Faculty of Classics

MPhil in Classics 2013-14

MPhil Thesis

NAME: Mr Lucas Krief

COLLEGE: Christ’s

APPROVED TITLE: Plotinus, interpreter of the Timaeus in VI.7 [38]

Sub-title (if necessary): The ζῷον παντελὲς (Timaeus 31b2) in

VI.7.8-12

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WORD COUNT: 11,998

This dissertation is submitted for the degree of Master ofPhilosophy.

Proclus speaks for most Neoplatonists when he quotes

Iamblichus with approval: ‘Then, the divine Iamblichus rightly

says that the entire Platonic doctrine is encompassed by those

two dialogues: the Timaeus and the Parmenides.’1 This holds for

Plotinus too: even though he did not compose a commentary on

the Timaeus, he finds a true understanding of the intellect and

of the soul in it.2

There are many problems that beset a complete

understanding of the Timaeus, and I wish to examine how

Plotinus tackled one of them, namely: what does Plato mean

when he calls the paradigmatic model upon which the demiurge

looks ζῷον παντελὲς (31b2, hereafter ‘Animal’)? Plotinus

refers to 31b2 several times, but VI.7.8-12 probably

1 in Plat. Ti. 1.13.14-7; translations are my own. Other translations are quoted as follows: B for Bréhier’s, A for Armstrong’s and T for Theiler, H for Hadot (1999). Lines are after H.-S.².2 E.g. V.1.8.5-6.

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constitutes the most important treatment.3

While many issues regarding Plotinus’ interpretation of

the Timaeus have been well covered, and while VI.7 has been the

subject of numerous studies, 8-12 as it relates to the Timaeus

has been little commented on.4 And, as Hadot has noted,

although we do know that Plotinus regarded the triad being-

life-intellect as central, there is surprisingly little

explicit argument he comes up with in its favour.5 Through a

study of these chapters, I aim to shed light on why Plotinus

held this view.

My aim is to spell out Plotinus’ understanding of the

Animal and to show how he justifies it. My thesis will be that

Plotinus’ reading is, notwithstanding his claim to repeat only

what has been said long ago (V.1.8.10-4), original if not

unprecedented, consistent and based on a careful dialogue with

the Timaeus.

I have divided the passage into five main sections,

subdivided into several portions of text when appropriate. The3 H.-S.² 1983: 362, ad loc.4 On the treatise, see: Dillon 1988, Siegmann 1990, d’Ancona Costa 1992, Rappe 2002, Schiarapelli 2008, Thaler 2011, Narbonne 2011: 97-113; on Plotinus’ reading of the Timaeus, Charrue 1978, Matter 1964, Opsomer 2005, Mesch 2005, Dufour 2006, Chiaradonna 2014.5 Hadot 2010: 138.

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first one sets a problem and provides a partial answer to it

(8.1-9.5). The second fully addresses it, in ways which partly

overlap the first and set the agenda for the remaining

chapters (8.22-9.22). The third and most important section

outlines the main principles for Plotinus’ interpretation

(9.22-10.17). Chapter 11 discusses the four elements and

plants. Chapter 12 summarises the discussion.

I. 8.1-9.5

This section raises a problem: how can non-rational

animals be in the Animal? I shall explain the meaning of the

problem and its significance.

(i). 8.1-14

(1)6 How do the horse and each of the animals up there7 not

consent to look (βλέπειν) to the things down here?8 [Initial

6 Numbers and explanations in brackets have been added in orderto explain the text and/or to make the argumentative sequenceclearer.7 ‘up there’ and ‘down here’ will be used to render ἐκεῖ and ἐνταῦθα, themselves referring to the intelligible and the sensible.8 H 107-8, n. 95 proposes to correct the sentence by including

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problem.] (2) But [what] if, so that a horse should come to

be or some other animal, he [god] invented the notion of

horse? [Replaces the initial problem until 8.14.] (2a) And

yet, how wishing to make a horse was he able to intelligize9

[the notion of] horse? For it is clear that by that point

the notion of horse existed, given that he wanted to make a

horse. (2b) In this way, it is not possible that so as to

make [a horse] he intelligized, but the uncreated horse

existed first, before the one which was to be after these

things. Therefore, if it was before the becoming and it is

not the case that it was intelligized in order that it

should come to be, nor is it the case that he [god] who

possessed the horse up there held it while looking towards

the things down here, [then] it is not that in order to

create the things down here he possessed it and all the

other [animals], but they were up there, and the things

[down here] followed by necessity from the things up there:

for it was not possible to stop to the things up there; for

who could have stopped a power that was able both to remain

and to proceed?

a second πῶς right after the first one to create a second sentence. This does not seem necessary, as we shall see.9 Throughout, I have translated νόησις and its cognates as ‘intellection’ and its cognates.

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First, what exactly is the problem in 8.1-3? In

particular, what does βλέπειν mean in this context? The

conclusion of ch. 7 is that ‘just as sensations [down here]

are dim intellections (ἀμυδρὰς νοήσεις), intellections up

there are clear sensations (ἐναργεῖς αἰσθήσεις)’ (28-30).

Thus, βλέπειν of the intelligible animals need not mean sense

perception, but can mean intellection as well, since sensation

and intellection are placed on a continuum. ‘Looking at’ would

thus mean ‘turning one’s mind to’.10 The problem is now: why

would the intelligible animals have to turn their minds to

sensible things?

The question can hardly be about reason, since ‘animals’

here designates the genus without any differentia and

therefore cannot be intended to single out rational animals

(the distinction occurs only in 8.15-6.). καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν

ζῴων, which seems to exclude no specific animal makes this

clear. Nor can it be about sensation, because Plotinus has

just explicitly dispensed with this topic (8.1). The question

has to be relevant to animals qua animals, as Plotinus’

10 A frequent use in the Enneads: βλέπειν ad loc. in Lexicon Plotinianum.

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reformulation of the question in 8.15 shows: ‘But on account

of what would these animals be up there?’11

Still, the question asked bears a resemblance to the

puzzle about sensation treated in chapters 3-7 and 3.26-33,

set out in the following dilemma. If man up there is only an

intellect, why does the intellect not incline down to add

sensation to sensible man? But if sensation is eternally

present in the intelligible, why does it not incline down to

actualize this potentiality, since sensation is of sensible

things?12 Plotinus’ summary of the problem in 7.17-9 links both

sub-horns as well (‘sensation’, ‘intellect inclining down’):

‘our question was, how sensation belongs to man, and how

things up there do not look to becoming’.

Given that nothing here seems to hinge on something being

added to the form of animal, I submit that the problem is the

following: animals down here eat, try to survive, reproduce,

etc. But animals up there do none of these things: forms don’t

need to eat. Thus, how is it that the animals up there do not

‘turn their mind’ down to actualize these potentialities, if

indeed it is essential to animals to do these things? For how11 Fronterotta 2007: 126, n. 61.12 Thaler 2011: 170 and H 208 for the dilemma, which parallels 1.1-5.

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could there be an animal which does none of them? A way of

getting rid of the question is Plotinus’ immediate suggestion:

perhaps god created the horse. In which case, god looks down to

create.

It appears that this view is the Middle Platonic doctrine

that forms are divine intellections.13 It is summarised in

V.9.7.14-6: ‘When it is said that forms are intellections, if

it spoken so as to mean that when [god] intelligized, such-

and-such came to be or is, it is not right: for it is

necessary that what is intelligized is prior than this

intellection’.14 Setting aside the complicated question of

potential influence, Philo can be regarded as defending this

doctrine, since he claims that god ‘first formed the

intelligible one [world], so as to use an incorporeal and most

godlike model to produce the corporeal world.’15 Plotinus has a

devastating objection to this way of portraying creation. If

god wants to make the form of horse, the notion of horse

already exists, for this very creative wish could not exist if

that were not the case. Such a doctrine presupposes what it13 Dillon 2011 for an overview.14 Cf. also VI.6.6.5-19. 15 opif. 16; Siegmann 1990: 55 contrasts Plotinus with ‘Schöpfungsmetaphysik’. Runia 1995: 183-191 for Philo’s influence.

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has to explain, and is thus incoherent.

Since the second horn of the dilemma has been eliminated,

Plotinus returns to the first.

