Policy Framing and Denizen Enfranchisement in Portugal.

Why some migrant voters are more equal than others.

Luicy Pedroza

The enfranchisement of non-citizens across different democracies has been mostly approached at with macro-explanations that propose national traditions of citizenship or transnational influences as remote causes, leading researchers to explain variation through some fuzzy balancing of the two. This paper joins the more recent literature focusing on the meso-level, particularly on political discourses on denizen enfranchisement, to examine the deviating case of Portugal, based both on strict reciprocity and differentiating clauses that divide non-citizen migrants into different universes of voters and non-voters. Such a case allows theoretical refinement of process-based and discursive approaches on denizen enfranchisement and shows that it succeeded in Portugal when parliamentarians framed it as a symbolically generous but practically restricted move that promised prestige gains vis-à-vis Europe and Portuguese emigrants.

As of today up to fifty democracies worldwide have discussed the extension of voting

rights to resident migrants who already enjoy different sets of civil and social rights

(henceforth called denizens). The case for denizen enfranchisement has been built on

basic principles of liberalism and democratic transcending borders –i.e. no person

should be subject to political decisions for long periods of time without being able to

participate in them. In the citizenship studies literature, explanations for denizen

enfranchisement are usually linked to stories of migration: solving the challenges of

governance posed by migration, responding to activism of emigrant diasporas or

honouring post-colonial commitments towards certain migrant populations

(Waldrauch 2005, Bauböck 2007). Theoretical arguments often suggest a functional

logic where denizen enfranchisement (at least at the local level) appears as a

innovative response to the deficit of democratic legitimacy provoked by big

populations of unrepresented migrants -the “traditional response” being the

facilitation of naturalization or acquisition of citizenship-as-nationality (Hammar

1990, Soysal 1998). Denizen enfranchisement speaks for all those grand arguments,

yet the case of Portugal shows that apparently successful cases may bring little

substantial change for migrants.

The enfranchisement of denizens in Portugal deviates from others in that it is

based on strict reciprocity and the preferential treatment for some migrants,

distinguishing as many as four electorates1. Denizen enfranchisement varies across

countries in three major respects: the polity level at which denizens are enfranchised,

the eligibility conditions to vote (and to be elected), and the degree to which the total

denizen population is included. Although reciprocity and preferential treatment of

some migrants once characterized extensions of voting rights to denizens in Nordic

countries during the 1980s, they were quickly removed in favour of universal

franchise. Portugal’s restrictive model, however, remains stable since 1996. By

explaining why Portugal enfranchised denizens on such conditions this paper throws

light at new variables to understand why denizen enfranchisement models differ so

much across democracies.

So far, two theoretical explanations trump in the literature. On the one hand,

transnational influences are credited for the spread of denizen enfranchisement in the

world, as well as for its relative concentration in time and regions (last forty years,

Northern to Western Europe; South America, then Eastern Europe). On the other

hand, national traditions of citizenship are considered to explain differences in

denizen enfranchisement reforms across democracies (Hollifield 1992). Balancing

theories of transnationalism and historical institutionalism to explain denizen

enfranchising reforms might be plausible, yet the mere statement that both

transnational influences and traditions of citizenship seem to be at work does not take

us any further in understanding denizen enfranchisement. Academic literature has

been mostly blind to its qualitative variations across polities and to how, in the

tradition of Schattschneider, issues are taken in or out of politics through political

processes that differ in each case. There are, of course, exceptions (see Bauböck 1994,

Earnest 2003, Howard 2006, Joppke 2007), the most notable of which is the work of

Dirk Jacobs (1998; 1999) on denizen enfranchisement in the Netherlands and

Belgium, where he scrutinised the internal logic of political discourse in both

countries. The present article contributes to that line of study in proposing a middle-

range framework of analysis where an interpretive lens is used to observe processes

by which transnational influences, different internal commitments and national

traditions introduced into politics in democracies regarding denizen voting2.

According to Maria Ioannis Baganha and Constança Urbano de Sousa, denizen

enfranchisement in Portugal marked a ‘movement towards a concept of citizenship

which is disengaged from nationality [and] goes beyond the special status of

Brazilians or the inherent status of EU citizens (which implies the right to vote and be

voted in local European Parliament elections)” (2006, p. 437). This is a valid, but

somewhat overstretched claim. By attributing a special status to certain migrants

according to the origin country the Portuguese enfranchisement of denizens differs

substantially from the majority of countries which conceded electoral rights to all

foreigners –in European cases, to ‘third-country nationals”- and which can be said to

truly disregard nationality. The claim of disengagement from nationality, even if

limited to European realities, is undermined by a member State giving privileged

access to franchise to groups with whom it shares specific legal or cultural affinities.

Why did Portuguese legislators chose to stand out instead of aligning with the, by then

already, ‘best practice” of universal enfranchisement? In the next section I present the

analytical tools and empirical material with which I tackle that question. Section Two

presents the migration policy context of Portugal in the period under study. Section

Three analyses the denizen enfranchisement process and finally leads to the paper

conclusions.

Analytical Framework, Methods and Data

The spinal cord of the analysis in this paper is interpretative; its assumptions stand in

line with classics of social constructivism (Berger and Luckmann 1991). The first of

these assumptions is that issues of citizenship are a matter of politics and policy,

resulting from long decision-making processes where multiple interpretations of the

social world are heard, which are more than deductions from national traditions

simply applied to problems, and more than the embrace (or contagion) of emerging

norms that transcend borders. Because elections constitute the form of participation

par excellence in democracies, enfranchisement debates tend to be controversial for

politicians even if franchise is limited to the local level, because they entail giving

denizens entry and currency in a political market that chose them so far being

exclusively composed by nationals.

