enjoyed a trade surplus of $61 billion and current account

surplus of $46 billion, equal to 19% of GDP.404

As a matter of fact, since the past few years, Russia has shown increased interest in its

easternmost hemisphere, showcasing Russian plans to develop the geo-politically

strategic area as means of increased integration into the Asia-Pacific. The 2012 Asia-

Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was hosted by Russia in the port city of

Vladivostok; signaling Moscow’s changing dynamics towards its outlet to Asia-Pacific.

The signals were confirmed by Vladimir Putin in the Presidential Address to the Federal

Assembly in 2013 when he confirmed Russian recognition of the strategic importance of

the Russian Far East and Siberia and marked the development of these regions as the

403. Ibid, p.7 404. Ibid, p.9

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“national priority for the entire twenty first century.” In view of the strategic location of

the RFE, Russian aspirations for the region cannot be considered exaggerated. Japan lies

just 940 KM across the Sea of Japan from Vladivostok. The Bering Strait, at its narrowest

point, divides Russia and Alaska by a distance of mere 55 miles while the southern tip of

the region shares borders with North Korea and China. An integration of the neighboring

Asian economies with the region presents a potential that can change geo-economic

landscape of not only the periphery but also the world.

Russian plans for the development of its far eastern hemisphere and of emerging as a

Eurasian power has more profound prospects of accomplishment then have ever been in

the future. Political changes of colossal significance have taken place since the last

decade of the twentieth century. The collapse of USSR, the emergence of China as an

economic giant, the economic escalation of Southeast Asian economies has all led to the

realization of geo-strategic and economic importance of the Asia-Pacific. In this scenario,

economic revival of Russia under Putin corresponds with the shift from western centric to

Asian centric economy. Consequently, not only does Moscow now realize, but is also

striving for the attainment of the philosophy of Fyodor Dostoyevsky;

“What is the need of the future seizure of Asia? What is our business

there? This is necessary because Russia is not only in Europe, but also in

Asia; because the Russian is not only a European but also an Asiatic. Not

only that; in our coming destiny, perhaps it is precisely Asia that

represents our main way out…. In Europe we were hangers-on and slaves,

whereas to Asia we shall go as masters. In Europe, we were Asiatics,

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whereas in Asia we too, are Europeans. Our civilizing mission in Asia will

bribe our spirit…. Build two railroads: begin with one to Siberia, and then

to Central Asia, and at once you will see the consequences.”405

(Fyodor Dostoyevsky, 1881)406

The philosophy given by Dostoyevsky in the nineteenth century was endorsed in the late

twentieth century by the Soviet leadership,

“The East, specifically Asia and the Pacific region, is now the place where

civilization is stepping up its pace. Our economy in its development is moving

to Siberia and to the Far East…. The Soviet Union is an Asian, as well as

European country, and it wants to see that the huge Asia-Pacific region, the area

where world politics will likely focus next century, has everything it needs to

improve the situation in it, and that due account is taken of the interests of all

states and of a balance between them. We are against this region being

somebody’s domain.”

(Mikhail S. Gorbachev, 1987)407

The policy of developing the Far East, though was not immediately implemented

following the breakdown of the USSR nor were any concrete changes to be seen

straightaway in the years following 1991. But since that time, particularly after 1999-

2000, a comparatively systematic approach could be seen in Moscow aiming directly at

405. Hafiz Malik, Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), p.3 406. Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Goek-Tepe, Chto Takoe Aziya Dlya Nas? Taken from What is Asia to US: Russia’s Asian

Heartland Yesterday and Today by Milan Hauner, (New York, Routledge, 1990), p.1 407. Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World, (New York: Harper & Row,

1987), p.180

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the internationalization of the Russian Far East. The changing nature of Russian policy

towards Far East is discussed below.

6.3 CHANGING DYNAMICS OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

During the 1980s until the collapse of the USSR, Russian foreign policy was based on the

principle of Perestroika initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev. The coming of the ‘New World

Order’ provided the contemporary Russian policy makers with an opportunity to

synchronize Russian interests with those of the civilized west but also “to blunt and,

eventually, extirpate ancient ethnic animosities on the territory of the former Soviet

Union.”408

There were serious debates in the government circles to ascertain the new

foreign policy of Russia. Two important schools of thought emerged during this time.

First was the Internationalists dominated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and led by

Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, while the Neopatriots or the Drezhavniks, under State

Counselor Sergei Stankevich were members of the Supreme Soviet in the presidential

office.

The internationalists favored a policy of nonintervention in the neighboring regions. The

Drezhavniks advocated a powerful defense of Russian security including the transfer of

Soviet nuclear weapons to Russia, resolving border disputes and catering to the interests

of Russians in the newly formed states. The two groups also differed on their stance for

the USA. The former favored a pro-US policy, while the latter considered the pursuance

of such a policy as a hurdle in exercising great power politics. By 1993, Kozyrev was

acknowledged for looking into Russia’s “national interests” as well as its “regional

408. Michael Mandelbaum, The New Russian Foreign Policy, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), p. 23

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responsibilities.” In January 1993, Kozyrev proposed policy draft to the Committee on

Foreign Relations. President Yelstin signed the same in April 1993. The major change

brought by the policy; Osnovnye polozhenia, was the shifting of emphasis from security

and foreign policies to local economic and political policies as the primary concern for

the new government. The Osnovnye polozhenia laid nine important points of interest for

Russian policy of which only two dealt with affairs beyond the border, namely

maintaining relations with the newly formed states and securing the rights of ethnic

Russians there. The remaining points were exclusively local in nature, for the acquisition

of which it was necessary to have stability in the “Near Abroad.” For this very reason,

“the Post-Soviet Space” called a “unique geopolitical space” by Kozyrev, was to become

the most crucial element in Russian foreign policy. It was also held among the policy

makers that Russia alone would be able to bring peace and stability in this space.409

Nevertheless, by mid 1990s, Yelstin and his government had realized that Russia’s

problems were too serious to be solved merely by using the former Soviet republics. This

did not mean abandonment of the CIS which was formed as a successor entity to the

USSR. The organization was kept intact and meetings were held regularly. But Moscow

also adhered to its policy of “integration” by creating more multilateral organizations

with a lesser number of members. The customs union of four states formed in 1995

(Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) was enlarged in 1999 to include

Tajikistan. Hardly anything fruitful was achieved through the union. The Tashkent

Security Agreement, renamed the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in

1999 consisted of Russia, Belarus and Armenia. Following Uzbekistan’s withdrawal in

409. ibid, p. 24,26-27

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1999, the CSTO was reduced to a body insufficient to satisfy the security needs of the

members. By the end of the decade of 1990s, the Post-Soviet states saw Russia as a force

incapable of managing the security interests of the region. For example, in Afghanistan,

in spite of the fact that Russia was aiding the Northern Alliance; the Taliban advance was

only slightly slowed. Russia’s role in Chechnya was equally disappointing. When asked

for help by the Kyrgyz government against the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in 1999

and 2000, the Russian answer was in denial. Even the creation of a 1500 men force for

use in Central Asia in 2001, though it held regular exercises, was never really fully

deployed.

However, Russia does have other methods for exercising influence in the former states.

In view of the interconnected nature of Soviet economy, the Post-Soviet states remain

dependent on Russia. The states have also innate large sections of Russian population in

their territory, a situation which can be used by Moscow as a tool at any time. The most

effective tool in the post-1991 period remained the control of energy supplies by Russia

to seek concessions from the newly independent states. This was particularly manifested

in the case of Kazakhstan, where electricity for the northern part of the country is

exclusively dependent on Russia. Consequently, Kazakhstan gave stakes to Unified

Energy Systems, Russia’ natural energy network, in some of the hydroelectric stations in

Kazakhstan. In return, Kazakhstan was promised debt forgiveness by Russia. However,

in the early years of agreement, Moscow often secured extra concessions due to its

influential presence in the country. Russia also secured concessions from Azerbaijan,

Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. Russia’s stiff stance at the Caspian Pipeline Consortium

(CPC) to divert oil from Kazakhstan to the Russian port of Novorossiysk made the US

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policy makers realize that maximum amount of Caspian oil should reach the foreign

markets via areas bypassing Russia. Russia created Turkmenrosgaz in 1995 with a view

to continue its control of the Turkmen gas industry. Following President Niyazov’s

disillusionment with Turkmenrosgaz, Gazprom used to keep Turkmen gas away from

European markets and apportioning it to low paying customers of CIS. At the same time,

Russian military was also anxious of the policy to be followed in Central Asia. The

201stMotorized Division of Russia continued its presence in Tajikistan despite of the

continued allegations by the latter of the former facilitating drug trade in the country.

Russia’s limited presence in Central Asia was supported in different circles of the

country. The problems confronted by ethnic Russians in these states were one reason for

advocating Russian military presence in the region.

Russia’s fight to curb inflation in its own premises was what led to the untangling of

post-Soviet states’ economies. When Vladimir Putin succeeded to the Russian leadership

in 1999, the Central Asians whom he confronted were comparatively aware of their

national interests. He turned it into an opportunity by treating his Central Asian

counterparts as his equals; a move deemed very unlikely of his predecessor. It was during

his term that Russia admitted its limitation of resources for the first time.410

Terrorism

was the most important agenda in Russia’s foreign policy. With terrorism on the foremost

agenda, Russian Military Doctrine of 2000, National Security Concept of 2000 and the

Foreign Policy Concept of 2000 were developed under Putin’s patronage. In January

2001, terrorism was labeled as a primary threat for Russia, Central Asia and the rest of

the world. Putin, while addressing the Foreign Ministry said:

410. Martha Bill Olcott, Central Asia’s Second Chance, Op. Cit., pp.55-57,60-61

(339)

“Our country has to face a whole range of acute questions. They include

regional conflicts, separatism, terrorism, uncontrolled migration,

organized crime and others. I would like to stress the danger of

international terrorism and fundamentalism of any, absolutely any, stripe.

We have said this on many occasions and we are responsible for it

becoming the part of international vocabulary. Quite contrary a Terrorist

International is emerging and together with our partners we should

proceed in a concerted and coordinated way. It is in our direct interest to

contribute to the establishment of effective mechanisms of international

cooperation in every area.”411

Besides terrorism, Russian policy since the turn of the century has been primarily focused

on economic up-gradation of the country and restructuring the ragged economic fabric

carried down from the Soviet legacy. In this context also, as discussed above, Russia

initially attempted economic renaissance by means of cooperation with the former Soviet

states. The latest example in this regard is of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU)

formed in 2015. Formed for a deeper integration of the former Soviet states, the Union

comprises of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. The importance of

EEU is described as follows:

“EEU is a massive economic block comprising a single economic market

of 170 million people, over 20 million square kilometers of land, and GSP

of 2.7 trillion USD…. An important feature of the EEU is the unification

411. Lena Johnson, Vladimir Putin and Central Asia: The shaping of Russian Foreign Policy, (New York: I.B Tauris,

2004), p.66

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of economic policies among the member states, elaboration of common

market strategies, and coordination of policies in the energy sector,

industry, agriculture and transport. These events add a global dimension to

Russia’s new Asian-Pacific strategy and attracts more interests to the

“Asia Pacific’s last frontier.”412

An important realization, in addition to the admission of terrorism as a grave threat to

country’s integrity, was the recognition of the fact that Russia could not endeavor

economic revival through trade with CIS alone. For this, Moscow realized the

indispensability of investment and cooperation in those quarters of the country which

were heretofore limited to broiling military bases or exile camps. In view of Russian

relations with the West and of limitations in the Central Asian market, Moscow has been

actively seeking convergence with Asia-Pacific economies so as to expand economic

activity in the resource rich regions of RFE and Siberia which in the past had been either

functionally limited or preferred to be overlooked in the context of regional geo-political

milieu. However, as the world order has changed so has the bilateral relations been

modified on various fronts. This is particularly true in the case of Russia and China which

have transformed rather profoundly in the recent past. Relations between the two

countries shifted time and again during the Cold War years. Following the collapse of

Communism, Russian aspirations of rebuilding the national economy coincided with

China’s policy of socialist market economy, and therefore, relations between the two

countries have come at unprecedented high level.

412. Jing Huang, Alexander Korolev, ed., International Cooperation in the Development of Russia’s Far East and

Siberia, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p. 4

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In the case of RFE, Chinese interest in the region is manifested by high levels of

cooperation and investment by Beijing. A burgeoning RFE guarantees a thriving Chinese

market in the region. Similarly, in spite of Russian apprehensions against increasing

Chinese presence as threat to Russian demography in the region, the former is keen to

benefit from Chinese experience in successful zonal development, distinctive proficiency

in transport infrastructure and its ever growing economy and foreign reserve for the

development of RFE.