(ii). 8.15-17

(1) But on account of what would these living beings be up

there? For why would they be in god (ἐν θεῷ)? (2) Let the

rational ones be, but this multitude of non-rational

animals, what is σεμνὸν in them? [First occurence of the

differentia ‘rationality’, which will be central up until

9.15 and replaces the initial problem.]

The beginning of the passage raises two questions: A)

what does it mean to be ‘ἐν θεῷ’? B) what has σεμνός to do

with this ?

A) The first question might seem puzzling only if the

background of Plotinus’ doctrine is left out. In his thought,

intelligible and intellect are identical: thus, what we would

say is in the Animal might be legitimately said to be ἐν θεῷ,

the creator god.16 Note that this also applies to the doctrine

that forms are divine intellections, for intellections are

16 Pépin 1956: 44-55.

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presumably within the intellect, which is god.17

B) The use of σεμνός is more significant. In and of

itself, the meaning of the term is not problematic: ‘august’,

‘holy’ or ‘revered’ are unambiguous renderings. In the

Enneads, σεμνός is often used to qualify the soul or the

intellect.18 Thus, its role perhaps is to stress the difference

between rational and irrational.

Yet, σεμνός is also tied to a polemical context.19 It

stems from Aristotle’s puzzlement about the prime mover: ‘For

if it does not intelligize, what would make it something

σεμνόν ?’ (met. 1074b16-7). Plotinus remarks in 37.3-7 that

this could be asked about the One too, yet he asserts that the

One makes intellection σεμνός and τίμιος, and not the

opposite. 9.1-5 goes further in this direction.

(1) But, someone will say (φήσει τις), let the worthy (τὰ

τίμια) animals be [up there]. (2) How, on the other hand,

were the worthless (τὰ εὐτελῆ) and irrational ones [up

there]? [Back to 8.16-17.] Manifestly, they are worthless

(τὸ εὐτελὲς) because they are irrational, if worth (τὸ

17 E.g. Alcinous’ did. 163.11-4.18 e.g. IV.4.16.20-1, III.7.2.5-7.19 Hadot 2010: 133-5.

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τίμιον) is due to reason. [Tentative explanation of why

they should be excluded from the intelligible.] And if

worth is due to having intellect [alternative explanation],

being deprived of intellect will be the opposite. (3) And

yet how would something unintelligent or irrational be in

the one [god] in which the individual things are [the

forms] or from which they [created things] come? [Spelling

out the problem fully.]

With this in mind, we may allow that Plotinus is not

arguing from his own premises: having reason or intellect20 is

neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for being

τίμιος, because the One is τίμιος too. This is Aristotelian

dialectic: φήσει τις introduces the ἔνδοξα that follow (top.

1.1).

Together, τὸ εὐτελὲς and τὸ τίμιον point to a second

polemical context. In Parm. 130a7-e4, Parmenides asks Socrates

about what he thinks there are forms of. The final question

concerns forms of things that might seem absurd (c5), such as

mud and dirt (πηλὸς καὶ ῥύπος, c6) or something else that is

20 The ambiguity between ‘rational’ and ‘intellectual’ in the objection might be explained in reference to Stoic readings ofthe Timaeus that treated them indifferently (Sextus M 9.104-7, Sedley 2007: 235-6).

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most worthless and cheapest (ἢ ἄλλο τι ἀτιμότατόν τε καὶ

φαυλότατον, c6-7). εὐτελής was also used in connection with

the Parmenides passage by Alcinous: ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τῶν εὐτελῶν τινός

... οἷον ῥύπου καὶ κάρφους, 163.28-9. This surely reflects

older as well as contemporary debates among Platonists on the

Parmenides.21

Given that τίμιον and εὐτελὲς occur respectively in the

Parmenides and in discussion of it in Alcinous, we may see

Plotinus as alluding to Parm. 130c5-6, changing the terms of

the question with specific reference to irrational animals.22

Consequently, we might expect Plotinus to replicate

Parmenides’ rebuttal of Socrates: ‘That is because you are

still young, Socrates, and philosophy has not yet seized you’

(130e1-2).

These observations all point to the same conclusion: the

problem seems only to serve the pedagogical purpose of

introducing Plotinus’ doctrines, not to point at a real worry.

II. 8.22-9.22

21 Fronterotta 2011: 48-9.22 εὐτελής is not used when alluding to the question in V.9.14.7-11. This is because it is only used in connection with animals in the Enneads (Lexicon Plotinianum, ad loc.).

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In this section, Plotinus offers a general overview of

his interpretation. He appeals to a complex set of references,

which I will attempt to decipher.

(i). 8.22-32

(1) Now, what prevents it from being the dyad?23 It was not

possible that each of the two [ones] in the dyad be the

total One [the first One of the Parmenides] but at the very

least they are two again and again, and these two in turn

in the same way [Parm. 142d1-143a3]. (2) Therefore, in the

first dyad there were both rest and motion, there was also

intellect and life was in it, both perfect intellect and

perfect life [soph. 248e7-49a2]. And it was not as one

intellection, but a total one, in fact having each and

every single intellection and as large as them all, and

even greater. And it did not live as one soul, but as all

souls, and even more,24 having the power to make individual

souls. (3) And [the dyad] was a Total Animal [Ti. 31b2], not

having man alone in itself: for then man would be alone

23 Lines 17-22 omitted because the argument used (Parm. 142d1-3a3) reoccurs in the same form for the dyad.24 Reading πλείων with H 109, n. 99, mss. EBRUQ.

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down here.

These lines contain intertwined references to Plato. The

dyad, an element of the so-called ‘unwritten doctrines’ is

quoted as well. Let me explain how these elements cohere.

First, Plotinus appeals to his interpretation of the

Parmenides: the first hypothesis of the dialogue describes the

first One, while the second describes νοῦς.25 Plotinus points

to an argument in the Parmenides 142d1-3a3 to link this second

hypothesis with the dyad. It goes as follows: the one-which-is

contains parts, and more precisely is a duality because

‘being’ and ‘one’ are not the same thing in it (142d1-5). But

each of these parts themselves has ‘being’ and ‘one’ as its

parts, and so on ad infinitum.26

In Aristotle, one of the recurring qualifications of the

dyad is ‘the large and the small’ (e.g. met. 987b25 f.) or

‘the indefinite’ (e.g. met. 1081a14). Thus, it can be a

principle of contraries, such as rest and motion (9.25). But

the connection between all the elements Plotinus appeals to

25 VI.9.1-4, V.1.8; later Platonists disagreed, e.g. Proclus: theol. Plat. 1.10, 4-9.26 Here, the dyad stands for the intellect, not the intelligible matter as in Rist 1962: 105.

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(rest, motion, soul and intellect) is found in the Sophist,

248e7-49a2:

What, by Zeus? Are we going to be easily convinced that in

truth motion, life, soul and intelligence are not present

in the total being (τῷ παντελῶς ὄντι), that it neither

lives nor is intelligent, but august and sacred, having no

intellect, it is standing motionless?

Plotinus understands τῷ παντελῶς ὄντι as the intellect, as the

equivalence of the second one of the Parmenides and the dyad

makes clear.

Finally, Plotinus connects the dyad and the Animal. Two

crucial indications can be gathered from this. First, that it

is νοῦς: if the dyad is νοῦς, and the Animal is νοῦς, this

follows. Second that παντελές is given a particular stress.

This is evident in Plotinus’ emphasis on the complete

character of the dyad: ‘complete soul’ and ‘complete

intellect’ are complete in the sense that they include each

and every single intellect and soul (28, 30). This is an echo

of Plato’s own argument for the unity of the Animal, namely

that two incomplete animals would necessarily be included in a

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third total one (31a4-b1).

Now, the question raised at the start is partially answered:

for if the animal is total, then it necessarily contains all

the animals, including the irrational. But Plotinus has left

out the particular point about the relation between reason and

worth, which is why the question reoccurs.

(ii). 9.5-15

(1) Before we take up a refutation about and against these

things, know that man down here is not of the same sort as

man up there, so that also the other animals up there are

not the same as the ones down here, but it is necessary to

understand the ones up there in a greater way. (2) Then,

there is no rationality up there, for down here perhaps man

is rational,27 but up there is the man who is prior to

reasoning. (3) Now, why does this man reason down here, but

the other animals not? [If all of them are before reasoning

up there, why does it make a difference down here?] (3a) Or

given that there is a difference up there between men and

other animals with regard to intellect, there is also a

27 Following A 113, T 269 and H 110 in taking the subject here as ‘man’.

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difference in reasoning, for in a way there are many acts

of intellections in other animals too.28 [Attempt at

explaining the difference between man and animal, which

transforms a difference of kind into a difference of

degree.]29 (3b) So why are they not equally rational? [Why

is there a difference in the intellect in the first place?]

