Rational choice theory and the sociology of ethnic relations: a critique

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Rational choice theoryand the sociology ofethnic relations: acritiqueSiniša MaleševićPublished online: 07 Dec 2010.

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Rational choice theory and thesociology of ethnic relations: a critique

Sinis· a Males· evicÂ

Abstract

This article is a critique of the main principles of the rational choice theoryin the way they have been developed and applied in the sociology of ethnicrelations. The general argument of the essay is that although rational choicetheory is presented as a successful explanatory alternative to post-essen-tialist criticism of social science, its explanatory value is limited. The authorfocuses on four central criticisms of the theory: its circularity, its wide andvague understanding of rationality and intentionality, its insensitivity tocultural values and its neglect of politics. Consequently, it is argued in thearticle that the rational choice theory is unable to provide a comprehensiveexplanation of ethnic phenomena.

Keywords: Rational choice theory; sociological theory; ethnicity; ethnicrelations.

Introduction

There seems to be something paradoxical in the study of ethnic relationswithin the theoretical framework of rational choice theory [RCT]. Therational choice approach is by its methodology and epistemology ulti-mately an individualist position of analysis, whereas ethnicity, ethniccon�icts and ethnic relations in general, are regarded as having a dis-tinctly collectivist character. RCT draws its explanations from the centralassumption of an individual’s rationality, whereas ethnic hostilities andcon�icts were often perceived by many as an example of collectiveirrationality. However, ethnic relations and ethnic group solidarity havebeen one of the phenomena where RCT analysis has been shown to bea very popular and applicable paradigm. In the realms of the contem-porary sociology of ethnic relations, RCT is one of the widely usedapproaches. The aim of this article is brie�y to interpret and critically toevaluate some of the RCT postulates, particularly in the way that they

© 2001 Taylor & Francis LtdISSN 0141-9870 print/1466-4356 onlineDOI: 10.1080/0141987012010945 8

Ethnic and Racial Studies Vol. 25 No. 2 March 2002 pp. 193–212D

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have been used in the �eld of ethnicity and ethnic relations. The purposeof the essay is to explore the strengths and weaknesses of RCT in termsof its explanatory power for the sociology of ethnic relations.

The main argument of the article is that although RCT is presentedas a successful explanatory alternative to post-essentialist criticisms ofsocial science, its sociological and epistemological value is very limited.Since the main postulates of the theory are tautological and explanatoryde�cient for a serious sociological analysis, it is argued that RCT is notable to provide what promises to be a full explanation of social life.Equally so, rational choice approach has little value for the understand-ing and explanation of ethnic relations.

First, I shall outline the main principles of RCT, then I shall look athow these principles were applied to ethnic relations and �nally I shallgive an evaluation of this theory with a special reference to the sociologyof ethnic relations.

The foundations of rational choice theory [RCT]

Rational choice theory is based on the simple assumption that humanbeings are rational and self-interest motivated in their everyday actions.The notion that individuals tend to behave as rational and egoistic crea-tures also includes assumptions that their actions are predominantlyintentional as well as that they have a stable and relatively consistent setof preferences. It is argued that although the actions of actors may berestricted by their experience and social norms, their behaviour can regu-larly be explained in reference to their need to try to maximize theiradvantages. Unlike structuralism or functionalism, where the elementaryunit of analysis is a social system, a collective, in RCT that place is alwaysreserved for an individual. Individual actors are seen to be the point ofdeparture for analysis, while groups and collective behaviour are inter-preted in terms of the self-interest driven cooperation of the actors.

In the traditional sociological distinction between agency vs. structureexplanations (European debate) and macro vs. micro approaches(American debate) RCT belongs clearly to the agency and microexplanatory camps. Even though some RCT proponents claim thistheory to be ‘transitional’ between the macro and the micro position ofanalysis (Coleman 1990, Coleman and Fararo 1992), most rational choicetheorists de�ne themselves exclusively as methodological individualists.As Jon Elster (1985, p. 3) states, according to the principle of methodo-logical individualism collective desires or collective beliefs do not exist.For the methodological individualists the analysis is valid if and only ifit can be undertaken with reference to facts about individuals. Although,as Coleman (1990) points out, the job of sociologists is to concentrateon the groups and social systems, these macro phenomena ‘must beexplained by factors internal to them, prototypically individuals.’

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RCT has its philosophical roots in Hobbes and Locke’s theory of socialcontract, Bentham’s and Mill’s utilitarianism and the view of humannature as being intrinsically sel�sh, greedy and largely unchangeable. Itseconomic and mathematical origins can be traced to Adam Smith andneo-classical economics as well as to increasingly popular game theory.However, what is most important for us is its sociological background.Although this background has never been fully explored one can �ndrational choice type of argumentation in some of Weber’s and Pareto’sworks. Weber’s (1968) theoretical and less so empirical emphasis onmethodological individualism and accent on the fact that only individualsare capable of ‘meaningful social action’ and Pareto’s theory of socialaction (1966) with the emphasis on an individual’s rationality in theprocess of justi�cation of residuas through derivations all indicate astrong presence of RCT type of thinking among the classics of socio-logical theory.

Unlike most other contemporary sociological theories (i.e. neo-func-tionalism of Luhmann and Alexander, genetic structuralism ofBourdieu, post-structuralism of Foucault or re�exive modernization ofGiddens and Beck) RCT is exclusively focused on human behaviour. Itstheoretical postulates as well as its methodological and empirical studiesare concentrated on explaining and predicting individual and groupbehaviour whereas attitudes, beliefs, cultural values and ideologies aremostly neglected or simply perceived as a ‘second order reality’. Theanalyses of behaviour are also distinct in a sense of overemphasizingmaximization over optimization. In other words, unlike neo-functional-ist explanations that see human beings as homines sociologici whoseactions are predominantly norm-oriented, for RCT an individual isactually its opposite – homo economicus whose actions are almost uni-versally seen and explained as utility-oriented. In RCT analyses one canclearly �nd Smith’s and Hobbes’ legacy which states that ‘only desire canmotivate action’.

