Political Interactions on Social Media: Increasing the Divide
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Political Interactions on Social Media: Increasing the Divide Matthew Sommerfeld George Mason University Professor Mayer Fall 2014
Transcript of Political Interactions on Social Media: Increasing the Divide
Political Interactions on Social Media: Increasing the Divide
Matthew Sommerfeld George Mason University
Professor Mayer Fall 2014
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Politics and Social Media
The 2014 election saw more than a twofold increase in the number of
Americans who obtained political information about politics via social media than
had been the case in the 2010 elections, and over the past decade the percentage of
Internet users who use social media has increased from 8% in 2005, to 75% in
2014.1 While politicians have made various attempts to harness new technologies
for their own electoral benefit, researchers have been examining its impact on
democratic behavior. Recent scholarship, for instance has examined social media’s
impact on voter turnout, political engagement and mobilization efforts, campaign
finance, and information consumption.2 Opinions are mixed as to the democratic
implications of social media, with critics bemoaning the rise of ‘slaktivisim’, while
more optimistic interpretations point to the ability of websites like Facebook to
motivate individuals to get to the polls out of social obligation.3 This analysis
contributes to the evolving scholarship by examining interactions among individuals
on social media platforms and its impact on the intensification of partisan loyalties.
A deliberative democracy relies on a broadly informed public and a healthy
ecosystem of competing ideas; if individuals are exposed exclusively to people or
facts that reinforce their pre-‐existing beliefs, democracy suffers.4 However, are
individuals utilizing the interactive functions of social media to engage in genuine,
enlightened debate, or are they merely interacting with co-‐partisans in ‘echo
chambers’, or ‘trolling’ cross-‐partisans, thus strengthening their ideological and
1 Smith (2014) 2 Bond, et al. (2012); Howard. and Hussain (2011); Morozov (2009); Gladwell (2010) 3 See Bond, et al (2012) 4 Sunstein (2002)
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partisan predispositions in the process? In other words, what exactly is the impact of
‘liking’, ‘commenting’, or ‘defriending’ on Facebook or other social media platforms?
Does it polarize people to the point where it is difficult for the ‘democratic dream’ to
finally be realized?5 With these questions guiding the subsequent analysis, the
following hypothesis is put forward: Individuals who are interactively engaged in
politics on social media hold stronger partisan and ideological attachments than those
who refrain from interacting on social media about politics.
This analysis demonstrates that one’s level of interactivity is positively
correlated with identifying strongly with a political party and ideology, while
controlling for other factors typically associated with polarization. While individuals
who are already sorted may be more inclined to interact about politics on social
media, it is the contention here that they become more sorted as a direct
consequence of these interactions. The subsequent sections describe the theoretical
foundations for the hypothesis, outline the data and methodology employed, before
finally suggesting future research endeavors and the implications for social media
and democracy.
Polarization and Partisan Sorting
Much has been written in recent decades, in the mainstream media and in the
academic literature, on the increasing ideological differences between Republicans
and Democrats.6 Indeed, simply looking at a map of the country on election night
reveals an apparent divide in this country between ‘red states’ in the Midwest and
5 Barber (2004) 6 McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2013); Abramowitz and Saunders (2008); Fiorina and Abrams (2008); Silver (2012)
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the South, and ‘blue states’ on each of the coasts. Likewise, the number of
battleground, ‘purple’ states has significantly diminished since the 1960s, leaving
fewer states in which presidential candidates direct their attention during
campaigns.7 Similarly, fewer congressional districts have been deemed ‘competitive’
in recent elections when compared to past decades, as a higher proportion of
incumbents currently reside in ‘safe seats’.8
Many have inquires as to the media’s role in contributing to this partisan and
ideological divide. The non-‐partisan voices of Walter Cronkite and Tom Brokaw
have given way to the likes of Rachel Maddow and Bill O’Reilly, who cater to their
loyal followers by demonizing political opponents.9 As the Internet, and particularly
social media, has become the primary source for political information for a new
generation of voters, the potential for further polarization becomes a more probable
reality. The following provides brief overview of polarization in Congress and
partisan sorting within the mass electorate, followed by a review of relevant
findings regarding the Internet and social media’s role in these trends.
