Denise LarozePhD(c) University of Essex

dalaro@essex.ac.uk

Presented at MPSAApril 5, 2014

Party Financing and the Entrance of New Presidential

Candidates

Motivation

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QuestionHow have party finance regulations (and the costs and benefits they generate) impacted the number of new presidential candidates running for office?

Unit and time18 Latin American 1978-2013, that is 113 elections

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Theory

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Building on the literature regarding The effective number of candidates (Golder 2006; Hicken, A. and H. Stoll 2008; Jones 1994, 1999, 2004, Potter and Tavits 2013; among others); The emergence of new political parties (Cox 1997; Carreras 2012; Hug 2001; Tavits 2006, 2008)The rise of relevant new political actors in Latin America (Carreras, 2012; Corrales, 2008; Levitsky and Cameron, 2003; Mainwaring, 2006; Tanaka, 1998; Mayoraga, 2006; Roberts, 2007; Seligson, 2002). This paper argues that the economic incentives introduced by party finance regulations are associated with the number of new presidential candidates (NPCs).

Public Funding Incentives

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Past Election

Current Election

Inter-

election years

Inter-electi

onyears

Registration Costs•Non-partisan candidates

Campaign costs:•Public funds for campaigns

•Subsidies to media

Potential benefits:•Funding on-going

activities

NPCs

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HypothesisH1: Less restrictions on who can run for president, result, ceteris paribus, in a higher number of NPCsH2: Public funding for political campaigns is associated with a lower number of NPCs, ceteris paribus, when public funding is allocated as function of past electoral resultsH3: Public subsidies for media access based on past electoral results are associated with a lower number of NPCs, ceteris paribusH:4 The existence of public funds for on-going party activities, ceteris paribus, is positively associated with the number of NPCs.

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Empirical MethodsPooled Dynamic PoissonRobustness tests with variations of the dependent variable and methods of estimation, including:

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Results 5% Threshold I

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Results 5% Threshold II

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Robustness to Definition of DV

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Other robustness tests

First Differences

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Conclusion

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The results of the empirical analyses provide evidence that changes in economic in incentives coincide with strategic behavior by NPCs.

These results are robust to different definitions of the dependent variable and methods of estimation.

The study has substantive policy consequences that should be considered in future regulatory reforms.

Further research:More nuanced measures of costs and bene ts of fipublic funding.

Country specific analysis at the subnational level.

Thank you!!!

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