European Journal of Political Research 21: 163-180, 1992. 0 1992 KIuwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

Revisiting old friends: networks, implementation structures and the management of inter-organizational relations

KENNETH HANF’ & LAURENCE J. O’TOOLE, JR2 ‘ Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands; Auburn University, USA

Abstract. Most of the current work on network analysis tends to concentrate on the relationship between actors and the context within which various actors engage in the formulation of public policy. Consequently, analysis of the inter-organizational structures through which this policy is implemented receives less attention. In this article attention is drawn to questions concerning the management of inter-organizational networks as the vehicles for carrying out policy programmes. At the same time, an argument is made for using the term ‘network’ not only as an analytical concept but also to denote collectivities that are consciously constructed for the realization of purposeful joint action.

A reader of the various overviews of the emergence and use of the concepts of ‘network’ and ‘network analysis’ in the study of public policy is struck by the variety of literature and theory whose authors often seem to be unaware of the work of other researchers toiling in the same or adjoining vineyards. Our purpose in writing this article is to point to a tradition within the analysis of policy networks that receives less attention than it perhaps deserves.

An important part of the argument presented here focuses on the relative neglect of policy implementation in most discussions of policy networks. To be sure, the word is used and reference is made to the ‘formulation and imple- mentation’ of policy. We all seem to know that policy programmes need to be ‘executed’; the selected instruments ‘applied’ in concrete situations; and that, in doing all this, much can go amiss. Furthermore, ‘administrative actors’ are quite often central to the webs of interaction. But the implementation process ‘on the ground’ is seldom the explicit focus of analysis. Moreover, when perchance it is, it is most often seen from the point of the view of an outside observer looking in at the patterns of interaction, and at the structure of relationships through which the behaviour of the actors is channelled. It is rare that the perspective of the actor inside the network is taken, that of someone who is trying to work within and through a set of relationships with other actors, in pursuit of both individual and collective objectives.

The contemporary study of inter-organizational relations began with a strong management orientation. Although initial work on these questions followed this lead, insofar as it was concerned with administering pro-

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grammes, these questions have not received as much attention in the later work that has tended to focus on ‘policy communities’ and ‘policy sub-sys- terns’. In this article we focus on another tradition and pose a set of questions that draw on similar insights into the inter-organizational nature of the world within which decision makers attempt to come to grips with and manage interdependent relations in the implementation of public policies. The central concern for us is the organization and management of ‘purposeful’ problem- solving activities in decision situations characterized both by a high degree of institutional differentiation and by a need for joint action as a precondition for the realization of both individual and collective objectives. We argue that, having used network analysis to describe the interactions of actors involved in policy formulation, as well as to characterize intergovernmental relations, it is time to apply these insights to questions of the management of the structures through which policy is implemented.

In this article we present no systematic and critical overview of the ways in which different scholars have used the notion of a ‘network’ to examine the interactions between government and social actors in the making of public policy. Our modest purpose is to promote the consideration of another set of analytical questions as a step toward the linking of research on policy formula- tion with policy implementation. The systematic application of network analy- sis to problems of policy implementation will obviously require a good deal of refinement and elaboration of both concepts and methods.

The crisis of governance and the problem of steering complex systems of inter-organizational relations

Recent years have constituted an era of sober realism among those who specialize in the study and practice of governance. Grand hopes and bright visions have given way to reports of multiple policy failures, pernicious unin- tended consequences, and persistent budget problems. Indeed, within little more than a decade, there has been a radical change in the metaphors used to characterize the very process of governing. Not so long ago, the standard image was that of the ‘can-do’, nearly-omnipotent state. More recently, the picture has altered to one of an overloaded and perhaps chronically weakened system of governance, one which with but a limited ability to direct the course of the broad-scale action needed to address policy difficulties.

This shift in metaphor raises a host of important questions, including: What are the causes of this altered conception of governance? If the image of ‘the-state-in-control’ is outmoded or inaccurate, what conclusions follow from this? Do we need to modify the concepts used to describe governance, the theories developed to explain it, and our practical advice to those who deal

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with important policy questions? Is it really possible for government to direct social forces to achieve legitimate public objectives? Have the issues with which society is currently confronted overwhelmed existing capacities for effective action? Has the overall capacity for governance been excessively diminished?