The second assumption is that enfranchisement debates exist within certain

institutional confines that limit the terms available for discourse. This assumption is

close to discursive approaches were agency, institutional order and historicity are

considered to make sense of the terms, categories and framing of denizen

enfranchisement -e.g. Schmidt’s discursive institutionalism (2008). The process of

redefinition and reinterpretation of who is subject to certain rights and entitlements in

a polity is limited by the rules, terms and practices made accessible in the institutional

context defined by the interplay of naturalization rules, migration policy and history

defining the ideology of political parties.

Concerning methods, this paper relies on process tracing (Bennett 2004) and

political discourse analysis (Yanow 2000, Fischer 2003, Hajer and Wagenaar 2003).

As in process tracing, the analysis presented here reconstructs in detail the historical

and institutional circumstances surrounding the enfranchisement debates, in order to

track every step in the process leading to the final decision (Aminzade 2003). As in

interpretive policy analysis, the task of unveiling the meanings conveyed by different

arguments on denizen enfranchisement, their implications, and the conflicts between

them is central to the argument: different conceptualizations of denizen voting can

change the way policies fare. The concept of policy framing is particularly important

here: it involves looking for patterns in the way political actors collectively put

forward particular views on specific issues and how contending frames might hamper

communication between policy-relevant groups (see the work of R. Schmidt 2006;

Scholten and Van Nispen 2008; and Linder 2001). Frames are “particular ways of

making meaning out of complex situations by directing attention toward some

elements while simultaneously diverting attention from others” and, thereby, advising

a course of action. Used as gerund, ‘framing” deliberately highlights agency and a

dynamic analysis over time (Yanow 2000: 11). I also observe the categories used

along the debate, because the terms used to refer to newly defined electorates are

revealing of what is silenced and what is named when translating ‘transnational tends”

or “national traditions” into policy.

The political process under analysis started as early as 1971, with the signature

of a special quasi-citizenship agreement between Brazil and Portugal; passed through

the inclusion of a prospective consent in the Constitution of 1976 for denizen

franchise for Lusophone-country citizens at the local level on the condition of

reciprocity; then, through constitutional reforms that enlarged this consent to other

foreigners (i.e. no longer specifying Lusophones) under strict reciprocity (1989) and

to European citizens (1992) until, finally, ordinary legislation finally made it

applicable in 1996 with qualitative differences for four universes of voters.

The data for this paper consists of parliamentary debates (accessed through the

Assembleia da República, henceforth only referred as Parliament, archives);

government and party programs. Parliamentary debates are a good proxy for political

processes in democracies because they are the venues par excellence for the

aggregation of political preferences as represented through directly elected

representatives and the parties that group them; they are also the supreme organs of

political deliberation in contemporary democracies. In parliamentarian or semi-

parliamentarian systems, like Portugal, they are unavoidable venues of authoritative

decision-making and have exclusive competence on issues of citizen rights, liberties,

and nationality law. Generally, communication in the Portuguese Parliament is

characterized by fairly rhetorical speeches. Beyond a generally formal style of

address, statements are often spontaneous and sarcastic. The president of the

Parliament organizes the debate, often pushing fighting deputies into trading speech

time with one another; hence group statements take not only the form of speeches, but

also of dialogues. Parliamentary debates are rich in memory, with absolutely precise

references to previous interventions and debates.

As analyses of political rhetoric for one single issue might be disorienting

because similar rhetoric may incorporate quite different meanings depending on the

context and party pushing for change (Hansen and Koehler 2005, Joppke 2005), the

analysis here follows not only the change from initial proposals to final decisions but

has a wider scope than the enfranchisement debate only. It has therefore included the

institutional context configured by the migration and naturalization profile and

policies, as well as the concomitance of other relevant debates. The purpose of

widening the scope is to get an idea of predominant issues alluded to or omitted as

antecedents of enfranchisement, to make room for comparisons and to facilitate

setting plausible scope conditions that later facilitate middle-range comparisons with

other case studies. The aim is not to find “ultimate reasons” of parliamentarians, but

the justifications called forth and the context of their success or failure. Thus the data

was constantly confronted with the question: “How is denizen enfranchisement

portrayed by the various parties in the decision-making process?”

The analysis is subdivided in four subsections that illustrate the process by which

frames were constructed, tested and transformed to fit prevailing normative

frameworks in policy debates. Addressing a common critique to framing studies,

namely that they often lack empirical or counterfactual comparisons and thus appear

to be functionalist so far as causality is concerned (Campbell 2002), these analytical

steps consist of diachronic and synchronic comparisons with previous, concurrent and

later debates in order to explain its timing, and show the specificity of its framing and

institutional context as key for its success.

Migration context and policy in Portugal

Much like the political system, the identity and the migration profile of Portugal

reached a tipping point with the Revolution and the quick decolonisation that

accompanied it. Emigration, significant during all the twentieth century3, and

reinforced by the colonial wars in the 1960s4, decreased after 1974 as emigrants

started to return –especially in the 1990s- and Portuguese living on the ex-colonies

were repatriated (Peixoto 2004). More importantly, immigration increased growing at

an annual rate of 13 per cent between 1975 to 1980, composed mainly by flows from

Europe and PALOP5 countries (which until 1974 had been considered ‘inter-regional

migration” and therefore excluded from statistics on foreigners) (Pires 2003, p. 123),

but also a counter-current of Brazilian migration, and Asian immigration, mainly from

Pakistan, India and Bangladesh (Malheiros 2009). Portugal’s increasing demand for

labour during the decade of 1980 contributed to an increase of 230 per cent in its

legally resident foreign population. Since the late 1990s migration from Eastern

Europe (Ukraine, Moldova, Russia and Romania) increased vastly, relative to PALOP

immigration.

Still, long after the migration profile of Portugal had changed, net immigration

did not interest politicians. The perception of migration remained anchored to

emigration, and it was strengthened by the perception of post-imperial Portugal being

a small European territory with a third of its people spread around the globe6. The

only inflow of interest for politicians in post-revolutionary Portugal was the

prospective return of Portuguese living in the ex-colonies: the retornados.

