Sideshow:

Arab Awakening and Revolt in the First World War -

A Historiographical Examination

Chris Murray

Submitted to Dr. Nikolas Gardner

War Studies 543

The First World War

Royal Military College of Canada 16th December 2013

A note to the reader on spelling and terminology For the sake of simplicity and readability I have chosen to adopt contemporary spelling and terminology in referring to both individuals and place names subject to this papers examination. Arabic does not lend itself easily to transliteration in the English language and as such the debate over spelling is both a complex and long standing one. In the case of this paper, the choice was made to rely on contemporary commonly recognized spelling which seems the simplest and most logical course of action. It should also be noted that the concept of the Middle East as a distinct region is itself in part a product of the First World War. Before this, the territories of the Ottoman Empire were simply viewed as Asiatic and anything more specific was limited to ‘the Near East.’ However, given that the term ‘Middle East’ has entered the common lexicon and carries with it the intended meaning of this author it has been used, again for the sake of simplicity. To clarify what that meaning is, the Middle East in the context of this paper specifically encompasses the regions spanning the entire Arabian peninsula and territories ranging from the Levant, the Eastern Mediterranean coast and the Red Sea to Mesopotamia, the Persian gulf, and the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. From south to north it spans from Yemen and the Arabian Sea to Syria as far north as the Taurus Mountain range and bordering the south-eastern Anatolian region.

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The Middle East is possibly the least understood or appreciated theater of the First World

War. Often relegated to afterthoughts and footnotes one could make a legitimate argument that

the Middle East was actually the most significant theater of the First World War. This view

depends a great deal on measure. Certainly, wartime losses of men and materials were far lower

than that of European fronts but using only casualties as a measure of relative significance would

be simplistic and misleading. The rising internal instability and growing Arab nationalism within

the Ottoman Empire were cause for mounting European imperial encroachment. The discovery

of oil as an abundant resource in the Middle East increased the importance of the region to

Europe’s empires. Additionally, the rise of Islam as a political force, due to the significant

presence of Muslims under European rule, has all meant the wartime events of this region have

had lasting implications a century later.

Despite these considerations, contemporary histories of the British Empire are still

reluctant to acknowledge the Middle East’s central role in British imperial wartime calculations.

Instead it is still treated, as T.E. Lawrence once famously described it, as a “sideshow.”1 Recent

histories still hold a marked reluctance to acknowledge the Middle East as a region that,

according to Dr. John Darwin* was “a sphere of far greater [British] imperial significance than,

say, the whole of tropical Africa.”2 Still, some would argue that any view that puts the Middle

East in a predominant position has been caught up in the romanticisms of an ancient region and

the what some have gone so far as to claim was a largely fictional Arab awakening.3

1 T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph. (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1938), 274; John Darwin, “An Undeclared Empire: The British in the Middle East, 1918–39” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 27, no. 2 (1999): 159 * Dr. John Darwin is Beit University Lecturer in the History of the British Commonwealth at the University of Oxford. 2 Darwin, “An Undeclared Empire,” 160 3 Efraim Karsh & Inari Karsh, “Myth in the Desert, or Not the Great Arab Revolt” Middle Eastern Studies 33, no.2 (1997): 267

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The question of an Arab nationalist awakening occurring in the years leading up to and

during the First World War has become a significant point of debate in contemporary discourse

concerning the region.4 Was there an Arab awakening and a true revolt? Or was it manufactured

(intentionally or unintentionally) during the war by the British and promoted after the war by

ambitious Arab leaders and guilt-ridden imperialists? In the years immediately after the war

there emerged a narrative of a mass popular Arab uprising against the Turks. This narrative was

rooted within the complex of British wartime propaganda, imperial desire to carve up the Middle

East, rising Arab nationalism, and the ambitions of various Arab leaders to secure their own

place in the new order. It was this narrative that laid the foundations for traditional

historiography on the subject. Authored primarily by British imperial officers which relied

almost entirely upon a British imperial perspective it treated the Arab awakening and revolt in

simplified terms more akin to myth than to fact.5 In this view the Arab revolt was painted as the

focal point of a mass popular uprising, which was the culmination of a burgeoning Arab

movement, aimed at the goal of independent Arab statehood.