Although there is a strong common link between various rationalchoice theories, one can still identify signi�cant differences between thethree leading rational choice sociologists – Jon Elster, Raymond Boudonand James Coleman. While all three share the emphasis on methodo-logical individualism, the primacy given to actor’s intentionality andrationality, they all differ in their theoretical and political leanings:whereas Elster develops the Marxist theory of rational choice andBoudon builds on the Weberian tradition, Coleman’s aim is to providea theoretical synthesis of micro and macro positions using RCT.

Elster’s work is unique in his interpretation of Marx as a methodo-logical individualist. Although Marx is commonly perceived as amethodological holist whose explanations focus on the structural factorssuch as ‘capitalist mode of production’, ‘social formations’ or ‘socialclasses’ and as such has been traditionally ‘hijacked’ by structuralist

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Marxists of Althusser’s, Poulantzas’s or Godelier’s type, Elster (1985,1990) has attempted to demonstrate that Marx was �rst of all concernedwith explaining the unintended consequences of human action. Unlikestructuralist-oriented Marxists Elster’s analytical Marxism aims to showthat what is good and worth preserving in Marx’s work was his econo-mistic model of social action. What is needed according to Elster is toset the micro foundations for Marxian macro analysis and to introducegame theory in order to explain the strategies of the individual actorsand their motives and necessities in the formation of such collectiveorganizations as social classes. For Elster, Marx’s emphasis on the classstruggle indicates that he was primarily concerned with the agency (pro-letariat and capitalist entrepreneurs as social agents) and not with thestructure as commonly believed.

In contrast to Elster, Boudon’s ambition is to develop a rational choicetheory of Weberian type. Although Weber is traditionally seen as anidealist, neo-Kantian, whose explanations of value systems and worldreligions are derived from his verstehen, interpretative-driven method-ology, Boudon’s aim is to show us another, more materialist, face ofWeber. As Boudon tries to demonstrate Weber was not only a self-declared methodological individualist but also one whose many expla-nations focus on the rationality of individual actors (i.e. the Romansoldiers af�nity towards Mithraism or the impact of magic on Aborig-ines). What also distinguishes Boudon’s approach from most otherrational choice positions is his signi�cantly wider understanding ofrationality. Instead of pure means-ends utilitarian rationality, Boudon(1987, 1989, pp. 207–208) following Weber, argues for the introductionof at least two other types of rationality: axiological and situated ration-ality. While axiological rationality refers to social action that is relatedto the values and not to ends (in accordance with Weber’s value-rationalaction), situated rationality includes, as Boudon explains a set of an indi-vidual’s ‘good reasons’ for undertaking certain action. Thus, rationalityof action according to Boudon can be accessed not only through utili-tarian motives, but also through social action driven by particular strongbeliefs (i.e. hero sacri�ce) and through an actor’s own internal motivesfor pursuing a particular course of the action.

Unlike Elster and Boudon, Coleman is less interested in grounding hisposition with reference to the works of classics. His main aim is rather todefend the rational choice position from the accusations of being too microand too individualist. For that purpose his theory aims at integrating microand macro levels of analysis. However, the integration is achieved bygiving clear primacy to the micro level and could be summarized well inCollins’s (1981) phrase as the ‘microfoundations of macrosociology’.Coleman recognizes the fact that individuals very often behave in a non-economic way by seeking to realize collective interests at the expense oftheir self-interests as well as that they are institutionally and normatively


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constrained in their actions. He explains this situation in terms of grantingthe authority held by one individual to another in which granted authorityleads to subordination of one actor to another and where new resultingentity (i.e. structure) begins to operate independently from the wills of theactors. In this way actors are occasionally in a situation that leads them tobehave as accomplishing the interests of others or of the collective units.Nevertheless, what is crucial for Coleman is that an individual’s ‘transferof control’ over his/her actions to others is initially motivated by self-interest. For Coleman (1990, p. 292) norms are nothing more than a resultof individual’s ‘giving up of partial rights of control over one’s own actionand the receiving of partial rights of control over the actions of others’.As such norms are ‘initiated and maintained by some people who seebene�ts resulting from the observation of norms and harm stemming fromthe violation of those norms’ (Coleman 1990, p. 292).

Although these three positions differ greatly they also share manycommon themes such as the assumption of an individual’s rationality andmethodological individualism. However, what is more important is thatall three are similar in accounting for a solution to the two central ques-tions for RCT: a) the individual’s decision-making process and b) thenature of cooperative behaviour. In other words they all give similaranswers to the questions: How do individuals make their choices? AndHow are society and collective action possible if everybody acts as asel�sh individual?

The process of decision-making is the key problem of RCT analysis.Individuals make decisions that may lead them to attain certain goals.They have more or less stable preferences and an available set of alterna-tive behaviours. RCT states that in most cases individuals would behaverationally – acting so as to obtain the maximum net advantage. Accord-ing to Elster (1986, p. 4) there are three distinct elements in the choicesituation: a) feasible set of all courses of action which (are rationallybelieved) to satisfy various ‘outside’ constraints, b) a set of rationalbeliefs about the causal structure of the situation that controls thecourses of action as well as their outcomes and, �nally, c) subjectiveranking of the feasible alternatives (often deduced from a ranking of theoutcomes to which they are expected to lead). RCT analysis claims(Hechter 1986, p. 271) that individuals ‘will engage in collective actiononly when they estimate that by doing so they will receive a net indi-vidual bene�t’.