Decolonisation and political instability in PALOP countries pushed nearly half a

million people to Portugal, the majority of which entered as retornados, even if half

of them never had touched the Iberian Peninsula before. Recalling this exodus is

important here because of two reasons: first, nationality laws were radically changed

in order to address it; second, it was the reason why the drafters of the 1976

Constitution potentially extended to Lusophone-country citizens the quasi-citizenship

status of Brazilians.

The development of legislation to regulate migration indicates how late

Portugal started taking issue with immigration. Before 1995 immigration policy had

been thinly regulated favouring a minimalist policy of control of flows, hardening

entry requirements and reducing rights. The Schengen agreements in 1992 forced

Portugal to further tighten controls over the entry, permanence and exit of third-

country nationals. Until then, historical ties to PALOP countries and Brazil had made

Portugal a privileged port of entry and stay for their migrants. According to Teixeira

and Albuquerque (2005, p. 10) Portugal found itself in the double bind of complying

with European Union regulations while trying to preserve its ties to Lusophone

countries. Only after 1995 did immigration gain relevance in government, legislation

and administration7: on that year for the first time a government program included

issues of immigration under its internal administration and social policy goals. In this

light, the law that enfranchised denizens in Portugal (Law 50/96) was part of a bigger

turn8 to immigration policies that reached well into the realm of integration.

Despite growing immigration in the 1980 and 1990s, the percentage of

foreigners that acquired Portuguese nationality never surpassed 1.5 per cent of the

total legally resident foreign population in Portugal. This is no surprise given the

restrictiveness of naturalization laws throughout those years, which highly contrasted

with a tradition of jus sanguinis upheld in Portugal since the promulgation of the Civil

Code of 1867 and through the Salazar dictatorship (Weil 2001). After the revolution,

however, the fear of massive immigration from the ex-colonies prompted Portuguese

politicians to legislate as to “close the doors”, however letting the white population

‘come back’ (de Santos 2006, p.283). To that effect, the Decree 308-A of 1975

introduced the loss of nationality, and later the Nationality Law 37/81 limited the

preservation of Portuguese nationality to jus sanguinis, easing the “repatriation” of

whites while hardening entry of black Africans (Reiter 2008). The later statelessness

of children of African ancestry born in Portugal did not stir legislators to action.

According to Weil (2001), after an initial phase of migration, European

governments tend to recognise over time that the norms and values of a democracy

are incompatible with very restrictive laws of nationality. However, Baganha and de

Sousa show that neither the original version of the Nationality Act of 1981, nor its

later rewordings in 1994 and 2004 raised heated debates or irreconcilable political

divisions regarding its restrictiveness. Quite the opposite: until 2006 this Law

reflected broad consensus among the main political powers about who was, and who

should be Portuguese (2006, p. 450).

Still, as Peter Hall (2003) reminds us, much of the confusion about relevant

factors to ensure the adoption of a given policy comes from the bias in the literature to

analyze only successful reforms. In this case, reading only successful legislative acts

overlooks the significance of failed attempts by the opposition to change the

Nationality Law. If we look instead at all proposals, also those failed or stranded in

the legislative limbo, we can observe which coalitions or rewordings made a

difference. Regarding the Nationality Law, the PCP (Partido Comunista Português)

fraction in Parliament had attempted to alter it through a Law Project (510/IX) in

1994 which would eliminate bureaucratic leeway and arbitrariness by making

naturalization a right once requirements were fulfilled, and ease those requirements.

This initiative got stranded. Law proposals made by the majority centre-right

government and by the PS (which relative to European party families could be seen as

a social democratic party) were approved by large majorities in the Parliament, while

the projects presented by left-wing parties and the Greens, aimed at making more

profound changes to the Law, were rejected until finally Law 2/2006 –again, a PCP

proposal but this time under a PS government- changed the Law of Nationality 37/81

in precisely the same lines they had been proposing for years: it strengthened the

principle of jus soli as a path to acquire Portuguese nationality; it facilitated

naturalisation (by considerably limiting the room for discretionary assessments and

decision on the application by the authorities); finally, it eliminated the differences on

grounds of nationality in the residence periods required so that a period of six years of

residence is now asked from all applicants, Lusophone or not9.

The enfranchisement of resident migrants in Portugal

The analysis of migration policy and nationality laws suggests that Portuguese

politicians aimed to accommodate migration developments to the close relation they

aimed to keep with the Portuguese diaspora, estimated to consist of roughly 4.3

million persons who thanks to two decades of jus sanguinis naturalization law and

double nationality remained fully-fledged citizens. A diaspora almost ten times bigger

than the foreign/foreign-ancestry population in Portugal10 constituted an electoral

weigh that would be felt in the enfranchisement debate.

The Constitution of 1976 established the principle of non-discrimination and

equalisation of rights among nationals and foreigners11: legally resident foreigners in

Portugal had the right to health care, education, social security, and access to judicial

courts, but no political rights. However, the Constitution already made room for a

potential extension of voting rights to Lusophone citizens at the local level on the

basis of reciprocity. That had happened before the Nordic countries (pioneers in the

field), and later the Netherlands enfranchised denizens in local elections with a

residence requirement only. However, denizen enfranchisement was not made

effective until twenty years later, through Law 50/96. By then, Denmark, Norway and

Finland had eliminated reciprocity clauses that limited the denizen population eligible

for franchise. Portugal kept it. Built upon what the Constitution and later reforms in

1989 and 1992 had envisaged, Law 50/96 enfranchised Lusophone-country and

European citizens, but also other citizens whose country of citizenship gave voting

rights to Portuguese (with longer waiting periods, though). This legislation, outdated

and restrictive if compared to Northern European cases, was praised within the

Parliament as innovative and generous when, in fact, it was giving little and expecting

a lot in return. Let us start by delineating the conditions that may explain its remaining

dormant until 1996.

