PRISLAM:

The Recruitment and Radicalization of Terrorist Operatives in the Prison System and the

Threat to the American Homeland

Melissa Jane Kronfeld March 10, 2011

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INTRODUCTION

Homegrown terrorism, although a limited phenomena, is on the rise in the United States.1

But what makes even its limited occurrences more startlingly is the continued

contribution by Western nations in general and American citizens in particular, who are

recruited and radicalized in the U.S. often without any contact with or instruction from al

Qaeda core itself.2 How is this recruitment happening? Although madrassas or the

Internet are often cited as unique tools for the recruitment and radicalization of terrorist

operatives, less attention is played to the role of prisons and the prisonization of the

citizenry in contributing to the creation of the terrorist mindset and the formation of lone

wolf or small cells of actionable operatives. This paper seeks to answer the primary

question: Does prisonization and criminality play a role in making the modern terrorist?

Homegrown terrorism has become a threat which is most likely to stem from the

native born Muslim population who represent the single largest Muslim demographic in

the U.S.3 Approximately 35% of all U.S. Muslims were born in America and the

remaining foreign born Muslims represent a diversity of nationalities.4 Native-born

Muslims are younger then the general Muslim and American populations, are less likely

to have a higher education or a job, and are more likely to be of a lower income status.5

Native born Muslims are almost entirely converts to the faith, predominately African

American, with a growing Hispanic presence, and more likely to identify with their

religion over their nationality.6 Although not a majority, more native-born Muslims

believe their community should remain distinct from mainstream America.7

Since 9/11, the native born population has grown further apart from, not only the

Muslim American community, but also Americans in general. Native-born Muslims feel 1 Jenkins, Brian Michael. “Would Be Warriors.” Washington, D.C.: The RAND Corporation, 2010 (hereafter, Jenkins, Would be Warriors) 2 For the most comprehensive examination of all post-9/11 terror arrests see Ibid and “Post-9/11 Jihadist Terrorism Cases Involving U.S. Citizens and Residents.” Syracuse: Syracuse University, Feb. 2011. <http://homegrown.newamerica.net> (hereafter Terrorism Cases). 3 “Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream.” Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, May 22, 2007, p. 15 and 22. <http://pewresearch.org/pubs/483/muslim-americans> (hereafter Pew). 4 Felton, Eric. “Muslims in America.” Interview with Zahid Bukhari. Voice of America. Nov. 27, 2002; Ibid, p. 15. 5 Pew, pp. 17-19. 6 Ibid, pp. 17, 22 and 31. 7 Ibid, p. 33.

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a greater strain on their identity.8 They are more likely to perceive anti-terrorism policies

as singling them out and almost 75% believe the “War on Terror” is actually a war on

Muslims.9 They are more likely to be against American action in Afghanistan and Iraq

then American Muslims in general and a larger minority, albeit just 7%, express support

for al Qaeda.10 Their support for al Qaeda is equivalent to that expressed by American

converts to the faith, and rivaled only by African American Muslims, of whom 9%

express support al Qaeda.11 If these percentages seem small, they still represent at least

100,000 and as many as 700,000 Muslim American citizens.12 As the Washington

Institute noted in a report on counter-radicalization, “though their numbers are small,

their potential impact is large.”13 The report continued: “While only a very small

percentage of radicalized Muslims have turned to terrorism, those who do present a

special, potential threat.”14 Indeed, these numbers are daunting if we consider a

successful cell need only consist of a handful of individuals.

Radicalization in the U.S. is often dismissed by “experts” who cite the high level

of integration within the Muslim immigrant community. But in his testimony before

Congress, Zeyno Baran stated, “There is a false sense of security in the U.S. that derives

from the belief that American Muslim are well integrated. However, if we look at the

number of attempted homegrown terror plots that were prevented (often by pure luck) we

need to be very concerned.”15 And when discussing the unlikely possibility of

8 Amanpour, Christiane. “God’s Muslim Warriors.” CNN. Dec. 16, 2007 and Pew, p. 35. 9 Ibid; Pew, pp. 36 and 50. 10 Pew, pp. 49 and 54. 11 Ibid, p. 54. 12 The number of Muslims in America is not satisfactorily documented because the U.S. Census Bureau does not collect statistics on religion. But estimates compiled from multiple sources by the author place the Muslim population anywhere between two and eight million individuals. Therefore, the number of native born or African American Muslims who express support for al-Qaeda is approximately 140,000 (if the population is two million) and 720,000 individuals (if the population is eight million). Ibid, p. 54. 13 “Rewriting the Narrative: An Integrated Strategy for Counterradicalization.” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Mar. 2009, p. 6. <www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PTF2-Counterradicalization.pdf> (hereafter Rewriting the Narrative). 14 Ibid, p. 6. 15 Baran, Zeyno. “The Roots of Violent Islamist Extremism and Efforts to Counter It.” Washington, D.C.: Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Jul. 10, 2008, p. 7. <http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Hearings.Detail&HearingID=5a224d11-

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radicalization and homegrown terrorism in the U.S., Fathali Moghaddam stated before

Congress, “The only serious exception I see to this is the potential for violent Islamist

extremism taking root in U.S. prisons, among individuals who become convinced they

are unjustly treated because of their group membership, they have no voice, and no hope

for a better future.”16

MUSLIMS IN AMERICA: A MODERN PERSPECTIVE

There is no official figure for the Muslim American population. Estimates calculate the

population to be as few as two million or as many as seven million individuals, or

roughly 2% of the total U.S. population.17 The very highest estimates place the number of

American Muslims at eight or nine million.18

2f50-4fcc-a1f0-450ee0b42885> (hereafter Baran, Roots); Jenkins, Would be Warriors and Terrorism Cases 16 Moghaddam, Fathali M. “Violent Extremism in Global Context.” Washington, D.C.: Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Jul. 10, 2008, p. 8. <http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Hearings.Detail&HearingID=5a224d11-2f50-4fcc-a1f0-450ee0b42885> 17 See Appendix One: Muslims as a Percentage of U.S. Population (2000). Ammar, Nawal H. et al. “Muslims in Prison: A Case Study from Ohio State Prisons.” International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology. 2004: Vol. 48, No. 4, p. 416; Bergen, Peter. “Islamic Extremism in Europe.” Washington, D.C.: House Committee on International Relations, Apr. 27, 2005. <http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/299.pdf>; Boehlert, Eric. “Who speaks for African-American Muslims?” Salon. Oct. 23, 2001; Bruinius, Harry. “When NYPD wears a Muslim topi.” Christian Science Monitor. Mar. 19, 2009; Cilluffo, Frank J. et al. “Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization.” Washington, D.C.: George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute, 2006, p. 10. <http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/pubs/hspi_pubs.htm>; Elliott, Andrea. “A Muslim Leader in Brooklyn, Reconciling 2 Worlds.” The New York Times. Mar. 15, 2007 (hereafter, Elliott, A Muslim Leader); Felton; Grossman, Cathy Lynn. “Muslim census a difficult count.” USA Today. Aug. 5, 2008; Fountain, John W. “A Nation Challenged: African American Muslims; Sadness and Fear as a Group Feels Doubly at Risk.” The New York Times. Oct. 5, 2001; Hadnot, Ira J. “Muslims make effort to welcome Hispanic ‘reverts.’” The Dallas Morning News. Oct. 25, 2003; Harden, Blaine. “A Nation Challenged: American Muslims; Saudi Seek to Add U.S. Muslims to Their Sect.” The New York Times. Oct 20, 2001; Jenkins, Chris L. “Islam Luring More Latinos.” The Washington Post. Jan. 7, 2001; Jonsson, Patrik. “New profile of the home-grown terrorist emerges.” Christian Science Monitor. Jun. 26, 2006; Kaplan, David E. “Made in the U.S.A.: Hundreds of Americans have followed path to jihad. Here’s how and why.” U.S. News & World Report. Jun. 2, 2002 (hereafter Kaplan, USA); Kong, Deborah. “History Draws Hispanics to Islam.” Associated Press. Jun. 17, 2002; Leiken, Robert S. “Bearers of Global Jihad? Immigration and National Security after 9/11.” Washington, D.C.: The Nixon Center, 2004, p. 72. <http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/monogrpahs/Leiken_Bearers_of_Global_Jihad.pdf> (hereafter Leiken, Immigration); Magagini, Stephen. “A Matter of Faith: Islam is Fastest Growing Religion in the U.S.” Sacramento Bee. Jul. 1, 2001; Martinez, Leonard. “Converts to

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Muslims in the U.S. represent everything but a monolithic block: Although more

then half of U.S. Muslims are immigrants, no single national group comprises more then

12% of the total Muslim population, within which more then seventy different countries

are represented.19 No single racial group dominates the Muslim community either; in fact

Muslims represent an almost equal proportion of White, Black, Asian, and mixed race

individuals, with Black Muslims usually cited as representing a slightly larger majority.20

Muslims in America different from their European counterparts in that they are

considered more integrated.21 For example, only 2% of Muslims in the U.S. are

considered low-income, compared to 23% of Muslims in Spain, 22% of Muslims in

Britain, and 18% of Muslims in France and Germany (see Graph #1).22 Annual incomes

also vary across the spectrum. In America, 35% of Muslims make less then $30,000 a

year.23 But more then 60% of Muslims in the U.K., 80% of Muslims in France and

Islam face many obstacles.” El Paso Times. Mar. 5, 2004; Mirovalev, Mansur. “Ole – Islam in Spanish.” Access Magazine. Apr. 2, 2004; Pew, pp. 9-13; Ortega, Jazmin. “Latino Muslims.” La Prensa. Feb. 2001; “Jewish Population of the World, The.” Chevy Chase: The American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, 2006. <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Judaism/jewpop.html>; Turner, Richard Brent. “Mainstream Islam in the African-American Experience.” Virginia: Muslim American Society, Aug. 25, 2004. <http://www.masnet.org/news.asp?id=1572>; Zoll, Rachel. “Islam Behind Bars.” Arizona Daily Star. Jun. 5, 2005; Zoll, Rachel. “U.S. Prisons Becoming Islam Battleground.” Associated Press. Jun. 4, 2005 (hereafter Zoll, Islam Battleground). 18 Even if the Muslim American population does not exceed four million, this number still represents a six-fold increase since just 1970. Alter, Alexandra. “More Hispanic women converting to Islam.” Miami Herald. Oct. 5, 2005; Butler, Kenneth. “Reshaping One Nation Under God.” Washington Square News. Feb. 14, 2006; Elliott, Andrea. “Between Black and Immigrant Muslim, an Uneasy Alliance.” The New York Times. Mar. 11, 2007 (hereafter Elliot, Black and Immigrant); Kohn, Rachael. “The Black Imam of Brooklyn.” Interview with Siraj Wahaj. Radio National (Australia). May 21, 2000; Lalwani, Sheila B. “Islam and the black inmate.” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. Mar. 18, 2006; Mili, Hayder. “Al Qaeda’s Caucasian Foot Soldiers.” Terrorism Monitor. Nov. 2, 2006: Vol. 4, No. 21; Moore, Kathleen M. Al-Mughtaribun: American Law and the Transformation of Muslim Life in the United States. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995, p. 175 (hereafter, Moore, Al-Mughtaribun); Sacirbey, Omar. “Muslims Look to Blacks for Civil Rights Guidance.” Religion News Service. May 16, 2006 <http://pewforum.org/news/display.php?NewsID=10521>. 19 Pew, pp. 11 and 15 and Felton. 20 “Gallup Coexist Index 2009, The: A Global Study of Interfaith Relations.” Washington, D.C.: The Gallup Coexist Foundation, Mar. 10, 2009. <http://www.muslimwestfacts.com/mwf/118249/Gallup-Coexist-Index-2009.aspx>, p. 21 (hereafter, Gallup) and Pew, p. 17. 21 Pew, pp. 18-19. 22 Ibid, p. 3. 23 Ibid, p. 19.

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Germany, and 90% of Muslims in Spain make less then the equivalent income each

year.24 In terms of identity, only half of Muslims in America and in France think of

themselves as Muslims first, unlike the 81% of British Muslims, the 69% of Spanish

Muslims and the 66% of German Muslims who do view themselves as Muslim over their

nationality (see Graph #2).25 Muslim communities also hold different beliefs regarding

extremism. A little more then 50% of American Muslims are concerned about Islamic

extremism, while only 35% of French Muslims, and 29% of German and Spanish

Muslims find Islamic extremism to be troublesome (see Graph #3).26 Similarly, only 8%

of Muslims in the U.S. and 7% in Germany believe suicide bombing is justified,

compared to 16% in France and Spain and 17% in Britain (see Graph #4).27 Muslims in

the U.S. are also less likely then their European counterparts to believe someone other

then the implicated nineteen hijackers were responsible for 9/11.28 Only 28% of U.S.

Muslims believe a group other then Arabs carried out the attacks of 9/11, the most

popular suspects being the Bush administration, the world Jewry or the state of Israel

compared to 33% of Spanish Muslims, 35% of German Muslims, 46% of French

Muslims and 56% of British Muslims (see Graph #5).29

Muslims in the U.S. are mostly satisfied with their experience.30 They see no

conflict between being a Muslim and an American; almost half adopt American customs

and assimilate to the American way of life.31 But a sizeable minority believes that

Muslims should remain separate from society.32 Although they are happy in America,

24 Ibid, p. 19. 25 Ibid, p. 3. 26 Those countries with Muslim populations less concerned with rising extremism were also countries whose Muslim population showed stronger support for al-Qaeda. Ibid, p.3. 27 Ibid, p. 53. 28 Ibid, p. 51. 29 Ibid, p. 51 30 Gallup, p. 44 and Ibid, pp. 29-30. 31 “Arab Population: 2000, The.” Washington, D.C.: United States Census Bureau, Aug. 2001. <http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-23.pdf> and Pew, pp. 32-33. 32 Moore writes in her study of Muslims in America,

The enduring debate within the global Muslim community about minority status and the appropriate model for living in a non-Muslim society continues to move between two poles: accomamodationism, seeking religious equality and equal access to society’s resources, versus isolationism, which emphasizes

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Muslims are greatly dissatisfied with the direction the country is heading: more American

Muslims are against the war in Afghanistan and Iraq then the general U.S. population

(see Graph #6).33 And more then half of all American Muslims report that life has

become more difficult since 2001.34 They are also increasingly concerned about their

place in the U.S. and report facing problems with discrimination, racism, and prejudice.35

Muslims report personal experiences with intolerance and more then half of all Muslims

believe “anti-terrorism” policies are profiling their communities.36 Most Muslims report

knowing someone who had experienced discrimination and a quarter of Muslims in

America claim to have been racially profiled themselves.37 In addition, “The integration

of Muslims has not been helped by the growth of Islamophobia in the West, which has

led many Muslims to reorient themselves towards their own communities and cultural

and religious backgrounds.”38

Still, the U.S. has been described as the “best country in the world” for Muslims

to practice their faith because no restrictions on the practice of religion exist.39

Approximately 25% of all Muslims claim to be “very religious,” while another 24% say

they are not religious all. The rest fall squarely in the middle.40 Native-born Muslims and

young Muslims tend to be more religious then immigrants.41 Still, approximately 70% of

the distinctiveness of Islam and seeks to preserve Islamic cultural modes of representation.

See Moore, Al-Mughtaribun, p. 137 and Pew, p. 33. 33 Pew, pp. 49-50. 34 “Georgetown Announces Release of 2004 American Muslim Poll.” Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, Oct. 19, 2004. <http://explore.georgetown.edu/news/?ID=1310> (hereafter Georgetown Poll); Gilbert, Dennis. “Hamilton College Muslim America Poll.” New York: Hamilton College, May 30, 2002. <www.hamilton.edu/news/MuslimAmerica/MuslimAmerica.pdf>, p. 13 and Pew, pp. 29, 35 and 46. 35 Felton; Gilbert, pp. 10-11 and Pew, pp. 35-36. 36 Pew, p. 36 and 38. 37 Georgetown Poll. 38 Precht, Thomas. “Home grown terrorism and Islamist radicalization in Europe.” Copenhagen: Ministry of Justice, Dec. 2007, pp. 44-45. <http://www.justitsministeriet.dk/fileadmin/downloads/Forskning_og_dokumentation/Home_grown_terrorism_and_Islamist_radicalisation_in_Europe__an_assessment_of_influencing_factors__2_.pdf> 39 Felton. 40 Pew, p. 25. 41 Gallup, p. 96 and Ibid, p. 26.