The question of collective action is also answered in reference to indi-vidual motives. Thus, according to RCT, when one observes a collectivebehaviour in practice this can always, in the end, be explained as a situ-ation where actors integrate for the purpose of bene�ting from thecollective good and where collective action only serves as a most rationalmeans available to make a ‘price’ less costly. The famous ‘prisoner’sdilemma’ game is for RCT a typical example of how individuals can lose


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if they blindly follow their own self-interests at the expense of altruisticbehaviour that would prove to be a bene�cial outcome for all actorsinvolved. Cooperative behaviour in RCT analysis is analysed also withreference to game theory’s models of assurance and chicken dilemmas.Therefore group formation and group behaviour are explained in termsof cost-bene�t calculations. To understand the RCT argument aboutcollective action and group solidarity more clearly let us take a look athow RCT explains ethnic relations.

Ethnic relations and RCT

First, one should clarify from the outset that most rational choicetheorists do not believe in the existence of anything called ‘ethnicphenomena’. For Hechter, (1986, 1995) ethnic relations are not quali-tatively different from class, religion or status relations. Similarly to class,religion or status, in his view, ethnicity can be analysed and explained inreference to the ‘ordinary’ sociological categories such as social and indi-vidual action, rationality, assimilation, group formation and so on. Whatmakes ethnic groups different is only the fact that in this case cultural orphysical differences are used by the actors themselves to demarcate indi-viduals and social groups with the single aim of maximizing individualadvantages.

Rational choice sociologists look at individuals as the actors who arein the state of permanent competition over limited resources, economicadvantages, wealth, power or status. In this process of competition, eth-nicity, meaning sharing the same cultural resources such as language,customs, accents, skin colour or even eating habits, can and very oftendo serve the function of making the price of group membership signi�-cantly ‘cheaper’. In other words, in the situation of a group con�ict oran immanent threat of such a con�ict individuals are more likely toamplify the importance of their ethnic group membership. In thesecircumstances, according to Hechter (1986, p. 271), ethnic groupsperform two functions: a) they are the central source of the privaterewards as well as punishments which motivate actors to take part incollective action; and b) since the actor’s cost/bene�t calculation dependsheavily on its estimation of the probability of success of that particularcollective action, ethnic groups play a crucial role by controlling theinformation and thus limit the scope of the choices available to indi-vidual actors. To put it more simply, individuals are on the one handoffered the bene�ts of ethnic group membership and on the other handare restricted in their choices by the ethnic groups who prevent ‘freeriding’ by monitoring and controlling its membership.

Although physical and cultural differences are deeply related toethnic animosities since the conflicts of this nature are perceived by theactors as the real group conflicts (i.e. Serbs vs. Albanians, Hutus vs.


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Tutsi, etc.) they are in themselves insufficient for the formation of thegroups. As Banton (1992, p. 105) points out, it is only when these differ-ences are granted cultural significance and used by individuals for theirown ends that social groups form. For example, people may differ inthe type of clothes they wear or the kind of flowers they like, but theywould only under very exceptional circumstances organize themselves(perceive in-group/out-group membership) on such a basis andattribute cultural and political significance to this type of groupmembership.

To succeed in attributing cultural signi�cance to groups it is necessary,as Barth (1969) was already aware, to tow the line between the groupsand to demarcate the ethnic group boundaries. Only when groupsmanage to establish relatively �rm boundary markers can cultural differ-ences become sources of group identi�cation. As long as actors competeon an individual basis the ethnic boundaries are largely irrelevant, butwhen the collective action takes place the situation becomes completelydifferent. In Banton’s (1992) words ‘when people compete as individuals,group boundaries are weakened but when they compete as groups,boundaries are strengthened’. Thus, in RCT ethnicity just as any otherform of collective membership functions primarily as a source of bene�tsthat compel individual actors to participate in collective action.

According to Hechter (1986, p. 271) the collective action on an ethnicbasis depends not only on a group’s monitoring capacity but also on itsorganizational resources, the intensity and form of solidarity, theadoption of non-violent tactics, the history of equitable distribution ofcollective bene�ts, a group’s size, as well as the capacity of individualand institutional ‘opponents’ to punish potential participants. AlthoughHechter recognizes the importance of the impact of structural factors onthe potential ethnic social action, it is his belief that individual motivesare central for such an action to happen. Ethnicity is no more than asocial resource that can be mobilized and manipulated for individualgain.

Although the strength of ethnic ties in more exceptional situationssuch as wars and con�icts is recognized, these are largely explained withreference to situational factors. Banton (1994) argues that individualshave a number of social roles within the society and these roles arevisualized as being arranged on a scale – from so-called basic roles (i.e.gender) at the one end to those roles ‘which are largely independent ofother relationships’ (i.e. fan club) at the other end of the scale. AsBanton (1994) claims in more extreme situations ‘ethnic roles that havebeen towards the middle of the scale have been pushed up to the basicend’. In other situations and under different circumstances they arelikely to be replaced with other social de�nitions: class, family, religion,etc.