1st Step: Comparing programs of different governments

In light of the special quasi-citizenship status enjoyed by Brazilians since 1971, the

prospect of extending voting rights to Lusophone-country denizens had the merit of

discretely mixing privileged Brazilians in a larger category of persons that ‘needed to

be” addressed: ex-colonials. Drafted by a Socialist (PS) majority in 1976, throughout

the next twenty years denizen enfranchisement would remain a Socialist project. The

constitutional reform of 1992, which opened franchise a little further to other not

Lusophone-country foreigners, was a PS proposal (DAR II 8/VI/2; 15.10.1992: 131-

146). This would have a great impact for the creation of the Community of Countries

of Official Portuguese Language (CPLP) and the Council of Portuguese Communities

which, together with denizen enfranchisement, were part of the PS’ government

program in 1995, when it returned to power under Prime Minister António Guterres

and appointed by President Jorge Sampaio -also a PS member. Falling only four seats

short of the absolute majority in Parliament, the socialists could practically govern by

themselves. By sanctioning a favourable regime for Lusophone-country citizens in

Portugal, based on reciprocity, they were returning to a foreign policy principle they

had imprinted in the Constitution of 1976.

The law that effectively enfranchised resident migrants in Portugal (Law 50/96)

entered Parliament as Law proposal 37/VII, to alter two secondary laws on May 28th,

199612. The exposition of motives for the proposal referred back to the program of the

XIII Government, which included it as a measure to improve participative

mechanisms in political life. In stark contrast to the Program of the previous PSD

(Partido Social Demócrata: centre-right)-led government, this program included

immigration goals under the list of measures to ‘fight social exclusion and uphold

citizen rights” (www.mne.gov.pt-document, p.12). Migration was branded a

“challenge for the solidarity of European societies” and a special one for Portugal: “In

our case, immigrants come mainly from countries where Portuguese is spoken and

with which migrants are a fundamental link for relations of cooperation and

friendship” (ibid., 16).

In its foreign policy chapter the XIII government program connected denizen

voting rights for European citizens with the fulfilment of European commitments

(ibid., 14) and set the goal of ‘putting all effort into the creation of a Community of

Countries of Portuguese Language with African countries and Brazil” (loc.cit.), with

the purpose of ‘the affirmation of Portugal in the world [which] requires reinforcing

cultural links between all Portuguese speakers” (ibid., p. 28).

Government programs are relevant in Portugal because they contain all major

policy directives of new governments, and because their parliamentary approval is at

once a vote of confidence. Comparing government programs shows that the initiative

to enfranchise denizens was truly a PS project. The program of the previous PSD-led

XII Government (1991-1995), had not included one single mention of the word

“migrant” (DAR I, Nº.4/VI/1, 11.11.1991, 33-43), but had instead focused “the need

to correct the unjust lack of participation of emigrants in presidential elections” (39).

2nd Step: framing of the enfranchisement reform

The proposal 37/VII of 1995 was justified with a mix of legal, moral and cognitive

reasons. First, it referred to the Constitutional provision that already had made room

for it and to the Directive of the European Council No. 94/80/CE13 which had

established rules for the exercise of voting rights and eligibility at local level for EU

citizens residents in a State from where they are not nationals. Second, it referred to

the ‘significant immigrant communities coming from countries of Portuguese

language, which reside in Portugal for a long time already, and that honouring the

special character of the historical and affective links that unite us to them, should

have access to the rights of political participation at the local level” (DAR II A

Nº.45/VII/1, 31.05.1996, 862). Third, the proposal was located within a broader

phenomenon: ‘the XIII Government’s program echoes the generalized understanding

that the right to vote in local authority elections will eventually need to be a vote of

all residents and not only of the nationals” (loc.cit.).

The proposal 37/VII was praised for having the merit of “stimulating”

Lusophone and third countries where Portuguese had not yet acquired electoral

rights”, to introduce, “in a reciprocal attitude of openness, constitutional and

legislative reforms that allow Portuguese there to exercise their electoral rights for

local authorities” (loc.cit). This stance towards expected reciprocity was consistent

through the debate, revealing a politic/strategic rather than moral/cultural rationale.

In the next step of the legislative process the Commission of Constitutional

Affairs, Rights, Liberties and Guarantees prepared an opinion on the proposal. It

hedged the protagonist role of the government in the proposal by stating that it was

‘nothing but the fulfilment, at the level of ordinary law, of the possibility conferred by

the Constitution” (DAR II, A Nº.57/VII/1 13.07.1996, 1350). Because commissions

are usually composed mirroring parties’ strength in the Parliament, this hedging is no

surprise. Recognising that four populations of voters would ‘alter qualitatively the

electoral census”, the Commission nevertheless passed the proposal to plenum,

considering that from the technical point of view it echoed alterations of electoral law

which had been approved for the European Parliament14.

Once in plenum, the debate on the proposal opened with an introduction by the

Minister of Internal Affairs, Alberto Costa, an impassionate speech that rallied the

support of all deputies to reach consensus. Emphasizing its socialist ownership,

together with recent measures of the government regarding immigration (see Table),

he framed the proposal as introducing “a new concept of civic modernization” which

would allow Portuguese society to catch up with modern countries (DAR I

Nº.86/VII/1, 26.06.1996, 17). ‘To modernize civic participation, valuing the frame of

life and residence as a title for participation, going beyond the classic title of

nationality” was the only mention made in the whole legislative process of a

connection between voting rights and nationality, with the apparent meaning that

modern civic countries would overcome nationality (loc.cit.).

The justification for going beyond the mere enfranchisement of European

citizens was grounded on the urge to be up to both “the heritage and the contemporary

challenges of Portugal”(loc.cit.). Despite noting that there were countries with

universal denizen franchise, Costa justified reciprocity and selectivity in by linking

them to a ‘new idea of Portugal”, where, notably, only the Portuguese were alluded to:

…an open, welcoming Portugal; but also an offensive, self-confident,

competitive Portugal, a Portugal capable of welcoming and including,

composed by Portuguese capable of affirming themselves, project themselves

and include themselves in the very exterior of Portugal. (loc.cit.)