But why are men not equally rational in comparison with one

another? [Rhetorical answer which does not get to the heart

of the problem but hints at the solution: it is necessary

that all the degrees of reason are realised.]

The initial problem has been dissolved because it assumed a

sharp (unjustified) distinction between irrational and

rational animals, which Plotinus undermines here. Note that

the problem will not reappear in its initial form later in the

treatise, although we will witness family resemblances between

other objections and this first one.30

The real problem is now: why should there be differences

in the Animal itself? Why isn’t everything the same up there?

The next passage addresses this question.

28 Against H 110, Fronterotta 2007: 54 and T 269, siding with A113, thus taking the sentence as concerned with the intellect.29 H 237-8.30 Contra Ibid.: 21-2 the paradox does not get beyond 9.15.

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(iii). 9.15-22

(1) It is necessary to consider that these numerous lives

[of animals in general], which are like motions, and these

numerous intellections ought not to be identical, but that

these lives differed and the intellections differed in the

same way. [Answer to the preceding question.] (2) And that

the differences are (2a) somehow more lucid and self-

evident, (2b) and that according to their nearness to first

things, they are first, second and third (κατὰ τὸ ἐγγὺς δὲ

τῶν πρώτων πρώτας καὶ δευτέρας καὶ τρίτας). On which

account, among intellections, (2c) some are gods, some are

a sort of second rank, in which, down here, we say reason

is, and right after these, what is called irrational.

A point regarding translation first. διόπερ τῶν νοήσεων

αἱ μὲν θεοί, αἱ δὲ δεύτερόν τι γένος is translated by Hadot as

‘C’est pourquoi, parmi les pensées, les unes deviennent des

Dieux, les autres constituent un deuxième genre...’ (my

emphasis). His interpretation matches the translation: first

intellections generate sensible gods, the second sensible

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rational animals, etc.31 But nothing that Plotinus says in this

paragraph is about sensible things: the close parallel with

8.22-32 (ζωὰς, κινήσεις and νοήσεις, 16-7) and the specific

terms qualifying the intellect (νοήσεις, νοήσεων, 16, 18, 20)

make this clear. A final argument can be devised:

linguistically speaking, to supply ‘are’ is much more likely

than to supply ‘become’ or ‘constitute’. Thus, the order here

is not the hierarchy of generations, but an order within the

intellect.

The answer to the earlier puzzle is contained in the

first lines: the intellect is not wholly uniform, but there

are differences in it. Why this is so is easily gathered from

Plato’s discussion of the structure of the Animal. First, it

is described as including by definition the totality of

intelligible animals. If this is the case, it necessarily is

ordered in a certain way because the intelligible horse is not

the same as the intelligible god, although both of them are

animals (Ti. 39a10-40a2).

Plotinus’ first way of defining these differences (2b) is

the following: intellections are defined with regard to their

31 Ibid.: 111, 237. Thaler 2011: 174-5, Siegmann 1990: 59 seem to agree with this.

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relative closeness to the ‘first things’, being of first,

second and third rank.32 Not much can be done with this, since

Plotinus doesn’t tell what the ‘first things’ are.

One important point, though, is that (2b) and (2c) divide

the intellections according to a triad. The triad is an

important way of ordering reality in the Pythagorean and

Platonic traditions, as evidenced by Numenius’ three gods,

Moderatus three ones or the tripartition forms, mathematical

entities, sensibles.33 Plotinus goes further on two scores. He

interprets the triad as constituting an order of reality, the

intellect,34 and as constituted as follows: gods, rational

animals and irrational ones. This classification is not very

striking in itself, but given the close links with the Timaeus,

something more than this can be gleaned.

In the Timaeus, there is one taxonomy of animals in the

Animal (39e8-40a2) and two descending hierarchies (41d8-42d2,

32 There is probably no meaningful connection between this and the Platonic Second Letter (312e3-4) because in our passage the first-, second- and third-order kinds of beings are determinedby their closeness to the first things, not to second and third things.33 Moderatus ap. Simplicius, in phys. 230.34-231.27, Numenius, fr. 24, 51; Matter 1964: 93-5. Merlan 1960: 11-33, 59-87 for the last tripartition. 34 Majercik 1992, Tardieu 1996 for the same triadic motive in Gnostic texts.

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90e1-92c4). The gods come first in the order of generation and

are the first species (39e10-40a1). Those gods, in turn, are

asked to create the remaining species (41a7-d3). Then the

demiurge sets the laws of fate: if men fail to live justly,

they turn into women. If they further fail, they turn into

animals (42c3-4, also: 90e1-92c4). In both passages, men and

women are a lot closer to one another than they are to the

animals, although there is a continuum between them: only one

life is needed to turn into a woman whereas it seems to take

longer to turn into an animal (42c1-2, the same goes for 90e1-

92c4).

The same descending hierarchy is therefore at work in

both passages. Thus, the first taxonomy is re-ordered

according to the following scheme: gods are at the beginning

of the series, men and women being in the middle, and beasts

at the end. Given Plotinus’ stress on reason in the previous

lines, we can see why he would recompose and unify the three

hierarchies in such a way. This is reinforced by the echo in

πρώτας καὶ δευτέρας καὶ τρίτας of Plato’s δεύτερα καὶ τρίτα at

41d7. In this passage, Plato is talking about different grades

of life made from the same soul material. The emphasis on

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their common provenance further strengthens both the

hierarchical order and the continuity between the members of

the class. This may also be partly why Plotinus seems to

endorse the doctrine that there is no radical break between

rational and irrational animals: they are part of the same

intelligible phylogenic line.35

Thus, this is a remarkable example of ‘allegorical

interpretation of the regressive evolution from man to animal,

described at the end of the Timaeus, 91-92’.36 Allegorical,

because what is a feature of the sensible world in the Timaeus

becomes an integral part of the Animal, implying that it has

its own living dynamic. I will demonstrate the further

significance of this exegesis below.

To sum up, Plotinus has so far expounded both aspects of

the Animal. For it to be an animal means that it is also an

intellect. For it to be total means that it contains all the

kinds of animals there are, constituting a hierarchy modelled

on those of the Timaeus.37 The chapters that follow explain the

principles on which Plotinus’ dogmatic exposition has been

founded.35 Carpenter 2008: 39-56 for animals in Ti.36 H 239, on 9.38.37 More generally, Hadot 2010: 63-8.

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III. 9.22-10.17

Here, Plotinus appeals to three principles, which he

briefly defends. These help him secure the view he has just

presented.

(i). 9.22-28

The first principle is the Principle of Intelligible-Intellect

Identity (POI): ‘Each form is also an intellect.’

(1) But up there even what we call irrational was reason

[contradiction with 9.10? not if we allow a certain

flexibility of vocabulary, cf. n. 20] and the

unintellectual was an intellect, since what intelligizes

horse is an intellect, and the intellection of horse was an

intellect. (2) But if it is intellection alone, it wouldn’t

be absurd for the intellection itself to be intellection of

what is unintellectual. [‘Intellection alone’ meaning

intellection not identical with its object.] (3) Now as it

is, if intellection is the same thing as the object (τῷ

πράγματι), how could it be intellection, and its object

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unintelligent? [met. 1075a1-5, de an. 430a3-5.] (3a) For in

this way intellect would make itself unintellectual.

[Reductio ad absurdum: if intellection is identical with its

object and the object is unintellectual, the intellect

would become unintellectual by intelligizing it.]

In the passage, Plotinus contrasts two kinds of

relationship between intellection and object: one in which

intellection is not identical with its object and one in

which it is. It is hard to see if the first intellection

is purely counterfactual case or not. But this matters

little, as Plotinus’ point is that in the former case it

is not absurd that the object is unintellectual, while in

the latter it is.

We might gather that Plotinus is here spelling out

and clarifying the implications of POI. It is vital to his

overall argument, because that is what enables him to say

that the form of horse is an intellect. Consequently, this

will get him from Animal to intellect, as he asserted in

8.31. But his justification for it is extremely brief and

concise, which forces us to make use of other passages in

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the Enneads.38

The most developed statement about POI is to be found

in VI.6.6.19-26.