In RCT ethnic identity is perceived as one of the elements of general


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social identity that every individual holds. RCT underlines multiplicityof social identities. An interesting example is Basque ethnic identity(Lyman and Douglas 1973, p. 355). A Basque living in the USA, incontact with another Spanish Basque, would stress his regional sub-ethnic identity (Vizcayan); in contact with a Basque from France hewould stress his national identity (Spanish Basque); in the contact witha non-Basque he would stress his general ethnic identity (Basque); andin contact with a Basque in the Basque region he is an American. Thissituationality and changeability of ethnic identities has been demon-strated by rational choice sociologists on numerous occasions. Since eth-nicity has been identi�ed as a social and cultural resource that actors canoccasionally rely on in pursuit of their own individual bene�ts,researchers were eager to show how individuals use the strategy of so-called ‘ethnic identity switching’ in a rational and self-interested manner.A typical example is G. Duijzings’ (1992) report on the appearance of arelatively large ethnic group in Kosovo and Macedonia in 1991 whoclaimed to be Egyptian and demanded to be registered as such in theYugoslav census.

As Duijzings explains on the last census those people mostly declaredthemselves Albanians, while in fact, Duijzings things, they belong byethnic origin to the Roma population. The reasons for their frequent‘identity switching’ is the fact that after 1981 (the time of the lastYugoslav census) Albanians lost their political dominance and Serbstook over the political hegemony and control of all strategic institutionsin the province of Kosovo. In 1991 being Albanian was a clear disadvan-tage, so in order to gain some bene�t from this position they demandedto be a separate and distinct ethnic group – Egyptians. Here again onecan see how RCT emphasizes fuzziness and circumstantionality of ethnicidentities.

What is crucial for this perspective is the view that ethnicity is not aprimordial or static feature but rather a dynamic, changing process. Inother words, ethnicity is to be analyzed principally in terms of inter-group and inter-individual relationships, not in terms of �xed ‘culturalcontents’. As Banton (1994) precisely states: ‘change in ethnic relationsoften comes about not because people change the value they place uponassociation with co-ethnics, but because they change their ideas aboutwhich relationships are to be governed by ethnic norms’.

Since RCT is primarily concerned with the social change and claimsthat is, unlike structuralism or functionalism, able to explain the change,the analysis of the changing nature of ethnicity is the main focus of itsstudy. The change in the importance attributed to ethnic identity is henceexplained in line with cost-bene�t calculations of individuals. InHechter’s (1986, p. 269) view ethnicity should be analysed in relation toan individual’s changing circumstances and his/her perception of thischange:


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Changing relative price leads to corresponding changes in behaviour:the more costly it is for people to choose a traditional course of actionto achieve a given bene�t, the more likely it is that they will consideran innovative alternative to reach the same end.

An evaluation of rational choice perspective

In the last two decades or so all contemporary sociological theories hadto respond to �erce post-essentialist criticisms of sociology. Post-struc-turalism of Deluze and Foucault, post-modernism of Lyotard and Bau-drillard and post-Marxism of Laclau and Mouffe among others haveargumentatively attacked universalism, positivism and totalizing objec-tives of classical and contemporary sociological theory. Post-essentialistapproaches have also emphasized authoritarian outcomes of totalistprojects and have agreed on the impossibility of single universal truthpromised by the Enlightenment project. Essentialist approaches havebeen perceived as no more than ‘hegemonic metaratives’. On the otherhand, radical post-essentialism has led towards paralysis, extrememethodological relativism and theoretical and political nihilism. To avoidboth of these two extremes most contemporary approaches in sociologyhave responded by scaling down their explanatory ambitions, softeningtheir concepts and methodology, by introducing the concept of self-re�exivity, by working on the synthesis of micro and macro levels, bygiving up the ambition of theory building or by focusing on the particu-lar.

RCT has chosen a different path. In order not to give up sociology’sexplanatory ambitions by making its hypotheses milder and more re�ex-ive, hence vague and imprecise, but also with the awareness of positivistlimitations, RCT has opted for a pragmatic reductionism. By pragmaticreductionism is meant that although the researcher is aware of the limi-tations of his/her theory and methodology he/she is still committed tothe activity of providing scienti�c explanations. However, these expla-nations are now possible, according to RCT, only if one analyses socialphenomena by reducing them to individual actions, beliefs and proper-ties. In other words by applying the doctrine of methodological indi-vidualism. As Elster (1985, p. 5) argues ‘if the goal of science is to explainby means of laws, there is a need to reduce the time-span betweenexplanans and explanandum – between cause and effect – as much aspossible, in order to avoid spurious explanations’ and ‘in this perspec-tive reductionism is not an end in itself, only a concomitant of anotherdesideratum’. Hence, if sociology wants to remain an explanatoryscience then it has to opt for a pragmatic reduction and for methodo-logical individualism.

The position of pragmatic reductionism clearly has its merits. On theone hand, it aims at rescuing sociological research from the paralysis and


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irrationality of some post-essentialist approaches and, on the other hand,it wishes to preserve sociology’s explanatory potentials. Unlike post-modern reluctance to engage with the ‘real life issues’ by overempha-sizing ‘social construction’ of reality such as gender, class, ethnicity,arguing for the multiplicity of truths and avoiding singular explanationsby playing with meta-narratives, RCT does indeed provide a practicaland reliable alternative of explanatory certainty. However, howplausible and certain is this certainty?

My view is that RCT propositions are built on false assumptions andmore importantly are explanatory sterile. Although RCT presents itselfas a viable alternative to post-essentialist criticisms the weakness of itsontological and logical foundations indicate that RCT is unable toovercome the central problems raised by post-essentialism.