McCarty et al. provide the most widely accepted empirical evidence
regarding the increase in Congressional polarization over the past 40 years.10 Based
on their analysis of roll call voting, the distance between the ‘mean scores’ of
Republican and Democrats are reaching levels not experienced since the Civil War.
For the first time in recent history, there is literally zero ideological overlap between
the most conservative Democrat and the most liberal Republican in either the House
7 See Abramowitz and Saunders (2008) 8 See Silver (2012) 9 Sobieraj and Berry (2011) 10 See McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, p. 15-‐32 (2006)
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or the Senate. Determining the factors that caused this trend has captured the
interest of various congressional scholars over the past few decades, with theories
ranging from the crystallization of the Southern realignment, geographical sorting
trends, institutional reforms, and even the ‘Gingrich effect’.11 The foregoing
explanations point to various developments that have altered the incentive
structure of politicians in Washington towards political homogeneity within their
respective party caucuses, and away from moderation and compromise. A lingering,
and unsettled debate remains as to whether this elite-‐level polarization has
percolated down to the masses.
The primary point of contention regarding the existence of polarization in
the electorate comes down to methodology and conceptualization. At the center of
the debate are Abramowitz and Fiorina, the former contending that the electorate is
coming further apart, while the latter arguing that rather than polarization, the
phenomenon we are experiencing can be better characterized as ‘partisan sorting’.12
Fiorina concedes that voters have become more ideologically consistent and tend to
identify more strongly with a party than they had in the past; however, he argues
that the extremity of their views is not necessarily more pronounced than in past
decades.13 Depending on the issue, Fiorina finds, the electorate has either shifted to
the right or left collectively, but not necessarily more extreme on the ends, aside
from a few issues. That being the case, there is no need to sound the alarmist bells
11 Polsby (2004); Bishop (2009); Theriault and Rohde (2009) 12 See Fiorina, Abrams and Pope (2008) and Abramowitz and Saunders (2008) for their responses to each other. 13 See Levendusky (2009) for further explanation of the ‘partisan sort’.
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that the population at large is on the brink of tearing each other apart over political
differences.
In any case, scholars tend to agree that at the very least, a significant increase
in partisan sorting has been taking place in recent decades.14 A 2014 Pew Report
underscores these trends, finding that both Republicans and Democrats become
more ideologically consistent in the past 20 years, with each others’ perceptions
regarding the other also growing more negative in the process. While it is unclear
whether individuals in the mass public hold stronger views on an issue-‐by-‐issue
basis than they did in the past, the evidence is clear that politics has become more
tribal in recent decades.
Explanations for partisan sorting vary as well. For instance, McCarty et al.
find that voters are more likely to vote on economic issues than they did in the past,
a trend largely attributable to rising inequality that began to take off in the early
1980s.15 Levendusky attributes partisan sorting to elite polarization, with a causal
process similar to that of Katz and Lazrsfeld’s influential two-‐step flow model of
media effects.16 He argues that polarized elites contribute to voters becoming more
loyal to their partisan identification (and more adversarial to the opposite side) with
the language they use and the bills proposed in Congress. Levendusky’s causal
process centers on two diverging routes that voters may take to become more
sorted: altering their ideology to conform to their partisanship, or altering their
partisanship to match their ideology.
