Operationalisation of Hybrid Peacebuilding in Asia - OAPEN

From Theory to Practice

Operationalisation of Hybrid Peacebuilding in Asia

Edited by Yuji Uesugi · Anna Deekeling ·Sophie Shiori Umeyama · Lawrence McDonald-Colbert

SECURITY, DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN EAST ASIA

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Yuji Uesugi · Anna Deekeling ·Sophie Shiori Umeyama ·

LawrenceMcDonald-ColbertEditors

Operationalisationof Hybrid

Peacebuilding in AsiaFrom Theory to Practice

EditorsYuji UesugiWaseda UniversityTokyo, Japan

Sophie Shiori UmeyamaWaseda UniversityTokyo, Japan

Anna DeekelingWaseda UniversityTokyo, Japan

Lawrence McDonald-ColbertWaseda UniversityTokyo, Japan

Security, Development and Human Rights in East AsiaISBN 978-3-030-67757-2 ISBN 978-3-030-67758-9 (eBook)https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67758-9

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2021. This book is an open accesspublication.Open Access This book is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permitsuse, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as longas you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link tothe Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.The images or other third party material in this book are included in the book’s CreativeCommons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If materialis not included in the book’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is notpermitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtainpermission directly from the copyright holder.The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that suchnames are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free forgeneral use.The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and informa-tion in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neitherthe publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, withrespect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have beenmade. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published mapsand institutional affiliations.

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Acknowledgements

We are deeply grateful to all the people who have made it possible topublish this book. A special appreciation goes to the students who tookthe course called Global Conflict Analysis and Resolution at the Grad-uate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University, in the 2018 Fallsemester and who have jointly developed the idea of this book project.The heated debates and seemingly endless dialogues in class under thebanner of “students with opinions” have aided tremendously in carvingout the path for this project and in stimulating the ideas and conceptsargued for in this book.

We owe the transformation of these ideas into more tangible thoughtsto many academics who have helped us enormously by offering their feed-back and sharing their unique knowledge. This book was refined andsolidified especially during the international workshop on Reconstructingthe Architecture of International Peacebuilding held between 11th–13thSeptember 2019 at the Global Asia Research Centre, Waseda Univer-sity with financial support from the Top Global University Project by theJapanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology.We would like to sincerely thank the discussants such as Oliver Rich-mond (The University of Manchester), Joanne Wallis (The Australian

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vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

National University), Dahlia Simangan (Hiroshima University), Minji Yoo(Chonbuk National University), Hidekazu Sakai (Kansai Gaidai Univer-sity), Hiroko Inoue (Daito Bunka University) and Kyoko Cross (KyotoSangyo University) who provided critical feedback and suggestions to thefirst draft of the chapters of this book.

Beyond the workshop participants, we have many more to extend ourgratitude. Having had a chance to present at a workshop held on 1stNovember 2019 in the Peking University together with Waseda Univer-sity was an additional milestone that provided us with thoughtful feedbackand broadening our perspectives on peacebuilding in Southeast Asia. Thevarious insights from scholars working in the field helped us to elevate theproject to the next level.

As you can see from the line-up of the contributors of this book, ineach chapter a junior scholar was supported and guided by a more expe-rienced scholar serving as his or her co-author/mentor. Their kind guid-ance was invaluable and helped to increase the quality of analysis presentedin each chapter of this book. We would like to express our special thanksto our “global” co-authors: Cedric de Coning (Norwegian Instituteof International Affairs), Dahlia Simangan (Hiroshima University), WillBrehm (University College London), Jovanie C. Espesor (Mindanao StateUniversity) and Fujian Li (China Foreign Affairs University).

The above-mentioned Top Global University Project also supported thisbook to be published as “open access” so that more people, especiallystudents with financial constraints and in difficult conditions under theCOVID-19 pandemics, can have free access to our research, and instruc-tors can assign this book as a textbook or reference for their classeswithout hesitation as it incurs no financial burdens to students. We, “stu-dents with opinions”, are very glad that this book is published in thismanner so that our work can inspire other “students with opinions” inthe world.

Finally, we would like to thank the faculty members, staff and studentsof Waseda University and especially those of the Graduate School of Inter-national Culture and Communication Studies, Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Graduate School of Social Science and Graduate School ofPolitical Science for providing the thought-provoking, collaborative and

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS vii

conducive environment for us to engage in truly academic endeavours. Weowe a great debt to Waseda University for providing such an opportunityand space for young scholars from all over the world to come togetherand work collaboratively for peace.

October 2020 Yuji UesugiAnna Deekeling

Sophie Shiori UmeyamaLawrence McDonald-Colbert

Praise forOperationalisationofHybrid Peacebuilding in Asia

“Peacebuilding is a crucial instrument of international conflict resolution.Due to its significance, Professor Yuji Uesugi edited and published a bookon Hybrid Peacebuilding in Asia in 2020. The book explored a novelidea called the mid-space bridge-builders. The idea received considerableattention since the publication of the book. The current book takes themid-space bridge-builders idea one step further by introducing specificcase studies. The case studies make a significant contribution to the theoryand practice of international peacebuilding. The book will be of value topeacebuilding practitioners, researchers, and students.”

—S. I. Keethaponcalan, Salisbury University, Maryland, USA

“This important collection adds further weight and nuance to the growingbody of scholarship that has recently emerged on the development ofhybrid political orders and on hybrid peace frameworks in complex,contextual political conflicts. It also consolidates work on Asian contri-butions to peacebuilding. The chapters offer innovative theorising onhybridity, as well as an interesting range of cases and examples. In thecontext of Asian contributions to peacebuilding, focussing on Chinaand Japan, and in the contexts of Cambodia and Mindanao, the bookoutlines how political differences are externally and internally mediatedand incorporated into hybrid frameworks for peacebuilding. These aredeeply affected by bottom-up demands for reform. The book suggests

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x PRAISE FOR OPERATIONALISATION OF HYBRID PEACEBUILDING IN …

that regional and contextual lessons in these examples indicate that “mid-space actors” tend to accumulate the pluralist capacities necessary tofacilitate more legitimate forms of peacebuilding.”—Oliver Richmond, Research Professor of IR, Peace and Conflict Studies,

The University of Manchester, UK

“This book makes two important contributions to the literature onhybridity and peacebuilding. First, it brings Asian perspectives to bear ontheoretical debates at the cutting-edge of peacebuilding theory. Second,it examines case studies of peacebuilding conducted by Asian actors thathave largely been overlooked by Western analyses. Based on these contri-butions, Uesugi and his contributors open pathways for further analyses of“Eastphalian hybrid peacebuilding” as an alternative to dominant Westernperspectives.”

—Joanne Wallis, Professor of International Security, University ofAdelaide, Australia

Contents

1 Introduction: Operationalisation of HybridPeacebuilding in Asia 1Yuji Uesugi

2 A Brief Sketch of Hybrid Peacebuilding 21Yuji Uesugi, Anna Deekeling, and Anton Ingstedt

3 Hybridity, Adaptive Peacebuilding and Complexity 37Cedric de Coning and Lawrence McDonald-Colbert

4 Bridging Gaps: From a Descriptive to a PracticalMid-Space Actor Typology? 59Anna Deekeling and Dahlia Simangan

5 The Power of Identity in Hybrid Peacebuilding:Buddhist Monks in Post-Conflict Cambodia 81Sophie Shiori Umeyama and Will Brehm

6 Frictional Binaries: Hybridity, Civil Society,and Liberal-Local Peacebuilding in Mindanao 99Ferth Vandensteen Manaysayand Jovanie Camacho Espesor

7 Rise of China’s Developmental Peace: Prospectsfor Asian Hybrid Peacebuilding 127KwokChung Wong and Fujian Li

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xii CONTENTS

8 Japan’s Peacebuilding and Mid-Space Actors: A BridgeBetween the West and the Rest 159Yuji Uesugi and Anna Deekeling

9 Conclusion: Alternative Theory and Practiceof Peacebuilding in Asia 187Yuji Uesugi, Anna Deekeling, Sophie Shiori Umeyama,and Lawrence McDonald-Colbert

Index 197

Notes on Contributors

Will Brehm is a Lecturer of Education and International Developmentat the UCL Institute of Education, University College London, and amember of the Centre for Education and International Development.His research interests include the intersection of comparative and interna-tional education with international relations and the political economy ofdevelopment, focussed primarily in Southeast Asia. Follow him on Twitter@wbrehm.

Cedric de Coning is a Research Professor with the Norwegian Instituteof International Affairs (NUPI) and a Senior Advisor for the AfricanCentre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD). Hisresearch covers African, Global South and United Nations peace andsecurity issues. He has a special interest in the application of ComplexityTheory in International Relations and Peace and Conflict Studies, wherehe has introduced Adaptive Peacebuilding and Adaptive Peace Opera-tions.

Anna Deekeling graduated with her Master’s of Arts from the Grad-uate School of Social Science, Waseda University in 2020. Her thesis isentitled “Dialogue building in post-conflict societies—Japan as a hybridpeacebuilding actor? Can hybrid peacebuilding theory be conceptualisedas a practical tool to promote dialogue within a post-conflict society, andhow can Japanese peacebuilding experiences contribute to this approach?”

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xiv NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Jovanie Camacho Espesor is a Professor at the Department of PoliticalScience of the Mindanao State University, General Santos City, Philip-pines. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the Department ofPolitical Science and International Relations, University of Canterbury inChristchurch, New Zealand. His area of research interest intersects thedisciplinary boundaries of Political Science, Anthropology, Critical Secu-rity and Development Studies. He publishes scholarly articles on peace-building, development and security issues in the southern Philippines andAceh, Indonesia.

Anton Ingstedt is a consultant with experience of working for inter-national organisations in the fields of Youth, Peace and Security, youthempowerment and antiracism. His main academic interest falls on thegendered dimensions to conflict prevention, for which he explored inhis Master’s Degree dissertation how the targeting of gender normsand stereotypes can enhance disarmament, demobilisation and reintegra-tion efforts, at the Graduate Institute for International and DevelopmentStudies in Geneva.

Fujian Li is a Research Fellow of the Institute of Asian Studies at ChinaForeign Affairs University. He obtained his Ph.D. in Political Scienceand International Relations from the University of Western, Australia.He has been a Visiting Fellow with the Future Directions Internationalsince 2012 and an Adjunct Research Fellow with the Centre for OceanianStudies at Sun Yat-sen University since 2013. His research interests arecentred on China’s regional relations and Sino-Australian relation.

Ferth Vandensteen Manaysay currently works as an Academic ResearchAssociate at the School of Government, Ateneo de Manila University.He holds a Master’s Degree in International Relations from the Grad-uate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University. His research inter-ests on Southeast Asia (Indonesia and Philippines) include civil societyand social movements, environmental politics, disaster management, andpeace and security studies.

Lawrence McDonald-Colbert graduated with his Master’s of Arts fromthe Graduate School of Political Science, Waseda University in 2020. Hisresearch focuses on conflict resolution, international state-building andcapacity development in post-conflict societies. He has particular inter-ests in the hybrid state and the intersection of Complexity Theory withinternational peacekeeping.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xv

Dahlia Simangan is an Assistant Professor at the Network for Educa-tion and Research on Peace and Sustainability and the Graduate Schoolof Humanities and Social Sciences at Hiroshima University in Japan.Her research interests include peacebuilding and international relations inthe Anthropocene. She authored International Peacebuilding and LocalInvolvement: A Liberal Renaissance? (Routledge, 2019).

Yuji Uesugi is a Professor of Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding atthe Faculty of International Research and Education, Waseda University,Tokyo, Japan. His fields of expertise and research interests include hybridpeacebuilding in Asia, UN peace operations, security sector reform andregional security in the Asia-Pacific. He has edited Hybrid Peacebuildingin Asia (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020).

Sophie Shiori Umeyama graduated with her Master’s of Arts from theGraduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University in 2020. Sheresearches and is interested in identity and memory in the Asia-Pacificregion, as well as the “comfort women” issue between South Korea andJapan.

KwokChung Wong is a Ph.D. Student at the Graduate School ofInternational Culture and Communication Studies, Waseda University.His research interests include Chinese policies and peacebuilding. Hehas contributed co-authored chapters, China’s Participation in RegionalConflict Resolution in Preventive Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific (WorldScientific, 2020), and The ASEAN Regional Forum’s Action-OrientedPreventive Diplomacy Mechanisms in the Rohingya Crisis in Case Studieson Preventive Diplomacy in Asia-Pacific (World Scientific, 2020).

Abbreviations

AfPak Afghanistan and PakistanAIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment BankARMM Autonomous Region in Muslim MindanaoASEAN Association of Southeast Asian NationsASG Abu Sayyaf GroupBBL Bangsamoro Basic LawBDA Bangsamoro Development AgencyBIFF Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom FightersBLMI Bangsamoro Leadership and Management InstituteBOL Bangsamoro Organic LawBPCA Bangsamoro People’s Consultative AssemblyBRI Belt and Road InitiativeBSG Bangsamoro Study GroupBTA Bangsamoro Transition AuthorityBTC Bangsamoro Transition CommissionCAB Comprehensive Peace Agreement on BangsamoroCBCS Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil SocietyCBO Community-Based OrganisationCFSI Community and Family Services InternationalCIIS China Institute of International StudiesCMEC China Myanmar Economic CorridorCOP Consolidation for PeaceCPEC China Pakistan Economic CorridorCPRN Conflict Prevention and Response NetworkCSO Civil Society OrganisationEU European Union

xvii

xviii ABBREVIATIONS

FAB Framework Agreement on BangsamoroFPA Final Peace AgreementGPH Government of the PhilippinesIAG Institute for Autonomy and GovernanceICG International Contact GroupICRC International Committee of the Red CrossIFFC Independent Fact-Finding CommitteeIID Initiative for International DialogueIMF International Monetary FundIMNSJ Independent Monk Network for Social JusticeIMT International Monitoring TeamIPRA Indigenous People’s Rights ActIUJ International University of JapanJ-BIRD Japan-Bangsamoro Initiatives for Reconstruction and Develop-

mentJICA Japan International Cooperation AgencyJPF Japan PlatformKIO Kachin Independence OrganisationKR Khmer RougeLMT Local Monitoring TeamMILF Moro Islamic Liberation FrontMNLF Moro National Liberation FrontMOA-AD Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral DomainMOFA Ministry of Foreign AffairsMPC Mindanao Peoples CaucusNATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganisationNDPCC National Directorate for Prevention of Community ConflictNGO Non-Governmental OrganisationNZAID New Zealand Agency for International DevelopmentODA Official Development AssistanceODANGO Official Development Assistance Non-Governmental OrganisationOECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and DevelopmentOIC Organisation of Islamic CooperationOPAC Okinawa Peace Assistance CentrePDIA Problem-Driven Iterative AdaptationPPP Public–Private PartnershipR2P Responsibility to ProtectRESPECT Recovery, Employment and Stability Program for Ex-combatants

and Communities in Timor-LesteSCO Shanghai Cooperation OrganisationSDF Self-Defence ForcesSDG Sustainable Development GoalSOE State-Owned Enterprise

ABBREVIATIONS xix

TNF The Nippon FoundationUN United NationsUNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeUNDRIP United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous PeoplesUNFC United Nationalities Federal CouncilUNGA United Nations General AssemblyUNMISET United Nations Mission of Support in East TimorUNPKO United Nations Peacekeeping OperationUNSC United Nations Security CouncilUSAID United States Agency for International DevelopmentUWSA United Wa State ArmyWB World BankWWII Second World War

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Operationalisation of HybridPeacebuilding in Asia

Yuji Uesugi

Overview of the Book

This study expands on the recent discussion presented in Hybrid Peace-building in Asia (Uesugi 2020) which examined complex processes ofnegotiated and/or mediated hybridisation shaped through interactionsamong myriad of stakeholders including local, national, regional andinternational actors. While the focus of this study is related closely tothe key arguments presented in the aforementioned study, it constitutes astand-alone academic work seeking to revitalise the reappraised discussionon hybridity and peacebuilding led by Mac Ginty and Richmond (2016)from a distinctive angle of Asia.

The study does this in three ways. The first approach explores,both conceptually and empirically, the roles of both inside and outsidepeacebuilders in the process of hybridisation, which can be formedthrough an interplay between actors operating in the ‘mid-space’ or spacebetween contending parties, between national and sub-national levels,

Y. Uesugi (B)Waseda University, Tokyo, Japane-mail: [email protected]

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and between insiders and outsiders (Uesugi 2020). The second approachadopts theoretical insights gained from the existing studies on ‘com-plexity’ and ‘identity’ as well as critical perspectives gained from thefeminist approach to the notion of ‘hybridity’ as a step towards trans-forming it from a descriptive lens to a more analytical one so that it canbetter inform the practice of peacebuilding. The third approach enrichesour understanding of the role of ‘mid-space gatekeepers’, who hold a keyto contesting, adopting and adapting norms brought from outside, bydrawing upon identity theories emphasising the significance of the processof ‘othering’ (Berreby 2008). By focusing on contextually unique mid-space actors in Asia, such as Buddhist monks and hybridised civil societyorganisations, it unpacks our presumed understanding about potentialpeacebuilders. The combined insights of the three approaches indicatethat to operationalise hybrid peacebuilding theory, the analysis shouldnot be limited to actors or agencies of peacebuilding but it should includetheir ‘intersectionality’ as underlying assumptions of complexity and iden-tity stress the importance of relational aspects in a hybrid encounter. Itis difficult to appreciate the process of hybridisation without graspingrelationships which are fluid like a cascade.

To complement the abovementioned theoretical discussion, this studypresents four empirical case studies from Asia; the first two offer insider’sperspectives—Cambodia and Mindanao, the southern Philippines—andthe other two provide outsider’s perspectives from China and Japan.These Asian peacebuilders operate in ‘statecentricity’, in which nationalsecurity is prioritised over realising human-centred governance (Howe2018). It is no doubt that the rise of China as a global power is beginningto shape the rules in many areas and fields. Foreign direct investments,trade, development assistance, and peacekeeping are among few thatChina’s influence is no longer negligible. Peacebuilding is no exception.Growing interests in the literature on the rise of China indicate that itsanticipated impact on the existing norms and practices of peacebuildingcould shake the foundation of the Western dominance (Lanteigne andHirono 2012; Lee 2020).

In the context of Asia, feminist’s demand for safeguarding the needsand interests of most marginalised in a peace process, and for reconcep-tualising the masculine structures of domination are more likely to beneglected in the discourse of hybrid peacebuilding. Non-governmentalorganisations (NGOs) often act as spearheads for implementing femi-nist’s perspectives. Under the supremacy of ‘statecentricity’, the four

1 INTRODUCTION: OPERATIONALISATION OF HYBRID … 3

cases in Asia—Cambodia and Mindanao as insiders and China and Japanas outsides—have revealed different styles of NGO’s engagement inpeacebuilding. While focusing explicitly on Asia, many of the argumentspresented in this book are relevant to a general discussion surroundingthe field of peacebuilding, and thus they can advance our understandingof hybrid peacebuilding both in theory and practice in Asia and beyond.