Firstly, there is a certain circularity in RCT explanations that leadstowards explanatory dead-ends. If we assume that every individualaction is rational and motivated by self-interest, then what is the pointof analysis when we already know what our research results will be. Inother words RCT explanations seem often to resemble some die-hardMarxist and feminist analysis that presuppose their �ndings by onlylooking for and then �nding their explanans and explanandums in patri-archy and capitalism. In RCT these factors are assumed rationality,intentionality and egoistic motives of actors. This circularity and tautol-ogy of analysis leads towards post hoc type of reasoning. As Baert (1998,p. 166) rightly points out rational choice theorists ‘conceive of their taskas demonstrating the fact that social practices which are prima facieirrational are actually rational after all’. In this sense they are similar tothe early functionalist arguments of Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown’sabout universal functionality of certain ‘savage’ customs, rituals andpractices. What was functionality for Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brownis now rationality for Elster and Boudon. Since the circular and post hocexplanations are based upon propositions that are not empirically vali-dated and which often aim at supplying mutually exclusive observations(i.e. explaining with the same level of conviction why people engage inethnic con�icts and why they do not) this type of reasoning is hence, asBaert (1998, p. 167) and Smelser (1992) con�rm, not falsi�able.

The de�ciency of this type of argumentation is clearly visible in thestudy of ethnic relations. A �nding that ethnic group behaviour andethnic con�icts are not products of collective madness but of individualrationality does not really tell us much. This circular form of reasoningonly tries to rationalize events in an ex post facto manner. The rationalchoice theory sociologist wants us �rst to accept the idea of individualrationality and then this assumed rationality is used as an explanationfor the particular type of behaviour such as social action in ethnic con-�icts. The outbursts of mass killings on an ethnic basis are explained inreference to group competition in imperfect markets: the individuals


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choose to participate in such actions because all other options are morecostly. For example, Hechter (1995, p. 54) claims that

it is not dif�cult to interpret events in Bosnia as the by-product of acool, calculating land-grab by Serbs and Croats against their weakerMuslim victims, for grabbing land, like other forms of looting, is pro�t-able in the absence of effective state authority.

In other words, taking part in an ethnic massacre was seen by actors asthe most rational choice. This type of reasoning is not only ethicallyproblematic (exempli�ed in the often used cynical and euphemistic RCTphrase ‘the exit costs have been raised’), but it is also explanatory de�-cient. It is a typical case of post hoc explanation that �rstly presupposesindividual rationality and then explains the massacres by referring to thatrationality. When an individual is forced to chose between taking part inthe massacre or being massacred himself then we can hardly say that hehad any real choices to make. It is certainly more fruitful to look at thestructural and situational determinants that had an impact on thedevelopment of such a situation. Additionally, looking at the variablessuch as fear, conformity with rules, shared values and memories, ideo-logical convictions and so on can give us probably more information thatwould yield better explanations (Male ¹ evi æ , 2000, 2002a).

Or let us take a less extreme example. Hechter (1986, p. 276, italicsmine) aims to explain the persistence of the traditional Romany/Gypsyand Amish populations within fully modernized societies as examples ofgroup rational behaviour. He states that

by controlling education, intentional communities not only maximisetheir chances of moulding children’s preferences – giving them a tastefor community-provided bene�ts and an aversion to those provided inthe outside world – but also raise their exit costs by denying theirchildren access to the kind of training that would enable them tocompete successfully in the external labour market.

Here again we have the case of presupposed rationality that produces avery weak explanation. Taking into account that all traditional com-munities try to ‘reproduce an archetype’ and maintain the traditionalway of life the real question is why the Romany/Gypsies and Amisheshave been able to do this whereas the other traditional communitieshave not. In addition, to avoid the circularity of rational choice expla-nation, Hechter is also forced to move from methodological individual-ism and presupposed utility-oriented explanation towards conceptsborrowed from the enemy camp of structural-functionalism such asinternalization of group norms and socialization (community that shapeschildren’s preferences) and structural determinants of individual action


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(community and education system). A similar strategy is employed inBanton’s work (2000, p. 487) who now agrees that ‘ethnic ties may beinculcated’ and ‘that individuals frequently acquire a preference forassociation with co-ethnics as people who share the same norms as them-selves’.

Secondly, there is a clear problem with the way that the notions ofrationality and intentionality are used. Although most rational choicesociologists recognize the simple fact that not all human actions arerationally motivated and that people do not always behave in such a wayto realize their interests, they argue that the assumption that people dobehave in this way allows us, to identify the role of other motivations intheir behaviour. The main problem with this line of thinking is thatrationality and intentionality are too vaguely de�ned and often stretchedto the extremes. If one considers every form of social action as beingrational, intentional and meaningful then again our analysis becomeuseless. The point of explanatory activity is to discriminate betweenthose factors that are somehow more substantial and those that are lessimportant in highlighting the reasons, motives and origins of certaintypes of action or event. By overstretching the notions of intentionalityand rationality our emphasis shifts from the internal and situationalunderstanding of the roots of social phenomena towards looking for anexternal justi�cation of our presupposed rationality. In other words,instead of focusing on the social problem itself, we focus on the question:‘How can I demonstrate that behind this action were individual’s rationalmotives?’ Thus, we become much more political than analytic: our aimis not any more to explain but rather to convince. If one treats all humanaction as rational and intentional then we end up with �ndings of verylittle explanatory relevance.

In addition, as Baert (1998, p. 169) rightly points out, most sociologicaltheories do recognize the role that an individual’s intentionality plays insocial action, but unlike RCT, they do not postulate the regularity or typ-icality of its occurrence. In Baert’s view RCT does not make a distinc-tion between acting rationally and acting as if one is rational. Althoughone could agree with the idea that individuals generally tend to act withinthe realm of principles of rationality, it does not mean that this can beused as empirical evidence that individuals generally act rationally. AsBaert (1998, p. 168) concludes ‘for individuals to act as if they arerational does not necessitate any rational decision process remotelysimilar to the one attributed to individuals by RCT’. Furthermore, asChivers (1985, p. 467) and Dex (1985) have also emphasized, the socialaction can shift from being at one time rational to becoming at a laterstage inertial or even habitual. However, more importantly, although theassumption of an individual’s rationality tells us that there will be acertain consistency in people’s behaviour, it does not tell us anythingabout the substance of their concerns (Hindness 1988, p. 8).


