External and Internal Factors of Security in the South Caucasus

and Russia’s Caucasus Policies

George Tarkhan-Mouravi1

As quite a number of definitions exist for the rather ambiguous concept of security, it may be

better to specify in advance what we are going discuss. We will mainly discuss here national security

and human security in the narrow sense as an absence of threats to human lives, territory, and

institutions, and less about such things as environmental, food or energy security, on one hand, or on

global/international security, on the other.

The three states of the South Caucasus, this small area on the periphery of both Europe and

Asia, have moved during the last two and a half decades, since the collapse of the Soviet Union,

along strikingly different political trajectories, whether from the viewpoint of internal developments

or of external orientations. Respectively, these different trajectories depended mainly upon the

internal (ethnic, religious, cultural, linguistic, and those related to political tradition) differences and

geographic location, but also on the external influences that in their turn would depend on the above-

mentioned differences as to which policies and approaches are applied, and what impacts are

produced. Of course, the specificities of political history of the South Caucasian states have had a

direct influence on how modern political landscape developed, although some aspects of the

situation may be essentially not too different from other post-Communist transitional societies,

particularly in the post-Soviet south, and there are some general similarities among all the political

regimes in the region.

The heritage of the Soviet past in the form of underdeveloped democratic institutions and

political culture, along with the scars caused by authoritarian suppression, civil wars and ethno-

territorial conflicts, still continues to haunt political processes and civil society building, narrowing

the space for political and social discourse, and leading (although with varying dynamic and to

different degree) to what now is commonly called ‘competitive authoritarianism’2 of ‘hybrid

regimes’ (to use the term introduced by Terry Lynn Karl back in 1995). Such hybrid regimes

combine a high degree of state centralization with the stripping formally democratic institutions of

real content, and their methodical replacement with substitutions that are intended to serve some of

1 Institute for Policy Studies, Tbilisi 2 Steven Levitsky, Lucan A. Way. 2002. “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism”. J. of Democracy 13 (2), 51-65. Also available

online at http://scholar.harvard.edu/levitsky/files/SL_elections.pdf; S. Levitsky, L. Way. 2010. Competitive Authoritarianism:

international linkage, organizational power, and the fate of hybrid regimes. New York: Cambridge University Press.

their functions but without challenging the incumbent leaderships’ hold on power.3 In a paradoxical

and maybe even ironic sense, Francis Fukuyama’s concept of the ‘end of history’ found all over the

post-Soviet South Caucasus a spectacular if somewhat ironic illustration – while the advent of

Western-style liberal democracy was still a remote possibility, all these governments have learned to

imitate,4 although with different skills, the formal aspects of democratic institutions, and the leaders

just love to talk about democracy and the rule of law, most probably interpreting these in their own

surreptitious way.

Nevertheless, the status of democratic reform is not the same in the three states. These

differences are represented in a range of substantive policy categories including: human and civil

rights, treatment of dissidents and opposition, rule of law, tolerance for religious and ethnic

minorities, the character of the business environment, a fight against corruption, and geopolitical

orientation. While Georgia has moved forward to an extent, in other two states of the region weak

and ineffective opposition is as a rule unable to create any viable alternative to incumbent elites, and

any dangerous challenge would normally emerge due to splitting of the former allies in power. The

same ruling elite attempts, and to varying extent succeeds to control mass media, and in particular

electronic media. Neglect for human rights, and frequent human rights abuse by law enforcement,

readiness to use excessive force against opposition and mass protests are still other specific

characteristics of the post-Soviet political reality in these states. Indeed, other than in the case of

Georgia, which tend to demonstrate more political volatility, the same political regimes rule for

many years, and everywhere there is the same problem of succession – and while the same clan

would retain power, the transition itself was somewhat differently resolved – in the case of

Azerbaijan (from father to son), in Armenia (from president to prime-minister).

Indeed, especially from the security perspective, differences between the three countries are

very significant, and are growing. Recently, things started to change with ever accelerating speed.