6.4 A BRIEF OUTLOOK OF THE RFE

With the close of the twentieth century ended the era of Far Eastern Republic as its status

was changed into that of Russian Far Eastern Federal District (RFEFD) by President

Putin in May 2000. As a matter of fact, many changes have taken place in the policy

graph in the region’s transition from Soviet Era Far Eastern Republic to Far Eastern

Federal District under Putin’s government. Since the beginning of the current century,

Russian leadership has manifested its increased interest in the development of this region

that had been, until now, significantly neglected. In addition to the amendment in the

region’s official status, Moscow established ministry for the Development of the Russian

Far East in 2012.

The District consists of four oblasts, three krais, one orkug and one republic. Each has its

own unique set of geographical, mineral and strategic wealth.

Lying on the southeast of Russia, situated on the banks of River Amur and River Zeya is

Amur Oblast sharing borders with Khabarovsk Krai and Jewish Autonomous Oblast of

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the Far Eastern Federal District. Of all the regions of Far Eastern Federal District, Amur

Oblast has the longest common border with the PRC. As a result, not only is China the

chief importer of Amur timber, but also the economic importance of Amur Oblast

increases multifold for the Russian Federation. In addition to this, this region is also the

fourth largest producer of gold in the country. The fact that, Trans-Siberian and Baikal-

Amur railway line cross Amur Oblast further adds to the geo-economic significance of

the region. Encompassing an area of 361,913 sq. km, the Oblast has a population of

811,274 (as of January 2014), leaving the population density at 2.2 per sq. km.413

The

area discovered in 1639, came under Russian control in second half of the nineteenth

century. The region was given status of an oblast in 1932. However, during the early

post-Soviet years, the Amur Oblast experienced a short of episode of self-declared state

of transition into a republic and later of adopting a republican constitution.

According to the statistics of 2012, there were 2,934 km of railways and 10,731 km

paved roads in the Oblast while the gross regional product (GRP) was estimated at

234,010m rubles. Agricultural activities in Amur Oblast are mainly limited to animal

husbandry, bee keeping and vegetable and grain production. Minerals, including iron,

titanium and silver, though in abundance remain largely unexploited.414

Sharing border with Amur Oblast and PRC, the Jewish Autonomous Oblast covering

36,266 sq. km in its territory was carved out by Stalin to be inhabited by Jews the

majority of whom came under Russian control following the partitions of Poland in the

eighteenth century. During the nineteenth and early twentieth century, these Jews, unless

413. The Territories of the Russian Federation, Europa Publishers, (Oxon: Routledge, 2014), p.291 414. Ibid, p.293

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given special permission, could only live within the Pale of Settlement (comprising of

modern day territories of Belarus, Lithuania, Ukraine and Poland). The Birobidzhan

national region, lying on the southwest of Khabarovsk Krai was incorporated into the

Russian Far East for the establishment of Jewish Autonomous Oblast in 1934 and

remained a part of Khabarovsk until 1991.415

Khabarovsk Krai, covering an area of 787,633 sq. km, lies on the Sea of Okhotsk and

shares borders with Jewish Autonomous Oblast, Amur Oblast, Republic of Sakha,

Magadan Oblast and PRC. Established as a military outpost in 1858, the region benefitted

from the Trans-Siberian railway since 1905. At the time of its establishment into a krai in

1938 until 1945, the Sakhalin formed part of its jurisdiction, whereas the Jewish

Autonomous Oblast remained a principality of the Krai until 1991.Khabarovsk Krai

shares an important part in the country’s economy. The region’s importance increases

multifold for being a hydrocarbon route. The East Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline

transports Russian crude oil to China, Japan and Korea. The Sakhalin-Khabarovsk-

Vladivostok gas pipeline ships gas from Sakhalin to Khabarovsk and Vladivostok.

Realizing the geo-political importance of the region, Moscow has established a Port

Special Economic Zone in Khabarovsk and more than 600 companies from China, USA,

South Korea, Singapore, Australia, New Zeeland and the European Union are operating

in the region.

415.Ibid, p.301

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6.4: East Siberian- Pacific Ocean Pipeline

Another important territory of the RFEFD is Primorskior Maritime Krai. Called Primorye

in the local dialect, the Krai is situated at a highly strategic location; on the Sea of Japan,

with two international borders with China in the west and North Korea in the southwest.

More than two-third of the 164,673 sq km land is forested. The highly strategic province

of Russia was originally recognized as Chinese procession under the terms of the Treaty

of Nerchinsk (1687). In 1860, the Treaty of Peking made the territory a legal Russian

dominion. Thereby, the port of Vladivostok was founded for maritime trade.

In 1938, the Soviet administration officially created the Maritime Krai.416

Since then,

economic development of the Krai has been in the policy framework of all Russian

regimes. Historically, major economic activities of Primorsky Krai centered on the

traditional fishing and mining industries. However, with the passage of time, along with

traditional commerce, region’s natural resources have taken place in the region’s

416. Ibid. p.287

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industrial potential which now concentrates heavily on metal processing, electricity and

tool building. The capital of Primorski Krai, Vladivostok, is being developed as a major

economic hub. Transneft, Roseneft and Gazprom have handsome shares in regional

investment. In addition to this, participation of international actors is also evident in the

regional economic activity.

Third oblast of the RFEFD; Magadan Oblast, occupies an area of 462,464 sq. km and is

situated in the northeast of Russia where it shares common border with the District’s

regions of Kamchatka Krai in the east, Chukotka Autonomous Orkug in the northeast,

Khabarovsk Krai in the southwest and Republic of Sakha in the northwest. While the

southeastern belt of Magadan has a coastline along the Sea of Okhotsk, a larger part of

the Oblast is mountainous, and has the landscape of forest and tundra-forest. Russian

expansion into Magadan dates back to the seventeenth century. At the time of the

Bolshevik Revolution, Magadan Oblast was a part of the Far Eastern Republic and served

as Gulag camp during Stalin’s era. At the time of the establishment of Magadan Oblast in

1953, Chukot Orkug was also included in its jurisdiction. However, the creation of

Chukot Autonomous Orkug in 1992 ended the episode, thereby significantly reducing

Magadan territory. In a territory that spans over four hundred square kilometers of land

and offers sizeable reserves of tin, tungsten, silver, timber, peat, petroleum and natural

gas; the Oblast has 2,440 km of paved roads and no railways. The first plan for a railway

track in Magadan was proposed as recently as in 2014 under an expansion program of the

Trans-Siberia Railway.417

417. Anna Leisowska, Siberia’s Great New Railway Starts Operating to Yakutsk, The Siberian Times, September 1, 2014,

available at http://siberiantimes.com/business/casestudy/news/siberias-great-new-railway-starts-operating-to-yakutsk

(346)

The RFEFD also consists of island territories. One such territory is the Sakhalin Oblast

comprising of Sakhalin and Kurile islands. Other than Sakhalin which lies off the coast of

Khabarovsk Krai, the Kurile Islands extending from Kamchatka to Hokkaido Island of

Japan, have long been a subject of dispute between Russia and its Pacific neighbor. After

gaining control of in 1644, the Sakhalin Island served as a prison cell for the Czars until

its occupation by the Japanese in the late eighteenth century. In 1853, Russians

established a military base in the region. This was followed by joint administration of the

island until 1875 when it was returned to Russia in exchange of the Kurile Island.

Together with the Kurile Island and Khabarovsk Krai, the Sakhalin Island became a

separate administrative division in 1947.

Brought under Russian control in 1743, Kamchatka Krai remained a Soviet subject as

Kamchatka Oblast. It was in 2007, that on the requests of deputies of Kamchatka and

Koryag Autonomous Orkug, the two regions were merged to form the Kamchatka Krai.

Kamchatka Krai borders Chukotka Autonomous Orkug in the north and Magadan Oblast

in the northwest and is washed by Pacific Ocean, Bering Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk in

the east, northeast and west respectively. Economic struggle of the local population

started early in the twentieth century. During the period of Soviet Collectivization,

reindeers, which constitute a basic cultural feature of the Krai, was put under sovkhozy

(collective state property) unlike the traditional practice of managing herds by

experienced herders. Similarly, the primary industry of Kamchatka Krai (to this date);

fishery was brought under the umbrella of kolkhozy (collective farms for commercial

fishing). Although the results of these projects remained far from pleasant for the local

populace, the state of affairs changed in the 1950s when Moscow heavily invested in the

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region’s industrial sector. The decades of 1960s and 1970s saw high tides of Soviet

investment followed by a major influx of professionals from European Russia entering

the region. The result was improved living standards along with demographic changes.

However, the collapse of the USSR also brought the state investment projects to an end.

Consequently, from 1991 to 2004, a decline of 124, 000 people was recorded in the

regional population.418

The shore of the two oceans’, Chukotka Autonomous Orkug, facing Alaska across the

Bering Strait in the east and Sakha Republic in the west, stretches from Arctic Ocean in

the north to the Pacific Ocean in the east. The Chukchi inhabited area was infiltrated by

Russians in the seventeenth century. Later on, it was incorporated into the Magadan

Oblast during Soviet rule. Shortly after the demise of the Soviet Union, the region

acquired the status of an autonomous orkug. During Soviet rule, the Orkug served as a

military base against potential threat from the US, although tin and gold deposits were

found in the region in 1930s and 1950s respectively. In view of the strategic and mineral

wealth of Chukotka, Russian citizens were offered ‘long rubles’ (high pay scales) for

voluntarily settling in this far off Far Eastern region. But with the collapse of the USSR,

the center could no longer afford high pay scales for the settlers. As a result of this and in

the absence of government subsidies, scores of people left Chukotka Autonomous Orkug

in favor of settling in the European parts of Russia. Although a few positive changes have

occurred following the election of Roman Abramovich as the Orkug’s governor in 2000,

the socio-economic conditions in the Orkug are far from healthy.

418. http://www.kamchatka.gov.ru/en/index.php?cont=7

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As for Sakha Republic, often referred to as Russia’s Diamond Colony, is Russia’s largest

diamond producing area; contributing 25% of global diamond production. Moreover, the

region is highly rich in natural resources. However, the vast expanse of land (previously

called Yakutia) which is nine times the size of Belgium or slightly larger than India419

has

an extremely thin population. In addition to lack of infrastructure and socio-economic

resources, the climatic severity of the region is also a reason for the scarce population.

Believed to be the coldest region of the Northern hemisphere, the temperature here can

fall as low as -71°C. Sakha is washed by two seas of the Arctic Ocean in the north; the

Laptev Sea and the East Siberian Sea. In the seventeenth century, Russian explorers and

the native masses first encountered each other on the banks of River Lena. In 1632, the

Russian settlers built a fort on the western river bank. It was later established as the city

of Yakutsk; the current capital of the republic. In 1923, Soviet power was laid on the city.

The strategic location of the Republic combined with immense wealth of natural

resources, kept the region under high priority in the Soviet policy framework. The

Republic serves as a doorway to Northeast Asia, Pacific coasts and northwest America.

In the context of natural reserves, it is held that “every element of Mendeleev’s

table”420

can be found in the region. During the years of Soviet rule, the region witnessed

high scale investment including gold mining (1920s), the inception of the Northern Sea

Route and the development of the Tiksi seaport (1930s), as well as diamond mining and

exploration (1950s). Following the demise of the USSR, Sakha was established as an

independent republic. The new republic followed the footsteps of the center in embarking

steps towards privatization. However, a close analysis of the whole process reflects that

419. John Tichotsky, Russia’s diamond Colony: The Republic of Sakha, (New York: Routledge, 2000), p.21 420. Ibid, p.23

(349)

privatization in Sakha was limited to a power shift from local to regional

government.421

Although positive indicators can be seen in the economic development of

Sakha Republic, such as improvement in gold and diamond mining and hydrocarbon

exploration, many problems still persist in the economic development of the Republic

including high tariff rates for transportation services, complex customs procedure, and

lack of adequate means for the promotion of local products.

With minor exceptions, vast majority of the region remains backward and

underdeveloped; a profound manifestation of physical and emotional alienation from the

center. Moreover, developing RFE and fostering Russia’s Asia-Pacific rim is not as

simple as it may appear. The topography of the region and its difficult terrain alone are

substantial hindrances in way of the region becoming a cross-road between Asia and the

west. As a matter of fact, Moscow must struggle hard to “transform its territorial curse

into comparative advantage.”422

6.5 OSVOENIE: RUSSIA’S NORTHERN POLICY

Commencing form 2000, a more widespread policy for the North/Arctic was developed

by the newly elected Putin presidency. Initially the policy centered on principles of free

market, and “ensuring that the North became a profitable part of the Russian state that no

longer required special policy attention…encouraging migration from areas of the North

that no longer had prospects of viable economic activity.”423

Nevertheless, the North

421. Ibid, p.160 422. Alexander Korolev, Jing Huang, International Cooperation in the Development of Russia’s Far East and Siberia,

(Springer, 2015), p.6 423.423. Elana Wilson Rowe, Russia’s Northern Policy: Balancing an Open and Closed North, Russian Analytical Digest,

No. 96, 12 May 2011, p.2, available at http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-

securities-studies/pdfs/RAD-96-2-5.pdf

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could not be ignored form Russia’s periphery concentrations and in 2008 with the

issuance of the document entitled Foundations of Russian Federation State Policy in the

Arctic through 2020 and Beyond, the North resurfaced on Moscow’s policy graph as a

region that was once again to be dealt separately by the center. The document sheds light

on softer areas of policy making, such as, environment, human rights, living standards

and cooperation with other Arctic states. The document, nonetheless, also discusses the

importance of Arctic resource base and Arctic shipping routes in view of Russian

economic development in the future.