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When such a wide notion of rationality is applied to the study ofethnic relations, then we end up with all but identical explanations.Rational choice sociologists want to convince us that people will gener-ally tend to use their ethnic membership in order to achieve some indi-vidual gain. Their ethnicity is explained in reference to intentionalchoices optimal in a particular situation. Behind the ethnic group soli-darity we can �nd no more than individuals motivated by self-interestwho rely on their ethnic markers to maximize their advantages. Hence,ethno-mobilization, separatism, ethnic revival, xenophobia, ethnic wars,ethno-nepotism are all explained as the best available choice under situ-ational constraints for a rational individual. For example, in discussingethnic con�icts and nationalism Hechter (1995, p. 62) makes the follow-ing strong statements: ‘there is ample evidence that nationalist groupsemploy violence strategically as a means to produce their joint goods’or the ‘state authorities are always interested in suppressing nationalistgroups’. Hechter overlooks that in most ethnic wars and large-scale con-�icts violence comes as a chaotic end and a very last resort to the longprocess of historically changing relations between ethnic groups. In thatsense the strategic use of violence is more often a rarity than a rule.

Furthermore, there are numerous empirical examples demonstratingwhen and how the state authorities can be interested in promotingvarious forms of nationalism, from the nationalisms of the majorityethnic group (i.e. Han in China, Serbs in Milo ¹ evi æ ’s Yugoslavia), overthe state-sponsored nationalisms (Swiss, American, Nigerian) to thenationalisms of minority ethnic groups of which the most recent exampleis president Yeltsin’s strong support for the Baltic states’ nationalisms inthe last two years of the USSR’s existence.

The problem with this type of explanation is twofold. On the one hand,an overstretched notion of rationality does not allow us to discriminatebetween the subtlety of various ethnic situations and, on the other hand,the extreme voluntaristic concept of an ethnic group undermines deeperunderstanding of processes involved in ethnic relations.

When we demonstrate that separatism, xenophobia or ethnicnepotism can all be traced back to the individual’s rational and self-interest-motivated behaviour what more do we know about grouprelations than we knew before the analysis was undertaken? We mightknow more about individual motivations, but we know very little aboutspeci�cities of group relationships. From RCT analysis we can learn littleabout differences between the macro events such as the break-up of thestate and micro actions such as favouring to shop in a store owned by aco-ethnic. When the analysis is exclusively focused on an individual’srationality the macro variables such as the role of the state, ideology,historical legacies, collective memories and so on are completely left outof the picture. Because of its overemphasis on an individual’s rationality


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and intentionality, rational choice theories very often do not see thewood for the trees.

By giving primacy to an individual’s choices, RCT has to adopt anextremely voluntaristic concept of ethnicity. In these studies ethnicgroups differ very little from philatelic societies. For example, Banton(1980, p. 476) explicitly states that ‘any approach from rational choicetheory must treat all groups as coalitions or alignments of individuals,in�uenced by the consequences of choices made in earlier periods’.Ethnic membership is here seen as a matter of simple choice, whereasin reality it seems to be just the opposite. This approach is almost exclus-ively focused on the internal aspect of ethnic group de�nition and haslittle analytical patience with the ascribed (external) aspect of ethnicity.For example, Hechter (2000, p. 97) argues that ‘. . . different heights,weights, hair and eye colour . . . might serve as a basis for the develop-ment of a social identity’ and that ‘social identities are parasitic on groupformation: one can only identify with a given group when such a groupactually exists’.

Unfortunately, as many anthropological studies show, the ascribedethnic categorization often has a much more profound effect on inter-group relationships than the internal one. What Hechter ignores here isthat the crucial problem is whether a particular ethnic collective is per-ceived as a ‘legitimate’ group by others. It is often the case that certaingroup actions and state policies are governed by the belief that somecommunities do not constitute a separate ethnic or national unit. A greatnumber of ethnic con�icts are fought over the question whether aparticular community is a ‘real’ ethnic or national group. A typicalexample includes Bosnian Muslims (today known as Bosniaks) who haveuntil very recently been categorized by Croats and Serbs as a (presum-ably ethnically unconscious) religious group that is part of aCroatian/Serbian ethnic community. By viewing ethnic groups as inde-pendently created by the voluntary action of individual actors, RCT hasdif�culty in explaining the enormous strength of ethnic ties throughhistory in forms of collective memory, as well as the persistence of so-called ethnic cores or to use A. Smith’s (1981) terminology ethnies.Stating that ethnic group membership is no different from class or statusgroups, rational choice is unable to explain the simple question: Why doethnic attachments regularly prove to be more potent than any othertype of group membership? Why are so many people ready to die, oreven more strikingly to kill, for their ethnic kin and so few for their tradeunion or golf club?

Thirdly, rational choice sociologists simply ignore the cultural aspectof individual choices. Rationality as well as actor’s choices are always farfrom being culturally free. Although most rational choice theoristsassume that preferences are stable across cultures (i.e. Becker 1976) asnumerous ethnographic studies demonstrate this view could not be


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further from the truth. Despite some universal features of human ration-ality a great deal of social action is shaped by speci�cities of individualcultures.