More than the lofty presentation of the proposal what merits a closer look are the

surprisingly close positions among parties across the spectrum and their consensual

tone in the debate. Maria Celeste Correia, speaker for the ruling party fraction, the PS,

mentioned the ‘great heterogeneity at the European level” regarding the concession of

voting rights to foreign residents, without naming universal enfranchisement. She

went on to make the only mention in the debate of the urgency of the proposal from

the point of view of the integration of migrants: ‘in a moment when the issue of

migrants is in the centre of political and public debate, integration becomes a

necessity”(ibid. p. 19). However, instead of linking this “necessity” to migration facts

from Portugal, she linked it to a communication approved in a conference of

European Ministers which days earlier had suggested the ‘need for measures which

allow active participation of migrants in decision-making processes”. She reassured

the minimal risks posed by the proposal:

As is evident in the numbers, the proposal will benefit mainly the citizens of

Lusophone countries and from the EU. Besides, it is important to remember that

Portugal has until 31 December 1995 169,316 foreign legal residents. For them

to benefit from this law, it is demanded that their countries recognize this right

to their Portuguese resident immigrants. Reciprocity, which is a characteristic of

our Constitutional regime in this matter, is a form of instituting these rights for

our emigrants in any country of the world. (ibid. 20)

Correia appropriated time and again the cause as one long fought for by the PS,

praising it as part of a coherent strategy which was ‘up to date with the best of the

Portuguese heritage and strategically important for their future.” (loc.cit.).

Next, Deputy Calvão da Silva, from the biggest opposition party (PSD),

objected to incompatibilities in the law that gave ‘third nationals” more advantages

relative to Portuguese citizens. In view of the PSD, the emigrant Portuguese deserved

from Portugal the best possible treatment, ‘in a time of globalization in which there

are temptations to dilute the real and only nationality that is, in this case, the

nationality that each, by jus soli or jus sanguinis, acquired.”(ibid. p. 21) Here the

PSD was supporting the view of nationality it had upheld while in power, a view

permissive of emigrants’ rights but restrictive of immigrants’.

The speaker of the party furthest to the right in Parliament, the CDS/PP (Centro

Democrático Social/ Partido Popular), applauded the link of the proposal to the recent

creation of the CPLP and demanded that the reciprocity clause be also applied to

Lusophone-country citizens. Adding nuance, he stated that

Beyond humanitarianism, there are laws that we must apply first of all with

those that have made a journey of centuries with us, who use our language and

who want to keep on using it […] We share the idea that all are equal but some

are always more equal”(ibid. p. 22).

At the other extreme of the political spectrum, the PCP recognized the ample

consensus on the issue and expressed only one concern: ‘securing strict observation of

the reciprocity principle”. In this respect, it is crucial to note that party furthest to the

left was in line with the one furthest to the right. The PCP did, however, question the

reasons why Lusophone citizens were differentiated as electorate, to which Costa

replied tautologically:

‘…we are conscious that the reasons to contemplate a Venezuelan, a Peruvian or

Israeli should not be confused with the reasons to elect a Cape Verdean, a

Brazilian, a Mozambican or a Saotomese. For the Government those two realities

have different historical foundations and, in the future, may come to have

different juridical regimes regarding many matters that are in development.

[Probably referring to the creation of the CPLP] We are not speaking about a

community with countries which, already give us rights, and us offering other

rights as counterpart [most likely referring to the 1971 Convention with Brazil],

but we want to prepare for possible developments. (DAR I Série Nº.86…, p. 18)

Last, the speaker for the Greens tried to appropriate the initiative for her party, yet

applauded the focus on Lusophone citizens defining them as ‘the community of

migrants that shares with us a special historical, linguistic and cultural affinity”. The

Greens were the only to express reserve regarding reciprocity, for its would limit the

scope of enfranchisement. In his reply Minister Costa offered a somewhat obscure

differentiation of reciprocity meanings that merits quotation:

[…reciprocity] is a topic that unifies us, but there are many ways of treating it:

one is a symmetrical and retributive manner of the kind do ut des, in which one

only give what has been given by the counterpart. On the other hand, in a logic

of increase something can be offered that is not yet offered by the other part and

that will gain increased stimulus, authority and legitimacy that will contribute

to it being promoted by the part that advances immediately with its own offer, in

this case, a civic offer [sic]. The Government does not shy away from the idea

of a stimulating, incremental reciprocity. We want to support positions that we

want to defend in the future, in the sense of eliminating restrictions that remain

in other countries (loc.cit.).

If there is one clear point in this statement, it is that the government was framing the

proposal as strategically based on expected reciprocity, rather than on existing

agreements.

The proposal was minimally changed in the specialized commission and voted

unanimously (DAR I série Nº.96/VII/1, 13.07.1996), becoming Law 50/96 on 3

August 1996 (DAR II, Série A, Nº.59/VII/1 03.08.1996, 1430-1436). As it is clear

from the examples provided, and contrary to our assumptions, no big ideological

divides came to sight: apart from minor questions, all parties (even the Right!) tried to

appropriate the proposal as far as possible and agreed on the linkage to reciprocity

(even the Left!), time and again accentuating the special link to the Lusophones. How

come there was such consensus in a debate as polemic as enlarging the electorate?