In geographical terms, the term Arctic relates to the area around North Pole. Today, the

North encompasses more than 60% of the Russian landmass whereas Russian sector of

the Arctic covers 9 million km² of which 6 km² are waters.424

The Russian Security

Council has defined Arctic as follows:

“the northern area of the Earth, including the deep Arctic Basin, shallow

marginal areas of the islands and the adjacent parts of the continent of

Europe, Asia and North America. Within the Arctic are five Arctic states –

Russia, Canada, the United States of America, Norway and Denmark,

which have the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the

Arctic Ocean.”425

424. Jakub M. Godzimirski Elana Wilson Rowe Helge Blakkisrud, The Arctic: What Does Russia See? What Does

Russia Want? Ministry of Defense, Oslo, 2012, p.3 425. Principles of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period till 2020 and Beyond, available

at http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/15/98.html

(351)

6.5: Map of Russia’s north

Extending from the Russia’s western border with Norway, all the way to the Bering

Strait, the North gives due share to Moscow in its geopolitics. Russia also happens to be

the largest state in the Arctic and thus plays an important role in Arctic energy markets.

The geopolitics of North has changed significantly since the Cold War during which time

the regional geopolitical milieu remained highly militarized. However, the post-Soviet

years have witnessed high scale international cooperation in issues relating to military,

society and environment. Moreover, the strategic importance of the Arctic has also

escalated in recent years as the region is believed to be housing 25% of global

undiscovered hydrocarbon reserves. Also, “climate change is rendering the northern

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icescape less predictable in the short term, and more open in the long term,”426

a fact that

Russia and other states of the Arctic remain determined to utilize to its full potential.

6.6 A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NORTH

First mention to the North is found in the works of Greek traveler Pytheas who traveled

to a "gloomy land" ahead of which "there is no sea or land or air with some mixture of all

these elements hanging in space."427

This perception of the North remained in the

European mind and began to change only with the appearance of the Norsemen between

the ninth and eleventh centuries. From this time onwards, the North was an

uncomfortable but familiar acquaintance for the European rulers. The knowledge about

the region, though still remained largely vague. The notion of mastering the land and its

resources began in the sixteenth century when the Russians advanced across the Urals to

use the territory from the Ural Mountains to Alaska as a supply station of fur and pelt of

marine and terrestrial animals. Exploitation of resources remained a primary activity in

the North through the middle ages. The Czarist regimes gave subsidies and concessions

to commercial activities in the region. In addition to this, development of the Northeast

Passage also received royal patronage, which in turn laid the foundations for such

infrastructure as the Northeast Shipping Route that the Soviet government later expanded

to access capital in the North. The Soviets maintained a highly business driven approach

in the North. To explain what was required by the USSR from the Far North, Otto

426. Elana Wilson Rowe, Russia’s Northern Policy: Balancing an Open and Closed North, Russian Analytical Digest,

No. 96, 12 May 2011, p.2, available at http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-

securities-studies/pdfs/RAD-96-2-5.pdf 427. V.O Klyuchevskiy, History of the Northern Sea Route, https://www.nersc.no/sites/www.nersc.no/files/fulltext-3.pdf

(353)

Schmidt mentioned the mineral resources that the USSR was “in short supply of or did

not have”, forestry, hunting, marine animals, fishing and reindeer hunting.428

During the sixteenth century merchants from the Netherlands and England made several

voyages to the Arctic with the aim of moving eastwards through the ice. The sailors were

able to reach the eastern Barents Sea and the Kara Sea. The voyages were followed by

intense Russian explorations in the RFE and Siberia. Not only was the Asian Russia

explored from Urals to the Pacific Ocean but the land and seas in the north of Russia

were also claimed in the Czar's name. Russia thereby led the way in Arctic shipping.

With the emergence of Cossacks in the Russian political map, the exploration of the

North was carried to a higher level and by 1650 all the major rivers had been explored

and settlements established alongside. As a result of these explorations, Russian

knowledge of the Northern conditions was considerably widened, which later helped

Peter I in the development of foreign trade. It was also during this time that the Great

Northern Expedition (1733-42) was sent for the exploration of the Arctic. In addition to

the discovery of Alaska, the Expedition made hallmark achievements in the study of the

Arctic. It is for these reasons that the Great Northern Expedition is counted among "most

effective expeditions in the history of earth's explorations."429

But it was still more than a

hundred years later that the first successful voyage passed through the NSR; led by a

Swedish scientist in 1878. It was sponsored by King Oscar II of Sweden, Swedish

manufacturer O. Dikson and a Russian gold miner A.M Sibiryakov.

428. Ibid, p.4 429. V.O Klyuchevskiy, History of the Northern Sea Route, https://www.nersc.no/sites/www.nersc.no/files/fulltext-3.pdf

(354)

During the decades of Soviet rule, the North largely remained a closed nationalized entity

marking a space in the Soviet economic planning. Soon after taking control of the RFE in

1922, various expeditions were sent for the calculation of regional potential. Otto

Schmidt, the architect of the Northern Shipping Route (NSR) and Stalin’s chief advisor

on the North, described the importance of North for Soviet policy makers in these words:

“We look at the Far North as simply a geographical part of the Soviet

Union. Since the [North] exists, then it is necessary that the people living

there should enjoy those benefits which the members of the Soviet Union

enjoy in those parts outside [the North]. Since the [North] exists and uses

some of the benefits [of the Soviet Union] then it is necessary that [the

North] must give [the Soviet Union] what it can give.”430

The importance of the NSR increased further after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. The

highly significant Hydrographic Expedition to the Arctic Ocean (1910-1915) discovered

the Severnaya Zemlya Archipelago, which Czar Nicholas formally claimed in the

Country’s name in September 1916. After the Russian Revolution, the Arctic was

explored on a large scale. Specialized research institutes for Arctic studies were also

established during this time, notable among them being the Northern Research

Commercial Expedition (later re-organized as the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute;

AARI) and the Floating Marine Institute (later became the State Oceanographic Institute).

The volume of trade along the NSR also increased substantially during the post-

430. John Tichotsky, Russia’s Diamond Colony: The Republic of Sakha, Op.Cit., p.2

(355)

revolution years. With the help of icebreakers, the trade volume increased six times since

the inception of trade activities along the route in the nineteenth century.431

The Soviet plan for mastery over the North continued and the center continued to import

resources from the RFE where they were either used as raw materials for national

industrialization or exported for foreign capital. During the decade of 1970s, oil and gas

fields of Western Siberia were rapidly developed; making Soviet Union the largest

hydrocarbon producer in the world. During the same years, timber production, electric

and infrastructure development and excessive mining of gold, diamond and coal was

conducted on state orders. In the light of Perestroika, Gorbachev called for a revised

Northern Policy in favor of the local population. The policy however could not continue

long as the collapse of the USSR in succeeding years also gravely affected the RFE. The

Russian policy during the transitional period of the 1990s remained disorganized and

focused on ad hoc solutions to regional problems. During this period, a renewed interest

of the international community could be seen in the North. This was due to the fact that

the North is viewed as a region with maximum benefits and minimum chances of

conflict. The Arctic Council, the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, Arctic Military

Environmental Cooperation (AMEC) and the EU Northern Dimension were established

during this period.

However, there have been times when Moscow has sought to minimize international

cooperation in the Russian North. For example, the AMEC, was established by Norway,

Russia and the US in 1996 for the containment of radioactive pollution in the North with

431.V.O Klyuchevskiy, History of the Northern Sea Route, https://www.nersc.no/sites/www.nersc.no/files/fulltext-3.pdf

(356)

“particular attention paid to the Northern Fleet in northwest Russia.” In 2007, on a

routine visit to Russia, an AMEC employee was denied entry in Russia on account of

alleged illegal information gathering. This was, in fact, an indication of a change in

Russian approach apropos the degree to which the Russian North should be open to

international actors and activities. As a matter of fact, there are certain intertwining areas

in Russia’s Arctic policy, such as relating to areas with complete Russian sovereignty,

areas with partial sovereignty (such as the exclusive economic zone of Russia), areas with

sovereignty of other Arctic states and areas where Russia believes to have special rights

(such as Svalbard Archipelago). Russian claims in the UN in 2001 of adding 20 percent

or 1.2 million km² to the 1.3 million km² of Russian EEZ in the Arctic can be seen in

light of escalating Russian attention towards the Arctic in recent years. This interest can

also be seen as Russian attempt at regaining her international position. The “sheer length

of the Northern border and the importance of the Arctic vector in…. Russian strategic

imagination”432

contribute in the region being viewed as geopolitically and strategically

important part of Osvoenie. Russian military presence in the region serves dual purpose;

it ensures military parity with the US while protecting Moscow’s economic interests.

According to Alexander Kokoshin, former secretary of the Security Council, in order to

secure control of the regional development, Russia must strengthen the Northern Fleet

and border guard by building airbases in the region. Moreover, the development of the

Arctic region has become more of a necessity for Moscow in view of the Great Game. In

order for Russia to maintain its hegemony in international economy, the hydrocarbon

giants, such as, Gazprom and Rosneft will attach immense importance to the “Arctic

432. Jakub M. Godzimirski Elana Wilson Rowe Helge Blakkisrud, The Arctic: What Does Russia See? What Does

Russia Want?, Ministry of Defense, Oslo, 2012, p.4

(357)

Front”433

for the arctic may contain more than 200 billion tons of oil and 400 trillion m3

of natural gas.434

As a matter of fact, it is the economic potential of the Arctic that makes

it indispensable for the Arctic states in general and Russia in particular. In contrast to the

mere 8% population that lives in the Arctic, the region generates 20% of Russia’s GDP

and 22% of national exports. According to Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy, former

commander of the Northern Fleet, Arctic represents 90% of Russia’s production of gas,

60% of oil, 90% of nickel and cobalt, about 60% of copper and 98% of platinum.435

Osvoenie or Mastering of the North has been consistently followed in Russia since the

inception of the idea in the eighteenth century. The focus has however shifted from fur

trade to hydrocarbon and resource extraction. For this, official attempts aiming at

modernization of the region have been put in place for many decades, though there still

remains much to be done for improving the region’s socio-economic conditions. A silver

lining in this milieu is the international attention directed at RFE and Russia’s North.

International investment can already be seen in various quarters of the North which in

return gives a promising outlook to the region in future. Other than economic cooperation

and foreign investment in the RFE, climate change also aides’ Russian aspirations for the

region. As ice melts in the Arctic, new sea routes emerge that are presumed to be safer

and shorter than conventional sea lanes. In the same light, the Northern Sea Route (NSR)

is drawing international attention as alternative sea route between Northeast Asia and

Western Europe. Recession of Arctic ice and discovery of raw materials at a time when

there is a growing demand for the same escalates the future economic importance of the

433. Ibid, p. 5 434. Zonn, Igor & Sergey Zhiltsov. 2011. ‘Arkticheskiy neftegazovyy front. Dannye po zapasam resursov

na Kraynem Severe nuzhdayutsya v utochnenii’. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 13 December 435. Ibid, p.5

(358)

region and the sea route. The NSR also referred to as the Northeast Passage (NEP),436

is

defined by Russian legislation as extending from the Novaya Zhelaniya Straits to Cape

Dezhnev by the Bering Strait.437

Unlike similar latitudes elsewhere, this region remains

ice-free because of the warm water flows from the Gulf Stream “flowing into the North

Atlantic current, flowing towards the Northeast Atlantic.”438

The emergence of new sea

routes is gaining attention from regional and non-regional actors alike. Similarly, the

Russian Climate Doctrine of 2009 encourages to adapt to the socio-economic dimensions

of climate change as well as to increase energy proficiency on the domestic front by

reducing greenhouse emissions.