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American Muslims say religion is “very important” in their life.42 More then 30% of

Muslim Americans attend services at a mosque more then once a week or at least once a

week.43 (There are over one thousand mosques in America, serviced by hundreds of

Imams, most whom were recruited from overseas due to a lack of credentialed Islamic

educational institutions in the U.S).44 But another third of all Muslim Americans seldom

or never attend services at a mosque, indicating that, for many Muslims in the U.S.,

practicing Islam in America is a personal or private matter.45

Muslims in America generally adopt traditionalist religious beliefs, and are more

likely to believe in a strict, literal interpretation of the Qu’ran then American Christians

are to have a similar interpretation of the Bible.46 Despite this trend, most Muslim

Americans believe that there is more then one interpretation of Islam.47 Still, a substantial

minority disagrees.48 Most Muslim Americans are Sunni, approximately 10% are Shia

and 25% report having no affiliation at all and.49 Less then 10% of Muslims practice a

form of Islam outside the two dominant sects.50

AMERICAN ISLAM: AN INDIGENOUS MOVEMENT

The most “distinctive feature” of American Islam are the number of converts to the faith,

making Islam the fastest growing religion in America.51 It is estimated that approximately

one million Muslim converts and their direct descendants live in the U.S., the largest

Muslim convert population in the Western world.52 Almost 25% of Muslim Americans

are converts and it is estimated that more then 20,000 people in the U.S. convert to Islam

42 Gilbert, p. 16 and Pew, p. 24. 43 Gallup p. 29; Gilbert, p. 15 and Pew, p. 24. 44 Elliott A Muslim Leader; Grossman; MacFarquhar, Neil. “A Growing Demand for the Rare American Imam.” The New York Times. Jun. 1, 2007. 45 Pew, p. 24. 46 Ibid, p. 23. 47 Ibid, p. 23. 48 Ibid, p. 23. 49 Gilbert, p. 14 and Ibid, p. 21. 50 Ibid, p. 14 and Ibid, pp. 21-22 51 As noted by the Washington Post in 2006, “the conversions speak to a larger evolution of immigrant identity, as a new generation ingests a cultural smorgasbord of ideas. Magagini; Felton; Moore, Al-Mughtaribun, p. ix and Raghavan, Sudarasan. “A Clash of Culture, Faith: Latinas Balance Catholic Upbringing, Adoption of Islam.” The Washington Post. Jun. 5, 2006. 52 Pipes, Daniel. “In Muslim America: A Presence and a Challenge – The Anti-Americanism of U.S. Converts to Islam.” National Review. Feb. 21, 2000 (hereafter Pipes, Muslim America).

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each year (excluding jailhouse converts, which exceed this annual number by more then

double).53 Almost 60% of all converts are African Americans but converts still represent

a diverse group and include all races and ages.54 Although most American Muslims were

born into their faith, almost all converts were born in America.55 A little more then half of

American converts to Islam report being Sunni, while almost 25% report non-

affiliation.56 About half of all of conversions to Islam occur under the age of 21.57

Conversion is important for three reasons. The first is the nature of conversion.

Converts tend to and more pious and tend to take an absolutist perspective on their

newfound faith.58 Feeling a strong desire to “fit in”, a convert may be willing to do

anything to prove themselves to their peers.59 A French intelligence official told the Los

Angeles Times, “Converts are the most important work for us right now. They want to

show other Muslims their worth. They want to go further than anyone else. They are full

of rage and they want to prove themselves.”60 Their lack of confidence and knowledge

makes them easy prey for extremists and makes them more vulnerable to their radical

ideology.61 One Danish terrorist researcher remarked, “individuals who have converted to

53 Amario, Christine. “US Latinas seek answers in Islam.” The Christian Science Monitor. Dec. 27, 2004; Boehlert; Hadnot; Felton; Pew, pp. 21-22 and Martinez, Leonard. “Converts to Islam face many obstacles.” El Paso Times. Mar. 5, 2004.. 54 Pew, p. 22 and Pipes, Muslim America. 55 Pew, p. 22. 56 Ibid, p. 22. 57 Ibid, p. 22. 58 Bakker, Edwin. “Jihadi terrorists in Europe.” The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Dec. 2006, p. 41. <http://www.clingendael.nl/cscp/publications/?id=6480&&type=summary>; Ford, Peter. “Why European women are turning to Islam.” The Christian Science Monitor. Dec. 27, 2005 (hereafter Ford, Turning To Islam); Hamm, Mark S. “Terrorists Recruitment in American Correctional Institutions: An Exploratory Study of Non-Traditional Faith groups.” Washington, D.C.: Dec. National Institute of Justice, Dec, 2007, p. 35 <http://ww.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/220957.pdf> (hereafter, Hamm, Terrorist Recruitment); Mili; Murphy, Kim. “Muslims Converts in Britain Seen as Among Most Extreme.” The Los Angeles Times. Aug. 22, 2006. 59 Ford, Turning To Islam. 60 Rotella, Sebastian. “Al-Qaeda’s Stealth Weapons.” The New York Times. Sept. 20, 2003 (hereafter Rotella, Stealth Weapons). 61 A noticeable trend in Islamic conversion worldwide is the growing number of women. See Ford, Turning To Islam; Greenway, HDS. “How France confronts terror.” The Boston Globe. Feb. 17, 2009; Kholmann, Evan F. “‘Homegrown’ Terrorists: Theory and Cases in the War on Terror’s Newest Front.” The Annals of American Academy. Jul. 2008: Vol. 618, p. 95; Leiken, Robert. “The Islamist extremist threat in – and from – Europe.” Washington, D.C.: The

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Islam represent a minuscule minority in the ranks of the militant Islamists [but] they are

potentially highly deployable for Jihad.”62 The second reason why conversion is

important is the role of converts in the global Jihadist cause.63 Al Qaeda is a transnational

organization that encourages conversion and gives converts leadership positions.64 Osama

bin Laden had urged Americans to convert to Islam and Al Qaeda has admitted to

recruiting foreigners to penetrate Western institutions, especially Americans and

Europeans, and the goal of a fully “Caucasian Cell,” or “an army of white-skinned

militants, men born in Europe and America who can convert to Islam and become harder

for the authorities to detect,” is a aspiration of the organization.65 Converts provide an

operational benefit by attracting less attention then their Arab counterparts, especially in

Washington Institute, Sept. 24, 2005, p. 26. <www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC07.php?CID=274>; Murphy, Kim. “Muslims Converts in Britain Seen as Among Most Extreme.” The Los Angeles Times. Aug. 22, 2006; Travis, Alan. “MI5 report challenges views on terrorism in Britain.” The Guardian. Aug. 20, 2008 (hereafter Travis, MI5); Smith, Craig S. “Europe Fears Converts May Aid Extremism.” The New York Times. Jul 19, 2004 (hereafter Smith, Converts Aid Extremism). 62 Taarnby, Michael. “Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe: Trends and Perspectives.” Denmark: University of Aarhus, Jan. 14, 2005. <http://www.justitsministeriet.dk/fileadmin/downloads/Forskning_og_dokumentation/Rekruttering_af_islamistiske_terrorister_i_Europa.pdf> 63 Niblett, Robin. “Islamic Extremism in Europe.” Washington, D.C.: Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Apr. 5, 2006. <http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2006/NiblettTestimony060405.pdf>, p. 4; Petter Nesser as quoted in Benard, Cheryl. “A Future for the Young: Options for helping Middle Eastern Youth Escape the Trap of Radicalization.” Washington, D.C.: The RAND Corporation. Sept. 2005, p. 36 <http://ww.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WR354/>. 64 “Qaeda Position on Recruiting Europeans, Americans.” World News Connection. Aug. 3, 2003. <http://www.why-war.com/news/2003/08/03/qaedapos.html> (hereafter, Qaeda Position on Recruiting Europeans, Americans); Mili; Uhlmann, Milena. “European Converts to Terrorism.” Middle East Quarterly. Summer 2008: p. 31; Whitlock, Craig. “Trial of French Islamic Radical Sheds Light on Converts’ Role.” The Washington Post. Jan. 1, 2006. 65 European authorities report watching thousands of high-risk converts. See Ford, Turning to Islam; McGrory, Daniel. “British computer whiz-kid exports terror via Internet.” The Times of London. Jun. 7, 2006: p. 6; Mili; “United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism, The.” London: Office of Security and Counter Terrorism, Mar. 24, 2009, p. 35. <http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publicationsearch/general/HO_Contest_strategy.pdf> (hereafter UK Counterterrorism Strategy); Michael Waller as quoted in Terrorism: Radical Islamic Influence of Chaplaincy of the U.S. Military and Prisons.” (hereafter Terrorism: Radical Islamic Influence) Washington, D.C.: Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security, Oct 14, 2003, p. 97 <http://www.nicic.org/Library/019232> (hereafter Waller); Qaeda Position on Recruiting Europeans, Americans; Whine, Michael. “The Aftermath of 7 July – New Trends in Terror.” Herzliya: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Jan. 20, 2006.

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high security situations.66 Foreigners who convert and join the Jihad also serve as an

important propaganda victory for al Qaeda. Finally, conversion is important because it is

a testament to the complex, amorphous nature of the threat of terrorism and a powerful

illustration of how little is known about it.67

One of Islam’s most distinguishing feature, as is true for most Muslim

communities across the world, is its large and growing youth demographic.

Approximately half of the Muslim adult population in the U.S. is between the ages of

eighteen and forty years old.68 These individuals are predominately single, unemployed,

religious, less likely to be registered to vote and are more negative then their peers and

elders in regards to their American experience.69 Almost 25% of young Muslims report

being very unhappy with their lives and few see themselves as thriving; they are more

unsatisfied with their standard of living and less optimistic about it getting any better.70

Among their peers they are also, the least satisfied with their communities and strongly

believe their communities are getting worse.71 Young Muslim Americans are more likely

to perceive themselves as Muslim over American.72 But they are equally divided over

whether they should remain distinct from U.S. society.73

In a post-9/11 America these young Muslims report high levels of societal

victimization, and almost half report being harassed, treated suspiciously, singled out by

the police, threatened or even attacked.74 Muslims between the ages of eighteen and

twenty-nine are more likely then Muslims over thirty to support al-Qaeda, justify suicide

bombings against civilians or believe that 9/11 was conspiracy.75 They’re also the least

concerned with rising extremism.76

66 Ford, Turning to Islam and Rosenau, William. “Al Qaeda Recruitment in the United States: A Preliminary Assessment.” MIPT Yearbook. 2004. <http://www.terrorisminfo.mipt.org/pdf/2004-MIPT-Terrorism-Annual.pdf>. 67 Nesser, Petter. “Lessons Learned from the September 2007 German Terrorist Plot.” CTC Sentinel. Mar. 2008: Vol. 1, No. 4, p. 7. 68 Gallup, p. 22 and Pew, p. 16. 69 See Ibid, pp. 93, 97, 100-104; and Ibid, pp. 26 and 47. 70 Ibid, pp. 99, 106-107 and Ibid, p. 29. 71 Pew, pp. 110-111. 72 Ibid, p. 29. 73 Ibid, p. 29. 74 Gallup, p. 99; Ibid, p. 38. 75 Pew, pp. 51 and 54. 76 Ibid, p. 52.

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RADICALIZATION and RECRUITMENT in the UNITED STATES

Former Muslim prison chaplain Frederick Al-Deen, captured the essence of radicalization

when he stated, “Radicalization is something every human being that is older than fifteen

knows. That they are a member of soccer teams, football teams, basketball teams, unions,

fraternities, sororities. Everybody’s taught to get fired up. And that’s what radicalization

is.”77 Yet, in practice, “radicalization makes little noise.”78 Radicalization has been

described as a funnel – in which many enter but only a select few exit – a ladder or step

of stairs – in which each rung or step represents a different level of commitment – and

even a house or a pyramid – where the majority live on the bottom floor and a small, core

group lives exclusively at the top.79

Radicalization is a process by which a change in beliefs, feelings, and behavior

occurs that increasingly justifies violence and demands sacrifice in defense of the

group.80 “Radicalization implies a transformation of the individual’s worldview over time

from a range that society tends to consider to be normal to a range that society tends to

77 Brooks, Anthony. “Prisons to Remove Unapproved Religious Books.” Interview with Frederick Al-Deen. National Public Radio. Sept. 26, 2007. 78 Jenkins, Brian Michael. “Building an Army of Believers: Jihadist Radicalization and Recruitment.” Washington, D.C.: The RAND Corporation, Apr. 5, 2007, p. 7. <http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT278-1/> (hereafter Jenkins, Believers). 79 Baran, Roots, p. 7; Bhatt, Arvin and Silber, Mitchell D. “Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat.” 2007: NYPD Intelligence Division, p. 10. <http://hoekstra.house.gov/UploadedFiles/NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf>; Daly, Sara and Gerwehr, Scott. “Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment.” Washington, D.C.: The RAND Corporation, Dec. 12, 2007. <www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/2006/RAND_RP1214.pdf>; McCauley, Clark and Moskalenko, Sophia. “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism.” Terrorism and Political Violence. 2008: Vol. 20, No. 3, p. 416; Moghaddam, Fathali M. “Violent Extremism in Global Context.” Washington, D.C.: Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Jul. 10, 2008. <http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Hearings.Detail&HearingID=5a224d11-2f50-4fcc-a1f0-450ee0b42885>; Silber, Mitchell. “Homegrown Radicalism in the United States.” Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Oct. 20, 2007. <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC07.php?CID=367> 80 Sageman describes radicalization as the, “process of transforming individuals from rather unexceptional and ordinary beginnings into terrorists with the willingness to use violence for political ends.” McCauley, Clark and Moskalenko, Sophia. “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism.” Terrorism and Political Violence. 2008: Vol. 20, No. 3, p. 416; Sageman, Marc. Leaderless Jihad. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008, p. viii.

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consider extreme.”81 Radicalization occurs on many different levels and for many

different reasons, but “radicalization” is only a means to an end. Radicalism does not

create violence; rather it serves as a facilitator for violet action. The process involves, The manipulation of communication (isolation from broader views), social pressure (reward and punishment, social status), the creation of role models (saints, martyrs, etc.) and moral commitment (taking an oath, testament) on behalf of the individuals, so that their relationship with the world becomes redefined. This solidification of radicalization is reinforced by the strength of inter-group bonding.82

But it is the group and its dynamics that keeps a cell together as well as what can tear it

apart.83 As group identity forms, the individual’s identity is subsumed by the whole

through shared ideological commitment, peer pressure and the creation of “fictive kin,”

until the actions and goals of the group are inseparable from the individual.84 The

personal social network of friends, family and neighbors, that defines the group identity

become the definitive structure by which all decisions are made.85 The constant threat of

81 Hannah, Greg et al. “Radicalization or Rehabilitation.” Santa Monica: Rand Europe, 2008, p. 2. <http:www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2008/RAND_TR571.pdf> 82 “Policy memorandum on radicalism and radicalization.” The Hague: Ministry of Justice, Aug. 19, 2005, p. 10. <http://english.nctb.nl/Images/Policy%20memorandum%20on%20radicalism%20and%20radicalisation_tcm92-132315.pdf?cp=92&cs=25485> (hereafter, Policy Memo). 83 Atran, Scott. “Who Becomes a Terrorist Today?” Perspectives On Terrorism. Mar. 2008: Vol. 2, No. 5, p. 5; Daly, Sara and Gerwehr, Scott. “Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment.” Washington, D.C.: The RAND Corporation, Dec. 12, 2007, p. 84. <www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/2006/RAND_RP1214.pdf>; Hudson, Rex A. “The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes A Terrorist and Why?” Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Sept. 1999, p. 34. <http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/Soc_Psych_of_Terrorism.pdf> (hereafter Hudson, Psychology); Leiter, Michael E. “Statement for the Record.” Washington, D.C.: Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Jul. 10, 2008 <http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Hearings.Detail&HearingID=5a224d11-2f50-4fcc-a1f0-450ee0b42885>; McCormick, Gordon H. “Terrorist Decision Making.” Annual Review of Political Science. 2003: Vol. 6; Neumann, Peter R. and Rogers, Brooke. “Recruitment and Mobilization for the Islamist Militant Movement in Europe.” London: King’s College London, Dec. 2007, p. 70. <http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/terrorism/prevention/docs/ec_radicalisation_study_on_mobilisation_tactics_en.pdf> 84 Borum, Randy. “Psychology of Terrorism.” Tampa: University of South Florida, 2004, pp. 35 and 56. <http://worlddefensereview.com/docs/PsychologyofTerrorism0707.pdf>; Hudson, Psychology, pp. 34-35; Kirby, Aidan. “The London Bombers as “Self-Starters:” A Case Study in Indigenous Radicalization and the Emergence of Autonomous Cliques.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 2007: Vol. 30, p. 423; Neumann, p. 71; Travis, MI5. 85 Atran, Scott. “Who Becomes a Terrorist Today?” Perspectives On Terrorism. Mar. 2008: Vol. 2, No. 5, pp. 5 and 7; Borum, p. 56 and 58; Leiter; Neumann, pp. 72-73; O’Duffy, Brendan. “Radical Atmosphere: Explaining Jihadist Radicalization in the UK.” Political Science &