3rd Step: comparing to similar debates on external voting rights

Just one year after the approval of Law proposal 37/VII and already in the context of

the discussions of the constitutional reform of 1997, the PSD proposed again external

voting rights for Presidential elections, which meant changing Art. 124 of the

Constitution. The PSD reiterated its view on the importance of Portuguese emigrants:

A little country like ours […] has to base its strategy on three pillars: an active

participation in the European Union, the defence of the Lusophone ideal and the

trust on the Portuguese communities. (DAR I, Nº.100/VII/2, 24.07.1997, p. 5)

The PSD criticised the PS government for ‘looking down on the Lusophone ideal”

and the debate stalled in a fight for appropriating the cause of giving electoral rights to

emigrants and having fought most consistently for it over time15. Deputies of the PCP

fiercely opposed the reform on the grounds that it had the clear purpose of benefiting

the PSD, and contested its framing as an emigration issue:

‘The Right has never lost hope of changing the rules of democratic game

through the establishment of the vote of residents abroad […] their real

objective has never been the rights of emigrants but exploiting the objectively

different conditions under which the electoral process is realized abroad. This is

not a question of emigrants or a question of emigration policy; it is a question of

the organization of the State…” (ibid., p. 9).

This debate shows a stark contrast with the debate over enfranchisement, which

occurred in the very same Parliament, with the same party composition and deputies,

and suggests that reforms affecting the electorate needed to be framed in such a way

that would secure the status quo. In the denizen enfranchisement debate party

positions complemented each other in such a way that it did not represent a danger to

any single party. In contrast, whenever the possibility of altering party proportions

through a new electorate was raised, debates were heated, confrontational and

tensions with nationality laws came to the surface. Even the topic of the “effective

link” of the emigrants to Portugal, usually a taboo (or myth, in the interpretive policy

analysis jargon) in political discourse, was raised as soon as the risk of losing

parliamentary seats was palpable. In view of the PCP, the danger was the very

“possibility that a President of the Republic is imposed from abroad and against the

will of Portuguese citizens residing in Portugal” (ibid., p.11). Representatives of the

right-wing CDS-PP seconded this fear and the demand to prove a link to the

Portuguese community (ibid. 16). The PSD replied by attacking the categorization of

Portuguese abroad as emigrants: “it is slanderous that the Portuguese who live in the

EU, where they are treated as citizens, continue to be treated here as emigrants […]

considering them different from the Portuguese living here is insulting” (ibid. p. 31).

Another example of the controversial character of debates regarding the

electorate is the seemingly modest and technical Law project 594/VII submitted by

the PCP in 1999, which aimed at eliminating bureaucratic hurdles for the register of

foreign voters to the electoral roll (DAR Série I, Nº.25/VII/3, 14.01.1999, 31)16. Its

discussion was part of a major revision of electoral laws three years after the success

of Law 50/96: after long, excruciating debates, it barely gathered the votes to pass,

and even the PS expressed concern that it went too far in facilitating administrative

procedures. Three years later, no party dared to question the prevalence of the

reciprocity norm or the legitimacy of distinguishing Lusophone denizens from others.

4th Step: comparing the successful reform 50/96 with its failed predecessor

The most telling contrast with another debate in the parliamentary context is that

between the debate of the successful denizen enfranchisement Law proposal 37/VII

(later Law 50/96) and the Law project 3/VI initiated by the PS, four years earlier as

opposition, with the PSD in government. After fierce initial debates in plenum and

commission reports (DAR II A, Nº1/VI/1, 12.11.1991, 4-5), it stranded in the

legislature for lack of address in plenum.

At first sight, the frame and arguments for the 3/VI proposal diverge only

slightly from the 37/VII. The former had mentioned other international cases of

extensions of voting rights to non-citizens; the prospect of its discussion by the EU

(thereby urging that Portugal takes its place among the pioneer nations); the legal

room opened by the constitutional revision of 1989 for allowing foreigners to

participate at the local level on condition of reciprocity, and finally the possible

reciprocity gains for Portuguese emigrants (ibid., 5). Substantially, however, it had

been framed from the perspective of immigration: it was part of a package, together

with proposals for an extraordinary regularization of illegal immigrants and the

improvement of social conditions for migrants. The PS had made this frame explicit:

“the three projects constitute an integral policy of immigration [and] need conjunct

approval…” (DAR I, Nº.21/VI/1, 15.01.1992, p. 507).

Back in 1991, the revising Commission’s report on the 3/VI proposal had

expressed self-contentment with the status quo, noticing that voting rights for

foreigners in local elections had been extended in a ‘significant number of European

countries”, but also that there were “many countries with a big number of resident

migrants in their territory” that did not concede such a possibility. Most curiously, the

report situated Portugal in the first group, having already extended voting rights to

Brazilian citizens, and recalled that the constitutional revision of 1989 had conceded

electoral capacity to other foreigners in local elections in conditions of reciprocity,

even if it was a non-implemented law, leaving “freedom to the legislator to choose the

moment to approve legislation on this matter” (DAR II A, Nº 12/VI/1, 15.01.1992, pp.

263-4). In 1991 the proposal was deemed “too permisive” by PSD- and “careless” by

CDS-Commission members. The report was then approved by PS and PCP members

only. The PSD abstained, criticising the PS of “opportunism” for revealing so much

concern in defending rights of foreigners in Portugal while lacking “the decency to

give foreigners abroad the right to vote for president” (ibid., 515). The PS responded

that voting rights for migrants had been introduced in the last constitutional revision

and that higher external voting rights would have to be discussed in the next one,

probably suggesting a tit-for-tat between parties. Later in plenum, the PSD also

opposed to the proposal on the ground that it was precipitated vis-á-vis the regime that

anyway would eventually be built by the European Union (ibid. p. 523).