Since the early years of the twenty first century, the notable reduction in ice thickness in

the Arctic has incited wide interest in the economic potential of the region. Compared to

Northwest Passage and the Trans Polar Route, the NEP boasts highest chances of

profitable activity in the future. Such areas as fishing, tourism, research and resource

extraction can benefit from the potential enriched sea route; though resource extraction

remains as a filed with highest chances of swift prospective as the route promises

westward and eastward connection to Europe and Asia. As a matter of fact, the shipping

routes from Northeast Asia to Europe will be shortened to 24% of the distance covered

via the Suez Canal route. These factors have led to an escalated international interest in

436. NEP is at times called theNorthern Sea Route (NSR), the NSR is formally defined in Russian law as extending from

the Novaya Zhelaniya straits (at the Novaya Zemlya archipelago, connecting the Barents Sea to the West and the Kara

Sea to the East), to Cape Dezhnev by the Bering Strait. The main difference between the NSR and the NEP is that the

latter comprises the Barents Sea and provides access to the port of Murmansk, the largest Russian Arctic port. Given

that the NSR constitutes the majority of the NEP, many sources use the terms NSR and NEP interchangeably. 437. The difference between NEP and NSR is that the former includes the Barents Sea and gives access to the Port of

Murmansk (the largest Russian Arctic port). 438. Albert Buixade Farre, et al, Commercial Arctic Shipping Through the Northeast Passage: Routes, Resources,

Governance, Technology and Infrastructure, Polar Geography, Vol. 37, Issue 4, p.299, 300

(359)

6.6: Northeast Passage439

439.Albert Buixade Farre, et al, Commercial Arctic Shipping Through the Northeast Passage: Routes, Resources,

Governance, Technology and Infrastructure, Polar Geography, Vol. 37, Issue 4

(360)

6.7: Northern Sea Route

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Russia’s North. Singapore and Norway have shown keen interest in the development of

Siberia and the RFE. If the NSR develops as prophesied by certain quarters, the current

status of Singapore as the hub of transportation between east and west can seriously alter.

In this case, highly developed industry and experience enriched workforce of Singapore

can aide in growing instruments of cooperation with Russia in the Far East. Moscow will

welcome the European dimension in the RFE which comes as a result of cooperation with

Norway, which shares substantial partnership with its Russian counterparts in fishery and

oil and energy sector.

The most notable and highly debated foreign trade partner in the RFEFD is the People’s

Republic of China. One of the most important bilateral agreements in the context of Sino-

Russian Arctic partnership is the 30 years’ gas deal between the two neighbors signed in

2014. The agreement is supposed to connect China with Arctic and Siberian gas fields of

Russia through a 4000 KM long pipeline named the Siberian Power (Sila Sibiri).While

Russia seeks Chinese help in the construction of railways to transport cargo to Arctic and

Northern Sea Route ports, the Chinese want Russian assistance in conducting in depth

study of the Arctic and what lies beneath its icy expanse. In 2015, China announced to

begin container voyages and vessel services through the NEP.440

The Russian Deputy

Prime Minister has also asserted the importance of developing NEP which he believed

“guarantees the guarantees the security of year-round cargo shipments both foreign and

domestic…this is not just the economic Silk Road but the cool [Arctic] Silk Road.”441

Moscow is aiming at increasing shipping capacity along the route from four million tons

to eighty million tons by 2030.

440.http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/arctic-shipping-route-through-russia-planned-by-chinese-company-1.3296334 441. https://www.rt.com/business/324973-russia-china-sea-route/

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The importance of Arctic lies not only in the shipping lanes but also in the fact that

beneath the icy exterior of the ocean lies approximately 30% of world’s gas reserves,

20% of oil reserves along with platinum, gold and tin deposits.442

The same fact holds

true in the case of RFE. The entire region of the Russian Far East is rich in natural

resources. Sakhalin Oblast alone boasts of 45 billion BTOE making it a major attraction

for Russia’s foreign investment. In fact, Sakhalin I and Sakhalin II; the major energy

extraction projects in Sakhalin, are being operated by foreign firms. US based Exxon-

Neftegas is working with Russian Roseneft, Japanese SODECO and Indian ONGC

Videsh Ltd in Sakhalin-I, whereas Sakhalin Investment Company (Russia), Gazprom,

Shell, Mitsui and Mitsubishi are operating Sakhalin II. Vladivostok, the capital of

Primorsky Krai has been developed into a major hub of international economic activities.

The Krai located strategically close to South Korea and China has received much

international and domestic attention with Transneft, Rosneft and Gazprom making

handsome investments in the region. Khabarovsk Krai, another part of the RFE,

contributes a healthy share in the country’s economy. The ESPO and the Sakhalin-

Khabarovsk-Vladivostok Pipeline pass through the Krai thereby increasing its

significance. In view of its importance, Moscow has created a Port Special Economic

Zone in Khabarovsk to facilitate trade activities in the region. More than 600 companies

from China, USA, South Korea, Australia, New Zeeland, Singapore and the European

Union are actively operating in the Krai.443

442. https://www.rt.com/news/331837-china-antarctic-arctic-russia/ 443. http://gov.khabkrai.ru/invest2.nsf/folders/welcome-en.htm

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From To Rotterdam, via:

Cape of Good

Hope Suez Canal NEP

Difference between

Suez and NEP

Yokohama, Japan 14,448 11,133 7,010 37%

Busan, South Korea 14,084 10,744 7,667 29%

Shanghai, China 13,796 10,557 8046 24%

Hong Kong, China 13,014 9,701 8,594 11%

Ho Chi Minh City,

Vietnam 12,258 8,887 9,428 –6%

6.8: Sailing distances between Asia and Europe through the NEP (in nautical miles)444

The most important fact however remains that these energy reserves are found in a

quarter which has remained peaceful and stable in contrast to resource rich Middle East,

Africa and South America.

Similarly, Kamchatka Krai, Magadan Oblast, Jewish Autonomous Oblast and Sakha

Republic are not without their advantages. Kamchatka is important to Russia for its

shipbuilding, forestry, fishing, (contributing to 17% of all fish catching in Russia), oil,

coal and gold industries Kamchatka has in fact also secured its place in the Far Eastern

Economic Region. Amur Oblast is known for gold, tungsten, lead, zinc, mercury, copper,

platinum, coal, lead and precious stones. Besides power generation, metallurgy and

timber processing constitute the chief industries of the Oblast. In addition to this,

agriculture in Amur Oblast and also in JAO is also of prime importance. The Trans-

Siberian and the Baikal-Amur Railways further facilitate the economic development of

444. Albert Buixade Farre, et al, Commercial Arctic Shipping Through the Northeast Passage: Routes, Resources,

Governance, Technology and Infrastructure, Polar Geography, Vol. 37, Issue 4, p.301

(364)

the region. Magadan is famous for gold production and has rich reserves of silver and

tungsten. Moreover, the very remote Republic of Sakha continues to be Russia’s

Diamond Colony.

Despite the region’s natural wealth, the population of RFE which amounts to 5% of

Russian population has always lived in poverty. However, with the inception of Putin’s

presidency, major improvements can be seen in the regional situation. Beginning with

state sponsored investments in the region, the federal budget escalated from 19.7 billion

Rubles in 2009 to 26.7 billion Rubles in 2010 of which a major part of 54.5% was

apportioned for Sakha Republic in which lies about half of the Far Eastern Federal

District’s landmass. High scale foreign investments are also running in the RFE with such

international firms as Silver Bear Resources, SRK Exploration, Norton Rose,

Petropavlovsk and Micromine operating actively in the region. Similarly, a few decades

ago hardly any local enterprise could have been expected to take part in RFE business

environment. But since the turn of the century many national firms including Nordgold,

SiGMA OJSC, GV Gold, Kinross, Gazprom, Rosneft and Transneft are running active

businesses in the RFE. As a matter of fact, Moscow’s inclination for setting up

development pace of the RFEFD was very well manifested in choosing Vladivostok as

the principle seat for APEC summit in 2012. In addition to this, many other projects have

been started in RFE for its socio-economic development. In 2014, as part of the policy to

create advanced economic zones in the RFE, the Ministry for the Development of the Far

East signed memorandums with seven international companies. The proposal was given

by President Vladimir Putin in an address to the Russian Duma in 2013 to set up “a

network of special advanced economic development zones in the Far East and East

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Siberia, offering preferential terms for setting up manufacturing and processing

productions aimed, among other things, at export markets.”445

Moreover, in contrast to

other special economic zones operating elsewhere in Russia, special advanced economic

development zones is likely to be implied on those territories which enjoy exemptions

from general regulations including a tax break as suggested by Putin himself in the

Duma. The whole idea of special advanced economic development zones was drafted

after comparing the situation of Far East with East Asian and Asia-Pacific economies

such as Japan, Korea and China.

“The mechanism of special economic zones did not work; Japan gave it up

and instead introduced strategic special zones. Furthermore, as part of the

reform, a special ministry running these zones was set up…The basic idea

behind these strategic zones is the same as in the case of advanced

economic development zones: to exempt a large territory from general

regulations, establish different regulations for it, including tax breaks,

economic freedoms and lower taxes…The same practice was applied in

other countries. South Korea is an example of development through

human capital and state support, which accounts for 90 percent of the

country's economy…since the start of the 21st century, there has been

population drain from the Russian Far East, which is, in fact, the world's

fastest growing region…Only one region in that part of Russia, Chukotka,

has managed to achieve industrial growth of 187 percent year-on-year,

largely thanks to specific microeconomic decisions. This is currently the

445. http://rbth.com/business/2014/09/20/seven_large_foreign_investors_are_to_come_to_russian_far_east_39979.html

(366)

only region in the Far East where the population is growing… in the

1990s, Russia chose the macroeconomic strategy for developing its

regions, whereas Asian countries, on the contrary, opted for specific

microeconomic solutions…China started with establishing four special

economic zones. It is an example of how applied microeconomics has had

an effect…”446

The program has already started to attract Asia-Pacific economies. North Korea is also

likely to participate in some of these advanced economic zones, “crafting a model which

they can then implement on their own territories.”447

A March 2015 protocol will ensure

trilateral cooperation among Russia, North Korea and South Korea. A rather more

important step by the Russian government for harboring closer ties with its neighbors was

the creation of the Eastern Economic Forum in May 2015. With the participation of more

than 20 countries and 800 foreign companies, the level of agreements on wide ranging

fields is most likely to reach high grounds.448

Thus, it has become increasingly clear that Moscow aims at increased economic

integration with huge foreign markets which are closer to the RFE than Moscow itself,

including China, Japan and Indonesia.

446. http://rbth.com/business/2014/09/20/seven_large_foreign_investors_are_to_come_to_russian_far_east_39979.html 447. http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/energy-and-trade-in-russias-far-east-realignment/ 448. http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/russia-seeks-far-east-realignment-domestic-initiatives/

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6.7 CHINESE INVOLVEMENT IN THE RFE

The most important part of RFE’s economic sector remains energy. The Siberian Power

gas pipeline running 4000 KM is expected to add 100 billion cubic meters per year.449

Besides, the construction of two coal export centers worth $768 million at Cape

Petrovsky and Sukhudol Bay in Primorsky Krai have also been undertaken in 2015 with

Chinese help. The ESPO oil pipeline has also been extended; increasing capacity and

decreasing supply costs. Furthermore, the ESPO pipeline which had initially been built

for the export of 20 mt/y via Rosneft to China, has received Chinese consent increase its

ESPO crude imports from 20 mt/y to 30 mt/y by October 2017.450

This move replaces

Saudi Arabia with Russia as chief oil supplier to China.451

This ‘strategic energy alliance’

involves countries other than China. Some recent examples in this context are;

10 year liquefied natural gas agreement with Singapore (2014).

Agreement for the construction of high power floating nuclear plants in Indonesia

in (2014).

Japanese installation of first wind energy units in Kamchatka Krai (2015).

Russian plans to develop RFE also include sectors besides hydrocarbons and energy. It is

particularly due to the reasons that Moscow understands that in order to develop the

region to its full potential in as short a time as possible, the potential of all trading areas

within the region must be calculated. Also, if Russia is to minimize any chances of

Chinese economic and demographic conquest of the RFE, Moscow would need to engage

449. http://tass.ru/en/economy/824749 450. http://www.platts.com/latest-news/oil/singapore/china-to-double-russia-espo-pipeline-imports-27812989 451. http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/energy-and-trade-in-russias-far-east-realignment/

(368)

all contending parties in future development programs for the RFE. For this purpose,

Russia is aiming to double its trade with Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam by 2020 in

energy as well as defense, agriculture and infrastructure projects. For example, Thai and

Indonesian rail networks are to be expanded with Russian help. Russia has also signed a

free trade agreement with Vietnam in 2015.452

6.9: Russia’s key trading partners in Asia ($ billion)453

Nevertheless, the vast lands of RFE are much closer to China than Russia. With

6,215,900 square kilometers territory, RFE has a population of less than 7 million. On the

other side of the fence, at a mere distance of a few miles, Chinese provinces along the

452. http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/energy-and-trade-in-russias-far-east-realignment/ 453. 2013 Russian Foreign Trade Statistical Bulletin. http://rt.com/business/157092-east-west-russia-trade/

(369)

Russian border have a population of almost 100 million in the region. Chinese influence

is further endorsed by their settlers, bilingual sign boards and Chinese products.

It must be noted that the trade statistics of RFEFD are not balanced entirely in the favor

of China. As a matter of fact, China, Japan and South Korea are close contestants in the

regional trade. However, different parts of the region have exceedingly different levels of

dependence on PRC for trade. China‘s share of trade remains high on the regions of

RFEFD bordering with the PRC; Amur Oblast, Primorsky Krai, Jewish Autonomous

Oblast and Khabarovsk Krai. As for the rest, investments from various international

partners including USA, South Korea and Japan are running in the provinces.