Roles of Outsiders in HybridPeacebuilding in Asia

This study aims to offer a better understanding of the process of hybridi-sation in Asian peacebuilding by looking into activities taking placesometimes strategically but often spontaneously without any coordina-tion nor orchestration among stakeholders. This objective is pursuedby focusing on undertakings in the ‘mid-space’. Lately, a perspectivethat subscribes to the notion of ‘local turn’ (Mac Ginty and Richmond2013; de Coning 2013; Randazzo 2016; Lee 2020) or ‘local owner-ship’ (Donais 2012; Lee and Özerdem 2015; Lee 2019) is dominantin both theory and practice of peacebuilding. Building upon this trend,this study explores how outsiders can engage effectively in the process ofhybridisation; how they can tap into local actors and resources effectivelywithout jeopardising local ownership or causing critical rejection by localstakeholders, both of which would damage ‘locally grounded legitimacy’(Clements and Uesugi 2020) of peacebuilding intervention and thus itssustainability.

According to Bargués-Pedreny and Randazzo (2018: 1543),“hybridity requires acknowledging that peacebuilders can do little toshape the course of events.” If local ownership/empowerment is a key tosuccessfully bringing sustainable peace, it is ethically as well as practicallynot recommendable for outside interveners to operate with a fixed setof worldviews projected through a liberal peace paradigm. For outsiders,the question is how to address the dilemmas of hybridity or “how tomaintain local political frameworks necessary for autonomy, while bothreforming and working with existing power structures and identity”(Richmond 2015: 54). Thus, the major puzzle examined in this study isrelated to this dilemma revolving around the quest for local ownership(ibid.: 61): Which forms of ownership, at which level and which localinterests should be seen as representative of an ‘authentic’ and sustainablypeaceful polity? Authentic for whom? What ensues when discrepancies

4 Y. UESUGI

in this understanding occur? If the principle of local ownership is to berespected, the answer would be as follows: authenticity or local legitimacyshould be negotiated and defined by local actors themselves rather thanby external actors. This premise deprives the international peacebuildingplanners of their power to control the process of hybridisation, whichcould lead to the emergence of negative forms of peace or illiberal peace(Simangan 2018). Temptation on the part of outside interveners tomaintain their influence upon the process and outcome of hybridisationis criticised as a neo-colonial mindset (Richmond 2015: 64). If altruisticexternal interveners have to let go of their responsibility in helpingto establish what Wallensteen (2015) calls ‘quality peace’ or post-warconditions that make peace sustainable, however, do they enjoy bothlocal and international legitimacy? Are they supposed to be responsiblefor what is created on the ground in the aftermath of their intervention(Howe et al. 2020)?

These questions bring us back to the dilemma of hybridity. One wayfor outsiders to circumvent the dilemma is to pursue what Richmond(2015: 60) calls ‘positive hybrid forms of peace’ that does not includea compromise on the potential emancipatory and empathetic nature ofpeace. This implies that there is a role and responsibility on the side ofexternal actors to support the genesis of positive forms of hybrid peace.This study argues that ‘locally grounded legitimacy’ is a key to rescuehybrid peacebuilding from the dilemma. The pursuit of empowering solu-tions embedded in plurality and relationality is a way forward to achieve‘quality peace’. The real question is: how can altruistic external inter-veners be connected to the national elite and grassroots stakeholders sothat emerging hybrid peace would be based on the ‘locally groundedlegitimacy’?

To answer this, functions of mid-space actors are highlighted andinvestigated in this study. In Asian peacebuilding, outside peacebuildersare often powerless in the face of protected sovereignty as Asian stateshave sufficient power to exclude or circumvent the external intrusion andusurpation of their national sovereignty (Keethaponcalan 2020). Undersuch circumstances, outside intervention aiming to bring about changesat the level of grassroots communities seems not feasible. This is why itis essential for outside peacebuilders to establish trust and develop rela-tionships with local mid-space gatekeepers who have access to both thetop/national level and the bottom/grassroots level (Uesugi 2020).


Engagements and interactions in the mid-space are empiricallyexplored in the subsequent case study chapters, in which peacebuildingefforts by China and Japan that do not fit into the Western proto-type of liberal peacebuilding are observed. The presence of non-Westerndonors such as China, Japan, India, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia andSingapore has posed an additional complication to Asian peacebuildingventures in the Philippines, Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand, Sri Lanka,Nepal and Afghanistan. Having been the victims of Western colonisa-tion and occupation by themselves, they do not necessarily operate inthe same way as Western donors nor are they constrained morally by‘universal’ norms and ‘international’ standards defined by the West. Thismay have unprecedented practical implications for peacebuilding in Asiawhere non-Western donors such as China are beginning to exert theirinfluence on the practice of peacebuilding and development in the region(Takagi et al. 2019). In this study, therefore, peacebuilding efforts of twomajor non-Western actors, China and Japan, in several Asian contexts suchas Myanmar, Afghanistan, Timor-Leste and Mindanao are reviewed tooutline distinctive features of their peacebuilding styles, which so far havenot given a high priority to liberal values on recalcitrant local commu-nities (Ghimire 2019: 3), thus effectively avoiding the pitfalls of liberalpeacebuilding.

From a Descriptive Lens to an Analytical Tool

In addition to examining the basic assumptions of hybrid peacebuildingtheory, this study embarks on a difficult endeavour to operationalise suchtheory, advancing the practical utility of ‘hybridity’ beyond its descriptivepower. Existing discussion on hybrid peacebuilding describes the processof hybridisation and possible outcomes of such a process to be a mixtureof ‘international’ and ‘local’ values. This binary framing of reality has beencriticised as will be illustrated in Chapter 2. The variations of interna-tional norms and the diversity in historical contexts, cultures, and politicallandscapes in each setting have suggested that such a binary worldviewcripple us to overlook the important dynamism and complexity on theground. In Chapter 3, complex theory is introduced as an alternative tothe binary presumption, offering a more holistic view of the world wherea myriad of actors operating in the mid-space are trying to influence theprocess and shape or reshape the outcome of hybridisation. The process ofhybridisation is complex, and its outcome is dependent on unpredictable

6 Y. UESUGI

interactions of multiple actors and factors, and thus, a simplistic and staticepistemology is problematic. There are hundreds, if not thousands, ofdifferent unexpected paths, networks, and nodes that may exist or emergein the intermediary mid-space.

The introduction of such complexities, however, seems to underminethe goal of operationalising hybrid peacebuilding theory, as it means totransform the theory into a more practitioner friendly and analyticallyrobust tool. Randazzo (2016: 1360) identifies a possible dilemma of oper-ationalising hybrid peacebuilding by saying that when hybridity is usedas a tool to uncover unscripted and hidden practices of the everyday, itoperates to make the invisible and blurry visible. This, she goes on andargues, runs contrary to the complexity perspective about the process thatacknowledges the untraceable links that produce blurred hybrid identi-ties (ibid.). How can such a dilemma be circumvented? Knowing thisdilemma, how hybrid peacebuilding theory can better inform the practiceof peacebuilding? Is there a way to comprehend dynamic and complexrealities in a conceptually manageable manner? What needs to be doneto increase the explanatory power of hybrid peacebuilding theory so thatexternal interveners can prepare and equip themselves for more effectiveassistance?

Finding answers to these difficult but important questions is attemptedin Chapter 4 where a typology of mid-space actors is discussed as astep towards operationalising hybrid peacebuilding theory. To solve thesepuzzles, this study borrows key insights from relevant discourses ofrelationality, complexity, identity and feminism, and discusses their impli-cations for the operationalisation of hybrid peacebuilding. The typologypresented in Chapter 4 helps reflective practitioners to analyse and engagewith mid-space actors more effectively. Questions remain unanswered,however, as to how external interveners can design a proper interven-tion and anticipate their possible impact on the process in the midst ofcomplex exchanges and constantly-changing surroundings. On this point,this study illustrates the utility of relational and systemic approaches, andproposes an alternative to binary, linear and static views of the process ofhybridisation. The alternative framework aims to enhance the awarenessof external peacebuilders about the local terrain of the relational land-scape in which they intervene, and to serve as a set of analytical guidelinesto prepare external peacebuilders for supporting efforts of insider-partialmediators to bridge gaps in conflict-affected societies.


Key Arguments

The abovementioned theoretical undertakings are complemented byempirical analyses that demonstrate the efficacy of an upgraded hybridlens. As a prelude to the empirical chapters in this volume, the followinghighlights the underlying hinges between the following four auxiliaryconcepts for operationalising the thematic of hybridity and the premises offour case studies of Asian peacebuilding: (1) relationality, (2) complexity,(3) identity, and (4) feminism. Why they are considered pivotal foroperationalising hybrid peacebuilding is elaborated below.

Relationality

Lederach (2005) advocated the need of a Copernican shift from ‘know-how’ to ‘know-who’ in the pursuit of peacebuilding. Building uponhis actor-oriented approach, Uesugi (2020) argued that mid-space gate-keepers play key roles in bridging cleavages that exist in society. Uesugiand Kagawa (2020) introduced the concept of ‘transformative relation-ships’ as a key indicator for assessing the traits of mid-space gatekeeperswho could serve effectively as bridge-builders. This book reiterates thisperspective and advances an argument that the nature and magnitudeof multidimensional relationships that mid-space actors can cultivate in agiven setting is one of the most significant factors explaining the processand outcome of hybrid peacebuilding. As the process of hybridisation ischaracterised as a journey of constant negotiation and mediation amongdifferent stakeholders, an outcome—yet not a terminal—of such a processwould be shaped through unregulated and spontaneous interactionsamong them.

To increase our ability to grasp the dynamic and interactive nature ofhybridisation, this study takes two qualitatively different but closely inter-twined approaches. The first approach examines power relations amongdifferent actors within a complex system. This approach is based on theassumption that any peacebuilding intervention will instigate multiplechain reactions which are unpredictable, and thus denying a simple linearcausal attribution to hybrid peacebuilding. At the same time, it assumesthat a sound visualisation of power relations among key gatekeepers inthe mid-space helps external peacebuilders to navigate in such unchartedwaters in the hinterland. The second approach focuses on the identity of

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mid-space actors involved in a peace process. It is based on the assump-tion that while chain reactions triggered by a series of peacebuildingundertakings in complex systems are hard to predict and control, gate-keepers employ their ‘transformative relationships’ to bridge existing andemerging gaps in a conflict-affected society so that peacebuilding effortscan bring about ‘quality peace’.

Chapter 5 demonstrates that ‘transformative relationships’ of mid-space actors are shaped by their ‘identity’ vis-à-vis others involved, andthe environment in which they operate. Thus the success and failure ofbridge-building by particular mid-space actors can be explained partiallyby their relational identity, i.e., how they see others and how others seethem in a given context. Since it is difficult to forecast what sort of chainreactions a certain intervention on a particular relationship can cause,international peacebuilding planners cannot pre-design the course ofintervention to induce positive changes in gatekeepers’ identity and theirperceived identity in a given setting. At the same time, if they presupposeand prepare for the practical necessity of adapting and adjusting constantlyto dynamic situations, they may have a better chance of supporting localmid-space actors to nurture their ‘transformative relationships’ and usethem to bridge cleavages in a society. To operate under this premise,outsiders have to be ready to abandon the fixed cookie-cutter blue-print approach merely focusing on a mechanical cause-and-effect analysisapplying typical logical frameworks for project formulation. This is one ofprescriptive insights that this study presents.

Complexity

Building upon the perspective of relationality, this study reflects on themomentum that exists in the literature, and applies complexity theory topeacebuilding. Brusset et al. (2016: 2) argue that “Complexity may bringnew ideas, methods, and tools to peacebuilding practice”. According tothem, complexity allows us to comprehend how complex systems functionand incorporate new realities into our methods, so that we can exert influ-ence more effectively and carefully on such complex systems (ibid.: 3). Byapplying complexity theory to the security sector reform, a particular fieldof peacebuilding, Ansorg and Gordon (2019: 2) examined the multitudeof different actors within and beyond the state, and identified complexpatterns of co-operation and contestation within reform initiatives. Theyconcluded that the multiplicity of norms and actors complicated efforts to


build peace (ibid.). Drawing from the discourse on complexity, they illus-trated how proliferation of and contestation between actors, and betweentheir normative positions, may question assumptions of ‘success’ and‘failure’ of international intervention (ibid.: 5).

In Chapter 3, it is argued that the theory of complexity offers aperspective helpful for grasping the dynamic process of hybridisation, oneof which is the significance of intersectionality or the nodes of relation-ships. Uesugi (2020) introduced the notion of a ‘dialogue platform’ tohighlight such intersectionality and examined the roles and functions ofmid-space intermediaries who operate as a node, or bridge, which runacross different cleavages. This study offers additional insights in theprocess of hybridisation by employing an innovative approach proposedby de Coning (2018: 317) called ‘adaptive peacebuilding’ in an effortto operationalise hybrid peacebuilding theory. The insight gained from‘adaptive peacebuilding’ is that interplays between international peace-builders and local stakeholders are iterative processes of mutual learningand adaptation. This premise implies that outsiders have to commit them-selves to a long-term engagement in peacebuilding endeavours and beready to abandon results-based budgeting in which budget formula-tion is guided by predefined short-term and measurable objectives setby outside interveners to be accountable to their donors, which hasprevented international peacebuilders from investing in time-consumingbut critical relationship-building with mid-space actors in the hinterland.This is another prescriptive insight presented in this study.

Identity

What increases the complexity of hybrid peacebuilding is the inclusionof a wide variety of actors who work together to achieve positive peace,suitable and beneficial to all those affected by it. This predisposes hybridpeacebuilding to lay explicit focus on the concept of identity which isintrenched in mid-space gatekeepers partial to the peace process. Thisstudy assumes that the path of a peace process is determined, at leastin part, by identity factors. This is because in dealing with the complexsocial reality, people employ ‘cognitive fames’ to examine, categorise andmake sense of the situations and their experiences. Frames define ourperceptions, understandings and views of reality, by so doing, they helpus systematise our experience and provide normative prescriptions for

10 Y. UESUGI

possible actions (Korostelina and Uesugi 2019). It is important to under-line that a frame defines not only our ways of interpretation of specificsituations but also it decides what particular issues, incidents or conditionsreceive our attention. Hence, being a social boundary maker, mid-spacegatekeepers have the power to set the frames that act as a device to drawborders around what is and is not important (Gardner 2003).

Identity frames include ideas about who they are, what characteris-tics they share with their group(s) and how they should relate to others(Ibid.). When people view themselves as a part of a larger group, position,institution, or set of values, they behave in ways that protect the markersof this specific identity (ibid.). Gatekeepers who are the guardians of thesense of self (beliefs, values and group affiliations) provide such markersof shared identity or ‘identity frames’ to their constituencies. Becausegatekeepers possess power to impose the shared identity frames on theirfollowers, it makes sense for outside interveners to work with them. Intheory, outsiders can expect that gatekeepers exercise their influence toreframe their perceived reality on the ground, and marshal collectivesupport from the grassroots community members for the planned inter-vention. Because ‘identity’ is what ties gatekeepers to their followers, itis important for outside interveners to appreciate how gatekeepers’ iden-tity affects their preferences, priorities, behaviours and decisions, as theiridentity and group affiliation influence on how they view and respond toa given situation (ibid.).

A challenge in practice, however, is that gatekeepers are in an inher-ently difficult position to change their identity as their primary task isto defend their social boundaries. It is true that identity is changeableand under certain circumstances gatekeepers have shifted their domi-nant identity to serve as bridge-builders. When gatekeepers’ identities arethreatened or challenged through intervention, they respond normally inways that reinforce their allegiance to their group affiliations. AlthoughRichmond (2008: 457) argues that hybrid peacebuilding is valued as arealm of complex interconnectedness where multiple actors and networksexist, interact and overlay, “without necessarily resulting in the domina-tion of one core identity or idea”, the case study of Cambodian Buddhistmonks presented in Chapter 5 demonstrates that under certain condi-tions it has been proven otherwise. The Cambodian ‘peace’ monks, whoseattributes as gatekeepers stem from their clerical status shared amongthe affiliated lay followers, revealed that their transformative relationshipsworked in a horizontal direction but failed in vertical bridge-building.


While serving as the very source of local and international legitimacy,their primary identity as monks rooted in religious faith and theirsecondary identity as peace activists limited their flexibility in serving asa vertical bridge-builder whose tasks sometimes compelled them to over-step established Buddhist doctrines and to confront with the authoritarianregime.

As pointed out in Chapter 4 and examined in Chapter 5, identitycan serve as both a connector and a divider. Especially in conflict situ-ations, the ‘us versus them’ frame or the in-group/out-group mindsetbecomes cognitively prevailing. Under such a psychological condition,while identity serves as a connector that consolidates the shared foun-dation of an in-group, it has the tendency to act as a divider, deepeningthe gap between ‘us and them’. In theory, gatekeepers have the potentialto become a bridge-builder, but in reality it is very difficult for them touphold the spirit of inclusivity as their primary role as boundary keepersforces them to draw a line between them and their adversaries. The iden-tity of gatekeepers can work against what hybrid peacebuilding advocatesfor: blurring identity boundaries and fostering interconnectedness andplurality (Randazzo 2016: 1356). Nevertheless, gatekeepers can becomebridge-builders in a conducive environment in which they maintain firmgrips on their followers by framing their expectations and addressing andtheir needs.

Given the fluid and complex nature of identity that influences theprocesses and outcomes of hybridisation, identity frames can turn intoeither tools or obstacles for gatekeepers depending on the circumstance.It is therefore argued in this study that identity is a key factor that affectsthe condition for gatekeepers to reach beyond their in-group and conductbridge-building across social boundaries. Gatekeepers may commit them-selves to either bridge-building or spoiling, depending on the context inwhich their overriding identity is perceived and defined. Outside inter-venors should not be surprised at the act of spoiling committed bygatekeepers nor should they be disguised by a superficial and static iden-tity of gatekeepers as it is variable. Upon facing spoiling repercussionson the peace process, outside interveners might have to reconsider andadjust their approach, rather than trying to dissuade gatekeepers fromspoiling. As Chapter 4 suggests the act of spoiling can be regarded as anopportunity for outside interveners to meet the requirements for beinggranted a locally grounded legitimacy. This assumption guides outsidepeacebuilders to a more inclusive and adaptive practice of peacebuilding,

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urging them to extend their reach to a wide range of mid-space actors.Upon intervention, peacebuilders have to be aware of their epistemo-logical prejudice (including cultural, linguistic and professional ones) aswell as their predisposed habit of labelling stakeholders and being selec-tive about whom they work with. Their stakeholder mapping and analysismust reflect the dynamic and complex nature of the reality, paying specialattention to the power of identity. This is the third prescriptive insightpresented in this study.