So what did the successful denizen enfranchisement Law proposal 37/VII

1996 have that the failed Law project 3/VI did not? First of all: a frame of emigration,

not of immigration. In stark contrast to the frequent mention of emigration,

immigration was seldom mentioned in 1996, and when it was, references were

shallow and did not refer to facts in Portugal. At first sight, it may seem that

Portuguese legislators ignored the immigration situation, but on a closer reading the

absence of the topic suggests conscious silencing. The XIII Government was very

active at the time developing immigration policy; yet the enfranchisement debate

included no mention of the lack of representation of migrants. The closest idea was

framed abstract and positively, as “civic modernization” linked to a sense of urge that

Portugal took its place in Europe and more relevance in the world. However, over the

earlier year changes to nationality laws had repeatedly referred to migration. The

silencing of it in 1996 and a broad, diffuse emphasis on the advantages for emigrants,

together with the forceful anchor on reciprocity framed the 37/VII proposal as a

winning topic that posed no threat to the status quo: all parties could pay lip service to

a reform that rhetorically benefited emigrants in their residence countries without

changing much at home.

Secondly, the specificity regarding electorates differently favoured by the

proposal 37/VII highlighted two symbolically relevant categories of persons for

political projects widely supported across parties: “the Lusophones” and the

“Portuguese abroad”. Thinking first and foremost about Portuguese emigrants, parties

agreed to disaggregate the pool of voters into four groups anchoring all of them in

reciprocity, which amounted to frame the proposal as a strategic promotion of voting

rights for Portuguese emigrants in their residence countries. For the most part, this

disaggregation was largely symbolic: without it, enfranchisement would have also

benefited mainly Lusophone-country citizens because they constituted 2/3 of all

eligible (regular) migrants and because the reciprocity clause excluded most other

denizens. Moreover, the “privilege” of Lusophone denizens ultimately consisted of a

one-year shorter waiting residence period. As to the Lusophone political project,

already in 1995 the PS government had taken the first steps towards the creation of a

Lusophone commonwealth, the CPLP, which would crown the special constitutional

treatment of Lusophone-country citizens. All parties supported the CPLP as the

backbone of all efforts to redefine an influential role for Portugal after Empire by

means democratically legitimate in the contemporary world.

Finally, the Law proposal 37/VII entered Parliament as a Law proposal drafted

by a mono-party government, not as a Law project by the opposition. In Portugal

migration policy and nationality laws clearly depended greatly on the party or

coalition in government. The enfranchisement of denizens in Portugal was a slow

process mainly pushed by the PS, not a once-and-for-all measure supported by wide

sectors of society or influential intellectuals. Still, it never was a prominent PS

campaign topic. That the issue did not move forward for twenty years unless by PS

initiative helps to show how little popular interest was behind it17.

Conclusions

The peculiar Portuguese enfranchisement of denizens shows how fundamental

framing and symbolic politics are in processes that match international trends with

national institutions and citizenship traditions. Beyond sheer parliamentary majorities,

different political resources were mobilized over time throughout the enfranchisement

process to at once constrain and legitimize proposals. Trial-and-error provided

Portuguese legislators with feedback on how to reach a unifying frame. The success

of framing became clear in the attempts of all parties to appropriate the issue

(Baumgartner, 2009) and in the surprisingly close party positions in 1996, contrasting

with other heated debates over minor issues regarding electoral rules.

The lack of discussion of migration and nationality laws in the debate is

especially significant in the light of the literature on denizen enfranchisement. The

absence of these topics supports the hypothesis that that the success of denizen

enfranchisement in Portugal rested more on framing strategies over a long process

with plenty of feedback, than on the pure backing of a mono-party government. Even

though the PS was crucial in liberalizing naturalization and undoubtedly the main

impulse behind denizen enfranchisement, no trade-off was seriously considered to

exist between them (cfr. Abreu Silva da Costa, 2000, p.211).

Currently, the legal framework defining migrant political rights still caters to

Portuguese emigrants, despite lapses of attention to immigrant issues in PS

governments. The 350,000 registered foreign voters correspond to approximately 3.5

per cent of the population of Portugal, excluding the foreign born who have

naturalized (OIM, 2007: 27). The reciprocity clause has kept the universe of foreign

voters in Portugal reduced18 and, to this day, has not produced any remarkable results

regarding expected reciprocity in the countries where most Portuguese emigrants

reside: France, Canada, Germany and the USA. The robustness of reciprocity in

Portugal seems to suggest that traditions do play a role in explaining kinds of denizen

enfranchisement, but the relevant legal traditions need not be linked to citizenship or

naturalization. Still, the case of Portugal could erase its birthmark soon, as diverse

voices have been calling for the abolition of reciprocity19. The PS has stated that the

differentiating between denizens has been irrelevant and should be avoided. In this

light, the PS’s framing of Law 50/96 might have been a short-term goal of stepwise

process aiming at universal denizen franchise.

For the agenda of comparative Citizenship Studies the case of Portugal

suggests that novel conceptions of citizenship might be better understood by looking

into processes of reinterpretation in politics and policy –in the case of

enfranchisement processes at the arguments used to frame it- than to transnational

trends or nationality traditions as remote causes. Denizen enfranchisement in Portugal

was shaped over time by actors that ordered the “relevant issues” and the categories of

people to be addressed by it until a resonant, technically applicable proposal was

found in light of the political and institutional context. The successful reform and its

frame had –unfortunately- little to do with the democratic deficit and the migration

story of Portugal, i.e. little connection to the (mostly normative) reasons that

theoretical literature on denizen franchise has developed. This piece hopes to further

encourage comparative researchers to look for middle-range explanations of how

diverse cases join what from the outside may look like a generally homogeneous trend

(See Freeman, 2006) and enrich our understanding of cross-type variations of non-

citizen voting.