Nevertheless, the importance of China for Russian geopolitics rises far above than any of

its western or eastern counterparts. Chinese investment in RFE encompasses several

fields other than hydrocarbons. China and Russia are jointly developing the Zarubino port

located at Russian, North Korean and Chinese borders. The three states converge at the

Tumen River. The project will greatly facilitate in lifting the economic starvation of Jilin

province in the northeast of China which is cut off from the Sea of Japan coast by mere

15 kilometers. Not only does Zarubino port brings Chinese northeast in closer proximity

to North American markets, it also shows promising signs of linking trade access

between underdeveloped Chinese provinces and Europe that could benefit from NEP

routes. It is for these reasons that in comparison to the North Korean port of Rajin on the

other side of the river, Zarubino port is a more reliable option for Chinese government as

the hermit kingdom maintains far from reasonable ties with the west.

(370)

6.10: Share of China, Japan and South Korea in the RFEFD’s Trade454

454. http://www.theasanforum.org/

(371)

6.11: Chinese Investments in the REF-Transbaikal by Province (2011-2012) In Millions of Dollars455

455. http://www.fpri.org

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6.12: Strategic Location of Zarubino Port

In 2014, shortly after the Sino-Russian gas deal, there were talks of an Asian economic

bloc comprising of the RFE and the Chinese northeast, at the St. Petersburg Economic

Forum when the Chinese vice president Li Yuanchao stated the importance of such

projects.

“We know that Russia sets a high value on the development of its Far East

and views China in this respect as the priority partner. The Chinese

government, for its part, approves of the activity of China’s business in

this development,…. In such a way, we can assist the integration of the

workforce, material and financial opportunities of these two regions. And

turn the two into a big market with effective allocation of resources in

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terms of capital and technologies – and gradually into a new economic

bloc in Asia,”456

If such a project is implemented, Beijing has clear advantages against its western

counterparts as,

“its giant state-owned corporations, which boast some of the deepest

pockets in the world and are driven by the government's strategic

calculations as much as by purely commercial considerations.

Compared to Western companies with shareholder responsibility,

they can make hefty investments with much longer planning

horizons and without expecting short-term returns. This gives China

a significant advantage in the RFE, where business projects often

require massive financial outlays, are accompanied with significant

risks, and do not promise quick profits.”457

Russian approach toward Chinese involvement is not free from doubts. It is a widely

acknowledged phenomenon that China aspires to create zones of influence in Eurasia,

Central, South and Southeast Asia. Many of the states in these regions have been under

Chinese as well as Russian administration. Beijing’s policy has been to bind the “rear

areas” with the neighboring Chinese regions, for example, “southwestern China

456. https://www.rt.com/business/161284-china-russia-economic-zone/ 457. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/artyom-lukin/russian-far-east-china_b_6452618.html

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(especially Yunnan province) for Southeast Asia, western China (Xinjiang) for Central

Asia, and northeastern China (Heilongjiang) for the RFE.”458

Moreover, increased Chinese trade activities in the region is likely to exclude

international as well as Russian contenders in the coming years. This remains a huge risk

in front of Moscow as this has considerable chances of tilting the geopolitical vector in

favor of Beijing. Although the chances of China attacking and annexing the RFE, as

speculated in some western circles remain low, the RFE could however virtually become

China’s backyard through Manchuria in view of ever increasing Chinese economy and

the demographic graph already standing in favor of Beijing rather than Moscow.

In 2014, the China Development Bank confirmed $5 billion in the RFE to be used for

mega infrastructure projects. The timing of the investment coincided with Beijing’s plan

for the One Belt and One Road (B&R) program. The B&R running under two parts; Silk

Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road is expected to be an extended version of

the Ancient Silk Road that connected China with the Roman Empire. The program will

would be a planned network or road, rail routes, oil and gas pipelines that will stretch

from Xi’an, Lanzhou, Urumqi and Khorgas into Central Asia and Europe. As for the

Maritime Road, it would be a network joining ports and coastal communications from

South and Southeast Asia to Africa and the Mediterranean. In this context, increased

Chinese investment in the RFE along with Trans-Siberia and Baikal-Amur railroads

could largely add to the land part of the B&R program while the sea route in the North

could help achieve maritime connectivity as expected in the program. It was also

458. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/artyom-lukin/russian-far-east-china_b_6452618.html

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resonated in Chinese Vice Premier’s remarks about Russia’s drive in its far eastern

regions during the Eastern Economic Forum in September 2015 when he said “the Far

East development strategy coincides with China's strategy of north-east rebirth,…(The)

Russia-Chinese partnership will definitely bring generous fruits."459

6.8 WHY RUSSIA NEEDS CHINA

Of all the contending parties, China remains the most active player in Russia’s northern

dimension. The burgeoning economy of China depends on oil imports via the Strait of

Malacca from Africa and Middle East. These shipments traversing the South China Sea

in proximity of unfriendly neighbors put China in a rather vulnerable position. On the

other hand, according to the Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia has 142 BTOE of

undiscovered petroleum. The massive economy of China requires substantial and

undisrupted supply of energy which is expected to double the current percentage by 2040.

What makes China the most appealing partner in northern shipping is not only its rising

economy and consequent demand for energy. It is in fact, the persistent interest that

Beijing has shown in commercial shipping in the Arctic, the most materialized example

of which comes from the fact that China; a non-Arctic state has acquired three ice

breakers as of 2016. In addition to this, in view of uncomfortable relations with the west,

Russia has aspired at budding closer ties with the CCP. Moscow and Beijing are also

partners in various development projects in the Arctic and RFE.

In face of the evolving political ties with the west, Sino-Russian partnership has become

indispensable for the two neighboring giants. In this situation, the remote quarters of the

459. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-east-putin-china-idUSKCN0R50AM20150905

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RFE have received considerable attention from across the borders. The significance of

RFE for China is multifold. Firstly, China wants a friendly and peaceful northern frontier

with Russia so as to station its military assets in such areas as where the former

encounters the frowns of unfriendly neighbors. Secondly, Chinese economy needs huge

hydrocarbon provisions, which RFE can deliver. The coffers of RFE are filled with oil,

gas, diamond, gold, copper, timber, wildlife, fish and even freshwater. In addition to this,

Beijing also views RFE as a strategically important region. In view of the uncomfortable

ties in the Asia Pacific, a naval blockade by the US may very well be fed off through the

sea lanes offered by Arctic’s melting ice. Chinese pocession of ice-breakers, despite

being a non-Arctic state and its partnership with Russia; already embarked on building a

new fleet of ice breakers,460

sheds much light to Chinese policy for RFE and the

Arctic.461

In the same light, a healthy relation with Beijing has also become unavoidable

for Moscow. Until a few decades back, Russia remained skeptical of Chinese access to

the RFE. However, like China, Russia also had limited options when it came to choosing

an ally following tensions with west over the issue of Ukraine.

Thus, in the coming years, Sino-Russian partnership will not only highly affect political

and economic activities in the North but it will also profoundly alter the nature of geo-

political environment in the periphery.

460. When completed, the new fleet will be an addition in Russia’s collection of dozen diesel ice breakers and six

nuclear ice breakers compared to two diesel ice breakers owned by the US so far. 461. http://russia-insider.com/en/politics/russia-increase-northern-sea-route-capacity-20-times/ri7874

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CONCLUSION

The beginning of 1990s was a setting stage for decisive events in world history. The

dissolution of USSR, the emergence of uni-polar world, and the birth of new Central

Asian states were colossal events of the past century. The resulting situation was to

change the course of many upcoming political events. The emergence of the new

republics in Central Asia significantly altered the geostrategic outlook of the region. The

result was an obvious thrust of world’s industrial powers for the quest and accession of

hydrocarbon resources of the region. On a similar note, the Chinese periphery has had its

own set of attractive features for the world powers. The juxtaposition of Taiwan, which

so makes it a neighbor with Japan, makes the island a vulnerable feature of the Chinese

foreign and home policy. The close ties of both the island regimes with Washington are a

rather curious factor for Beijing which is then forced to adjust its Asia pacific policy

accordingly. Beijing’s policy towards Taiwan during the last decade of the twentieth

century was initially designed on maintaining a strong political presence on the island to

strengthen its advocacy of One China Principle. However, it soon shifted to that of

economic engagement to suit the ever burgeoning economy of the mainland. This had

been largely accomplished under the 1992 Consensus between the two contending parties

whereby which both agree on One China Principle and which holds Taiwan from the

claim of independence from the PRC. The increasing cross-strait trade graph during the

1990s’ decade provided a hint, not only to the turn the two regimes were to take in their

bilateral relations but also as to how the future of the industrial powers was to take an

Asia centric turn in the coming years. The point of the fact is that Russian and Chinese

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peripheries have their respective shares of international connection that thus makes the

regional issues more complicated.

The result of 2016 elections in Taiwan was in utter contrast to Beijing’s desires for the

island territory. The polls favored victory of Tsai Ing-Wen of Democratic Progressive

Party (DPP) which was legalized in 1989 when a ban on opposition parties was lifted in

Taiwan. The victory of Tsai meant the end of honeymoon period between China and

Taiwan enjoyed during the term of the ex-president Ma Ying-jeou. Tsai has been vocal in

her stance for de jure independence for Taiwan and in her opposition against the 1992

Consensus. Her inaugural speech sheds light on her intention to keep from pursuing

independence as well as unification; “stable and peaceful development of the cross-strait

relationship must be continuously promoted.”462

For Beijing, Tsai’s victory is a two-fold

problem. Not only does Beijing have to deal with a government in Taipei which wishes to

undermine the economic and political reliance on the former, but also results of the poll

indicate at a similar rising trend among the Taiwanese society. Therefore, since the

elections, Beijing has been exercising pressure ion DPP’s government to formally and

clearly acknowledge the 1992 Consensus. For this end, Beijing is also diplomatically

approaching states that have held ties with Taiwan in the past, so as to corner Taipei into

diplomatic isolation. This approach is most likely to carry negative implications for not

only Taiwan but also for Chinese market across the strait.

Since the mid twentieth century and particularly during and after the end of the Cold

War, the issue of Tibet has continued to escalate against the wishes of Beijing which has

462. http://www.chicagotribune.com/sns-wp-yomiuri-editorial-taiwan-02a00c16-2033-11e6-9e7f-57890b612299-

20160522-story.html

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otherwise sought to settle the question as per national interests. As the geographical

location of Tibet and its wealth of natural resources make it an indispensable element in

China’s national affairs, the Chinese government has long sought to contain insurgency

in the plateau which strongly effects Beijing’s global position. The decades of 1980s and

1990s witnessed deteriorating relations between the Tibet government in exile and the

CCP. While various policies were adopted by the latter to develop the resource rich

plateau, the same were repeatedly criticized by the former of being acts of manipulation

by the central government to exploit the natural resources of the region at the expense of

the native populace. The stance of the Dalai Lama and his colleagues appear

commonsensical in their own sense as Beijing is often reported to have bypassed or

ignored the socio-cultural tendencies in not only Tibet but also in Xinjiang. The

immigration of Han Chinese in both the regions has always been an unacceptable option

for the ethnic population of the TAR463

and the XUAR464

. Both the regions’ populations

rightly perceive the influx of Han population as a serious demographic threat in way of

their respective demands for autonomy and independence one of the ground reasons for

which is provided by their ethnic majority in the regions. Moreover, on the economic

front, Beijing’s Han oriented policies also add to the concerns of these minorities for it is

believed that the center develops the periphery regions only for the economic relief of the

Han population. Many a times, Han workers are settled in these regions to carry out the

bulk of industrial responsibilities. Most of the companies come to these regions for the

installation and completion of state directed projects with their own teams of more

463. Tibet Autonomous Region 464. Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

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qualified and experienced technical and administrative Han staff; leaving none or only

marginal jobs for the natives of these regions.

Despite state allocation of healthy funds for the development of Tibet and Xinjiang, the

overall economic condition of these two regions is far from satisfactory. The most

important cause for this lies in center’s repeated attempts as reciprocating the model of

development of eastern regions of China in the western areas that are dominated by

ethnic minorities. The projects in TAR and XUAR are often launched with the help of

firms that have little concern for the topographic realities of the region and are designed

under their own economic models. In order to increase the productivity of these projects,

the patrons bring with them their own team of workers and administrators; adding little to

job creation and rather intensifying the locals’ resentment against center sponsored

projects. Moreover, rather than using regional banks, many of the companies operating in

these regions use their offices in other parts of the country to pay their taxes, causing

further economic trouble.

