Posidonius and the Timaeus: off to Rhodes and back to Plato

Classical Quarterly 47 (ii) 455-476 (1997) Printed in Great Britain 455

POSIDONIUS AND THE TIMAEUS: OFF TORHODES AND BACK TO PLATO?

We know enough about Posidonius' life1 to trace his wanderings: he was born into awealthy and influential family in Apamea, Syria; he went through all the steps of anHellenistic education; in Athens he encountered his Stoic teacher Panaetius; andfinally he settled—except for some travelling throughout the Mediterranean and toRome—in the high society of Rhodes, where he actively participated in political lifeand headed a Stoic school.

But Posidonius'journey to Rhodes is easier to map than his co-ordinates within thehistory of philosophy. In particular, the questions of his return to Plato and hiscontributions to later Platonism have created a sustained debate, full of controversies.2

One side of the argument includes fragments which are not explicitly ascribed toPosidonius, and in a number of cases relies on the hypothesis of a Timaeuscommentary by him, in order to recover theological, eschatological, or more 'mystical'aspects of his theories. These, then, are supposed to be the traits which anticipate laterPlatonism.

The countermove,3 which will be largely followed here, is much stricter in its choiceof fragments, is skeptical about the existence of a Timaeus commentary, and presentsus with a Posidonius who is more down to earth and who has pronounced scientificinterests. By this account, the evolution from Plato to his later followers is largelydetermined by the inner dynamics of Platonism itself; at the most Posidonius touchesupon some aspects of the evolution.4 But perhaps the question of Posidonius'intellectual co-ordinates should be rephrased.

As Ian Kidd5 convincingly argues, our evidence is too scanty to prove that Posido-nius wrote a commentary on the Timaeus, but at the same time it does not permit us toclaim with full certainty he did not. The least one can say, however, is that Posidoniushad a strong interest in the Timaeus, just as his predecessors in Stoicism did.6

Edelstein and Kidd show that Posidonius adapted parts of the Timaeus to his own

1 M. Laffranque, Poseidonios d'Apamee Essai de mise au point (Paris, 1964), ch. 2, tries to dofull justice to the influences of Posidonius' social and historical context on his life and thought.

2 For a review see K. Reinhardt, RE 22,1 col. 570.28-624.11; Laffranque, op. cit., pp. 1-44; R.Hoven, Stoicisme et Stoiciens face auprobleme de I'au-dela (Paris, 1971), pp. 95-102.

3 As in Laffranque (op. cit.) or A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy (London, 1974), pp. 216-22.For the fragments I refer to the collection by L. Edelstein and I. Kidd (Cambridge, 1972).

4 As in Ph. Merlan, 'Beitrage zur Geschichte des antiken Platonismus: II. Poseidonios fiber dieWeltseele in Platons Timaios', Philologus 89 (1934), 197-214; From Platonism to Neoplatonism(The Hague, 1953), who focuses on the mathematical definitions of soul and the ontologicalstatus of mathematics in general. See also J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists (New York, 1977), p.107.

5 In the commentary on F85 (Sext. Emp. Math. 7, 93), which deals with a theory of senseperception based on the principle of 'like known by like', cf. 77. 45B-46C; see also PosidoniusF193; Etym. Magn. 'sight', F194, Aet. 4, 13, 3. The Sextus Empiricus fragment contains thefollowing statement: . . . , <jrqoiv 6 IJoaeiSoivios TOT IJX6.TWVOS Tifiaiov l^yoi^fvos,... F.Lasserre, Abrege inedit du Commentaire de Posidonius au Timee de Platon (PGen inv. 203)',Accademia Toscana di Scienze e Lettere, Studi 83 (Firenze, 1986), 71-127, claims to have found asummary of Posidonius' 'commentary' in the manuscript tradition.

6 For the Early Stoics' interest (primarily Zeno and Chrysippus) in the Timaeus, cf. myforthcoming book 'Demiurge and Providence: Stoic and Platonist Readings of Plato's Timaeus'(with Brepols Publishers).

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456 GRETCHEN REYDAMS-SCHILS

purposes as a Stoic philosopher. On this line of thought Plato represents forPosidonius a Stoic avant la lettre. But the reverse is the case as well: Posidonius'deviations from previous Stoic doctrine bring him more in tune with Plato's theories.This double move might have been motivated by a desire to secure the alreadyestablished position of Stoicism as a 'mainstream,' respectable philosophy, incor-porating notions from other schools of thought, and particularly from Plato, as adefence against the skeptical Academy, a fierce opponent of the Stoics. An issue thatmerits further investigation but goes beyond my present purpose is whether this kindof assimilation was intended to salvage the project of philosophy and truth from theSkeptics' 'suspension of judgement' by getting beyond disagreements betweendifferent thinkers. If the dissension can be smoothed over and if the implicit,underlying claim holds that the dissension is only apparent, the Skeptic cannot reactwith eiroxrj. But does this bring us back to the moot issue of Posidonius' contributionsto later Platonism, of his intellectual co-ordinates?

Not necessarily. Posidonius' 'deviations' are curiously difficult to pin down. Whatexactly are they and to what extent, if at all, do they constitute a genuine return toPlato? Why are these questions so hard to answer in the first place? Galen claims thatPosidonius tried to align both himself and Zeno with the Platonists.7 But why shouldwe believe Galen? The line of argument I will develop is that Posidonius' views havepassed through a screen of Platonism. In many cases it is difficult to know whatexactly Posidonius meant, because we do not have his own account, but glimpses ofhis work in later Platonists, whose wording coloured even late, non-Platonistrenderings. It is not so much that the nominal fragments are imprecise and faulty, butthat their selection, oddly enough, tends to focus on issues of Posidonius' return toPlato. Occasional slips in the wording also give the distortion away. While it is true thatfor the Early Stoics too we are limited to fragments in other sources, that particularproblem acquires a new dimension in the case of Posidonius.

Platonists appear to use Posidonius' deviations from the previous Stoic line to turnhim into their ally; they assimilate him, but nevertheless still criticize him for makingmistakes by the standard of orthodox Platonism. What we should not overlook,however, is that once the Stoic Posidonius has been turned into an ally of thePlatonists, he probably also justifies the assimilation into Platonism of some generalStoic concepts, which are common to Posidonius and the Early Stoics (a move which isintensified by Posidonius' Academic counterpart, Antiochus of Ascalon). Posidoniusis not a precursor of later Platonism, but some of his theories have been assimilated,and in this process Stoic concepts as well jumped aboard, as stowaways. (Or not socarefully stowed away after all? If we pay close attention to the texts, we can detect theirpresence.) Posidonius has not only transmitted and contributed to a Stoicizing readingof the Timaeus (which started before him), but he has also made concessions to Plato'sdiscourse which gave later Platonists a justification for adopting Stoic views.

This being the larger theoretical framework, the question that concerns us here ishow Posidonius incorporates material from the Timaeus—which is crucial to anyunderstanding of Posidonius' rapport with Platonism—and how our sources presenthis interpretations. I will concentrate mainly on the issue of the principles, God andmatter, but other test-cases will also be examined: the nature of the soul; the relationbetween Providence, necessity, and fate; and the interaction between the human leveland the universe as a whole. For both Stoics and Platonists these themes areinterconnected.

7 De Placitis 4, 258.19-23. Zeno did study with Polemo.



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POSIDONIUS AND THE TIMAEUS 457

I. THE PRINCIPLES OF THE UNIVERSE8

While most readers of the Timaeus, both Ancient and modern, have been and arepuzzled by the exact relationship between Being, Demiurge, World Soul, andreceptacle, the Stoics displayed an explanatory parsimony and posited two principlesfor the universe's structure: the active principle, or God, versus a passive one, ormatter. Modern scholars disagree on whether the Stoics considered these principlesas corporeal or not. I will argue that they did and that Posidonius agreed with hispredecessors. In order to do this I will re-examine the doxographical evidence anddraw on one Platonist source, Calcidius, who apparently saw no essential distinctionbetween Zeno and Chrysippus on the one hand, and Posidonius on the other. Then Iwill contrast the doxographical evidence and Calcidius' presentation with two otherPlatonist sources, Galen and Plutarch, who hauled Posidonius over to the Platonistcamp. The juxtaposition of two versions of Posidonius' tenet—one in tune withEarly Stoicism and one more Platonist in character—should help us assess therhetorical distortions to which his work was subjected.

But as stated already, before we can examine how Posidonius viewed the active andpassive principles, we need to take a side in the scholarly controversy over the questionof the corporeality of these principles. For Zeno and Chrysippus both the active andthe passive principles are said to be bodies,9 and the clash here seems to be onebetween Plato's incorporeal Being and the Stoics' corporeal divine principle. Not allmodern scholars,10 however, accept the evidence as genuine, the claim being that itrepresents an unfavourable attitude towards the Stoics. It is true that both Plutarch"and Plotinus12 report that this is the Stoic position and then accuse it of a regress: ifthe divine principle is corporeal, does this not imply that it contains matter (regress a)?There is a second regress to be noted: if corporeality can be considered a quality, doesa corporeal matter then not presuppose a minimum of structuring Xoyos, whichwould require another, lower-level substrate (regress b)?13 Also, if both principles arebodies, and the active principle totally permeates and is coextensive with the passiveone, then an absurd conclusion follows: two bodies occupying one and the samespace.14

8 Along the lines of the Early Stoics and the Timaeus, Posidonius considers the universe aunity (Edelstein and Kidd F4; D.L. 7, 143) and a living, ensouled and rational being (Edelsteinand Kidd F99a; D.L. 7,142-3).

9 At the heart of the controversy lies the fragment of Diogenes Laertius which I quote belowas (1) (7,134; SVF2,299; 300): the mss. tell us the principles are corporeal (owfiaTa), the parallelSuda version says they are incorporeal (d<rco/u.aTouy). The following are fragments which call theprinciples corporeal: SVF 1, 90 (ambiguous, however); 98 (vide infra); 153; 2, 305 (corporealmatter); 310 (see also 475); 313 (Plutarch's critique, vide infra); 314-315; 320 (Plotinus, vide infra);323 (Galen); 326 (corporeal matter); 336; 340 (cause is body); 343; 394; 467; 469 ('everything" iscorporeal); 533 (corporeal matter); 793; 1028 (aco^aToeiSi? TOV 9eov) 1029; 1032; 1034 (in which,curiously enough, Plato is aligned with the Stoics); 1046; 1051-3.