A revisionist school of historiography has emerged responding to this narrative with a

dramatically polarized view. This revised view points to the weaknesses in the traditionalist

narrative, born of the war and rooted in British wartime propaganda. In this view, the British, far

from manipulating an honest Arab awakening, are in fact master, creator, and sustainer of an

artificial imperial construct.6 This view of events has rightly levied valid criticisms against what

4 Donald M. McKale, “Germany and the Arab Question Before World War I” The Historian 59, no.2 (1997): 311-12 5 See George Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement. (London: H. Hamilton, 1938) as an example of this narrative. 6 James Renton, “Changing Language of Empire and the Orient: Britain and the Invention of the Middle East: 1917-1918” The Historical Journal 50, no.3 (2007): 654-5; Adeed Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair. (Princeton NJ USA: Princeton University Press, 2003), 36-7; David French, “The Dardanelles, Mecca and Kut: Prestige as a Factor in British Eastern Strategy, 1914-1916.” War & Society 5, no.1 (1987): 55-6; Maxwell Orme Johnson, “The Arab Bureau and the Arab Revolt: Yanbu' to Aqaba” Military Affairs (1982): 194 ; Donald M. McKale, “Germany and the Arab Question,” 311

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is described as a naïve and simplistic view of the complexities of a nationalist awakening. It

further points out that this traditionalist narrative was one of advantage to both Imperial Britain

and the Arab leaders who rebelled against the Ottomans. Furthermore these Arab leaders had a

vested interest in reinforcing this narrative in the post-war era to gain support for their own anti-

imperialist agendas.7 This attempt at rehabilitating the Arab narrative however, has produced a

surprising by-product. An element of this reformist movement has gone beyond questioning the

nature of this Arab awakening. Instead, this reformist element is intent on disproving the entire

notion of an Arab awakening from having occurred before or during the war. It instead argues

the entire movement is of myth and propaganda.8

These debates hold tremendous significance in shaping our understanding of the First

World War as well as to modern concerns regarding the region and its peoples. It is central to

shaping our view of this period, region, its political currents, the historical roots of current

concerns and the Arab national awakening itself and its meaning. The problem faced by the

historiography is that it operates in a politically charged environment. As a result, what has

emerged are competing narratives that have had the importance of contemporary political

agendas imposed upon them. Those arguing against an Arab awakening are doing so from what

appears to be a politically motivated agenda.9 The latest school of thought to emerge on the

subject has begun in earnest to counter these arguments. This new group of post-revisionist

historians concede there are issues with the traditionalist view of the Arab awakening. However,

it argues that as flawed as the historiography may be in its understanding of the nature of this

‘awakening’ there was nonetheless a very real nationalist uprising occurring that permanently

7 Dawisha, Arab Nationalism, 39-43 8 Karsh and Karsh, “Myth in the Desert,” 267; Dawisha, Arab Nationalism, 34-5 9 Ian S. Lustick, “Israeli history: Who is fabricating what?” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 39, no.3 (1997): 156

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altered the region. It is this view that this paper intends to demonstrate is the only one which

demonstrates any attempt at a genuine understanding of the complexities of a nationalist

awakening or explores the nature of this Arab awakening in an appropriate context free of

political and historical basis.

The seminal work The Arab Awakening (1938) represents the origins of the traditionalist

view of Arab nationalism. Written by George Antonius,* it built upon the wartime work of

Arnold J. Toynbee.** The Arab Awakening likely represents the first history of Arab nationalism

and Antonius one of the first historians of Arab nationalism.10 Antonius’ work defined Arab

nationalism along cultural and linguistic grounds and argued that a 19th century revival of Arabic

language and thought by Arabian intellectuals represented the beginnings of a new Arab national

awakening. As the First World War approached, the masses and intelligentsia of Arab culture

had, in his view been mobilized in the pursuit of Arab independence. In his words the Arabs

were an “infant” national movement.11 During the war it was this cadre of Arabists led by

intellectuals and Arab officers in the Ottoman army that formed the central leadership of the

nationalist movement.12 Its failure, Antonius alleges, was due to the British who took advantage

of the Arab awakening during the war by orchestrating an uprising that was ignored once the

revolt had outlived its value to British imperial interests.13

* George Antonius was a Cambridge educated British author and diplomat who served as a civil servant in the British mandate administration in Palestine and later became one of the first historians of Arab nationalism. ** Arnold J. Toynbee was a British historian and philosopher of history worked for the political intelligence department of the British Foreign Office. During the First World War he become a staunch supporter and promoter of the notion that a popular Arab nationalist movement was occurring in the Middle East. After the war he became a research professor of International History at the London School of Economics and the University of London and authored numerous books. 10 Dawisha, Arab Nationalism, 27 11 Antonius, The Arab Awakening, 53–55 12 Sören Scholvin, “Clashing Geopolitical Visions: Iraq from the First World War to the 1958 Revolution” Revista Română de Geografie Politică 13, no.2 (2011): 159; Martin Kramer, “Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity” Daedalus 122, no.3 (1993): 177-8; Johnson, “The Arab Bureau,” 196; James J. Schneider, Guerrilla Leader: T.E. Lawrence and the Arab Revolt. (New York: Bantam Books, 2011), 28 13 Karsh and Karsh, “Myth in the Desert,” 267