Just a few months ago, at the end of 2013, the security situation in the Caucasus, and even broader –

in Europe and the world, seemed to be very different from what we observe at present. Recent

developments in Ukraine, Russian annexation of Crimea, and the general breakdown of the post-cold

3 Jonathan Wheatley, Christoph Zürcher. 2008.”On the Origin and Consolidation of Hybrid Regimes: The State of Democracy in the

Caucasus”. Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 4, No.1, pp. 1-31. Available online at http://www.tfd.org.tw/docs/dj0401/001-032-

Jonathan%20Wheatley.pdf

4 Dmitri Furman. 2008. „Imitation Democracies“. New Left Review #54, November-December. Also available online at

http://www.newleftreview.org/?view=2750

war security situation and the world order,5 have drastically changed the security profile also in the

South Caucasus.

One has to acknowledge that the other sources of insecurity have not disappeared, probably

the unresolved Nagorno Karabakh conflict being the most dangerous among these. However, it is

also true that against the background of the growing threats emanating from Russia’s revisionism, all

the traditional ones on one hand pale in comparison, but on the other – may be reinvigorated by

Russia’s actions. Respectively, it looks prudent to first consider the few possible, or in some cases

even highly probable scenarios, as what happens in and to Ukraine, and then discuss the possible

repercussions in the South Caucasus and the former Soviet South in general; then we may consider

what could be the possible responses from various engaged actors, including the regional ones.

Now, after the annexation of Crimea, the attention of international observers have shifted to

South-East Ukraine, where we see some processes similar to what happened in Crimea, but also we

can observe important differences. We may argue that Russia’s actions in Ukraine6 will reveal, with

high probability, both its future actions, and the international response to these.

The new version of the Cold War is looming, and even the possibility of a new large scale

war is getting discussed7. Currently, we are in the situation of rapidly changing security environment

and the applicability of international law8, – following the Anschluss of Crimea, dangerously

unfolding developments in South-East Ukraine, generally unpredictable practices of expansionism,

revanchism and revisionism of Russian leadership against the weak response from the international

community9, and policy impact of emotional shenanigans of Russia’s highly personalized small

circle of the top decision maker(s).

The ideological framework for respective policies is formed by the complex blend of internal

politics consideration and unrestrained populism, as well as anti-Western, nationalist-imperialist

5 Fareed Zakaria. “Russia endangering global order” http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2014/03/31/zakaria-russia-endangering-

global-order/?hpt=wo_r1 6 Daniela Schwarzer, Constanze Stelzenmueller. “What is at Stake in Ukraine”. GMFUS, 13 March 2014.

http://www.gmfus.org/archives/what-is-at-stake-in-ukraine/ 7 Edward Lukas. “I hope I'm wrong but historians may look back and say this was the start of World War III. Daily Mail, 15 April

2014.” http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2605578/Edward-Lucas-I-hope-Im-wrong-historians-look-say-start-World-War-

III.html 8 Jeffrey D. Sachs. “Ukraine and the Crisis of International Law.” http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/jeffrey-d--sachs-sees-

in-russia-s-annexation-of-crimea-the-return--with-us-complicity--of-great-power-politics#FgUCQYAcxcAorAxY.99 ;

Fareed Zakaria. “Our new international tension is global norms vs. national interests” The Washington Post, 10 April 2014.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/fareed-zakaria-our-new-international-tension-is-global-norms-vs-national-

interests/2014/04/10/0bbcd68e-c0f0-11e3-bcec-b71ee10e9bc3_story.html 9 Ivan Krastev. “Putin’s World”. 1 April 2014. http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ivan-krastev-blames-the-west-s-weak-

response-in-crimea-for-empowering-russia

worldview of derzhavnost and neo-Eurasianism à la Alexander Dugin10

, the increasingly influential

apologist of Russia’s imperial future and neo-fascist ‘traditionalism’11

, professor at the Moscow

State University and advisor to the General Staff. As a result, Russia becomes currently the key

source of insecurity for the South Caucasus. Indeed, the biggest threats emanating from Russia are

now by no means originating in its North Caucasus, as some Russian experts try to argue, - but from

the ruthless policies of the Kremlin menacing European and international stability12

, as it started

moving along the road outlined a couple of decades ago by Alexander Solzhenitsyn13

– gathering

together the lands and territories that now institutionalized Russian nationalist worldview14

considers

as own, and then possibly re-establishing the USSR II, with the mottos of a ‘special path’ and the

‘traditional values’15

of Russia (as opposed to those of degenerating West) replacing outdated

Communist slogans.16

Russia still may, or may not, implement the Crimea scenario in some South-Eastern regions,

or Southern Ukraine 17

but it still may have also other plans regarding its post-Soviet neighbours that

are difficult to predict due to often irrational factors influencing such decisions.18