14 Pew Research Center (2014) 15 See McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthall, p. 71-‐114 (2006) 16 See Levendusky, p. 12-‐37 (2009); Katz and Lazarsfeld (2005)
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Media’s Role in Polarization and Partisan Sorting
Scholars have also examined the impact that the media has on intensifying
the political views of the electorate, with particular attention geared toward the rise
of partisan media since the mid-‐1980s. Sobieraj and Berry for instance, provide a
thorough content analysis, finding that ‘outrage discourse’ was found in 100% of
cable TV episodes, 98.8% of talk radio programs, and 82.8% of blog posts.17 On
average, examples occurred once during every 90 to 100 seconds of political
programming on TV and even more often on radio. These findings support Prior’s
theory regarding the evolving nature of media environments over the decades and
its impact on polarization among individuals.18 When individuals merely had
network news or radio at their disposal, their views were moderated by the more
objective reporting disseminated by these stations, a phenomenon often referred to
as ‘by-‐product’ learning.19 As cable news sources proliferated (to be followed by
Internet news), only the genuinely interested (and more inherently partisan)
remained attuned to politics of the day, resulting in increased demand for more
partisan and extreme commentary in the media (those who were not genuinely
interested have opted for entertainment programming, an option that was not
available in the ‘pre-‐cable era’). While the polarizing effect on the latent public may
not be that pronounced, according to Prior, those who have maintained interest in
political news, despite other entertainment options, have become more polarized
over time. Contributing to the polarizing phenomenon, the consumers of partisan
17 See Sobieraj and Berry (2011) 18 Prior (2007) 19 Downs, p. 223 (1957)
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political news are also more likely to participate in the selection of candidates for
office, leaving the disengaged ‘moderates’ to choose between the two extremes.
Prior’s theories provide a thorough analysis of the potential for the mass media to
polarize the electorate. However, writing in 2007, his analysis concludes just as the
use of social media networks for political newsgathering were becoming more
widespread in the electorate. As mentioned previously, since 2005, the percentage
of Internet users who use social media on a regular basis has increased from 8% to
75%. One would expect this change in the media environment to have similar effects
on consumers of political information, as did the proliferation of television channels
in the early 1980s.
Regardless of age group, more people are gathering political news and
following candidates on social media with each passing election. First, do social
media exacerbate the tendency of cable news media towards the fragmentation of
news audiences and the ‘echo chamber effect?’ A majority of the initial research on
Internet newsgathering reveals an affirmation to the foregoing inquiry, with Bennett
and Iyengar finding an ever increasing fragmented audience for political news. 20
They find that in the ‘new era of minimal effects’, selective exposure tendencies are
likely to increase, as the Internet provides an even easier means for political junkies
to siphon off information that fails to conform to their preconceived biases.
Hargittai, et al., for instance, find that political blogs primarily link to other blogs of
similar ideological persuasions.21 Similarly, Baum and Groeling collect data from
Reuters and AP’s “top political news” sections in order to uncover in variance in the 20 Bennett and Iyengar (2011) 21 Hargittai, Gallo, and Kane (2008)
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types of stories deemed ‘newsworthy’ by those more established news
dissemination institutions and partisan blogs. He finds greater filtering on the part
of the blogs, further exacerbating the silo effect of partisan blog reading.22 Similarly,
Lawrence, et al. examine the readership of blogs, intuitively finding that the
consumers of left-‐wing and right-‐wing blogs are ideologically far apart from one
another, while adding that blog readers tend to be more extreme in their views than
non-‐blog readers.23
More specifically to social media, Itai et al. analyze political activity on
Twitter during the weeks preceding the 2010 election, finding users’ ‘clusters’ are
characterized by similar ideological views and are linked to like-‐minded information
sources. Particularly troubling is the trend on the part of younger news consumers
to gravitate away from neutral news reporting and towards more partisan
sources.24 They find that when individuals do engage with ideological adversaries,
the ensuing interactions tend not to involve meaningful dialogue. This last point is
supported by the findings of Conover et al., who examine ‘retweet’ trends and finds
that when individuals do venture out of their partisan silos, they do so to interject
partisan content into a thread of political adversaries, otherwise known as
‘trolling’.25 Itai, et al., however, analyze inter-‐partisan dialogues between right and
left-‐wing bloggers, finding that although the arguments are typically shallow (use of
22 Baum and Groeling (2008) 23 Lawrence, Sides, and Farrell (2010) 24 Itai, McCeery, and Smith (2013) 25 Conover, Ratkiewicz, Francisco, Goncalves, Flammini, and Menczer (2011)
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straw-‐men), the fact that they are engaging each other does demonstrate the
potential of social media for cross-‐partisan dialogue.26
Despite the abundance of scholarship on the effects of political news
consumption online, and particularly via social media, few researchers have
attempted to isolate the impact of interacting with others online. A 2012 Pew report
finds that 38% of users are ‘surprised’ to discover their friends’ political leanings
online, 47% have ‘liked’ a political comment they agreed with, 38% have
commented positively in response, while 9% have even blocked, ‘unfriended’, or
hidden someone because they posted something objectionable about politics.27 This
Pew report underscores various unanswered research questions: does this
interactivity offered by social media simply crystallize the tendencies cable news and
partisan online content – further intensifying partisan loyalties? The scholarly
evidence thus far supports this notion, and thus the hypothesis of this analysis,
restated there: Individuals who are interactively engaged in politics on the social
media hold stronger partisan and ideological views than those who refrain from such
activities.