If someone were to say that in things without matter

knowledge and its object are the same, one ought to

understand what is said as follows: (1) he neither says

that knowledge is the object, (2) nor that the

theoretical definition of the object is the object

itself. But on the contrary: (3) the object itself

without matter is intelligible and intellection; (3a)

[this intellection is] not such as to be a definition

of the thing, (3b) or a notion of it; (3c) but what is

the object itself, being in the intelligible, other

than intellect and knowledge?

Plotinus presents three candidates for interpretation, of

which he rejects two and endorses one. On the face of it,

though, this seems absurd. If A (ἡ ἐπιστήμη) = B (τὸ πρᾶγμα),

what difference does it make to say instead that B = A? In

fact, what Plotinus is arguing against is the Middle Platonic38 More generally, Schniewind 2013, Hadot 2010, Menn 2001, Szlezák 1979: 120-66, Sumi 1997, Emilsson 2007: 60-5 and Perl 2007.

25

doctrine witnessed at 8.3-14, as he himself says: ‘For it is

not that he [god] intelligized “what is justice” and justice

came to be, nor that he intelligized “what is motion”, and

motion existed.’ (VI.6.6.8-10). Plotinus and X39 disagree on

what makes it true that A = B, i.e. on which of B or A is more

fundamental and on which of the two can be reduced to the

other.40 Understood in this peculiar way, A = B (X) means: ‘The

intellect intelligizes the forms; the forms are definitions,

perfect concepts’; B = A (Plotinus) means: ‘Each form is an

intellect.’41

It might be asked how ‘B = A’ is compatible with ‘B

produces A’, since Plotinus claims the following: ‘Thus,

intellection of motion has not produced (οὐ πεποίηκεν) Motion

Itself, but Motion Itself has produced (πεποίηκε) the

intellection, so that it itself has made itself motion and

intellection.’ (VI.6.6.30-33). We need some more context to

deal with the problem properly. Plotinus thinks that the

39 Plotinus’ target is indeterminate. One might think of Alcinous (e.g. did. 163.27-31, 30-4) or of Alexander (e.g. de an. 89.10-1). For Alexander as a source of Plotinus on the intellect, see Armstrong 1960 and Merlan 1963: 7-47.40 See Sedley 1988: 302. Schniewind 2013: 31-9 simply assumes that A = B and B = A are different.41Alexander’s de an. 88.2-3 is a strong anticipation of Plotinus’ thesis.

26

intellect is derivated from the One, but not in its full-blown

shape. It is first indeterminate and by gazing to the One it

determines itself.42 One should understand the claim that B

produces A as the fact that B is prior to A in the generation

of the full-blown intellect. B = A, by contrast, when the

intellect is fully formed.43 Plotinus thinks that B is prior to

A because ‘if we foresee intellect as prior to being, it will

be necessary to say that in acting and intelligizing it

produces and generates being’ (V.9.8.8-11). And we have seen

that this is contradictory (8.1-14).44

With the right interpretation of POI in mind, we can

piece together several indications in the Enneads and construct

an argument for the principle.

The first step is given by Plotinus in V.3.1.19.-68 and

V.9.1-16.45 True νοῦς is not potentially νοῦς but eternally

νοῦς in actuality (V.9.1-4). But if νοῦς intelligizes its

object outside itself it cannot rule out falsehood from its

intellection because it has only an image of it and no truth

(56-7). But there is truth, and hence νοῦς has its object42 See Nyvlt 2012: 131-63, Emilsson 2007: 69-123. 43 Pace Bréhier 1931: 157, Merlan 1963: 44-5, Emilson 2007: 152-7.44 Pace Montent 2000: 219-20.45 Menn 2001: 238, Siegmann 1990: 60.

27

within itself, from itself. And from this, Plotinus concludes

that it is its object (V.9.5.6-7).

The reason why he draws this conclusion is that there are

two ways in which we might understand the fact that νοῦς has

its object within itself. Either νοῦς has it as its

intellection, or it simply is identical with it. But we have

seen that the former is incoherent (8.1-14, VI.6.6.8-33,

V.9.7.11-4). Therefore, the latter.

Finally, if νοῦς is identical with its object, then the

object is a νοῦς. For if it that were not the case, ‘intellect

would make itself unintellectual’ (9.28). In turn, this neatly

lends us POI: each form is an intellect.46 We should note,

however, that POI is compatible with there being only one form

in the intellect. POI by itself is not enough to get us a full-

blown understanding of the Animal.47

(ii). 9.28-35

46 Emilson 2007: 160-4.47 See Menn The Aim and Argument of Aristotle’s Metaphysics IIIγ2 (unpublished): 25-30.

28

The second principle defended here is the Principle of

Homeomericity (POH):48 ‘Each particular intellect is also in a

way the whole intellect.’

(1) And it is not unintellectual but this particular kind

of (τοιόσδε)49 intellect: for it is this particular kind of

life. (2) For just as any particular life does not cease to

be a life, in the same way too this particular kind of

intellect does not cease to be an intellect, (3) since the

intellect in respect of any particular animal (ὁ νοῦς ὁ

κατὰ ὁτιοῦν ζῷον) does not cease, for its part, to be

intellect of all things, like that of man as well (4), if

indeed each part, whichever someone takes, is all things

but perhaps differently. (4a) For while in actuality it is

this, it is potentially all things.

Plotinus here talks about a particular form, which is also a

particular intellect (from POI). The argumentative sequence

goes as follows: a particular intellect is still an intellect

because any particular intellect is also the intellect of all

things, as every particular intellect is potentially all the

48 In reference to Porphyry, sent. 22.49 VI.6.6.2-3 for the same use, H 238.

29

others. Everything here hinges on POH and its two

formulations, (4) and (4a). Here again, the justification is

tentative, which forces us to look both at the historical

background and at other indications in the Enneads.50

Plotinus’ formulation of the POH recalls another

principle that Iamblichus traces back to Numenius: ἐν πᾶσιν

ὡσαύτως πάντα εἶναι... οἰκείως μέντοι κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ἐν

ἑκάστοις, which Dodds renders as ‘all things are in all

things, but in each after its own fashion’.51 Plotinus’

emphasis on each νοῦς being αὖ ... νοῦς ... πάντων (9.32) and

ἕκαστον μέρος... πάντα ἀλλ’ ἴσως ἄλλως (9.33-4) strongly

anticipates this formulation.

Yet, as has been noted, the principle might be

interpreted in two different ways, one ‘vertical’ and one

‘horizontal’.52 The vertical interpretation is best seen in

Porphyry’s Sent. 10:

All things are in all, but each according to its essence.

For [they are] in the intellect, intellectually, in the

50 T 491, n. on 9.33 for Posidonius as the ancestor of POH, ap.Diogenes Laertius 7.138-9.51 Fr. 41. 9-10; Dodds 1963: 254.52 Hadot 1968: 243-4.

30

soul rationally, in plants spermatically, in bodies as

images (εἰδωλικῶς) and in that which is above (ἐν δὲ τῷ

ἐπέκεινα), unintellectually and superessentially

(ὑπερουσίως).

This interpretation is vertical because it ranges over all

levels of reality. But that is not what Plotinus is concerned

with here, since he is only talking about νοῦς, which leads us

to the horizontal interpretation.

Hadot takes it to mean that in a single process different

stages are singled out according to the prominence of their

constituents.53 Yet neither is this what Plotinus means here,

for there is no process with different stages.

What distinguishes Plotinus’ POH is his use of δύναμις

and ἐνέργεια. And this is crucial to his own explanation of

it, most prominently with the use of the metaphor of the

complete science, e.g. in IV.9.5:

(1) For science (ἡ ἐπιστήμη) is a whole and its parts are

such that the whole remains and the parts are from it (7-

9)... (2) One ought not to think of [the part] as bereft of

53 Victorinus’ ad. Ar. 1-3.

31

the other theorems: if one does, it will not be artful

(τεχνικόν) or scientific (ἐπιστημονικόν), but as if a child

were to speak. Therefore, if it is scientific, it also has

all things potentially (δυνάμει) (19-21)... (3) And the

geometer shows in his analysis how one proposition has all

the other prior propositions through which there is

analysis, and also the following ones, which are generated

from it (23-6).54

This passage fully brings out Plotinus’ POH. On the one

hand, in the mind of a geometer, Pythagoras’ theorem is linked

to other propositions regarding the nature of triangles. It

stands in a relationship with all other geometrical

propositions because it contains them potentially, in the

sense that from it such-and-such propositions can be deduced

and that such-and-such propositions have been used to deduce

it.55 On the other hand, in the mind of a child, there are bits

of geometrical knowledge which are not properly connected to

one another. νοῦς is like the science of the geometer. Every

54 See Tornau 1998 and Nikulin 2005 on this passage.55 Frege 1884: 101, the theorems are in the axioms ‘wie die Pflanze im Samen’.