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the enemy - the perception of “us versus them” - and the need to act are requisite to

sustaining the group and managing internal and external tensions.86 The perception of “us

versus them” also serves to foster stronger ties with the imagined Ummah or Muslim

community.87 This leads to “groupthink” and “illusions of invulnerability, excessive

optimism, risk taking, and a presumption of morality” that creates a “one-dimensional

‘evil enemy’” for whom the group is whole-heartedly “intolerant” of.88 It is through this

process that charismatic leadership takes on a pivotal role in the creation and operation of

a cell.89 Ideology only goes as far as motivation for collective action; it provides a set of

ideas and parameters or frames, for interpreting the collective goal.90 By framing the

collective goals, a charismatic leader can provide the malleable recruit with the cognitive

tools and language to help him or her in creating a social construct that resonates with the

radical Islamist cause and mobilizes them to action.91

“Radicals are not born, they are made.”92 And those attracted to the radical

Islamist ideology today tend to be young Muslim men, in their twenties and thirties, some

are converts, other “reverts” or “born-again” Muslims, who are experiencing a crisis of

identity, who perceive themselves to victims of the West or who are disenfranchised by

Politics. Jan 2008: Vol. 41, No. 1; Whine, Michael. “The Aftermath of 7 July – New Trends in Terror.” Herzliya: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Jan. 20, 2006. <http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/204/currentpage/11/Default.aspx> 86 Baran, Roots; Borum, p. 59; Hudson, Psychology, p. 10; Leiter; Choudhury, Tufyal. “The Role of Muslim Identity Politics in Radicalization (a study in progress).” London: Department for Communities and Local Government. April 2007, p. 22. <http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/communities/muslimidentitypolitics> 87 Neumann p. 16; Khosrokhavar, Farhad. “Suicide Terrorism.” The NYU Review of Law and Security. 2008: No. 8-9, pp. 26-27; Mufti, Siraj Islam. “Islam in American Prisons.” Islam Online. Aug. 31, 2008. <http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1156077734147&pagename=Zone-English-Muslim_Affairs%2FMAELayout>; Roy, Olivier. “EuroIslam: The Jihad Within?” The National Interest. Spr. 2003: No. 71, p. 63 (hereafter, Roy, Euro Islam). 88 Hudson, Psychology, pp. 35-36 and McCormick, p. 489. 89 Borum, p. 60; Leiter; O’Duffy, Brendan. “Radical Atmosphere: Explaining Jihadist Radicalization in the UK.” Political Science & Politics. Jan 2008: Vol. 41, No. 1; Precht, pp. 53 and 55. 90 Wiktorowicz, Quintan. “Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory: A New Direction for Research.” Mediterranean Politics. Sept. 1, 2002, p. 202 and 208. (hereafter Wiktorowicz, Activism). 91 Chodhury, p. 22 and Ibid, p. 202 92 Policy Memo, p. 9.

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their country of birth and alienated from the native culture of their parents.93 These young

men find groups of social networks to connect with; groups of likeminded people, who

rally around a spiritual leader or a charismatic Muslim providing answers to their

existential questions through the dialogue of their renewed faith.94 Just as there is “no

terrorist profile,” these young men are as diverse a group in any population.95 Today’s

terrorist “challenge many of the stereotypes that were held about who becomes a terrorist

93 Baran, Roots, p. 7, 9 and 14; Borum; Bryant, Elizabeth. “Judge profiles new terrorist generation.” United Press International. Oct 5, 2005; Burke, Jason. “Al-Qaeda: the second coming.” The Guardian and Observer. Mar. 11, 2007; Choudhury, pp. 5, 21 and 28; Daly and Gerweher, p. 85; Fink, Naureen, Chowdry and Hearne, Ellie B. “Beyond Terrorism: Deradicalization and Disengagement from Violent Extremism.” New York: International Peace Institute, October 2008, p. 6. <http://www.ipacademy.org/asset/file/384/BETER.pdf>; German, Mike. Thinking Like a Terrorist: Insights of a Former FBI Undercover Agent. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, Inc, 2007, p. 52; Hoffman, Bruce. “Does Our Counter-Terrorism Strategy Match the Threat?” Washington D.C.: Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation: Sept. 29, 2005, pp. 6-8; <http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT250-1/>; Hudson, Psychology, pp. 26, 35-36, 43-44 and 46-47; Jenkins, Army; Jenkins, Brian Michael. “Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy, Strengthening Ourselves. Washington, D.C.: The Rand Corporation, 2006, pp. 5 and 92. <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG454/> (hereafter Jenkins, Nation); Kirby, p. 422; Leiter; Peter Nesser as quoted in Benard, pp. 36-37, 43; Nesser, Petter. “How did Europe’s Global Jihadis Obtain Training for the Militant Causes?” Terrorism and Political Violence. Apr. 2008: Vol. 20, No. 2, p. 234 (hereafter Nesser, Militant Causes); Neumann, pp. 30, 58, 68 and 91; Niblett, p. 4.; O’Duffy, pp. 37-38 and 40; Policy Memo, pp. 10 and 39-40; Precht, pp. 5, 6, 11,12, 19, 22, 35-36, 42-44, 48; Pressman, Elaine. “Countering Radicalization: Communication and behavioral Perspectives.” The Hague: Clingendael centre for Strategic Studies, Jan. 1, 2006, p. 9. <http://www.hcss.nl/en/download/67/file/20060100_csss_insight_1.pdf>; “Recruitment for the jihad in the Netherlands from incident to trend.” The Hague: General Intelligence and Security Service. Dec 3, 2002. <http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/AIVD_JihadRecr.pdf>; Rosenau; Roy, EuroIslam, p. 70; Saathoff, Gregory. Washington, D.C. Testimony before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Feb. 8, 2008, p. 2. <http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/docs/legal/cases/rl_dscrm_prsn_cs/GregorySaathoffCvlRghtsComm.pdf>; Stemmann, Juan Jose Escobar. “Middle East Salifism’s Influence and the Radicalization of Muslim Communities in Europe. The Middle East Review of International Affairs. Sept. 2006; Travis, MI5; Whine; Wilton Park; “The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism.” London: Office of Security and Counter Terrorism, Mar. 24, 2009, p. 42 and 89. <http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/newspublications/publicationsearch/general/HO_Contest_strategy.pdf> (hereafter UK Counter Terrorism Strategy). 94 Baran, Roots, pp. 7-9; Hoffman, Bruce. “Does Our Counter-Terrorism Strategy Match the Threat?” Washington D.C.: Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation: Sept. 29, 2005, p. 7. <http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT250-1/>; Precht, pp. 9, 45 and 52; Sageman, pp. 84-85; UK Counter Terrorism Strategy, p. 42. 95 Hudson, Psychology, p. 52.

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and why… [they represent] a diverse collection of individuals, fitting no single

demographic profile, nor do they all follow a typical pathway to violent extremism.”96

Anyone can be led down the pathway towards radicalism.97 A “tipping point” or

“catalyst” event in the life of the individual creates a cognitive opening that can turn a

‘normal’ young man into a hardened, stealth Jihadist.98 But no single factor can be

considered “causal” in the radicalization process, a terrorist cell is a multi-faceted human

construction that equally draws and requires, the “misfit,” “the money-maker” and the

Mujadheen.99 Through radical ideology, extremists are creating a ‘Rejectionist

Generation,’ whose grievances, whether real or perceived, are articulated by the global

Islamist narrative.100 Religion serves as a “tool of mobilization,” that allows for “a way of

framing or representing a struggle in terms that a potential constituency will

understand.”101 And, “because the religious worldview is, issues of identity and ideology

are often merged.”102

RADICALIZATION in the PRISON SYSTEM

Prison radicalization has been seen predominately as a phenomenon occurring outside

America. But, this “radicalization experience is relevant… because individuals in both

the United States and Europe are radicalizing due to the same global factors, albeit not to

the same degrees.”103 Prisons in Europe are, on average, overwhelmingly Muslim in

ethnic makeup, and much like in the U.S., prisons reflect the socio-economic divides of

96 Travis, MI5. 97 Chodhury, p. 21 and 23; Precht, p. 43; Sageman, pp. 72-73; Travis, MI5; UK Counter Terrorism Strategy, p. 42. 98 Nesser, Militant Causes,” p. 236; Neumann, p. 67; Precht, p. 55; Sageman, p. 18; Wilton Park. 99 Crenshaw, Martha. “The Causes of Terrorism.” Comparative Politics. Jul. 1981: Vol. 13, No 4, p. 392 (hereafter, Crenshaw, Causes); Peter Nesser as quoted in Benard, pp. 37-38; Neumann, p. 61; Precht, p. 5, 11 and 32; Wilton Park. 100 Greenway, HDS. “How France confronts terror.” The Boston Globe. Feb. 17, 2009; Mili; Precht, p. 43; Haahr, Kathryn and McCue, Colleen. “The Impact of Global Youth Bulges on Islamist Radicalization and Violence.” CTC Sentinel. Oct. 2008: Vol. 1, No. 11, p. 14; Hannah et al., p. 3; O’Duffy; Yaukey, John. “U.S. Authorities looking for homegrown radicals.” Gannett News Service. Oct. 1, 2006; UK Counterterrorism Strategy, p. 41 and 83. 101 Jerold Post as quoted in Club de Madrid. “Addressing the Causes of Terrorism.” The International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security. Madrid: Vol. 1, Mar. 8-11, 2005. <http://media.clubmadrid.org/docs/CdM-Series-on-Terrorism-Vol-1.pdf>. 102 Ibid, p. 16 and Jackson, Richard. Writing the War on Terrorism: Language Politics and Counter-Terrorism. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005, pp. 181-182. 103 Haahr and McCue, p. 12.

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life across the continent. What we see from the experience in Europe is that jailed

Islamists use prison as a platform for creating “drama” that lends credence to the cause

by “continuing the resistance behind the wire”.104 A recovered al Qaeda recruitment

manual promotes the use of prison as a vehicle for recruitment, a time for personal

growth and a means through which to stage protest, subvert the system and disrupt the

order of the institution.105

There are anywhere between thirteen and twenty million Muslim in Europe; a

number expected to rise to approximately one hundred million by 2035.106 They are, on

104 Among the most popular means of resistance by imprisoned terrorists include:

Making consistent allegations of mistreatment at the hands of the authorities as part of a deliberate strategy; refusing to cooperate in the formal prison regime and creating parallel structures in the prison for administration, education and, in the case of violent Jihadists, for religious purposes; using time in prison to develop and refine their ideological and strategic thinking, and to distribute such material both within and without the prison, sometimes resulting in profound consequences for both environments; mounting large-scale escapes, in some cases with concerted assistance from outside, and using the propaganda value of such escapes to maximum effect; seeking to use prisoners more generally as vehicles for propaganda and information campaigns; taking hostages outside the prisons in an effort to negotiate the release of their captured comrades; using coded communication or variations in language to communicate internally and with associates and organizations outside the prison.

See Hannah et al., p. 24, 26 and 31; Moore, Molly. “In France, Prisons Filled With Muslims.” The Washington Post. Apr. 29, 2008 (hereafter Moore, France). 105 The British radical, Anjem Choudary said of his impending imprisonment,

So if it is part of my destiny to be in prison then so be it. I can worship God just as well in prison as I can out of it. I don’t think prison is something you need to look down upon. I don’t think being in prison means you are necessarily a bad person. Even for the West, some of their heroes are people that have been in prison. People like Nelson Mandela spent time in prison for what they believe in. I think this concept of being in prison because you struggle for what you believe in, an ideology you want to live by – surely that is a good thing.

See, “Choudary: I’ll Be a Prison Martyr.” The Daily Star. Apr 5, 2009; Fighel, Jonathan. “Londinstan.” Herzliya: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism. Jan. 5, 2003. <http://www.ict.org.il/NewsCommentaries/Commentaries/tabid/69/Articlsid/118/ currentpage/10/Default.aspx> 106 Cilluffo, Frank J. et al. “Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization.” Washington, D.C.: George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute, 2006. <http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/pubs/hspi_pubs.htm>p. 10; De Borchgrave, Arnaud. “Criminals

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average, poorer, less educated, and significantly younger then the general European

population.107 Many have petty criminal records for which they are often quickly

released.108 But while in prison they struggle to survive in a violent and politically

charged environment where the discourse of Islam is the answer to marginalization,

alienation and disenfranchisement.109 European prisons acquired bulging populations of

young men after the enactment of American style “get tough” crime policies pioneered in

New York City.110 These same policies, enacted across the U.S. in the form of the “three

strike” policy, are the primary reason why America possesses the world’s largest prison

population (of more then two million individuals) many who are also ripe for

radicalization.111

Recruited for ‘Islamic Army’ in America.” News Max. Aug. 21, 2002; Leiken, Robert S. “Europe’s Angry Muslims.” Foreign Affairs. Jul/Aug 2005: Vol. 84, No. 4, p. 120; Roy, EuroIslam, p. 65. 107 Cuthbertson, Ian M. “Prisons and the Education of Terrorists.” World Policy Journal. Fall 2004: p. 17; Dalrymple; McLean, Renwick. “Common criminals in Spain transformed into Islamic militants: Terrorists recruiting in prisons.” The International Herald Tribune. Nov. 1, 2004; Pantucci, Raffaello. “Britain’s Prison Dilemma: Issues and Concerns in Islamic Radicalization.” Terrorism Monitor. March 24, 2008: Vol. 6, No. 6 (hereafter Pantucci, Prison Dilemma); Siegel, Pascale Combelles. “Radical Islam and the French Muslim Prison Population.” Terrorism Monitor. Jul. 27, 2006: Vol. 4, No. 15; Yahmid, Hadi. “French Prisons Teeming With Muslims.” Islam Online. Jun. 19, 2008. <http:///www.islamonline.net/English/News/2005-06/19/article04.shtml> 108 Bakker, p. 45 and 48; Haahr and McCue, p. 13; Rotella, Sebastian. “Holy water, Hashish and Jihad.” The Los Angeles Times. Feb. 23, 2004 (hereafter Rotella, Holy Water). 109 Carlile, Jennifer. “Islamic radicalization of Europe’s jails?” MSNBC. Jul. 8, 2006; Colin Mellis as quoted in “Reversing the Tide of Radicalization.” Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Sept. 20, 2008; Doward, Jamie. “Extremists train young convicts for terror plots.” The Guardian. Jul.15, 2007 (hereafter Doward Extremists); “Reversing the Tide of Radicalization.” Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Sept. 20, 2008 (hereafter Pandith, Reversing the Tide); Leppard, David. “Al-Qaeda bid to recruit inmates.” The Sunday Times of London. Sept. 28, 2008; McLean, Renwick. “Common criminals in Spain transformed into Islamic militants: Terrorists recruiting in prisons.” The International Herald Tribune. Nov. 1, 2004; Siegel; Yahmid, Hadi. “French Prisons Teeming With Muslims.” Islam Online. Jun. 19, 2008. <http:///www.islamonline.net/English/News/2005-06/19/article04.shtml> . 110 Close and Dix-Richardson, p. 98; Doward “Extremists;” Siegel, Pascale Combelles. “Radical Islam and the French Muslim Prison Population.” Terrorism Monitor. Jul. 27, 2006: Vol. 4, No. 15; Smith, Craig S. “Islam in Jail: Europe’s Neglect Breeds Angry Radicals.” The New York Times. Dec. 8, 2004 (hereafter Smith, Islam in Jail); Zoll, Islam Battleground. 111 For more information on prison statistics nationwide and worldwide, see Appendix Three: State, Regional and National Prison Statistics and Appendix Four: Comparison of International Prison Population. “One in 100: Behind Bars in American 2008.” Washington, D.C.: The Pew Center on the States, Feb. 28, 2008.