The most important element in the chaos seen in the TAR and XUAR during 1990s has

been the addition of the foreign factor in the independence movements. In the case of

Xinjiang, the Baren incident is vastly considered the outcome of international

involvement for the use of high-tech weaponry was enough to point at the budding

concern that extra-state elements had already started giving their share in the region’s

politics. As for Tibet, in addition to the diplomatic support by the international

community, the period also saw western media taking up the Tibetan cause with various

Hollywood movies being produced on the subject, such as Seven Years in Tibet (1997),

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Kundun (1997) and The Cup (1999). Keeping in view the situation of turmoil and ethnic

unrest that the two regions experienced in the twentieth century, it can be easily

calculated as to the escalation in the turbulence as these vital areas of Chinese periphery

entered into the new millennium which was to witness such events as were to change the

very façade of global politics.

In addition to the above mentioned factors, some common concerns often ignored by the

Chinese leadership have added to the deteriorating political situation in the XUAR and

the TAR. For example, in the wake of the 1989 protests in Tibet, the power show, if

avoided by Beijing, could have helped in maintaining a lesser degree of local resentment

by the plateau population and also lesser international humiliation.

On the other hand, Chinese experience with Hong Kong presents a different picture to the

way Beijing addresses the problems in its periphery. Although the closing years of

colonial rule saw sharp contest between the British and Chinese counterparts on the

question of future constitutional and electoral pattern for the island, it however remained

dubious as to how the Chinese would govern the region following the colonial

withdrawal. Nonetheless, in sharp contrast to the center dictated policies in the TAR and

XUAR, Chinese dealing of Hong Kong has been based on the policy of extracting

maximum benefits out of the island’s economy and retaining the British system of

governance for the island if that be required. In fact, Chinese model of governance in

Hong Kong can be used as precedence by Beijing towards the solution of Tibetan and

Xinjiang’s dilemma. The political and economic freedom given to the people of Hong

Kong can be reciprocated in the TAR and XUAR by giving autonomy to the people in

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their cultural affairs and inculcating the local populations of the two autonomous regions

in the economic development of the regions can settle many simmering issues in the

interests of the PRC. Furthermore, accepting cultural uniqueness of the two ethnically

populated regions should not present as a daunting task for Beijing which enjoys

popularity against its western counterparts for upholding cultural attributes of different

societies in various countries around the globe under its foreign aid programs. Doing so,

Dalai Lama’s Five Point Peace Plan for Tibet will also be answered handsomely which

includes the following demands;

Creating Tibet into a peace zone,

Stopping Han immigration into the plateau,

Respecting human rights and democratic freedom of Tibetans,

Protection of Tibet’s natural environment, and

Negotiations between the two sides on the future status of Tibet.465

Although converting Tibet into a peace zone is a vision far from reality in view of

Chinese drive to develop its nuclear power but the main resentments held by Tibetans

against the Chinese; namely of economic and demographic exploitation can be answered

if a model like that of Hong Kong is applied in the plateau and also in the XUAR.

In a context similar to Tibet and Xinjiang, but to a rather large degree, has been the

situation in the Russian state of Chechnya. Ethnic unrest, pro-independence movement

and external involvement were the protagonists of 1990s’ Chechnya. The radical element

465. http://tibet.net/important-issues/sino-tibetan-dialogue/important-statements-of-his-holiness-the-dalai-lama/five-

point-peace-plan-for-tibet/

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and the ideological orthodoxy were to create one of the biggest challenges for Kremlin in

Russian history. The Russian experience was to be even difficult as the simmering

turmoil soon turned into a full scale war. Not only was the war given coverage by

international media but also the incidents of human rights violation were reported and

raised at the highest international levels. As the series of events continued unabated, the

Chechen resistance only strengthened. Not only was this a matter of national concern for

Moscow, but the time setting was also highly unfavorable for the latter. Occurring in the

middle of the decade of 1990s, the Chechen War was a stumbling block for the newly

emerged Russian Federation. Rather than a war involving high scale mass destruction, a

decade of peaceful coexistence would have served a better purpose to the recently

disintegrated former super power. As a matter of fact, the transition of Chechnya from a

federal subject to one demanding complete sovereignty was not so much an outcome of

the communist ideologues nor was it exclusively an outcome of nationalism. It was rather

the result of hyperactive centralization advocated by communism and the ensuing

inefficient socio-political and economic systems that had been in practice by the center

for decades.

A serious repercussion of the Chechen turbulence was its consequent effect on the

neighboring state of Dagestan. Where the Dagestanis provided a buffer zone to the

Russian military in the First Chechen War, the same region’s populace was soon found to

be turning against the center by the end of the last decade which also saw the outbreak of

the Second Chechen War. As a matter of fact, demand for independence, ideological

fervor and radicalism soon became particulars of Dagestan’s politics. In addition to the

effect of the upheavals on the international standing of Moscow, the fact that the

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turbulence was taking place in regions that were strategically indispensable for the center,

added woe to misery. In spite of the long expected problems and the lack of solutions to

the same, the Russian Federation remained in a fix so as to solve the issues thus engulfing

the resource rich republics of the Caucasus. The center could not abandon the republics

specially so in view of their geo-strategic locations and resource potential. Moreover,

economic development of the region was also largely neglected which further added to

the anti-state sentiments of the public. The economic graph of these areas of Russian

periphery showed a steady decline throughout the decade of 1990s and even before to

which not much attention was paid by the capital neither were the prospective

consequences of such situation prudently calculated. The result was a sheer escalation of

unrest in the political landscape of Chechnya and Dagestan.

In some cases, it seems that war could have been avoided. All that was needed was some

prudent political decisions by Kremlin. The very decline in the economic situation of

Chechnya was enough to provide stimulus to win the conflict through table talks rather

than by use of force. For example, following the disintegration of USSR, Chechnya

suffered serious economic hardships as the unemployment rate rose to approximately

40% other than the decline in work opportunities. Oil production which formed the basic

component of economic generation declined from 21 million tons in 1971 to 4 million

tons in 1991. By 2000, the volume had declined to a mere value of 1.5 to 2.0 million tons.

In addition to this more than half of the Chechen produced goods (including oil)

depended on the supplies coming from Russia and the countries of the former Soviet

Union. It was for this reason that Dudayev, in 1992 in a letter to Yelstin put forward his

proposal of paying transit fees to Russia in return for Chechen control over the republic’s

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oil pipelines.466

The proposal did not receive any material end though it could have

served to improve economic relations between the center and Chechnya.

According to Valerii Tishkov, the Minister of Nationalities, Yelstin and Dudayev had

almost come to an understanding for the solution of Chechen problem on the model of

Tatarstan but the President was dissuaded at the last moments by his close advisers on the

account of some “negative comments” made by Dudayev regarding the Russian

President. Tishkov further reports that the two leaders were rigid on their respective

stances as Yelstin could only allow a direct conversation with Dudayev on condition that

he showed appropriate respect for him while the latter would negotiate only if Moscow first

recognized Chechen sovereignty. While Tishkov attributes these events to ethnic element

in the Chechen conflict; his own work often contains traces of the same. For example,

while he labels Dudayev’s methods as those of “arrogance, ambitiousness, and cunning” he

attributes Yelstin’s strategy to “political maturity and civic consciousness”. 467

In the case of the Republic of Ingushetia, the matter of grave concern was that the border

conflicts of the republic were with that state of Russia which was already a bedlam of

ethnic tensions and anti-state activities. Supporting a stance not much suitable for the

Chechens could also have had aggravated the state of mayhem in the Chechen republic.

More importantly, the potpourri of ethnicity in the Russian periphery is not an easily

solvable riddle. This made it difficult for the government to settle a question of border

demarcation that was soundly structured on the basis of ethnic distribution.

466. Matthew Evangelista, The Chechen Wars: Will Russia go the Way of the Soviet Union, Op. Cit., pp.20-21,27 467. James Hughes, Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), p.58

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On a somewhat similar note, the rising tide of nationalism in KBR468

was also a direct

result of years long practice of non-adherence to the grievances prevailing among the

local population. The hardships faced by the Balkars including the 1944 deportations,

confiscation of their properties and furthermore, the remapping of the Balkar territory and

its amalgamation into the neighboring states of Caucasus, were enough prerequisites for

nurturing bitter outlook towards the center. Therefore, by the later part of the twentieth

century, the coexistence of Kabartay and Balkars showed visible cracks.

On the religious front, Islam as a deciding factor in Caucasus politics happened later in

time. It was more of a last resort by the Balkars to reinforce the demand for an

independent republic. Even in the case of Chechnya, it was only in 1999 that Maskhadov

announced a sharia based system in the republic.

Until the early 1900s, Russia had only one official religion namely Orthodox Christianity.

All other religions were kept from proselytizing and were persecuted as ethnic sets

causing dissension among the Russian masses. Antagonism towards other religions was

also largely fueled by the Russian experience in the Caucasian Wars of the nineteenth

century. It was only after the Edict of Toleration was decreed in 1904 that the Russian

Empire saw religious tolerance that survived until the country came under communist

rule, following which Atheism replaced every other religion in Russia under close

government observation. Nazi attack on the USSR was the unique episode in Soviet

history where religion was used as an ally by Stalin to trigger patriotism against foreign

aggression. But for almost seven decades, religion in Russia was a taboo that believers

468. Kabardino-Balkaria

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had to pay a huge price for being affiliated with. It was a threat against the government

which the Kremlin could never afford to have at ground. It was opium of the people from

which the state must keep them at bay in fear of losing national energy in the spiritual

aroma of religion. Therefore, the Soviet crackdown against religion was in fact a state

measure against illusions and illusory happiness of the people.

China, being one of the earliest civilizations on earth has a history of religion just as

primeval and diverse. While records of religious practices such as burials and human

sacrifices are found as early as Neolithic era and of religious risings dating back as early

as the second century BCE, the same account is a fair indication as to the coincident

development of religious adherence of the masses and of religious oppression by the

center. The CCP inherited a country that had seen religious fanaticism and oppression for

as long as historical accounts would lead them, consequently the center remains hostile

towards religion in its borders.469

Unlike Russia, where atheism was adopted in

succession of the allegation on religion as the primary cause of all problems faced by the

country and its people, Chinese oppression towards religion is shaped by experiences too

profound to ignore. The stern stance against religion by Chinese authorities relaxed

briefly after the Cultural Revolution and in the post-Mao period. However, a larger

tendency of the Chinese government remains in focus of minimizing religious

interference from the lives of Chinese citizens, for which the center employs every

method conceivable.

469. The Yellow Turban Movement (CE 184) and The Five Pecks of Rice Rebellion (CE 184) are some of the oldest

religious rebellions in Chinese history.

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In China, state oppression against religion is most vivid in Tibet and in Xinjiang and in

the Caucasus in the case of Russia. Among the various reasons for the obstinate

adherence towards the locals of the disturbed peripheries, the most important are;

Islam, which addresses every aspect of socio-political and cultural dimension of

life, has kept the people in a strong bond which is seen as basic identity by its

followers, be they in XUAR or the Caucasus.

The economic dispossession in these areas furthers religious adherence of the

people as means of finding spiritual healing and salvation against the grave

economic constraints.

The primordial oppression against religion by the center strengthens the religious

bond, thus moving people in the direction of identifying themselves as a separate

cultural group fighting against cultural assault of a dissimilar religious and

cultural power.

Of the factors quoted above, the last two remain equally true in the case of population of

the TAR. The latter half of 1980s signaled important steps towards change in Soviet

religious policy. Gorbachev’s meeting with Patriarch Pimen and other members from the

Orthodox Church, which was the first such meeting after 1943, and the millennial

celebrations of the Russian Orthodox Church are some of the examples in this regard.

Similarly, the law on Freedom of Religious Belief and Conscience; separating church

from the state, was a bold step by Soviet descendants towards religious liberty. Since

then, religion in Russia has seen an upsurge under the new wave of revival. There has

been a sharp increase in the percentage of people who identify themselves with the

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church or any of the five officially recognized religions of the Russian Federation from

the Soviet times. Though the level of religiosity may not be as high as generally

expected, the point of the fact remains that unlike the Soviet era, when people gave up

their religious identity under sheer pressure from state auctioned measures against

believers, religion in Russia today has evolved to a very different place where church

attendance is missed not in fear of state persecution but simply by will. Nevertheless,

many gray areas remain in Russian religion’s domain. The official ban on certain

religious cults and the circulation of religious texts is a far cry from the modern standards

of liberty of religion.

An added factor in this regard is the plight of media in Russia and China. Functioning

under strict government control, many issues of serious import are disallowed from being

broadcasted on local channels. In addition, access to foreign internet and television links

is also not free from government monitoring. This has far more repercussions on the

masses than the simple fact of the people being alienated from more advanced western

media. As a result of government censorship on print and electronic media, viewers

living outside Russia and China are more informed of the state of situation in these

countries than those living within the borders. Therefore, many of the incidences where

government could come under public pressure are either not elaborated on state channels

or are tailored to gather public sentiments in favor of center’s policies.