32

form contains the others potentially, in that each form implies

the whole realm of the forms.56

However, this does not make 9.28-35 fully understandable:

animals are not theorems.57 It is meaningful to say that

theorems imply one another, but in what sense do animals imply

one another?

(iii). 9.35-10.9

The answer lies in the Principle of Totality (POT), which I

shall formulate only after having discussed the issues

surrounding it.

(1) We understand each thing according to its actuality.

And its actuality is last, so that the last of this

particular intellect is a horse, and being horse, it is

where it stops its forever proceeding toward lower life,

while another will stop lower. (2) For the unfolding powers

(δυνάμεις) always leave [something] above (εἰς τὸ ἄνω).

They proceed, losing something, but also, in the process of

56 Emilsson 2007: 199-207 for a similar interpretation.57 Dillon 1988: 350: ‘[a form] is a certain quasi-mathematical formula, which is also a field of force’. Again: how do these descriptions relate?

33

each of them losing different things,58 because of the

deficiency of the animal that has appeared, discovering

something else to add from what is lacking. [This very

difficult sentence is explained by the following examples.]

(2a) For example, since there is no longer enough [power]

for life, nails (ὄνυξ) were produced and curved claws (τὸ

γαμψώνυχον), jagged teeth (καρχαρόδον) and the growth of

horns (κέρατος φύσις).59 (2b) So that, at whichever point

the intellect has gone down, at this very point it emerges

again due to the self-sufficiency of its nature and

discovers stored in itself the cure of the deficiency. (3)

But how is there deficiency up there? For why would there

be horns for self-defence up there? <There are horns> for

self-suffiency and for completeness qua animal.60 For qua

animal it needed to be complete, qua intellect too <it

needed to be> complete, and qua life too <it needed to be>

complete, so that if there is not this, there is that. And

the difference is due to [having] this rather than that, so

that out of all these <animals be composed> the most

58 If one accepts H.-S.²’s emandation of ἄλλα· ἀλλὰ (mss.) into ἄλλα ἄλλαι. The mss. reading would give: ‘... in the process of losing them, losing different things ...’. But the point is clear: the powers lose different things.59 φύσις, A 115 has ‘nature’, B 79 and T 273 do not translate; Hadot’s ‘la formation des cornes’ seems to make the most sense, cf. IV.3.13.14 and IV.4.11.19.60 ὡς ζῴου, which H 113 renders ‘en son essence d’animal’.

34

complete animal, the complete intellect and the most

complete life, each part being perfect qua part.61

This text, which I have decided to treat as a whole, is as

difficult as it is fascinating. For that reason, I shall start

with an exposition of the status quaestionis.

What is the passage dealing with? Rappe thinks, without

justifying this view, that it is about how the intellect gives

rise to different sensible species.62 Perhaps the vocabulary of

procession (ἀεὶ εἰς ἐλάττω, 9.37, προΐασι, 39) points toward

this. But, as Thaler rightly notes, this cannot be right.63

First, the appearance of horns, fangs and claws is made within

the intelligible, as the question at 10.1-2 makes clear. It

would make no sense to ask why there are horns in the

intelligible if he had claimed there are none. Second,

Plotinus makes it explicit that it is the intellect itself

which ‘goes down’ and ‘emerges again’. Third, this would be

equivalent to saying what Plotinus has constantly denied,

namely that the intellect inclines toward things below.

61 Leaving out 10.7-14 which explains in different words what has been said.62 2002: 83. Also: Adamson 2011: 25, Fronterotta 2007: 129, n.70.63 2011: 175, n. 30, Siegmann 1990: 62.

35

In addition, Thaler points that there is clear

teleological overtone here.64 Hadot thinks as much and points

toward what he takes Plotinus’ philosophical sources to be,

i.e. Plato and Aristotle: ‘What in Plato’s Timaeus was the

outcome of the providence of the gods becomes in Aristotle an

outcome of the internal teleology of nature, and in Plotinus

an outcome of the systematicity of the intellect’.65 I find

myself in broad agreement with Thaler and Hadot, but what is

lacking in both is a thorough discussion of how Plotinus

critically engaged with Plato and Aristotle.

The examples to which Plotinus appeals to illustrate this

process within the intellect are the first things I want to

consider, because they have been neglected hitherto. What

springs to mind is that these are quite peculiar ones. And

indeed these are rare words for Plotinus, used once or twice

elsewhere.66

Once we turn to Aristotle’s biological works, however,

Plotinus’ four examples start to make more sense.67 First, all

these have much in common: they are homeomeric (hist. an. 485a5-

64 Ibid. 176.65 1999: 240.66 Lexicon Plotinianum 195, 539, 555 and 745.67 Cf. Louis 1973: 88, 96 and 129.

36

8, 517a6-517b2) and they are often listed by Aristotle as

means of defence for the animal (teeth: part. an. 661b5-6,

662a14-5; curved claws: 662b4-5; horns: 662b27-8). Second,

they seem to be incompatible with one another: for example, an

animal having jagged teeth cannot have horns (hist. an. 501a19-

20), and those which have horns tend to have hoofs, and thus

cannot have claws (hist. an. 499b15). This is because, according

to Aristotle: ὃ γὰρ ἐκεῖθεν ἀφαιρεῖ ἡ φύσις προστίθησιν

ἐνταῦθα, gen. an. 750a3-4. We may call this the Principle of

Completion (POC).

In part. an. 3, Aristotle has a sustained discussion of

three of the four Plotinian examples, linked to POC.68 Nature

provides one sufficient means for a given species: ‘for nature

gave to some nails (ὄνυχας), to others teeth fit for fighting

(ὀδόντας μαχητικούς) and to yet some others some other part

sufficient for defence’ (662b33-4). When a species lacks

something with respect to survival, nature gives it something

else to compensate.

Note that the principle appealed to at the start of the

passage is distinctly Aristotelian as well. An acorn is

potentially an oak; the actuality comes last in the sense that68 H 240.

37

it is the end of the acorn to become an oak (e.g. met. 1049b17-

29).69

These four examples are features of living creatures that

seem to make perfect sense on an Aristotelian view: they are

the results of the need of animals to defend themselves and of

the generosity of nature. But they seem to make no sense if

biological explanations are to be made in terms of

intelligible forms, as Plotinus insists they should be. And

this is because Plotinus both rejects the view that the

intellect looks down and, thus, is comitted to there being

intelligible horns. But it is unclear why an intelligible form

would need horns, because it need not defend itself.70

Consequently, animals and certain features of them prove the

most difficult aspects of the intellect to explain, and this

perhaps explains the aporiai above.

All this background allows us to understand what it is

that Plotinus is rejecting, namely an Aristotelian explanation

of living things.71 Note indeed that the immediate retort to

69 Plotinus would reject the other sense in which actuality is prior to potentiality because δυνάμεις come first in the intellect, cf. last § of the section.70 Thaler 2011: 170.71 This substantiates Rappe’s claim (2002: 81-5) that Aristotleis criticized here.

38

Plotinus’ account is Aristotelian: horns are for self-defence

(πρὸς ἄμυναν, 10.1-2) and what would self-defence be up there?