10 For a review see M. Lapidge, Archai and Stoicheia: A Problem in Stoic Cosmology',Phronesis 18 (1973), 240-78. See also A. Graeser, Zenon von Kition: Positionen und Probleme(Berlin, 1975), pp. 89-118; F. Sandbach, The Stoics (London, 1975), pp. 71-5; H. Hunt, APhysical Interpretation of the Universe: The Doctrines of Zeno the Stoic (Melbourne, 1976), pp.17-25; R. Todd, 'Monism and Immanence: Foundations of Stoic Principles', in The Stoics, ed. J.Rist (Berkeley, 1978), pp. 137-60; J. Mansfeld, 'Zeno of Citium', Mnemosyne 31 (1978), 162,167ff.; R. Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion. Theories in Antiquity and their Sequel (Ithaca, NewYork, 1988), ch. 6, esp. pp. 93-8.

11 Plut. De Communibus Notitiis 1085b-c.12 Plotinus Enn. 6, 1,26, 12ff.; see also SVF2, 323 on the problem of a corporeal matter.13 Both kinds of regress are pointed out by Graeser, op. cit., p. 103.14 This problem is hinted at in SVF2, 310 (cf. also 475). Note that the same problem applies to



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These conundrums have led some modern scholars to assume that what the Stoicsreally meant is that both principles, which never occur separately, are corporeal in sofar as they are aspects of bodies.15 There are several cogent reasons, however, forassuming that this was not the original Stoic position. First of all, one would have toargue away many of the fragments in von Arnim's collection.16 Secondly, as is essentialto my argument here, this formulation looks like the kind of solution a later,platonizing source might have come up with, in an attempt to reconcile the Stoic lineof thought with Plato.

Thirdly, a theory which denies that both principles are corporeal may actually losean explanatory advantage. That is, corporeal principles not only create problems, suchas the double regress mentioned above, they explain what things as we experience themlook like by assuming that corporeality is one of the fundamental features of theworld. Again, a later interpreter may consider that the solution is not worth thesacrifice of the Platonic purity of Being, which, however, has great difficultyaccounting for the corporeality that comes about when Being and the receptacle orBecoming are joined. The fact that so many interpretations of Plato's receptacle havebeen put forward (already in antiquity) should bring out the elegance of the Stoicsimplicity.

A fourth line of arguments focuses on the inner consistency of Stoic doctrine. Itseems reasonable to suppose that the Stoic principles are a special kind of bodies, asopposed to mere physical objects, because we expect the principles to be more basicthan the entities they help us to understand. But corporeal they are if one takes thefollowing points into account. (1) The corporeality of the active and passive principlebecomes clearer if we remember one of the Stoic descriptions of a body, namely asthat which has the capacity 'to act and/or be acted upon'. The 'or' disjunction wouldapply to the principles: the active one 'acts', the passive is 'acted upon'. The 'and'conjunction would apply to bodies in the ordinary sense: all bodies such as chairs andcats both act (even if merely by resisting) and are acted upon. So we do have the meansto distinguish the corporeality of the principles from that of physical objects.17 If thatis what we, as modern readers, mean when we use the phrase 'aspects of bodies', thenthere is nothing wrong with it, because it leaves the corporeality of the principlesintact. However, I would still plead for the terminology the Stoics themselves used,precisely in order to avoid the Platonists' (polemical and sometimes deliberate)misunderstanding. (2) The active principle inasmuch as it is creative fire (nvprexviKov) or life breath (wetâ)1 8 seems to have a corporeal nature. (3) The activeprinciple also seems corporeal when it is considered under its aspect of World Soul."This argument hinges on: (a) the corporeality of the human soul20 in the Stoics'theory, and (b) their strict parallel between macrocosm and microcosm: the human

the notion of a corporeal soul permeating a body; cf. SVF 2, 467; 471 (which presentsChrysippus' attempt at solving the problem). See also R. Todd, 'Alexander of Aphrodisias onStoic Physics. A Study of the De Mixtione ...', PhilAnt28 (1976).

'5 See, for instance, Lapidge, op. cit., p. 264 and Ssndbach, op. cit., p. 74.16 See n. 9.17 See SVF 1, 90; 2, 343; 363. Cf. Long and Sedley, pp. 273-^ (commentary on the fragments;

45A = SVF 1, 90; 45B = SVF2, 363).18 See, for instance, SVF 1, 171; 2, 1027; 1037 (which contrasts aawârov with wvevâ); 1054

(acb/xa irvevixaTiKOv); 1133; 1134.19 See, for instance, SVF 2, 311; 604; 605; 1064; see also A. Long, 'The Stoics on

World-conflagration and Everlasting Recurrence', Southern Journal of Philosophy Suppl. 23(1985), 22-3.

20 See, for instance, SVF 1, 134ff; 2, 773ff; 790ff.



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soul is a spark of the World Soul21 and consists of the very same Aoyos.So there appears to be plenty of evidence to underscore the corporeal nature of the

Stoic principles. But there are also indications22 that Stoic philosophers themselvestried to deal with the problem of the double regress. The question is whether Posi-donius was one of them and whether he turned to a more Platonist approach or not.

If we limit ourselves to one fragment preserved in Diogenes Laertius, this does notappear to have been the case:

1. 'It is the Stoics' opinion that there are two principles of all that there is, the active and thepassive. The passive principle is unqualified substance, matter; the active is the logos [rationalorganisation] in matter, namely god. For the latter, being eternal, fashions through the whole ofmatter each separate thing. This view is laid down by Zeno of Citium in On Substance,Cleanthes in On Indivisibles, Chrysippus near the end of Bk. 1 of Physics, Archedemus in OnElements, and by Posidonius in Natural Philosophy, Bk. 2. They say that principles are differentfrom elements. Principles are not subject to generation or destruction; elements are destroyed inthe conflagration. But also principles are bodies2* and without form, elements are enformed.'

(trans. Kidd F5; Diogenes Laertius 7, 134)24

If one wants to maintain that Posidonius deviates from the Early Stoics on the issueof the principles' corporeality, a possible explanation for the fragment just quotedcould be that Posidonius agrees with his Stoic predecessors concerning the generalfunction of both principles: that the active principle is the structuring factor to whichpassive matter owes its differentiating features. Because of this general agreementbetween the Early Stoics and Posidonius, one could argue, Diogenes Laertiusoverlooks a crucial difference.

This difference is supposedly given in another fragment, one from Arius Didymus,which singles out Posidonius:

2. 'Posidonius said that the substance of the whole and [i.e.?] matter was without quality andwithout shape, in so far as in no way has it a form detached of its own, nor quality by itself

21 See, for instance, 2, 774; 776; 777; 787.22 For a full discussion, see Kidd in his commentary on F92, 368-74.23 See n. 9. In a paper he graciously showed me before publication, Asomatos: Nuances of

Incorporeality in Philo', John Dillon has tried to make the case again for the dowpdrovsreading, but claiming it only for Posidonius, who is mentioned last. He bases his argumentationon (a) the symmetry of the passage, (b) the possibility that a later, 'smart' scribe corrected thepassage in light of the well attested corporeality of the Stoic principles. But note that accordingto (a) (argument of form) aoi/ucn-a would be the lectio difjicilior, and that the insertion of rayapxds could justify the break in the symmetry; according to (b) (argument of content)dacu/iaTouj would be the lectio difficilior. Contra (b), however, I argue that dowixdrovs is theresult of a Platonist influence on a later source, and that one would have to find a reply to Kidd'scombination of evidence from Plutarch (cf. my discussion of my fragment 5 below) and DiogenesLaertius, which indicates that Posidonius too considered matter to be corporeal. I would like tothank John Dillon for showing me his paper before publication, and for his willingness toparticipate in an exchange of ideas.

AoKet o avTois [sc. TOIS 2JTCOIKOLS] dpxds eivai TCOV 6XWV SVO, TO TTOIOVV KOI TOTraoxov. TO fiiv ofiv irdoxov etvai rr/v airoiov ovoiav TT)V vXr/v, TO Si TTOIOVV TOV iv avrfjXoyov TOV deov TOVTOV yap dt&iov ovra. Sid ndarjs avrijs Sfjiuovpyeiv eKaara. Ti8r)oi 8e TOSdy/u.a TOVTO ZTJVWV fj.ev 6 Kirievs iv T<J IJfpl ovolas (SVF 1, 85), KXedv0T)s 8' iv TU> FleplTWV aVo/wuv {SVF 1,493), Xpvoimros S' iv rfj d TCOV ^VOIKWV npos T(i reXfi (SVF 2, 300),M.pxio~r)ij,os o" iv TU> Ilepl aroix^twv (SVF 3, Arch. 12), KO.1 Floaei&wvios iv TW /} TOU<PVOIKOV Xoyov. 8ia<f>epeiv 8e (fiaoiv dpxas fa i CTTOt^efo' ras /J.iv ydp elvai ayevr/rovs<Kal> d<j>8dpTovs, ra 8e OTOixeia Kara. T-qv iK-nvpwaiv (frdeipeoOai. aXXa. Kal awpMra(dawixdrovs) elvai rds dpxas xal dfi6p<j>ovs, rd hi fiefiop<j>woQai. I use Kidd's translations asa starting point, in order to have some common ground for the discussion. Only when I disagreeon the points relevant for my discussion have I indicated alternatives between brackets.



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either, but always is in some form and quality. [For? Added by Kidd, sic] He said that substancediffers from matter in thought only, being the same [emendation] in reality.'

(trans. Kidd F92, word order changed; Arius Didymus Epitome fr. 20)25

The last sentence of the fragment, which carries the information we need, iscorrupted and is translated with an emendation. Essential to the understanding of thisdifficult passage is the meaning of the word 'substance' (ovaia).

The Stoics use the word 'substance'26 for 'prime matter' (npcuTr) vX-q), the substratetaken as a whole—the matter 'of all things taken together', as we will see belowDiogenes Laertius defines it—as opposed to the matter which underlies any givenentity. While Kidd agrees that this is probably the meaning of 'substance' in the firstline of the Posidonius fragment, he shifts the meaning of the term in the crucialclosing line: '[matter] exists as ovaia in everything as qualified material substrate. vX-qand ovaia always in fact concur'.27 Kidd here ties 'substance' together with particularsand equates it with 'qualified material substrate'. But it seems unlikely that Posidoniushimself would have shifted his usage of such an important concept as 'substance'within the span of this short fragment. I therefore would like to propose instead thatin the closing line 'substance' still means 'prime matter', and that according toPosidonius prime matter and the matter underlying particulars are not distinct inreality, but in thought only.