In academic and practical analyses of these matters, the basic question of complexity has assumed a prominent place. There are many indicators of how important and recurring a theme complexity has become. Policy now requires the application of innumerable substantive specialties, from abstruse medical and biological subjects, to materials engineering, to economics, diplomacy and planning. The apparent rate of growth in knowledge continually acceler- ates. The links between specialties, increasingly necessary to achieve policy goals, become ever more dense while the degree of differentiation implied by hyper-specialization continues to rise. At the same time, causal links become more sensitive to environmental disturbances.

From the point of view of public management the question, in the last analysis, concerns the extent to which the need to rethink the role of govern- ment shapes the way in which government goes about its business. To what extent have these developments led to a redefinition of the concept of ‘govern- mental steering’ that underlies the development of policy strategies, and of the instruments on which this relies? In short, the complexity of policy problems is both reflected in, and amplified by, the complexity and polycentrism of the institutions through which policy must be addressed. In this kind of setting, the broad question of ‘governability’ seems most pressing.

At the most general level then, the governability problem refers to the dilemma in which policy makers increasingly find themselves: government, while charged with addressing important public problems, seems unable to deal satisfactorily with the issues on its agenda. There are many sources of complexity in policy and administrative settings. One of the most significant factors involved - indeed the one that, more than any other, is directly connected to difficulties of steering - is the inter-organizational nature of the politico-administrative world.

Virtually any recent effort to understand how programmes operate - wheth- er these are wholly public or combine public and private elements - has confronted the multi-organizational character of action. That this subject should become so widely recognized as important can be understood by considering the nature of policy requirements in welfare states during the last few decades. There are very few social problems that still can be dealt with, let alone solved, within or by one or a few organizations working alone. In both making and carrying out all kinds of policy measures, decision makers are dependent on conglomerates of organizations in which the public and private spheres are more or less coupled with one another. The overall pattern of this

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inter-linking or interweaving of government and society has been referred to by Hull and Hjern, for example, as the ‘mixed economy’ (Hull and Hjern, 1983).

Policies required to deal with the types of issue on the agenda of welfare states during modern times - such as income security, labour market dys- functions, environmental degradation, and public-private relations - typically demand that policy makers link information, units, and capacities that span multiple bureaucratic niches. Many important policy questions are increasing- ly dealt with in arenas in which no individual or organizational actor possesses the wherewithal to coordinate by using authoritative pronouncements, or to compel action from a privileged power position. Action, if it is to be successful, must be multi-lateral and inevitably will involve a variety of units that have differing perspectives, interests, and levels of influence. It is impossible to handle policy issues within the compartmentalized, ‘neatly-decomposable’ niches of administrative units.

At the same time, these preconditions for effective action confront a struc- ture of decision making that creates serious problems with regard to a govern- ment’s capacity for problem solving. Modern government is characterized by decision systems in which territorial and functional differentiation disaggre- gate effective problem-solving capacity into a collection of sub-systems of actors with specialized tasks and limited competence and resources. As a result, relatively independent participants, who need to work together in one way or another, possess different bits of information, represent different interests and pursue different interests through separate, often conflicting courses of action. At the same, governments are increasingly faced with problems that tend to cut across the boundaries of the separate jurisdictions and specializations. In the face of the resulting functional interdependencies, the incongruity between the scope, complexity and interrelatedness of the problem fields, on the one hand, and the limited action space and resources of the individual components of the politico-administrative system, on the other hand, becomes even more problematic.

Our interest in the analysis of inter-organizational decision systems is, therefore, guided by this piece of conventional wisdom. Under such conditions the ability of individual decision units to achieve their own objectives will increasingly depend not only on their own choices and actions but also on those of others. Actions at one level of decision making will be influenced by the relationships between levels as well as across functional boundaries. Given all this, it is unlikely that adequate policy solutions can be formulated and implemented within the action space of a single, hierarchically integrated organizational unit. On the contrary, effective problem-solving systems will typically involve participants from different decision levels and from a variety of functionally specialized organizational units.

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Consequently, the effective treatment of complex and highly interdepend- ent problems depends more and more on the development of a capacity for mobilizing and combining the separate problem-solving capabilities of the individual units that make up the relevant decision systems. In this sense, success in formulating and implementing policies appropriate to such prob- lems presupposes the creation of inter-organizational decision systems capable of managing joint problem-solving activities. Modern policy action requires polycentric arrangements as a matter of course; issues cannot be ‘finessed’ by more frequent or inventive reorganization within the standard hierarchical framework. The inter-organizational nature of the policy world is an endemic feature of the modern era, not evidence of a maladapted steering pattern. Fancier top-down structures, therefore, cannot solve the institutional mis- match between structures and issues.