China and Russia, as we see today have been shaped by glorious successes, humiliating

defeats and concomitant changes affecting almost every walk of life. The policies, as a

result, are reminiscent of the two nations’ respective pasts and experiences with society

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and religion. It is unjust to expect from nations of the like of Russia and China which have

had no intellectual renaissance as have been the case of the west, to emerge as champions

and role models of religious liberty and tolerance against ethnic minorities. Unlike the

west, Russia and China have been on the path of modern development only since the last

decade of the twentieth century. Keeping this in view, it will take some time before the

development in democracy, freedom of expression and religion would reach the pace

where a final shape of the state of religion in the two countries can be drafted out.

Sino-Russian Partnership: Counterforce to US Hegemony

In spite of the importance attached with freedom of navigation, China military rise and its

unbending stance on Chinese sovereignty over the SCS has taken other regional actors on

a defensive mode. As a consequence, Malaysia and Vietnam have increased their arms

trade with Russia and India. As for Philippines, not only has the government increased its

defense budget twofold in 2011 but has also signed a five-year accord for joint military

exercise with the US. Similarly, China cannot easily ignore regional pressure, particularly

in the case of exploration in disputed waters as China needs a cohesive diplomatic

understanding with the countries of Southeast Asia to complement its strategy of the

Maritime Silk Road which is a consecution to the land based route of the Silk Road

Economic Belt.

The much asked question in this scenario has been over the lack of Russian support to the

Chinese in the disputed waters unlike the example of USA in the case of Philippines and

Japan. Firstly, it must be realized that unlike China-Russia relations, the USA enjoys the

highest level of international relations with Philippines and Japan, that is, an alliance

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relationship. On the contrary, though Moscow and Beijing enjoy close strategic relations,

there is no alliance between the two powers. Though often cited as allies even in the

absence of an alliance treaty, the truth remains thus: China-Russia relations are based on

mutual interests. South or East China Sea is not a region where Russia can be expected to

expand its interests. Other than this, Russia has cordial relations with the most of the

countries of South East Asia including Philippines and Vietnam. Russia would rather not

deteriorate these relations and thus hamper its arms trade and the resulting regional cum

military trade influence in the region. In a similar context, it would be highly imprudent

of Moscow to develop more conflicts with the EU and the US in view of the already on-

going crisis over Ukraine that has cast serious reservations in the west over Russia’s

expansionist designs. Even more important is the fact of increased Chinese presence

within Russia. Many in Russia would consider the involvement of China in the conflicts

of SCS as means to keep Chinese expansionism in the Russian Far East at bay. In the

same light, in spite of the strategic partnership that Beijing enjoys with Moscow, the

latter received only calculated support from the PRC on the recent Ukraine crisis. This

must not be taken as anti-China or anti-Russia stance of the Kremlin or Beijing

respectively. It rather hints at the deep partnership enjoyed by the two regional giants

which leaves large room to aggrandize their national interests yet keeping strategic co-

work, such as joint military exercises, in practice.

Disturbed peripheries are a feature common in the politics of Moscow and Beijing.

Apprehensive of the uptight situation in their respective peripheries has somehow;

although circuitously, brought the two countries together. That the peripheries enjoy

strategic and geostrategic import, has further added to the policies designed for these

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areas. The peripheries of both Russia and China carry huge geopolitical, strategic and

geo-economic significance for the host countries. While the Caucasus is located at the

crossroads of Asia and Europe, the Chinese territories of Tibet and Xinjiang are the

gateway to South and Central Asia. As for Hong Kong and Taiwan, the former has been

China’s window to the west since long and the latter symbolizes One China Principle, in

addition to the economic advantage attached with both.

Unfortunately, though, the peripheries have been a bedlam of ethnic violence and

political conflicts that have only intensified in the previous decades. Aggrieved with the

feelings of alienation and ignorance at the hands of the respective governments, these

regions of Russia and China have been echoing with demands for autonomy, separation

and independence. But neither of the two powers is willing to let go of these remote

quarters of their countries for reasons economic, political and strategic. In the Russian

case, the leadership in Moscow finds itself encircled by states that are becoming more

dynamic and versatile by the day. The countries of Eastern Europe are slowly being

amalgamated into the European Union. The states of Georgia and Azerbaijan have

become chief American allies. With the south and west being inculcated with western

ideas and policies, the east presents a picture of both an opportunity and that of challenge.

With the dramatic rise of China within the last three decades, Moscow would be rather

perplexed as to engage further with the former or to marginalize the interests of the PRC

within the regional graph. But it however remains clear that both Russia and China

benefit from bilateral trade and economic engagement. Therefore, the two powers

continue to cooperate in trade and investment, particularly in the hydrocarbon business.

As Putin himself noted in 2007 that a calculation of the combined GDPs of the BRIC

(393)

countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) is greater than that of the EU while the

combined GDP with India and China surpasses the GDP of the US.470

Concerned that the US presence in particular can deteriorate the situation in Sino-Russian

peripheries, the two Asian powers have become increasingly critical of western

interference in the region. In recent years, Russia has become more vocal of US

involvement in the region. It has openly accused Washington of promoting the regimes

that add to the prevalent violence in the region. The Russian foreign minister responded

to American claims of “Russia for violating Georgia’s territorial integrity, behavior that

is impermissible in the twenty-first century” by saying that the US and its allies’ backing

of Saakashvili’s regime “will be a mistake of historic magnitude…. America’s military

aid to Saakashvili’s regime never became a leverage with his government. On the

contrary, it encouraged this irresponsible and unpredictable regime to proceed along the

road of escapades.”471

However, though the two remain skeptical of each other, Russia

and China have eased up their relations. Nevertheless, American involvement in the

trans-Caucasus states and Russian adventurism in eastern Europe have kept the west from

coming into as strong a partnership with Moscow as that enjoyed between PRC and the

Russian Federation.

The first half of the decade of 1990s witnessed some very important acknowledgements

being made by both sides in favor of the developing ties. For instance, Yelstin’s 1992

visit of China concluded with a joint statement that the two regarded each other as

friendly nations. Jiang Zemin’s visit to Russia two years later noted the two sides making

470.Andrew C. Kuchins, Russian Assessment of US Power, Op. Cit., p. 119 471. Ibid, p.119

(394)

constructive measures for the building of a partnership that would align with the trends of

the twenty first century. Another important meeting in Sino-Russian ties was Yelstin’s

visit to the PRC in 1996. The visit escalated the bilateral relations to a higher level of

“strategic and cooperative”472

partnership. However, the hallmark treaty in Sino-Russian

ties was signed in 2001 in Moscow under the title of the Treaty of Good Neighborliness

and Friendly Cooperation. The treaty, which is a twenty-year pact between the two

powers, outlines such initiatives that serve as the very basis for the foundation of mutual

economic, diplomatic and geopolitical coalition. The most important part of the treaty is

summed in clause 6, 8 and 9:

The contracting parties point out with satisfaction that each has no territorial

claim on the other and both are resolved to make active efforts in building the

border between the two countries into one where ever-lasting peace and

friendship prevail. The contracting parties will adhere to the principles of non-

encroachment upon territories and national boundaries as stipulated in

international laws and strictly observe the national boundary between the two

countries.

The contracting parties shall continue to hold talks on the pending boundary

alignment of the sectors which China and Russia have not yet arrived at an

agreement through consultations. Prior to the settlement of these issues, the two

sides will maintain the status quo in such boundary sectors. (Article 6)

472. Li Jingjie, Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership Cooperative Relations and the US Factor, available at

http://www.theasanforum.org/sino-russian-strategic-partnership-cooperative-relations-and-the-us-factor/

(395)

The contracting parties shall not enter into any alliance or be a party to any bloc

nor shall they embark on any such action, including the conclusion of such treaty

with a third country which compromises the sovereignty, security and territorial

integrity of the other contracting party. Neither side of the contracting parties

shall allow its territory to be used by a third country to jeopardize the national

sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the other contracting party.

Neither side of the contracting parties shall allow the setting up of organizations

or gangs on its own soil which shall impair the sovereignty, security and territorial

integrity of the other contrasting party and their activities should be prohibited.

(Article 8)

When a situation arises in which one of the contracting parties deems that peace is

being threatened and undermined or its security interests are involved or when it

is confronted with the threat of aggression, the contracting parties shall

immediately hold contacts and consultations in order to eliminate such threats.473

(Article 9)

This Article sets precedence for the highest form of diplomatic victory between any two

nations. By subduing the most sensitive issue of border disputes, the Treaty completely

controls any uneasiness emerging between the two sides that may affect other modes of

cooperation, be it economic, political or geo-political. Various examples can be quoted in

international politics where border disputes have kept states from vibrant cooperation and

473. Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian

Federation, available at http://www.voltairenet.org/article173177.html

(396)

peaceful co-existence. The Pakistan-India dispute over Kashmir, Sino-Indian dispute over

the McMahon Line and the squabble over the SCS among the ASEAN states are some of

the examples where territorial disputes have hindered cross-state partnerships. An equally

important factor in this regard was the Russian acknowledgement that “there is only one

China in the world, that the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government

representing the whole of China and that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. The

Russian side opposes any form of Taiwan’s independence.” Similarly, the agreement that

both sides must not become members of a bloc, let their soil be used by gangs and that

they must immediately start talks in case of any apprehended danger to strategic interests

is not only a great achievement on paper but has also been observed in practice. Even

before the Treaty of Friendship, China and Russia signed an agreement with Tajikistan,

Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan in 1996 aiming at ensuring non-militarized character in the

border region. On a border stretching at 7300 Km, the limit for troops was set at

134000.474

The agreement reduced chances of disputes between Moscow and Beijing in

issues relating to the militarization of Central Asia. It is for this reason that after almost

fifteen years since the execution of the treaty neither side has stepped back from

cooperation. The continuation of the success of the treaty becomes even more

troublesome for the western powers in view of the increased military interaction between

the two states that is provided in Article 7 of the same treaty. Under this article, both

Russia and China gain access into each other’s military as it calls for “measures to

increase trust between their militaries and reduce military forces in the border areas…

consolidate each other’s security and strengthen regional and international stability…

474. Li Jingjie, Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership Cooperative Relations and the US Factor, available at http://www.

theasanforum.org/sino-russian-strategic-partnership-cooperative-relations-and-the-us-factor/

(397)

military and military technology cooperation of the contracting parties carried out in

accordance with the relevant agreements are not directed at third countries.”475

Therefore,

since 2002, the two parties have had joint military exercises, both at land as well as sea.

This has been a cornerstone in increasing confidence, military access as well as the

training required for dealing with regional and trans-regional challenges. It has been

particularly beneficial for China; a country that has fought no major was since the first

quarter of a century to learn from the experienced Russian army. In economic sector,

Sino-Russian partnership has seen profound development. Bilateral trade reached the

mark of US$ 88.1 bn and has been forecasted to reach US$ 100 bn in 2015 and US$ 200

bn in the year 2020. As Russian hydrocarbon exports have soared recent years, China will

start importing 28 billion barrels of natural gas by 2018, which will eventually reach the

target of 60 billion barrels.476

Furthermore, both the states have increasingly sought to

create such regional and multilateral organizations as the SCO, BRICS, EEU and

strengthen their economic and political role in international arena which thus decreases

US hegemony and invigorates the budding of multilateralism.

475. Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian

Federation, available at http://www.voltairenet.org/article173177.html 476. Li Jingjie, Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership Cooperative Relations and the US Factor, available at

http://www.theasanforum.org/sino-russian-strategic-partnership-cooperative-relations-and-the-us-factor/

(398)

Estimated Russian energy exports by 2020 (in million tons oil equivalent)477

Both Russia and China have common interests in a large number of fields. A losing

situation for one party can become an equally challenging trouble for the other. China

needs Russian natural and technological wealth while the latter needs Chinese market.

Both are indispensable for each other to realize their dreams of economic modernization.

Moreover, it has been realized in Russian circles that the regions of Siberia and the

Russian Far East cannot be developed without Chinese assistance. Similarly, both the

states advocate freedom in designing domestic and foreign policies, without any

interference, which rather upsets western interests. If Russia surrenders in the way of

western designs of the region, Chinese grand military, certainly on a back foot in terms of

experience, would have to face the equally equipped but far more experienced western

military presence. In order to change the post- Cold War status quo where the US enjoys

unilateral supremacy, a bilateral partnership is only inevitable. Without any one of the

477. Source: European Commission

(399)

two in equation, the world system is set to fall in a uni-polar world dominated by the US.

Changing the world order form unilateralism to multilateralism is a common and

foremost element in the foreign policies of the two Asian giants and has brought the two

further together. Although the US-led War Against Terrorism in 2001favored China and

Russia in gaining international support in the fights against the unrest in their respective

peripheries, the continuation of the War in Iraq, Libya and Syria has stirred serious

criticism from the two sides. In a similar context, NATO’s inclusion of Baltic states in

2004, and its establishing of an anti-missile system in Poland and the Czech Republic in

2006, against Russian protest of the same, were direct threats to Moscow. Inclusion of

Baltic states expanded NATO’s into the former Soviet territory.