In order to prove the point, we can return to Diogenes Laertius and the ancientdoxographical tradition, which we need to examine in detail here. The following is thedistinction for which Diogenes Laertius this time singles out Posidonius' predecessors,Zeno and Chrysippus (so in the first fragment we had a statement about the Stoics asa group, the second was about Posidonius, and this one focuses on Zeno andChrysippus28):

3(1) Ovaiav 8e' <f>aoi TWV OVTWV dndvTwv rr/v Trpwrgv vXrjv,ws /cat Xpvaimros eV TJJ irpwrr) TWV QVOIKCOV KO.1 Zr/vwv.

(2) v\r) Se Zany e£ ~qs 6TI8T]7TOTOVV yiverai.

(3) /caAetrai Se* Styajg ovaia re /cat VXTJ,rj re TWV TrdvTwv

/cat r/ TWV €TTt jiepovs.

•q fxiv ovv Taiy SXwv OVT€ irXeiwv OUT' iXdrTwv ytVeTat•q Se Tan* em fiepovs /cat irXfiwv /cat eXaTTwv.

(4) awfxa Se £OTI zcaT* avrovw r/ ovaia /cat •netrtpaafievr), . . .(Diogenes Laertius 7, 150)

In (1) we get the definition of 'prime matter' as 'substance': 'Of all things existing,

I7oa€i8wviov. e<f>TjO€ 8e 6 Uoaeiowvios T~hv TOJV OXCOV ovaiav /cat VXTJV a/notov /cata/xopfiov flvai, Ka8' oaov ovSev dnoTeTay/xevdv iSiov e^et c^ /na oi58e noiorijTa Ka6'avrqv, del 8' ev Tin oxr/pari /cat TTOIOT^TI elvai. 8ia<f>fp€tv Se TT/V ovaiav TTJS vXrjs, TTJV<ai5ri7v> ovaav /caTa TTJV vwoaTaaiv, emiWa fj,6vov.

26 SVF 1,86-87; 2, 316-318; 300; 323. ' 27 373.28 Although these fragments are nominally attributed to the Stoics, I am aware of the fact that

they reveal doxographical patterns and traits, i.e. structuring features, which are typical of'collections of opinions' like Diogenes Laertius' or Arius Didymus', and which might not havebelonged to the original wording. Yet this does not imply that nothing of the originalterminology survived, and the recurrence of a specific vocabulary, with subtle shifts, remains avalid tool to assess Stoic doctrine.



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POSIDONIUS AND THE TIMAEVS 461

they say, prime matter is substance, as Chrysippus says in Bk 1 of Physics and Zenosays.'

Now if 'prime matter' can be called 'substance', it is both a kind of matter and it isdistinct from matter which does not carry the label 'prime'. In (2) we are given themeaning of matter in the general sense: 'Matter is that out of which (ef -fc) any giventhing comes about.' Matter in the general sense 'can be spoken of in two ways' (3),namely as 'substance and matter . . .'29 I take the second 'matter' here as a subkind ofthe general one; as matter which is not 'prime' or matter in a stricter sense. The textcontinues: 'the one [matter] (ovaia) of all things taken together, the other [matter] (uAijin the strict sense) of the particulars; the one of the whole (ovola), then, does notbecome more or less,30 the one of the particulars (vX-q in the strict sense) does'. So in(3) we find the feature which distinguishes prime matter as 'substance' from matter inthe strict sense. I take this distinction not to be the one between first and so-called'second matter' in the Aristotelian sense (the latter being something in its own right)but between two viewpoints (KaAefrcu 8e Six***5) o n unqualified matter or stuff, oneconsidering it together, and then it is prime matter, and the other considering it as thestuff which underlies particulars, i.e. the amount of stuff that went into a particularentity. (The 'second matter' would necessarily always fall under the latter category.)Ontologically speaking, though, both would be the same stuff. Looking at matter fromthese two perspectives is meaningful in a Stoic universe—as opposed to the eternalAristotelian one—because of the two eternally alternating phases of conflagrationand ordering, and the claim that the two principles always coexist. Thus there ispre-cosmic matter, completely drawn into the active principle, and matter underlyingthe generation of all things great and small (which, however, we can also, here andnow, consider as a whole, in relation to the active principle; the two perspectives are notlimited to diachronic alternations). We close (4) with the affirmation that 'substanceaccording to them (Chrysippus and Zeno) is a body and limited'.

Let us now compare this fragment to the one of Posidonius quoted above (2, intranslation):

IJoaeiScoviov. f<j>rja€ 8e 6 IlooeiSwvios(1) T17V rdv oXtuv ovaiav Kal vXrtv anoiov Kal afj.optj>ov tlvai, KCL8' oaov ovScvdiroT€TayiJ.4vov iSiov eêt ax'/jlô. ovSe TroidriyTa Ka9' aurijv, del 8' ev TIVI oxr/pari KalTTOIOTTJTI efvai.(2) Sia<f>€p€iv Si TTJU ovoiav rrjs vXrfs, TTJV âvTyjv^ ovoav /card TTJV imooTaaiv, €TTIVOIQfiovov. (2)

If the Posidonius fragment can be read as parallel to that of Chrysippus and Zeno,29 Hicks in his Loeb translation takes ovala re Kal uAij (i) as the subject and not as the

predicate and (ii) as two coinciding notions, i.e. as ovaia which is VXTJ. I adhere to a differentinterpretation. I am gratefully indebted to J. van Winden for having engaged himself in adiscussion about the issue and having strongly defended the Hicks-Waszink hypothesis, the one Iam arguing against. The following are my motivations for preferring the alternative reading: (i)the no article-predicate rule, (ii) 'first matter', not matter tout court, is called 'being* here, and (iii)precisely because there is no article (cf. in contrast the Posidonius passage 2) it is hard to tellwhether the two designations are coinciding or not; I take this re Kal to be anticipating thedistinction made immediately following. Note that my hypothesis as a whole does not stand orfall with this reading: minimally there are two kinds of matter being distinguished. For a parallelto reading KaAeirat Si^tu? as 'something is called by two names', see Galen Meth. Med. 14; 10,974,15 (where it is used as an equivalent of Sixws ovofxAêadai).

30 This does not have to impinge on the so-called 'Growing Argument' (cf. Long and Sedley,pp. 172-3): growth and diminishment in the case of particulars (aufr/my/fiei'eooiy) require anidentity of a subject, something remaining the same throughout the process, and that identitywould be due entirely to the active principle, not to the substrate. The question is whether the



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this would, I believe, yield the following interpretation. In (1) we examine whatapplies to matter in general, namely that it functions as a substrate and does not haveshape and quality in its own right, qua matter (compare with fr. 3, 2). In theexpression Wr/v TWV oXwv ovaiav xal VXTJV' (compare TTJV TWV OXWV ovaiav with rj

re TWV navTuivl-q pev TWV oXwv of 3, 3) the label 'matter' is not entirely coextensivewith 'substance', although the KO.1 is explanatory, as Kidd claims:31 'substance' is akind of matter, in the general sense, but it is not the only kind there is. Since the firstpart of the statement is concerned with what applies to matter generally, 'substance'and 'matter' are taken together here (one article for both) and the sentence continueswith a verb in the singular. In (2), however, it goes on to distinguish (8ia<f>epeiv 8e)'substance' from 'matter', and hence we here need 'matter' in its strict sense, thesubkind which is not 'prime' (notice the use of two articles). Prime matter is distinctfrom the matter of particulars in thought only, and not in reality. The Posidoniuspassage, then, does not shift the meaning of 'substance', but rather shifts themeaning of 'matter', from its general to its strict sense, and if the doxographicalrendering is accurate, Posidonius follows in the footsteps of his predecessors, whouse 'substance' in the same sense as he does32 and who also carry out the same shiftin the meaning of 'matter'.

If Posidonius' distinction as reported by Arius Didymus is related to the one ofZeno and Chrysippus which is preserved in Diogenes Laertius, there is an importantconsequence for our reading of the ancient doxographical tradition: the AriusDidymus fragment cannot be considered a strand of information which is totallyseparate from Diogenes Laertius' sources and cannot be used as an alternativeaccount, against Diogenes Laertius. That is, we cannot readily claim that whileDiogenes Laertius groups Posidonius together with the Early Stoics as a proponent ofcorporeal principles, Arius Didymus on the other hand shows us a Posidonius whoadheres to a very different view. If Diogenes Laertius lacks a crucial bit of informationconcerning Posidonius, we lack it too, since, as we will see, the Arius Didymusfragment is not sufficient all by itself to sustain the claim that Posidonius did moveaway from the original Stoic position. But another possibility is that DiogenesLaertius simply does not consider Posidonius' version of the distinction between'substance' and 'matter', in the strict sense, innovative enough to highlight it in a

notion of 'becoming more or less', on the other hand, does ask for such a strong identityrequirement, and whether it is to be put on the same level as 'growing and diminishing', seePosidonius F96 = Long and Sedley 28D, (5): 'The substance neither grows nor diminishesthrough addition or subtraction, but simply alters, just as in the case of numbers and measures.'(TT/V Se OVOICLV OVT' av^todai OVT€ fi€tovoOai /card Trp6od€oiv rj atJMiipeoiv, dXXa \t.6vovaXXoiovodai, KaBairep eV apidfJMv /cai fiirprnv. As with 'stuff', one can add to or subtractfrom numbers and measures; amounts and sizes can become more or less, but they cannot growor diminish in the strict sense used here.) See also Long and Sedley 28q = SVF1, 87 = part F92Posidonius, my passage 2, where Zeno, Chrysippus, and Posidonius are mentioned, with the claimthat for Zeno the sum total of matter does not become more or less, and that for Chrysippus itdoes not grow and diminish (both of these being true). The latter passage is not so helpful withregard to particulars, because they are described in terms of division and fusion, which are due tothe active principle, in the lines devoted to Zeno.