Beyond metaphor: network analysis and the conceptualization of complex inter-organizational systems

The dominant feature of the public sector is the relationship between many organized actors with separate interests, goals and strategies. The extent to which government will be able to influence the provision of goods and services, taking into account the self-regulating powers of the systems concerned, will depend on achieving coordination and control among these disparate actors. It is in the sense that judgments regarding the possibilities of governmental guidance, or steering and control, must be based upon an examination of the ‘institutional modes of coordination within the public sector, coordination of multiple actors as an important precondition for increasing the capability of government to perform a more active part in the desired transformation of society’ (Kaufmann, 1986: 4).

A major objective of policy analysis is to develop recommendations regard- ing the ways in which rules and institutions can be reformed to improve the effectiveness of collective problem solving. Such recommendations must be based on systematic research into the ways in which different structural ar- rangements affect patterns of individual and collective choice. This in turn requires that we work with units and levels of analysis that allow us to treat the structure characteristics of the inter-organizational relations as critical varia- bles.

Insofar as beauty is so often in the eye of the beholder, it can also be the case that the problems we perceive, as well as the possibilities we discern for effective action, will be a function of the models we use for understanding reality. Any attempt to deal with serious social problems by the design of alternative institutions needs to be based upon a firm understanding of the

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extent to which different institutional structures affect the regulatory capacity of the system. Yet our evaluations of existing systems, and our recommenda- tions for improving their performance, will be coloured by the theoretical perspectives we use.

What the studies and findings that we have referred to above have in common is that they document the inter-organizational nature of the policy world. In matching problems to the decision structures through which appro- priate problem-solving strategies can be developed and applied, inter-orga- nizational theory can profitably be used to draw attention to the linkages between relevant organizational units. It also reminds us that the design of an appropriate decision system must be based on the deliberate integration of the activities of individual decision units into a multi-organizational arrangement for joint action. In light of these characteristics of the real policy world, it is important that we develop and apply concepts that focus upon inter-orga- nizational relations as a relevant unit of analysis, we should then be able to examine the structural characteristics of inter-organizational relations in terms of their effect on policy outcomes.

Along with the terms ‘policy community’, and ‘policy sub-system’, the concept of ‘network’ is widely used to describe both the nature of a policy field as well as the institutional structures through which policy is formulated and implemented. Even a quick perusal of representative examples of this rapidly expanding body of literature indicates how varied the usage of this concept is. In and of itself such variety can be quite healthy and useful; at the same time, the use of a common term by different authors each referring to a seemingly common body of supporting theory and research, implies that they are talking about the same social phenomena in much the same way. While this is indeed the case to a certain extent, important differences hide beneath this apparent conceptual consensus.

We have already seen that at least three general ideas are important for characterizing the general situation in which government activity occurs. If these problems are to be dealt with effectively, some kind of joint action on the part of the individual public and private actors engaged in problem processing activity will be needed. It must be assumed, furthermore, that in most impor- tant cases such joint action is not likely to occur spontaneously (at least in the quantity and quality deemed necessary for effective problem solving) and that it cannot effectively be compelled through hierarchical channels of communi- cation and authority. It is the interaction of these various features of typical policy situations which many analysts feel can be best captured by the idea of a network.

Volker Schneider stresses the widespread ‘metaphorical’ use of this concept to connote the ‘structural relationships, interdependencies and dynamics be-

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tween actors in politics and policy making’ (Schneider, 1987: 2). Used in this way, the notion of networks serves to help describe ‘. . . complex interdepend- encies in substantive terms; to grasp configurations of actor sets which lack any clear-cut hierarchical subordination and in which actors are more or less coupled together’ (Schneider, 1987: 2). It conveys a sense of the complexity of relationships among multiple actors, each concerned with some problem or objective of individual interest to themselves. It provides a perspective from which to analyze situations in which a given policy cannot be explained by centrally concerted policy action toward common goals. The concept of net- work draws attention to the interaction of many separate but interdependent organizations which act, in a self-interested manner but nevertheless coor- dinate their actions through inter-dependencies of resources and interests.’