The Russian

10 See in more details: Alexander Dugin. Foundations of Geopolitics (Основы геополитики. Москва, 2000): (p. 141) 11 See, e.g. Антон Шеховцов. Палингенетический проект неоевразийства идеи возрождения в мировоззрении Александра

Дугина. Форум новейшей восточноевропейской истории и культуры, 2, 2009. стр. 105-126. http://www1.ku-

eichstaett.de/ZIMOS/forum/docs/forumruss12/7Shekhovtsov.pdf. On Dugin’s latest activities, see: Matthew Campbell. “Rise of the

new Russian empire”. Searchlight Magazine, 20 April 2014. http://searchlightmagazine.com/news/international-news/rise-of-the-new-

russian-empire 12 Back in 1946, George F. Kennan wrote in his famous Long Telegram: ”At bottom of Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is

traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. … for Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively

archaic in form fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of

Western countries. For this reason they have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between Western world and their

own, feared what would happen if Russians learned truth about world without or if foreigners learned truth about world within. And

they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and

compromises with it.”

http://www.facebook.com/l.php?u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww2.gwu.edu%2F~nsarchiv%2Fcoldwar%2Fdocuments%2Fepisode-

1%2Fkennan.htm&h=zAQFV1Vn6 13 Aleksander Solzhenitsyn. Rebuilding Russia: Reflections and Tentative Proposals. Harvill Press, 1991 (first published in

Komsomolskalya Pravda, September 18, 1990. http://www.kulichki.com/inkwell/text/hudlit/ruslit/solzheni/kak_obustroit.htm) 14 See in more detail: Игорь Зевелев. “Новая внешнеполитическая доктрина России.” Ведомости, 4/8/2014

http://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/news/24981841/novaya-vneshnyaya-politika-rossii?full#cut 15 Stephen Blank. “Russia’s Lurch toward Fascism”. : http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stephen-blank/russias-lurch-toward-

fasc_b_5169230.html#es_share_ended 16 Lilia Shevtsova. “Putin Doctrine: myth, provocation, blackmail, or the real deal?” http://www.the-american-

interest.com%2Farticles%2F2014%2F04%2F14%2Fthe-putin-doctrine-myth-provocation-blackmail-or-the-real-

deal%2F&h=uAQEPzA3v

17 Johan Norberg & Fredrik Westerlund. “Russia and Ukraine: military-strategic options, and possible risks, for Moscow”. IISS, 7

April 2014. http://www.iiss.org/en/regions/ukraine/russia-and-ukraine-3b92

18 “Russia's actions in Ukraine, while still in full swing, signal nothing less than the maturing of a new and interventionist strategy.

Resembling the original Brezhnev doctrine, the Kremlin seems fully resolved now to interfere with any of its post-Soviet neighbors,

should they chose a political model at home or affiliations abroad that differ from what Moscow proposes: autocracy from within, and

Eurasian integration from without.” Joerg Forbrig. “Crimea crisis: Europe must finally check the Putin doctrine”. CNN, March 14,

2014. http://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/14/opinion/ukraine-russia-putin-doctrine-joerg-forbrig/index.html

writer, Vladimir Sorokin, a veteran observer of politics in his country and rare voice of dissent,

admits to being at a loss, because Putin's intentions are impossible to read: "Unpredictability has

always been Russia's calling card, but since the Ukrainian events, it has grown to unprecedented

levels: no one knows what will happen to our country in a month, in a week, or the day after

tomorrow." 19

Russian leadership seems to be ready to sacrifice the long term national interests in

order to achieve immediate geopolitical gains and increase popular rating.20

As Joseph Nye has

recently stated, these short term gains may, along with many other losses, bear the price of losing

soft power for a long time21

.