31 370.32 As Terence Irwin pointed out to me, in Posidonius F96 = Long and Sedley 28D, Posidonius

himself uses 'substance' both for prime matter and matter underlying particulars. This couldindicate that he did not always make the distinction, just as in part 1 of the fragment thatconcerns us here. Note that in fragment 96 Posidonius does not use the word 'SXTJ' at all, not evenwhen he talks about the 'qualified individual' being one of two receptive parts, next to substance,for a 'peculiarly qualified thing'. Again, I think that in part 2 of the fragment 92 Posidonius alignshimself with and consciously refers to his Stoic predecessors, i.e. if the source has any accuracy.



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separate entry. In that case we have two versions, one ascribed to Zeno andChrysippus, the other to Posidonius, of one and the same distinction.

That Posidonius held a view similar to that of his Stoic predecessors is at least howCalcidius—the late Platonist whose thinking shows a kinship with MiddlePlatonism—seems to have understood it.33 Within his commentary on the TimaeusCalcidius devotes considerable attention to the concept of 'matter'.34 He does notreject the Stoic view altogether, because, like Plato, he claims that the Stoics considermatter to be eternal and ungenerated35 and to be without form or quality.36 But hedoes assert that matter cannot be without form or quality and yet be corporeal as well,as the Stoics want it,37 and he also criticizes the Stoics for intertwining the divineprinciple too intimately with matter.38

Calcidius too mentions the Stoic distinction between 'substance' and 'matter', andhe has conflated the two different versions we have discussed so far. After he hasprepared his ground, he, like Anus Didymus in the Posidonius fragment, starts withwhat is typical of matter in general, its function as a substrate (essentia et silva est...,294.1; cf. rrjv TOJI> OACDJ' oiiaiav KOLI vX-qv and the singular verb, 2,1) and he then goeson to distinguish the two notions (Plerique tamen silvam separant ab essentia ...,294.6; cf. Siaêpeiv 8e rr/v ovaiav TIJS VXTJS, 2, 2). He rephrases the distinction twiceafter the initial attempt.

His first distinction (294.6-12) splits up a pair of terms that is prominent in thePosidonius fragment (2,1), the one of 'quality' and 'shape':

S/iToiov a.fj.op(f>ovTroionjTct axyjâ•noia-rtjTi (j iy/ian

Calcidius claims that 'prime matter'/'essence' (essentiam vero primam rerum omniumsilvam; in 1.12 he uses substantiam) is without shape or form; 'matter' as distinct from'prime matter' is what underlies qualities, and hence the term could also apply tosomething like the bronze for a statue, a material which is something in its own right,but qua matter for the statue is the substrate for its qualities. Here the Peripateticcontributions to the legacy of matter as substrate surface again. (In my discussion ofthe Posidonius fragment, 2,1 claim that this probably is not the distinction at whichZeno and Chrysippus were getting.)

The phrase 'without shape or quality' seems to be Calcidius' preferred label for'matter'.39 Among the Stoics, it is Posidonius who appears to use it emphatically, in thefragment quoted here. It is striking that the fragments which mention or include hisStoic predecessors display the tendency to either use 'without quality' or 'withoutshape/form', not both modifiers joined together in a pair.40 Even Waszink, who

33 See also Alcinous, Didaskalikos 162.29-39.34 Cc. 275-320 (ed. Waszink). 35 Cc. 279-301.36 Cc. 283-301. 37 Cc. 310-11; 319-20.38 See, for instance, 296.11-297.6.39 It reappears, for instance, in 310.12-15; 311.5; and Waszink (1962), p. xxxiv, has used it for a

subdivision in his outline of the structure of the text.40 As Kidd himself points out, 370, 'without quality' (diroios) appears in SVF2, 300 (D.L. 7,

134; quoted here as 2.1); 301 (Stoics in general); 309 (Stoics in general); 313 (Stoics in general);315 (Stoics in general); 318 (Origen, apparently an exception to the claim made here; vide infra);323 (Stoics in general); 326 (Stoics in general); 'without shape' (Kidd's translation, apopôs) wefind in SVF2,299 (again D.L. 7,134); 314 (Stoics in general); 'without shape' (dox^/iana-ros) cf.SVF2, 311 (Stoics in general); 318 (the Origen fragment). The Origen fragment seems to be anexception, since it does pair up the two labels. But Waszink points out that there are verbalsimilarities between the Origen passage and the one of Calcidius discussed here (a resemblance



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generally dismisses Posidonian influences on Calcidius' commentary, admits that hemight be behind this part of Calcidius' account: Waszink sees a connection betweenPosidonius' distinction 'in thought only' and Calcidius' claim that 'matter' is a labelused 'in the thought of a craftsman' (contemplatione opificis, 294.15). But Posidonius'influence here might go beyond that particular claim. The fact that Chrysippus andZeno are the only Stoic thinkers explicitly mentioned by name can be explained if wetake into account that the original distinction between 'prime matter' and 'matter' inthe strict sense goes back to them and that Calcidius has conflated the two versions.

This conflation is demonstrated in the doxographical pattern of first showing whatsubstance and matter have in common, in order to focus next on the differences, and itis reinforced by Calcidius' or his source's transformation of the Stoic material.Calcidius does not merely first render a view attributed to Zeno and Chrysippus andthen one which parallels Posidonius; a distinctly Peripatetic veneer is added. ThePosidonius distinction as rendered in Calcidius builds on a designation of matter asfoundation (fundamentum, 294.14) which is added to his version of the Zeno/Chrysippus fragment (1. 9; it is not in the Diogenes Laertius version, 3). Within thepassage which is supposed to be parallel to Zeno/Chrysippus 'prime matter/substanceas foundation' is glossed as that which is 'the cause of being' for things (ut sint causaest, 11). But we know from other accounts of Stoicism that the Stoics themselves,contrary to Aristotle, did not consider matter to be a cause.41 Accepting matter as acause would go against the fundamentally passive nature of matter in its relation withthe active cause. Similarly, Posidonius' designation of 'existing in thought only' hasbeen transformed into 'in the thought of a craftsman', a theme which is anticipated bymentioning artefacts (fabrefiunt, 10) in the preceding passage. The Peripatetic elementswhich should alert us to the fact that Calcidius—or, once again, his source—is notmerely juxtaposing two authentic versions of Stoic doctrine, are (i) the reference tomatter as a cause and (ii) the use of the metaphor of artefacts/material to explain thenotion of second matter as underlying qualities, yet also having an identity in its ownright.

If Diels, Edelstein, and Kidd are right about the reconstruction of the context forthe Posidonius fragment (2 in this paper) in Arius Didymus, then we find in Stobaeus42

yet another confirmation of the point that Posidonius agrees with his predecessors:the Posidonius fragment is preceded by a definition attributed to Plato, with referenceto the Timaeus, a heading for Aristotle, Zeno and Chrysippus' definition of primematter as substance and the claim that according to the Stoics 'matter' is body (not'aspect of a body').

I have tried to interpret, in its ancient doxographical context, an importantfragment of Posidonius' view on the principles. The distinction in the passage quotedis the one between 'prime matter' as 'substance' and matter underlying particulars.

which he believes to go back to Numenius) and Kidd, 374, also notes the resemblance betweenthis particular passage of Origen and Posidonius' fragment. The ps.-Timaeus Locrus (94A)describes matter as '. . . a^.op<)>ov Si KWT' avravrav Kai dax^p-driaTov, Sexo/xevav Si naoavfi,op(f)dv'. Cf. Baltes' commentary, PhilAnt 21 (1972), 41. 'Without quality/form, shape' does alsooccur in Philo Fug. 8 and the Didaskalikos 162.29-39 (see n. 33).

41 See J.-J. Duhot, La conception stoicienne de la causalite (Paris, 1989), pp. 139-52; Seneca Ep.65,2ff.; 89,16; Stob. Eel. 1, 13,1; SVF1,89; 2, 336; Edelstein and Kidd F95; Theophrastus fr. 230(ed. Fortenbaugh et al).

42 See Kidd 368-9; Stob. Eel. 1.11.5; H. Diels, Doxographi Graeci (Berlin/Leipzig, 1929), pp.457-8.

43 . . . avanvqaOwixev Si nepi rrjs Koivijs ovaias ditdvTuiv aiofidrujv, ws ex Svolv dpx<*>vi iScixOrj ovvderos \yndpxtwt <V\TJS re /cat ei8ov$>, V\TJ$ <^,iv> dnoiov KCLT' eirivoiCLv,



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The fragment does not say anything about a distinction between the passive and theactive principle, and the latter is only hinted at as the 'form and quality' inhering inmatter.

The Early Stoics do hold the view that the principles, though they are ontologicallydistinct, never in fact occur separately. But even if the Posidonius fragment did containthe stipulation, which it does not, that the active principle and matter are 'distinct inthought' only, that would still tell us nothing about these principles in their own right.If we, as modern interpreters, move from principles which in fact always coexist toprinciples which exist as logical concepts only, we commit a fallacy. There is adifference between saying that 'x and y are distinct in thought only'—a statementwhich tells us something about the relation between x and y, that in reality they alwayscoexist and that the distinction can only be effected in thought—and saying that 'xand y exist in thought only', a statement which tells us something about theontological status of x and y considered in their own right. It is only the latter positionthat fundamentally moves away from the original Stoic line. The Arius Didymusfragment of Posidonius cannot sustain the claim that for Posidonius the principles arecorporeal in so far as they are aspects of bodies, but are incorporeal, or beyondcorporeality, in their own right. In addition, all of the doxographical evidence welooked at seems to point in the same direction: that Posidonius' distinction is avariation on a theme developed by his Stoic predecessors and that he too considersmatter, the passive principle, to be body.

And yet, besides Calcidius' passage, which we have examined in some detail, thereare also at least two other Platonist strands in the doxographical tradition, which, inorder to secure supremacy for the Platonist views, do try to haul Posidonius over totheir side, one which denies the principles corporeality.

This is how Galen phrases it:

4. 'Let us sum up concerning the common substance of all bodies, that it has been shown to usto be composed from two principles, <matter and form>, of which unqualified matter [exists?]in thought [my translation: of which matter is unqualified in thought, but contains . . . ],containing in itself a mixture of four qualities, the hot, the cold, the dry and the wet.'