Data and Methods
Data utilized to compile the variables in the analysis are extracted from a
Pew survey (2012) on social media habits and political views of individuals in the
electorate.28 The survey was conducted from January 20-‐February 19, 2012, and
included 2,253 adults, with 901 cell phone interviews.
26 See Hargittai, Gallo, and Kane (2008) 27 Rainie and Smith (2012) 28 Rainie and Smith (2012)
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In order to measure the relationship between an individual’s partisan and
ideological consistency and level of interactivity on social media, an ordinary least
squares statistical test is conducted. A number of control variables that have been
found to contribute to partisan sorting have been added to the model in order to
isolate the effect of interactivity on the dependent variable, partisan and ideological
consistency.
Similar to the strategy employed by Levendusky, Fiorina, and others
attempting to capture polarization and sorting, the dependent variable in question,
partisan and ideological sorting, is measured by combining two questions: three-‐
category partisan ID (Republican, Democrat, and Independent) and five-‐category
ideology (very conservative, conservative, moderate, liberal, very liberal). This six-‐
category index was then collapsed into three categories, placing the two extreme
ends (conservative Republican and liberal Democrat) into a single category, strongly
sorted. Individuals who indicated that they were both moderate and Independent are
labeled not sorted, with the remaining respondents who answered with a
combination of those answers on the survey as moderately sorted (Table 1).
An index is also created in order to measure the primary independent
variable in the model, social media interactivity. The index was created by combining
12 dichotomous (some recoded) different questions from the survey that capture
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the frequently and the nature of one’s social media habits, with particular attention
to whether they interact with others about politics through social networking sites
(see appendix for further explanation of index creation). For instance, questions ask
the importance social media plays in discussing politics with others, how often they
post about politics on social networks, and whether they respond when they
disagree with another’s post about politics (see appendix for survey and further
explanation of the index). The index ranges from 0-‐12, with 12 being the most
interactive, and 0 the least interactive (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Social Media Interactivity
Relevant control variables that have been found to be influential in affecting
individual level partisan and ideological loyalty have also been added to the model.
Various research points to education as a highly correlative (if not causal) variable
to polarization.29 This variable is measured on a seven-‐point scale, ranging from 0 to
1-‐8 years, to graduate or professional degree. Likewise, Baldassarri and Bearman’s
29 See Abramowitz and Saunders (2008)
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findings regarding wealthier individuals demonstrate that income may correlate
with higher levels of partisan and ideologically loyalty, particularly to that of
Republicans.30 Income is measured on a nine-‐point scale, ranging from less than
$10,000 per year, to $150,000 or more. Similar to the effects of education and
income, various researchers have found that partisan attachments tend to grow
with age, as voting preferences become habitual over time.31 Thus age is added to
the model to control for these effects.
Finally, dummy variables are included for both gender and race. Recent
election trends reveal that white males have been increasingly moving towards the
Republican Party, with women and minorities gravitating towards Democrats.32
Including these variables enhances the model’s ability to isolate the effect that
interactivity has on the strength of partisan and ideological attachment.