It is interesting to consider various modes of influence an external state such as Russia may

use in order to change (or sometimes preserve) the status quo, although not all of the below list can

be directly related to security issues. In many cases it is more subtle regime change and political

developments are influenced, or even radical changes take place, though it may appear difficult to

unambiguously single out external factors from the complex combination of factors leading to

change. It makes sense to distinguish several modes of external influence that may be used at the

different stages of political development:

Support/disrupt the sustainability of the existing regime through assistance/ sanctions

and sabotage;

Diffusion of norms, influencing the attitudes, values and skills of the population at

large or some its segments through educational programmes, programmatic support, mass media and

communication channels;

Inducing and promoting gradual change of a regime, through (promise of) support or

integration based on conditionality, or threats of withdrawal of such support, or using incentive-

based pressures or rewards to influence elite regime preferences;

Offering a normative model for change;

19

Vladimir Sorokin. “Let the Past Collapse on Time!” The New York Review of Books. 8 May 2014.

http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/may/08/let-the-past-collapse-on-time/ 20 John Lough. “Putin’s High-Risk Game in Ukraine”. Chatham House, 14 April 2014

http://www.chathamhouse.org/media/comment/view/199034?dm_i=1TYG%2C2DDIW%2CBLOKNG%2C8LVFL%2C1; David

Ignatius. “The cost of Putin’s adventurism in Ukraine”: http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david-ignatius-the-cost-of-putins-

adventurism-in-ukraine/2014/04/15/f31efed0-c4ce-11e3-b195-dd0c1174052c_story.html; Loren Thompson. “Perils Of Empire: Five

Ways Putin Hurt Russia By Grabbing Crimea”. Forbes, 11 April 2014. http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2014/04/11/perils-

of-empire-five-ways-putin-hurt-russia-by-grabbing-crimea/ 21 Joseph S. Nye. “Putin’s Calculus.” http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/joseph-s--nye-asks-whether-russia-s-short-term-

gains-in-ukraine-will-be-worth-the-long-term-loss-of-soft-power

Supporting one of the sides during the regime change, or influencing the procedure of

such change;

Imposing regime change by force, including the regime change on a part of the

territory (supporting conflict, annexation), and clandestine operations such as so called ‘hybrid

warfare’.

All of these have been applied by the Russian Federation when dealing with its neighbours

such as Georgia and Ukraine, to different degree of success. However, whether any of these is

considered as security threat depends on the interpretation of the term, as already mentioned above.

Nevertheless, it is worth that here in the South Caucasus leaderships pay great attention to how the

leverage for such influence. It can be expected then that Russia will use again its formidable power

and influence in the three countries in question to either steer those in the direction it finds fitting its

interests, are uses available resources to destabilize regimes that are not sufficiently obedient.22

What

is new, however, is that after Crimea, Moscow does not seem to be shying away from the direct use

of force or of violating international norms and agreements when this is found conducive to

achieving its geopolitical goals.23

Peter Doran, director of research at the Center for European Policy

Analysis in Washington, D.C., and co-author of a new report on security in Central and Eastern

Europe, says, "Crimea has changed the world. The treaties—the U.N. Charter, the Helsinki Final

Act, the Budapest Memorandum, the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Russo-Ukrainian Treaty

of 1997—that created peace in Europe for the past 20 years have been called into question by the

invasion and annexation of Crimea. Georgia was the first sign that Vladimir Putin is a revisionist.

Then came Ukraine. What will the third country be?"

Indeed, the recent Ukrainian events reminded us of the 2008 Russian-Georgian war due to a

number of striking similarities,24

in particular if you look at it as a punishment for the pro-Western

orientation, even if the Georgian leadership did provide a good opportunity to Russia to at least

somehow justify its actions. So, on the fourth anniversary of the war, Russian president Putin

admitted his personal responsibility for both preparing for the war and arming South Ossetian

22 Александр Муринсон. "Путин активизируется и на кавказском направлении."

http://novosti.az/expert/20140409/300178127.html 23 Karmo Tüür, Viacheslav Morozov (eds.) Russian Federation: Short Term Prognosis. University of Tartu, 2014.

http://www.ut.ee/ABVKeskus/sisu/prognoosid/2014/en/pdf/RF2014.pdf 24 Christoph Stefes. http://www.rockymountainnews.com/news/2008/aug/18/speakout-facing-russias-threat/ ; Edward Lucas. The New

Cold War: Putin's Russia and the Threat to the West. Palgrave-Macmillan, 2008, pp.???, Roger E. Kanet, Maria Raquel Freire Key

(eds.) Players and Regional Dynamics in Eurasia: The Return of the Great Game. 2010, pp. ???

militias, and actually ordering the intervention.25

Previous president and now prime-minister

Medvedev also admitted in a speech to officers of the Russian Southern Military District, on