RCT treats preference formation largely as an unproblematic processbecause it starts from the presupposition that all human beings aredriven by similar motives. For example, Hechter (1986, p. 269) says: ‘. . . it can be expected that everyone will prefer more wealth, power andhonour to less, because attaining them often makes it easier for indi-viduals to attain other (perhaps more idiosyncratic) goals’. This state-ment overlooks that individual preferences do not have to be connectedwith possession not only in psychological terms (i.e. idiosyncratic values)but more importantly in terms of dominant norms and cultures. Actorsmay have aspirations and preferences that do not �t utilitarian measureswhich means that their preferences cannot be hierarchically ordered andmeasured in terms of ‘less or more value’. The problem with this line ofthinking is that it reduces the complexity of human values and motivesto hierarchically ordered ‘preferences’. Individual action is not onlydriven by the content of ends but also by the content of means.

On the psychological level some individuals may prefer simple hardwork, without material bene�ts, as their intrinsic, psychological need,which enables them to achieve self-ful�lment; or they may prefer thingssuch as security or serenity over any material bene�ts; or they can actcompletely on an emotional basis (anger, fear, anxiety); or they can bemotivated by categories such as glory, heroism, altruism, saving-face orsocial justice. The studies of ethnic relations are full of examples whichshow how individuals often intentionally sacri�ce for ethno-nationalist,religious or ideological reasons. How can a rational choice sociologistexplain mass self-in�ammation of Kurds in front of Greek embassiesafter the capture of the PKK leader in 1999? Or what about the self-in�ammation of the young Czech student, Jan Palach, in 1968 after theSoviet invasion, or Japanese kamikaze pilots in World War II, or Hezbol-lah suicide bombers? Hechter’s response (1995, pp. 55–56) to this is thefollowing: ‘social sources of emotional action are not well understood’;‘very little is known about the salience or intensity of values’; ‘it isimpossible to tell which of them [religious beliefs or the fear of sanc-tions] is responsible in the usual case’. In other words, the RCT argumentis: since we know little about emotions and values one should rule themout as an explanatory device. How convenient!

This problem is even more pronounced on the cultural level. Throughsocialization individuals can internalize or develop preferences wherethey despise material goods, power, or honour. There are manyanthropological studies showing how some ethnic groups support egali-tarianism and reject individualist values. A nice example is given byLevi-Strauss (1989, p. 30) in the case of Gahuku-Gama of Papua NewGuinea who have learnt football but who play for several days, as many


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matches as are necessary for both sides to reach the same score. Becauseof the predominance of egalitarian values the game is not perceived inits original European sense as a competitive contest, but is rather treatedas a ritual around which collective values are reaf�rmed.

To demonstrate the cultural diversity of individual preferences, we donot have to go to Papua New Guinea. As sociological research shows,collectivist values prevail in some European societies as well. Forexample, Croatian sociologist ® upanov (1977, 1985) has repeatedlydemonstrated in his empirical work that former Yugoslav society wascharacterized by the predominance of the collectivist ethos, which hetermed ‘egalitarian syndrome’. Hence, not all human behaviour takesplace within a context of competitive individualism. RCT also omits thesigni�cance of collective memory as a value driven form of social action.Armenian animosity towards Turks cannot be explained without refer-ence to collective memory of 1915 genocide, nor can dislike or distrustof Tutsis towards Hutus be understood without knowledge of 1994massacre.

Fourthly, RCT does not only neglect culture, values and ideology butalso politics, RCT analysis reduces political action and political actors toeconomics. Perceiving social actions only in terms of individual maxi-mization, RCT is unable not only to account for non-economic and non-materialist sources of individual motives but also for structuraldeterminants of collective action.

Even when one agrees that human beings are often guided by theirself-interests and situational rationality these factors are frequently oflittle relevance in explaining macro phenomena. RCT treats all indi-vidual choices as equal, while complex societies are full of situationswhere the ‘structural’ conditions of choices are very unequal. Forexample, an individual can do little in resisting the social in�uence of theinstitutions such as the school (which is obligatory in all modern masssocieties), mass media (owned by the state or huge business corpor-ations), army (obligatory in countries with conscription), police andimmigration of�ce, courts or the party (in one-party states). He/she cancertainly make individual rational choices but the impact of structurescan, and often is decisive for the outcome of individual and collectiveaction.

Coleman’s (1990) attempt to explain the structure in reference to indi-vidual’s initial rationality when granting the authority to another indi-vidual and then becoming unintentionally placed in situation to pursueinterests of another actor is very problematic. On the one hand, it statesthe obvious – as Hobbes and Rousseau taught us a long time ago andRawls (1971) more recently, in every society individuals do indeedtransfer a part of their will and liberty on to joint institutions. The hypo-thetical social contract exists whenever one �nds ‘the state of law’ oper-ating. Although individuals often do pursue (rather unintentionally) the


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interests of other actors (i.e. leaders, ruling elite, etc.) most of the timethey simply obey and follow the inertia and ‘irrationality’ of institutionallogic and bureaucratic mechanisms of action. The ‘state’ and ‘the school’certainly have no will of their own but still operate as independent socialagents and in accordance with non-individual logic.

On the other hand, Coleman’s argument falls short of providing anexplanation of how and why the structure becomes perceived as an inde-pendent entity by the individuals themselves. Since the individuals reifysocial relations and see ‘the state’ or ‘the nation’ as real entities theirbehaviour is also guided by such beliefs. As we could learn from Weber(1968), social action is not only guided by instrumental rationality butalso by value rationality. Individuals are more often than not directed bytheir strong beliefs and commitments. Unlike other RCT sociologists(i.e. Hechter 1997, p. 152, who explicitly rules out both emotional andvalue-rational motives), Boudon has acknowledged this fact. However,when one recognizes that values are often as important as interestshe/she undermines the principles of pragmatic reductionism and placetheir explanation out of the RCT frame of reference.