Yet, he retrieves certain features of this view and uses them

on the intelligible level. POC is at work here too: τὸ ἐνδεὲς

τοῦ ζῴου (9.40) and τοῦ ἐλλείποντος (9.41) are responsible for

the appearance of horns, teeth, etc. The notion of survival,

of there being enough for life (τὸ ἱκανὸν εἰς ζωήν, 9.42),

becomes a feature of the Animal. All the teleology is thus

explained through the necessity of totality in the Animal.72

It is certainly puzzling that all features of animals,

including horns, should be part of the Animal. But I shall try

to alleviate the strangeness of this claim on three main

points: i) why there is totality; ii) why what loses something

has to gain something; iii) why intelligible horns (that is,

why such precise details are included in the forms).

i) The totality need not be assumed, because something

like Plato’s argument in Ti. 30c2-d1 that the Animal should be

total so as to be a good model can be devised. The Animal qua

intellect cannot lack any form/intellect/animal because it

then would fail to be an intellect: if the form of the

triangle were outside the intellect, it would fail to72 Thaler 2011: 174-80.

39

intelligize it.73

ii) Let me appeal to Plotinus’ allegorical interpretation

of Ti. 90e1-92c4 to explain why what loses something has to

gain something else. Let us posit that at a certain moment in

the descent of the intellect man appears, because rationality

is added to an animal that was lacking something else. The

intellect continues its descent and thus some powers lose

rationality. These powers have the potentiality to become

birds and quadrupeds, for example. If they remain as they are,

the Animal would not be total: it would lack some διαφορά that

it could have. Thus, διαφορά (10.5), understood as having εἰ

μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο (10.4), is a necessary condition of

completeness.74

iii) What remains puzzling is the painstaking level of

details that Plotinus seems to have in mind (fangs, claws,

etc.). Why can’t we account for intelligible animals on a more

general level? A way to answer this is to think in terms of

73 The explanation in 13 (Thaler 2011: 177) only concludes thatthe intellect ought to intellegize a multiplicity of objects, not all objects. 74 There is no contradiction between the eternity of the intellect and the ‘happening’ of the process because the process is already realised. Plotinus didactically gives us its law of constitution as if happening now. Cf. Armstrong 1979:XV 72, Emilsson 2007: 163-5, Nyvlt 2012: 225.

40

degrees of determinacy. The mathematical analogy is helpful to

make this point. If one wants to write or to think of a

complete geometry, it is not enough merely to supply the axioms

and the more general theorems. Although it would be

potentially complete, since one would be able to deduce all

other lemmas and propositions from these, it would not actually

be complete. For it to be actually complete, everything down

to the most remote consequences needs to be written down or

thought of. If the geometry that one has in mind is not

determinate enough, it simply is not total. The same holds for

the totality of animals. It is not enough to mark off the

species as Plato does, by calling attention to where they live

(Ti. 39e8-40a2) because there are many quadrupeds and many

flying species. If the Animal only includes the subgenus

‘flying animal’ but not more determinate forms, it only has

those flying animals potentially and not actually. Now, the

specific organs which Plotinus uses as examples are precisely

marking off species from one another. The clearest example is

τὸ γαμψώνυχον which is taken by Aristotle to designate a

species by itself (e.g. hist. an. 488a5, 503a30). Thus, if

having claws is the necessary and sufficient characteristic to

41

distinguish A birds from B birds, the absence of claws in the

Animal entails that it is not total: it would have A and B

potentially, not actually.75 Plotinus is thus be able to give clear

and precise meaning to Ti. 30c6: parts καθ’ ἓν refer to

individual species while parts κατὰ γένη refer to the more

general subgenera.76

Therefore, POT might be formulated as: ‘Each species

necessarily exists in the Animal in a way determinate enough

for the Animal to have them all actually.’

But all this leaves one question unanswered: why is it

that the intelligible δυνάμεις go forth and lose something? We

might say that it is because the Animal needs to be total.77

But although this is plausible, it is not what Plotinus says

here. Rather, teleology is involved only when ‘there is not

enough for life’, and thus as a result of the procession of the

δυνάμεις. The ‘proceeding toward lower life’ seems to be a

feature of the intellect not obviously or directly connected

with the teleology of totality.

Actually, δυνάμεις is sometimes used by Plotinus in75 Consequently, each form has to be as determinate and complete as possible. Which helps to explain Plotinus’ earlierremarks about man in 2.46-54 (H 204-5, Siegmann 1990: 65).76 Taylor 1928: 82-3.77 Ibid.: 176-8.

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connection with the double act doctrine: that everything which

is has two activities, one ‘of the οὐσία’ and another ‘out of

the οὐσία’.78 Plotinus has displayed such a use of δύναμις in

8.13-4: ‘for who could have stopped a power (δύναμιν) that was

able both to remain (μένειν) and to proceed (προϊέναι

δυναμένην)?’ I infer from this that δύναμις here too refers to

the internal activity of the intellect. Let me say more about

the doctrine before proceeding. Emilsson has neatly provided

us with a clear example of how these two activities relate.79

Think of someone walking (first activity) and of the trace

that he leaves on the sand (second activity). They are

connected in that the walking causes the trace. Thus, the

second activity is causally derivative from and reducible to

the first. In the same way, beings in Plotinus’ ontology have

a fundamental act and in so doing, they cause something else.

If this is so, it leads to an interesting result. As

described by Plotinus, we have two different processes in the

intellect, or at least one process described in two different

ways: one of them is the unfolding of the powers toward lower

life. The other is the invention of new features of the78 V.4.2.21-37, see Emilsson 2007: 29-30 for the use of δύναμις. 79 2007: 48-52.

43

intelligible animal to make up for the lack caused by this

process.80

Now, it seems to me that these two processes have a lot

to do with the two causes in the Timaeus: the divine one and

the necessary one (68e7).81 To be sure, there are a lot of

dissimilarities here, if only because Plotinus rejects the

sort of causal explanation Plato gives for the human body (ch.

1-3). But it is worth emphasizing the points of contact. For

convenience’s sake, I shall call the first process ‘necessity’

and the second ‘intellect’, although it should be clear that

these two are in the same intellect. Plotinus is only picking

out different ways of understanding the inner workings of a

single entity.

First, necessity always goes toward the worse, or down

(ἀεὶ εἰς ἐλάττω, 9.37-9, αἱ δυνάμεις καταλείπουσιν ἀεὶ εἰς τὸ

ἄνω, 9.38-9), and makes the powers lose something; it seems

that there is no way to stop this descent, as the intellect

does not stop it, but rather repairs it. In Plato too,80 Strikingly, the process is wholly internal to the intellect: the One is not present in the account (for non-internal processes, see Armstrong 1979: XV 69). 81 Another piece of evidence for the use of the Timaeus here is that the first example is ὄνυξ. In Ti. 76d8-76e6, they are signs that the gods foreknew that men would turn into beasts, and nails into claws (occurrences in 76e2, 76e4-5).

44

necessity can also be persuaded, not annihilated and by itself

is random and the cause of disturbance.82 Second, Plotinus

strikingly uses verbs like ἐξευροῦσαι (9.41) and εὑρεῖν (9.45)

to describe this process. Thus, not only is the activity of

the intellect teleologically ordered much like that of the

gods of the Timaeus, but it is also described in the same way.

For Plato uses εὑρίσκω to describe the creative activity of

the demiurge twice: i) in 30b1 (ηὕρισκεν), where the demiurge

discovers that an intelligent world is better than an

untelligent one; ii) in 47b6 (ἀνευρεῖν), where he invents the

power of sight. Plotinus’ use of those words is remarkable,

precisely because he is in general very cautious about

attributing actions of this sort to the intellect, and because

he has just refuted the view that god invents the form of

horse (8.14). Third, the activity of the intellect is

constrained by this necessity. The intellect can only add what

is missing according to the requirement of POT, not anything

whatsoever to any animal. This is also a feature of the

interaction between the two causes: the gods cannot do what

they want, they are constrained by necessity, e.g. they cannot

82 Adamson 2011: 10-8. I am here talking about ‘persuaded’ necessity (e.g. 48a2-5).

45

build skulls which are very solid and thin at the same time

(75b2-d1).

I have shown above that Plotinus interprets allegorically

the taxonomies of the Timaeus (II, (iii)). Here too, he

interprets allegorically the working of the principles of the

Timaeus (demiurge, lesser gods and necessity) in that he

redeploys explanations used at the sensible level to explain

the workings of the Animal itself.