(trans. Kidd, Commentary 374; De Sequela, Scripta minora 2, 36; ed. Miiller.)43

An important line again contains an emendation (supplementation). At first glance,the passage does seem reminiscent of Posidonius: there is a 'common substance' and'matter' is said to be 'unqualified' 'in thought'. However, the common substanceclearly is not 'prime matter' here—if the emendation is correct—but, as thesubstance of 'bodies', it has come to be considered a combination of both matterand form, leaving room for the implication that what it is to be body preciselyrequires this combination, and that matter and form in their own right do not countas bodies. Galen's account, as opposed to Posidonius', can lead to the hypothesis thatboth principles are not corporeal in their own right, and is compatible with Plato'sview. For a Platonist who has accepted the label 'existing in thought', there are twoways for something to be non-corporeal: either it exists in thought, as is said ofmatter here,44 or it exists in a transcendental mode, as Plato's intelligibles would.

Of Galen's passage, Kidd in his commentary remarks that it 'is said of Plato', but inthe essay in which 'Galen refers to Posidonius extensively at the end'. But precisely the

exovarjs 8 ' ev iavrrj TTOIOTTITWV TeTrdpcuv Kpaoiv, dfpfxoTrjros t/ivxpOTr]Tos fijpoTTjrosVypOTTJTOS.

In the Timaeus itself (52B2) it is said that the receptacle 'can be grasped in some kind ofbastard reasoning, not accompanied by sense-perception' ( . . . fier' avaioO-qolas OMTOVAoyiCT/Ato Ttvi v69w . . . ) .



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fact that this is said about Plato should make us very careful about using theinformation. A Platonist could have a vested interest in presenting the Stoic principlesas incorporeal, because then they resemble more closely Plato's viewpoint, i.e. in thiscase the Timaeus framework of the paradigm of Being versus the receptacle. We willsee that Galen likes to turn Posidonius as much as possible into his ally in othercontexts as well.

The other passage which is worth considering here is more polemical and comesfrom Plutarch. The following fragment and its context can teach us something on thepoints which constitute Plutarch's objections against Posidonius:

5. 'The Posidonians are liable to the same criticism as these [previous passage], for they did notwithdraw far from matter. But having accepted that "the being of the limits" was the meaning of"divisible in the case of bodies", and having mixed these with the intelligible they declared thesoul to be form of that which is everywhere extended, constructed [constituted] according tonumber which encompasses concord.'

(trans. Kidd F141a; Plutarch De Animae Procreatione in Timaeo 1023B-D)45

We will return to this difficult fragment46 in the discussion on soul. The immediatecontext is a criticism of materialists who equate the Timaeus' (35A-B) 'indivisiblebeing' with shape and the 'divisible' kind with corporeal matter (acD/xariK-qv vXrjv,1022F). Plutarch makes Posidonius and his followers liable to the same criticism, andaccording to him they equate 'divisible being' with the limits of bodies. We knowfrom other sources that, contrary to his predecessors, Posidonius47 considers theselimits to exist both in reality and in thought (as opposed to in thought only, adistinction we have run across already).48

The above definition does show that Posidonius reinterprets the Timaeus accordingto his own tenets. Plutarch's criticism would have no justification whatsoever, ifPosidonius did not genuinely believe that the World Soul in its corporeality containsmatter. Posidonius like the Early Stoics, considers soul, both on the universal and thehuman level, to be a corporeal entity.49 But the Early Stoics did not need to drawmatter into the World Soul in order to account for its corporeality; the equation of theWorld Soul with the active principle as corporeal in its own right would have beensufficient.

To what extent has Posidonius made a concession to the Timaeusi Perhaps he hasmade none, if Plutarch himself is the one who assumes along Platonist lines that anydoctrine of a corporeal World Soul implies that it contains matter—an argumentwhich, as I mentioned above,50 Plutarch does not hesitate to use against the corporealactive principle itself (cf. regress a).51 But even if Posidonius does indeed draw matterinto the World Soul, most likely the only concession he makes is that he considers the

45 "O/xoia Se TOVTOIS ianv dvrenreiv KO.1 TOIS nepl FloaeiScoviov ov yap fiaKpav -rfjsvXrjs aTrdoTTqoav dXXd 8e£dfi€voi rr)v rcbv nepdrwv ovaiav nepl rd awp^ara Xeyeodaifiepicrrrjv KCLL r au ra Tti VOTJTW fj.t£avT€s 6.7T€(j>rjva.vTo TT/V tftv^v ZSeav eti>ai TOV 7TCLVTT]SiaoraTov, Kar' dpidixov ovveOTUioav dpixovlav TTepti^ovra.

46 See H. Cherniss, in his edition of this text; Laffranque, op. cit., pp. 431ff; A. Taylor, ACommentary on Plato's Timaeus (Oxford, 1928), pp. 11 Iff; P. Thevenaz, V ame du monde, ledevenir et la matiere chez Plutarque, dissertation (Neuchatel, 1938), pp. 63-7; J. Rist, StoicPhilosophy (Cambridge, 1969), pp. 205flf.

47 . . . KO.L Kar' irrivoiav KO.1 KO.6' vnoaraaiv . .. Cf. Edelstein and Kidd F16; D.L. 7, 135.48 Kidd (commentary) F16, 126 connects this with Plato Timaeus 53Cff. and Meno 76A.49 See Edelstein and Kidd F100, 101, 139.50 See also n. 11.51 Note that Plutarch, 1012Dff., includes Xenocrates as equating 'divisible being' with the dyad

(matter).



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specific body which the World Soul is as a combination of the active and the passiveprinciple. This is not a minor point, because it would undo the Early Stoic alignmentof the World Soul and the active principle and thus put the World Soul on a lower levelas consisting of both principles. It would constitute a return to a more Platonisthierarchy. Whatever interpretation one prefers of the puzzling notions 'indivisible' and'divisible being', it would be difficult to ignore the World Soul's intermediate status inPlato's acccount, if one takes the exposition seriously, as Posidonius appears to havedone.

However, that even this latter viewpoint does not necessarily imply that matter is alogical concept only and not corporeal in its own right becomes clear if we combinePlutarch's account with information from other sources: Posidonius and his followersare materialists, i.e. they belong to the group of people who equate Plato's 'divisiblebeing' with matter, and they also claim that 'divisible being' is 'the being of thelimits'.52 From this account of Plutarch it would follow that for Posidonius the mattergoing into the World Soul is 'the being of the limits'. As already stated above,Posidonius holds the view that the limits exist both 'in thought' and 'in reality'. Thisimplies in turn that the matter for the World Soul exists in reality, as opposed to inthought only. For something to exist in reality in the strong sense, i.e. to be entitled tobeing,53 it has to be body, according to the Stoic mode of analysing reality.

As elsewhere Plutarch is here too struggling with Stoic notions, but for amainstream Platonist corporeality only comes about when the paradigm of Beingjoins with the receptacle.54 Maybe Plutarch pushes Posidonius to the Platonist side, byassuming Posidonius precisely needs matter for his corporeal World Soul—i.e. needs itto be a combination of both active and passive principles—because he considers theprinciples to be only aspects of bodies and to be non-corporeal themselves. In otherwords, it is possible that Plutarch has noticed the distinctively Stoic approach, asopposed to the Platonist one, of making the soul corporeal and the specificPosidonian approach of making matter a component of the World Soul, and that he

52 See also D.L. 7, 150, where prime matter/substance is called 'limited' (neTTepaonevr)).53 See J. Brunschwig, 'La theorie stoicienne du genre supreme et l'ontologie platonicienne',

Matter and Metaphysics, Fourth Symposium Hellenisticum, Elenchos 14 (ed. J. Barnes and M.Mignucci, Naples 1988), pp. 19—127. In the Stoic view of the world two kinds of things havereality value and fall under the general heading of 'something' (TI): bodies and the incorporealspace, void, time, and the Xeicrov ('meaning', 'sayable'). On the one hand, the combination ofboth 'in thought' and 'in reality' seems particularly suited to describe the admittedly awkwardcategory of incorporeals that, unlike mere constructs of the mind such as universals, do haveobjective reality value, but not in the strong sense of bodies. On the other hand, the 'limits' aregranted 'being' in Plutarch's passage (ovala), as Posidonius' interpretation of Plato's 'divisibleBeing'. Strictly speaking the Stoics consider only bodies and not the incorporeals as entitled tobeing (TO OV). (Brunschwig, pp. 42-60, discusses and dismisses apparent exceptions, includingSeneca's claim, Epistulae 58, 22, that the void and time are quasi being—quae quasi suni). All ofthis evidence once again points towards a corporeal matter, as is also indicated by the context ofPlutarch's passage about Posidonius and his followers (awfj.ari.Krjv vXr/v, 1022F).

54 At first glance Plutarch himself appears to be oscillating between a corporeal matter (cf.Cherniss' list of passages, in his Loeb edition, 185 n.c), and one that is strictly qualityless andhence derives its sensible features from a participation in the intelligible (1013C, 1014F).Plutarch's corporeal matter bears the 'traces' of the elements (1016D-E; Timaeus 52D-53B);matter in its basic sense is qualityless (51A; 52A), but the matter the Demiurge structures doesalready have some features (see also 30A). This tension is present in Plato's own text, thoughPlutarch takes it further. Cherniss notes that Plutarch borrows Stoic terminology to talk aboutmatter, as in 1014B, 180 n.b., and 1014C, 183 n.d.; the Stoics are mentioned at 1015B as usingOLTTOIOV ovaiav. On p. 185 n.c. Cherniss also draws attention to a passage from the Placita(Doxographi Graeci 308 A4-9, B5-9) in which the Platonic receptacle is called vXr/la7rotovlawfj.aroeiSij, in the Stoic vein.



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nevertheless has replaced the Stoic theory of corporeality by Plato's account.This would explain a peculiarity in Plutarch's report of the Posidonian view. In the

definition Plutarch gives us, the word 'form' appears in the expression 'form of thatwhich is everywhere extended'.55 It might very well be that Posidonius himself did usethe word (iSea)56 in the sense of 'shape', but Plutarch goes on to criticize Posidoniusfor misunderstanding Plato's forms. This criticism is again either totally misplaced, orPlutarch does consider it justified by something about Posidonius' view. What ifPlutarch actually believes that for Posidonius the active principle, the logos whichshapes entities, is an incorporeal entity which comes closer to the realm of theintelligibles; close enough in Plutarch's eyes to justify attacking Posidonius for notgetting it quite right? The kind of scorn Plutarch then reserves for Posidonius wouldbe of a particularly stinging kind.