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This traditional narrative of a mass Arab awakening that was manipulated into a revolt,

rooted in rising Arab nationalism, by the British for imperial gain, has been vigorously debated

amid the literature of the Middle East during this period.14 Efraim Karsh* is likely the most

recognizable and controversial figure leading this anti-Arab nationalist awakening narrative. He

argues that, “There is probably no more potent a myth in the annals of the modem Middle East

than the so-called 'Great Arab Revolt' of the First World War… [which] signifies the culmination

of an ‘Arab Awakening’ which had long been in the making.”15

Along with Karsh, Adeed Dawisha** embodies this revisionist narrative that views the

Arab Awakening as a myth born in First World War propaganda. In his book Arab Nationalism

in the Twentieth Century: from Triumph to Despair (2003), Dawisha utilizes pre-war Arab

scholars’ writing of ambitions to create a singular Arab state as the basis for his framework to

measure the validity of claims of an Arab awakening and determine its eventual failure or

success. Dawisha contends that Arab nationalists argued “Arab nationalism would be a hollow

and meaningless concept if it did not strive to gather its children…in one unified and sovereign

Arab state.”16 Along this line, Dawisha argues that the ultimate goal of Arab political unity and a

singular Arab state is what anchors the definition of Arab nationalism.17 Having established these

criteria, Dawisha argues that because ‘the few’ Arab nationalists who existed (at least in print) in

the Ottoman Empire professed this to be their final aim that by their own criteria the nationalist

movement failed. The irony, however, of utilizing pre-war Arab theorists writing on the issues of

14 McKale, “Germany and the Arab Question,” 311-2 * Efraim Karsh is a professor of Middle East and Mediterranean Studies at King's College London, professor of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University and a principal research fellow (and former director) at the Middle East Forum and has become a vocal critic of Arab nationalist narratives. 15 Karsh and Karsh, “Myth in the Desert,” 267 ** Adeed Dawisha holds a PhD from the London School of Economics and is a professor of political science at Miami University 16 Dawisha, Arab Nationalism, 4 17 Ibid, 8

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criteria for, and goals of Arab nationalism to prove that an Arab nationalist awakening was not

occurring, seems to be lost on Dawisha.

Dawisha’s approach is naïve to think one can construct a framework to define a national

awakening, especially since he argues for a unified movement intent on a singular state. This is

especially foolish in a region as broad and multifaceted as the Middle East. When one looks to

other historical examples of nationalist uprisings+ we see that the evidence presented by Dawisha

arguing against a national awakening is in fact, common elements of all awakenings.

Furthermore the reality of a nationalist revolt does not conform to Dawisha’s proposed view of a

unified movement as the benchmark of nationalist awakening.

Dawisha ignores the realities of the region, and fails to grasp that a non-unified

movement is still a movement nonetheless. Although the Arabs were united by a common

language and religion, there was nonetheless deep divides within Arab society. Indeed, Antonius

freely admits that the Arabs were far from ready for the speed of events to come and that at the

time of the war the Arab awareness of a single national identity among themselves was still in its

infancy.18 Dawisha himself admits Arab loyalties at the beginning of the twentieth century were

pluralistic but uses this to argue against the possibility of a nationalist awakening. There was

indeed a pluralist nature to Arab identity which included regional, political, tribal, clan and even

+ When one looks to other examples of nationalist uprising movements, such as those seen in Ukraine and Yugoslavia during the Second World War, we see that nationalism mixes with conflicting political ideologies and other currents in the region, be it religious, ethnic or otherwise. In this matrix of conflict what results is a series of competing agendas presenting themselves within the nationalist movement all with the same overarching principal aim(s). This means in practical terms one is far more likely to find a nationalist movement composed of several fractured and conflicted groups that are as much in conflict with one another as they are with the perceived external/outside threat(s) than they are any unified monolithic movement akin to that of a state apparatus. These groups often have very different end goals and visions for the nationalist movement in the post-conflict world and only share a principal aim of a nationalist rising against the perceived threat(s). What this means for the landscape of conflict is that instead of a simple ‘A’ versus ‘B’ dichotomy what emerges is a multipoint and multilayered conflict akin to a spiders web with points intersecting in conflict and alliance often times in a constant state of flux. 18 Antonius, The Arab Awakening, 32-3

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religious elements. Rashid Khalidi* argues that Arab identity in this period was indeed pluralistic

and that Arabs “identified with the Ottoman Empire, their religion, Arabism, their homeland