With this in mind, let me come back to 9.15-22 and see

what light has been shed on the passage. First, Plotinus has

shown not only that differences are necessary, but how these

differences come about. The static ordering of genera and

species has been replaced by the dynamic self-constitution of

the intellect. Second, our understanding of the tripartition

of gods, mortal rational animals and irrational animals is now

deepened: there are underlying principles that unify all the

three kinds. The ‘tinkering’ at work in the intellect makes

all animals part of the same line of descent in a much clearer

way.83 Third, it was mysterious what τῶν πρώτων (9.19-20)

referred to.84 It is now possible to say that it refers to the83 Jacob’s celebrated expression, 1977: 1163-6.84 A question not addressed by anyone else, as far as I know. The highest level of the intellect is constituted by the five

46

δυνάμεις in their most indeterminate and potential form: when

they have maximum power. The δυνάμεις in question are in

effect both powers of life and potentially all the animals.85

At this level, every animal is contained potentially and none

exists in actuality. This is exactly what Plotinus, using

another metaphor, says in VI.2.25-6: ‘In turn, qua genus, it

is the potentiality of all species under it and none of them

in actuality’.86 Fourth, we see how Plotinus is justified in

calling forms both animals/lives and intellections/sciences. It

is because both animals and theorems give meaningful

descriptions of what essentially constitutes the intellect: an

ordered system of forms implying one another.87

The three principles taken together thus justify the

conception of the Animal as a system of living intellects

which derive from one another.

genera of the Sophist (Emilsson 2007: 161, Slaveva-Griffin 2009:109-10) but this does not seem what Plotinus has in mind here.85 Same use in 8.14 and 9.34-5.86 The use of potentiality as disconnected from any external agent ‘justifi[es] [Plotinus’] use of potentiality to account for internal “processes” or relationships within the intelligible world.’ (Smith 2011: IX, 66; also: Armstrong 1979: XV, 70-1, Nyvlt 2012: 219-26). Thus, there is no contradiction with II.2.1.87 Siegmann 1990: 65 wrongly attributes all the work to POH.

47

IV. 11.1-51

This section shows that elements and plants are included in

the Animal too.

(1) It is said that even the heaven, — and many animals

are manifest in it too [this seems to refer to the sky (H

242), not to the world (echo to Ti. 28b3) because it is

contrasted with the universe below] — does not disdain

[ἀτιμάσαι, contrary to the objector in 8.14-6] the nature

of any of the animals, since this universe also possesses

them all. Therefore, whence does it possess them? [The

answer is implied: ‘from up there’.] (2) So then, does up

there have everything that is down here? (2a) Or [rather]

as many things as are made by a forming principle and are

according to form. [Necessary and sufficient criteria for

‘natural individual’, e.g. products of art are κατ’ εἶδος

but are not made by a λόγος.] (2b) But when it possesses

fire [Plotinus thinks that fire is the most incorporeal and

noble of all elements, hence its first position here (e.g.

VI.5.8.22-46, VI.6.17-31, H 243)], it possesses water too

and also certainly plants [plants are different on several

scores from animals, but still living things (Ti. 77a4-c6,

48

Carpenter 2010: 285); they are thus a middle-ground between

animals and elements]. (2c) But how would plants be up

there? And how is fire alive? How is earth? For either it

is alive or it will be like a corpse [what neither lives

nor intelligizes is a corpse, IV.7.9.23-5, V.4.2.44, Hadot

1960: 108, n. 6-7] up there, so that not everything up

there is alive. [Cf. 8.15-6 and 9.1-4: reason and intellect

raised the issue that life raises now.] And in general why

will these things too be in the intelligible? (3) It would

be possible to fit the plants into the account, since

plant here too is a forming principle resting in life. (3a)

If the enmattered forming principle involved in the plant,

by which the plant is, is a certain kind of life and a sort

of soul, and [there is] a forming principle in it [the

equation is: λόγος = ζωή = ψυχή, on which already see de an.

414a13-4 (H 242)], then surely this plant is the first, or

it is not but the first plant is before this one, from

which this one too comes. For this first plant is one,

while these are many and come from this one from necessity.

[‘One-over-many’ principle applied to the plants.] (3b) If

this is so, the former plant ought much sooner to be alive

[in virtue of the fact that the intelligible beings are

‘greater’, recalled in 9.5-9] and be the plant itself while

49

from it the other plants live in the second and third ranks

(ἀπ’ ἐκείνου δὲ ταῦτα δευτέρως καὶ τρίτως) and according to

its traces (κατ’ ἴχνος).88 [17-31 are omitted.]89 (4) [The

same conclusion is drawn regarding earth: an ensouled

living principle works through earthly things, namely the

active nature of earth.] Having discovered the working

nature seated in earth as life in a forming principle, we

might easily believe the following: that earth up there is

much sooner alive and that earth has a life endowed with

reason, being first and absolute earth from which the earth

down here too comes. [Since earth is a life down here too,

there is no problem in conceiving its life up there after

all; the same reasoning is applied to fire of which the

conclusion is the following]; [36-42 are omitted, see n.

82.] And this is life and forming principle, both of them

one and the same. (5) On which account also Plato says that

in each of those [elements] is soul, in no other way than88 ‘Second’ and ‘third’ cannot refer to 9.19-20 because here they are degrees of ‘planthood’ in the sensible; this rather refers to the earlier discussion about the three men (intelligible, rational and sensible) in ch. 4-6; H 115, n. 108 seems then correct in pointing out that the second rank isthe λόγος, while the third is the composite form/matter. Cf. Chrétien 2001: 250-2 for the relevant references on ἴχνος usedto designate the derivative of the principles.89 Details of the reasoning in 17-32 and 36-42 are omitted because they do not involve any difficulties and can be summarised as follows: X exhibits behaviour that could only beexhibited if X were/had a soul, hence X is/has a soul.

50

as making this perceptible fire.90 Therefore, what makes

fire down here is a certain fiery life, a truer fire. Then,

the fire that is beyond is more a fire and would be more in

life. Then fire itself also is alive. And the same

reasoning goes for the other [elements], water and air. Why

would these elements too not be ensouled just like earth?

(6) Therefore, that even these [elements, plants] are in

the total Animal (ἐν ζῴῳ τῷ παντί) is clear, I suppose, and

that they are parts of this Animal [is clear too].91

This passage echoes 9.5-15, where the problem of 8.14-6

vanished because it was based on a misunderstanding. The same

strategy is used here too: it might seem that elements are not

living, but upon closer examination they in fact are. If so,

there is no problem in including them where everything is

alive.92

There is however an issue not addressed in this passage.

Elements and plants are explicitly called μέρη ζῴου (11.51).

90 Most commentators point to Epinomis 984b-c where the soul is described as forming animals from the elements.91 51-71 omitted because they are concerned with a rather different question which has no bearing on the main issue, namely: why do elements not seem alive? 92 It is not obvious that the forms of elements at Ti. 55b are living, Cornford 1937: 40-1.

51

But how do they relate to the animals which are parts of the

Animal too? A tentative answer is the following: the text that

Plotinus seems to quote, Epinomis 984b-c, claims that animals

are made from the elements by the soul. Given that Plotinus

rejects any ‘looking-down’ on the part of the intelligible

animals, it follows that they too must be constitued by

intelligible elements. Thus, elements are parts of the Animal

because they are parts of the animals in it. A similar line of

thought is open regarding plants: plants are said to be

created for safeguarding animals at Ti. 77a1-6. We might

imagine that they are implied by the account of any given

animal and thus appear with it.

V. 12.1-30

In the final section, Plotinus recapitulates what he has

shown.

(1) But let us argue again in this way. For since we say

that this universe is related to a sort of paradigm of it,

much sooner ought the total animal to be up there, if its

being is total, to be them [animals] all. (2) And the sky

52

up there ought to be an animal too, not deprived of

celestial bodies, those which we say [are in] the sky down

here, and this is the being of the sky. (2a) Up there

clearly is earth, not deprived [of life], but much more

enlivened, and in it are all animals at once, those which

are called footed and terrestrialdown here, and clearly

plants live settled in life. (2b) And sea is up there too,

and all the water [up there] abides in flow and life, and

all the animals in water; the nature of air is a part of

the whole up there, and the aerial animals in it,

corresponding to air itself. (3) For how would these in the

Animal not be living, if even down here [they are]?