In this basic sense, the term ‘network’ merely denotes the fact that policy making and implementation involves a large number and wide variety of public and private actors from the different levels and functional areas of government and society. By stressing the ‘inter-relationships’ and ‘interde- pendencies’ of these actors, the term also draws attention to the pattern of linkages and interactions among them and to the way in which these affect the behaviour of the individual organizations. These organizations are embedded in a particular set of relationships, the structure of which constrains the options open to them as well as the kinds of behaviour that they can engage in. Used in this way, the concept of network a useful reminder of the fact that all orga- nizations are involved in relations of one kind or another with other orga- nizations in their environment.

But many authors working with network analysis go further and argue the need to shift the unit of analysis from the single organization or actor to the set of interrelationships that constitute the inter-organizational network. In doing this they go one step beyond the injunction that the behaviour of a given individual unit can only be understood in relation to its organizational envi- ronment (although this behaviour will be a product of such inter-organization- al relations). Instead, approaching these relationships as a ‘network’ advances the idea that this pattern of linkages and interactions as a whole should be taken as the unit of analysis.

In writing about the factors that affect the implementation of environmental policy in Germany, for example, Renate Mayntz reminds us that a good deal of the behaviour of governmental as well as non-governmental actors engaged in implementation can be understood in terms of the self-interests that they pursue as a result of their structural features and of their position in the implementation process as a whole (Mayntz, 1982: 85). Consequently she concludes that, if we have adequate knowledge of the executive actors re- quired to carry out a particular programme we should be able to anticipate

these behavioural tendencies and the implementation problems that they cause. We could then use this knowledge to design more effective imple- mentation structures.

However, Mayntz hastens to add, the behaviour of regulatory agencies is determined not only by the characteristics of these organizations themselves but also by constraints placed on their freedom of action by the necessity to work together with other actors. Therefore, even under optimal conditions there are limits to our ability to ensure effective implementation by designing appropriate structures. Not only are there limits as to what programme design- ers can do to determine the jurisdiction and powers of the various executive agencies involved; not only do they confront a set of relatively autonomous non-public actors involved in implementation; not only is there an absence of direct hierarchical relations between the programme authority and the exec- utive agency; but also, and most importantly, the success of the programme does not depend alone on the characteristics of the different actors but also on the structural features of the inter-organizational network as a whole that is activated by the programme (Mayntz, 1982: 85).

Other authors have noted in a similar vein that, insofar as the fundamental processes of policy making and administration are generated in inter-orga- nizational systems, the policy of the ‘parent government’ serves to formalize the decisions that have been negotiated by its agencies in these semi-autono- mous systems. The key insight in this regard is the observation that the crucial forces driving policy making at the different levels of government originate in multiple inter-organizational systems and are channeled by the political pro- cesses of these inter-organizational structures, not by the structural character- istics of the individual governments themselves. What this type of research does is to draw attention to the inter-organizational system as a whole as the appropriate unit of analysis.

The term network can also be used to point out the ways in which in- terrelated organizations can function as a collectivity. That is, it can be used to refer to situations in which interaction among individual organizations is deliberately sought or promoted for its purpose of effective policy coor- dination or joint action in pursuit of a common objective. In this sense, inter-organizational coordination involves intervening to promote the kinds of interaction deemed appropriate for achieving the necessary concerted effort. Here the focus of analysis (and also of action) is the conscious interaction that is expressly designed to achieve particular policy objectives through coor- dinated efforts. It is in this sense that inter-organizational studies are con- cerned, not with the performance of any particular organization, but with the set of interrelated actors as a whole.

If the inter-organizational emphasis in the use of the concept of network is to be transformed into a conceptually and theoretically useful tool, then we must

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become more precise and more self-consciously analytical in our investigation of complex multi-actor systems. It is important to distinguish the way in which the idea of a network is metaphorically invoked to convey the sense of the complexity of social relationships from the more precise use of the term to refer to a specific set of links among a defined set of individuals.*

To summarize there is a disparate body of literature, in which individual anthors are working in different ways, using seemingly similar notions, and similar assumptions about the unit of analysis, the behaviour of individual actors, and the impact of structural variables. Are we interested in networks as relationships between organizations? Or do we stress the fact that networks are constructed around the personal relationships between individuals, rela- tionships that transcend the boundaries of organizations? Are such networks themselves collectivities, characterized by common action, decision making and coordination, or should the term be used as an analytical construct that brings patterns of interdependence among separate actors into focus? These are but a few of the many questions that need to be answered before we can be sure we are talking about the same thing when using the concept of network.