Only Platonist sources hint at Posidonius' departure from the original Stoic line onthe principles' corporeality. The theory that the principles are aspects of body, and notbody themselves, is the counterpart of Plato's Being and the receptacle. This view isascribed to Posidonius (or at least used as a corrected version of his definition),because he has come some way to meet the Platonists: (i) he possibly undid thealignment between the World Soul and the active principle (according to Plutarch),and (ii) he reintroduced Plato's three soul components (elsewhere attested by Galen,vide infra). Hence we should not be surprised that other Platonist sources such asCalcidius57 see no problems in putting the Stoic definition of matter to their use, withthe proviso that matter has to be genuinely qualityless, i.e. in their terms 'neithercorporeal nor incorporeal'. We might have good reason not to trust Plutarch when hetells us that Posidonius no longer considers the World Soul an aspect of the activeprinciple—which does entail a break with Stoic physics—but the assumption thatPosidonius in fact did make this move will help us to make sense of another bit ofevidence, concerning Posidonius' views about the relation between Providence, nature,and fate (vide infra, III).

II. ON SOUL

Let us return now to the text of Plutarch's fragment:

5 . ' . . . They declared the soul to be form of that which is everywhere extended. . . ' 5 8

In the Timaeus (34B3-4/36D9-E3) too the World Soul both envelops the universe'sbody and is extended all through it. Precisely this feature, in its mathematicalformulation of three-dimensionality,59 surfaces again in Posidonius' definition,

55 The intriguing point is that Iamblichus ascribes this definition to Speusippus (TaranF54a-b; Lang fr. 40). Taran (365—71; contra Merlan et al.) defends the hypothesis thatSpeusippus used this definition as an interpretation of the Timaeus (35A7, where ISea 'does notmean "idea" at all'; 36E2) and as a defence of Plato against Aristotle, without necessarilyadhering to it himself.

56 Although I do not consider as sufficient evidence the fact that Macrobius attributes the termto Posidonius, in his Commentarii in Ciceronis Somnium Scipionis 1, 14, 19; Edelstein and KiddF140. 57 And Alcinous, cf. n. 33.

58 For the entire mathematical definition and its Old Academy heritage, see Merlan (1934) andKidd in his commentary on F141, 533-5.

59 A physical variant of this tenet for the human soul makes it extend even through the bonesof the human body and connects this with the Timaeus 73B, where it is said that the soul's bondsare in the roots of the bone. Cf. Edelstein and Kidd (commentary 150—1) F 28a, b; Scholia inHomerum; Eust. //. 12, 386.



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which is an account of the World Soul as a corporeal entity. Posidonius, as alreadystated above, does not limit himself to a commentary or a review of possibleinterpretations of the Timaeus, but adapts its information to his own purposes.

It is to Galen60 we need to turn for Posidonius' doctrine on the human soul, andhere we encounter a famous, much-debated 'return to Plato'. Galen uses Posidonius ashis ally against Chrysippus and in support of Plato's view.61

Chrysippus ascribes both reason and affections to one and the same soul-entity, ourgoverning part, and for him, affections are merely reason gone wrong. Posidonius, onthe other hand, returns to a model which uses the three different factors we alsoencounter in Plato's work: reason, spirit, and appetite. But like Chrysippus, Posidoniusdoes not62 take over Plato's separate spatial locations—as we know them from theTimaeus (69D7-70A7)—which underscore Plato's claim that the factors are 'parts'Qxeprf) of the soul. According to Posidonius the three factors are faculties of one andthe same substance, anchored in the heart, and Galen claims that Aristotle subscribesto the same view:

6. '(a) Plato, because he thinks the faculties of soul are separate in physical location and differvery greatly in essence, reasonably terms them forms or species and parts.(b) Aristotle and Posidonius refuse the terms 'forms' and 'parts' of soul, and say that they arefaculties or capacities or powers of a single substance, with its base in the heart.(c) Chrysippus not only pulls anger and desire into a single substance, but also into a singlefaculty' (trans. Kidd F146; Galen De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis 6, 368.20-6)63

As is to be expected from the agenda which he sets for himself, to prove that Plato isright and Chrysippus wrong, and to use Posidonius against his Stoic predecessor, asan ally of Plato, Galen downplays the common points between Posidonius andChrysippus:64 that both oppose Plato's spatial distinctions and locate the -qyefioviKovof our soul in the heart.65

60 De Placitis, mainly books 3-5 (up to 336.15) in the edition of Ph. De Lacey, CorpusMedicorum Graecorum 5, 4, 1, 2 (Berlin, 1978).

61 See the commentary of Kidd. For a thorough analysis of Galen's methodology and adefence of Chrysippus, see also T. Tieleman, 'Galen and Chrysippus. Argument and Refutation inthe De Placitis Books ii-iii', dissertation, Quaestiones Infinitae 3 (Utrecht, 1992).

62 A point overlooked by Pohlenz, op. cit., 1, 227; 2, 114 and Laffranque, op. cit., 429: 'L'amecomporte done trois facultes rattachees a trois endroits differents du corps humain (?) unesubstance unique issue (fun seul lieu, le coeur, et enfin, des parties en nombre sensiblement pluseleve que celui des facultes, mais leur correspondant au moins partiellement.' The last part of thisstatement is based on a very problematic account by Tert. De Anim. 14, 2; Edelstein and KiddF147. Laffranque also plays the importance of the Timaeus for Posidonius down to the bareminimum: see, for instance, op. cit., pp. 373-4.

63 6 fiev ovv IlXaruiv Kal TOIS TOTTOIS TOV awfiaros Kt\wpla8ai vofit^wv avra KalTats ovoiais ird^nroXv SiaA<A>aTTeiv evAoyws €LSTJ T€ Kal fiepjj irpooayopevtc 6 8'PlpioTOTtXrjs re Kal 6 IJooeiSwuios eiSi; /xev fj fJ.€pi) ifivxrjs OVK 6vofial,ovaiv, Sin>dp.fis§' flvai <f>aoi /tids ova (as £K rrjs KapSias 6p(iwfj.evr)S' 6 Si Xpvaiinros wairep els filavovoiav, OVTWS Kal els Swa/xiv fiiav ayei Kal TOV Bvfxov Kal TIJV einBvfiiav. See also F142;Galen De Placitis 5, 312.29-34.

64 I am gratefully indebted to David Blank for drawing my attention to the debate about theStoic Diogenes of Babylon; see M. Nussbaum, 'Poetry and the Passions: Two Stoic Views',Passions and Perceptions. Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind; Proceedings of the FifthSymposium Hellenisticwn (ed. J. Brunschwig and M. Nussbaum) (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 97-149.If, as Nussbaum claims, Diogenes' interest in music and poetry foreshadows Posidonius' doctrine,and if, indeed, Diogenes prepares the ground for Posidonius' revision of Stoic psychology, thenwe have yet another reason for breaking through Galen's ideological marshalling of Posidonius asa radical reformer. Two remarks are appropriate here: (a) I believe that Posidonius' position ofallocating three faculties to one and the same soul substance is considerably weaker than afull-fledged return to Plato's doctrine of a tripartite soul; (b.l) Diogenes' musical theory might be



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Also, as far as the label for the psychic factors is concerned, it should not be asurprise that the sources which report Posidonius' position sometimes slip into theusage of Plato's 'parts' as opposed to 'faculties'.66 Brad Inwood67 argues that it is inaccord with a Platonist perspective to represent Chrysippus' view, on the other hand,as attributing only one faculty to the soul. That is, a Platonist wants to highlight theabsence in Chrysippus' theory of irrational faculties which can work independentlyfrom and against reason. But in fact there is evidence68 to show that Chrysippus is notas strict a monist as would appear from the Galen passage quoted here, and that forChrysippus the governing part of a human soul has different faculties for the tasks ithas to perform, namely reason, representation, assent, and impulse. Elsewhere Galenhimself is aware of, and annoyed by, the fact that Chrysippus describes the inner con-sistency within the rational faculty's set of opinions as a 'symmetry of parts'.69 Themode of description of a given theory very much depends on who is describing it.70

The major difference remaining between Chrysippus and Posidonius is that thelatter reintroduces the concept of irrational powers of the soul, rejected by Chrysippus.According to Posidonius, these powers have to be independent from reason in orderto explain observable facts of human behaviour, including motivational conflicts.

Posidonius has his own reasons for returning to Plato's psychology, and to thePhaedrus model in particular, reasons, which are not, however, exclusively inspired bythe problem of motivational conflict, but rather by the issue of motivation tout court:he contests that children and animals71 which do not have reason—children only growinto it over time72—cannot therefore be said to have affections either, a claim which

'non-cognitive' or irrational in the sense that it focuses on the senses, which are instrumental tothe -qyefioviKov, but this position is still essentially different from a non-cognitive approach whichassigns irrational faculties to the soul's ruling component itself, and it also has to be noted thatperception is cognitive for the Stoics; (b.2) this point is related to the question whether any modelof the impact of musical harmony on the soul necessarily presupposes this soul to be composite,in Plato's or Posidonius' sense. For a theory of musical harmony which is compatible with aunitary soul, see A. Long, 'The Harmonics of Stoic Virtue', Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy,Suppl. (1991), 97-116. For a more extended argument concerning the points of similaritybetween Chrysippus and Posidonius, see J. Fillion-Lahille, 'Le De Ira de Seneque et la theoriestoicienne des passions'. Etudes et Commentaires 94 (Paris 1984), 119-62.

65 Cf. J. Mansfeld, 'The Idea of the Will in Chrysippus, Posidonius and Galen', Proceedings ofthe Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 1 (ed. J. Cleary, 1991, published Lanham,1993), 124.

66 Galen himself makes this slip, see for instance De Placitis 5, 318.13-14. See also, forinstance, infra, Edelstein and Kidd F186; Clem. Al. Strom. 2,21, 129.1-5 (text 9).

67 Op. cit., pp. 33-4.68 Inwood (op. cit., pp. 30-3) refers to Iamblichus, Stob. Eel. 1, 369; Simpl., SVF3,203; Philo,

SVF2, 844; Arms Didymus, SVF3,112.69 De Placitis 5, 305.18-27.70 In a recent article, 'Posidonian Polemic and Academic Dialectic: The Impact of Carneades

upon Posidonius' Tltpl iradcov', Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 34 (1993), 229-323, JohnA. Stevens goes an important step further. He claims (p. 322) that Posidonius himself 'attributesto Chrysippus subtly altered representations of Carneades' views'. But this apparent concessionto the skeptics' criticisms is in fact motivated by Posidonius' attempt to salvage core Stoicdoctrine by drawing on common sense experience about the nature of the soul and irrationalbehaviour. If Stevens is right, we have yet another, deeper-level manipulation of Chrysippus'views, one by Posidonius, that is embedded within Galen's own purposes.