Therefore how would every animal of necessity not be up

there? For as there is each of the great parts

[environments of the animals], of necessity it holds in the

same way for the nature of animals in them. Therefore just

as the sky is and holds up there, all the animals in the

sky both are and hold up there and it is not possible that

they are not. Or else they would not be [taking ‘animals’

for ‘they’ would be redundant; it seems that Plotinus

alludes to the ‘great parts’, cf. A 127 and H 119]. (4)

Therefore, if one seeks where the animals come from, one

seeks where the sky up there comes from. And this is to

53

seek where the Animal comes from; and this is the same as

to seek where life, total life and total soul and the whole

intellect come from: up there, there is no poverty or

impotence, but all things are gorging and as if boiling

with life. [To seek this is to be misguided; it is not to

recognize where explanations ought to stop; if one seeks

where life comes from, one must be content if one arrives

at life itself because it is self-explanatory in that

respect.] (5) There is a sort of flow of them all from one

spring, not like one particular breath (ἑνός τινος

πνεύματος) or one warmth [a criticism of the Stoics who

make one element (fire, identified as πνεῦμα) superior to

others? (H 119, n. 122)], but as if there were one quality

having all qualities in it and keeping [them] intact:

sweetness of taste and fragrance, both the quality of wine

and the powers of all tastes together; both the sights of

colours and all things known by touch; and let there be

also all things heard by hearing, all tunes and every

rhythm.

Although fully coherent with what has been said before,

this summary is not without novelties. Plotinus fits the

environment of the animals into his account, linking them with

54

the elements, surely following Ti. 40a1-2 in listing aerial,

aquatic and terrestrial animals.93 Again, though, he does not

say how they relate to the animals in the intelligible. But

this is easily gathered from his indication that if they were

not the animals, the ‘great parts’ would not be (καὶ οὐκ ἔστι

μὴ εἶναι· ἢ οὐδ’ ἐκεῖνα ἔσται, 18-9). We may thus assume that,

when such-and-such animal appears, the relevant environment

appears too or is implied. This is confirmed by Plotinus’

remark that to inquire where the animals come from is to

inquire where the sky comes from (19): aerial animals imply

the existence of the sky just as the nature of the right-

angled triangle implies Pythagoras’ theorem (from POH and

POT).94 This enables us to envision the intelligible descent

more precisely. Each animal bears a relationship to its

environment and thus animals which have similar environments

can be said to descend from one another. There is possibly

also a smooth continuum between all the environments although

it cannot be inferred from 12.1-30 what the order of this

continuum would be.

93 As in VI.3.9.6-10.94 See also Siegmann 1990: 64, Dillon 1988: 350-1.

55

V. Conclusion

I now want to make two sets of concluding remarks

about A) i) how my interpretation and exposition of VI.7.8-12

differ from previous ones, and ii) what contributions it makes

to our understanding of Plotinus; about B) how Plotinus’

understanding of the Timaeus and of the Animal compares to both

i) ancient and ii) contemporary readings.

A) i) Throughout, I have attempted to show how Plotinus’

argumentation hangs together, justifying it when it was

sketchy. In so doing, I have been able to correct,

substantiate or deepen existing interpretations, more

precisely on the following points: i) the meaning and

signifncance of the problem(s) at 8.1-2, 8.15-7 and 9.1-5; ii)

the connections between 8.22-32, 9.5-15 and 9.35-10.19 along

with their allegorical interpretations of the Timaeus; iii) the

precise meaning of POI (‘B = A’ and ‘B produces A’); iv) the

way in which Plotinus’ three principles cohere; v) the manner

in which Plotinus reinterprets Aristotle and Plato in building

his own teleology; vi) the relation between intelligible

animals, elements and environments.

56

ii) In turn, this has value for our understanding of

Plotinus more generally. Justifiably, studies of νοῦς have

focused on features it has qua νοῦς.95 The literature has

sometimes been content simply to note that Plotinus is

comitted to the identity between the demiurge and its model.96

But other aspects come to light when νοῦς is considered qua

Animal, most prominently the teleology of totality and thus

the ways in which animals imply one another, much like

theorems. I infer that this is the most fundamental reason for

Plotinus’ commitment to the triad being-life-intellect, namely

that forms are adequately and analogously said to be true

beings, sciences/intellects (POI) and animals.97

B) i) Broadie distinguishes two interpretative stances

one might take regarding the Timaeus.98 The first one is

cosmological: it is interested in the sensible for its own sake,

and in the Animal for what it can tell us about the sensible.

95 The most important problems dealt with by the literature aretreated concerning intellect qua intellect, e.g. Pépin 1956, Trouillard 1961, Bussanich 1988, Crystal 1998, Menn 2001, Emilsson 2007 and Nyvlt 2012.96 E.g. Pépin 1956: 48-9, Dufour 2006 : 215-9, Charrue 1978: 135-9.97 Rather than acceptance of merely traditional doctrine, as Hadot 1960: 119 supposes. See VI.2.21.24-59, VI.6.7.14-9, 15.7-15, 17.39-43. 98 2012: 60-6.

57

The second, the metaphysical stance, is the exact converse.

Plotinus is comitted to the latter, as are most ancient

commentators. But while non-literal interpretations of the

Timaeus go as far back as Xenocrates, what I have called an

‘allegorical’ interpretation is unprecedented.99 And this is,

to recall my point, to interpret different explanations of

sensible phenomena at work in the Timaeus as applying to the

Animal first and foremost.

ii) As for contemporary readings, I think it is

illuminating to see where Plotinus fits into the controversy

over the number and range of forms contained in the Animal.

Sedley points out that just as the Animal is called ζῴων (e.g.

30c2-3) and ὃ ἔστιν ζῷον (39e8), the Couch is called κλίνη

(rep. 597c2) and ὃ ἔστι κλίνη (rep. 597a2). The Animal is also

said to have (only, it seems) four subgenera of animals (39e3-

40a2).100 This carries a lot of weight: if other commentators

fail to show why the Animal should be different than the Couch

in some respect, we may conclude that it is intended by Plato

as no more than the ‘form of the genus animal’.101

99 Fr. 52 Heinze for Xenocrates’ view. Cf. Hadot 1960: 135 for a similar treatment by Plotinus of some Stoic views. 100 2007: 108, n. 36101 Ibid.

58

Most recently, Perl has defended the view that the Animal

contains all the forms, with two main arguments.102 The first

of these two focuses on Ti. 30c-31a (Plato’s argument that two

Animals would be included in a third total one). Perl argues

that if it did not contain all the forms, the Animal would be

‘only a part of the total system, it would lack the

perfection’ it needs.103 Perl misses something, though: what

Plato argues for is completeness and perfection qua Animal.

Thus, it needs to include all the intelligible animals and not

all the forms unqualifiedly. An additional premise is needed,

namely that all forms are living animals. If this is the case,

then the Animal has to include all the intelligible animals,

i.e. all the forms. This premise is exactly what Plotinus

defends at length — both on exegetical (soph. 248e-249a, met.

12.7, 9) and philosophical (POI, POH, POT) grounds. Without

it, Perl’s argument fails. The second argument rests on Ti.

39e-40a, the four subgenera of animals. Although there are

only four subgenera, Perl’s claim is that since the demiurge

has looked at the Animal to build the living cosmos, it has to

include all the parts of the cosmos as forms, because they too

102 1998: 86-9. Zeyl 2000: xxxvii-xxxviii, n. 66 for a summary. 103 Ibid.: 86.

59

are living.104 But again, Perl misses that it is at least

unclear whether the elements, which are parts of the world,

are living or not in the Timaeus. Here too, the premise that

all main features of the living universe are living is

missing. And here too, this is exactly what Plotinus defends

in 11-2.

Thus, Plotinus is able to claim that the Animal is unlike

the Couch because all forms can meaningfully be said to be

parts of the Animal as animals themselves, while this is not

so with regard to the Couch. He is further able to point out

that when Plato distinguishes four subgenera of animals, he is

simply picking out the most salient features of the

intelligible line of descent. This would explain why plants

are not listed although they too are animals (Ti. 76e7-77c5).105

Plotinus’ reading of the Timaeus (especially in VI.7.8-12)

is not, as has sometimes been said, a reading into the text of

what he thinks is true on independent grounds. It is rather a

highly sophisticated attempt to come to terms with the

philosophical problems that Plato too dealt with.106

104 Contra Ibid. 87.105 Carpenter 2010, Skemp 1947 on this topic. 106 Sumi 1997, 2006 for Plato as a riddler in Plotinus. On the ‘philological’ side of Plotinus, Merlan 1963: 5-87, Henry 1960, vita Plotini 14.

60

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