Thus the type of inter-organizational analysis to which we are drawing attention takes as its point of departure the description of a pattern of interac- tions within which policy is formulated, central to so much of network analysis. However, it focuses on how appropriate structures can be designed and managed as vehicles for problem-solving. In this respect there is an important difference between a network as an analytical construct and a network as a vehicle for action. In the following sections we will attempt to clarify this distinction.

Managing inter-organizational networks

An interest in problems of programme and organizational management is likely to guide the analysis networks or ‘implementation structures’ concerned with the pattern of linkages joining public and private actor^.^ As we have noted above, in much, if not most, of the literature on networks the term is used primarily as an analytical concept. A network can, however, also be conceived of as an instrument or structure through which individuals and organizations act in situations in which they are dependent on the inputs or contributions of others before they can realize objectives that they cannot realize alone. In the first case, network analysis describes the context of, and factors leading to, joint decision making; in the second case, it focuses on the structure and process through which joint action is organized and managed.

In this section we examine some of the important differences in using the concept of network to analyze the structural features of policy implementa-

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tion, on the other hand, and to suggest to practitioners how to manage these implementation processes, on the other. At the same time, we ‘look inside’ these structures and view them in terms of the management processes through which different actors try to ‘direct’ policy implemention or problem solving. Here the management of inter-organizational networks is our central focus.

Certain strategic variables may be subject to a degree of predictable influen- ce by actors in polycentric settings. In manipulating these the actor is engaged in an important set of tasks connected with building, maintaining, and altering multi-unit networks. ‘Steering’, in this sense, is a term referring to a set of functions described variously by analysts as the ‘reticulist’ function (Friend, Power and Yewlett, 1974), ‘fixing’ (Bardach, 1974), ‘facilitation’ (O’Toole, 1983), or the ‘multilateral brokerage role’ (Mandell, 1988).

Intergovernmental management

If one considers multi-unit action as essentially a problem of cooperation, then one can conceive of inter-organizational activity as a function of inducements toward, and constraints on, cooperation.4 Substantial constraints typically inhibit cooperation between multiple units in a particular policy sphere, since organizations often serve as structures that encourage coordination within their boundaries but discourage it between units (because of such factors as established world views, goals, and organizational procedures). In a typical situation, inducements to cooperation across organizational units are rela- tively limited: authority is absent or weak, and common interests (or norma- tive ties) are likely to emerge slowly, if at all.

The remaining inducement is exchange, which can itself be rendered prob- lematic by the characteristics of many inter-organizational processes. The likelihood of generating a level of exchange that is sufficient for sustained, cooperative effort depends upon the composition and alignment of certain strategic variables. We discuss four briefly: policy characteristics, inter-orga- nizational structure, information, and modes of problem solving. All can be influenced by public actors in polycentric settings. Thus, despite the absence of top-down control, some indirect steering is possible.

Particular policy features can themselves influence steering in inter-orga- nizational settings. This point is one of the main staples, even obsessions, of the top-down perspective on polycentric systems. The evidence that policies can affect inter-unit action in particular sectors is now overwhelming.’ They can do so by providing resources, especially financial. Policies also can influen- ce the inter-unit structure by determining some of the participating orga- nizations, or certain features of their relationship to each other. Thus they can enchance the chances of action on the collectively-pursued objective around

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which the network is ostensibly constructed, or they can fail to do so. Partic- ular features of policies do not determine everything that is crucial to poly- centric policy patterns, but they can be one important element in this.

Implications for practice flow from these general comments. Managers may pursue certain mandated linkages to further publicly-legitimated objectives. They may also seek to simplify or reduce coordinating links when flexibility, or a narrower set of actors, would be likely to enhance chances for coordination. Thus, as Scharpf et al. discuss in their analysis of joint decision making, adapting the formal structure of a network can reduce the complexity and sometimes the perversity of such arrangements (Scharpf et al., 1976). A key element of inter-organizational management can be the need to work for appropriate levels and types of resources, both for achieving network ob- jectives and also for managing or caring for the network itself. A further possible stimulus toward cooperative effort in otherwise-unfavorable circum- stances is to be sensitive to the need for risk reduction, by helping to design policies that take account of opportunities for lowering or pooling contingen- cies.