71 See Edelstein and Kidd F31; Galen De Placitis 5, 322.28-326.8; F33, Galen De Placitis 5,332.31-334.10. Posidonius uses for his description of the lowest category of animals aterminology which is reminiscent of Plato's account of plants (cf. Ti 77B).

72 In the Timaeus (44B), too, reason, in connection with its cognitive circular motions, is saidto start out weak in children; cf. Edelstein and Kidd (commentary) F31, 155.162.



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follows from Chrysippus' position that affections are the result of reason having gonewrong. Posidonius makes the irrational powers independent of reason and thereforethey can be seen at work in children and animals.73 Marie Laffranque74 arguesconvincingly, however, that Plato's metaphor has become something quite different inPosidonius' theories,75 in a more 'down to earth' approach, and that in Posidonius'version the balance of powers has become a goal in itself, which does not necessarilyentail a rejection of the human soul's irrational functions.

Galen reports that Chrysippus leaves room for 'outside violent influences' toaccount for the passions. Galen, along the lines of Posidonius' criticism, asks thequestion how these outside influences can have an effect on us, if there is nothinganswering them in our own constitution.76 Chrysippus could have used the 'Socratic'approach as a defence, by relegating the pernicious influences to the body strictlyspeaking as opposed to the corporeal entity the soul is. The closest approximation ofthis approach is the original Stoic theory of 'appropriation' (oiKeicoois), i.e. of ourawareness of our own constitution, including our bodily needs, which can upsetpriorities. However, the Early Stoics' view of corporeality would have prevented themfrom proclaiming the body as the villain in the story, even if they had a conceptualtool to distinguish between the kind of corporeal entity the soul is and the bodystrictly speaking.

The ultimate question for us, in this analysis, is what Posidonius' reintroduction ofirrational faculties in humans—with its bearing on the problem of the highest goal fora human life (vide infra)—does to the Stoic analogy between World Soul and humansoul. Has ontological deficiency on the human level, an essential feature of theTimaeus account, manifested itself again, and has the gap between the human and thedivine been reasserted?77

III. PROVIDENCE, NATURE, AND FATE

The two fragments which have generated the debate on the role of Providence,nature, and fate in Posidonius' work are the following:

7. 'Therefore I think we should, as Posidonius does, trace the whole influence and rationale ofdivination first from god, about whom enough has been said, then from fate, and then fromnature.' (trans. Kidd F107; Cicero De Divinatione 1, 125)

8. 'Posidonius is recorded in the doxographies as saying that fate is "third from Zeus; for firstthere is Zeus, second nature, and third fate".' (trans. Kidd F103; Aetius Placita 1, 28, 5)79

A preliminary comparison between the two fragments is telling in itself. Cicero'saccount does not need to be read as a hierarchy of the three notions and he connects

73 For the case of animals, see the excellent analysis by R. Sorabji, 'Animal Minds and HumanMorals', Cornell Studies in Classical Philology 54 (Ithaca, NY, 1993).

74 398-9; 478, see also Reinhardt, op. cit., col. 746.75 See Edelstein and Kidd (commentary) F 31, 156; 158-160, which also indicates that even in

his use of the Phaedrus image, Posidonius borrowed terminology from the Timaeus.76 DePlacitis 5,460-3.77 See Rist (1969), p. 212; I do disagree with Rist, however, that this needs to lead to a strong

dualistic view of the human soul. See also part iv of this paper.78 Quocirca primum mihi videtur, ut Posidonius facit, a deo, de quo satis dictum est, deinde a

fato, deinde a natura, vis omnis divinandi ratioque repetenda.79 IloaeiSiovios Tpirrjv and Atos [sc. rr/v iiiiapixevrjv]: irpwrov fiev yap e[i]v<u TOP A (a,

Sevrepov Se rr/v tf>voiv, rpirov 8e TVJV l



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them explicitly to the issue of divination.80 The second fragment, the Aetius version,displays a different sequence and is more hierarchical.

These fragments have been considered by some scholars as an anticipation of laterPlatonist triads81 and some modern interpretations follow a platonizing strand, maybewithout being fully aware of it. L. Edelstein,82 for instance, identifies God with reason,fate with matter, and nature with soul.

This view is attractive in light of what has been said above (part I) concerning theactive principle and the World Soul. Apparently for Posidonius the World Soul cannotsimply be equated any more, as for the Early Stoics, with the active principle; thespecific corporeal entity it is also includes matter. According to Edelstein's inter-pretation of the fragments discussed here, then, the World Soul as nature would haveboth aspects of divine reason and matter.

The main problem,83 however, is how this hypothesis would affect the role of theactive and the passive principle. On this topic Posidonius is in tune with his Stoicpredecessors:84 all structuring factors are to be ascribed to the active principle. If fate,a structuring factor within the universe, is paired up with matter, then the matterwould not be entirely passive any more. How far removed are we then from dualismand the Platonist necessity factor in the recalcitrance of matter, i.e. a matter which isnot entirely amenable and which can resist the impact of the divine Demiurge?

1 M. Rist,84 who on more than one point defends the hypothesis of Posidonius'return to Plato, actually advances the hypothesis, 'along the lines laid down by Plato inthe Timaeus', that fate here corresponds to 'the Platonic errant cause or necessity'. Wedo not have the evidence to sustain such a drastic break within the Stoic tradition, andmoreover this move is not even followed by all the Platonists since Calcidius considersfate the expression of Providence, God's work, as opposed to necessity. Of the othertwo components, Rist would like to pair up God with the World Soul and nature withits body. But the same objection as raised against Edelstein could be brought up here,namely that such an hypothesis goes against the function of the Stoic active andpassive principles which both together constitute all entities, including the universe'sbody.

The active principle, God, nature, and fate for the Early Stoics constitute differentaspects of one and the same reality. Both Marie Laffranque86 and M. Dragona-Monachou87 try to get at the meaning of the latter three terms for Posidonius by usingthe one clue Cicero gives us. Of these two, Dragona-Monachou's approach is the moreconvincing: she proves, using the context in Cicero, that the three terms do notconstitute different sources of divination, as Laffranque claims, but the philosophical

80 Two points fully explored by A. Graeser, Plotinus and the Stoics (Leiden, 1972), p. 110 andM. Dragona-Monachou, 'Posidonius' "hierarchy" between God, Fate and Nature and Cicero'sDe Divinatione', Philosophia 4 (1974), 286-301. Kidd (commentary) thinks that Posidonius'(F108; Cic. Div. 1, 64) view of our minds being capable of divination because of reason, i.e. ourkinship with the divine, stands in conscious opposition to the Timaeus 71D-72B, wheredivination is an essentially irrational process.

81 See, for instance, W Jaeger, Nemesios von Emessa, Quellenforschung zum Neuplatonismus undseine Anfangen bei Posidonios (Berlin, 1914), pp. 97-133.

82 L. Edelstein, 'The Philosophical System of Posidonius', A JP 57 (1936), 292f., 301-5.83 Kidd in his commentary points out (p. 416) conflicts between this hypothesis and other

views ascribed to Posidonius on cause (F95), soul (F141), punctual existence (F98, F16), matterand substance (F92) and on god (F101). I focus on the general role of the active and passiveprinciple as in F5, vide infra.

84 F5; SVF1, 85; 2,299 (not 229 as in Kidd 104); D.L. 7, 134.85 Rist (1969), p. 211. 86 Op. cit., pp. 340,351.87 Op. cit., p. 292, and throughout her argumentation.



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premises needed to account for divination. Divine Providence, then, has the logicalpriority; second comes fate as the chain of causes which makes it possible for oneevent to be the 'sign' of another; and nature, thirdly, is the 'common house of all'.88

The question Dragona-Monachou does not explicitly address,89 however, is whetherfor Posidonius God, fate, and nature are still aspects of one and the same reality orwhether somehow they have become disentangled.90 I conjecture that as structuringfactors they all three still refer to the Stoic active principle, that they are aspects of it,but that they are not entirely coextensive anymore as they were for Posidonius'predecessors. The label God, then, would apply primarily—although maybe even herenot exclusively—to the active principle in its purest state (still corporeal in its ownright and still embedded in matter) at the limits of the universe or in the phase of totalconflagration; fate would be the active principle in its other manifestations ortransformations of matter; and nature would be what encompasses both states of theactive principle. Hence 'God' and 'fate' on the active principle's side would be thecounterparts of 'substance' and 'matter' for the passive, with 'God' and 'substance'being the principles in their pure form, so to speak, and 'fate' and 'matter' being thename for those same principles at work in the ordered universe. The conscious,rational, and provident agent would be represented by the active principle in its pureststate, the physical laws would be the expression of how this reason manifests itself inthe manifold appearances of reality. In the label 'purest state' a value judgement andhierarchy seem to be implied, and yet this does not have to be true in an absolute sense,as long as we accept that the physical laws are still essential to what the active principlerepresents for the Stoic Posidonius.

Modern scholars have tried to fit the World Soul into their hypotheses (vide supra),an entity which is conspicuously absent from the two fragments discussed. I wouldargue that the reason it is absent is precisely that contrary to nature and fate, the WorldSoul is no longer put on the same level as the active principle by Posidonius. (And somaybe there is a true insight preserved in the Plutarch passage, text 5.)

This may also help to explain the evolution Dragona-Monachou91 sees fromCicero's version of the fragment to that of Aetius. In Aetius, a source which can verywell reflect Middle Platonist material, the notions which might have been merelydisentangled by Posidonius evolve into the direction of a theory of hypostases, withfate at the bottom. Here again, there is no reason to ascribe a platonizing hierarchy toPosidonius himself; but his distinctions might have prompted a recuperation of hisviews by Platonists. In this case, then, we have another instance of a more neutralversion existing side by side with a Platonist and less reliable one.

