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SEARLE’S SPEECH ACTS IN A THEORY OF LANGUAGE USE

Adetutu, Olusola Joseph

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 Background 2

2 Relevant Issues 2

2.1 Saying What to Whom? 2

2.2 The Controversy of Acting 4

3 Analysis of Data 7

3.1 The Basic Five 7

3.2 Searle’s Taxonomy in a Natural Language Environment 9

4 Conclusion 13

Bibliography 15

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1 BACKGROUND

Language is man’s unique tool for communication. The practical use of this complex tool is

guided by meaning-determining factors, conversation-internally or otherwise. This is natural

language.

Therefore, a theory which accounts for natural language must: establish the creation of meaning

relations; then account for the communicative roles of these relations in various situations on

universal, extra-linguistic grounds. Only this is an exhaustive theory of language use.

Considering these, I opine that such theory operates on a context-semantic interface. The theory,

while acknowledging that, unlike metalanguages, natural language is both a linguistic and extra-

linguistic system of communication, is bound to locate utterances in universal situations.

What I therefore undertake in this essay is; place Searle’s (1975) taxonomy of illocutionary acts

on a semantic scale, where I consider them as effective communicative delivery of speaker

intentions. I then place them on a context scale, where I consider them as adequate or otherwise

both in universal and contextual instances. I have chosen Searle (1975), because his illocutionary

acts are the immediate intentional content of (his proposed) speech acts.

2 RELEVANT ISSUES

2.1 Saying What to Whom?

Language users use language as a tool for expression. While the act of expressing, on the one

hand, is an act; what is expressed is, on the other, another act. I will refer to the former as a

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communicative act and the latter, as in the literature, a speech act. This is precisely stated when

Halliday (1979: 196) says that language, which is a “semiotic system, is a code having two or

more realisational cycles in it, so that the expression of content 1…is itself a content [2]…that in

turn has its own expression…”. Therefore, by saying

(1) I will help you

I have created two forms: the physical and the intentional form. Therefore, (1) is a first

content (the physical) which expresses another content whose own (indirect) expression, is that

of a promise (the intentional) – the illocutionary force.

The illocutionary force accompanies a proposition – the specific intentional weight of an

utterance. This might be confusing, “since it suggests that different illocutionary forces occupy

different positions on a single continuum of force” (Searle, 1975: 345) and because a single

proposition might have varying illocutionary forces. (2), for instance, might have the force of an

assertion or an order but a single proposition – that the wine is good.

(2) The wine must be good

Searle (1979: 178) himself admits that “the problem…of the theory of language [use] is to

describe how we get from the sound to the illocutionary acts” (Rajagopalan, 2000: 348). Searle’s

“sounds” is the communicative act, which Austin (1962) terms locution (cited in Grundy, 2000:

51).

While a movement away from the locution, L yields a single proposition, herein abbreviated P; a

movement further away might yield two different illocutionary forces, 𝐹1 and 𝐹2. This

establishes three levels, L→P→𝐹1/ 𝐹2.

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Therefore, what determines transition L→P is not what determines transition P→F. For example,

while the fact, P, that the wine is good is correct based on evidence available to and observed by

me, I might be, for instance, asserting 𝐹1 as a wine taster or ordering 𝐹2 a non-challant apprentice

wine-maker.

This possible diversity brings up what Searle (2002: 4) calls “constitutive rules”, the basic form

of which is: X counts as Y in C. So what is C? C is a condition that must be for an act to be

performed.

Since “most natural language utterances are vague” (Green, 1996: 11), the derivation of specific

meaning would engage the interlocutors, the utterance, and the context. Context therefore is an

extra-linguistic phenomenon, on whose basis specific meaning is derived from locution. The

question then is: is it context or condition(s) that is more important for the derivation of specific

meaning from utterances? For the sake of brevity, I will only practically pursue this further in

Section 3.

2.2 The Controversy of Acting

The idea of acting with speech is itself debatable; let alone the identification of what particular

act a speaker performs with his speech. It is a known fact that, as Grundy (2000: 52) says, “the

meaning that utterances have as a result of our understanding what they count as doing was first

described” by Austin (1962). However, Austin’s perspective, though unquestionably still

relevant, has been under heavy criticism by pragmaticists like Allan (1986), Searle (1975).