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Today, in Western prisons across the world Muslims represent a far larger

proportion then the they do in the their respective general populations.112 Although,

“Radicalization is not a disease, a kind of contagious virus affecting people, so that

entering into contact with a radical Muslim… induces radicalization in others,” prison

overcrowding is a “situation that breeds criminality by contiguity.”113 And as prisons

reach capacity, and beyond, the possibility of a negative backlash from the inmate

community becomes significantly more viable.114 This is compounded by the fact that

approximately 50% of all American prisons are currently functioning at overcapacity.115

But in Europe, the increasing number of Muslims in prison is also due in part to the

failure of integrationist policies to be successfully enacted.116 The primary concern of

security officials in Europe is what these criminals, radicalized by the Islamist ideology

in overcrowded prisons, will do upon release.117 Examples of radicalization in Europe

abound:

In 1993 there were approximately 2,000 Muslims imprisoned in the United

Kingdom, and authorities had begun to note a developing “cult of extremism” recruiting

members through prison conversions, which markedly increased after the 2005

<http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/report_detail.aspx?id=35904>, p. 1 (hereafter, Pew, One in 100); Maghan, Jess. “The Post-9/11 Prison.” Crime and Justice International. Sept/Oct. 2004, p. 14. 112 Razaq, Sadia. “Call to Prayer: Prisoners Converting to Orthodox Islam in Growing Numbers.” New York: Columbia University, 2001. <http://web.jrn.columbia.edu/studentwork/race/2001/pray_razaq.shtml>; Zoll, Islam Battleground. 113 Maghan, p. 6 and 15. 114 Hamm, Terrorist Recruitment, p. 115 115 On August 8th and 9th race riots raged in a China California prison, primarily between Black and Hispanic inmates. The prison, which houses nearly twice as many inmates the for which it was built, is just the most recent example in a long line of detrimental prison policy that seemingly breeds more violence then it prevents. See “Gulags in the sun.” The Economist. Aug. 15, 2009; Knox, George W. “The Problem of Gangs and Security Threat Groups (STG’s) in American Prisons Today: Recent Research Findings From the 2004 Prison Gang Survey.” Washington, D.C.: National Gang Crime Research Center, 2005, p. 29. <http://www.ngcrc.com/corr2006.html> 116 Blanche, Ed. “Jailhouse jihadis.” Current Affairs. Feb. 1, 2009; Siegel; Yahmid. 117 Carlile; Doward “Extremists;” Leppard; Neumann, Peter R. and Rogers, Brooke. “Recruitment and Mobilization for the Islamist Militant Movement in Europe.” London: King’s College London, Dec. 2007, p. 44. <http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/terrorism/prevention/docs/ec_radicalisation_study_on_mobilisation_tactics_en.pdf>

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bombings.118 One British scholar noted, “Prisons around the world are universities of

terror and there is no reason to believe the United Kingdom’s will not be the same.”119 By

2009, the number of Muslims had jumped to almost 9,000 and Islam had become

Britain’s fastest growing religion in prison, potentially providing the next generation of

British “foot soldiers” for al Qaeda’s war.120 A March 2009 report issued by the

government listed prisons as one among many “private venues… [and] open spaces in

communities and institutions [that] radicalizers exploit.”121 The recruiters were identified

as some of the one hundred plus prisoners detained in the U.K. with direct ties to al

Qaeda, a number expected to grow exponentially, as terrorist suspects enter the British

penal system are tried and convicted.122 The U.K. houses the most terrorism suspects in

Europe and prison officials estimate that al Qaeda targets one in ten Muslim prisoners for

recruitment.123 Muslims represent over 10% of the prison population but fewer then 3%

of the British population,.124 In some prisons, Muslims represent as much as 25% of the

118 Dalrymple, Theodore. “I see Richard Reids in jail every day.” The Telegraph. Dec. 30, 2001; Hastings, Chris and Syal, Rajeev. “Warnings on jail Muslims were ignored by ministers.” The Telegraph. Aug. 31, 2002; Pantucci, Raffaello. “UK Prisons: Incubators for Terrorism?” The Guardian. Feb. 4, 2009 (hereafter Pantucci, Incubators for Terrorism); Spalek, Basia. “Muslims in British Prisons.” Prison Service Journal, 2004. 119 Edwards, Richard. “Britain faces attacks by new generation of terrorists, warns experts.” The Telegraph. Jun. 13, 2009 (hereafter Edwards, New Generation). 120 There are so many Muslim prisoners in jail, one researcher commented that a visitor “could mistake it for an Islamic country.” See Brandon, James. “British Muslims Providing Foot Soldiers for the Global Jihad.” CTC Sentinel. Oct. 2008: Vol. 1, No. 11; Darrymple; Ford, Richard. “Jail imams vetted by security services and Muslim books screened for code.” The Times of London. Feb. 26, 2007 (hereafter, Ford, Imams); Neumann, p. 40; Pantucci, Prison Dilemma; Pantucci, “Incubators for Terrorism. 121 UK Counter Terrorism Strategy. 122 Blanche; Doward, Extremists; Leppard; Pantucci, Prison Dilemma; Riches, Chris. “UK: Jailed Al-Qaeda killer demands female prison guards wear hijabs.” The Daily Express. Jan. 28, 2009; Rice-Oxley, Mark. “British target prisons as terror incubators.” The Christian Science Monitor. Mar. 21, 2008; Travis, Alan. “Tenfold rise in terrorism prisoners forecast.” The Guardian. Nov. 8, 2007 (hereafter Travis, Tenfold). 123 Leppard; Travis, Alan. “Prisons failing to tackle terror recruitment.” The Guardian. Oct. 2, 2006 (hereafter, Travis, Prisons Failing). 124 For more information of European Muslim prison and civilian populations, see Chart #1: Selected Comparison of European General Muslim Populations and Their Respective Muslim Prison Populations. Cuthbertson, Ian M. “Prisons and the Education of Terrorists.” World Policy Journal, Fall 2004, p. 17; Fox, Urban. “Captive Converts: What makes Islam so attractive to prisoners.” The Times of London. Aug. 11, 2005; Leppard; Moore France; Pantucci, Incubators for Terrorism; Spalek.

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population.125 Like most prisons across the Western world, Muslim chaplains are scarce

and when available, prove to be as much a threat to the institution as the prisoners.126

Examples of extremism in the British penal system include:

• Jailed Jihadists have refused to use a multi-denominational chapel on prison grounds because it is used by “non-believers,” they have demanded a mosque be built and have insisted female prison guards be veiled.127 One prison went as far as removing a crucifix from the chapel to avoid offending Muslim inmates;128

• Due to fears of being labeled Islamophobic, prison authorities at some U.K. prisons have allowed Muslims to gain the upper hand; fanatics have taken over prayer services, are confrontational and abusive to staff, have increased recruitment efforts by forcing conversions, and, in one prison, a Sharia court has been established to try and punish prisoners;129

• Asian inmates used a Muslim holiday to gather and riot while other Muslim prisoners have staged hunger strikes, claiming their rights have been restricted;130

• Muslim groups have begun to adopt American gang style tactics wresting control away from prison officials and inciting prisoners to convert by keeping young, impressionable inmates in their cells or in adjoining cells;131

125 Travis, Alan. “Gang culture flourishing in top-security jail, report reveals.” The Guardian. Jan. 13, 2009 (hereafter Travis, Gang Culture). 126 Armstrong, Jeremy. “Jail Veil demand of al-Qaeda killer Kamel Bourgass.” The Mirror. Jan. 27, 2009 (hereafter, Armstrong, Demand); Doward “Extremists;” Hastings, Chris and Syal, Rajeev. “Warnings on jail Muslims were ignored by ministers.” The Telegraph. Aug. 31, 2002; Viviano, Frank. “French prisons: extremist training grounds.” San Francisco Chronicle. Nov. 1, 2001. 127 Armstrong, Demand. “Penrose, Justin. “Jailed Islamic extremists want ban on women prisons officers.” The Mirror. May 24, 2005; Riches. 128 “Prison bans chapel crucifix to avoid offending Muslims.” The Daily Mail. Dec. 15, 2008. 129 Beattie, Jason. “Jails to get tough on Muslim prayer gangs.” The Mirror. Apr. 21, 2009; Doward, Extremists; Edwards, Richard. “Muslim prisoners at top security jail double in two years.” The Telegraph. Feb. 6, 2009; “Muslim prisoners ‘converting inmates.’” Politics. Oct. 10, 2008; Murray, James. “Muslim Fanatics ‘Hijack British Prison.’” The Daily Express. Nov. 23, 2008; Pantucci Prison Dilemma; Riches; Rusin, David J. “At Whitemoor Prison, Common Sense Remains in Lockup.” Islamist Watch. Dec. 6, 2008. <http://www.islamist-watch.org/blog/2008/12/at whitemoor-prison-common-sense-remains-in.html>; Travis, Alan. “Watchdog warns of rival Muslim factions and pressure from militants at jail.” The Guardian. Nov. 21, 2006 (hereafter Travis, Watchdog); Viviano. 130 “Asian inmates go berserk in British prison during Eid celebrations.” Irish Sun. Dec. 9, 2008; “Muslim Detainees in Belmarsh Prison Go on Hunger Strike.” Apr. 23, 2009. Al-Istiqamah.com’s Weblog. <http://alistiqaamah.wordpress.com/2009/04/23/muslim-detainees-in-belmarsh-prison-go-on-hunger-strike/> 131 The largest threat the prison system are the “Muslim Boys” a gang of young, predominately Black, men, ages fifteen to thirty, spread across the country who are adopting Muslim and gang style identities inside and outside of prison. On the streets they commit crimes and other violent acts, and inside they enforce strict Islamic beliefs, often forcing conversions. An advisor to the mayor of London called the group, “one of the most serious criminal threats the Black community has ever faced. The police tell me they have never seen anything like this gang before.” The

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• In one prison, Muslims were given a cell block so that they can live separately from non-Muslim inmates;132

• Nine Muslims inmates with ties to terrorism planned an “audacious jail bust” in which a hired helicopter would be commandeered and landed in the prison yard;133

• The conflict between Islam as it is practiced by the African/Afro-Caribbean inmates and that practiced by the Asian inmates, has created a situation described as “potentially explosive” in one prison, while clashes or attacks occur frequently between Muslim terrorists and non-Muslim prisoners forcing some terrorists into protective custody in others;134

• An Islamic cleric imprisoned in the U.K. sent letters to an Arabic language British newspaper lamenting his situation as well as his conditions;135

• Imprisoned terrorist have been found with contraband including cell phones and computers; 3,500 cell phones were confiscated from British prisoners just last year.136

concern of law enforcement is that the groups will eventually become a criminalized front for terrorism. In 2008 members of the group were caught planning the kidnapping and execution of a corrections officer from their prison cell. The Muslim Boys have been compared to the Melanic Islamic Palace of the Rising Sun, an indigenous African American Muslim prison movement in the U.S., known for violence, intimidation and the adoption of gang techniques. See Beattie, Jason. “Jails to get tough on Muslim prayer gangs.” The Mirror. Apr. 21, 2009; Doward Extremists; Doward, Jamie. “Muslim gangs ‘are taking control of prison.’” The UK Observer. May 25, 2008 (hereafter Doward, Muslim Gangs); Ford, Imams; Fox, Urban. “Captive Converts: What makes Islam so attractive to prisoners.” The Times of London. Aug. 11, 2005; Hamm, Terrorist Recruitment, p. 27; “Muslim stronghold in Midland prison.” Sunday Mercury. Jan. 31, 2009; Pantucci, Incubators for Terrorism; “Report: Muslim inmates planned jail kidnap.” United Press International. Jan. 8, 2008; Syal, Rajeev and Townsend, Mark. “Islamists target teen crime gangs in London.” The Observer (UK). Jan. 11, 2009; Travis, Prisons Failing. 132 Gallagher, Ian. “Muslim prisoners get their own cells after sharing row.” The Daily Mail. Jun. 21, 2009. 133 A similar plot successfully executed in London twenty years ago may have inspired the inmates. See “Audacious ‘helicopter prison break’ plan foiled.” Metro. Mar. 31, 2009; “Muslim extremists plot escape from prison.” The Daily Telegraph. May 4, 2009. 134 Conversions to Islam by Afro-Caribbean inmates has become increasingly common. See Asthana, Anushka and Doward, Jamie. “Al-Qaeda threat to UK prisons.” The UK Observer. Feb. 10, 2008; Blanche; Doward Extremists; Pantucci, Prison Dilemma; Spalek; Travis, Prisons Failing; Travis, Watchdog; “Terrorist ‘in prison oil attack.’” The Mirror. Oct. 20, 2007. 135 A spokesperson for the British based anti-extremist think tank, the Quilliam Foundation, said of the matter,

It is terrifying that [Islamic cleric] Abu Qatada has been allowed to distribute pro-Jihadists texts from within British prisons. The very reason that Abu Qatada has been detained is because he has threatened public safety by inciting terrorism and violence. Yet the Prison service appears powerless to prevent him from continuing to incite violence and hatred from behind bars.

See “Abu Qatada ‘issues jail edicts.’” BBC News. April. 6, 2009; O’Neill, Sean. “Hate cleric, Abu Qatada, issues rallying cry from prison.” The Times of London. Apr. 4, 2009.

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• A radical Muslim cleric, caught smuggling missile blueprints in the U.K., was released early to “ease overcrowding.”137

French prisons have been described as the “cradle of the future Jihad,” where more

60% to 80% of the inmates practice Islam, despite Muslims representing less then 10% of

the general French population.138 Examples of extremism in the French penal system

include:

• French intelligence estimates at least 175 radical inmates – many convicted on terrorism offenses but whom remain in general population - are proselytizing to inmates and officials are concerned that their recruits will turn to terror upon release;139

• Approximately 20 individuals who converted to Islam while in prison have become a “high security risk” and are currently proselytizing and recruiting other inmates as they were radicalized and recruited themselves;140

• French prison has been described as a “terrorist university” where smuggled tapes and literature, including training manuals, bomb making instructions, and anti-Western gospels by al-Qaeda leadership, are readily available;141

There are an estimated 8,000 Muslims in Spanish prisons; more then one hundred

have been convicted of terrorist related offenses.142 Young North African men with petty

criminal histories, born or raised in Spain have begun to form a ready pool for

136 In 2007, a prisoner incarcerated for possessing bomb-making instructions was caught downloading bomb-making instructions from the Internet. Cell phones are not only a problem in U.K. prisons but are also a growing problem in U.S. prisons where they are frequently confiscated from prisoners. The average price for cell phone in prison ranges anywhere between $250 and $500. With increasingly sophisticated technology, prisoners will be able to undertake increasingly sophisticated communications. See Cilluffo et al., p. 10; Doward, Extremists; “Gangland Behind Bars.” Trenton: Commission of Investigation, May 2009. <http://www.state.nj.us/sci/pdf/Gangs%20SCI%20Report%20Full.pdf>, pp. 2, 5 and 20-29 (hereafter Gangland Behind Bars); Hannah et al., pp. 34-35; Knox, p. 24; Lewis, Jason. “Jailed terrorists are using the internet to contact supporters.” The Daily Mail. Apr. 13, 2008; “Lockup: Indiana: Extended Stay: For Better or Worse.” MSNBC. May 30, 2009; Maghan; Pantucci, Prison Dilemma. 137 Johnston, Philip. “Radical Muslim terrorist released from prison early to ease overcrowding.” The Daily Telegraph. Mar. 29, 2008. 138 “Jailhouse jihad.” The Economist. Sept. 20, 2008; Moore France; Siegel; Smith, Islam in Jail; Viviano. 139 Siegel; Smith, Islam in Jail; Van Dale, Johan. “French Prisons Breeding Ground for Radical Islam.” The Free Republic. Jan. 13, 2006. 140 Siegel. 141 Viviano. 142 Kapralos, Krista J. “One in 10 inmates behind bars turn to Islam.” The Daily Herald. Feb. 1, 2009; McLean; Rotella, Sebastian. “The World From Behind Bars, Waging A Verbal Jihad.” The Los Angeles Times. Dec. 24, 2007 (hereafter Rotella, Verbal Jihad).