Results
Table 2 summarizes the results of the OLS regression. The entire model
predicts more than 16 percent of the variation (R2 = 0.162) on the dependent
variable, partisan and ideological sorting. All of the variables are statistically
significant, with the exception of income (99% confidence). Interestingly,
interactivity is the second most explanatory variable, behind education, both of
which are statistically significant at 99.9% confidence levels. A ‘one-‐point’ increase
in one’s interactivity results in .07 increase in partisan and ideological strength. In
other words, as individuals move from low levels of interactivity (a ‘2’ on the scale)
30 Baldassarri and Bearman (2007) 31 Sunquist (2011) 32 Rouse, Swers, and Parrott (2013)
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to high levels of interactivity (10), their corresponding partisan and ideological
strength increases by more than half of a category (or a 17% increase in sorting).
Likewise, a one-‐category increase in education (from high school to some college)
increases one’s partisan and ideological strength by 0.146 units on the index. The
difference between a high school graduate and someone with an advanced degree is
almost 0.6 units on the partisan and ideology strength index.
Polarization = (.07) interactivity + (.146) education + (.005) age + (.143) gender + (.216) race
As expected, age, gender, and race all increase the predictive ability of the
model, although the latter two in counterintuitive directions. Women actually
harbor stronger partisan and ideological feelings than men, a surprising result,
given some of the results of other research mentioned previously.33 Likewise, non-‐
whites are more ideologically and partisan sorted than whites, all else being equal.
Perhaps the gravitation of women and minorities toward the Democratic Party in
33 See Rouse, Swers, and Parrott (2013)
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recent elections explains this trend, as their shift trumps the effect of white males
becoming more conservative and Republican during that same duration. Socially
conditioned responses may also explain why women and minorities have an easier
time self-‐identifying as liberals than white males do.
Discussion
Certainly many factors contribute to the strengthening of one’s partisan and
ideological identity; the results here indicate support for the hypothesis: As
individuals become more interactive on social media about politics, they grow stronger
ideological and partisan identities. Although education explains a higher proportion
of the variation on one’s partisan and ideological attachments, social media
interactivity is more predictive than other established variables like age, gender,
race, and income. A number of scholars have demonstrated the potential polarizing
effects of the Internet, and particularly social media. These results take the next
theoretical step by identifying and isolating the key characteristic of social media
that contributes to its polarizing nature. By interacting online, both with co-‐
partisans and cross-‐partisans, individuals develop stronger in-‐group loyalty to a
political party and ideology. Rather than engage in thoughtful dialogue that
encourages feelings of empathy and understanding, interacting with others about
politics via comment threads and political posts seems to further alienate the
electorate.
Limitations and Future Research
Although the results here are illuminating, caution must be exercised before
placing undue weight on the cause and effect of the variables in question. One may
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make the case that individuals who already hold strong ideological and partisan
feelings are more likely to interact about politics on social media networks (i.e.
reverse causality). In other words, the same people are engaged in politics outside
of the virtual world are likely to be drawn towards the interactive nature social
media provides. Certainly individuals who are predisposed to partisan and
ideological sorting are more likely to seek out political interactions online; however,
the contention here is that by doing so, they develop even stronger attachments. Put
another way, it is highly unlikely that individuals who have little interest in politics
finds themselves engaging in a back and forth on a comment thread debating
economic policy, thus becoming more partisan or ideological in the process. Rather,
someone who is perhaps a moderate Democrat or Republican (or liberal or
conservative) may gravitate to these types of activities, and upon interacting with
co-‐partisans (who pile on the trash talking about ‘the other side’) or with cross-‐
partisans (who insult one another uncivilly), begin to more positively associate with
their in-‐group and more negatively with the out-‐group. In that sense, interacting
about politics on social media is a confounding variable, that when combined with
other factors contributing to polarization (education, interest in politics, etc.),
enhances the strength of partisan and ideological attachments. More sophisticated,
mixed method approaches are necessary, however, to uncover the underlying
foundations of interactivity on the web and its impact on partisan identity.