November 21, 2011, the real interests behind the Russian intervention.26

While there was some

disappointment toward the West when the political support provided during the war with Russia of

August 2008 was deemed inadequate, Georgia’s external orientation has not changed much, even

with all the attempts to normalise relations with Russia. Georgian government and society remain in

strong favour of Euro-Atlantic integration, and Georgia (along with Moldova and Ukraine) has

signed Association Agreement with EU,27

with Russian leadership already declaring serious

consequences for the signatory countries. Association Agreement, as well as forthcoming (in

September 2014) discussion of Georgia’s NATO membership aspirations at the summit in Wales,

brings in serious risks to Georgia’s security, although the danger of direct military actions seems to

be somewhat reduced, while economic sanctions Georgia can certainly withstand, based on the past

experience.

In case of Armenia, Russia is rather supportive of the incumbent government, and its

observers would always claim any rigged elections there as free and fair, whatever the evidence of

the opposite. As already mentioned, Armenia is fully dependent on Russia in guaranteeing its

security, being squeezed between Azerbaijan and Turkey with which it maintains uneasy relations

after capturing Karabakh and the significant territories around it. Russia is a member of the OSCE

Minsk Group of mediators, and has made several demonstrative efforts at mediating solution over

Karabakh, and improving Armenian-Turkish relations, but there are many signs that it is perceived

in Russia’s national interest to maintain status quo along both these dimensions, and thus preserving

it strong position in the region. Russia maintains a strong military base in Armenia, with which it

25 "The Russian president affirmed that the military offensive against Georgia was premeditated and prepared by the General Staff

under his orders. He also acknowledged that the Russian military had armed and trained local militiamen in South Ossetia, one of

Georgia's separatist regions, in the center of the August 2008 conflict… It is Vladimir Putin himself who has just confirmed that on

television. ‘There was a plan, it's not a secret ... It's within the framework of this plan that Russia acted. It was prepared by the General

Staff at the end of 2006 or the beginning of 2007. It was approved by me, agreed with me,’ said the Russian president…” Isabelle

Lasserre. “Poutine reconnaît avoir planifié la guerre en Géorgie”. Le Figaro, 10/08/2012.

http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2012/08/10/01003-20120810ARTFIG00541-poutine-reconnait-avoir-planifie-la-guerre-en-

georgie.php

26 “If we had faltered in 2008, geopolitical arrangements would be different now and a number of countries in respect of which

attempts were made to artificially drag them into the North Atlantic Alliance would probably be [in NATO] now… And for some of

our partners, including for the North Atlantic Alliance, it was a signal that before taking a decision about expansion of the alliance,

one should at first think about the geopolitical stability.” Quoted in: David Satter. Russia’s Looming Crisis. FPRI, March 2012. p. 48.

http://www.fpri.org/pubs/2012/201203.satter.russiasloomingcrisis.pdf

27 Michael Hikari Cecire. "The Georgian Defence". Foreign Policy,

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/03/11/the_georgian_defense; Tom de Waal. Georgia in

Ferment. http://m.ceip.org/moscow/eurasiaoutlook/?fa=55291&lang=ru

shares the membership in Collective Security Treaty Organisation, and Russian troops are protecting

Armenian borders with Turkey and Iran. Russia also fully controls Armenian energy sector, and

many other economic assets. The most striking illustration of Russian hold on Armenian politics

took place on September 3, 2013, when Armenian president Serzh Sargsyan, after meeting Vladimir

Putin in Moscow, in a highly humiliating move suddenly renounced his country’s long advocated by

him plan to sign the Association Agreement with the EU, and promised instead to enter the Russian-

led Customs Union and at that time still non-existent Eurasian Union. However, Armenia

experienced yet another humiliation in Astana, when Kazakh president N. Nazarbaev pointed28

(obviously with Putin’s consent), that if Armenia is to enter the Eurasian Union, it will do so only

with the territories recognised by the UN (i.e. without Nagorno Karabakh and other occupied

territories). Although it is difficult to find any influential anti-Russian and openly pro-Western

politician in Armenia, still the Russian preference is to preserve the status quo and the fully

controlled incumbent government, with all its authoritarian tendencies and corruption that makes it

even easier to manipulate.