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recruitment in the prison system.143 Forced conversions are on the rise and separating

inmates has become necessary despite the associated risks of a dispersal strategy.144 The

Spanish penal system has encountered serious problems with visitations, the

dissemination of radical literature and inmate preaching.145 Examples of extremism in the

Spanish penal system include:

• Prisoners involved in the plot to bomb the Spanish National Court (a plot hatched in prison) wrote over five hundred letters to members of the 1993 World Trade Center terrorists, while both parties were incarcerated, the latter in a super maximum security prison in Colorado and the former in a Spanish prison’s general population because they had been accidentally categorized as common criminals rather then terrorists,146

• A Spanish prison official was reported as saying of prisons: “You can find all the raw materials for forming terrorists.”147

RADICALIZATION in the AMERICAN PRISON SYSTEM

Radicalization in prisons is not confined to Europe. In fact, “A culture of Islamic

radicalization already exists in America: “Most Americans do not know about it because

143 Mclean. 144 There are two strategies for dealing with terrorists in prison: concentrate and isolate or separate and disperse. Isolating and concentrating imprisoned terrorists is problematic because there is strength in numbers and they could find a way to exploit the situation; separating and dispersing imprisoned terrorists who accumulate too much power provides them the opportunity to continue to spread their message. The dispersal strategy also has its limit in terms of space. A senior British prison official stated, “If prisoners are concentrated they get more organized. If something went wrong, it could go disastrously wrong.” The Director-General of the British Prison Service also warned against “ a strategy of concentrating convicted terrorists.” Copley notes that even with the isolation strategy, there is the potential for prison guards to be corrupted or even radicalized. And as Saathoff points out, this “para-radicalization” is problematic because, “in this exploitative environment… even prison employees can be unwitting players who can be cajoled, bribed or coerced into transmitting message and materials without being aware of their real purpose.” In the U.S., correction officials use the isolate and concentrate strategy with gang leaders who acquire too much power while incarcerated. See Blanche; Copley, Gregory. “Special Report: The Handling of Radical, Terrorists and Politicized Prisoners.” Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily. Nov. 30, 2001: Vol. XIX, No. 198 (hereafter Copley, Special Report); Gangland Behind Bars, p. 1; Gregory Saathoff as quoted in Terrorism: Radical Islamic Influence; Hamm Terrorist Recruitment, p. 96; Hannah et al., pp. xi and 51; Knox, pp. 48-49; Leppard; McLean; Pantucci Incubators for Terror; Pantucci, Prison Dilemma; Syal, Rajeev and Townsend, Mark. “Islamists target teen crime gangs in London.” The Observer (UK). Jan. 11, 2009; Rosenau, p. 27; “Terrorists: Recruiting and Operating Behind Bars.” Central Intelligence Agency, Aug. 20, 2002. <http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/ctc082002.pdf> (hereafter CIA); Travis, Tenfold; Viviano. 145 Jordan, Javier. “Anatomy of Spain’s Disrupted Jihadist Networks.” CTC Sentinel. Oct 2008: Vol. 1, No. 5, pp. 10-11 (hereafter Jordan, Spain). 146 Rotella, Verbal Jihad. 147 McLean.

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it’s happening in places most of us do not go – our prisons… America is a country ripe

for jihad.”148 Examples of radicalization in the American penal system abound:

• In the early 1990s, Iran sent recruiters to the U.S. to regularly visit prisons in an effort to indoctrinate – specifically African American Muslim converts – to a fundamentalist Shiite perspective;149

• The terrorists imprisoned for the 1993 World Trade Center attacks were able to proselyte and recruit among the general population because prison officials did not want to be accused of racial profiling if they had been isolated.150 Later, the same terrorists, while incarcerated in Colorado’s super maximum facility, were able to correspond via letters with members of a Spanish terrorist cell (who were also incarcerated) as well as Arabic newspapers. Over ninety letters were smuggled over the course of two years;151

• On September 11, 2001, prisons reported inmates’ cheers could be heard echoing throughout cellblocks;152

• Inmates in a Washington, D.C, prison – openly claiming affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood – were punished in 2003 for strong-arming inmates who didn’t agree with their religious beliefs;153

• In October 2004 Muslim inmates in Colorado rioted because their religious dietary needs were not being met;154

148 Bauer, Gary. “Waiting for the American Jihad.” Human Events. Mar. 13, 2009. 149 The operatives were officially employed and sponsored by the Iranian Embassy at the time. Earlier, during the Iranian hostage crisis Ayatollah Ali Khomeini ordered the release of the thirteen African American hostage, calling them “oppressed brothers” and “victims” of America. See Aidi; CIA; Copley Special Report. 150 The Chairman of the Racial Equality for Justice has stated, “Policymakers aren’t taking action [against radical Muslims] because [radical Muslims] are using race and Islam as a cover.” See CIA; Cilluffo et al., p. iii; Hamm, Terrorist Recruitment, p. 32; Myers, Lisa. “Imprisoned terrorists still advocating terror.” MSNBC. Mar. 1, 2005; Silverberg, Mark. “The Silent War: Wahhabism and the American Penal System.” New Media Journal. Jun. 5, 2006. <http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/011391.php>. 151 The prison cited the problem as a “failure of staff to monitor communications” despite the facility claming to have “severe monitoring restrictions” on high security inmates. In his study of radicalization in prisons across the country Hamm concluded, “the threat remains that terrorists... inmates can use mail and verbal communications to conduct terrorism while incarcerated” making recruitment by mail and telephone contact a viable option. In a 2004-2005 nationwide study of prisons, researchers discovered almost 80% of prison officials believe inmate mail poses a serious threat to institutional security and almost 90% support aggressive mail monitoring as a proven and productive method to counter the threat. See Hamm Terrorist Recruitment, p. 35; Knox, pp. 17 and 25; Myers, Lisa. “Imprisoned terrorists still advocating terror.” MSNBC. Mar. 1, 2005; Gangland Behind Bars, pp. 29-30. 152 Saathoff, p. 3. 153 King, Colbert I. “Dangerous ‘Brotherhood’ at D.C. Jail?” The Washington Post. Dec. 27, 2003. 154 De Borchgrave, Arnaud. “Criminals Recruited for ‘Islamic Army’ in America.” News Max. Aug. 21, 2002.

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• An American based Islamic charity serving as a fundraising front for terrorism embarked on an ambitious prison outreach strategy, accumulating a detailed database of over 15,000 U.S. prisoners, interested in, converting to, or actively practicing Islam, and who had received radical literature from the organization while incarcerated;155

• On February 14, 2009 a homemade bomb, described as an “Improvised Explosive Device,” went off in a California prison;156

• Reports indicate that conversions have been on the rise since the American led invasion of Iraq in 2003;157

• The FBI has stated on the record that, “U.S. correctional institutions are a viable venue for such radicalization and recruitment,” and “recruitment of inmates, we believe, within the prison system will continue to be a problem throughout our country;”158

• A year before he was arrested on charges stemming from a plot to kill American soldiers in Iraq, Marwan Othman El-Hindi, a 42 year old American citizen, served

155 It remains unknown as to why the database created by the Al Haramin Islamic Foundation was never put to use. One employee testified before Congress that is was his belief the organization was unaware of the potential uses for the database, including the possibility of recruiting American convict converts to the Islamist cause. The Al Haramin was also a significant supplier of the Noble Qu’ran, “a version known for containing numerous interpolations not present in the original Arabic… these interpolations pushed the meaning in a radical direction suffused with contempt for non-Muslims, and which was dedicated to fostering the global jihad.” (The Noble Qu’ran has been described as a “supremacists Muslim, anti-Semite, anti-Christian polemic than a rendition of the Islamic scripture”). The organization distributed much of their literature through an active relationship with the prison Chaplaincy that willingly provided said literature to the inmate population. Another organization with a prison outreach program estimates that for every piece of literature sent to an inmate, 10 inmates read it. In 2004 a Justice Department audit discovered that prison officials have neglected to stop dangerous materials from flooding the prisons. The FBI feared “distributors of pro-jihad propaganda are turning prisons into a kind of terrorist university where young men enroll as felons and graduate as terrorists.” See Ali, M. Amir. “Islam in Prisons: The III&E Contributions Over A Decade.” Plainfield: Islamic Society of North America, 2007. <http://www.isna.net/Resources/articles/America/Islam-In-Prison.aspx> (hereafter Ali, Islam in Prisons); Cilluffo et al., p. 6; “Belated ‘Book Burning.’” Investor’s Business Daily. Jun. 11, 2007 (hereafter IBD, Book Burning); Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed. “Prison Jihad? How radical Islamic charities exploit their access to the prison system.” The Weekly Standard. Oct. 12, 2006; Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed. “Wahhabi Prison Fellowship: The teaching of jihad in American penitentiaries.” Weekly Standard. Sept. 26, 2005: Vol. 11, No. 2; “Prison Radicalization: Are Terrorists Cells Forming in U.S. Cell Blocks.” Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Washington, DC: Sept. 19, 2006, pp. 13-20. <http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/senate12sh109.html> (hereafter Prison Radicalization in U.S. Cell Blocks). 156 70% of all terror attacks worldwide are committed using “IEDs,” and there is growing evidence that the construction and use of such devises in American prisons is on the rise. As one prisoner in Virginia stated, “there is no crime you can’t do in prison.” See “Explosive goes off in California prison.” CNN. Feb. 14, 2009; Hamm, Terrorist Recruitment, p. 88. 157 Blanche. 158 John Pistole as quoted in Terrorism: Radical Islamic Influence, pp. 8-9; Rosenau, p. 23, and 25.

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as Imam at the Toledo Correctional Facility but was fired after he was caught bringing food to a prisoner; the Warden stated, “If he was going to do that, what else was he going to do?”159

• The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia funded the National Islamic Prison Foundation (NIPF), which was established to indoctrinate African American inmates with Wahhabism and prevent the distortion of their interpretation of Islam by indigenous Muslim Americans, through the “hijacking” the Black Muslim prisoner movement;160

• It is estimated that over 10,000 Noble Qu’rans – a Wahhabi version of the original text containing additional injective with a distinctly radical twist – were

159 Boak, Joshua. “Detainee served as imam at prison.” The Toledo Blade. Feb. 23, 2006 160 Other examples include the Saudi funded Institute for Islamic Information and Education based in Chicago, (which is headed by a self-proclaimed supporter of Osama bin Laden) and the Al-Huda Islamic Center, based in Georgia, which been banned from sending literature to some prisons because the organization advocates violence. The Islamic Assembly of North America (IANA), an un-indicted co-conspirator in the 1992 World Trade Center attack, has donated more then 530 packages of books and tapes to prisons across the country. Any “self-styled missionary” with a Post Office box can “set up shot” and spread any message they so chose, enabled by the fact that Islam has a lacking clerical hierarchy. In 2007 and 2009 two “purges” of prison libraries were undertaken by the BOP. Currently the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has filed a lawsuit on behalf of a group of inmates to keep religious literature, said to incite violence and anti-Americanism by authorities, in the prisons. The ACLU has said, “It is not the role of the government to dictate what is religiously acceptable… They could remove texts that are critical to a prisoner’s ability to practice their religion.” The DOJ notes that “the immense wealth associated with extreme Wahhabism/Salafism makes the religion appealing to inmates who are seeking financial support and assistance after they leave prison.” See Aidi; Baran, Zeyno. “Combating al-Qaeda and the Militant Islamic Threat.” Washington, D.C.: Committee on Armed Services, Feb. 16, 2005. <http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=4013&pubType=HI_Testimony>; Brooks; Colson, Charles. “Evangelizing for Evil In Our Prisons.” Wall Street Journal. Jun. 24, 2002 (hereafter Colson Evangelizing); Colson, Charles. “Terrorists Behind Bars.” First Things: Journal of Religion, Culture, and Public Life. Nov. 2002 (hereafter Colson, Terror Behind Bars); “A Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Selection of Muslim Religious Services Providers.” Washington, D.C.: Department of Justice. Apr. 2004, p. 7 <http://ww.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0404/final.pdf> (hereafter, DOJ); “From Dawa to Jihad.” The Hague: Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Dec. 2004. <http://www.minbzk.nl/contents/pages/42345/fromdawatojihad.pdf>; Glazov, America; Hamm, Terrorist Recruitment, p. 24; Harden, Blaine. “A Nation Challenged: American Muslims; Saudi Seek to Add U.S. Muslims to Their Sect.” The New York Times. Oct 20, 2001; IBD, “Book Burning”; Neumann, p. 41; Popeo, John W. “Combating Radical Islam in Prisons Within the Legal Dictates of the Free Exercise Clause.” New England Journal on Criminal and Civil Confinement. 2006: Vol. 32, p. 13; Roy, EuroIslam, p. 63; Spencer, Robert. “Fighting to Keep the Jihad in Prisons.” Front Page Magazine. Mar. 26, 2009; Silverberg; Teague, Matthew. “The Radicals Among Us.” Philadelphia Magazine. Feb. 2009; Thomas, Cal. “Radical recruiting in America’s prisons.” The Washington Times. Jun. 20, 2002; Waller, p. 97; Zoll Islam Battleground.

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distributed throughout U.S. prisons to inspire convicted felons to become “cannon fodder” for their cause.161

• A prison official who spoke to the Los Angeles Times on the condition of anonymity in 2005, stated “If you’re asking me are concerns about extremism in the prisons real, I’d have to say yeah, they are – and have been for a long time;”162

• Both national endorsing organizations used by the Bureau of Prison (BOP) to hire Muslim Chaplains were found by the FBI to have ties to terrorism;163

• Following 9/11 five Muslim Chaplains displayed questionable behavior while working in the prison system:

- In 2001 Aminah Akbarin, a prison Chaplain was put on paid administrative leave after he called Osama bin Laden a hero and told prisoners the attacks were the fault of President George W. Bush;164

- In 2003 Warith Deen Umar, a Saudi trained New York prison Chaplain for more then twenty years, was accused of denying prisoners access to mainstream material, was reported calling prisons a “perfect” vehicle for recruitment to the international Jihadists cause because they are a “powder keg” of radicalization, and praised Osama bin Laden while calling the 9/11 hijackers “martyrs;” he was responsible for the hiring and training of over forty New York state Chaplains;165

- Shia prisoners in New York were forced into protective custody after prison Imam Salahuddin Muhammad (who was hired by Umar) and

161 Cilluffo, Frank. “Jihadists Threats to the West, In the West.” Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute, Sept. 16, 2006. <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC07.php?CID=307> (hereafter Cilluffo, Jihadists); Hamm Terrorist Recruitment, p. 23; Menefee, Amy. “Islamic Religious Groups Jockey for Prison Access as Concerns Over Inmate Terrorism Grow.” Congressional Quarterly. Jun. 24, 2003; Waller, p. 98; 162 Moore, Solomon. “Radical Islam an Issue in Prisons.” The Los Angeles Times. Aug. 20, 2005. 163 A review of the procedures in place for hiring Muslim chaplains found that the BOP does not require Chaplains to reveal their denominations or sect, nor are the applicants doctrinal beliefs, past sermons or public statements examined. The Justice Department says asking such questions “would place the government in the position of approving or disapproving of a person’s religion… candidate’s doctrinal beliefs are secondary to what they will commit to do in the job.” The BOP has since reported that religious service providers are questioned regarding their beliefs on violence. See DOJ, pp. 2, 14, 22, 36-37; Charles Schumer as quoted in Terrorism: Radical Islamic Influence” pp. 4-6; Cilluffo et al., p. 12; Popeo, p. 140. 164 Colson, Terror Behind Bars; Seymour, Stephen. “The Silence of Prayer: An Examination of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Moratorium on the Hiring of Muslim Chaplains.” Columbia Human Rights Law Review. Winter 2006: Vol. 37, p. 558. 165 In a review by the Justice Department it was discovered that numerous prison officials had heard him make inflammatory remarks but failed to terminate him. See DOJ, p. 35 and 48; Hartstein, Esther. “Prisoners Being Recruited to Radical Islam.” American Daily. Feb. 12, 2003; Lefkowitz, Josh. “Terrorists Behind Bars.” New York: The NEFA Foundation, May 2008. <http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/TerroristsBehindBars.pdf>; Popeo, p. 135; Schwartz; Seymour, Stephen. “The Silence of Prayer: An Examination of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Moratorium on the Hiring of Muslim Chaplains.” Columbia Human Rights Law Review. Winter 2006: Vol. 37, p. 526; Silverberg; Terrorism: Radical Islamic Influence,” p. 9; Zoll, “Islam Battleground.”

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Abdulkadir Elmi distributed anti-Shia literature to the Sunni majority inmates in two separate prisons;166

- In 2005 Intkiab Habib retired from the Chaplaincy with the Fire Department of New York (FDNY) after expressing doubt that al Qaeda committed 9/11;167

- Also in 2005, Chaplain Umar Abdul Jalil, who had been hired in 1993 and had been in charge of overseeing all New York state clergy and the Islamic studies curriculum since 2004, was suspended with pay, but reinstated by Mayor Michael Bloomberg, after making anti-American remarks, including stating Muslims were being tortured in New York City prisons and calling the Bush administration “terrorists.”168

ISLAM in the ‘BIG HOUSE’

The Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons stated before Congress in 2003 that, “the

Bureau is playing a significant role in our Nation’s war on terrorism.”169 At the same

hearing, the former President of the American Correctional Chaplains Association added,

“terrorist recruitment in prisons and jails is indeed a potential serious concern for our

country.”170 At that time, less then forty terrorists were detained in American correctional

facilities.171 But as more terrorists are captured and tried, more will be placed in U.S.

prisons including the possibility that some of these same prisons might one day absorb

Guantanamo Bay detainees. One analyst wrote “Whatever happens, the Federal Bureau

of Prisons – because it deals with the high-profile, national-level prisoners of the State –

is now in the front lines of strategic policy.”172

Prison is the type of environment most likely to enhance the vulnerability of an

individual to succumb to radicalization by creating a cognitive opening strikingly similar 166 The New York Times reports that Sunni inmates in American prisons have harassed Shia prisoners. See Schwartz; Silverberg; Zoll, Islam Battleground. 167 Silverberg. 168 Abdul Jalil is an African American convert to Islam who spent time in prison during the 1970s and later counseled 9/11 victims and their family members. See Howard, Paul. “A Fifth Column in the Prisons?” City Journal. Spring 2006; Von Zielbauer, Paul. “Metro Briefing: New York: Rikers Island: Correction Dept. Chaplain Placed on Leave. The New York Times. Mar. 10, 2006. 169 Henry G. Lappin as quoted in Terrorism: Radical Islamic Influence, p. 12. 170 Ibid, p. 32. 171 Currently thirty-three international terrorists are incarcerated in a super maximum-security prison in Florence, Colorado. Hamm concludes in his nation wide study of the American prison system, “Maximum security prisons are more likely to produce radicalized prisoners than less secure institutions.” See: Copley, p. 97; Hamm, Terrorist Recruitment, pp. 110 and 113; Johnson, Carrie and Pincus, Walter. “Supermax prisons already hold terrorists.” The Washington Post. May 22, 2009. 172 Copley, p. 95.