IV. THE ORDER OF THE UNIVERSE AND THE GOAL OF HUMAN LIFE

Zeno and the Stoics consider 'living according to nature'92 the highest goal of humanlife. Chrysippus' rendering of this doctrine already betrayed an influence of the

88 S e e C i c . Div. 1 , 1 3 1 : ' . . . , c u m d o m u s s i t o m n i u m u n a , e a q u e c o m m u n i s , . . . "89 She does write, however (op. cit., p. 299): 'Nor is God unconnected with the corroboration

of divination by Fate, since God is Fate, having decided, once and for all, all that is decreed tohappen; but God's primary aspect is to be providential.'

90 The latter view is defended by E. Brehier, History of Philosophy. The Hellenistic and RomanAge (trans. W. Baskin, Chicago, 1965), p. 137, and G. Verbeke, devolution de la doctrine dupneuma du stoicisme a S. Augustin (Louvain/Paris, 1945), pp. 130-1.

91 Op. cit., pp. 300-1.92 TO 6iioAoyov(ji.€vws TJJ <j>vaei. £i)v; cf. SVF\, 179ff.



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Timaeus.93 The following is, according to Clement of Alexandria, Posidonius'interpretation of this tenet:

9. (a) 'To live contemplating the truth and order of all things together(b) and helping in promoting [or establishing or organising)] it as much as possible, in no waybeing led by the irrational part of the soul'.

(trans. Kidd F186; Clement of Alexandria Stromateis 2, 21, 129, 1-5)94

That for Posidonius the happy life consists of 'not being led by the irrational part[more likely he would have used the term 'power', vide supra] of the soul' is alsoattested by another fragment:

10. (a) 'The cause of the emotions, that is of inconsistency and of the unhappy life is not tofollow in everything the daimon in oneself, which is akin and has a similar nature to the one [i.e.daimon] which governs the whole universe, but at times to deviate and be swept along with whatis worse and beastlike.95

(b) Those [the Chrysippeans] who have failed to observe this neither give the better explanationfor the emotions in these things [i.e. in the sphere of goods and the end], nor do they holdcorrect opinions about happiness and consistency [concord].(c) For they do not see that the foremost thing in it [happiness] is to be led in no way by theirrational and unhappy, that is what is godless in the soul.'

(trans. Kidd F187; Galen De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis 5, 326.20-7)96

The parallel with the Timaeus (47B2-C4, 90A-D)97 is striking, as modern scholars98

have noticed, even more so because Posidonius in his psychology has reintroduced theirrational soul components, which allows him to criticize the Chrysippean positionand to follow Plato more closely. Timaeus tells us that the best part of our soul,reason, is a daimon given to us by god; for Posidonius this daimon is related to theuniversal one: human reason is related to the immanent, divine Logos.99 Timaeusadvises us to observe and think over the heavenly revolutions in order to maintain ourown cognitive functions; for Posidonius the structure of the whole of our universe isthe model and the norm. Timaeus formulates his parallel precept positively:

93 SVF3,4 = D. L. 7. 87-8 = Long and Sedley 63C.94 cm n&oi re 6 IJoaeiSuivtos ro £rjv Oecopovvra rr/v TWV OXOJV aXrjdeiav Kai rd£tv Kai

ovyKaTao~K€va£ovTa avTTjv Kara TO ZvvaTOv, /card f^rfSev ayofievov VTTO TOV aXoyov /xepovsrrjs tfivxys-

95 I agree with Reinhardt (op. cit., col. 747) and Kidd (commentary on F187; 677), against forinstance Edelstein (1936, 314) and Rist (1969, 212), that this passage does not necessarily implywe also have an evil demon, in the irrational part of our soul, a theory which would turnPosidonius into more of a dualist.

96 TO Srj TCUV Ttaduiv alriov, TOVTCOTI rrjs Tt avofioXoyias Kai TOV KaKo&alfiovos ftiov, TOfir) Kara TTSLV iireodai TW ev avT<x> Saifxovi ovyyevei T€ OVTI Kai TTJV ofiolav <f>vaiv €)(ovTt T<JTOV SXov Koofiov StoiKovvTi, To> Se xflpovl / < a ' £yoSet TTOTC OVV€KKAIVOVTO.S </>ep€o0ai. olSe TOVTO napiSovres ovTf £v TOVTOIS JSCATIOUCTI rf/v aiTiav TWV 7ra#aii> oure iv TOIS nepl rijsevSaipovlas Kai OftoXoylas 6p0o8o£ovoiv ov yap fiXtTrovoiv, OTI npwTov eaTiv iv avrfj TOKaTa. fi7)8£v ayeodai VTTO TOV aXoyov re /cai KaKoSaifiovos Kai adeov rfjs ifivxrjs. See alsoEdelstein and Kidd F85.

97 See also Tht. 176B, for the theme of onolwois.98 See, for instance, Pohlenz, op. cit., p. 229 and in reply Reinhardt, op. cit., pp. 747-8.29; Kidd

(commentary 669-78).99 Compare and contrast also Xenocrates fr. 81 (ed. Heinze; Aristotle Topics 2, 6, 112a32):

KaOdfffp XevoKpdrrjS <j>-qaiv ev&aiyiova elvai TOV TTJV i/>vxrjv iftOVTa airovBalav TavT-qv yapeKaoTov etvai Saipova; 'as Xenocrates says, happy is the man who has his soul in goodcondition. For that (the soul) is each man's daimon.' Notice that here, however, the soul in itsentirety is our daimon.



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11. ' . . . and because he always takes care of the divine [in himself?], and always keeps thedaimon which lives with him in a good condition, he necessarily will be exceedingly happy.'

(90C4-6)100

Posidonius tells us what we should not do, namely allow ourselves to be led by whatis godless in the soul. In spite of all the resemblances, and the important concessionto Plato's psychology, Posidonius, like Chrysippus, has given a distinct Stoic turn toPlato's words.

But what is the ultimate aim of observing the structure in the universe? ForTimaeus, it leads to self-improvement: our own souls will adopt the right disposition.Some scholars have emended the manuscript version of Clement's fragment101 in orderto make Posidonius claim something similar:

9. (b) 'and fashioning oneself as far as possible in accordance therewith [i.e. the truth and orderof all things together]'.

Here, once again, modern readers have fallen into the trap of platonizing Posidonius,and they reject an acceptable manuscript reading in favour of an emendation.

In contrast with Timaeus, Posidonius puts our contemplation of the universe'sstructure to the service of a collaboration in this design. Our own reason, which isrelated to the divine Logos, allows us, to a certain extent, to participate in the divinestructuring activities.

This tenet does not constitute a break in the Stoic tradition, but it does open anew perspective for the problem of the relation between Providence, fate, and theindividual in Stoicism. Apparently we are not entirely limited, as human beings,to undergoing the universal regulations, with an emphasis on our passivity.102

Chrysippus, as Cicero tells us in his On Fate (39-43) stipulates that 'everything comesabout through fate'. Even according to Chrysippus' famous distinction between ourinternal assent/impulse as the primary cause for our actions and the auxiliary outsidestimulus of impressions, that which is in our power is best understood as what fateaccomplishes through us, i.e. not through causes external to us.103 Posidonius, on theother hand, suggests that we can actively contribute to the causal chain and 'the orderof all things together', emphasizing the relevance of our actions to the universe as awhole. On this view, our rapport with fate and the divine ordering activity works inboth directions. But this does not imply that we can actually go against the universe'sregulations or undo them. Only a more Platonist worldview, such as that presented byCalcidius, will allow for human interference in the causal chain by developing thenotion of a hypothetical fate. But perhaps hypothetical fate is another Platonisttransformation of a Posidonian nuance.

In this paper we have investigated a number of these possible transformations.Hints of a Posidonian theory of the passive principle as merely existing in thought, oras a logical concept, and of both active and passive principles as incorporeal, can befound only in Platonist contexts that want to draw parallels with Plato's analysis ofBeing versus the receptacle. Galen, who is generally sympathetic with, though notentirely uncritical, of Posidonius, draws him to the side of the Platonists on the issue

. . .are oe aei vepairevovra. TO oeiov e\ovTa re avrov ev KiKoafirjfievov TOV oaifiovaOVVOIKOV eauToi, 8ia<f>€p6vTws euSaiju-opa etvai.

101 'avTov instead of 'auTi)!/'. See Kidd, pp. 672-3, for a discussion of the problems with thisreading.

102 See Laffiranque, op. cit., pp. 450,478; Rist (1969), pp. 214-15.103 For a discussion of the Cicero passage (62C = 5 VF 2.974) in connection with Alexander of

Aphrodisias On Fate 181.13-182.20 (62G = SVF2.979), see Long and Sedley, commentary, pp.392-4.



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of the human soul's functions, trying to make the gap between Posidonius andChrysippus on the one hand, and Chrysippus and Plato on the other as wide aspossible. In the two fragments about the interaction between Providence, nature, andfate we have the clearest example of two parallel versions of Posidonius' doctrine, withone of them more Platonist than the other. Finally, concerning the issue of theinteraction between humans and the universe, the technique of the ancient platonizingsources has been so persuasive that even modern scholars have started to rewritePosidonius in order to bring him more in tune with Plato. In fact, in all of the casesmentioned some of them have turned Posidonius more into a follower of Plato than heactually might have been.

There are nevertheless intriguing points which do constitute deviations from theoriginal Stoic position and concessions to Plato. It could be that Posidonius has giventhe World Soul a lesser status than the active principle; that the World Soul hasbecome the kind of body which contains both the active principle and matter. He alsoreintroduces the irrational powers of the human soul, thereby implicitly acknow-ledging its ontological deficiency compared to the World Soul. With Posidonius we arein a more hierarchically structured universe after all, especially regarding the status ofsoul in general, but it is still essentially a Stoic one.104

University of Notre Dame G R E T C H E N R E Y D A M S - S C H I L S

104 I presented a version of this paper at the University of Leiden, The Netherlands, in June of1994, and at Cornell University, on February 2, 1996. The paper has greatly benefited from bothaudiences, and from the comments of the people I thanked in the footnotes, among whomAnthony Long and John Dillon, who saw me through the entire process and let the disagreementsstand. Many essential final touches were added during my stay at the 'Fondation Hardt' inGeneva, May 20-June 8, 1996, made possible by a grant from the University of Notre DameInstitute for Scholarship in the Liberal Arts. I also would like to thank Kenneth Sayre and thereader of the journal.

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https://doi.org/10.1093/cq/47.2.455


Posidonius and the Timaeus: off to Rhodes and back to Plato

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