Feminist’s Perspective

When focusing on relational and actor-based approaches to peace-building, hybrid peacebuilding theory offers a useful lens and a practicaltool. However, hybrid peacebuilding approaches tend to focus on influen-tial players both at local and international levels in negotiating, mediating,defining and refining the emerging hybrid order and peace, and theytend to neglect other actors who have very limited influence upon thepeace process. By criticising conventional approaches, feminists underlinethe importance of including marginalised and minority groups as well asmoving away from lingering colonial attitudes in the peace process. Ashighlighted in Chapter 2, feminists argue strongly for the establishmentof a positive peace and the eradication of those illiberal structural factorswhich could endure into the post-conflict orders and hierarchies.

In Chapter 5, a special attention is paid to Cambodian ‘peace’ monkswho constitute a minority group in the Buddhist clerical community (interms of not following the mainstream, state-centric Buddhist’s teaching),and their effectiveness as bridge-builders is assessed by the functionthat their paramount identity played. On the issue of representationfor marginalised groups of people, pitfalls or dangers of hybrid peace-building are identified in the structure of multi-track peacebuilding. Asub-national minority who lives along with a national-level minority isoften not included in the peace process as traditional approaches topeacemaking have focused on incumbent-insurgency confrontation at thenational level (Wilson 2020). Indigenous Peoples in Mindanao are a casein point, which is covered in Chapter 6. Being non-Muslim sub-nationalminority residents in Mindanao caught in the midst of war of nationalliberation fought by a national-level minority of Muslims called Morosagainst the government of the Philippines, Indigenous Peoples wereoften marginalised in the ‘Bangsamoro’ peace process. Likewise, women,


youth and poor are often not included in traditional peace processes. Byunpacking the concept of civil society and analysing empirically the rolesand functions played by civil society organisations in Mindanao, Chapter 6sheds light on the conventionally silenced group of people, and discussesthat civil society organisations served as a vehicle promoting IndigenousPeople’s participation and women empowerment. It demonstrates thatperspectives of Indigenous People were included in the peace process byutilising civil society organisations as a platform and employing relevantinternational trends and norms to legitimise their views.

Eastphalian Hybrid Peacebuilding

This study is a response to emerging interests in peacebuilding actorsin Asia and the impact their practice has on the existing liberal order,which is built upon the Western values and practices. In other words, itcontributes to a debate about whether ‘Eastphalian’ orders (Kim 2009)are emerging as alternative narratives on hybrid peacebuilding by exam-ining approaches taken by two dominant regional powers in Asia, Chinaand Japan, in Chapters 7 and 8 respectively. Following the footsteps estab-lished by the companion volume, Hybrid Peacebuilding in Asia (Uesugi2020), knowledge gaps in the discourse on hybrid peacebuilding arebridged in this study by providing case studies of Asian-led peacebuilding.

A key added-value of this study, therefore, is to share empirical anal-yses of the peacebuilding practice in Asia so far overlooked by theWestern scholarship on peacebuilding, in which Asian contexts are treatedas subjects of peacebuilding intervention such as Cambodia, Myanmar,Mindanao, Nepal, Timor-Leste, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Aceh(Indonesia) to name but a few (Uesugi 2014). In contrast, this studysheds light on Asian peacebuilders and examines their efforts on theground, exploring their potential as a ‘hybrid peacebuilding facilitator’(Uesugi 2018). In English language literature, Japanese approaches topeacebuilding have been covered mainly by Japanese (Tatsumi 2016;Tatsumi and Kennedy 2017) and scholars from Asia such as Lam (2009)from Singapore. Attention paid to Chinese approaches to peacebuildingis a relatively recent phenomena as many of the academic work on Chinafocuses on China’s peacekeeping (Lanteigne and Hirono 2012) or theBelt and Road Initiative, a notable exception is the report of the Safer-world entitled China and conflict-affected states (Campbell et al. 2012).Thus, this book contributes to filling the gap in the existing literature.

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Another added value of this study is that, through empirical studiesof the Chinese and Japanese peacebuilding efforts, it offers a way toimprove current models of peacebuilding. The findings of these casestudies suggest that their approaches, while sharing many similarities,have distinctive features between them and between them and liberalpeacebuilding approaches. Both China and Japan prefer to operateunder the Westphalian principles of respecting sovereignty and avoidingforceful military intervention. At the same time, however, they bothhave attempted innovative undertakings that deserve more than a pacingnotice in the literature and practice of hybrid peacebuilding, which willbe elaborated in Chapters 7 and 8.

Structure of the Book

This book has five components. This introductory chapter and the subse-quent literature review chapter serve as a backgrounder to this study. Thesecond part encompasses two conceptual chapters laying the theoreticalfoundations of this study by introducing concepts such as complexity,adaptive peacebuilding, mid-space actors and gatekeepers. The followingtwo chapters constitute the third component that offers both theoret-ical discussion and empirical analysis focusing Cambodia and Mindanao,providing insider’s perspective on hybrid peacebuilding. The next section,which includes two empirical chapters focusing on peacebuilding effortsof China and Japan as outsiders, outlines the main features of theseapproaches from an angle of hybrid peacebuilding. Finally, the concludingchapter synthesises the key findings and arguments. Before closing thisintroductory chapter, a set of previews of the subsequent chapters areprovided as follows.

Chapter 2: A Brief Sketch of Hybrid Peacebuilding by Uesugi, Deeke-ling and Ingstedt connects hybrid calls and relevant criticisms to thedevelopment of peacebuilding debates at large. It briefly presents onto-logical aspects of peacebuilding, as they may be found both in academiaand practice. It also explains core arguments in favour of adopting hybridpeacebuilding, and shows how the concept of hybridity has been criti-cised in the discourse of peacebuilding both within its own circles andby others. Showcasing the various sides of peacebuilding, and hybridityspecifically, this literature review chapter sets the stage for a new set ofdiscussions in the subsequent chapters.


Chapter 3: Hybridity, Adaptive Peacebuilding and Complexity by deConing and McDonald-Colbert makes the case for the inclusion of acomplexity ontology and an adaptive methodology into the hybrid peace-building debate. International peacebuilders can assist and facilitate thevoluntary emergence of self-sustainable and resilient social institutionsthrough the peace process, but if they interfere too much, they wouldundermine the self-organising processes necessary to sustain resilientsocial institutions. Based on this premise, this chapter introduces ‘adap-tive peacebuilding’ to address the dilemma of hybrid peacebuilding, byso doing it contributes to operationalising hybrid peacebuilding theory.It provides a conceptual guidelines with an adaptive methodology wherepeacebuilders engage actively in a process to sustain peace and resolveconflicts by employing an iterative process of learning and adaptation. Itargues that a complexity informed approach to hybrid peacebuilding cansafeguard, stimulate, facilitate and create the space for societies to developresilient capacities for self-organisation.

Chapter 4: Bridging Gaps: From a Descriptive to a Practical Mid-SpaceActor Typology? by Deekeling and Simangan puts forward an argumentthat the concept of hybridity sheds light on the complexity of conflictsettings. Hybridity as a lens helps to analyse the participation of all actorsinvolved and entangled in a social network of normative and politicalpower, while avoiding theoretical binaries that oversimplify the processof post-conflict peacebuilding. The chapter stresses that what lacks is apractical application of hybridity in peacebuilding that engages activelywith bottom/local or grassroots, top/national and international actorsthrough mediation in the mid-space to create sustainable peace. Giventhis practical shortcoming of hybridity, a conceptual review of mid-space actors as gatekeepers and their capacities to enable dialogue amongopposing parties are presented. It offers an analytical frame for inves-tigating the encounters between insider-partial mediators and outsidepeacebuilders in and around the mid-space, which is applied to thesubsequent empirical chapters.

Chapter 5: The Power of Identity in Hybrid Peacebuilding: BuddhistMonks in Post-Conflict Cambodia by Umeyama and Brehm connects theconcept of identity to mid-space actors involved in hybrid peacebuilding.The power of identity draws attention to the process of framing andothering as important factors contributing to successful bridge-buildingacross diverse actors during hybrid peacebuilding. This chapter focuses onthe role of identity of Buddhist monks in Cambodia, and examines how

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and why they both succeeded and failed in their roles as bridge-builders.It is argued that identity frames and networks of mid-space actors predis-pose them to excel in particular fields and fail in others. Through thecase study of Cambodian ‘peace’ monks, it demonstrates that the conceptof identity serves as an useful indicator for explaining why and how amid-space actor may transform from being a bridge-builder into a spoilerduring the peacebuilding process.

Chapter 6: Frictional Binaries: Hybridity, Civil Society, and Liberal-Local Peacebuilding in Mindanao by Manaysay and Espesor argues thatthe concept of hybrid peacebuilding has highlighted the need to empowerlocal civil society groups. Using examples from Mindanao, this chaptercontends that the debates on liberal-local hybridity can most mean-ingfully gain from asking questions not only about the processes ofinternationalisation and localisation, but also about the ways in whichhybrid mechanisms are able to produce more or less stable outcomes. Byturning into the agency of civil society actors, it suggests that the conceptof hybridity, which is often represented using dichotomised categoriessuch as ‘liberal-international’ and ‘illiberal-local’, tends to oversimplifythe conceptual intricacies and dynamic processes between top-down andbottom-up approaches. The analysis in the chapter illustrates the mannercivil society actors are able to negotiate their complexities within the fric-tional binaries of liberal ideas, institutions and resources vis-à-vis localpractices, power relations and norms.

Chapter 7: Rise of China’s Developmental Peace: Prospects for AsianHybrid Peacebuilding by Wong and Li claims that without a clear peace-building policy at home, China does not take a systematic and unifiedapproach to peacebuilding, although its ‘developmental peace’ has manytraits that resemble the pursuit of hybrid and adaptive peacebuildingundertaken to compensate for the shortcomings of liberal peacebuilding.This chapter demonstrates how China has approached to conflict-affectedsocieties in Asia, especially their mid-space actors, and how the Belt andRoad Initiative has been employed to generate a synergy with ‘develop-mental peace’ by providing economic incentives to gatekeepers such asarmed ethnic groups in Myanmar and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Whilethe chapter identifies the shortcomings of China’s approach, it maintainsthat China’s ‘developmental peace’ can be regarded as a form of hybridpeacebuilding with ‘Chinese characteristics’ and be an alternative to liberalpeacebuilding.


Chapter 8: Japan’s Peacebuilding and Mid-Space Actors: A Bridgebetween the West and the Rest by Uesugi and Deekeling examinesJapan’s peacebuilding assistance in conflict-affected societies in Asia, andassesses Japan’s potential to emerge as a hybrid peacebuilding facilitator.By reviewing Japan’s flagship projects in Timor-Leste, Myanmar andMindanao, the chapter shows that Japan holds the ability to establishtrust-relationships with top/national leaders of the aid-recipient countriesthrough apolitical, non-intrusive and long-term approaches that Japaneseactors display. It demonstrates that how Japanese actors have developedrelationships with mid-space actors in conflict-affected societies whereand when access of other donors were denied. While the chapter iden-tifies several shortcomings of the Japanese approach such as the limitedinclusion of stakeholders and unequal distribution of peace dividend, itconcludes that Japan can emerge as a hybrid peacebuilding facilitator ifthese shortcomings are addressed.

Chapter 9: Conclusion by Uesugi, Deekeling, Umeyama andMcDonald-Colbert summarises the findings of the previous chapters andpresents the harnessing arguments among them. The goal is to evaluatewhether or not the existing gap between hybrid peacebuilding theoryand its operationalisation has been successfully closed. It reiterates thekey points of the study by using a complexity-informed framework andrevisiting the mid-space actor typology that is proposed as a link betweenthe analytical framework and the practical application. It concludes thatmid-space actors could provide a viable focal point in encouraging theestablishment of self-resilient social institutions from within withoutdictating the content of such emergencies.

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Bargués-Pedreny, P., & Randazzo, E. (2018). Hybrid Peace Revisited: AnOpportunity for Considering Self-governance? Third World Quarterly, 39(1),1543–1560.

Berreby, D. (2008). Us and Them. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Brusset, E., de Coning, C., & Hughes, B. (Eds.). (2016). Complexity Thinking

for Peacebuilding Practice and Evaluation. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Campbell, I., Wheeler, T., Attree, L., Butler, D. M., & Mariani, B.(2012). Conflict and Conflict-affected States: Between Principle and Pragma-tism. Saferworld. https://www.ecosonline.org/reports/2012/Saferworld_China_and_conflict-affected_states.pdf.

Clements, K. P., & Uesugi, Y. (2020) Chapter 7 Conclusion. In Y. Uesugi (Ed.),Hybrid Peacebuilding in Asia (pp. 139–152). Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

de Coning, C. (2013). Understanding Peacebuilding as Essentially Local.Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, 2(1), 1–6.

de Coning, C. (2018). Adaptive peacebuilding. International Affairs, 94(2),301–317.

Donais, T. (2012). Peacebuilding and Local Ownership: Post-conflict Consensus-building. London: Routledge.

Gardner, R. (2003). Identity Frames. In G. Burgess & H. Burgess (Eds.),Beyond Intractability. Boulder: Conflict Information Consortium, Universityof Colorado. http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/identity-frames.

Ghimire, S. (2019). The Politics of Peacebuilding: Emerging Actors and SecuritySector Reform in Conflict-Affected Sates. London: Routledge.

Howe, B. (2018). Chapter 1: State-Centric Challenges to Human-CentredGovernance. In B. Howe (Ed.), National Security, Statecentricity, andGovernance in East Asia (pp. 1–14). Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

Howe, B., Peou, S., & Uesugi, Y. (2020). UN Governance: Peace and HumanSecurity in Cambodia and Timor-Leste. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

Keethaponcalan, S. I. (2020). Chapter 2 Asian Peacebuilding: Theory and Prac-tice. In Y. Uesugi (Ed.), Hybrid Peacebuilding in Asia (pp. 15–35). Cham:Palgrave Macmillan.

Kim, S. (2009). Eastphalia Rising: An Enquiry into the Emergence of AsianPerspective on International Law and Global Governance (Unpublished J.S.D.thesis). Indiana University.

Korostelina, K., & Uesugi, Y. (2019, March). Perception of Korean ReunificationAmong Japanese Experts: The Collective Frame Approach. WIAS ResearchBulletin, 11, 5–16.

Lam, P. E. (2009). Japan’s Peace-Building Diplomacy in Asia: Seeking a MoreActive Political Role. Oxon and New York: Routledge.

Lanteigne, M., & Hirono, M. (Eds.). (2012). China’s Evolving Approach toPeacekeeping. New York: Routledge.

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Lee, S. (2019). Local Ownership in Asian Peacebuilding: Development of LocalPeacebuilding Models. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

Lee, S. (2020). Reflection on the “Local Turn” in Peacebuilding: Practitioners’View. Journal of Human Security Studies, Special Issue, 1, 25–38.

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Mac Ginty, R., & Richmond, O. (2016). The Fallacy of Constructing HybridPolitical Orders: A Reappraisal of the Hybrid Turn in Peacebuilding. Interna-tional Peacekeeping, 23(2), 219–239.

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Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative CommonsAttribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproductionin any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the originalauthor(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license andindicate if changes were made.

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CHAPTER 2

A Brief Sketch of Hybrid Peacebuilding

Yuji Uesugi, Anna Deekeling, and Anton Ingstedt

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to outline the existing literature on peace-building and identify the gaps in different peacebuilding theories. Thecentral emphasis is placed on hybrid peacebuilding theory, which servesas an overarching theoretical underpinning of this study. With an aim ofoperationalising hybrid peacebuilding theory this chapter assesses variouscritique and offers ways to overcome these gaps.

While much has been written on the various ontological dimensionsof peacebuilding, this study seeks to highlight elements of one specificstrand of theory and practice: the notion of hybridity. Conventional

Y. Uesugi (B) · A. DeekelingWaseda University, Tokyo, Japane-mail: [email protected]

A. Deekelinge-mail: [email protected]

A. IngstedtGraduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva,Switzerlande-mail: [email protected]


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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67758-9_2

22 Y. UESUGI ET AL.

approaches to peacebuilding have focused on the liberal practice of state-building, under which liberal institutions are constructed (de Leon andTager 2016). In stark contrast, hybrid peacebuilding approaches focus onthe dynamic mechanisms of interactions and relationships (Uesugi 2020).Mac Ginty and Sanghera (2012: 3) describe hybridity as “compositeforms of practice, norms and thinking that emerge from the introductionof different groups, worldviews and activity”. They call for a two-foldunderstanding of post-conflict settings: one as a historical constructionand the other as a living creature that is constantly shaped by dynamicinteractions by different factors and actors.

Before outlining the key features of hybrid peacebuilding theory,conventional understandings of peacebuilding theory and practice arebriefly discussed, which is followed by a digest of key approaches rele-vant to hybrid peacebuilding such as ‘local turn’, ‘hybridity’ and ‘feministperspectives’. Subsequently, a brief outline of hybrid peacebuilding theoryand practice is offered by introducing existing critiques and indicatingways to refute these criticisms.

Theory and Practice of Peacebuilding

Before diving into the discussion on hybrid peacebuilding, it is crucialto understand the general debates surrounding peacebuilding in orderto fully grasp the characteristics and traits of hybrid approaches. Someattempted to summarise the essentials of peacebuilding including Chetailand Jütersonke (2015) who have conducted a comprehensive review ofthe existing literature on peacebuilding, and Keethaponcalan (2020) whohas made a concise review of the literature focusing on the situationin Asia. Rigual (2018), on the other hand, has offered re-thinking ofthe ontologies of peacebuilding. The following does not aim to reca-pitulate these previous accounts and instead seeks to provide excerptsof some commonly discussed dimensions of peacebuilding to serve asa backgrounder for the later discussion on hybrid peacebuilding in thisstudy.

The United Nations (UN) (2009: 1) describes peacebuilding as activityto set space for opportunities of creating “basic security, deliver peacedividends, shore up and build confidence in the political process, andstrengthen core national capacity to lead peacebuilding efforts therebybeginning to lay the foundations for sustainable development”. Theproclaimed focus lies in strengthening national ownership during or in the

2 A BRIEF SKETCH OF HYBRID … 23

immediate aftermath of a conflict. Another useful definition is provided byInterpeace (2015: 2), which defines peacebuilding as “local and nationalcapacities for peace (values and attitudes; social processes and relation-ships; political and social institutions) necessary to incrementally andeffectively overcome the dynamics of conflict that lead to polarisation,violence and destruction”.