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to that currently being experienced by young Muslims across the western world.173 The

convergence of bulging prison populations filled with young adult offenders, who are

converting or “reverting” to Islam in unprecedented numbers is an alarming trend.174 Yet

‘Prislam’ remains a threat of “unknown magnitude” for corrections officers.175 And

despite the fact that 93% of all U.S. prisoners are incarcerated at the state and local level,

officials at Federal institutions (where it is estimated one in three prisoners are Muslim –

the majority prison converts), and not the state and local prisons and jails, are receiving

the necessary resources to deal with the issue of institutional security.176 At the state and

local level, the more pressing day-to-day threats posed by gangs, drugs, and violence

overshadows the problem of radical Islamists.177

Prison may be a controlled space, but it is also a uniquely conducive environment

for radicalization, in which the trials and tribulations of recruitment are decreased due to

the extenuating circumstances of prison life itself.178 Recruitment is made possible

through ideological manipulation conducted in closed setting with small groups under a

constantly perceived threat.179 In this unsettling environment, an individual is faced with

intensely existential questions, the constant imposition of harsh authority and the forcible

173 Hannah, et al., p. x. 174 Reversion is a belief that everyone is born into a state of submission to Allah and when the individuals realizes this, they do not convert to Islam, but revert to Islam. This rings particularly true for Hispanics and African Americans as both communities with historical ties to the faith. Reverts are also referred to as “born again Muslims.” See Abbady; “Chasing the Sleeper Cell.” PBS. Oct. 16, 2003. <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/sleeper/> (hereafter Chasing the Cell); Jones, James Edwards. “How Effective has the United States System of Justice been in Accommodating Islam?” Journal of Islamic Law and Culture. Spring/Summer 2000: Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 6; Roy, EuroIslam, pp. 64 and 70; Neumann, p. 40; Taarnby, p. 44; Vermaat, Emerson. “The Radicalization of young Moroccans and Turks in the Netherlands.” Militant Islam Monitor. Nov. 5, 2007. <http://militantislammonitor.org/article/id/3243> 175 Bhatt and Silber; Blanche; Gorski and Zoll; Krikorian, Craig and Warren, Jenifer. “Prisons Weigh Threat of Radical Islamist Gangs.” The Los Angeles Times. Sept. 4, 2005; Marks, Alexandra. “Islamist radicals in prisons: How many?” The Christian Science Monitor. Sept. 20, 2006, , p.3. 176 Riker’s Island prison in New York has established set up a radicalization task force to deal with the problem of Islam radicalism within that specific prison. See Appendix Two: Federal Prisoner Distribution Since 1950. Blanche; Cilluffo et al., p. 12; Cruz, Wil et al. “State prisons are major breeding ground for Islamic radicalization.” The New York Daily News. May 22, 2009. Hamm, Terrorist Recruitment, p. 105; Lalwani; Marks. 177 Cilluffo, Jihadists Threats and Hamm, Terrorist Recruitment, p. 22. 178 Neumann, p. 39. 179 Daly and Gerwehr, p. 74; Hamm Terrorist Recruitment, p. 103.

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acceptance of substandard living conditions, conversion becomes as much a symbol of

religious renewal and rebirth as it is an inmate’s defiance in the face of the prison’s

institutional order.180 Prison can be a “profoundly effecting” experience;” religion serves

as coping mechanism and “protest conversions,” become the “ultimate way to challenge

the system.”181

Islam has become “the religion of the oppressed – what Marxism was once in

Europe.”182 And in America, the prison has come to represent one of the last vestiges of

the struggle between the oppressor and the oppressed.183 The language of radical Islam

speaks to this configuration of power and promotes violent uprising. A young man in

American prison today who perceives himself to be an alienated and disenfranchised

victim of a power structure that incarcerates minorities at a significantly higher rate and

with harsher sentences, that he can channel his lethal resentment through the distorted

ideology of Islamic fundamentalism.184

Recruiters prey on the socioeconomic background of these inmates seeking out

the lost and dispossessed.185 The Islamist discourse not only satisfies their needs for

spiritualization but, Islam also provides a vehicle for expressing anger and rage through

enmity towards society.186 As this rage evolves in prison and the inmate’s newfound

beliefs develop, he continues to be exposed to the prison way of life. This process of

“prisonization” is “a radicalizing experience,” through which a prisoner is assimilated

into the inmate population and comes to accept and internalize the institution’s prevailing

180 Almond, Mark. “Why Terrorists Love Criminals (And Vice Versa). The Wall Street Journal. Jun. 22, 2002; Neumann, p. 40. 181 El-Hassan and Spalek, p. 101 and 109; Nawaz, Roots; Rotella, “Stealth Weapons” and Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism, p. 209. 182 Neumann, p. 41. 183 Smith, Christopher E. “Black Muslims and the Development of Prisoner’s Rights.” Journal of Black Studies. Dec. 1993: Vol. 24, No. 2, p. 136 (hereafter Smith, Black Muslims). 184 Close and Dix-Richardson; Colson, Evangelizing; Kushner, Harvey. “Assaying the Terrorism Threat: The Next Five Years.” Washington, D.C.: The Future of Terrorism Task Force, Sept. 28, 2006. <http://www.rightsidenews.com/200905164794/homeland-security/assaying-the-terrorism-threat-the-next-five-years.html> 185 Darrymple; El-Hassan and Spalek, p. 101; Hudson, Psychology, p. 34; Kushner, Harvey. “Assaying the Terrorism Threat: The Next Five Years.” Washington, D.C.: The Future of Terrorism Task Force, Sept. 28, 2006. <http://www.rightsidenews.com/200905164794/homeland-security/assaying-the-terrorism-threat-the-next-five-years.html>; Silverberg. 186 Darrymple.

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subculture and all its requisite customs and behaviors.187 “The universal operating “code”

among prison inmates is familiar to terrorist groups including rules such as, “don’t snitch,

mind your own business, get even, and present a false face to authorities.”188 Like

radicalization, prisonization is a continuum and, as the individual becomes more exposed

to prisonization, the more prisonized they will become.189 Prisonization is necessary for

an inmate’s integration into the prison’s “value system,” or “inmate code,” a subculture

in which new normative values are assigned to beliefs and behaviors necessary to act or

behave in opposition to the prison authority through unqualified loyalty to prisoners or

prison groups while simultaneously exhibiting non-compliance with prison officials.190

Inmate’s are drawn to extreme Islamist beliefs, not only for the power of faith, but

because it justifies their predisposition or propensity for violence as well as hatred of

America.191

Most importantly, Islam offers the inmate a support system outside of the

prison.192 As one commentator stated, “When Black American Muslims are released from

prison with the customary ten dollars, a suit of clothes and one-way bus or train ticket,

they know any mosque or masjid will shelter and feed them and help them find a job.”193

It is particularly difficult for convicts to find work after leaving prison, and Jihad is an

187 Clear, Todd. R. and Sumter, Melvina T. “Prisoners, Prison, and Religion: Religion and Adjustment to Prison.” Journal of Offender Rehabilitation. 2002: Vol. 35, No. 3/4, p. 130; Cruz et al.; Hannah et al., p. 9. 188 CIA. 189 Clear and Sumter, p. 130. 190 Ibid, p. 130. 191 Inmates will many times develop their own ideas and interpretations of religious teachings often to the extreme due to their inherent proclivities towards violence and institutional disillusionment and alienation. The Islamic concept of jihad is a perfect example of an idea that lends itself to misinterpretation. “Black America, Prisons and Radical Islam.” Washington, D.C.: Center for Islamic Pluralism, Sept. 2008, p. 7. <http://www.islamicpluralism.org/CIPReports/CIPPrisonReport.pdf> (hereafter “Black America”); Erickson, Christian and Rupp, Eric. “Prisons, Radical Islam’s New Recruiting Ground? Patterns of Recruitment in US, and comparisons with UK, France, and Spain.” San Diego: International Studies Association Annual Convention, Mar. 22, 2006. <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/9/9/3/8/p99381_index.html>; Hamm, Terrorist Recruitment, p. 24; Saathoff, p. 2; Travis, MI5. 192 Blanche; Fighel; Hamm Terrorist Recruitment, pp. 6 and 9. 193 De Borchgrave.

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alternative means of employment.194 In her research on British Muslim inmates, Marranci

noted a current trend in the U.K. that is equally applicable to Muslim American inmates.

Marranci found that Muslims leaving prisoner receive even less support then non-

Muslims because the community does not want reintegrate them for fear of drawing

unwanted attention to their communities.195 Marranci writes, “This has the dangerous

effect of isolating the former Muslim prisoners, and among them those who have

developed an ideology of Islam.”196 Additionally, There is currently no system in place to

track inmates not paroled after they leave prison if officials think they may have been

radicalized and could pose a threat to society.197

In his nationwide study of Islam in prisons Hamm concluded, “The danger to

America’s security is, therefore, not the number of adherents to Islam in prison but in the

potential for small groups of true believers to instigate terrorist acts or either by other

prisoners once they are released.”198 Terrorist recruits are not meant to yield large

numbers, rather the recruitment process is seen as a means to separate the dedicated from

the less then desirable.199 One expert estimated approximately ten inmates a year in just

New York alone give authorities, “a level of concern.”200 And with two hundred new

felons entering the prison system everyday in America, 98% of whom will eventually be

released, the potential number of recruits is staggering.201 As one legal scholar noted, “A

warehoused population with little available work or educational opportunity and the

194 Fink, Naureen Chowdry and Hearne, Ellie B. “Beyond Terrorism: Deradicalization and Disengagement from Violent Extremism.” New York: International Peace Institute, October 2008. <http://www.ipacademy.org/asset/file/384/BETER.pdf>, p. 6; Peter Nesser as quoted in Benard, p. 53. 195 Cilluffo, et al., p. ix; Marranci, Gabriele. “Faith Ideology and Fear: The Case of Current and Former Muslim Prisoners.” Aberdeen: University of Aberdeen, 2007, p. 8. <http://uws.clients.squiz.net/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/21678/Speech_House_of_Lords-26-06-07.pdf> 196 Marranci, p. 8. 197 Cilluffo, et al., p. ix and Saathoff, p. 7. 198 Hamm, Terrorist Recruitment, pp. 34 and 113. 199 Ibid, p. 110. 200 Fields, Gary and Sataline, Suzanne. “Bomb Case Raises Issue Of Islam in Jails.” The Wall Street Journal. May 23, 2009. 201 Susan Collins as quoted in “Prison Radicalization in U.S. Cell Blocks”; Ling, Lisa. Explorer: California Prison System.” National Geographic, 2005. “Megastructures: North Branch Correctional Intuitions.” National Geographic, 2005.

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promise of political, social and economic exclusion when they get out? Sounds like a

good opportunity for al-Qaeda to me.”202

PREACHIN’ in PRISON

Today most proselytizing comes directly from prisoners and occurs in small group

settings or in one-on-one sessions.203 Only a small number of inmates will embrace the

radical message and an even smaller number will engage in terrorist actions.204

Recruitment is easily conducted, and will take place regardless of what means of

prevention the prison authorities utilize.205 Sometimes inmates rely on other inmates, and it’s sort of the prison way. They turn to someone they trust, their ‘celly’ or someone in their cellblock, and put them on a pedestal as someone who has more knowledge about religion. [But] he could be spreading knowledge or spreading ignorance.206

It is clear the problem is neither a shortage of qualified religious leadership nor the

infiltration of subversive volunteers, although that has contributed to the problem.207

Chaplains represent the institutional face of Islam in prisons, and prisoners tend to

be anti-authoritarian in nature. As one researcher noted, Muslim prisoners who develop a

more radical view of Islam, “Tend to isolate and disengage form the prison, including not

recognizing the authority of the Imams. Some of these Muslims prisoners try to achieve a

charismatic role and be recognized as leaders.”208 A Chaplain in Michigan remarked that

the Muslims in prison do not want the institutional support of for religious programs.

“Prisoners like the power of running their own religious groups. For prisoners, there is

202 In May 2009 the Pentagon reported one in seven Guantanamo detainees released have returned to terrorism. See Bumiller, Elisabeth. “Terror Link Cited for 1 in 7 Freed Detainees.” The New York Times. May 20, 2009; Jonathan Simon as quoted in Krikorian and Warren. 203 DOJ, p. 8; Hamm, Terrorist Recruitment, pp. 35, 101 and 115; Kushner; Mufti, Siraj Islam. “Islam in American Prisons.” Islam Online. Aug. 31, 2008. <http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1156077734147&pagename=Zone-English-Muslim_Affairs%2FMAELayout>. 204 Hannah et al., p. 15. 205 Blanche; Daly and Gerwehr, pp. 80-82; Hamm, Terrorist Recruitment, p. 36 and Stojkovic, Stan. “Social bases of Power and Control Mechanisms Among Prisoners in a Prison organization.” Justice Quarterly. 1984: Vol. 1. 206 Gorski and Zoll 207 Ibid. 208 Marranci, p. 11.

35

nothing more important than power. Volunteers are a threat to that because they represent

power sharing.”209

Currently the BOP has only ten Muslim Chaplains, less then 4% of the

Chaplaincy service or approximately one Chaplin for every nine hundred prisoners.210

The shortage of Muslim Chaplains is a result of numerous factors, not least among them

is the lack of recommending bodies of Islamic educational institutions. Today most

Muslim Chaplains and volunteers tend to be African American because the Muslim

immigrant community and the indigenous African American community have always

been, and to this day, remain, at odds.211 Islam is experienced quite differently by these

two groups: African American Muslims perceive Islam as part of a “experience both

spiritual and political, and an expression of empowerment in a country they feel is

dominated by a White elite,” while the immigrant Muslim community and their

American born children see Islam as “inherent” to their religious identity, but not

necessarily their national identity.212 This schism that exists between the immigrant

Muslim and indigenous African American Muslim community has the potential to

threaten both equally.

In the post-9/11 world, Chaplains are fearful of teaching anything that might be

construed as “radical,” reducing their ability to address the needs and concerns of inmates

and as a result, inmate proselytizing flourishes.213 And because Chaplains are not

consulted on the hiring of volunteers, who are responsible for numerous religious duties

in the prison system, suspicion grows between the two groups religious service providers,

leaving a vacuum for power and pitting the Islamic groups against one another.214 This is

209 Cullen, Francis T. et al. “The Role of the Prison Chaplain in Rehabilitation.” Journal of Offender Rehabilitation. 2002: Vol. 35, No. 3/4 and Hamm “Terrorist Recruitment” p. 94; 210 DOJ, p. 7. 211 Boehlert; Elliott, A Muslim Leader;” Elliott, Black and Immigrant”; Hamm, Terrorist Recruitment, p. 93 and Felton. 212 One Muslim leader was quoted as saying, “Muslims will not be successful in America until there is a marriage between the indigenous and immigrant communities. There has to be a marriage.” See Elliot, Black and Immigrant. 213 Marranci. 214 It is estimated that with volunteers, religious services in prisons cost less then $250 each year per inmate served, while Chaplaincy programs cost closer to $14,000 per inmate served each year. See DOJ, p. 24; Hamm Terrorist Recruitment, pp. 62 and 98; O’Conner, Thomas P. and Perryclear, Michael. “Prison Religion in Action and Its Influence on Offender Rehabilitation.” Journal of Offender Rehabilitation. 2002: Vol. 35, No. 3/4, pp. 20, 22-23.