The case of Azerbaijan is a good illustration of the fact, that the rich and the poor are treated

differently, whether it is people or states. On the one hand, the oil wealth of Azerbaijan allowed it to

secure public support by redistributing at least a part of this riches,29

on the other, it may allow itself

to be less dependent on international assistance, and therefore, be more resistant to imposed change;

finally, its huge resources and strategic importance allow Azerbaijan to achieve more tolerance on

the part of Western countries, and bribe its way through more corrupt individuals, institutions or

countries (so called ‘caviar diplomacy’). The West has limited leverage over Azerbaijan, and its

statements about strengthening authoritarianism, unfair election procedures, human rights abuses, or

suppression of democratic freedoms often fall on a deaf ear. At the same time, Azerbaijan conducts

active international policy of promoting its image, and spends significant funds on its PR campaigns

in the West, but also participates in Western-sponsored programmes and initiatives. Baku leadership

and elites in general lean towards the West, where they sees a comfortable place to spend time, get

education for their children, and invest oil revenues, but on their own conditions – the regime should

not be threatened in any way.

28 “Президенты подписали договор о создании ЕАЭС,” Известия, 29.05.14, http://izvestia.ru/news/571652 29 Benjamin Smith. "The wrong kind of crisis: Why oil booms and busts rarely lead to authoritarian breakdown." Studies in

Comparative International Development, Winter 2006, Volume 40, Issue 4, pp. 55-76.

http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF02686303#page-1

While there was cooling of relations between Russia and Azerbaijan, leadership in Baku is

still well aware that Moscow holds much stronger 'sticks' than does the West and that the West could

counterbalance with its weaker 'carrots'. One of the traditional instruments of Moscow’s influence is

Diasporas, and Azeri Diaspora in Russia is very significant, counting among others a few influential

billionaires. Even stronger leverage is related to Azerbaijan’s ethnic minorities in the north and the

south of the country, and finally – the Kremlin has many instruments to covertly destabilise a

country, as clearly shown in Ukraine. However, Baku leadership is cautious enough in its policies,

and at present Moscow rather prefers to appease Baku, e.g. by selling it military hardware, or

inviting into the Eurasian Union, then risking further alienation of this important player.

Recent political developments in the South Caucasus once again explicitly demonstrated the

difficulties of post-Communist transition in the complex geopolitical environment. Formally existing

democratic institutions may lead to formal or virtual (imitational or façade) democracy, though in

absence of any communist ideology. Even if the system is hailed for various reasons by international

democracy watchdogs of democratic states, it may bring to power elites that are not necessarily

democratic or effective, and that tend to slip to authoritarianism or remain authoritarian. At the same

time, paths of authoritarianism in the post-Soviet south only partially depend on such issues as

affluence of resources (‘resource curse’), confession, or ethnicity. Much more important are such

factors as explicit pro-Western orientation, existence of an educated urbanized middle class, and the

tradition of political struggle.

Current situation in the region is characterised by high volatility and unpredictability.

Equally unpredictable is the geopolitical environment in which the region finds itself. Russia has

emerged as a still strongest player in the region, and a player on one hand unpredictable, on the

other, irrespective of any norms and laws when dealing with what it considers as its national

interests. Therefore, under current conditions the soft power of the West appears insufficient, as are

the existing modest incentives of Euro-Atlantic integration, are insufficient to promote democratic

change, and to counterbalance the direct hard threat of Russian expansionism and revanchism, or

even its support of authoritarian regimes in its neighbourhood. The possible response to such

prospects should be at least three-fold – on one hand increasing the incentives, on the other –

containing Russia’s expansionism through sanctions, and finally – through strengthening the ability

(including military capability) of the countries of the region to withstand existing threats. However,

it is the responsibility of leaders in the region to realise, that the world order30, 31, 32

is rapidly

changing, the long and dangerous ‘Cold War 2.0’ between Russia and the West is to be expected,

and high political skills and determination will be needed in order to avoid looming risks and

security threats emanating from this emerging conflict.

30 Christopher R. Hill: http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/christopher-r--hill-calls-on-the-west-to-prepare-for-a-long-

struggle-with-a-revanchist-russia 31 Richard N. Haass. http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/richard-n--haass-thinks-the-west-should-revive-the-containment-

strategy-that-guided-its-policies-during-the-cold-war 32 David Lane: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/04/10/eurasian-integration-could-offer-a-counterpoint-to-the-eu-and-the-united-

states-but-only-in-close-co-operation-with-states-like-india-and-china/