Palestine, their city or region, and their family, without feeling any contradiction, or sense of

conflicting loyalties.”19 Dawisha himself utilized this same quote from Khalidi but without fully

appreciating its meaning.20

Dawisha’s use of this pluralistic identity within Arab culture to suggest an Arab

awakening was not occurring or that Arab nationalism was not a current in Arab discourse on

identity is fundamentally flawed. There is no reason, given the pluralistic nature of their identity,

to suggest that Arab nationalism could not develop in a region which still held deep religious and

political bonds that would seem contrary to the principles of nationalism.21 To be direct,

continued loyalty to the Ottomans or divided loyalty is not in and of itself evidence that an Arab

national awakening was not occurring. It is also not surprising to see these difficulties and

contradictions encountered by Arab nationalism as it tried to emerge and define itself in earnest

against the competing experiences of the coming war.22 Antonius, however, insists that despite

what appeared to be early failures that the seeds had been sown.23

A main point of writers like Karsh and Dawisha, arguing against an Arab nationalist

awakening, is the power of religion in the region. They argue that Islam was the only real

identifier known to the Arabs who saw themselves first and foremost as Muslims.24 It is indeed a

valid observation that pan-Islamic ideas had spread thorough the Muslim world during the late

*Rashid Khalidi is the Edward Said Professor of Modern Arab Studies at Columbia University, and director of the Middle East Institute of Columbia's School of International and Public Affairs. 19 Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 19 20 Dawisha, Arab Nationalism, 15 21 Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, 19 22 Dawisha, Arab Nationalism, 28 23 Antonius, The Arab Awakening, 53–55. 24 Dawisha, Arab Nationalism, 20

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ninetieth century. However, this had been intentionally constructed and perpetrated by the

Turkish Sultan in the hope that pan-Islam might help shore up the declining Ottoman Empire.25

This is overlooked in the Dawisha-Karsh’s narrative. This exercise in pan-Islam was hoped to

discourage the European powers from further encroaching upon the Ottoman Empire for fear of

widespread Muslim revolt within their own empires.26 But as Mustafa Aksakal** has pointed out

the genie had been let out of the bottle and in having secularized Islam “through its employment

for secular, political ends, the reverse had also became true and resulted in the Islamization of

politics or, put differently, the politicization of Islam.”27

The post-revisionist school of thought as represented by Martin Kramer* argues that the

Karsh-Dawisha approach deeply misunderstands the nature of the Arab awakening which is why

they fail to recognize its emergence.28 Kramer argues that Arab nationalism did not “originate as

a straightforward reaction to Western imperial rule, of the kind familiar elsewhere in Asia and

Africa.” 29 He suggests, in contrast to the traditionalist school of thought that, “Arabism first

arose in the nineteenth century…as a critique of the state of the Ottoman Empire.” 30 Kramer

argues that the Arabs had, for nearly four hundred years, been fully reconciled to their role

within the Ottoman Empire. This role however, was viewed as a partnership in Islam with an

empire that professed Islam and embraced all the Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire.31 That

25 French, “The Dardanelles, Mecca and Kut,” 47-8 26 Ibid ** Mustafa Aksakal is an associate professor of History at American University in Washington DC and has held fellowships from the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, and the American Council of Learned Societies. 27 Mustafa Aksakal, “Holy War Made in Germany? Ottoman Origins of the 1914 Jihad” War in History 18, no..2 (2011): 188 * Dr. Martin Kramer holds a PhD in Middle Eastern history from Princeton University and serves as a Middle Eastern authority at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the Shalem Center. His focus is on Islam and Arab politics. 28 See Kramer, “Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity” 29 Ibid, 173 30 Ibid, 174 31 Ibid

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said, Kramer argues that Arabs retained a distinct individual pride rooted in their language, that

of Islam, the language with which Allah revealed the Koran.

As the First World War approached the commonly accepted view is that Ottoman Empire

was in a relative state of decline. With it Ottoman power and its Islamic symbiosis began to

weaken. Europe was beginning to view Ottoman territories with a covetous eye.32 This runs

contrary to the suggestion by Dawisha that “with the gradual loss of the “Christian” Balkans, the

Ottoman Empire acquired an increasingly more coherent religious identity that bound Arab and

Turk in one Islamic brotherhood.”33 Dawisha’s claim in fact runs counter to essentially the entire

breadth of historiography on the subject of Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the First World

War.34

David K. Fieldhouse**is one who would add a caveat to the notion of a declining

Ottoman Empire. In Western Imperialism in the Middle East, 1914-1958 (2006) Fieldhouse

parallels Dawisha by suggesting that despite setbacks in the early part of the twentieth century by

1914 the Ottomans were on a course of reconstruction.35 Aksakal for his part would argue this

was relegated more to the realm of intent than actual action on the part of the Ottomans.36

However, as far as Arab populations were concerned, Fieldhouse suggests that when discussing