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Probably the most confusing factor in Austin’s perspective is his emphasis on performatives.

This, I believe, is what led him on to a supposedly precise speech act construct. While a

taxonomy of speech acts is bound to be unspecific, Austin makes generalisations such as the

classification of intend, which is in fact “not intending”, as a performance of intention (Searle,

1975: 352).

Any act performed through the production of speech is a speech

act, including referring and predicating, as well as explaining,

intimating and nagging, but none of them can be performed by

[merely] naming the act...

Green (1996: 68)

It is not merely by stating but by carrying out the act in speech that a speaker realises a speech

act. A bully is not regarded so, just because he says

(3) I hereby threaten you

According to Searle (ibid), there is no particular rule guiding the classification of illocutionary

verbs into categories. These absent rules are felicity conditions. Even though Austin

acknowledges these general conditions, he does not give answer to the question: What

SPECIFIC requirements must be satisfied, before an utterance is a PARTICULAR speech act

type? Even though Searle (1975) provides definitive differences in speech act categories such as

the inevitable role of authority in directives, these too may not be accurate in a theory of

pragmatics. Thomas (1995), in Paltridge (2006: 59) opposes this notion of definitive constitutive

rules and propose non-definitive principles (similar to Grice’s maxims) instead, since “it is

extremely difficult to device rules which will satisfactorily account for the complexity of speech

act behaviour”. This means that: X may count as Y, when C is not. For instance, when a student

tells his flatmates, with whom he is currently in a competition:

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(4) I challenge us to win this competition

he is modestly ordering that a new and probably better course of action be taken by them (his

flatmates and him) to win the competition; but he is definitely in no place of authority.

Despite such slacks in his ideas, Searle (1975: 351) must be credited for his observation that,

owing to the absence of classification guidelines – my cover term for rules and principles,

“Austin…(assumes) that a classification of different verbs is eo ipso a classification of kinds of

illocutionary acts”. Austin must have been working in line with the Performative Hypothesis.

Now a less popular perspective on speech acts, its primary proposition was “that the underlying

linguistic representation of every sentence contained as its highest clause, a performative verb

and a first person singular subject” (Green, 1996: 69). There was no performance of a speech act

when: (a) the performer was not the (first-person singular) subject; (b) the verb was not an

explicit performative; and (c) there was no syntactic structure [𝑇𝑃 NP [𝑉𝑃 V [𝐶𝑃 NP + VP]]] or

[𝑇𝑃 NP + VP]. It did not acknowledge congratulate as a behabitive in (5) but in (6).

(5) [𝑇𝑃[𝑁𝑃 I] [𝑉𝑃 want you to know [𝐶𝑃 I congratulate you]]]

(6) [𝑇𝑃[𝑁𝑃 I] [𝑉𝑃 congratulate you]]

Searle’s observation probably makes him disregard the verb-act approach and rather

acknowledge implicit performatives and the fact that not all speech acts are sewn in the matrix

clause’s predicate (performative) verb but some are in the verb of a subordinate clause.

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3 ANALYSIS OF DATA

3.1 The Basic Five

Searle formalises his taxonomy, being careful not to confuse illocutionary verbs with: (a)

illocutionary acts; (b) manner-stating verbs; and (c) predicate verbs.

Representatives have a peculiar characteristic feature which I call Polarity. Its propositional

content (p) is either true or false, while its illocutionary force indicates the speaker only believes

that (p). This is to show that the speaker holds the truth-condition of the proposition on a bi-polar

basis.

(7) I affirm that technology is bad

(8) I deduce the sun will rise at 0600

Both (7) and (8) are quantifiable on a polar scale, since (p) might be false – hence technology

turns out good and the sun rises at 0559 or 0601 or some other time.