An additional limitation with the analysis is a methodological one. The
variables employed to measure partisanship and ideological strength are admittedly
simplistic, relying entirely on self-‐placement questions. Although this is one of the
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means by which other scholars have attempted to capture this phenomenon, studies
in which polarization is the primary dependent variable typically include attitudinal
measures on particular issues such as abortion, taxes, healthcare, and race, and
subsequently categorize individuals themselves based on their responses.34 Relying
on self-‐placement tends to skew responses to ‘moderate’ and ‘Independent’ because
of socially conditioned motivations to present oneself as ‘blindly partisan’.35
Unfortunately, data limitations constrain the measurement of the dependent
variable to the two self-‐placement variables, as the polarization question will have
to wait for future research.
Conclusion
Despite these limitations, the findings here contribute to the growing field of
research on social media and its effects on political discourse. Controlling for other
sources of partisan and ideological sorting, interacting on social networks about
politics increases one’s loyalty to political and ideological identifications. The
implications support the contentions put forward by Prior and others regarding the
changing media environment and its effect on political attitudes. As was the case
with the proliferation of both news and entertainment options provided by cable
television (followed by the Internet), individuals are becoming more fragmented
into more like-‐minded subgroups. Whether the subgroup represents Ron Paul or
Bernie Sanders supporters, or decorative spoon collecting enthusiasts, the Internet
acts as a double-‐edged sword that simultaneously brings people together and
divides them. Social media and politics just happen to be a perfect storm of ‘us vs. 34 See Abramowitz and Sanders (2008) 35 Robinson and Fleishman 1988
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them’, combined with fragmentation and interactivity, thus facilitating partisan and
ideological sorting (and potentially polarization).
What does this tell us about the future of political information on social media
and the Internet? Following Gutenberg’s printing press, each subsequent
technological advancement has altered the way in which society consumes
information and interacts with one another. Unlike the newspapers, the radio, or
even television, Internet for the first time provide the means for millions of
individuals to communicate directly with one another, bypassing elite power
structures that have been entrenched for centuries. Barber and other proponents of
the ‘strong democracy’ school are likely optimistic of the potential the interactivity
that social media platforms hold.36 For the first time in history, anyone can
essentially shout their opinion from the rooftops, while simultaneously inviting
others to join in. If the elites refuse to undertake an issue, the masses can speak
their mind, forcing policymakers to reconsider their stance, as was the case with
Obama and the Internet privacy debate over SOPA and PIPA.37 Detractors, however,
are quick to point out that elite opinion leaders are likely to co-‐opt the interactive
capabilities of the Internet and deploy it as a means to enhance their already
advantageous standing in society.38 After all, in the absence of motivation,
established media figures will continue to hold considerable sway in public
discourse, despite the fact that the ability and opportunity for mass-‐level
36 See Barber (2004) 37 Franzen (2012) 38 Stromer-‐Galley (2014)
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involvement has reached unprecedented levels.39 This two-‐step flow model, while
no longer as much of a necessity, does not appear to be relinquishing its usefulness
in the near future. There is little doubt that social media interactivity has the
potential to facilitate a positive democratic force in public discourse, the question is:
will society take advantage and realize Barber’s dream of a strong, informed
electorate?
39 Carpini and Keeter (1996)
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Appendix
Questions from survey and recoding details:
Interactivity Index:
Q18 About how often do you visit social networking sites?