32 Scott Anderson, Lawrence in Arabia: War, Deceit, Imperial Folly and the Making of the Modern Middle East. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2013), 152; Richard Hamilton and Holger Herwig, “European Wars, 1815-1914”, in Decisions for War, 1914-1917, by Richard Hamilton and Holger Herwig, 23-46. (New York, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 28-32; Kramer, “Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity,” 175; Mustafa Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War in 1914: The Ottoman Empire and the First World War. (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 10-17, 39-41, 57-62 33 Dawisha, Arab Nationalism, 33 34 Listed are only a few of such examples: Hamilton and Herwig, “European Wars, 1815-1914,” 3; Anderson, Lawrence in Arabia, 34; Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War, 1 ** Dr. David K. Fieldhouse, is a historian of the British Empire and former the Vere Harmsworth Professorship of Imperial and Naval History at the University of Cambridge. He has held posts at the University of Canterbury, Oxford University, Cambridge University and remains an active Emeritus Fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge. 35 Nigel Ashton, “Review no. 575,” Review of Western Imperialism in the Middle East, 1914-1958, by David K. Fieldhouse, Reviews in History, 1 February 2007. http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/575, 1 36 Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War, 10-17, 39-41, 57-62; Aksakal, “Holy War Made in Germany?,” 195

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the Ottomans one could go so far as to “talk of a reconquest and reintegration.”37 A point that

perhaps evaded Fieldhouse when choosing these words is in saying this it would imply there was

a need for reintegration suggesting the Arab population had indeed become separated from the

mainstream of the Ottoman Empire. With regards to the question of an Arab awakening

Fieldhouse is apprehensive over what he feels are the huge leaps made by the traditionalist

narrative of Antonius. Having said this Fieldhouse does not go so far as to suggest that there was

no Arab national awakening but does suggest that it was not a widespread mass movement as

portrayed by Antonius.38

As the Ottoman Empire declined, Kramer argues, so did the confidence of its remaining

subjects. Discontent appeared in various forms throughout the Arab provinces, it was this

discontent that Kramer labels as an “Arab Awakening.” 39 This rising sense of dissatisfaction

with Ottoman rule was compounded when combined with growing resistance to the Young

Turk’s increasingly exclusive program of Turkification and secularization. As the Ottoman

Empire stumbled, it was this program of Turkification aimed at giving a national identity and

stability to a polyglot empire that further drove forward the rising sense of an Arab national

awakening.40

The Turks had begun to enforce the Turkish language at the expense of other languages

including Arabic as a means to establishing this national identity. This program went so far as to

translate the Koran. This perceived attack against Arabs and Arabic as the bastion of Islam was

cause for Arab apprehension on the eve of the First World War.41 In Kramer’s view it “may have

37 Ashton, “Review no. 575,” 1 38 Ibid 39 Kramer, “Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity,” 175 40 Ibid, 176-7; John D. Grainger, The Battle for Syria 1918-1920. (Suffolk USA: The Boydell Press, 2013), 10 41 Schneider, Guerrilla Leader, 17

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helped to rally the supporters of cultural Arabism to a political purpose.”42 Scott Anderson,* in

his recently published book, Lawrence in Arabia: War, Deceit, Imperial Folly and the Making of

the Modern Middle East (2013) goes even further arguing this ‘attack’ on Islam was considered

so severe within the Arab community as to serve to bridge the gap between progressive urban

Arabs in northern Syria and conservative devout Arabs in southern Arabia.43 As Kramer suggests

it would appear that a rising sense of Arabism was a palpable response to the threats of

Turkification.44

In Kramer’s analysis, a pre-war Arab awakening was occurring and its roots can be

traced to two sources. The first Kramer identifies is an Arabic literary revival he argues was

occurring which although not translating immediately into Arab nationalism did argue for a

secular Arab culture outside of an Islamic narrative.45 Kramer traces the second source to

rivalries within the Arabic-speaking Muslim elite over appointments to Ottoman government

positions. Grievances of those passed over in Kramer’s view turned to demand for government

reform and autonomy for Arab provinces. By the beginning of the twentieth century these

demands were arguing for the Arabs to have more of a share in the conduct of their own affairs.

Kramer argues that by the turn of the century this sentiment had become firmly established in the

major Arab cities where a narrative of Islamic revival headed by Arabs mixed with these

demands for greater autonomy to create an Arab awakening wherein secular Arabism, became

intertwined with Islamic ideology.46

42 Kramer, “Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity,” 176-7 * Scott Anderson is a journalist, and a veteran war correspondent and frequent contributor to for the New York Times Magazine. 43 Anderson, Lawrence in Arabia, chap 5 44 Kramer, “Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity,” 176-7 45 Ibid, 175 46 Ibid, 175-6

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Although this form of Arab awakening as described by Kramer failed in his view to

develop a modern Arab political language it was enough to shake the confidence of Arab leaders

in the legitimacy of Ottoman rule.47 Kramer also suggests that by the eve of the First World War

Arabism had become an unmistakeable force in Ottoman political discourse.48 In Kramer’s view

“Arabism arose from a growing unease about the pace and direction of change.” Although

Kramer argues that this did not develop into what he terms “full-fledged nationalism” he clearly

makes the case that an Arab awakening was occurring within the Ottoman Empire during the

course of events leading towards the First World War.49

If one were to alternately take Fieldhouse’s view of the Ottoman Empire as being in a

state of revival as the war approached and the appeal of Arab nationalism not yet widespread one

is left with a narrative wherein the First World War emerges as the key event which altered Arab

discourse.50 One aspect to this argument shared by revisionists like Karsh, and Dawisha, is the

claim that in the years leading up to the war there is little evidence of actual physical Arab unrest

inside the Ottoman Empire. They therefore, argue that the revolt and awakening were products of

the war, constructed during it because of various motivations. However, the assertion that acts as

a foundation for this wartime argument, that there was little to no anti-Ottoman Arab activity

leading up to the war, is unsupported by even the evidence cited by those who promote this view.