Rigual (2018) presented a summary of trends in peacebuilding by cate-gorising its theory and practice into various discourses, of which fourare particularly prominent: (1) economic, (2) liberal, (3) critical, and (4)feminist peacebuilding. Among them, critical peacebuilding continues toattract the largest audience in academia and the main strand of discus-sion on hybrid peacebuilding falls into this classification. While this studyfollows the steps of critical peacebuilding, it also seeks to harness the otherpeacebuilding approaches, acknowledging their unique contribution tothe academic field of peacebuilding (Wallis et al. 2018; Keethaponcalan2020).

Economic peacebuilding prescribes the promotion of fiscal, labourand market reforms as a means to realise international peace. Theassumption is that conflicts arise in economically stressed situations,meaning that outsiders should promote development through providingloans, donations and investments to address economic grievances. Thisapproach is known as the Washington Consensus that advocates structuraladjustment programmes (Marangos 2009). Both Chinese peacebuildingendeavours, introduced in Chapter 7, and Japanese peacebuilding endeav-ours, introduced in Chapter 8, have adopted this approach, focusing onproviding development and investment to countries experiencing povertyor economic stagnation as these approaches operate on the premise thateconomic disparities and grievances cause conflict (Abb 2018).

Contrastingly, liberal peacebuilding assumes that political grievancesand democratic immaturity constitute the greatest cause of conflict. Thisapproach was widely adopted in early peacebuilding attempts made bythe UN in Kosovo and Timor-Leste, among other post-conflict settings(Paris 1997). As liberal peacebuilding heavily depends on the creationand expansion of liberal institutions to bring sustainable peace, its maintool for peacebuilding revolved around various democratisation measures.Democratisation through the construction of state institutions and polit-ical decentralisation are considered key to both reacting to and preventingeruptions of violence. This approach, however, evidenced shortcom-ings in both appropriate planning and execution. It was criticised for

24 Y. UESUGI ET AL.

imprinting Western liberal norms in conflict-affected societies in a quasi-imperialist manner, which left behind rather unstable political structuresand economic development (Nadarajah and Rampton 2015).

Because liberal peacebuilding achieved few sustained outcomes, a crit-ical view on the utility of liberal peacebuilding emerged, leading to therise of critical peacebuilding (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2009). Criticalpeacebuilding has mainstreamed the ‘local turn’, based on the assumptionthat “inclusion and participation can overcome the colonial/imperialisticshape of liberal peacebuilding and strengthen peacebuilding initiatives”(Rigual 2018: 159).

Likewise, feminist peacebuilding argues for the inclusion of variousactors in peace processes, especially those previously hidden or silencedsuch as women or other marginalised groups (Hudson 2000). With anaim to shed light on structural causes of conflict, it engages criticallywith militarisation as well as masculinist conceptions and institutional-isations of states and societies to understand why violent rather thanpacific behaviour is chosen as a means to deal with the situation (Rigual2018: 159). Feminist activists have advocated for structural transforma-tion, demilitarisation, gender equality, social justice, inclusive participa-tion, and the reshaping of capitalism to be included in peacebuildingendeavours, through consultative and bottom-up designs, and throughgender-sensitive budgeting (ibid. 2018; Coomaraswamy 2015).

From Local Turn to Hybrid Peacebuilding

Local Turn

With the mainstreaming of critical peacebuilding in academia a funda-mental shift in what is addressed through peacebuilding had occurred.The trend is moving away from technocratic programmatic activities witha clear blueprint for goals and outcomes, and steers toward politicalundertakings in conflict-affected societies that have a direct impact onthe everyday experience of actors on the ground (de Coning 2018).The framework of peacebuilding endeavours must in this light reflect theunderstanding of reality held by actors in the setting, which are rootedin the specific historic context of power relations, norms and expecta-tions (ibid.). A narrow definition of peace and a skewed understanding ofhow peace can be built, which are based on Western images of ‘justice’and ‘legitimacy’, would not work in a different social context, considering


that people may have varied expectations about peace and their interpre-tation of what constitutes the world may be quite different from those ofWestern donors (Richmond and Frank 2009).

Such a critical view against the conventional Western-centricapproaches to peacebuilding has led to the emergence of the ‘local turn’,which seeks to avoid the pitfalls of an imposed peace. Critical scholarssuch as Donais (2008, 2018) and Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013)explored ways to place the ‘local’ at the centre of peacebuilding endeav-ours. Although locals have been marginalised in liberal peacebuilding,critical scholars shed light on locals who live in and experience the verycontext, and they themselves are the constituting elements (Richmond2014).

Hybridity

Building on the local turn, Mac Ginty and Sanghera (2012) stressed therelevance of the local context in relation to the contribution that interna-tional actors can make in the field of peacebuilding. Hybridity as a socialprocess of emergence can be witnessed in both fragile social settings andseemingly consolidated settings. Each social, cultural, and political struc-ture is a result of prior hybridisation and thus a pure point of departuredoes not exist (Belloni 2012: 23). This assumption was revisited by Kentet al. (2018: 1), who pointed out that hybridity has been employed asa conceptual tool in a wide range of academic disciplines including thebiological sciences, social sciences and even literature and literary criti-cism. In social science, hybridity is defined as the outcome of interactionsamongst hegemonic practices, and as the attempt to decolonise peoples,territories and knowledge (Richmond 2014). Hybridity became promi-nent in the discourses of identity, culture, economic and power relations,and political systems (Kent et al. 2018).

Hybridity emerges from local resistance and frictions between ‘inside’and ‘outside’ normative frameworks (Björkdahl and Höglund 2013).Neither local nor international actors are free from context, yet theirexperiences can benefit each other and create an opportunity for theemergence of new and more resilient social structures that can strengthenconflict-affected communities. This is why local resistance should not beseen as an obstacle, but rather as a potential as locals carry a more refinedview of the context, which can better inform and improve the practice ofpeacebuilding assistance by outside interveners. Besides, in both theory

26 Y. UESUGI ET AL.

and practice, it is usually difficult to distinguish where the ‘local’ stopsand the ‘international’ begins (Richmond 2014).

Hybridity is perceived as an opportunity for engagement between localand international knowledge, thereby utilising international capacities toappreciate the specific context found in the everydayness of individualswho live in the epicentre. Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013: 764) took astep to overcome the dichotomy of local versus international and analysedthe concept of hybridity from a pluralist point of view and defined peaceas hybrid, multiple and often agonistic.

The process of mixing, interpreting and adapting is where the coreargument of hybridity lies. Communication among actors and institutionsin a conflict-affected society is highly dynamic and diverse, and therefore,constant reconsideration and reassessment of the given circumstancesand interactions amongst various factors and actors are necessary (MacGinty and Sanghera 2012). Consequently, it becomes vital to include asmany stakeholders as possible to ensure an inclusive and comprehensivepeacebuilding approach that benefits all spheres of society (ibid.).

Thus, hybrid peacebuilding seeks to address the lack of attention tothe local context, and the failure of liberal peacebuilding in a situationwhere the aid-recipient state is strong enough to deny intrusive outsideintervention for statebuilding. The proponents of hybrid peacebuildingare against the conventional approaches to peacebuilding through whichliberal state institutions have been merely imposed upon without payingsufficient attention to the local context. Keethaponcalan (2020), forexample, pointed out the mismatch between Western-liberal norms andthe Asian context. Since the social structures of the West and those ofAsia are not identical, each has been shaped through a unique mix oftradition, culture, religion, family structure and social behaviour. Cautionmust be exercised to avoid colonialist, racist and sexist legacies that maystill linger in foreign politics when considering the role of internationalpeacebuilding (Wallis 2012; Ismail 2008). Thus, hybrid approaches canhelp outsiders to recognise the strategies of locals who resist both overtand subtle forms of colonisation and domination (Richmond 2014).

The danger of divorcing liberal ideas from hybrid peacebuilding is thatcertain values can be left behind as they may be unnoticed or unconceivedby local actors due to different cognitive frameworks and worldviewsthey hold. It would be beneficial to move away from labelling ‘demo-cratic peace’ and ‘liberal peacebuilding’ as Western concepts, and adoptcontextually diverse concepts of governance, democracy, market economy,


human rights and sovereignty that are decolonised from the restraintsof Western domination. Keethaponcalan (2020) argues that democracy,human rights, and good governance should not be disregarded simplyas Western values as they are considered ‘universal’. By introducing thehybrid lens, anthropological variations of these values are allowed toco-exist, which effectively make them truly ‘universal’. By eliminatingWestern-centric ‘colonial arrogance’ and allowing non-Western expecta-tions to shape these values, hybrid peacebuilding can lead a formationof universal values, thereby transforming the approach of Western inter-vention to fruitful emancipatory peacebuilding interplay. Hybridisation,therefore, constitutes a way to incorporate the values that liberal peace-building proposes with locally grounded legitimacy (Clements and Uesugi2020). While aiming to empower local actors to define and shape thevalues, hybrid peacebuilding creates room for improving the real-lifeimplementation of structures and concepts that do not easily align withWestern-liberal equivalents.

Feminist Perspectives

Feminist perspectives underscore the importance of including the voicesof those who are traditionally marginalised in society (Hudson 2000).This approach resonates with core values of hybrid peacebuilding as it,too, gives primacy to mainstreaming equal participation in peacebuildingwhile guaranteeing the specific needs of women and girls are includedin peace dialogues and subsequent political processes. In practice, femi-nist perspectives are often implemented through gender mainstreamingprogrammes, and its argument for equal participation of ‘women’ resem-bles hybrid peacebuilding’s calls for inclusion of ‘locals’.

While both feminist and hybrid peacebuilding approaches underlinethe significance of diversifying the actors incorporated in the peaceprocess, one additional perspective that the feminist approach brings is itsdistinctive conceptualisation of violence. It seeks to improve the conceptsdeveloped by Galtung (1969, 1990) on the categorisations of violenceand the prerequisites for positive peace. It argues that war and other formsof fighting are intertwined, as they constitute a network of expressionsof violence. Cockburn (2004: 43) proposes that “gender links violenceat different points on a scale reaching from the personal to the interna-tional”. This thinking is highlighted by the fact that women experienceviolence in different ways than men both during times of war and peace

28 Y. UESUGI ET AL.

(Rigual 2018). For example, men often make up the majority of homi-cide victims, while women tend to be the main victims of intimate partnerhomicide (Geneva Declaration 2015). Feminist perspectives that advocatefor including a plethora of voices can expand the analytical horizons ofhybrid peacebuilding. The consciousness for varying experiences can beextended to not only women but also other marginalised and indigenousgroups as discussed in the case studies of insider perspectives of hybridpeacebuilding in Chapters 5 and 6 of this volume.

Thus, feminist perspectives can widen the scope of hybrid peace-building. They can make hybrid peacebuilding more empathetic tosocietal harm and responsive to the need for inclusion of neglectedperspectives. Feminist peacebuilding insists on developing a critical under-standing of how societal norms affect violent behaviour, especially byre-shaping militarised norms and stereotypes in society. For example,masculinity norms affect the roots of violence, such norms serve as ahotbed for forceful actions (Stiehm 2000). Revealing how norms andstereotypes contribute to violence makes it possible to examine crit-ically how a particular form of deeply embedded violence has beenconstructed in a given society. While feminist scholarship is at the fore-front of shedding light on structural violence, hybrid peacebuildingtheory has incorporated feminist’s perspectives into the major discourseof the supremacy of the ethnographic approach to peacebuilding (Millar2014a).

Hybrid peacebuilding underlines the significance of mid-space actorswho can bridge existing cleavages in a society. Likewise, from the stand-point of feminist peacebuilding, it becomes crucial to identify means offinding and interacting with these mid-space actors who act as interme-diaries to bring perspectives of underrepresented groups of people at thegrassroots to the peace process. This task encompasses a preferably fullunderstanding of the time (past, present and future) and space that canbe enhanced by considering a wide range of perspectives, which is theessence of hybrid peacebuilding.

Critique of Hybrid Peacebuilding

Pitfalls of Binaries

Hybrid peacebuilding has gained academic prominence by criticisingliberal peacebuilding and attempting to reconfigure the dichotomic


conceptualisation between ‘liberal’ and ‘illiberal’ or ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’ as such binaries tend to oversimplify the given context andoverlook its complexity (Peterson 2012). Ironically, hybrid peacebuildingtheory has been criticised for falling into this very pitfall. The emphasison the mixture of two components—traditional/modern, liberal/illiberal,local/international to name but a few—is the most distinctive feature ofhybrid peacebuilding that separates it from liberal peacebuilding (ibid.).Although these binary frameworks aid researchers to shape their cogni-tion of conflict situations, the reality is more than just a mere sum oftwo contesting concepts. Many advocates of hybrid peacebuilding theoryattach importance to the multifaceted, fluid and dynamic nature of peace-building settings. This method, however, caused a misperception amongheretics that proponents of hybrid peacebuilding theory were trapped ina pitfall of dichotomies.

As hybrid peacebuilding often receives criticisms on its flood of binaryconceptions, feminist approaches could also fall into the trap of binaryconceptions of gender, which has been constructed within the frame-work of Western norms and values. The concept of gender should avoidbeing seen as promoting a binary (Mohanty 1988). An idiosyncraticnature of the concept of gender should be embraced and a historicaland cultural diversity of the concept be accepted. Conventional genderdiscourses have succeeded in mainstreaming the Western perspective ofgender in the practice of the UN, but they have not succeeded in estab-lishing the plurality and fluidity of gender. What postcolonial feministcriticism implies is that hybrid peacebuilding should expand its analyt-ical horizons and incorporate perspectives of underrepresented groups inpolitical, economic, social, religious, cultural, and gender hierarchies. Toreflect on the perspectives of postcolonial feminism, the concept of iden-tity is explored as an analytical lens to supplement the hybridity lens inChapter 5.

Kent et al. (2018) provided a broad discussion on the problem ofoveremphasising binaries of certain concepts that need to be stirred justright to achieve the perfect blend of a normative framework that wouldsavour everyone’s taste buds sufficiently. Jackson and Albrecht (2018: 41)point out the underlying assumption that there is a direct causal linkbetween programming and results on the ground that can be planned andpredicted. To avoid this pitfall, de Coning (2013, 2016, 2018) suggestslooking at conflict-affected societies as complex systems that have theability to self-organise and emerge to a manifold of outcomes, which

30 Y. UESUGI ET AL.

would constitute an institution-building approach that would make socialengineering obsolete. This point is revisited in Chapter 3.

Challenges of Operationalisation

A desire to operationalise hybrid peacebuilding theory exists amongreflective practitioners of peacebuilding. Attempts to transform the analyt-ical lens to practical tools may entail the risk of merely imposing outsider’sview on what is the optimal ‘blend’ of international and local norms(Millar 2014b). If one insists on operationalising the theory, he or shemay end up with falling into the trap of the notorious cookie-cutterapproach of liberal peacebuilding. Thus, reflective practitioners advocatefor the utility of hybridity to create locally grounded, legitimate structuresof values and institutions (Clements et al. 2007). Filling this gap in criticalpeacebuilding literature is the main focus of this study, which is revisitedin Chapter 4.

Wallis et al. (2018) identified the risk of ‘romanticising the local’and downplaying significant power differentials at the local level that arebased on gender, age, ethnic or other similar divisions. Paffenholz (2015)echoes such concerns saying that hybridity is presented as a hegemonicand power-free space, and the power of local elites within hybrid struc-tures is overlooked. This means that underlying power structures affectpeacebuilding endeavours between the elite and the grassroot actors, aswell as they impact on local settings and actors in key social positionswho can control access to information, resources and perception aboutthe needs of stakeholders involved in conflict. On the other hand, Millar(2014b) warns not to overestimate the influence that outside interven-tion might bring to the dynamic of hybridisation. Richmond (2014: 52)extends this point by saying that hybridity needs to be seen in the contextof institutional and power-political struggles, adding different spheres ofdynamics, as hybridity “represents the contingent and complex natureof the politics of peacemaking and the dynamics of power, agency andidentity it involves”.

The term ‘hybridity’ itself has also become the target of criticism.Millar (2014b), for example, maintained that excessive conceptualisationof what ‘hybridity’ encompasses could compromise the needed space forsocial emergence on the ground, and turn to an outcome-focused, ratherthan a process-oriented framework. It is important to look at not onlythe outcomes of hybrid emergence, but also at its process. Hybridity


should not be seen as a result of a linear process that can generate apredictable outcome, but should be regarded as a by-product of inter-actions among different spheres of a society that hold the capacity tocreate a mutual understanding of peace and peacebuilding (ibid.). Thisnotion then actively engages with basic structures that are found on theground rather than downgrading what already exists and establishing anentirely new scaffold. To question the assumption of a linier progression,this study introduces the complexity approach, which focuses on intersec-tionality and dynamic relationships of stakeholders in conflict as discussedin Chapter 3.

Conclusion

To set the scene for the following chapters, this chapter provided a briefreview of some of the relevant literatures surrounding hybrid peace-building, and discussed its merits for a sustained, locally grounded andinclusive establishment of peace. Four discourses of peacebuilding—economic, liberal, critical and feminist—were presented to illuminate themain feature of hybrid peacebuilding and to serve as the foundationfor the subsequent discussions in which a spectrum of theoretical andempirical studies is offered.

The above literature review stresses that hybrid peacebuilding doesnot see peacebuilding processes in binary terms. Instead, it assumes thatthese processes are complex, multifaceted, dynamic and interactive. Whilebinary frameworks are fixed in static dichotomies, the hybridity lensprovides open perspectives, which are flexible and adaptive. Operational-ising hybrid peacebuilding means to consider and adapt such features ofhybridity. This increases the potential of hybrid peacebuilding for movingbeyond merely bringing economic development, political stability andfunctioning institutions. Based on such premises, the following chap-ters investigate how tools for peacebuilding can be applied in practiceto produce an inclusive process in which experiences and needs of thosewho have been marginalised and neglected are reflected.

As illustrated in the above literature review, feminist perspectives canshed light on the role of mid-space actors who serve as insider-partialmediators representing the interests of silenced people in conflict-affectedcommunities. To operationalise hybrid peacebuilding theory successfully,rigorous efforts must be made by outsiders to embrace the adaptiveinterplay of encounters with mid-space actors. The range of case studies

32 Y. UESUGI ET AL.

provided in this volume shows that hybrid peacebuilding may stem fromthe critical peacebuilding literature, but holds the potential to combineand learn from various perspectives of peacebuilding as the virtue ofhybridity is to harness multiple elements. Hybridity is aiming to promoteinclusion of different voices, views and realities rooted in all spheresof society. Thus, the operationalisation of hybrid peacebuilding shouldaim for the same: to promote inclusive thinking that can elicit fruitfulcontributions from various perspectives.