36

despite the Department of Justice stating that Chaplains are the BOP’s “most effective

and reliable resource for recruiting.”215

“PRISLAM”

Today, Islam is described by inmates as a good way of “doing time”; it serves as a coping

mechanism that provides psychological relief.216 Today, the U.S. has the largest prison

system in the world, with over two million people currently incarcerated and another four

million who have served their time and/or are currently on parole.217 Islam, once

considered by penal authorities as a “passing fad,” is now the fastest growing religion in

American prisons, mostly via the 30,000 to 40,000 annual jailhouse conversions, and

could represent anywhere between 5% and 10% of the prison population, but upwards to

20% in the penal institutions of New York, Pennsylvania, California and Maryland,

although no nationwide statistics exist.218 In 1995, it was estimated that approximately

4,000 inmates reported being Muslim.219 The number had remained stable for almost a

decade but it has since doubled.220 It is estimated that 80% to 90% of those who convert

while in prison choose Islam, and 20% of those who do convert continue to practice the

215 DOJ, p. 15. 216 Clear and Sumter, p. 127; Close and Dix-Richardson, p. 88; Hamm Terrorist Recruitment, pp. 10 and 66; Kushner; Stojkovic, p. 522. 217 Blanche; Kushner and Pew, “One in 100.” 218 Islam is also the fastest growing religion in Canadian prisons, the country with which we share our largest border. See Ammar et al., p. 417; Blanche; Cruz; Close and Dix-Richardson, p. 88 and 99; Colson “Evangelizing;” DOJ, p. 7; Fields, Gary and Sataline, Suzanne. “Bomb Case Raises Issue Of Islam in Jails.” The Wall Street Journal. May 23, 2009; Fox; Hamm, Terrorist Recruitment, pp. 19-20; Krikorian, Craig and Warren, Jenifer. “Prisons Weigh Threat of Radical Islamist Gangs.” The Los Angeles Times. Sept. 4, 2005; Lalwani; Karpalos; Lichtblau, Eric. “Al Qaeda Still Active in U.S., Counterterrorism Officials Say.” The New York Times. Sept. 5, 2003; Lichtblau, Eric. “Report Warns of Infiltration By Al-Qaeda in U.S. Prisons.” The New York Times. May 5, 2004; Marks; Popeo, p. 137; Razaq, Sadia. “Call to Prayer: Prisoners Converting to Orthodox Islam in Growing Numbers.” New York: Columbia University, 2001. <http://web.jrn.columbia.edu/studentwork/race/2001/pray_razaq.shtml>; Seper, Jerry. “Prisons breeding ground for terror?; Moderate Muslim chaplains in short supply, Justice report warns.” The Washington Times. May. 6, 2004: p. A11; Seper, Jerry. “Prisons tighten Muslim chaplain criteria: Shortage seen leading to extremist ideology.” The Washington Times. Jul. 16, 2004: p. A10; Silverberg. 219 Close and Dix-Richardson, p. 100. 220 “FBI: Al Qaeda still recruiting in US Prisons.” The World Tribune. Jan. 8, 2004.

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faith upon being released.221 Muslims are predominately African American, a group that

also represents the racial majority in the American prisons, and the majority of these

inmates are under forty-five years of age.222 Among the more then 30% of inmates who

seek religious services, a large percentage seeks out Muslim services.223 These numbers

increase if one considers those inmates who convert or pursue Islam outside of the formal

prison structure.

More inmates are now accepting a traditional view of Sunni Islam and have

developed a non-militant position to ensure clandestine activities, including recruitment,

radicalization and resistance to authorities, avoid detection, while still allowing Muslim

groups to obtain their Constitutional privileges.224 Corrections Today reported, “Sunni

inmates have formed sophisticated networks in prisons.”225 And like any successful

network, these clandestine activities remain confined to a handful of individuals.226 With

radicalization and recruitment methods, the expectation is to yield a small number of

potential operatives.227 As a California prison official put it, “One prisoner can upset a

221 Baykan, Y.N. “The Emergence of Sunni Islam in America’s Prisons.” Corrections Today. Feb. 2007: Vol. 69, No. 1; Gorski and Zoll; Kapralos; Lalwani; Popeo, p. 137; Silverberg; Zoll, Islam Battleground. 222 Ammar, Nawal H. et al. “Muslims in Prison: A Case Study from Ohio State Prisons.” International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology. 2004: Vol. 48, No. 4, p. 419; Baykan, Blanche; Colson “Evangelizing”; Hamm, “Terrorist Recruitment,” p. 19; Kapralos; Lalwani; Razaq; Silverberg. 223 In general, religious services tend to be the most attended services. See Dammer, p. 36; Hamm, Terrorist Recruitment, p. 19; Mufti; Popeo, p. 137. 224 In 1962 Muslim inmates won the right to limited proselytizing after the Supreme Court ruled in their favor case regarding the matter of convicts preaching among convicts. See Ammar et al., p. 421; Baykan; Clines, Francis X. “Prison Has the Body, but Allah Has the Spirit.” The New York Times. Jul. 2, 1992; Daly and Gerwehr, p.75 and 81; Hannah et al., p. xi; Karpalos; Hamm, Terrorist Recruitment, p. 24; Moore, Robert. F. “Deep Inside City Jails, Top Cops Keep a Watchful Eye.” The Daily News. Aug. 13, 2006; Teauge. 225 A prisoner in California described the Sunni inmates as, “a scary bunch… [who] are against the government and against the prison system.” See Baykan; Hamm, Terrorist Recruitment, p. 79. 226 Krikorian and Warren. 227 In its desire to expand the continued recruitment of terrorist operatives without the deployment of mid or senior level recruiters to the actual place of desired recruitment, al Qaeda has published an easily accessible, fifty-one page handbook entitled, “The Course in the Art of Recruitment,” that provides a “highly structured recruitment process with multiple stages and clear, simple metrics to assess a recruit’s progress.” The manual has been described as reflecting al Qaeda’s strategic “bureaucratization of decentralized Jihadist recruitment… and an attempt to simplify the difficult art of radicalization for a less-skilled generation of Jihadists recruiters.” See Cilluffo et

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cell block, three prisoners can disrupt an entire prison operation.”228 Still, Chaplains

consistently espouse the rehabilitative and reformative power of Islam, which for most

inmates, is true.229 One veteran correctional officer even stated that given the short

duration of most prison sentences, the opportunity to convert indoctrinate and radicalize

others is “extremely limited.230 But given the current trend towards accelerated

radicalization, even a short prison sentence could be a significant catalyst in the

formation of a terrorist.231

Prisoners turn to religion for numerous reasons.232 Islam can alleviate some of the

immediate deprivations of prison life.233 But the primary motives are protection from

sexual, physical or economic exploitation as well as connection to a social network

necessary for survival in unstable environments.234 “Many terrorist and extremists groups

view prisons as an especially attractive recruiting ground because they provide a pool of

vulnerable people, with little option but to join a group to survive.”235 As a Pennsylvania

based counter terrorism official said of Prislam, “It’s about survival. And then

indoctrination.”236 The decision to turn to Islam in prison is also influenced by group

dynamics like peer pressure as well as personal reasons like the pains of isolation from

friends and family and a need to belong.237 Even prisoners with the most restricted status

can frequently attend religious services.238 There are also superficial reasons, such as

special privileges.239 Like other religions, the ability to congregate for prayer serves

al., p. 5; Fishman, Brian and Warius, Abdullah. “A Jihadist’s Course in the Art of Recruitment.” CTC Sentinel. Feb. 2009: Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 10; Hamm, Terrorist Recruitment, p. 28. 228 “Hard Time: Breaking Point.” National Geographic, 2009. 229 Gorski and Zoll; Hamm, Terrorist Recruitment, p. 62. 230 In the case of the New Folsom terrorism plot (discussed below), the incarcerated leader of the terror cell was able to radicalize another inmate in the single month. The inmate went on to leave prison, recruiting and radicalizing two more young men. 231 Baran, Roots, p. 9; Bryant, Elizabeth. “Judge profiles new terrorist generation.” United Press International. Oct 5, 2005; Fighel; Rewriting the Narrative. 232 Dammer, p. 38 and El-Hassan and Spalek, p. 101. 233 Close and Dix-Richardson, p. 101. 234 Baykan; Close and Dix-Richardson, p. 101; Dammer, p. 43; Fighel; Hamm Terrorist Recruitment, p. 62, 66 and 108; Kushner; Neumann, p. 41; and Zoll Islam Battleground. 235 CIA. 236 Teauge. 237 Dammer, p. 46; El-Hassan and Spalek, p. 101; Fighel; Hamm Terrorist Recruitment, p. 66; Rosenau, p. 26 and Taarnby, p. 22. 238 Dammer, p. 47. 239 Ibid p. 50; Kushner.

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numerous purposes, chief among them is social interaction followed by “business” or the

passing of contraband or the issuing of gang.240 It is estimated that gangs control 40% of

religious services, and more then 60% of prison gangs use religious meetings as a cover

for criminal intentions.241 60% of corrections officials say the problem with gangs

abusing religious rights will definitely increase, and 70% believe the gang problem, in

general, will worsen over the next few years.242

Prison officials state that if prayer meetings get “too political,” then they are shut

down, but prisoner officials report monitoring only half of all religious services.243 And

approximately half of all prisons report inmates are allowed to lead religious services,

and it is primarily Muslim services, due to a lack of staff and resources, that are led by

inmates.244 But religious gatherings are not necessary for radicalizing and recruiting, an

activity best suited for the “yard.”245 One California prisoner stated, “Yards are so

politically charged these days… [Muslims] need to make a show on the yard because

gangs do it, if gangs make a show, then Muslims have to make a show to survive.”246 A

Florida Chaplin noted, “[Inmates] cluster in the yard by religion [and] more aggressive

people are doing the evangelizing.”247

THE AMERICAN PRISONER

A prisoner incarcerated in America today is most likely to be a young African American

male; in fact, one in nine Black men between the ages of twenty and thirty-four are

currently incarcerated, compared to one in twenty six for Hispanic men and one in fifty-

seven for White men.248 Across the spectrum of age, race and sex, Black men represent

240 Dammer, p. 48; Hamm Terrorist Recruitment, p. 96; Teauge; Zoll Islam Battleground. 241 Knox, pp. 29-30. 242 Despite the fact that 75% of all American prisons have rules in place that ban gang recruitment, jail remains the primary vehicle for gang recruitment in the U.S. today, and both prisoners and prison officials report prison as an environment that leads to the strengthening gang affiliation. Ibid, pp. 8, 14 and 30-31. 243 Ibid, p. 15; Hamm Terrorist Recruitment, p. 95. 244 Of the top ten religious service in American prisons being run by prisoners, six are Islamic in affiliation and among the twenty-four religious services being run by inmates, thirteen are Islamic in affiliation. See Cilluffo et al, p. 6; DOJ, pp. 7-8; Knox, pp. 15 and 42-43. 245 Dammer, p. 55; Hamm Terrorist Recruitment, p. 95. 246 Hamm Terrorist Recruitment, pp. 87-88. 247 Ibid, p. 69. 248 Pew, “One in 100,” p. 34.

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the highest proportion of the prison population: one in twenty-one African Americans in

the U.S. currently incarcerated in the nation’s penal system (for Hispanics the statistic is

one in fifty-four).249 In fact, at all levels of the judicial system African Americans are

disproportionably represented.250 Excluding race, we find that one in thirty men in

America between the ages of twenty and thirty-four are incarcerated.251 Black men are

incarcerated at six times the rate of Whites and almost one-third of all Black men

between eighteen and thirty-four are or have been incarcerated, or are currently on

parole.252 Given the rise of the number of incarcerated Hispanic Muslims – they now

represent the largest ethnic group in America’s federal prisons – the potential for a future

threat is present.253 Many of these individuals are not citizens and faced charges on

immigration related offenses, in addition, but not limited to, smuggling, transporting and

harboring illegal aliens; a troubling fact if one considers the growing connection between

terrorism in Latin America and transnational crime.254

Rates of incarceration in the U.S. have been on the rise for thirty-three years (with

Federal prisons leading the charge) despite more then a decade of declining crime

rates.255 The one aspect of prison that has not changed in the past thirty-three years, much

like that of its Muslim population, is its racial composition; prison in America has been

and remains to this day a predominately African American experience.256 Blacks in

America today make up almost half of all inmates (more than 900,000 individuals).257

249 Ibid, p. 34. 250 Close and Dix-Richardson, p. 99; Ibid, p. 34; Smith, Black Muslims, p. 137. 251 Pew, “One in 100,” p. 34. 252 Close and Dix-Richardson, p. 99. 253 One Hispanic Muslim organization reported distributing more then 5,000 Spanish language Qu’rans to mosques and prisons, after 9/11. By 2006, they will be filling annual orders in excess of 5,500 to institutions across the country, including prisons. See Appendix Two: Federal Prisoner Distribution Since 1950). Alter; Gamboa, Suzanne. “New face of offender in federal courts in Hispanic.” Associated Press. Feb. 18, 2009. 254 Ibid. 255 DeParle, Jason. “The American Prison Nightmare.” The New York Review of Books. Apr. 12, 2007: Vol. 54, No. 6; “New Incarceration Figures: Thirty-Three Consecutive Years of Growth.” Washington, D.C.: The Sentencing Project, Mar. 31, 2009. <http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1044.pdf> (hereafter The Sentencing Project). 256 Ibid. 257 Knox, p. 30; The Sentencing Project.

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Today’s American prisoner is generally a young, low-income, uneducated, Black

man with a prior criminal history.258 Recidivism is said to be “institutionalized” into the

American criminal justice system.259 An inmate at New York’s Riker’s Island stated,

“Once you’re in jail you’re always in jail because you just keep coming back.”260 Prison

not only reflects the inequalities of America, it also perpetuates them, exacerbates them

and creates new ones while hiding it all from view of the public.261 Overall, prison is a

microcosm of the world outside of its walls.262 But perhaps what makes it most distinct is

that it represents a “collective experience for young black men that is wholly different

from the rest of American society.”263

Prison is fertile ground for extremism because it creates a natural “captive

audience.”264 Muslim organizations in America recognize this fact. In 2001 the New York

Times reported an Imam at a predominately Black mosque in California as stating, “There

was a very deliberate recruitment by the Saudis [in the 1990s], trying to find Black

Muslims who had real potential for Islamic learning and also for submission to their

agenda.”265 It helps recruitment that inmates know little about Islam, nor do they

understand that they are being recruited.266 Some 90% of prison converts to Islam are

African American, a higher percentage then the number of African Americans in

258 Kushner. 259 Recidivism is estimated between 70% and 95%, but for “true conversion” it is estimated at just 15%. See DeParle; Hamm, Terrorist Recruitment, p. 55. 260 “Lockup: Return To Riker’s Island.” MSNBC. Jun. 13, 2009. 261 DeParle and Ibid. 262 Cilluffo, Jihadists Threats. 263 DeParle. 264 Ammar et al., p. 420; Colson, Evangelizing; Close and Dix-Richardson, p. 92; Fighel; Hamm, Terrorist Recruitment, p. 110 and 113; Krikorian and Warren; Marks; Rice-Oxley; Silverberg; Smith, Black Muslims; Syal, Rajeev and Townsend, Mark. “Islamists target teen crime gangs in London.” The UK Observer. Jan. 11, 2009; Taarnby, p. 32. 265 In 2002, U.S. News & World Report featured an article highlighting the role of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, over the past twenty-five years, in targeting African-American Muslims for recruitment and radicalization by offering scholarships to study Islam in their respective countries: “the first step is education, and then they’re recruited by more militant groups.” See “Black America, Prisons and Radical Islam.” Washington, D.C.: Center for Islamic Pluralism, Sept. 2008, p. 7. <http://www.islamicpluralism.org/CIPReports/CIPPrisonReport.pdf>; Harden; Kaplan, USA; Menefee, Amy. “Islamic Religious Groups Jockey for Prison Access as Concerns Over Inmate Terrorism Grow.” Congressional Quarterly. Jun. 24, 2003; Waller, p. 98. 266 Chodhury, p. 21; Saunders, Debra J. “Prislam – the threat from within.” The San Francisco Chronicle. Sept. 21, 2006.

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prison.267 And as the number of adherents continues to grow, “misunderstandings become

more and more dangerous.”268

OPERATIONALIZATION

14.5% of prisons report inmates reaching out to an “extremist group outside the U.S.”, a

group the report does not name for “security reasons.”269 Whoever this unnamed terror

organization may be, theses statistics imply that 280,000 inmates in the U.S. have

attempted to make contact with foreign terrorists from behind America’s prison walls. It

is difficult to imagine an indigenous Muslim group, reaching out to the international

Jihadi leadership to terrorism on American soil. But in 1987, members of a Chicago

based gang-turned-radical Islamist movement were convicted of plotting terrorist attacks

inside the U.S. in return for $2.5 million from the Libyan government, and its then

designated terrorist leader Muammar al-Qaddafi.270 The group, described as one of the

nation’s deadliest gangs, was once known as the Black P. Stone Nation but was

transformed by its leader Jeff Fort, an African American convert to Islam, into the El

Rukn Tribe of the Moorish Science Temple in America.271 Originally formed in the

1960s to fight White gangs, the group used the prison pay phone to begin a widespread

recruitment drive and at its peak had close to ten thousand “casual” members

(approximately three hundred who were considered hard core members or “divine

warriors”).272 The case marked the first time in history American citizens were convicted

of conspiring to commit terrorists acts in the U.S. for a foreign government in exchange

for money.273 But they were not the only Muslim group in prison to become an actual

operational threat.