Acknowledgements I want to thank Randall Hansen, Rainer Baumann, Rainer Bauböck, Dvora Yanow and Juliana Bertazzo for their helpful comments to draft versions of this article. Thanks also to the two anonymous reviewers for their suggestions. Endnotes 1 The Portuguese process of enfranchisement of denizens addressed five populations: 1) Portuguese resident abroad, 2) European citizens, 3) Lusophone-country nationals, 4) Brazilians in possession of special equality status, and 5) other foreigners. Thanks to the 1971 Convention of Equality of Rights and Duties between Portuguese and Brazilians, Brazilian who reside legally for more than five years can exercise political rights at local, regional and legislative elections (not presidential) and may also be elected at the local level, so long as they are not forbidden to do that in Brazil (Law-Decree 126/72). To avoid situations of inequality, the exercise of these rights in Portugal means their suspension in Brazil. Active electoral capacity in local authorities is conferred after two years of legal residence; passive electoral capacity is conferred after four years. All other foreigners only have active and passive electoral capacity for the election of local authority elections, in conditions of reciprocity and so long as they live in national territory for more than three years, to vote; and more than five, to be voted. European citizens in conditions of reciprocity may vote and be elected as deputies for the European Parliament. All translations from Portuguese are mine; emphases in quotations are also mine. 2 With Hansen and Koehler, I agree that ‘...the tentacular effect of nationality traditions and the causal effect of political culture are mediated through language, argument and institutional context.” (2005: 642). 3 The principal destinations of Portuguese legal emigration, from 1950 until 1988 were France, Brazil, USA, Germany and Canada. The rest of the world received less emigrants than Brazil (SECP, Boletim anual, 1988). 4 From 1961 until 1974 approximately 1.3 million Portuguese emigrated from the mainland. 5 Officially called PALOP countries after ‘países africanos de língua oficial portuguesa”: African countries of Portuguese as official language. 6 The idea that the empire was the only real guarantor of Portugal’s independence remained ingrained in the national psyche. According to polls in 1978, 20 per cent of the population believed Portugal would not survive without its empire (Lloyd-Jones: 2). 7 A specific body, Alto-Comissário para a Imigração e Minorias Étnicas (ACIME) was created to oversee immigrant and ethnic minority issues: (Decreto-Lei N 3-A, 26 January 1996). In 1998 the Immigration Affairs Council (COCAI) was created to assist ACIME (Organização International para as Migrações, 2007: 199) 8 This turn was all but permanent. After winning the elections in March 2002, the PSD formed a coalition with the CDS and announced in its government program (Programa do XV Governo Constitucional) a new migration policy that would go back to the pre-1995 state –i.e. expelling migrants from the territory; restricting the concept of resident and limiting entries

per year (cfr. Lei 22/2002). It is important to note, though, that even through restrictive phases a more favourable treatment for Lusophone migrants was maintained. 9 Experts in Portuguese nationality law consider that despite the introduction of new forms of acquisition of nationality through ius soli, this Organic Law 2/2006 also reinforced ius sanguinis by making the descendants of Portuguese residing abroad automatically Portuguese if they only declare their wish so or register. Contrary to the proposal of the Left Bloc, the principle of ius soli was not made absolute for the second generation immigrants; although the residence requirement that applies to the immigrant parents of the children born in Portugal, the acquisition of nationality for these children still depends on the migrant situation and length of residence of the parents (Piçarra and Gil, 2012, pp. 1, 15-22, 30). 10 The number of registered voters resident outside of Portugal in 1985 was 190,818. In 2006 they were 207,005 of 9,462,645 (http://www.cne.pt consulted in January 2010). 11 Article 7 states that ‘Portugal acknowledges the abolition of imperialism, colonialism and any other form of aggression, dominion and exploitation in the relations between peoples […] Portugal keeps its privileged links of friendship and cooperation with Lusophone countries” (Constituiçao). 12 These are: “Electoral Census Law” and the “Electoral Law of Local Autarchies”. 13 To apply article 8-B, 1 of the European Union Treaty. Consulted on eur-lex.europa.eu 12 August 2009. 14 In order to secure a quick pass through the Commission the proposal had been drafted following the technical pattern used two years earlier to make room in local electoral law for European Parliament elections. 15 In January 1996, the PSD bloc had presented a law project with this objective, but it was not even discussed. External voting rights had been granted already in 1976 for legislative elections. Following Portugal’s entry into the European Community in 1986, external voting rights were granted for the national lists for the European Parliament. Only in the constitutional revision of 1997 the PS and the PSD agreed to let Portuguese citizens abroad to vote for presidential elections and national referenda too. Marina Costa Lobo suggests that the PSD constant promotion of presidential voting rights for emigrants is no wonder given that since 1976 had shown that the PSD had a consistent majority of voters for legislative elections among external voters (2007: 83). 16 Shortly before the discussion and passing of the Law 50/96 in the VII legislature, the Law project 47/VII, authored by the PSD, aimed at regulating the exercise of vote by Portuguese residing abroad allowing them to vote in embassies and consulates and not only per post. In plenum discussion it was strongly rejected by the PCP with the argument that it was a charade by the PSD to get through bureaucratic means what it had lost on the polls, specifically by manipulating the consular network. Otherwise, PCP deputies argued, it could not be explained how come in 10 years of government with overwhelming majorities the PSD had expressed no interest in such a reform (DAR I, Nº.31/VII/1, 25.01.1996, 874-894). The CDS-PP supported the reform mildly but not without expressing a note of concern and distrust that the PSD only proposed this when in opposition. The Greens stated that the proposal tried to make of emigrants ‘a flag” that would serve politically the SPD. In the end, it was rejected with the Greens, PCP and PS against and only the PSD and CDS-PP in favour. It showed that for minority parties it is fundamental to guarantee that electoral rules do not bias voters: with potential 5 mi. Portuguese abroad even apparent technicalities led to heated discussions. 17 In the general public the absence of immigration as a topic was generalized well into the 1990s. Not even intellectuals in Portugal were as outspoken as in other countries regarding denizen enfranchisement. Until the 1990s Portuguese emigrants and their communities abroad had been the dominant both as an academic and a political issue. Academic literature on migrant participation in Portugal can only be found from the 1990s onwards (See Albuquerque, Ferreira and Viegas 2000). Not even in the media was migration but an intermittent topic dependent on certain events, such as political campaigns or incidents that attract media coverage and where immigrants play a central role (Figuereido). Even migrants

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