References

Abb, P. (2018). China’s Emergence as a Peacebuilding Actor: From ‘PeacefulDevelopment’ to ‘Developmental Peace’? The Asian Dialogue. http://theasiadialogue.com/2018/12/24/chinas-emergence-as-a-peacebuilding-actor-from-peaceful-development-to-developmental-peace/.

Belloni, R. (2012). Hybrid Peace Governance: Its Emergence and Signifi-cance. Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and InternationalOrganizations , 18(1), 21–38.

Björkdahl, A., & Höglund, K. (2013). Precarious Peacebuilding: Friction inGlobal-Local Encounters. Peacebuilding, 1(3), 289–299.

Chetail, V., & Jütersonke, O. (2015). Peacebuilding: Critical Concepts in PoliticalScience. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

Clements, K. P., Boege, V., Brown, A., Foley, W., & Nolan, A. (2007). StateBuilding Reconsidered: The Role of Hybridity in the Formation of PoliticalOrder. Political Science, 59(1), 45–56.

Clements, K. P., & Uesugi, Y. (2020). Conclusion. In Y. Uesugi (Ed.), HybridPeacebuilding in Asia (pp. 139–152). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Cockburn, C. (2004). The Continuum of Violence: A Gender Perspective onWar and Peace. In W. Giles & J. Hyndman (Eds.), Sites of Violence: Genderand Conflict Zones. Berkeley: University of California Press.

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de Coning, C. (2013). Understanding Peacebuilding as Essentially Local.Stability, 2(1), 1–6.

de Coning, C. (2016). From Peacebuilding to Sustaining Peace: Implications ofComplexity for Resilience and Sustainability. Resilience, 4(3), 166–181.

de Coning, C. (2018, March). Adaptive Peacebuilding. International Affairs ,94(2), 301–317.

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Declaration, G. (2015). Global Burden of Armed Violence 2015: Every BodyCounts. Geneva: Geneva Declaration Secretariat.

Donais, T. (2008). Understanding Local Ownership in Security Sector Reform.In T. Donais (Ed.), Understanding Local Ownership in Security Sector Reform(pp. 3–17). Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of ArmedForces.

Donais, T. (2018). Security Sector Reform and the Challenge of VerticalIntegration. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 12(1), 31–47.

Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. Journal of PeaceResearch, 6(3), 167–191.

Galtung, J. (1990). Cultural Violence. Journal of Peace Research, 27 (3), 291–305.

Hudson, H. (2000). Decolonising Gender and Peacebuilding: Feminist Frontiersand Border Thinking in Africa. Peacebuilding, 4(2), 194–209.

Interpeace. (2015). Strategic Positioning Paper. Geneva: Interpeace.Ismail, O. (2008). Enabling Local Ownership: Participation and Capacity-

Building in SSR. In T. Donais (Ed.), Local Ownership and Security SectorReform (pp. 127–145). Geneva: DCAF.

Jackson, P., & Albrecht, P. (2018). Power, Politics and Hybridity. In J. Wallis, L.Kent, M. Forsyth, S. Dinnen, & S. Bose (Eds.), Hybridity on the Groundin Peacebuilding and Development: Critical Conversations (pp. 37–39).Canberra: ANU Press.

Keethaponcalan, S. I. (2020). Asian Peacebuilding: Theory and Practice. In Y.Uesugi (Ed.), Hybrid Peacebuilding in Asia (pp. 15–35). New York: PalgraveMacmillan.

Kent, L., Bose, S., Wallis, J., Dinnen, S., & Forsyth, M. (2018). Introduction. InJ. Wallis, L. Kent, M. Forsyth, S. Dinnen, & S. Bose (Eds.), Hybridity on theGround in Peacebuilding and Development: Critical Conversations (pp. 1–20).Canberra: ANU Press.

Mac Ginty, R., & Richmond, O. P. (2013). The Local Turn in Peace Building:A Critical Agenda for Peace. Third World Quarterly, 34(5), 763–783.

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Millar, G. (2014b). Disaggregating Hybridity: Why Hybrid Institutions Do NotProduce Predictable Experiences of Peace. Journal of Peace Research, 51(4),501–514.

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Nadarajah, S., & Rampton, D. (2015). The Limits of Hybridity and the Crisisof Liberal Peace. Review of International Studies , 41(1), 49–72.

Paffenholz, T. (2015). Unpacking the Local Turn in Peacebuilding: A CriticalAssessment Towards an Agenda for Future Research. Third World Quarterly,36(5), 41–58.

Paris, R. (1997). Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism.International Security, 22(2), 54–89.

Peterson, J. H. (2012). A Conceptual Unpacking of Hybridity: Accounting forNotions of Power, Politics and Progress in Analyses of Aid-Driven Interfaces.Journal of Peacebuilding & Development , 7 (2), 9–22.

Richmond, O. P. (2014). The Dilemmas of a Hybrid Peace: Negative or Positive?Cooperation and Conflict , 50(1), 50–68.

Richmond, O. P., & Frank, J. (2009). Liberal Peace Transitions: BetweenStatebuilding and Peacebuilding. Edinburgh University Press.

Rigual, C. (2018). Rethinking the Ontology of Peacebuilding. Gender, Spacesand the Limits of the Local Turn. Peacebuilding, 6(2), 144–169.

Stiehm, J. H. (2000). Neither Male nor Female: Neither Victim nor Executioner.In I. Breines, R. W. Connell, & I. Eide (Eds.), Male Roles Masculinities andViolence: A Culture of Peace and Perspective (pp. 223–230). Paris: UNESCO.

Uesugi, Y. (2020). Introduction. In Y. Uesugi (Ed.), Hybrid Peacebuilding inAsia (pp. 1–14). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Wallis, J. (2012). A Liberal-Local Hybrid Peace Project in Action? The IncreasingEngagement Between the Local and Liberal in Timor-Leste. Review ofInternational Studies , 38(4), 735–761.

Wallis, J., Kent, L., Forsyth, M., Dinnen, S., & Bose, S. (Eds.) (2018). Hybridityon the Ground in Peacebuilding and Development: Critical Conversations.Acton ACT: ANU Press.

CHAPTER 3

Hybridity, Adaptive Peacebuildingand Complexity

Cedric de Coning and Lawrence McDonald-Colbert

Introduction

This chapter introduces Complexity and Adaptive Peacebuilding andconsiders how it contributes to the contemporary hybridity debate.Following a brief introduction to Complexity theory, this chapter exploresthe utility of a complex systems perspective to expand our understandingof hybrid peacebuilding. Adaptive peacebuilding is then introduced asan approach that can help hybrid peacebuilding cope with the uncer-tainty dilemma that is a characteristic of complex social systems, as wellas manage the relational dimension of hybrid peacebuilding through acollaborative approach. This chapter thus seeks to explore what hybriditytheorists may gain from a complex systems approach to peacebuilding

C. de ConingNorwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo, Norwaye-mail: [email protected]

L. McDonald-Colbert (B)Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan


37



https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67758-9_3

38 C. DE CONING AND L. MCDONALD-COLBERT

and begin to build bridges between complexity, adaptive peacebuildingand hybrid peacebuilding.

Peacebuilding is about influencing the behaviour of social systems thathave been affected by violent conflict. Insights from complexity scienceabout how best to influence the behaviour of complex systems, howsuch systems respond to pressure, and how to avoid unintended conse-quences (Aoi et al. 2007), should thus be valuable for those involvedin understanding and undertaking peacebuilding (Ramalingam and Jones2008). In the context of this chapter, ‘peacebuilding’ refers to all actionsundertaken by both the international and local actors that work towardsresolving a particular conflict and sustaining the peace in a given socialsystem. Peacebuilding is thus not understood only as something doneby international or local organisations that have peacebuilding as theirmandate, objective or profession, but as something done by all actorsthat work towards peace.

Concepts like peacebuilding convey the assumption that actors, suchas a United Nations (UN) agency or peacebuilding NGO, possess theknowledge and capability to ‘build’ peace in the same way an engineerbuilds a bridge. Social systems are, however, unlike a bridge or a machinewhere its parts have a specified and pre-designed role in the functioningof the whole, operating under a single pre-determined method to achievethat purpose (Morin 2005). When a machine becomes stressed it breaksdown and requires repair. Some people working in international conflictresolution approach peacebuilding with a similar mindset; as if it is atool designed to fix societies affected by conflict (Ghani and Lockhart2008). However, the insights gained from studies in social complexity,and especially from the processes of emergence and self-organisation,inform us that complex social systems must fix themselves if they are tobe self-sustainable (Luhmann 1990).

This does not mean that there is no role for international or externalactors. To the contrary, local systems are often trapped in a path depen-dent conflict cycle that are resilient against change, and they may needexternal assistance to open-up other possibilities. This is the role thathybrid peacebuilding attempts to fulfil. However, external fixes will notstick if they have not been internalised, and it is thus the internal adapta-tion process that is the critical element for self-sustainability (de Coning2016). External intervention may at times be necessary, but it is not suffi-cient on its own. It is the internal system’s own adaptations, and its own

3 HYBRIDITY, ADAPTIVE PEACEBUILDING … 39

integration of new attitudes, knowledge and behaviour into its own socialinstitutions, that result in self-sustainable peace.

Hybridity theory has been developed as a bridge that can facilitate themerger between the internal and the external worlds in the peacebuildingcontext. Over time, peacebuilding as an enterprise has trudged towardsstandardisation and uniformity, becoming mired in a formulaic and inflex-ible methodology (Mac Ginty 2008). This ‘flat-packed’ peacebuilding hasseen a surge of scholarly criticism in recent years, and one of the by-products of this debate has been the emergence of hybridity as a concernfor peacebuilding theorists. Hybridity is designed as the antithesis tothe rigidity and standardisation of ‘flat-packed’ peacebuilding. Embeddedwithin the methodology of hybridity theory is an acceptance of theinherent complexity of peacebuilding operations. Hybridity, as an onto-logical position, can be defined as an observance of the dynamic inter-change between all relevant actors in the field (Richmond and Mitchell2012). This dynamic interchange expresses causal and relational mecha-nisms that are out of the purview of the principally top-down ‘flat-packed’methods and highlights the complex multi-directional realities of thepeacebuilding arena. As put by Uesugi, “hybridity is a mandala whichenlightens us about the ‘relational’ dimension of peacebuilding” (2020:3).

Complexity

Complexity refers to a specific type of complex system, such as a society,that has the ability to adapt, and that demonstrates emergent proper-ties, including self-organising behaviour. Such systems emerge, and aremaintained, as a result of the dynamic and non-linear interactions of itselements, based on the information available to them locally, as a result oftheir interaction with their environment, as well as from the modulatedfeedback they receive from the other elements in the system (de Coning2016: 168; Cilliers 1998: 3).

Social systems are empirically complex (Byrne 1998). This means theydemonstrate adaptability and display emergent properties, including self-organising behaviour (Kaufmann 2013). As social systems are highlydynamic, non-linear, and emergent, it is not possible to find general lawsor rules that will help us predict with certainty how a particular societyor community will behave (Cilliers 2002). It is not possible to under-take a project and satisfactorily predict the outcome. Nor is it possible


to use a project design that performed well elsewhere, for instance theTruth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, expecting thatit will have the same effect in another context. This uncertainty is anintrinsic quality of complex systems, not a result of imperfect knowledgeor inadequate analysis, planning, or implementation. This recognition hassignificant implications for the way peacebuilding is thought about andundertaken.

Complex organisations, in this sense, should not be conceived of asfunctionally uniform input-output machines whose processes can be easilyobserved, identified and manipulated, but rather should be conceived ofas fields, in the Bourdieusian sense (Bourdieu 1977), in which the interac-tions of actors and the onset of events is facilitated. Due to the expansivediversity of fields through which complexity has developed, a truly synthe-sised theory or methodology of complexity does not exist (Chu et al.2003; Preiser et al. 2018). However, complexity has been constructedinto somewhat of an interdisciplinary umbrella term, allowing for asketching of the general features of complex systems, including a consoli-dation of conventional concepts, themes and terminology (Alhadeff-Jones2013; Preiser et al. 2018).

Complexity and Hybrid Peacebuilding

Preiser et al. (2018: n.p.) have distilled complexity into a few charac-teristics that provide a “conceptual typology” based on “an ontologicalreading… to discern general patterns and underlying causal explanations”.Four are particularly relevant for hybrid peacebuilding: relationality;dynamism; radical openness and contextuality, and adaptivity. Theseconcepts will be used as a “heuristic framework” (ibid.) that will allow usto discuss complexity theory’s relation to hybridity. Relationality entailsthat the elements in a complex system are flexible and dynamic. For hybridpeacebuilding, this means that research should not focus on actors, butrather on their connections and interactions, and how this changes thepeacebuilding environment. Further, these relations are non-linear anddynamic and thus produce emergent properties, meaning that no matterhow precisely a conflict is understood at the micro-level, a concurrentmacro-level analysis is always necessary. This is exacerbated by complexsystems having permeable and indefinite boundaries, so that the systemitself interacts both endo- and exogenously. This radical openness entailscontextuality in complex systems, where system behaviour is dependent


on its relational interactions in both the local and environmental context.Hybrid peacebuilding must acknowledge therefore that the local contextis never isolated from exogenous effects. As elements in a complex systeminteract with both other elements and their wider environment, theyeffectively ‘learn’, changing their behaviour to produce optimal outcomes.While this adaptivity may be a source of difficulty when it comes to peace-building interventions, it also provides a site of creativity that can help toiteratively improve interventions as they progress. Hybrid peacebuildingshould therefore seek to include local populations at all opportunities.The proceeding discussion shall systematically approach complexity andits efficacy for hybridity research by addressing each principle of the “con-ceptual typology” (ibid.) in turn and discussing its relation to hybridpeacebuilding, further defining key concepts as they are introduced.

Relationality

Relations, here, refers to the interactions between constituent compo-nents of the system. The process of giving, receiving, exchanging, influ-encing or otherwise making contact with other elements is the drivingforce behind what makes a system complex. Relations between elementstherefore take precedence over the elements themselves. Taking insightsfrom relational theory, the ontology of complexity thus conceives of theessential elements in a complex system not as the ‘things’ themselves,but rather as the processes (Rosen 1991). As such, complex systems “aredefined more by the interactions among their constituent componentsthan by the components themselves” (Preiser et al 2018: n.p.). A corol-lary of this therefore is that an analysis of systemic change or evolutionis crucial to an analysis of complex systems. By analysing the relationsbetween components in a complex system, what is being analysed is howthis system adapts and fluctuates over time.

Hybridity goes to great lengths to explain the multifaceted aspects ofpeacebuilding and emphasises the importance of including a wide andheterogeneous array of actors into the process (Mac Ginty and Rich-mond 2013). Complexity helps to emphasise the notion that these actorsdo not exist independently from one another, by putting the spotlightonto the interaction between these actors (over and above the natureof the actors themselves). In fact, it is the relations between them thatdefine their role in the system. In a complex system, elements are co-constitutive (by way of their adaptivity to feedback), and thereby rely on


the dynamics of the system for the formation of their identity. As hybridityacknowledges the extensive variation and interconnection of actors in thepeacebuilding field, complexity emphasises this variation and interconnec-tion as an essential part of the system. Hybridity can help to delineate whoactors are and how they behave in the peacebuilding context. Complexityhelps to understand how these actors fit into a wider network and howthis network systemically functions. Where hybridity highlights whichactors are imperative to peace processes, complexity demonstrates theposition of these actors within the wider process and how this impactstheir identities, as well as the structure and operation of the process as awhole.

However, whereas Mac Ginty and Richmond (2016) cast doubt overthe entire enterprise of instrumentalising hybridity, the contention of thischapter is that complexity can help to ‘bridge the gap’ between hybridity-as-theory and hybridity-as-practice. Relationality is one of the preeminentways in which this can be achieved. For Uesugi (2020: 9), peacebuildingis “a continuous process of negotiation, mediation, arrangement, adap-tation, adjustment, coordination, cooperation and contestation amongstdivergent stakeholders in a society over their conflicting interests, valuesand needs”. In line with a complexity ontology, this process is the superla-tive concern in peacebuilding. This moves away from the atomistic,a-temporal and actor-focused approach of contemporary peacebuildingtheory, whereby pre-eminence is put on the who rather than the howof peacebuilding. It is imperative, therefore, to over-rely on who theactors in a system are (institutions, groups, individuals etc.), but how theyconnect and interact, and how these interactions shape the evolution ofthe system. This can allow us to codify (to a degree) to what extent, andaccording to what mechanism, information flows between them.

In Chapter 4 of this volume, Deekeling and Simangan discuss theoperationalisation of hybridity through a ‘mid-space actor typology’. Thistypology consists of a classification of various roles and functions that canbe played by intermediary actors, referred to generally as ‘gatekeepers’, inthe peace process. These ‘gatekeepers’ safeguard the communities they area part of and oversee the avenues of communication between them. Thesegatekeepers could either serve as bridge-builders or spoilers to the peaceprocess, depending on the context. For Deekeling and Simangan, thepreeminent role of the peacebuilding community is thus the identificationand management of these ‘gatekeepers’ so that they stay on-track withthe aims of the peacebuilding efforts, and serve to bolster, extend and


fortify the peace process instead of hamper or detach it. This may be donevia capacity building or the coordination of interaction and knowledgetransfer between communities.

As hybridity has served to highlight the variety of actors in thefield, Deekeling and Simangan seek to operationalise this variety, util-ising those actor’s unique traits, abilities and connections to enhancethe peacebuilding programme. This endeavour fits well with the lessonsgleaned from complexity. The complexity literature emphasises the impor-tance of peacebuilding’s relational aspects. With regards to hybridity, thisentails that we identify how actors interact with one another, in whatmanner these interactions take place, and what commodities are trans-ferred through these interactions. The mid-space actor typology goessome way toward codifying these relationships; it allows us to beginto clarify what kind of relationships are active in the peace processand the manner in which they are interconnected. It is important toemphasise how definitionally relational the ‘mid-space actor typology’ is.The typology is a utilisation of the relationships between actors in thesystem—not a description of the actors themselves. Via their positionin the ‘mid-space’ gatekeepers shape and manage the relations betweenelements. As acknowledged by Deekeling and Simangan, it is impor-tant not to over-rely on an actor-focused typology. Whereas these actorsare defined relationally, and the typology itself operates on relationalgrounds, the application of this typology can lead to an overbearance onthe importance of specific actors in that peace process. While this bringsdangers that could hamper system resilience (i.e. through entrenched andover-connected actors turning ‘spoiler’ and having a needlessly signifi-cant impact on system functionality) the main issue with regards to theimplementation of a complex peacebuilding theory is an ontological one.