Directives are acts that, through whatever means, try to make the hearer do something. This

ultimately implies that what is to be done is spatio-temporally located in the future. The peculiar

feature of this type is that what follows – that is, (p) – the illocutionary verb (in the case of direct

speech acts) is expected to be carried out by the hearer in a way that conforms to the speaker’s

expectation. When I say

(9) I advise you step away from the river bank

I expect that (p) – that you step away from the river bank – be carried out as I propose(d).

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Commissives obligate the speaker to a course. This course is spatio-temporally located in the

future. However, since it is the speaker and not the hearer who is obligated to perform the action,

(p) is not a polarity element but a realisable element. Therefore, when I say

(10) I vow to be your husband, till death do us part

(11) I guarantee that this device will not be faulty for at least two years

I commit myself to a string of situations – not a single event.

Expressives state the speaker’s disposition to a current state of things. There is no stipulated

attitude of the speaker; it is a variable. While, in contrast, all commissives show an intention of

the speaker to do (p); some expressives approve, some disapprove of (p); and so on. Polarity and

the spatio-temporal Future do not have a role to play here, since (p) is undisputable, for example,

my child’s misdemeanourin

(12) I apologise for my child’s misdemeanour

Declarations do not state existent facts but instigate change in facts. This means the

performance of the illocutionary verb is ultimately equal to a change in fact. Therefore, when a

minister says

(13) I pronounce you man and wife

he changes a fact fiancé and fiancée to man and wife, hence an instigation of change by the

performance of pronounce.

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3.2 Searle’s Taxonomy in a Natural Language Environment

A theory of language use is one that does not only deal with natural meaning but also non-natural

meaning. Non-natural meaning is that which is found in non-conventional language. Also,

natural language is the language employed by its speaker for everyday discourses. This use

makes it impossible for it to conform to a perfectionist, semantic model but a radical,

nonconformist pragmatic model.

I will adopt Dascal’s (2003) description in no similar order here, since he only lists the points.

Also, I will merge some of them to avoid redundancy.

Grammar is probably the greatest weakness of Searle’s taxonomy. He (Searle) probably took

the first wrong step, when he admitted in his (1975) publication that the differences he had

specified between his five speech act types inevitably had effects on their syntactic forms. By

this, I mean that in a syntactic analysis of (14), for instance

(14) I promise to get there soon

the grammar must specify a [–PAST] time for the action to which the speaker commits

himself. The deep structure of (14) is (15).

(15) [𝑇𝑃 I promise [𝐶𝑃 that I will get there soon ]]

Will indicates future time; therefore, the speech act, according to Searle, is fine. However, what

Searle is not aware of is that transformations only operate on the deep-structure level; while

natural language merely deals with the surface structure of utterances. Searle forgets that he

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(1969: 18) admits that a transformational analysis of natural language “is extremely misleading”

(cited in Rajagopalan, 2000: 348). In natural language, I might say

(16) I promise you an apple

which is not analysable by a generative grammar. Searle (1975: 363) prescribes the structure

below for commissives.

I verb (you) + I Fut Vol Verb (NP) (Adv)

The deep structure of (16) is (17).

(17) I promise (you) + you will get an apple

Searle’s prescription works well for the first but not the second part. While he acknowledges that

you is optional in the former, he does not acknowledge that I is (also) a variable in the latter

because, as he believes, commissives must explicitly commit the speaker. But that is not the case

– the speaker might merely be assuring the hearer that, no matter the circumstances, the hearer

will get an apple. He promises a future occurrence; not his performance of a future action.

Also, unlike the Gricean model, Searle’s taxonomy is monological, and the taxonomy which is

practically grammatical cannot comprehensively study conversations which are the true uses of

language. Searle’s (1992: 143) argument, in Dascal (2003: 518), is that “’conversation’ does not

name a unit of meaning”, but a speech act does; therefore, to him, if this one engagement is

generalised, the mere study of a single speech act will satisfy the requirements of natural

language.