Inter-organizational structure can also be key, as the discussion in the preceding sections should have made clear. The structure of interdependence helps to determine the loci of power within the system, as well as the case and likelihood of bargaining. Some network structures require more coordination than others, and this relationship is not a simple function of the number of organizational units involved.

A further point to note here is the potential utility of theoretical work to date on the link between polycentric structure and problem-solving capacity. One practical implication of this work is to highlight the importance of a manager’s or facilitator’s style of operations in the network. Different styles would seem to be more or less appropriate depending on the network structure and the type of policy being considered. Finally, those interested in steering within networks can take advantage of ‘peaks of salience’ to alter network structure opportunistically over time (O’Toole, 1983).

Information is another crucial variable, since those in organizational units react to perceptions of others’ actions, motives and so on, rather than to the actions themselves. Inter-organizational settings provide plenty of opportuni- ty for selectivity in such perceptions, as well as for influencing the flow of information through- what are often only partially-shaped channels in poly- centric settings. Those concerned with steering can play an important role by articulating, recording and enforcing commitments across organizational boundaries and by respecting confidences and averting unnecessary embar- rassments, thereby raising the overall degree of trust in setting. They may also influence perceptions that might unnecessarily inhibit an implementation network from achieving its common purposes. They can time the use of

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information in such a way as to maximize chances of success; and they can adjust the flow of information to encourage the perception of shared interest.

Implementation structures

As we have seen from an inter-organizational perspective, implementation research examines policy action in terms of the manner in which the actors involved organize and coordinate their interrelated activities. Here the pri- mary concerns are the limits to the coordination of inter-organizational rela- tions, as well as design and implementation of management practices that effect the required degree of collaboration and joint action between various actors. In short, the problem is one of combining ‘action arenas’ in decision situations characterized by increasingly longer chains of action. This involves not only the linking of different levels of government and administration but also the ‘assembling’ of the public and private actors required for joint action at any given level of government.

We have already argued that, if the observed complexity of implementation situations is inherent in the conditions under which programmes are carried out, then analytical models must be designed to capture this reality. A step in this direction is the bottom-up approach, particularly as developed in the work on implementation structures (Hjern and Porter, 1981), assistance structures (Hull and Hjern, 1987) and regulatory structures (Hanf, 1982). This approach was intended as a method for the analysis of interactions among a set of public and private actors involved in different functional activities with regard to the implementation of a particular programme, or the handling of a specific problem, in a given locality. As such it offers a strategy for analyzing purposive action where parts of many public and private organizations cooperate in the implementation of a programme.

This bottom-up approach to implementation analysis combines four ele- ments, which when taken together enable the analyst to come to terms system- atically with the implementation of public policy in situations characterized by non-existent chains of command, ambiguous goals and multiple decision mak- ers. These four components define a point of departure for the description and analysis of implementation. They also present an analytic unit which stands at the centre of analysis. (In the work of Hjern and Porter, for example, the pattern of interactions among parts of organizations involved in a particular programme or functional activity constitutes the ‘implementation structure’.) The same components outline a technique for mapping such structures by bounding the set of relevant actors. They also provide a perspective not only for understanding the realities of the implementation situation but also for

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evaluating the performance of national implementation structures under par- ticular local conditions.

As far as the ‘methodological imperative’ of this kind of implementation research is concerned, Hjern and Hull (1982) point out that an analysis of inter-organizational relationships that works with a model in which the formu- lation and realization of policy unfolds in a collectivity of actors in social interaction, involves not so much the choosing as the discovery of the proper unit of analysis. For them the organizations engaged in policy formulation and realization in relation to some problem are identified through the patterns of social interaction among the participating individuals; it is the interactions chosen by individuals that lead us to hypothesize the existence of a collectivity. The resulting ‘implementation structures’ are analytical constructs that reflect the way in which individuals have self-selected themselves and engaged in social interaction with respect to the policy problem under investigation.