A crucial corollary of the relationality of complex systems is systemicchange and evolution. Any analysis of a complex system must have at itsheart an appreciation of that system’s development over time. Focus orreliance on specific actors leads us toward a rigid and static analysis of thesystem. Not only may their functions and roles differ, but the very natureof the actors themselves may evolve. Because the elements in a complexsystem are constituted relationally, their existence is contextual, flexibleand dynamic. With complex systems, we must focus on “the process ofbecoming, rather than static states of being” (Preiser et al. 2018: n.p.).Traditional approaches to peacebuilding focus on how key actors influ-ence the direction of the system (i.e. more or less peaceful). A complexity


lens complements this kind of analysis by emphasising the importance ofchanges over time; both at the individual and systemic level, which willbe discussed in the following section.

Dynamism

A defining attribute of a complex system is its inherent dynamism andperpetual volatility. This dynamism stems from the self-organising capaci-ties of complex systems, which in turn stem from the generative capacityof relational interaction amongst their elements (Heylighen 2001). Self-organisation, in this context, refers to the ability of a complex system,like a society, to organise, maintain and sustain itself without an externalor internal managing agent (Mitchell 2009: 13). In this sense, self-organisation refers to “the spontaneous creation of a globally coherentpattern out of the local interactions between initially independent compo-nents” (Heylighen 2001: 275). Self-organisation facilitates and modulatesthe flow and processing of feedback information, for instance throughdeveloping shared understandings, participatory decision-making andmonitoring mechanisms. Whereas complicated systems—for example anadvanced aircraft or super-computer—can be comprehensively describedand understood through an observation and analysis of their compo-nents and how they work together to produce a specific effect, a systemthat is complex cannot be understood via an analysis of its constituentelements (Cilliers 1998). In contrast to linear complicated systems, acomplex system output is more than just the sum of inputs (Willy et al.2003). Non-linearity in relational mechanisms in complex systems meansthat small, localised disturbances can evolve into critical states that impactthe entire system (Bak 1999). As such, the system will have properties,and exhibit behaviours or mechanisms that cannot be analysed or tracedthrough an analysis of its elements (Willy et al. 2003). If an alien wereto observe humans they may observe men, women and children, andsome of their relationships, but they will not be able to easily identifythe invisible emergent and self-organising cultural processes that organisethem into families, clans and societies. These properties, behaviours andmechanisms are known in the complexity literature as emergence.

Total-system outputs stem from the non-linear interaction processesof adaptive and dynamic elements, and so they are the result of complexcausalities; small causes can have large effects, and large effects can havesmall causes, all originating from disparate sites (Cilliers 1998). As such,


interventions in a system often produce unforeseen consequences andcreate new problems (Preiser et al. 2018). Complex interactions thusoccur where an organisation or system can change or adapt seeminglyspontaneously or automatically (Stacey 1992). Whereas a complicatedsystem can be understood holistically and engaged with or manipulated soas to produce some predictable outcome, a complex system is definitivelydifferent (Poli 2013). Designing, building and launching a rocket intospace is highly complicated, but once it is mastered, the same processcan be repeated with a reasonable chance of success. In fact, the mostfrequently used rocket to send people and goods into space is the SovietSoyuz rocket, which has a core design that has been in use since 1967(European Space Agency 2019). In contrast, non-linearity plays a criticalrole in the emergence and self-regulation of complex adaptive systems(Cilliers 1998: 3). Even if a particular process helped to generate apeaceful outcome in one society, such as the Commission for Recep-tion, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste, it cannot be repeated inanother context with any reasonable expectation that it will have the sameoutcome. In fact, it cannot even be repeated in Timor-Leste with anyexpectation that it will have the same outcome. Irreproducibility, then,is a function of dynamic process in complex systems and their emergentproperties.

Mac Ginty and Richmond (2016: 224) describe “the concept ofhybridity [as amounting] to a rejection of conflict scientism, or the notionthat conflicts can be ‘understood’ if only we have enough data and thecorrect formula”. Instead, hybridity aims to incorporate the complexityof local realities, allow space for the inclusion of variable perspectives, andrecognise the legitimacy of disparate sites of agency. Hybridity accepts thata conflict, and thus any intervention in it, cannot be totally planned andorganised from outside. Conflicts, from a Complexity ontology, are thusunknowable in the sense that such knowledge can lead to predicting howa conflict will behave in future. Any methodological tool of engagementmust therefore be careful not to over-state its analytical capabilities. Theschema of Deekeling and Simangan’s typology, though implicit ratherthan explicit, is the categorisation and organisation of the conflict ‘field’through the designation of the relevant parties and their interlinkagesand relations. Because gatekeepers are inherently relational, they implic-itly depend on the existence of a particular (though potentially flexible)networked system structure. Hypothetically, the typology would allow for


a ‘mapping’ exercise, where participating gatekeepers are plotted in refer-ence to one another by some observational cartographer. However, thedynamic nature of complex systems necessitates that even the most inti-mate and precise composition of elements of a conflict cannot lead to aholistic understanding of it at a grand scale. There must be a multi-levelanalysis, then. The typology can greatly benefit the micro-level analysis ofsystem elements and their relations. But this examination must be madealongside, and indeed separate from, a macro-level analysis of the systemat a grand scale. To complement the micro-analysis of the typology, weshould attempt to understand the dynamics of the conflict at a moreglobal scale. We can emphasise the typology, and of mid-space bridge-builders, as a method for or point of engagement with the system, butwe must further assure to operate with an appreciation of the wider stateof the system.

Radical Openness and Contextuality

Radical openness is the notion that complex systems are definitivelyborderless, and any boundaries drawn only serve as a pragmatic choice forstudying the system at hand (Chu et al. 2003). As societies are radicallyopen complex systems it is always problematic to draw precise bound-aries between distinctions such as local/international or internal/external(Cilliers 2001). Complexity informs us that in complex systems, includingsocial systems, change processes are emergent from within a given systemand evolutionary in nature. This system adapts to its environment andits own emergent behaviour through a continuous process of induc-tive adaptation, regulated by its own self-organising processes. Local orinternal in this context thus refers to those processes that are emergentfrom this internal experience, whilst external refers to the environmentwith which the elements in the system in question are interacting with(Bargués-Pedreny 2015: 122). In the peacebuilding context, a localsystem describes a society or community that is affected by conflict.External or international actors refer to outsiders that are engaging withthe local system. It is understood that all complex systems are opensystems and are thus influenced by their environment, and that in thiscontext it is not possible to isolate a local conflict system, without takinginto account the various regional and global influences that have shapedand that continue to influence that society. Manaysay and Espesor inChapter 6 of this volume discuss how, via external actors, international


norms and practices interact with local-level civil society in Mindanao,the Philippines, blurring their boundaries. Still, there is analytical value,from a complex systems perspective, to draw a distinction, to the degreepossible, between what can be perceived as Mindanao society and whatcan be perceived as external actors, even when it is understood that theseare very open and fluid categories. As acknowledged by Manaysay andEspesor, when the essential ingredient is self-organised, locally emergentsocial institutions, then there is value in trying to identify and supportthose local institutional processes.

Boundaries in a complex system are thus “permeable and allow forcommunication… between a system and its surroundings” (Preiser et al.2018: n.p.). The stark permeability of boundaries in complex systemsis denoted by radical openness, as interaction and commodity-sharingbetween elements can happen both endo- and exogenously. Subsequently,boundary definition can be particularly difficult when it comes to complexsystems—it is not always possible to know which elements are ‘in’ thesystem—or ‘out’. This is further complicated by Cillier’s description ofsystem boundary definition as being largely a function of the perspectiveof the observer (Cilliers 2001). Each system is a Bourdieusian ‘field’ thatstructures or brackets the interactions of a variety of elements—yet thesesystems are themselves part of a larger ‘field’.

A corollary of the openness of a system is system contextuality. Contex-tuality in this case refers to the impact of the situational or environmentalcontext on the actions of the elements. Elements within a complex systemare impacted by occurrences outside the system as much as those within(ibid.). As such, there are two modes of interaction that serve to delineatethe “patterns of organization” (Preiser et al. 2018: n.p.) that struc-ture communication mechanisms between elements in a complex system.These are dynamic interactions within the system (between the elementsand each other), and without (between the elements and the outsideenvironment). This double-layering of interactional contexts, coupledwith the ability of the elements to adapt their strategies, entails a largeamount of contextuality. This is illustrated in Chapter 5 of this volume,where Umeyama and Brehm discuss the fluctuating identities of Cambo-dian monks as they interact with both their local context, and the widerinternational peace process.

Boege et al. (2009: 15) discuss how a course of “positive mutualaccommodation” characterises the peacebuilding process, whereby “there


are no clear-cut boundaries between the realm of the exogenous ‘mod-ern’ and the endogenous ‘customary’ instead processes of assimilation,articulation, transformation, and/or adoption are at the interface ofthe global/exogenous and local/indigenous”. Hybridity theory therebyreferences the embeddedness of systems within one another; where a“messy local socio-political context” (ibid.) blurs system boundaries. MacGinty and Richmond (2016: 220) further acknowledge that “hybridity isa condition that occurs, in large part, contextually”. As the state of thewider environment ebbs and flows, and influences on the system to fluc-tuate, the nature of the hybrid context is in constant flux. Hybridity then,is “a constant process of negotiation as multiple sources of power in asociety compete, coalesce, seep into each other and engage in mimicry,domination or accommodation” (ibid.). We cannot, therefore, create asimple orrery of our conflicting society; there must be both implicit andexplicit reference to the wider cosmos.

Adaptivity

The contextuality of interactions in complex systems is exacerbated bycomplex system elements being definitionally adaptive. The elements thatmake up the system, people and institutions in society, adapt based onthe feedback they receive from their interactions relationally with eachother and with their wider environment. They act with intent, and othersaround them, or their environment reacts. In Complexity this reactionis referred to as feedback. Based on their interpretation of the feedbackreceived, the element changes their behaviour the next time they act inorder to improve their gain or to avoid losses. This change of behaviourbased on feedback is called adaptation. The elements effectively ‘learn’from their continuous interactions with each other and their system whichactions have the optimal effect. As a society we use adaptation to collec-tively learn what kind of behaviour we should and should not accept tosustain our peace. Systemic evolution is therefore a large part of whatcharacterises a complex system, and adaptation and feedback help toexplain how complex system evolve. This evolution develops locally, inpiecemeal portions of the system, and progresses bit-by-bit from adaptiveinteraction at the elemental level and may eventually result in large-scalesystemic fluctuations. Of course, as large-scale changes in system proper-ties fluctuate, this affects the contextual environment in which small-scale


elements operate and interact, creating a somewhat cyclical process ofchange.

Over time, these cyclical processes of adaptive interaction shape into“patterns of organization” (Preiser et al. 2018: n.p.) in sections ofa system, which loosely govern the structure of interaction betweenelements. Patterns of organisation are thus formed and maintainedthrough the self-organisational activities of system elements. Thesepatterns further inter-link with other system areas, generating the adap-tive capacities of a complex system (Morin 1999; Levin 2005; Fox-Keller2008). While not necessarily entailing path dependency, these patternsdo suggest some form of road-mapping and structuring of the system’spotential trajectories. This therefore hints at the potential for studying thesystem and its mechanisms of change and evolution. Adaptivity fuels self-organisation, which in complex systems like a society thus both explainshow it maintains its order, hierarchies, and organisation, as well as howit, at the same time, is continuously evolving.

Hybridity theorists acknowledge the power of local actors and environ-ments to subvert and reassemble the structures of liberal peacebuilding(Richmond and Franks 2007; Mac Ginty 2008), developing these struc-tures into “alternative versions of peace” (Mac Ginty 2008: 159). Theseacts of subversion are instances of adaptation. Hybrid peacebuildingaims to incorporate the “frictions” (Lowenhaupt Tsing 2004) betweenthe machinations of the liberal peace and local imaginaries of gover-nance into the larger hybrid peacebuilding project. The result is a sortof “institutional bricolage” (Cleaver et al. 2013: 168), whereby localepistemologies of peace and governance import and redefine exogenousliberal peace structures. This may initially appear to present a challengefor the would-be peacebuilding practitioner. This “cacophony of think-ing” (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013) fogs the ability of peacebuildersto implement a structured approach to peace. The “sheer heterogeneityof the sources of localised thinking and expression means that there isno neat framework of ideas” that peacebuilders can linearly or simplyrealise (ibid.). However, this variety of perspectives and approaches canserve as a point of resilience and inventiveness, as the inherent capacityfor self-development and self-organisation in complex systems allow forthe cultivation and operationalisation of learning and adaptive processesthat may generate a different process than what initially envisaged by thepeacebuilder, but that may still lead to the same overall outcomes. Theadded advantage of this process is that the outcome will now be the result


of an indigenous process. This increases the likelihood that the processwill be perceived as home grown, have social institutions that feel anownership towards it, understand the history and processes that generatedit, and therefore necessary to sustain it.

Complexity helps to explain why top-down, imposed or borrowedpeacebuilding models of social transformation is doomed to fail. Evena complex social system like a society that has been weakened by violentconflict typically has enough resilience to resist externally imposed solu-tions. Peacebuilders who stimulate and facilitate adaptive processes of asociety and encourage the society, subtly with negative and positive feed-back, to develop or strengthen the institutions it needs to sustain peace,is likely to be more effective. Boege et al. (2009: 14) emphasise theneed to “[take] into account the strengths of the societies in question,acknowledging their resilience, encouraging indigenous creative responsesto the problems, and strengthening their own capacities for endurance”.Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013: 780) concur, celebrating that while the“cacophony of thinking” is “messy… it has the capacity to be vibrant andrelevant to the communities from which it emerges”.

We have explained how relations between elements are the impera-tive concern for hybrid peacebuilding from a Complexity ontology. Whatadaptivity entails is that these relations change and evolve over time assystem elements practice iterative learning through feedback processesboth with other elements and their local environment. To accommo-date this fluidity in identity and function on the part of system elements,the typology itself must therefore be fluid and flexible. But more thansimply allowing for adaptivity and accommodating it within the widerfunctioning of the system, the typology should be structured or utilisedso as to actively encourage adaptivity. Owing to the positionality of theelements, and their capacity for engagement and learning—and there-fore, importantly, creativity—adaptivity in the hybrid context can leadto innovative problem-solving. The typology instrumentalised by Deeke-ling and Simangan in Chapter 4 utilises ‘transformative relationships’as a tool for identifying, shaping and relational progression. Adaptivityis accepted, and indeed encouraged, in the interaction between systemagents. The aim however is to ensure that the right kind of relations aretaking place between elements. This suggests a new role for would-bepeacebuilders, as more of a process facilitator than a direct intervenerin the peacebuilding process; stimulating self-organisation in positivedirections and influencing the interactions themselves so that they may


produce positive outcomes—where positive is understood as in supportof self-sustainable peace. The next section will address one such processfacilitation approach, Adaptive Peacebuilding.

Adaptive Peacebulding

Adaptive Peacebuilding is an approach to peacebuilding aimed at influ-encing complex social systems where hybrid peacebuilders, together withthe communities and people affected by the conflict, actively engage in astructured process to sustain peace and resolve conflicts by employing aniterative process of learning and adaptation (de Coning 2018).

In Adaptive Peacebuilding, the core activity of hybrid peacebuilding isprocess facilitation. The aim of peacebuilding is to stimulate the processesin a society that will lead to strengthening the resilience of those socialinstitutions that manage internal and external stressors and shocks, and inso doing prevent violent conflict and sustain peace. If a society is fragile,it means that the formal and informal social institutions that govern itspolitics, security, justice and economy lack resilience. Resilience refers hereto the capacity of social institutions “to absorb and adapt in order tosustain an acceptable level of function, structure and identity under stress”(Dahlberg 2015: 545).

Adaptive capacity is defined as the capacity to thrive in an environmentcharacterised by change (Joseph 2018: 14). In the conflict resolutioncontext, it refers to the ability of a society to adjust to disruptive change,to take advantage of opportunities, and to respond to consequences(Engle 2011: 648). As established earlier, local self-organisation is a pre-requisite for sustainable peace and the societies and communities that areintended to benefit from a hybrid peacebuilding intervention thus needto be fully involved and engaged in the initiative.

The specific arrangements will differ from context to context, butthe principle should be that no decisions are taken about a particularpeace process without sufficient participation of the affected commu-nity or society. Sufficiency here implies that the community should beengaged in such a way that the diversity and variety of their interests,needs, and concerns inform every step of the adaptation cycle. AdaptivePeacebuilding can therefore not be free or distinct from the dynamicsof politics or power. The process is not technical or abstract. It is aprocess that engages with all aspects and elements of societal change thatis needed for self-sustainable peace to emerge, such as reconciliation or


transitional justice, and it lends itself to a relational approach that seeksto account for how power is distributed through and within relationships(Day and Hunt 2020). Whilst actors and their interrelations can influ-ence complex social systems by facilitating and stimulating the processesthat enable resilience and inclusiveness to emerge, the prominent role ofself-organisation in complex system dynamics suggest that it is importantthe affected societies and communities have the space and agency to drivetheir own process (Burns 2007). This is why local adaptation processes areultimately the critical element for inclusive political settlements to becomeself-sustainable.

Adaptive Peacebuilding thus requires a commitment to engage in astructured learning process together with the society or community thathas been affected by conflict. This commitment comes at a cost, in termsof investing in the capabilities necessary to enable and facilitate such acollective learning process, in taking the time to engage with communi-ties and other stakeholders, in giving them the space for self-organisationto emerge and consolidate, and in making the effort to develop newinnovative systems for learning together with communities as the processunfolds.

The Adaptive Process: Variation, Selection and Iteration

Complex systems cope with challenges posed by changes in their environ-ment by co-evolving together with their environment in a never-endingprocess of adaptation (Barber 2011). This iterative adaptive processutilises experimentation and feedback to generate knowledge about itsenvironment. This is essentially the way natural selection works in theevolution of complex systems. The two key factors are variation and selec-tion. There needs to be variation, i.e. multiple parallel interventions, andthere needs to be a selection process that replicates and adapts effectiveinterventions and discontinues those that do not have the desired effect.The analysis-planning-implementation-evaluation project cycle is alreadywell established in the development and peacebuilding context. However,these communities of practice are not good at generating sufficient varia-tion. They are also notoriously bad at selection based on effect, and theyare especially poor at identifying and abandoning underperforming initia-tives (Rosén and Haldrup 2013). To remedy these shortcomings AdaptivePeacebuilding utilise a structured iterative adaptation methodology tohelp generate institutional learning.


This adaptive methodology builds on the work of Andrews et al.(2017), who have pioneered the problem-driven iterative adaptation(PDIA) approach as an alternative to the linear causal logic of the log-frame in development planning and evaluation. This adaptive approachconsists of iterative cycles of learning, starting with analysis and assess-ment. Based on the analysis, multiple possible options for influencing asocial system are generated. When the selected options are developed intoactual campaigns or programmes, their design must be explicit about thetheory of change each will employ so that their effects can be assessed. Atheory of change should be clear about how it intends to contribute tochange in the behaviour of the social system it intends to influence, i.e.how a series of activities are anticipated to generate a particular outcome(Valters et al. 2016).