The importance of political institutions and institutions in general forthe understanding of human action is perhaps most visible in the studyof ethnic relations. One cannot properly explain the current situation ofethnic animosities and wars in the Balkans or Caucasus as well as thebreak-up of former communist federations without making a referenceto the institutions of the communist state. As Brubaker (1996) rightlypoints out it was the Soviet and Yugoslav states that have institutional-ized ethnic differences at the level of territorial and political entities. Theconcept of ethnic nation was largely rei�ed in the minds of Soviet andYugoslav citizens through particular policies and practices of the com-munist state. As a result the break-up of the former federations runalong the lines of ethnic republics that were now governed by ‘institu-tionally constituted national elites’. Without understanding structuralchanges such as decentralization of federal power on an ethnic basis oneis not able to explain ethnic relations in the post-communist world. Therational and self-interested behaviour of individuals in the situation ofstate collapse might be an ultimate result of these changes but withoutan understanding of the state’s role in communism our micro expla-nation would certainly remain banal. Although one can look at the indi-viduals as rational creatures, as Hindess (1988, p. 29) makes it precise,they cannot be treated ‘as social atoms that can be picked at randomfrom their groups, because it makes no difference who they are’.

This weakness of RCT is implicitly acknowledged in the more recentworks of Banton (2000) and Hechter (2000) who now both explain ethnicand national con�icts much more in terms of politics than economics.Instead of focusing on any individual actor ‘who can be picked atrandom’ Banton strongly distinguishes between the role of political elites


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and the rest in the explanation of the ethnic con�icts, whereas Hechter(2000, p. 8) ‘limits nationalism to the realm of politics’. So we can, forexample, read that ethnic mobilization ‘can also be a form of collectiveaction by which members of elites pursue their individual ends with thesometimes reluctant support of followers who have less interest in thedesired outcome’ (Banton 2000, p. 489). A much more prominent roleis now given to elites and their ‘de�nition of situation’ who are seen as‘ideological mobilisers’ of ethnic action who ‘can impose their de�nitionof situation upon a person contemplating an exit option’ (Banton 2000,p. 490). It is even acknowledged that ‘ethnic preferences can be changedby the eloquence of mobilisers or by the messages of the mass media’(Banton 2000, p. 493).

Although one could easily accept these explanations they clearlybelong to a different theoretical traditions in sociology of ethnic relations,that is to the power elite approaches (i.e. Cohen 1981, Brass 1993,Male¹ evi æ 1998, 2000) and symbolic interactionism (Blumer and Duster1980; Lal 1992, 1995). The shift to a power-elite position and to symbolicinteractionism shows not only RCT’s inability to deal with unequalposition of different social actors but also demonstrates, through itsretreat into eclecticism, explanatory powerlessness of pragmatic reduc-tionism and methodological individualism. Even more importantly, theintroduction of explanatory apparatuses from other theoretical traditionsoften contradicts the basic postulates of rational choice theory. If theleader can impose his ‘de�nition of situation’ on his co-ethnics, where ishere a room for the individual’s free choice? And �nally, if symbolic inter-actionism and power-elite theory can successfully explain ethnic relations(and as I have argued elsewhere Weberian inspired elite theory can,Male¹ evi æ 2000, 2002a, 2002b), why would we need RCT at all?

Conclusion

The main quality as well as the main weakness of RCT is its simplemethodology. Its analyses are plainly too crisp and too good to be true.Because of its simplicity the theory can be questioned and attacked onalmost every aspect of its explanation: methodological individualism, themicro position of analysis, the economic deterministic approach, itsneglect of the affective sphere of human action, choice formation, thelack of attention to ‘structural reasons’ of human behaviour, its failureto explain the preference formation, its neglect of values and so on. Eventhe main axiom of individual optimization is tautological and it cannotbe tested nor falsi�ed. All these de�ciencies are also re�ected in thestudy of ethnic relations. Using an extremely voluntaristic concept ofethnicity and reducing politics and culture to economy rational choiceanalysis is unable to explain the obvious strength and persistence ofethnic ties, both historically and geographically.


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However, the application of RCT to ethnic relations had some positiveoutcomes. Taking into account that strong feelings of ethnic attachments,ethnic hostility and ethnic con�icts were until quite recently mainlyexplained as irrational, primordial and atavistic behaviour, the mostimportant contribution of RCT to the study of ethnic relations is itsdemysti�cation of ethnic irrationality. Rational choice analysis has elab-orately shown that phenomena such as racism, ethnic hatred or national-ism can be based on very rational motives. In market situations and inmarket-oriented societies competition over jobs, housing, educationpossibilities may develop into ethnic struggle if ethnicity is available tobe used as an advantage. On the other hand not all human behaviour isintentional and utilitarian, and not all actions of individuals are drivenby personal will. The questions of power-distribution, the role of values,choice and preference formation, as well as that of emotionally deter-mined behaviour remains unanswered by RCT. Therefore, even if oneagrees with RCT theoreticians that social relationships are very oftenbased on market relations that does not mean that every society andevery individual at every time, and in the same way applies this ‘the bestmeans to given ends’ schema. Society is much more than a market-place.

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank Michael Banton, Pete Morriss and Steven McNena fortheir helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.

References

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SINIŠA MALEŠEVIÆis Lecturer in Sociology and Political Science atthe National University of Ireland, Galway.ADDRESS: Department of Political Science and Sociology, NationalUniversity of Ireland, Galway, Newcastle Road, Galway City, Republicof Ireland, email: Sinisa.Malesevic@NUIGalway


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Rational choice theory and the sociology of ethnic relations: a critique

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