When the Ottoman Empire entered the war, the Sultan’s call to jihad, was received with

at best a lukewarm response.51 This call to war, couched in Islamic terms, would come to mark

the first step towards an impeding schism that straddled religion, ethnicity, and politics. Sören

47 Kramer, “Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity,” 176 48 Ibid, 176-7 49 Ibid, 177 50 Ashton, “Review no. 575,” 1 51 McKale, “Germany and the Arab Question,” 324; Anderson, Lawrence in Arabia, 102-15

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Scholvin* argues this was due to the fact that Arab nationalism had already begun to mix with

Islam and to rise beyond the reach of the Sultan’s religious leadership.52 In Scholvin’s view, and

others such as Kramer, there exists a commanding body of research that has shown in the years

leading up to the First World War the British and Germans had both “accumulated substantial

evidence” of growing Arab dissatisfaction with Ottoman rule.53 This research argues that it is

indisputable that a small, but growing, Arab nationalist movement had begun to emerge in the

Ottoman Empire.

Serious Arab unrest had indeed appeared in Mesopotamia and Yemen, which had become

violent.54 The key symbol of British support for the Arab awakening occurring in the Middle

East would however, come in the form of the Arab revolt. It was this revolt, led by the Sharif of

Mecca, Hussein ibn Ali under official British patronage, which would become the focus of

discourse of the period on the subject of Arab nationalism.55 With this in mind it is not surprising

to learn that the most significant debates concerning the Arab awakening focus on the wartime

events of the Arab revolt. The story of how this British patronage of the Sharif developed is of

particular interest concerning the debate on the Arab nationalist awakening.

By the time of the Ottoman entry into the war the British had come round to the idea that

the Sharif was the ideal candidate to counter the British fear of a Muslim uprising in the wake of

the Sultan’s call to jihad.56 However, the story of the union begins before the war. By 1913 the

British had been approached several times by the Sharif of Mecca in hopes of securing British

* Dr. Sören Scholvin is a Research fellow at the Institute of Economic and Cultural Geography, Leibniz-Universität Hannover, and former Research fellow at the GIGA Institute of African Affairs and doctoral student at the Hamburg International Graduate School for the Study of Regional Powers. 52 Scholvin, “Clashing Geopolitical Visions,” 159; Anderson, Lawrence in Arabia, 102-15 53 McKale, “Germany and the Arab Question,” 320 54 Ibid, 317 55 Renton, “Changing Language of Empire,” 654 56 Scholvin, “Clashing Geopolitical Visions,” 159; French, “The Dardanelles, Mecca and Kut,” 55-6; Renton, “Changing Language of Empire,” 651

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support against the Ottomans.57 The British Foreign Office was charting a careful response to

Arab overtures however. British policy had been, up to the Ottoman entry into the war, to

maintain the integrity and neutrality of the Ottoman Empire.58 It is therefore no mystery why

there is not more evidence of dissatisfaction on the part of the Arabs in the decades leading up to

the war, it was in fact, as argued by post-revisionists, being carefully managed by the British.59

This British caution however had done little to dampen the efforts of the Sharif who by

1913-14 had his sons Abdullah and Feisal working to secure the support of the British and Arab

nationalist movements. Despite British rebuffs before the war, Abdullah continued to call on the

British for support.60 Indeed, Karsh openly recognizes this point with no dispute. Where Karsh’s

argument lies is a dispute over the Sharif’s intentions. Karsh argues that the Sharif’s attempt to

gain British support represented his own personal ambitions.61 There seems little dispute within

the historiography regarding the Sharif’s ambitious nature, however its relevance seems

questionable. One is left asking, are not all leaders, as Karsh describes the Sharif, “self-

aggrandizers”, “ambitious”, concerned with their own advancement and willing to manipulate

their cause to do so? Of particular interest is that Karsh himself traces the history of these British

treaties with several regional Arab leaders, such as Sheikh Mubarak of Kuwait (1899), Abd al-

Aziz Ibn Saud of Najd (1915), or Muhammadal- Idrisi of Asir (1915).62 Are we then to

understand that these leaders were all simply seeking self-advancement without concern for an

Arab cause and free of any sort of Arab awakening? Would these treaties not represent the

57 S.A. Cohen, “The Genesis of the British Campaign in Mesopotamia 1914” Middle Easter Studies 12, no.2 (1976): 125 58 Cohen, “The Genesis of the British Campaign,” 125; French, “The Dardanelles, Mecca and Kut,” 48 59 French, “The Dardanelles, Mecca and Kut,” 48 60 Karsh and Karsh, “Myth in the Desert,” 269-70 61 Ibid, 267 62 Ibid, 281

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beginning of Arabs thinking of themselves as, if not independent, at least separate from the

Ottomans? This view of these treaties, however, seems lost on Karsh.