A selected number of these intervention options are then implementedand closely monitored, with a view to identifying and processing thefeedback generated by the system in response to each intervention. Thefeedback is then analysed, after which those responsible for the interven-tion, together with the affected communities and key stakeholders, decidewhich initiatives to discontinue, which to continue, and, in addition, whatadaptations to introduce for those that will be continued. The ineffectualones, or those that have generated negative effects, need to be aban-doned or adapted. Those that appear to have the desired effects shouldbe continued and can be expanded or scaled-up, but in a variety of ways,so that there is a continuous process of experimentation with a range ofoptions, coupled with a continuous process of selection and refinement.It is thus important that this process is repeated in regular relatively shortcycles. The traditional annual or multi-year planning cycles are too slowfor coping with highly dynamic social change processes, and most peace-building initiatives will have to employ adaptive planning and assessmentcycles that repeat 3 or 4 times a year.

Some form of inductive adaptation is already taking place in mostpeacebuilding initiatives, but what Adaptive Peacebuilding offers is a clearapproach or methodological process that can help to enhance and insti-tutionalise the rigor and effects of the adaptations that are already takingplace, or stimulate the uptake of adaptive thinking in others where thistype of approach to planning and assessment is new.

Adaptive Peacebuilding are scalable at all levels; the same basic methodcan be applied to individual programmes, to projects, to regional ornational-level campaigns, or multi-year strategic frameworks or compacts.


From a complexity perspective, the feedback generated by various inter-ventions at different levels should be shared and modulated as widely aspossible throughout the system, so that as broad a spectrum of initia-tives as possible can self-adjust and co-evolve based on the informationgenerated in the process.

Conclusion

In this chapter we explored the potential connectivity between HybridPeacebuilding, Complexity and Adaptive Peacebuilding. We have heuris-tically employed four foundational characteristics of complex systems tobuild bridges between the lessons learned from Complexity theory, andthe ideas proffered in the hybridity debate. Complexity emphasises theinherency of relationality in complex systems. From an analytical perspec-tive, the relations between the elements are more important than theelements themselves. The “process of becoming, rather than static statesof being” (Preiser et al. 2018: n.p.) must be the preeminent focus ina complex peacebuilding ontology. As far as the instrumentalisation ofhybridity is concerned, this aspect of complex systems urges the would-be peacebuilder to take care not to entrench any rigidity in the method ofengagement. Their characteristic dynamism means that it is impossible toholistically understand the workings of complex systems through an anal-ysis of their constituent elements, no matter how comprehensive it maybe. As such, we should not allow hybridity’s focus on the importanceof the local, or any typology’s concentration on the interactions betweenindividual actors, to obscure the necessity of also investing in system-wideanalysis. Any micro-level study must be accompanied by a contempo-raneous macro-level one, as non-linearity in the interactions of systemelements generate whole-system outputs that may be unpredictable andimmeasurable at the atomistic level.

The importance of context for complex systems should encouragepeacebuilders to appreciate the effects of the wider systemic environmentfor system functionality and take pains not to instantiate false and unfittingsystem boundaries. This “process of becoming” (ibid.) implies the neces-sary centrality of systemic dynamism. So, any methodology or typologymust remain open and flexible to allow for the systemic evolution thatcomes part-and-parcel with the constant interaction of definitionally adap-tive complex system elements. However, this adaptivity can serve as apoint of strength for complex systems. Their capacity for iterant learning


means that complex system elements are imbued with a nature of inge-nuity and creativity in responding to feedback processes. Translated intothe hybrid context, this entails the ability of actors to make use of localknowledge, or a combination of local-global knowledge, to problem-solveand imaginatively enhance system progression.

However, ‘system progression’ is a purposefully outcome-neutral term;it can lead either to a measure of societal bonding, or to further bifur-cation and an increase in conflict tension. So, what this entails forpeacebuilders is the possibility of an existential re-working. As imma-nently adaptive and inherently relational systems are unable to be coerced,peacebuilders may have to consider themselves more as process facilita-tors who encourage those interactions that should contribute to peace.Through iterative adaptation, whilst discouraging those that may promoteviolent or coercive means, peacebuilders are to contribute to nurturingand guiding the system progression, whilst at the same time learning fromand being guided by the system, in the direction of peace and stability.

This is where Adaptive Peacebuilding comes in. It offers a specificprocess that peacebuilders can employ to cope with Complexity. It offersa specific methodology for collaboration among peacebuilders, includinglocal and international peacebuilders. And it offers a specific approachaimed at nudging societal change processes towards sustaining peace,without interfering so much that it ends up causing harm by inadver-tently disrupting the very feedback loops critical for self-organisation toemerge and to be sustained.

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CHAPTER 4

Bridging Gaps: From aDescriptiveto a Practical Mid-Space Actor Typology?

Anna Deekeling and Dahlia Simangan

Introduction

Critiques of top-down approaches to peacebuilding propose that mid-space actors are more effective agents in fostering connections anddialogue between bottom/local or grassroots and presumably disen-gaged top/national and international actors. A recent work that advo-cates such a proposition is a volume edited by Yuji Uesugi entitledHybrid Peacebuilding in Asia, which aims to “fill the gap…betweenlocal stakeholders and outside intervenors” and elevate the notion ofhybridity in peacebuilding from an analytical lens to a useful tool forpost-conflict reconciliation processes (Uesugi and Kagawa 2020: 42).The book employs an actor-based typology to conceptualise “mid-space

A. Deekeling (B)Graduate School of Social Science, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japane-mail: [email protected]

D. SimanganGraduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences,Hiroshima University, Hiroshima, Japane-mail: [email protected]


59




https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67758-9_4

60 A. DEEKELING AND D. SIMANGAN

local bridge-builders” that might become active advocates for dialogue-building and peace negotiations (Uesugi 2020: 2–3). Mid-space localbridge-builders or gatekeepers can “move across different cleavages insociety to facilitate dialogue among competing stakeholders” (Uesugi andKagawa 2020: 38). They are enabled by their unique social position tosafeguard communities and channels of communication between themand other actors. Hence, they can become ‘bridge-builders’ who facilitatedialogue and peacebuilding or ‘spoilers’ who block passages of communi-cation, undermining the peacebuilding process. While the book presentsa conceptual basis for understanding the bridge- and dialogue-buildingroles of mid-space actors according to their specific settings, the archi-tecture of the mid-space or the network of social and power relationswithin it is left under-examined. It also raises many questions about howthis architecture shapes the opportunities and perspectives of mid-spaceactors, which can ultimately determine their motivations and actions.Although the concept of mid-space actors adds a constructive approachto substantiating the functions of hybridity as a lens, this chapter arguesthat it falls short of advancing hybridity from an analytical lens toward apeacebuilding tool.

The objective of this chapter is three-fold. First, it aims to critique thetypology of mid-space local bridge-builders by combining various theoret-ical approaches pertinent to hybrid peacebuilding, specifically attempts tolocate mid-space actors and their capacity to engage positively in conflictresolution. To overcome the barrier between theoretical and practicalapproaches, a combination of hybrid peacebuilding theory (including theknowledge outside intervenors have obtained from applying hybridity asan analytical lens) and the typology of mid-space local bridge-builders(including the meaningful engagement between outside intervention andlocal bridge-builders) is proposed in this chapter. Hence, this chapterexplores how hybridity can be operated as a theoretical concept to analysemid-space actors as well as being a practical tool to support them in theirdialogue-building endeavours.

Secondly, the concept of bridge-builders is developed by locating mid-space actors and their corresponding positionalities in the peace process.Several positionalities are identified in this chapter in terms of tappinginto resources of formal and informal power, sharing a cultural back-ground and thus means of social understanding within their community,and exercising skills toward transformative relationships, locally grounded

4 BRIDGING GAPS: FROM A DESCRIPTIVE … 61

legitimacy, and access to information. Relatedly, ways for outside inter-venors and mediators to engage the bridge-building skills of mid-spaceactors, rather than reinforcing a hubristic approach to peacebuilding, willbe explored. Such engagement is likely to promote the emancipatorypotential of peacebuilding through genuine dialogue and active partici-pation by local actors. Proposing this type of engagement rests on theassumption that bridge-building skills are inextricably tied to the actorsinvolved and defined by their social relations and, hence, are not trans-ferable to or easily manufactured by outside actors. Furthermore, theseskills inform the mid-space actors’ capacities to perform specific roles orfunctions within their society. This chapter, thus, interrogates whetherthese capacities can be enhanced by, and engaged with, broadening thepossibilities for mid-space actors to positively shape peace negotiations.

Thirdly, this chapter attempts to advance the descriptive function ofhybridity towards a more pragmatic approach to peacebuilding. Suchan attempt entails propositions for several practical applications of theconcept of hybrid peacebuilding that might be useful for outsiders whenassisting with local conflict resolution. It is argued that this pragmaticapproach has the potential to enable the agency of mid-space actorsby relying on their context-specific knowledge on the one hand andproposing a way to engage with mid-space actors on the other hand.This chapter presents an outlook on how outside actors could engagemeaningfully with mid-space actors.

Overall, this chapter explores the engagement of outsider intervenorswith bridge-builders during a peace process. To do this the followingdiscussion reviews the key concepts and definitions relevant to the concep-tualisation and construction of a mid-space actor typology. Then, acritical analysis of this actor-based typology is presented, followed byidentifying context-specific ways for outsiders to engage with mid-spaceactors by enabling their bridge-building capacity, without tarnishing locallegitimacy and undermining access to crucial information. The chapterconcludes by summarising the main arguments for advancing hybriditybeyond an analytical lens and towards a practical tool for peacebuilding.

Defining the Mid-Space

This section scopes how scholars have previously defined the mid-spaceby examining connections and differences between these definitions. Theinvestigation of the mid-space and the actors within it is not a novel


approach to peace and conflict studies. Paul Wehr and John Paul Lederach(1991) earlier highlighted the potential of insider-partial mediators toconnect conflicting parties effectively by using insider-specific knowledgeobtained through their involvement as local actors. They used the term“middle-range” (similar to mid-space), where actors are able to crossbetween the top and bottom levels of society by creating a networkof relationships and dialogue channels (Wehr and Lederach 1991: 87–88). Actors who can use these channels (similarly to bridge-builders)are likely to expand their social web and connect various stakeholders.The mid-space thus holds the capacity to function as a transition zone,where information can be shared and relationships between differentactors can be formed. On this basis Lederach (1997) later constructed alayered triangle model consisting of grassroots, middle, and elite sectionsin societies for understanding the interplay of actors in conflict resolu-tion and post-conflict reconciliation processes. These ideas were advancedin the works of several academics (e.g., Newman and Richmond 2006;Mac Ginty 2010; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013; Svensson and Lind-gren 2013) articulating how inside-out mediation can facilitate dialogueamong various stakeholders positioned in the top, middle, and bottomlevels of society.

The concept of the mid-space encompasses the space in which the top,elite levels have the opportunity to interact with the bottom, grassrootsor local level. Building on the work of Hancock and Mitchell (2018),Uesugi and Kagawa (2020) argue that the existing gap between top-level focused peacemaking and ground-level based peacebuilding couldbe overcome by local bridge-builders through dialogue-building, usingthe mid-space as a “transit zone” (Mitchell 2018). This transit zoneconsists of various spheres of societies in which the top/national andbottom/local levels interplay via a “vertical gap” (signifying an intra-community communication flow) and a “horizontal gap” (denotinginter-community communication) (Uesugi and Kagawa 2020: 38–39).In addition, the concept of the “diagonal gap” was introduced, whichemerges in the space between the local community and internationalcommunity, with the latter infiltrating the former by intervening in theconflict (ibid.: 38–40). It is not uncommon for these external, interna-tional interventions to ignore the local context, often creating debilitatingcircumstances or frictions in which local efforts are diminished over time(Millar 2014: 501–503; Uesugi and Kagawa 2020: 40–41).


The idea of the mid-space stems from the critiques regarding liberalpeacebuilding. It is suggested that liberal peacebuilding places too muchemphasis on a top-down approach rooted in the ideas of institutionalism(Mac Ginty and Sanghera 2012: 3–8). Furthermore, it fails to recog-nise local agency and power structures as well as the social, political,and historical contexts in which peacebuilding takes place. Conversely, thegrassroots-based approach takes a more ‘local turn’ and seeks to includemore culturally sensitive and locally relevant methods of conflict reso-lution and peacebuilding (Mitchell 2018: 1–2). Hybridity, as a conceptin peacebuilding, highlights the interplay between the local and theinternational and acknowledges hybrid peacebuilding outcomes (i.e., acombination of liberal and illiberal practices and outcomes) (Mac Ginty2008). As defined in Chapter 1 and elaborated in Chapters 2 and 3,hybrid peacebuilding is considered in this study as an approach betweenliberal peacebuilding and the local turn, combining the ‘best of bothworlds’ in terms of peace formation. As underlined in Chapter 2 the mainselling point of hybrid peacebuilding is its ability to understand conflictsin their complexity. Applying the concept of complexity necessitates anexamination of the historical and cultural background of a conflict, aswell as the inclusion of all actors involved, while paying special atten-tion to their power relations and interactions (Mac Ginty and Sanghera2012: 3–8). As illustrated in Chapter 3, hybrid peacebuilding views theinteraction of actors and institutions in a conflict-affected society as highlydynamic and diverse, calling for constant reconfiguration of peacebuildingprocesses.

Perhaps the most important question following the definition of themid-space is about the actors who work in this space. As the mostappealing aspect of the mid-space is that it provides an environment inwhich communication and information are shared, the question of whofacilitates these occurrences is pertinent. The authors of Hybrid Peace-building in Asia argue for the existence of “mid-space actors” (Uesugi2020: 2–3), who serve as intermediaries, being enabled by their uniquesocial positions, resources, and transformative relationships to connect thevarious levels of peace formation. Consequently, they become the gate-keepers of their communities. Gatekeepers are often local leaders, or attimes institutions, with high levels of local legitimacy while possessingthe capacity to connect the top/national levels with the bottom/locallevels, thus being able to travel among different adversaries (Uesugi and


Kagawa 2020: 45). The classifications of these mid-space actors and theirrespective roles are critically examined in the following section.

A Mid-Space Actor Typology

Mid-space actors are individuals, institutions, or representatives of insti-tutions involved in peacebuilding. They can be religious leaders, clanchiefs, security officers, or official representatives of organisations. Mid-space actors can be classified according to their relational networks, asChapter 3 demonstrates. Through their roles as gatekeepers (i.e., safe-guarding communities and channels of communication between themand other actors) they can become either bridge-builders or spoilers.Gatekeepers are shaped based on their social history and background inconnection to the underlying power relations that enable or block theirbridge-building potential in peacebuilding processes.

Due to their unique positionalities in the mid-space, gatekeepers havethe capacity to connect themselves with multiple communities and brokerinformation and dialogue among them (Uesugi and Kagawa 2020: 50–51, 54–55). Their positionalities allow them access to information andto obtain the needed legitimacy to engage with actors outside of theirdirect sphere of influence (Svensson and Lindgren 2013: 699–700). Gate-keepers can navigate in various directions, cross spheres and levels ofinteractions, and establish long-term relationships or bridges betweenstakeholders (Wehr and Lederach 1991: 85–98). Gatekeepers hold hori-zontal, vertical, and diagonal capacities that theoretically allow them toclose gaps and establish dialogue platforms, if they are willing to doso—an aspect that will be discussed below (Uesugi and Kagawa 2020:47–49). Gatekeepers can exercise various roles in conflict mediation basedon their insider-partial perspective, which can be seen from differentangles. For example, Chapter 3 examines their roles from a relationship-based angle. Chapter 5, on the other hand, discusses the identity of theseactors based on their co-constitutive and contextual perspectives, whichare influential in shaping the perceptions and attitudes of their respec-tive local communities (Jackson and Albrecht 2018). These perspectivesare dynamic, shaped by social interactions, and thus can be considered‘hybrid’ in themselves.

Attitudes, behaviours, and situations are also crucial factors that couldturn a gatekeeper to either a bridge-builder or a spoiler (Kagawa 2020:10, 14). In theory, both bridge-builders and spoilers incorporate the same


abilities that put them in the position of a gatekeeper—a unique socialposition that enables them not only to engage with the local and thetop/national but possibly also the international sphere. They also havevertical, horizontal, and diagonal capabilities (Uesugi and Kagawa 2020:42) that allow them to cross existing gaps between conflicting spheres andcommunities, accessing information from several sources and establishingrelationships. These capabilities refer to the ability to bridge over differentblockages in a conflict-affected society, between national elites and thegrassroots bottom (horizontal gap), among communities (vertical gaps),or the local and international contexts (diagonal gap).

Previous studies argue that actors who serve as gatekeepers have littlemotivation for sabotaging conflict resolution attempts because they areinterested in the immediate outcomes of peace negotiations (Svenssonand Lindgren 2013: 703). Hence, the chances of gatekeepers spoiling thepeace process are low. However, spoiling is not necessarily against peaceor in favour of conflict. For example, a gatekeeper may deem it beneficialfor the peace process to block the flow of certain information and cutoff pernicious relationships (Uesugi and Kagawa 2020: 44–48). Also, thegoals of conflict parties during a negotiation process may differ accordingto their perceptions of what caused the conflict, and these perceptionsare informed by their specific backgrounds and histories as well as theirexperiences of power hierarchies. These circumstances could lead gate-keepers to ‘spoil’ the peace process deliberately, not because it worksagainst their own interest, but because they perceive ‘spoiling’ to be inthe interest of their constituency. There is also a possibility of gatekeepersbeing side-lined during negotiations due to a lack of political agency andresources, resulting in their disengagement from the process (Jacksonand Albrecht 2018: 43–44). These types of ‘spoiling’ might occur unin-tentionally or simultaneously while trying to bridge existing gaps. Inthe case of Cambodia, for example, Buddhist monks worked to bridgetheir communities and the international sphere. However, their attemptsto challenge national policies through public demonstrations and otherforms of nonviolent peace movements were suppressed easily by govern-ment forces. While they were able to bridge the communities they wereengaged with their lack of advocacy towards the elites within the Buddhistcommunity and national politicians undermined their capacity to connectthe top/national and grassroots levels (Lee 2020). The link between


conflict and the construction of identity, which could have imposed limi-tations on the Buddhist monks’ ability to contribute to transformativerelationships, will be elaborated in Chapter 5.