[INTERVIEWER NOTE: IF R HAS MORE THAN ONE SNS ACCOUNT AND ASKS WHICH ONE TO THINK ABOUT, READ: the social networking site with the profile or account you use most often]
1 Several times a day 2 About once a day 3 3 to 5 days a week 4 1 to 2 days a week 5 Every few weeks (OR) 6 Less often 8 (DO NOT READ) Don’t know 9 (DO NOT READ) Refused *Recoded: 2-‐6=1; 1=2; name: frequency_use
Q20 Overall, how important are social networking sites to you personally when it comes to...[INSERT, RANDOMIZE]? [READ FOR FIRST ITEM, THEN AS NECESSARY: Are they very important, somewhat important, not too important or not at all important?]
a. Keeping up with political news b. Debating or discussing political issues with others c. Finding other people who share your views about important political issues d. Recruiting people to get involved with political issues that matter to you
CATEGORIES
1 Very important 2 Somewhat important 3 Not too important 4 Not at all important 5 (DO NOT READ) Don’t do this/Don’t use SNS to do this 8 (DO NOT READ) Don’t know 9 (DO NOT READ) Refused *All Recoded: 3-‐5=1; 1-‐2=2; names: a) social_imp_pol; b) social_imp_debating; c) social_imp_shareview; d) social_imp_involved
Q21 Thinking about everything YOU HAVE POSTED recently on social networking sites, such as status updates, comments, or links to news stories — about how much of what you have posted is related to politics, political issues or the 2012 elections? [READ 1-‐5]
1 All or almost all of it 2 Most 3 Some 4 Just a little (OR) 5 None at all 8 (DO NOT READ) Don’t know 9 (DO NOT READ) Refused
*Recoded: 3-‐5=1; 1-‐2=2; name: post_political Q22 How about the people you are friends with on social networking sites? How much of what THEY
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SHARE AND POST is related to politics, political issues or the 2012 elections? [READ 1-‐5]
1 All or almost all of it 2 Most 3 Some 4 Just a little (OR) 5 None at all 8 (DO NOT READ) Don’t know 9 (DO NOT READ) Refused
*Recoded: 3-‐5=1; 1-‐2=2; name: post_friends_political Q24 When one of your friends posts something about POLITICS on a social networking site that you
DISAGREE with, how do you USUALLY respond? Do you usually...[READ AND ROTATE 1-‐2]
1 Ignore the post you disagree with (OR) 2 Respond to it by posting a comment or posting something of your own (OR) 3 (DO NOT READ) It depends (VOL.) 4 (DO NOT READ) Neither/Something else (VOL.) 8 (DO NOT READ) Don’t know 9 (DO NOT READ) Refused
*Recoded: 1=1; 2=2; name: respond_disagree Q26 When you yourself have posted something political on a social networking site, have you ever
gotten a strong NEGATIVE reaction from a friend or someone who follows you – or has this never happened?
1 Yes, have ever gotten a strong negative reaction 2 No, has never happened 8 (DO NOT READ) Don’t know 9 (DO NOT READ) Refused
*Recoded: 2=1; 1=2; name: negative_response IF SNS USER (WEBaACT87=1 or WEBbACT87=1,2): Q29 Have you ever done any of the following on a social networking site? (First/Next), have you
ever...[INSERT, RANDOMIZE], or have you not done this?
a. Friended or followed someone because they SHARE YOUR POLITICAL VIEWS b. Clicked the “like” button in response to POLITICAL comments or material posted by
someone else c. Posted a positive comment in response to a POLITICAL post or status update from
someone else
CATEGORIES
1 Yes, have done this 2 No, have not done this 8 (DO NOT READ) Don’t know 9 (DO NOT READ) Refused
*All Recoded: 2=1; 1=2; names: a) friended; b) liked; c) positive_comment
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Polarization Index: ASK ALL: PARTY In politics TODAY, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, or
independent?
1 Republican 2 Democrat 3 Independent 4 No preference (VOL.) 5 Other party (VOL.) 8 (DO NOT READ) Don’t know 9 (DO NOT READ) Refused
*Recoded: 1=R; 2=I; 3=D; name: party_3 ASK ALL: IDEO In general, would you describe your political views as... [READ 1-‐5]
1 Very conservative 2 Conservative 3 Moderate 4 Liberal (OR) 5 Very liberal 8 (DO NOT READ) Don’t know 9 (DO NOT READ) Refused
*Recoded: 1-‐2=1; 3=2; 4-‐5=3; name: ideology3