In this connection Hjern and Hull warn us to the serious methodological problems the researcher confronts in trying to approach the analysis of inter- organizational linkages from some concept of ‘the organization’ (Hjern and Hull, 1982). On the contrary, they argue, the group dynamics of individuals representing organizations are as important as the strategies of organizations per se to the analysis of institutional linkages among the different relevant actors. What we need, therefore, are methods for getting at the interpersonal relations associated with inter-organizational linkages. A serious problem in this respect is that there is little theory available to account for the real complexity facing actors within the public sector; the theories either consider organizations as corporate actors and neglect the individuals who act as representatives, or they assume that only individuals matter.

The relationship between the individuals who form a network and the larger organizational entities to which they belong is central to the notion of ‘imple- mentation structure’ as originally developed by Hjern and Porter (1982). They stress that these implementation structures are not sets of relationships among organizations but are rather constituted by the interactions among pro- gramme- (or problem-) relevant individuals. A crucial distinction in this conceptualization is that between the organization and the programme. An organization can be concerned with many different programmes; in turn, the implementation of a given programme can involve parts of many different organizations, both public and private. The idea of the ‘implementation struc- ture’ was developed to provide a conceptual perspective from which to exam- ine purposive action in those situations where such parts of public and private organizations cooperate in performing the different tasks involved in the implementation of a particular programme. Since these structures are outside and apart from formal organizational hierarchies, and are organized around

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the ‘rationale’ of the programme in question. participation is ultimately based on a process of self-selection. The terms of inclusion are negotiated among the potential actors on the basis of their respective perceptions of the costs and benefits involved.

The foregoing comments make clear that it is important, when analyzing implementation structures, to remember that these networks are not made up of ‘free floating’ individuals. According to Kaufmann, the growing complexity of the world of policy action means, among other things, that nearly all relevant interaction within what is called the public sector is organization- related interaction; that is, it takes place within and between organizations (Kaufmann, 1986: 15). Therefore, when we say that individuals interact to form an implementation structure, this implies that they do not, in the first instance, act as individuals but rather as members of an organizational unit. Consequently, in the words of Kaufmann, ‘there is no position-free communi- cation that is relevant for public issues’ (Kaufmann, 1986: 15).

Kaufmann goes on to offer some suggestions for how to think about the problem of linking different levels of analysis:

Insofar as persons interact as representatives of organizations there will always be three frames of reference operating in the mind of the actor: the frame of reference of the individual actor as a person; the frame of reference of the organization he is representing; and the frame of reference of the interaction he is participating in (Kaufmann, 1986: 16).

The last frame means that the interaction itself has an emergent quality that cannot be reduced to the characteristics of the individuals involved, or the organizations that they represent. Similarly, the interaction will have a history that is in part defined in terms of the relationships among the organizations involved.

Although it is possible that such interrelationships can ‘grow’ over time - and can frequently ‘nest’ within more general and persistent contacts among organizations - we are particularly interested in those networks that are consciously constructed in order to pursue programmatic objectives.h While the individual actors may indeed perceive interdependencies among various social units, interdependencies that make a degree of functional integration among them appear to their mutual advantage, it cannot be assumed that this integration will occur spontaneously. On the contrary, the necessary coor- dinations for joint action may have to be created by intermediaries who play an important role in establishing and maintaining linkages between organiza- tions. A central focus of inter-organizational policy studies is there the mecha- nism by which these relationships can be institutionalized, and the consequent effects of these arrangements for policy.

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According to Hjern and Porter, implementation structures are character- ized by ‘commitment’ and ‘purpose’. In a similar vein, in their examination of programmes to aid small firms, Hjern and Hull define the ‘assistance structur- es’ they are analyzing as networks of actors and resources needed to achieve a particular purpose - in this particular case, to deal with impediments to the development of small firms (Hjern and Hull, 1987: 26-28). The notion of assistance structure provides a way to capture the relevant activities in sit- uations in which collective action often requires the involvement of actors other than those formally mandated for the achievement of a particular goal. Thus, the key characteristic of an ‘implementation (or assistance) structure’, in this narrower sense, is that they are ‘purposive entities organized around specific programmes’.’ The ‘purposive character’ is seen as a function of the ‘feeling of commitment’ on the part of the participants to accomplishing certain programme tasks.