Karsh argues that “however intriguing” any ideas concerning Arab moves towards the

British may be, the idea that they represent an Arab awakening is “totally misconceived.”63

Karsh argues that in the case of the Sharif that “This was no 'Great Arab Revolt': it was Hussein's

personal bid for an empire.”64 Karsh goes on to argue the Sharif was no “champion of national

liberation seeking to unshackle the 'Arab Nation' from the chains of Ottoman captivity.”65

Instead Karsh argues “he [Sharif Hussein] was an imperialist aspirant anxious to exploit a unique

window of opportunity for substituting his own empire for that of the Ottomans” who “If he had

ever truly subscribed to the notion of' Ottomanism', which he certainly had not, he discarded it

for the self- serving cause of 'Hashemism-' not 'Arabism'.”66

Beyond Karsh’s view of the Sharif’s motives to revolt he claims that the Arab response to

this revolt was one of “total indifference or even hostility.” Karsh argues that the Sharif was

unable to even garner support in Mecca itself and that his authority, that of custodian of the

Muslim holy places, was far from accepted.67 He however cites no evidence to support these

claims of dissent regarding the Sharif’s authority nor does he expand on this claim. We are then

left to simply take Karsh at his word that Muslims, even the Hashemites themselves viewed the

moral authority of the custodian of Islam’s holiest places with ‘almost complete disregard,’ and

this from the same Arabs Dawisha argues knew no identity other than Muslim.68

63 Karsh and Karsh, “Myth in the Desert,” 267 64 Ibid 65 Ibid 66 Ibid 67 Ibid 68 Dawisha, Arab Nationalism, 20

16

Dawisha goes on to question, citing one of Karsh’s many unsubstantiated claims, that due

to the slow response and growth of the revolt whether the Sharif’s rebellion does indeed deserve

the moniker the “Great Arab Revolt.”69 Those examinations that set upon examining the military

aspects of the revolt, with a refreshingly pragmatic approach, have found its growth was more

rapid than portrayed by Karsh and Dawisha.70 Furthermore, practical elements outside the scope

of the revisionist examination played a significant role in impeding the development of the

revolt. In fact, the revolt’s slow start was affected by several key factors not uncommon in

nationalist uprisings, all of which are ignored by Karsh and Dawisha. This included winning over

the various and conflicted tribes to the cause for example. More significantly however, once

recruits were secured the need to supply them with military training and equipment was a

daunting task in this region and took a great deal of time. Major Maxwell Orme Johnson* of the

United States Marine Corps observes however, that once Faisal had secured Aqaba’s port for the

revolt the speed and scope of the revolts activity increased dramatically.71 The historic

recurrence of common denominators which act as a telltale signs of a nationalist awakening seem

to have escaped Dawisha and Karsh. They are instead not examined in any such comparative

way and taken out of context are used instead to argue the revolt’s falsehood.

Moving back to the issue of the Sharif’s Islamic credentials, Dawisha takes issue with the

Sharif’s call to revolt. Dawisha argues that support for the Sharif was so weak he was forced to

couch his call to revolt in Islamic terms in hopes of lending religious legitimacy to his actions.

He describes the Sharif’s proclamation as a call to preserve Islam and that the view of ‘the Great

Arab Revolt’ “enshrined” in nationalist memory and historiography as the “patriotic spark that

69 Dawisha, Arab Nationalism, 35-6 70 Johnson, “The Arab Bureau,” 198  * Major Maxwell Orme Johnson of the United States Marine Corps holds a PhD in Foreign Affairs from the University of Virginia 71 Johnson, “The Arab Bureau,” 198

17

would launch the Arabs on a nationalist quest” as a myth.72 Instead, Dawisha argues that the