267 Ammar et al., pp. 419 and 425. 268 Ibid, p. 426. 269 Knox, p. 25. 270 “Five Draw Long Sentences for Terrorism Scheme.” The Associated Press. Dec. 31, 1987; Knox, George. “Gang Profile Update: The Black P. Stone Nation (BPSN).” Peotone: National Gang Crime Research Center, 2008. <http://www.ngcrc.com/ngcrc/bpsn2003.htm>; Schmidt, William. “Chicago Journal; U.S. Squares off Against Tough Gang.” The New York Times. Nov. 5, 1987; Terry, Don. “In Chicago Courtroom, Nation’s First Super Grand Fights for Life.” The New York Times. May 19, 1991. 271 El Rukn is Arabic for the cornerstone. See Ibid. 272 Ibid. 273 “Five Draw Long Sentences for Terrorism Scheme.” The Associated Press. Dec. 31, 1987.

43

The Jam’yyat Al-Islam Al Saheeh (JIS) plot was hatched by a charismatic African

American Muslim convert named Kevin James in California’s New Folsom Prison and

embodies many of factors discussed that contribute to a situation in which American-born

convicts are led to terrorism through conversion.274 A juvenile delinquent and long time

gangbanger, James was incarcerated for ten years in 1997 on robbery charges.275 He

converted to Islam and began proselytizing to other prisoners while secretly hand writing

and distributing his “JIS Protocol,” a manifesto of [his] religious beliefs, including the

justification for killing infidels… [and which] required prospective JIS members take an

oath of obedience to James [and] swear not to disclose the existence of JIS.”276 Using

smuggled letters and telephone conversations throughout the 1990s and in the early part

of the last decade, James was able to spread his ideology throughout the prison without

detection by authorities until late into 2002 when James, and other JIS leaders, were

dispersed throughout the system to decrease their accumulative power.277

James began distributing the same literature and preaching to prisoners in his new

home at California’s New Folsom correctional facility.278 And in 2004, James began

writing his “Blue Print 2005” (modeled after an al Qaeda manual easily accessible on the

Internet) that encourages incarcerated Muslims to set up “Islamic programs” and recruit

inmates who are “disenchanted with their country’s policies.”279 The document also

promoted developing skills in bomb building, creating as well as distributing propaganda

and taught recruits how to “blend into society” upon their release.280 And under the guise

of “religious worship” James was able to conduct paramilitary training on prison grounds

and was even able to co-opt a prison Imam, who smuggled in and handed out razor

blades to James and his followers in prison.281

274 Hamm, Terrorist Recruitment, pp. 42 and 39-53; Harris, Rob. “Kevin James and the JIS Conspiracy.” PBS. Oct. 10, 2006. <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/enemywithin/reality/james.html>; Krasnowski, Matt. “Probe fans fears of prison terror plots.” Copley News Service. Aug. 22, 2005. Also see “FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin.” Washington, D.C.: Department of Justice, October 2010. 275 Ibid, p. 40. 276 As of 2002, the document was over one hundred pages. See Ibid, pp. 40-41. 277 Ibid, pp. 41-42. 278 Ibid, p. 42. 279 Ibid, p. 43. 280 Ibid, pp. 43-44. 281 Ibid, p. 44.

44

James’ terrorist plan was catapulted into action when he radicalized a recent

prison convert to Islam, Levar Washington, just one month before he was paroled.282

During that brief period, James convinced Washington to stockpile weapons for an attack

and to recruit five people without criminal records to form a terror cell in response to the

war in Iraq.283 Washington was successful in recruiting two devout Muslims, African

American convert Gregory Patterson and Pakistani national Hammad Samana.284 The

three JIS members, went on a robbery spree to fund their operations, making off with

approximately $3,000 from eight gas stations in less then one month before being

arrested by cops at the scene of their last heist.285 JIS “sought to convert their criminal

behavior into a form of service to Islam.”286 When the police raided the apartment shared

by Washington and Patterson, a small cache of weapons was recovered.287 It was

determined the men had been planning on attacking U.S. Army recruitment stations as

well as Jewish centers in California.

In their extensive study of prisoner radicalization, researchers at the George

Washington University reported officials in California as stating, “every investigation

into radical groups in their prisons uncovers new leads, but [we] simply do not have

enough investigators to follow every case of radicalization.”288 And according to Hamm,

New Folsom is not the only institution where a plot similar to that hatched by the JIS has

been unconverted: A similar plot was discovered in California’s Pelican Bay correctional

institution, as well as in an unnamed California juvenile institution and a juvenile group

home.289 The Florida Department of Corrections also reported uncovering a similar plot

inside an adult prison facility.290 Hamm concludes, “All the organizational preconditions

are in place for the emergence of another terrorist group like JIS. The only thing missing

282 Ibid, pp. 44-45. 283 Ibid, pp. 44-45. 284 Ibid, p. 45. 285 Ibid, pp. 46-47. 286 Conway, Ian and Cozzens, Jeffrey. “The 2005 Los Angeles Plot: The New Face of Jihad in the U.S.” Terrorism Monitor. Jan. 26, 2006: Vol. 4, No. 2. 287 Hamm, Terrorist Recruitment, pp. 48-49. 288 Cilluffo, et al., p. ix. 289 Hamm, Terrorist Recruitment, p. 40. 290 Ibid, p. 40.

45

is a charismatic leader capable of radicalizing the most vulnerable.”291 There are no

shortages of such charismatic individuals in prison: “The prisons of today are producing

the terrorists of tomorrow.”292

CONCLUSION

If it is true that, “Ideology on its own does not make a radical,” that, “ideology provides

justification [and] the social situation creates the radicalization,” then the role of prison in

creating the next generation of al Qaeda, both in the U.S. and beyond, should be of great

concern.293 The convert does not need direction, he can self-recruit, self-indoctrinate and

be self-executing. As al Qaeda’s core “fragments, the threat may diversify,” thrusting the

“self-starter” to the front lines.294 Many extremists are “resolutely amateur” in their

tradecraft but “amateurs are as dangerous as professionals if they are lucky, and if there

are enough amateurs plotting, some of them will be lucky.”295 Al Qaeda no longer has the

luxury of importing operatives and has emphasized the individual’s undertaking of self-

financing, self-training and self-motivating, particularly through the spread of knowledge

on the Internet.296 What essentially develops is a “Leaderless Jihad.”297 The process has

become bottom up, rather the top down; it’s now a “system rather then an

organization.”298 Al Qaeda, as many commentators like to refer to it as, has become a

“franchise” operation.299

291 Ibid, pp. 89-99 and 115. 292 In a secret intelligence report from British authorities noted, “Terrorists groups are remarkably tolerant of individuals with serious criminal histories. This is the case even when those individuals continue to be involved in very serious non-terrorist crimes.” See Cuthbertson, p. 18; Ibid, p. 99; Rotella, Holy Water; Travis, MI5. 293 Huband, p. 3 294 UK Counter Terrorism Strategy, p. 48. 295 Edwards, Richard. “Britain faces attacks by new generation of terrorists, warns experts.” The Telegraph. Jun. 13, 2009 (hereafter, Edwards, New Generation). 296 The “serious impact” and importance of “virtual recruitment,” although beyond the scope of this paper, should not be underestimated. See Mili; Neumann, pp. 23-26; Nesser, Militant Causes, p. 234; Precht, pp. 9-10 297 Cilluffo, Jihadists Threats; Hamm, Mark S. “Crimes Committed by Terrorist Groups: Theory, Research and Prevention.” Washington, D.C.: Dec. National Institute of Justice, Dec, 2007, p. 69. <http://www.ncjrs.gov/app/Publications/Abstract.aspx?ID=232469> (hereafter, Hamm, Crimes); Neumann, p. 21; Sageman. 298 Baran, Roots, p. 9; Neumann, p. 22; Taarnby, p. 22 and 50. 299 Burke, Jason. “Al-Qaeda: the second coming.” The Guardian and Observer. Mar. 11, 2007; Kirby, p. 425; Hoffman, Counter Terrorism Strategy, p. 4; Neumann, p. 21.

46

Prison radicalization has been and continues to overestimated by the press and

underestimated by the government and law enforcement alike. Radicalism is an

intangible threat of which we are only just beginning to grasp in any depth. Gregory

Saathoff testified before Congress, “We are living in complex times. An officer who can

easily identify and remove a razor blade from a Bible will most likely not be able to

identify the razors of radicalization.”300 And as the Anti-Defamation League stated in

their comprehensive report of prison radicalization: “Convicts are not nearly so insulated

from the rest of society as many American would like to believe, nor are Americans

somehow unaffected by what foes on inside the prisons walls… Putting criminals in jail

does not make us immune to their effects.”301 The threat is real: In 2003, the FBI publicly

stated no one in or out of the American prison system had, to date, joined al Qaeda.302

When asked the same question almost two years later, the FBI stated that they had, “no

comment.”303

300 Gregory Saathoff as quoted in Terrorism: Radical Islamic Influence, p. 12. 301 “Dangerous Convictions: An Introduction to Extremist Activities in Prisons.” New York: Anti-Defamation League, 2002, p. 4 and 50. <http://www.adl.org/learn/ext_terr/dangerous_convictions.asp> 302 Zoll, Islam Battleground. 303 Ibid.

47

APPENDIX

48

GRAPH #1

Percentage of Low Income Muslims in the U.S. and Europe

0

5

10

15

20

25

% of Muslims

US UK SPAIN GERMANY FRANCE

49

GRAPH #2 Muslim Identity: Relgion Over Nationality

in the U.S. and Europe

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

% of Muslims

US UK SPAIN GERMANY FRANCE

50

GRAPH #3 Muslim Concern Over Extremism

in the U.S. and Europe

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

% of Muslims

US UK SPAIN GERMANY FRANCE

51

GRAPH #4 Muslim Support for Suicide Attacks

in the U.S. and Europe

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

% of Muslims

US UK SPAIN GERMANY FRANCE

52

GRAPH #5 Muslim Belief in 9/11 Conspiracies

in the U.S. and Europe

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

% of Muslims

US UK SPAIN GERMANY FRANCE

53

GRAPH #6: Americans and American Muslims Views on Post 9/11 U.S. Strategy304

304 Georgetown/Zogby; Gilbert, pp. 12-13 and Pew pp. 49-50.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

% of Population

Iraq Right Iraq Wrong Afghan Right Afghan

Wrong

War on Terror War on Islam

Pew (Muslim Pop.)

Georgetown (Muslim Pop.)

Hamilton (Muslim Pop.)

US General Population (Pew)

54

CHART #1: Selected Comparison of European General Muslim Populations

and Their Respective Muslim Prison Populations305

COUNTRY306 MUSLIM GENERAL POP. MUSLIM PRISON POP. Belgium ~ 2% < 15% Denmark > 5% 70% Germany > 2% 34%

Italy > 1% 28.5% Switzerland > 30% < 60%

Scotland > 1% 1.3% The Netherlands307 > 6% < 20%308

305 Arie, Sophie. “A rising tide of Muslims in Italy puts pressure on Catholic culture.” The Christian Science Monitor. Nov. 10, 2003; Cambrensis, Giraldus. “India: Why so many Muslims in prison?” Faith Freedom. Oct. 31, 20006; Colson, Charles. “Terrorists Behind Bars.” First Things: Journal of Religion, Culture, and Public Life. Nov. 2002 (hereafter Colson, “Terrorists Behind Bars”); Moniquet, Claude et al. “Islamism, Jihadism and Counter-Terrorism Five Years After 9/11.” Brussels: European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center, Sept. 11, 2006, p. 16 <http://studies.agentura.ru/centres/esisc/11september.pdf>; Moore, France; “Muslims in Europe: Country Guide.” BBC News. Dec. 23, 2005; “New report about Islamism in Sweden.” Stockholm News. Jan. 30, 2009; Potzl, Norbert. “Life in a Parallel Society.” Spiegel. Apr. 16, 2008; Smith, Converts Aid Extremism; Struening, Felix. “Danish Psychologist: ‘Integration of Muslims in Western Societies is Not Possible.” Europe News. Mar. 31, 2009. 306 Additionally, Sweden has also reported a rise of extremism and extremism related violence over the past five years, although precise comparative statistics are not available. 307 Non-Muslim prisoners in the Netherlands have recently raised complaints about the food they are being served in prison. Authorities have decided to serve only halal (or kosher) food to appease the Muslim majority, but non-Muslim prisoners are upset with the lack of pork products (deemed haram or forbidden in Islamic law). See “White prisoners forced to eat Islamic diet.” NIS News. Jun. 30, 2009. 308 20% represents both the adult and juvenile prison populations. Ibid.

55

Appendix One: Muslims as a Percentage of the U.S. Population (2000)309

309 U.S. Census Bureau

56

Appendix Two

Federal Prisoner Distribution Since 1950310

310 American Correctional Association Directory of Correctional Facilities, 2006.

57

Appendix Three: State, Regional and National Prison Statistics311

STATE CORRECTIONAL POPULATION312

CORRECTIONAL CONTROL

RATE313 ALL CORECTIONAL 7,328,200 1 in 31

ALL PROBATION 4,293,163 1 in 53 ALL PRISON 1,512,576 1in 151 ALL PAROLE 824,365 1 in 278

STATE CORRECTIONAL

POPULATION CORRECTIONAL CONTROL RATE

ANNUAL COSTS314

NATIONAL RANK315

Alabama 108,843 1 in 32 $420 20 Alaska 14,005 1 in 36 $240 28 Arizona 144,221 1 in 33 $951 23

Arkansas 73,193 1 in 29 $348 16 California 755,256 1 in 36 $9,660 29 Colorado 128,186 1 in 29 $625 15

Connecticut 82,665 1 in 33 $699 22 Delaware 25,082 1 in 26 $200 11

District of Columbia 22,892 1 in 21 N/A 3 Florida 462,435 1 in 31 $2,820 18 Georgia 562,763 1 in 13 $1,100 1 Hawaii 31,620 1 in 32 $228 19 Idaho 62,231 1 in 18 $207 2

Illinois 252,776 1 in 38 $1,360 34 Indiana 181,459 1 in 26 $669 9

Iowa 42,294 1 in 54 $353 46 Kansas 39,275 1 in 53 $341 45

Kentucky 91,993 1 in 35 $521 26 Louisiana 122,207 1 in 26 $625 7

Maine 12,852 1 in 81 $153 50 Maryland 156,776 1 in 27 $1,190 12

Massachusetts 206,241 1 in 24 $1,250 5 Michigan 278,805 1 in 27 $2,180 13 Minnesota 152,319 1 in 26 $460 8 Mississippi 56,208 1 in 38 $266 33

Missouri 125,613 1 in 36 $575 27 Montana 16,997 1 in 44 $169 39 Nebraska 30,195 1 in 44 $179 40 Nevada 40,172 1 in 48 $253 43

New Hampshire 11,628 1 in 88 $101 51 New Jersey 191,473 1 in 35 $1,580 24

New Mexico 42,197 1 in 35 $277 25

311 “One in 31: The Long Reach of American Corrections.” Washington, D.C.: The Pew Center, March 2009. 312 Total population for probation, parole, prison and jail. 313 At an American population of 229,030,637; Correctional Control Rate = 1 in X adults in the state is under some manner of correctional authority. 314 In millions. 315 By population.

58

STATE CORRECTIONAL

POPULATION CORRECTIONAL CONTROL RATE

ANNUAL COSTS

NATIONAL RANK

New York 282,215 1 in 53 $2,870 44 North Carolina 181,435 1 in 38 $1,250 31 North Dakota 7,885 1 in 63 $65 47

Ohio 351,879 1 in 25 $1,790 6 Oklahoma 65,720 1 in 42 $491 38

Oregon 89,589 1 in 33 $763 21 Pennsylvania 346,268 1 in 28 $1,840 14 Rhode Island 31,250 1 in 26 $185 10

South Carolina 88,352 1 in 38 $487 32 South Dakota 15,211 1 in 40 $81 36

Tennessee 117,428 1 in 40 $675 37 Texas 797,254 1 in 22 $2,960 4 Utah 29,023 1 in 64 $330 48

Vermont 10,662 1 in 46 $116 42 Virginia 129,681 1 in 46 $1,250 41

Washington 165,725 1 in 30 $917 17 West Virginia 21,065 1 in 68 $181 49

Wisconsin 110,642 1 in 39 $1,080 35 Wyoming 10,631 1 in 38 $103 30

59

Appendix Four: Comparison of International Prison Population316

316 Pew, One in 100, p. 35.