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(18) 𝐴1: You did not do what you promised yesterday

𝐵1: I apologise for that. I was busy. I promise to do it tomorrow

𝐴2: Okay

𝐵2: Wait a minute…you were not even around yesterday

𝐴1is an (indirect) elicitation of a reason why speaker B did not do as he promised. While Searle’s

taxonomy does not account for the apology and the (new) promise in 𝐵1, it cannot satisfactorily

– if at all – account for the discourse relevance of the discourse move 𝐵2. This is because the

taxonomy stipulates that commissives (as in 𝐵1) commit only the speaker, but 𝐵2 is not even an

illocutionary act – hence it is not analysable and/as relevant. An adequate taxonomy will regard

implicature for relevance to be established between 𝐵2and 𝐵1.

Furthermore, Searle’s taxonomy is formal. This also stems from its relationship with grammar.

The model does not deal with language as used but as it is. Searle and Vanderken (2005) propose

what they call the illocutionary logic. This is a formal prescription that stipulates the guidelines

for use in a natural language. This logic does not let a language user have parameters to utilise in

the realisation of his communicative performance. What it does is study the common (F) of

speech act types and justify the taxonomy based on that. However, this is inaccurate. For

instance, if Searle’s (1975) specification for expressives is to be followed, (14) will clearly be an

apology.

As a natural language instance however, this might not be expressing, to a college principal, a

father’s disposition to his child’s misbehavior but a non-literal commissive expression of a

determined intention to reprimand the child, when father and son get back home. This

interpretation is possible with external determining factors such as: (a) the child’s prior

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knowledge of a reprimand-misdemeanour pattern; or (b) the loud tone of the father, who also

looks disappointedly at the child, as he speaks.

An instance like (19) clearly implies that, as Dascal (2003: 518) states, Searle’s speech act theory

is semantic. They do not recognise certain basic external factors. Through its acknowledgment

of Austin’s (1962) felicity conditions, the taxonomy recognises only a few factors such as

interpersonal relationships, social status, and so on (Searle, 1975), but this is not entirely

pragmatically practical. Context is a safer extra-linguistic element, but a generative model –

unlike a functional one as that proposed in Halliday (1979), Halliday and Matthiessen (2004) –

cannot satisfy this.

According to Searle’s taxonomy, (19) does not pass as a commissive.

(19) I will be with you in a second

The speaker knows that he cannot and he does not intend to do the impossible. According to

Searle (1975: 356), the illocutionary force of commissives is I which stands for Intention but in

figurative (19), the speaker does not intend to be with the hearer in a second. This is merely an

extreme expression. Since the sincerity condition has been violated, Searle’s taxonomy regards

this as a non-pass.

This instance is proof that a taxonomy which satisfies a theory of language use is one which

employs principles as opposed to constitutive rules. The Gricean model is clearly functional and

not generative in this aspect, since it, aside employing principles, even allows for the flouting as

well as the violation of these principles.

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4.0 CONCLUSION

Illocutionary acts operate on the semantic level, because conversations are functional constructs

that operate on a pragmatic level, as opposed to the structural constructs of utterances and

sentences. Taxonomies of speech acts, such as Searle’s, therefore are hardly adequate for the

description of language use. It is concluded that Searle’s taxonomy is an inadequate, though

useful, tool for a study of language use.

(a) Because they are highly prescriptive, constitutive rules are inapplicable to conversations

which, being a series of both subtly and directly connected utterances, require a flexible,

descriptive model.

(b) That (F) and (p) are equidistant derivations of locutionary acts makes Searle’s taxonomy

practicable only in a context-free environment (cf. section 2.1).

(c) Transformations, which are features of a generative model applicable to single units of

language, merely disorient the pragmatic analysis of language (use).

(d) Since it is generative, Searle’s taxonomy is only a prescriptive theory “of communicative

competence” and not a “theory of performance” – if I am to follow Lyons’ (1977)

distinction, adopted in Dascal (2003: 545).

(e) Even in the case of single utterances, sincerity conditions are not an adequate means of

accounting for communicative but linguistic competence (cf. section 3.2).

(f) In a case entirely different from that of context, Searle’s taxonomy is incapable of

handling non-natural meaning. Though also not single-handedly adequate, a functional

approach is more effective (cf. section 3.2).

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On the whole, since functionalism too is an extremist “mistake” (Dascal, 2003: 539), Searle’s

taxonomy should not be outright discarded: though it is inadequate, it is yet useful.

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