In the regard of Sino-Russian strategic ties, particular importance must also be paid to the

newly but quickly emerging regional scenario set in motion by the China Pakistan

Economic Corridor (CPEC), part of the B&R initiative. The project which will increase

connectivity between China and Pakistan through road and rail linkages is cited as a

game changer by both Pakistani and Chinese officials. China has invested billions of

dollars for the materialization of the project. The outcome of the project will be multi-

dimensional. Firstly, it will help in controlling unemployment, curtailing power shortages

and boost agricultural, trade and commercial activities in Pakistan. On the Chinese front,

the project, most importantly, will link China with the port of Gwadar, thereby reducing

China’s dependence on the Strait of Malacca amidst unfriendly neighbors for its trade

activities. Through the network of communication spread across the length and breadth of

Pakistan, CPEC will reduce the distance for Chinese shipments en route Africa, Middle

East, Europe and America by scores of miles. Increased connectivity via Pakistan and

(400)

China is also beneficial for the states of South and Southeast Asia as well as Central Asia

and Afghanistan. The latter which already depends on Pakistan for maritime trade can

benefit from the sea, road and rail linkages in Pakistan to reach China and the rest of the

world. In fact, CPEC can also lead to a greater integrated region that will include China,

Afghanistan, Iran and Southeast Asian states, Russia and the Central Asian states. The

EU has also shown its increasing interest in the CPEC. The EU would want to take

advantage of the gap created by diminishing ties of Pakistan with the US.

“In recent years, Islamabad’s relation with Washington has progressively

waned, leaving room for other contenders. The EU could seize advantage of

this situation and continue to increase its presence in the country. The

announcement by China of the ‘One Belt, One Road’ strategy (of which the

CPEC is a part) has been positively received in the EU. As European

objectives in Asia focus on infrastructural connectivity, economic corridors

and, most importantly, fostering regional integration, the interests of the EU

seem so far complementary to the Chinese ones.”478

China would ideally want India to be a part of the program for its participation would

ensure stable bilateral ties between New Delhi and Islamabad which in turn would

warrant safety of heavy Chinese investment in Pakistan. But apparently, Indian stance

seems to be moving in the opposite direction. India has been opposing CPEC form the

very beginning. This is particularly due to the fact that India’s past has been rather uneasy

with not only Pakistan but also with China. On the other hand, Sino-Pakistan ties have

478. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/549052/EXPO_IDA(2015)549052_EN.pdf

(401)

been unwavering since their inception in 1950. Not only this, but China has also been a

strong supporter of Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir. Criticizing that the plan was

designed to encircle India in its littoral waters, the Indian government attested its position

of opposing the plan by boycotting the Belt & Road Forum taking held in May 2017 in

Beijing. The fact that some of CPEC’s projects pass through Azad Kashmir; a region

disputed between India and Pakistan, was cited as the reason for India’s boycott from the

Forum. During the event, China re-ensured to the international community that there was

no intention to form a small group detrimental to security. The significance of the Forum

can be calculated by the fact that it was attended by 29 heads of states along with

representatives from such institutions as the World Bank and IMF. The international

interest directed towards CPEC is an attestation of the global importance attached with

the project.

Unlike India, Russian inclination to reap favors of CPEC has become increasingly

evident in the recent past. Although, Moscow and Islamabad have their share of

unpleasant past experiences, but Russia has extended signals of keen interest in CPEC.

Since geographical realities can never be changed, it is only wise for regional players to

make use of available resources if political ambitions are to be realized. In this context,

Russia has not only been accorded approval to use Gwadar port but both Russia and

Pakistan are also planning to develop bilateral defense ties. Although this move is also

seen with serious apprehension by New Delhi, but the latter must realize that putting

geographical realities of the region to maximum practical and constructive purposes is the

only way to achieve peaceful co-existence in the region. Moreover, Russian interest in

CPEC and Pakistan can also be seen in light of increased Indo-US ties particularly in the

(402)

military sphere; such as the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement signed

between the two sides in 2016. In this scenario, not only is it natural for Russia to seek

smoother and deeper ties with Pakistan, but doing so through China also increases the

prospects of a strategic triangle of the three countries to push back US influence in the

region.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the facts gathered in the course of this research, the following recommendations

are forwarded for the solution of Sino-Russian problems in their inner periphery and for

the future development of bilateral ties between China and Russia.

China and Russia have had their share of ups and downs in centre-periphery

relations. Similarly, the two powers have come a long way to achieve their

respective present economic status. There is a dire need for both the states to learn

from past experiences in dealing with their peripheries.

In the case of Taiwan, the victory of Democratic Progressive Party, which

advocates independence for Taiwan, in the elections of 2016 has caused the

Chinese government to once again try and isolate Taipei in the international

community. If continued, this policy will hamper the market economy of both

China and Taiwan. Moreover, if this state of affairs is to continue, not only will it

negatively affect cross-strait relations but China’s own standing among Southeast

Asian states will also be heavily affected; a domain where China is already

regarded uneasily by the neighboring states. Therefore, China should continue the

policy of economic engagement with Taipei on the previous note. This is the only

(403)

favorable policy available to Beijing at the moment as the PRC cannot afford to

turn the Southeast Asian region, where already a large number of states stand in

open dispute with Beijing on the South China Sea, into a western bloc.

Since long, the island territory of Hong Kong has enjoyed social, political and

economic freedom from the mainland. After the end of the British lease in 1997,

China prudently followed the policy of learning from the century long capitalist

experiences of the island. This policy served in the best interests of China as the

latter has benefitted from Hong Kong’s market exposure and its film and tourism

industry. But recent attempts by Beijing to introduce such changes in the island

territory as which will alter the public’s adherence to freedom of speech and

socio-economic liberties can carry huge negative implications for the centre. Not

only will it make Beijing’s position awkward in the international arena, it will

also affect the economic sphere of the island as well as the centre. In a time when

Beijing is desperately trying to gain increased economic presence in the west

through the 21st Century Silk Road, any precedence of Beijing’s economic or

political weakening can turn the events against China’s larger geo-political

interests. Therefore, Beijing should continue the decades old policy towards Hong

Kong, that is, of autonomy in all regional affairs.

The situation in Tibet and Xinjiang remains largely unsettled. Beijing has yet to

frame out a permanent solution to settle the grievances of the population of the

two regions. Although converting Tibet into a peace zone is a vision far from

reality in view of Chinese drive to develop its nuclear power, but the main

resentments held by Tibetans as well as Uyghurs against the Chinese government;

(404)

namely of economic and demographic exploitation can be answered if a model

like that of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) is applied in the

plateau and also in the XUAR. The application of SAR in Tibet and Xinjiang will

give the ethnic minorities of these two regions considerable autonomy in local

administration.

Moreover, the influx of Han workers that comes along with state sponsored

programs in the two regions, should be strictly monitored. The Han workers

should stay in the region for a limited short time during the duration of which they

can train the local workers so as to enable a smooth transition of workmanship

and guarantee economic initiatives for the local population. Beijing should also

instruct the use of local banks for funds transfer and all other monetary

regulations for the maximum involvement of local organizations in government

programs.

A thorough implementation of the above mentioned policies will resolve the

major causes of resentment held by the population of TAR and XUAR against the

centre.

Of the problems seen in the mountain republics of Russia, many issues could have

been avoided had there been a sounder communication pattern between the center

and the periphery. The fact that the government apparatus was largely operated by

the Moscow appointed elite added to the communication gap rather than

facilitating the implementation of state policies. The same factor was also

responsible for adding to the grievances of the local populace and adding to the

(405)

widely held perception of the center being insensate to the regional problems as

the political elite conducted such policies as designed to suit the center.

The hyper centralization of its territories by Moscow was also one of the major

reasons for the rising political unease. As a matter of fact, the transition of

Chechnya from a federal subject to one demanding complete sovereignty was not

so much an outcome of the communist ideologues nor was it exclusively an

outcome of nationalism. It was rather the result of hyperactive centralization

advocated firstly by communism and later followed by the Russian Federation

and the ensuing inefficient socio-political and economic systems that had been in

practice by the center for decades. Evangelista reports in his book how gaps were

created between the center and the republic as the Chechen leader Dudayev is

quoted to have said, “as late as 29th

or 30th

[of November 1994], if they had only

spoken with me as a human being, everything could have been completely

different. But all I heard was ‘bandit, criminal, dictator, thief, leader of a criminal

regime!’ That didn’t offend just me, but my entire people.”479

Similarly, in Kabrdino-Balkaria, the demand for their creation as separate republic

came as a result of continuous repudiation of their demands regarding adjustment

of Balkar raions and equal opportunities and representation in government bodies

by Moscow. On the Ingush front, the relations with Moscow have deteriorated

due to the latter’s ignorance of the most important matter confronting the

population of Ingushetia. The land issues that emerged as a result of forced

deportations following the Second World War were conveniently ignored by the

479. Ibid, p.33

(406)

centre. The Ingush lands were inhabited by Ossetians and Russian promises of

settling this very important issue have failed the test of time.

Therefore, there is a dire need in Kremlin to establish an apparatus of

representation from Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria

which shall consist only of the true representatives of the people, elected by the

locals, rather than being directly appointed by the president. Moreover, Dagestan

which acted as a buffer zone during the First Chechen War was a major hotspot

against Russia in the Second Chechen War. Had the Dagestani society been

equally reciprocated during interval between the wars, the situation could have

proved to be different. Similarly, as of today, the government of Russia should

introduce special economic incentives for the entire Caucasus region to amend for

the lack of economic programs in the past. Moreover, Moscow must make haste

in settling the land issues in Ingushetia and KBR which have arisen because of the

centre’s negligence. Settling the basic political concerns along with a closer

economic integration of Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria

is a prelude to the solution of majority of the problems faced by Moscow in these

regions such as secessionism and extremism.

Sino-Russian partnership has developed significantly over the years. The current

geo-political developments should be used not only for further enhancing the

partnership but also for achieving regional stability through the involvement of

regional governments.

(407)

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the Belt & Road Initiative (B&R)

will highly alter the state of affairs in the region for all the regional actors. Russia

has already shown its interests in not only the B&R but also in the CPEC.

The three governments can use the CPEC and B&R platform for deeper economic

engagement, which will result in smoother ties between Moscow and Islamabad.

Since India has enjoyed friendly relations with Russia in the past, this move will

also carry the possibility of bringing India on board which has so far resisted the

two economic plans of Beijing.

Beijing and Moscow have common interests in security, regional stability,

economic growth, fighting violence within the borders and maintaining balance of

power in the region and in the world. The two powers can therefore work on the

path for increased stability in the region by bringing regional rivals such as India

and Pakistan on a common platform.

The creation of a Chinese zone of influence with Russian partnership, extending

from South Asia, Southeast Asia, Central Asia and into Europe is not far from

reality. But if China and Russia are to achieve the goal of international hegemony,

the two should settle disturbances within their borders in the best interests of the

centre as well as the ethnic communities. Achieving peace and order on the

national level will enable the two states to focus solely on molding international

affairs in their own interests.

The problems in the inner peripheries of Russia and China have not kept the two powers

from emerging as major protagonists of world politics in the twenty first century. A

solution acceptable to all stake holders in centre-periphery relations of Moscow and

(408)

Beijing will further add to the political and economic rise of the two states along with

adding strength to their bilateral relations.

In addition to other factors, western threat thrusts Sino-Russian partnership further

forward. The two have many common interests in areas such as security, regional

stability, economic growth, fighting violence within the borders and maintaining balance

of power. The fact that the two states have neither formed an alliance nor is it planned by

the two sides to direct their partnership against a third country, leaves ample room for

both the partners to conduct regional politics in a manner best suitable to their national

interests. This tendency is repeatedly witnessed over such issues as the dispute over the

SCS, PRC’s island disputes with Japan, Russian militarism in Georgia or most recently in

Eastern Europe. For the same reason, Moscow and Beijing have worked to strengthen

relationship with the US and at the same time have sought to minimize Washington’s

influence, while working in their own spheres. In many ways, the whole scenario can be

seen as a practical implementation of the Heartland theory put forward by Sir Halford

Mackinder in the early twentieth century. According to his theory, the ‘heartland’ or the

‘pivot area’ was the key to world domination. The heartland in his theory largely

corresponded to the Eurasian landmass which was then a part of the Russian Empire.

Although it was prophesized for Russia to achieve this domination but in the current

atmosphere it seems that China is more likely on the way to achieve world domination

through the heartland. Beijing’s reconstruction of the Silk Road in the twenty first

century will actually serve as a bridge that will connect the Eurasian heartland (present

Central Asian states) with Europe, Africa, Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia.

This, while economically strengthening China will create such a zone of Chinese

(409)

influence that will be invulnerable to US adventurism. This, in turn, can end the existing

world order that has been in practice since the demise of the USSR and create a new

world order revolving around China and Russia.

(410)

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