Sharif’s use of Islamic instead of nationalist language suggests that no awakening was occurring

and the Sharif knew it.73 Nowhere does Dawisha try to reconcile the connection Islam would and

did have to Arabism as he himself suggests, or in the context of a nationalist awakening in the

terms suggested by Khalidi.74 Nor is the hypocrisy of this position in relation to his own views

on the Sultans call to jihad acknowledged. Scholvin for his part dismisses Islam as an element

entirely arguing “Hussein did, in the end, not lead a religiously legitimised movement but

became the first key figure of Arab nationalism.”75

Karsh also seeks to dismantle the significance of the Sharif’s abstention from publicly

endorsing the Ottoman declaration of jihad. Karsh, like Dawisha, asserts that this abstention on

the part of the Sharif had little value. Karsh suggests, “that the Sharif's religious credentials had

never been prodigious enough to influence Muslim behaviour one way or the other.”76 This view,

however, conflicts with not only prevailing British views at the time, which could admittedly be

skewed, but also with their own principal view, as well as that of both Anderson and Kramer’s,

all of which emphasize the close association between Arab identity and Islam.77

Another puzzling aspect to Karsh’s view regarding the Sharif is his claim that Hussein

had not only demonstrated no nationalist sentiments prior to the war but had remained loyal to

the Ottomans.78 Karsh also contends that this was a view of the Sharif shared by Arab nationalist

secret societies. Ignoring what these nationalist secret societies represent to both Karsh and

Dawisha’s arguments given they both dismiss them as insignificant and not evidence of an Arab

72 Dawisha, Arab Nationalism, 34 73 Ibid, 34-5 74 Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, 19 75 Scholvin, “Clashing Geopolitical Visions,” 160 76 Karsh and Karsh, “Myth in the Desert,” 289-91 77 Anderson, Lawrence in Arabia, chap 5; Kramer, “Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity” 175-7 78 Karsh and Karsh, “Myth in the Desert,” 305

18

awakening, this is at least confusing. Given that in the same article Karsh discusses the Sharif’s

pre-war negotiations with both these secret societies and the British to obtain support against the

Ottomans, the Sharif’s behaviour as described by Karsh himself hardly seems in keeping with

Karsh’s claim of Ottoman loyalty.79 It is this perplexing double-speak which represents a

continuous theme of self-contradiction inherent within the historiography. However, given the

charges levied against Karsh of promoting a narrative reflective of a political agenda one should

not find this altogether surprising.80

In Kramer’s view there is no question of whether an Arab awakening was occurring.

However, as the First World War approached this awakening was unready to be confronted with

the prospect of independence. The Arab revolt and the British support for it was sought out by

both sides and was not entered into lightly. Kramer concedes that the Sharif did indeed have

ambitious visions of a vast “Arab Kingdom” for he and his family, but whatever his personal

motivations it was to be an Arab kingdom.81 In Kramer’s view the Sharif’s revolt did however

have little to do with the Arabism emerging in Mesopotamia, which only indicates the

multidimensional nature of the Arabs’ awakening. The Arab nationalist sentiment developed

within various regions of the Middle East, both in concert with one another and free of one

another. Kramer argues that, “an Arab nation had entered the game of nations, and from the

outset, its members made far-reaching claims which ran up against other claims.”82 The result

was, as Kramer describes it, that, “the revolt thus made for a volatile mix, whose diverse

participants dreamed the different dreams of Arab kingship, desert anarchy, liberal

79 Karsh and Karsh, “Myth in the Desert,” 269-70 80 Lustick, “Israeli history,” 156 81 Kramer, “Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity,” 177-8 82 Karsh and Karsh, “Myth in the Desert,” 178

19

constitutionalism, and military dictatorship.”83 In Kramer’s view, the war and the Sharif’s revolt

acted only to suspend these differences in so far as to support the drive for independence.84

A final comment from Dawisha might serve well as a means of closing out this

discussion of debates concerning the Arab nationalist awakening. He suggests that questions

asked by Arab nationalists leading up to the First World War concerning “whether the ethnically

different Arabs should strive for political independence, or whether they should eschew the

ethnic and linguistic divide in favour of Islamic solidarity and remain within the Ottoman

framework became irrelevant.”85 The Ottoman collapse forced the Arabs to face an inescapable

choice. It was therefore, in Dawisha’s view, only after the First World War that the idea of an

Arab nation and Arab nationalism itself truly took on a political form.86

Ultimately Dawisha’s argument seems one of semantics, which strives to split hairs over

what is an impossibly complex evolution and confluence of cultural, political, ethnic, linguistic

and religious themes. Did the Arab awakening truly represent a political movement before the

war, during the war, or not until after it? By whose definition do we determine what constitutes a

political movement? By our own standards, or the immensely more difficult task of determining

by Ottoman Arab standards? What represents a true nationalist awakening and what does not?

The revisionist argument does play an important role in forcing us to reconsider what was

certainly an overly simplified and misleading picture of what occurred in this region during the

war. That said, the discussion of what constitutes a nationalist awakening and attempts made to

argue that what occurred was not an awakening seem feeble and weak in light of events which

no party of any particular school of thought disputes.

83 Karsh and Karsh, “Myth in the Desert,” 177-8 84 Ibid 85 Dawisha, Arab Nationalism, 40-1 86 Ibid

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