Having said this, however, it should be noted that one of the advantages of the network concept is that it enables us to stress the interrelatedness and interdependencies, the linkages, between separate actors without assuming that these are integrated around a set of common objectives, as implied by the systems concept. This observation should sensitize us to two important points. First, implementation structures may well be organized around common pol- icy programmes or problem concerns but this does not mean that everything runs smoothly and harmoniously. The glue that holds these structures together continues to be the perception of the individual advantages from collective or joint action. Consensus among the participating actors must be constantly renewed through negotiations aimed at redefining the expected pay-offs and the conditions of participation. Second, there seems to be a qualitative but perhaps gradual distinction between those who are linked in a shared goal- directed activity and those who, out of a concern for their own self-interest, follow these activities either defensively or in a supportive manner. At some point, these other interested parties need to be relegated to the environment of the network. Self-selection into a collective-action network does not mean that any one who is in some way interested can be reckoned to belong to the network as collective action entity. Some degree of commitment to joint action would seem to be a minimum precondition for inclusion. Still, the borders between the network and its environment are porous and the continued functional integrity of the network will remain problematic. In this sense, as John Friend observes, ‘networking’ involves the play of power as well as the building of effective communication channels (Friend, 1978: 20). The central tasks of network management are thus the realization of the strategic consen- sus in terms of which the effective network is organized, and the mobilization of the resources required for its operation.

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Conclusion

In this article we have argued for the need to go beyond descriptions of the relationships that occur in complex policy systems to a framework for consid- ering the problem of policy management within multi-actor and multi-level structures. As Mandell observes, problems of management in such systems cannot be approached in terms of the perspective of an independent orga- nizational entity, but must rather be viewed in terms of the set of interactions among interdependent organizations. In her view, the separate and distinct actions of individual programme managers must be ‘coordinated’ and in- terrelated so as to mesh individual and network action behind the realization of a purposive whole. In the last analysis, effective policy implementation depends upon coping with the impact of interorganizational networks on the management of public policy.

Strange as it may now seen, the chronicles of the emergence of imple- mentation research remind us of the not-very-distant time when questions of policy implementation were generally neglected by students of public policy. Even now, when this oversight has been rectified, there continues to be relatively little interest in questions of managing the infrastructure of public and private organizations through which policy is carried out.

A similar shortcoming now threatens to develop in the scholarly interest in networks. At the risk of dangerous oversimplification, it seems possible to distinguish three general traditions drawing upon network analysis in more or less sophisticated ways. These are joined by their use of a common concept and dimly perceived shared antecedents. First, there are those with an interest in policy sub-systems and policy communities, who appear to be primarily in- terested in the structural conditions under which policy is formulated. A second group takes as its point of departure the perceived crisis of governance, and addresses the role of government in the increasingly inter-organizational context of action. Finally, there are those interested in the analysis of policy implementation through multi-actor structures, and in the attendant problems of the management of inter-organizational networks. Of course, these need not be mutually exclusive categories. But the utilization of a common concept has yet to result in the cross-fertilization and interaction necessary for building a body of commonly shared knowledge about policy processes and institutions in the late welfare state.

Notes

1 . Schneider himself has attempted to move beyond the metaphor and to use network analysis more systematically; see in this connection Schneider (1988).

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2. Among others, Rhodes has at various places attempted to provide more analytical precision to the general notion of network. He distinguishes, for example, five types of network, ranging along a continuum from highly integrated policy communities to loosely integrated issue networks. His efforts to classify networks according to differences in membership composition, the extent of interdependence between members and the distribution of resources among members is the kind of work that needs to be engaged in if network analysis is to gain more body (Rhodes, 1986; Marsh and Rhodes, 1992).

3. As used here, the term ‘implementation structure’ was coined and initially worked out by Hjern and Porter (1982). Their usage is quite different from the use of the term to refer to the various governmental actors, formally involved in one way or another in carrying out a programme, and the relationships between them. As an example of this usage, see Mayntz (1982).

4. The following treatment of intergovernmental management is based on the discussion con- tained in O’Toole (1988).

5. For a recent study, albeit one generated from a top-down framework, see McFarlane (1989). Of course, this has been the argument advanced by Sabatier and Mazmanian in various places. See, for example, Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983), and the attempt by Sabatier (1986) to integrate the top-down and bottom-up approaches to implementation analysis.

6. The most recent treatment of the questions regarding the concept of ‘assistance structure’ and the assumptions underlying this mode of implementation analysis can be found in Hull and Hjern (1987).

7. Mandell (1990) suggests a number of different kinds of structural arrangement for inter- organizational networks, depending on whether the impulse for coordination is self-generated or mediated by a third party outside the network.

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