The historical and contextual background of a conflict, the oppor-tunities and limitations of existing power structures, and the parties’perceptions of themselves and others, as informed by their attitudesand behaviours, determine whether gatekeepers will act as spoilers(Kagawa 2020: 78). These factors are not necessarily negative or conflict-promoting; the perception of the outcomes of a negotiation process is,after all, subjective. However, understanding the interplay of these factorscould bolster the potential for gatekeepers to turn into bridge-builders,especially when they are made aware of the costs and benefits of theiractions for their constituency. In this context spoiling might be only atemporary measure, hence sometimes recurring, as the dynamics of aconflict or the perception of actors towards it shifts constantly. Spoilingshould be seen as a fundamental part of the peace process when socioeco-nomic dynamics evolve and reorganise access to resources and information(Newman and Richmond 2006: 101–110). Therefore, spoiling does notnecessarily jeopardise a peace process as a whole but instead changes thepositions and angles of actors involved; peace then becomes an outcomeof re-organising the structures and processes of negotiations.

The ambivalent position of a gatekeeper—whether perceived as abridge-builder or spoiler, acting beneficially and/or disruptively towardsa peace process—needs to be examined in the light of their socialand power-relational backgrounds. What is perceived to be a ‘spoil-ing’ behaviour might not be aimed at tarnishing conflict resolution inthe long-run but may simply be a means of readjusting and reposi-tioning the actors involved (ibid.: 109). This is evident in the case ofthe Bangsamoro ceasefire agreements, in which rebel leaders go backand forth between engaging and disturbing negotiations whenever theydo not feel adequately heard by the government. In instances when thepeace process seems to reach a stalemate they re-engage by bringing inother actors, even potentially solidifying the peace process by broadeningthe spectrum of participants (Kagawa 2020: 71–72). Hence, analysingthe processes of peace negotiations or peacebuilding entails caution toavoid binaries such as right versus wrong or bridge-building versusspoiling. These binary conceptualisations neither capture the complexityand dynamism of post-conflict societies nor differentiate between layersof behaviour, such as short-, mid- or long-term ‘spoiling’. They also fail


to consider the peace-promoting potential of spoiling and the conflict-reinforcing potential of bridge-building from the viewpoint of otherparties involved. It may thus be necessary to rethink the terms ‘bridge-building’ and ‘spoiling’ and assign them as equally vital capacities forgatekeepers—without judging them as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for peacebuilding.

Determining the factors that enable the peace-promoting potential ofa gatekeeper is of pivotal importance in this analysis. It is crucial to under-stand what pushes gatekeepers to use their unique positionalities andreach out to other actors across the horizontal, vertical, and diagonal gapsof peacebuilding. One relevant concept in this puzzle is that of “transfor-mative relationships” (ibid.: 75–77). According to Kagawa (ibid.: 66–68),a transformative relationship is based on shared norms, values, and expe-riences that allow actors to connect to each other and express and actupon their interests to resolve a conflict. A gatekeeper can contributeto the cultivation of a transformative relationship by incorporating arelationship-oriented angle in order to rebuild trust and relationships withother actors from different conflicting groups. This angle entails lookingnot only at the actors and their capacities but also at how and to whomthey are connected, and how frequently and in which ways these relationsare utilised. Hence, it is important to consider what shapes a gatekeeper’sperspective towards other parties, how relationships can enable and blockengagement during peace negotiations, and how power hierarchies mightencourage or hinder gatekeepers in developing such transformative rela-tionships (Jackson and Albrecht 2018: 44–46). Those who foster thesetransformative relationships become bridge-builders while those who donot turn into spoilers.

The possibility of gatekeepers turning into either bridge-builders orspoilers (in some cases, gatekeepers exercise both roles simultaneously,see for example Lee 2020) demands a broader consideration of the gate-keepers’ perspective on a conflict and perceptions of other conflictingparties, as well as the social characteristics that allow actors to take onthe role of a gatekeeper (e.g., social status, horizontal, vertical, anddiagonal capabilities, and capacity to foster transformative relationships)(Uesugi and Kagawa 2020: 56). Given these compounding characteristicsof gatekeepers, the typology of mid-space actors can be a fruitful tool foridentifying and analysing key peacebuilding actors and their positionalitiesin post-conflict settings.


Critique of the Typology

While the typology of mid-space actors is broad enough to be applicableto a vast array of case studies, there are still some conceptual issues thatneed to be addressed. In particular, more specific definitions concerningthe type of capacities of gatekeepers, how their backgrounds enable orrestrict the development of those capacities, and how outsiders can engagewith gatekeepers need to be substantiated. The following discussion divesinto these issues in an attempt to bolster the conceptual soundness andnuance the categories embedded in the typology.

Gatekeepers

Firstly, the circumstances under which a gatekeeper becomes either abridge-builder or a spoiler are not completely clear. Although Kagawa(2020: 75–76) introduced the idea of transformative relationships to fillthis conceptual gap, the term itself remains underexplored. As mentionedearlier, Kagawa (ibid.: 66) defines transformative relationships as relation-ships “based on [gatekeepers’] common ground and social networks”.She suggests that the “criteria for nurturing a transformative relationshipinclude a healthy clan relationship, ethno-cultural-religious commonality,respective social ranks of the parties, and an authorised person to mobiliseinternal peacekeepers” (ibid.: 72). Social position is a key in becoming agatekeeper, in particular the ability to exert “a strong influence over ordi-nary people” and “power to control the access of top leaders and outsideintermediaries to the grassroots constituency under their realm of influ-ence” (Uesugi and Kagawa 2020: 38). These positions can be summed upinto two criteria: local legitimacy and access to information. Legitimacy iscrucial for how gatekeepers connect the top/national and bottom/locallevels. It determines whether actors on the ground are willing to adapt thenormative narrative of peace according to how it is presented to them bytheir leaders. Peace, after all, has to be grounded or conveyed througha normative understanding that is rooted in the culture of a commu-nity (Lemay-Hébert and Kappler 2016). To transfer their aspirations andcoalesce support, mid-space actors need to signify a culturally relevantpeace narrative and garner trust from their constituents.

Local legitimacy enables gatekeepers to access information, forge rela-tionships, and establish a base of support when other actors intendto spoil ongoing negotiations (Mitchell 2018: 3). For example, in


Myanmar ethnic groups are highly fragmented and organised not onlythrough representatives at the governmental level but also through self-administered areas and arrangements on the township level (Jolliffe2015). Within this structure actors with local legitimacy connect nationalgovernment agencies or representatives and the local villages. They arenot bound under the constitution and engage relatively freely and thushave the ability to advocate solely for their communities’ interests. Thelack of legal accountability raises the possibility of spoiling based on theirperceived interests or subjective judgements rather than careful consid-eration of the needs of affected communities (ibid.: 32). For example,some ethnic group leaders in Myanmar have even encouraged violenceagainst the government due to their lack of trust in the credibility of thelatter. From a political power perspective, guaranteeing the involvementof grassroots communities influences heavily on the local legitimacy oflocal leaders, hence the absence of opportunities for local involvementwould block the connection to the bottom spheres (Mitchell 2018: 3).

Legitimacy, according to Clements and Uesugi (2020), needs to belocally grounded, based on local culture and norms, rather than beingimposed by an outside entity such as international organisations. Thisraises the question, however, of whether it would be possible to trainmid-space actors as local bridge-builders to engage actively with thebottom/local during the peacebuilding process while outside intervenorsremain in a more passive position. Would this kind of resolution processbe more effective? Also, to what degree can local bridge-builders beguided by outside actors without being seen as yielding to the influence ofthe international community, which could jeopardise the consent of theirconstituent and damage their reputation? What is the role of the mid-space as positioning factor for legitimacy and how is it shaped by politicalpower? This chapter, as well as the subsequent empirical chapters, aims toclarify these questions.

Political Power

Locally grounded legitimacy can be understood as a hybrid form oflegitimacy, combining traditional, charismatic, and rational legitimacywith normative and legal frameworks as it bridges a set of dichotomiessuch as traditional/modern, local/cosmopolitan, particularist/universalist(Uesugi 2018). It can be questioned, though, whether or not this legit-imacy is able to bridge both sides. On one hand, the grassroots feel


included, their values are protected, and their voices heard. On the otherhand, a common ground is established where international and localframeworks can complement and enhance each other. How internationaland local arrangements for monitoring ceasefire agreements in Mindanaohave enhanced each other to promote legitimacy through the inclusionof diverse actors who could supervise independently the enforcement ofceasefire agreements will be discussed in Chapter 6. This chapter, never-theless, argues for the possibility of implementing international prioritiesfor peaceful negotiations while providing a platform for the engagementof local actors.

In connection to the ability to tap into various forms of legitimacy,there is a need to substantiate how the architecture of the mid-space (i.e.,the network of social and power relations) shapes the opportunities andperspectives for actors to emerge as gatekeepers. Furthermore, the char-acteristics required to overcome the blockage between different spheresinside a conflicting society remain under-examined. In this sense politicalpower can be understood as an essential yet dynamic and evolving elementthat defines the space wherein gatekeepers operate. Thus, power itself canbe seen as product of hybridity as it is shaped through the interactionof social actors behaving based on and in response to power relationsthat restrict and enable their actions. As Jackson and Albrecht (2018:40) argue, the “power of local actors to resist the imposition of liberalstatebuilding processes…shows that some hybrid structures do providea means to subvert externally imposed statebuilding but, importantly,access to these approaches is controlled and moderated by the politicalpower of local elites”. Political power might then be one of the crucialfactors that determines whether mid-space actors can develop and facil-itate transformative relationships, obtain local legitimacy, and maintainaccess to information. It can be anticipated that power relations hinderdialogue, especially in conflict-affected societies (Newman and Richmond2006: 107–108). Hence, it is fruitful to investigate how outside entitiesinteract with existing power networks, clearing the blockages around themid-space.

Insider-Partial Mediators

In addition to locally grounded legitimacy, the concept of transforma-tive relationships can be substantiated by drawing on the definition of‘insider-partial mediators’ presented by Svensson and Lindgren (2013).


Insider-partial mediators are actors within a conflict-affected society whocan take on mediation roles. They have the potential to “bring impor-tant indigenous resources to a peace process and […] can complementexternal mediators by mitigating the bargaining problem of informationfailure”, focusing specifically on their ability to negotiate out of theirspecific social position (Svensson and Lindgren 2013: 715). While theirstudy explains how and why certain actors become bridge-builders, theydo not include the possibility of those actors spoiling negotiation due to“issue bias” or an inability “to be strictly neutral to the issue at stake”(Svensson and Lindgren 2013: 703). This bias can also be caused bythe actors’ entanglement in a conflict, prompting them to evaluate thepossible outcomes of their actions based on how those outcomes affecttheir homes and social reputations (ibid.: 699). Insider-partial mediatorsare ultimately shaped by their unique social position, granting them powerand “pervasive institutional presence”, resulting in “significant culturalpower” (Appleby 2001).

What distinguishes insider-partial mediators from other partiesinvolved in resolving a conflict (e.g., ‘outsider neutral mediators’ or actorswho are not directly affected by the conflict and can thus be considered‘objective’ mediators) is their unmatched access to intimate informationabout the other parties. These characteristics make insider-partial media-tors an appropriate substitute or addition to outside intervention, whichis almost always present in conflict resolution processes (Svensson andLindgren 2013: 702–703). By building on trusting relationships amongsome or all conflicting parties, insider-partial mediators seek to createsolutions explicitly relevant to their socio-economic and political environ-ment, creating a more localised or contextualised rather than top-down,cookie-cutter approach. Embedded in the way actors access and shareinformation at the core of the negotiation process highlights the impor-tance of investigating what enables them to transfer information. It iscrucial to see not only how information is transferred but also howfrequently, and how this information generate impact on the strengthof relationships between parties. Similarly, by observing how these infor-mation flow, it might possible to locate gatekeepers within a conflictsituation. This flow of information can also be considered part of thedynamic nature and complexity of conflict affected societies as discussedin Chapter 3.

The question remains, however, of how outsider-neutral mediators(specifically, the international community) can engage effectively with


insider-partial mediators. This chapter proposes a revision of the mid-space actor typology by describing gatekeepers located in the mid-spacewho can become insider-partial mediators through bridge-building. Itis also important to explore how the international community canassist gatekeepers in their access to information and knowledge and inenhancing their legitimacy. Most pressingly, is there a possibility for theinternational community, as the outsider-neutral mediator, to draw ontransformative relationships, fostering and enhancing the engagementbetween the various stakeholders while guaranteeing an emancipatoryapproach? These possibilities, including the balancing of power hierar-chies, could be the key elements in removing blockages around themid-space and guaranteeing the development of dialogue. Such questionsopen the discussion on the following questions. Are these transforma-tive relationships transferrable, since they are viewed as inherent to localactors in their specific setting? Do transformative relationships hold thepotential for equal and mutual partnerships between insider-partial andoutsider-neutral mediators? Can insider-partial mediators take full respon-sibility, enabling the international community as the outsider interveneror mediator to act in a capacity-building rather than a conflict resolutionrole? Under which circumstances within these configurations would theoutsiders overstep their mandate and once again simply imprint liberalvalues of consensus-building and democratisation while overlooking localpower dynamics?

In terms of outsider intervention and conflict resolution, the workof Mitchell and Banks (1996) can be used as basis for establishing asensible and informed approach to negotiation. Coleman (2018) hascreated detailed descriptions of meaningful skills outsider intervenersshould encompass to contribute to ongoing peacebuilding endeavours.

In cases where the international community acts in a capacity-buildingrole, and trains gatekeepers to use effectively their existing transformativerelationships, the question of legitimacy is brought into the spotlight.Outsider interveners need to consider when and how to identify gate-keepers who are able and willing to receive capacity-building training.This kind of engagement can only be guaranteed through a deep andextensive understanding of the society one is engaging with. It also raisesthe issue of trust among outsider-neutral and insider-partial mediators,extended through them from their communities. Outsider-neutral medi-ators often have to deliver their mandate within a short timeframe andsometimes resort to engaging with elite actors with the technical capacity


to act as gatekeepers but without legitimacy within their communities(von Billerbeck 2015).

There are various factors shaping the engagement of mid-space actorswithin a post-conflict society. How gatekeepers emerge in different formsand settings, including their social contexts, social identity, and formaland informal organisations that generate social order, will be discussedin Chapters 5 and 6. These factors return, once again, to the ques-tion of identifying and appropriately engaging with mid-space actors andwhether a hybrid understanding of conflict and conflicting societies canhelp outsider-neutral mediators to approach gatekeepers. The followingsection will explore the potential application of the descriptive lens ofmid-space actor typology in practice.

From Descriptive to Practical?

To bridge the gap between the descriptive lens and a practical approachto analytical frameworks for peacebuilding, such as the mid-space actortypology, it may be necessary to step back from an analytical perspectivethat tries to locate gatekeepers and their contribution to peace negotia-tions solely in terms of process. Instead, this chapter proposes an approachthat helps the outside intervener to locate and engage with gatekeepersand contribute to their bridge-building in a meaningful manner. Such anapproach needs to consider how to properly engage with gatekeepers andsupport their mediation role without jeopardising their local legitimacy.Peacebuilding scholars and practitioners have long recognised the impor-tance of understanding the various factors influencing a community in apost-conflict environment in order to ensure appropriate local engage-ment. The 2015 review of the UN peacebuilding architecture states thefollowing:

Numerous and varied stakeholders—public and private, domestic, regionaland international—share the responsibility for peacebuilding. The multi-dimensional nature of sustaining peace is unavoidable and poses majorchallenges to achieving coherence; conflict and peace impact on everysingle person in a society. Reaching reconciliation and sustainable peacerequires broad and inclusive participation, involving state and civil societystakeholders all the way down to the grass-roots level. (UNGA 2015)


Building on this notion, Uesugi and Kagawa (2020: 48) claim that“it is possible to prevent the rise of spoilers and to convert them toconstituents of the peace process, if we understand factors that influ-ence the behaviour of a frustrated population”. Given the dynamicnature of identities and societies, approaches to peacebuilding callfor a constant re-configuration, re-negotiation and re-accumulation ofknowledge regarding local communities. Peacebuilding further demandslistening to evolving local perspectives on peace and what it takesto achieve it. Therefore, peace processes need to acknowledge thecomplexity of conflicts that require complex responses to the “highlydynamic, non-linear, and emergent” characteristics of societies (deConing 2016). An adaptive typology that provides guidance on howto engage with gatekeepers while taking into account existing powerstructures embodies the complex nature of peacebuilding. Specifically,the capacity-building role of outside actors as mediators, as pointed outearlier, can contribute to the local resilience that is needed to cope withand adapt to change, including conflict.

There are several ways in which an outside intervener can influencethe perspectives of gatekeepers on the peace process. First, outside inter-veners can train gatekeepers to acquire or enhance their skills to establishtransformative relationships. As Kagawa (2020: 76–77) showcases in heranalysis of the Bangsamoro peace process, ceasefire agreements servedas initial diagonal platforms for opposed parties to engage through aformally established setting. This institutionalised form of engagementserved as the base for the rebel and governmental parties to startnegotiation and eventually sign a renewed peace agreement. It laterinformed more dependable, direct connections among the negotiatingparties, proving to be a faster pathway for communication. As a result,the initial ceasefire agreements served as a learning experience for theopposing parties on how to approach, engage, and eventually establishtransformative relationships between them.

Secondly, outside interveners can coordinate the transfer of knowledgeamong gatekeepers, connecting external and internal intermediation.Access to information conveyed through specific social positioning insidea community, as well as local legitimacy rooted in traditional sources,may be difficult to reproduce. However, the act of transmitting infor-mation and the type of information transmitted remains feasible. Forexample, actors with extensive knowledge of indigenous normative frame-works can, while conveying international norms to local people, merge the


insider-partial perspective and outsider-neutral perspective (Honda 2018).This merging of perspectives directs transformative relationships towardopportunities for promoting mutual understanding.

Thirdly, outside interveners can assist in building the capacity of gate-keepers. The role a mid-space actor plays during a peace process dependson a combination of skills and resources acquired through formal trainingor social experiences. For example, UNDP, in cooperation with theClingendael Institute (2019), organised capacity-building programmesfor mediation experts to train young leaders of insurgent groups inMindanao. The training enabled the participants to share and discuss theirneeds and perspectives with each other in a meaningful way, empoweringthem to actively support the peacebuilding process in southern Philippineswhile enabling their agency to engage with their respective communities(Lidasan 2016). These types of capacity-building programmes pave theway for accessing the local knowledge of inside actors while enhancingtheir mediation skills and situating the importance of those skills withinthe broader context of conflict resolution. With roles built upon theircapacities, gatekeepers also form the basis for them to bridge gaps, builddialogue platforms, and sustain dialogue.

Finally, another approach to consider might be engaging with thepower-relations present in a conflict-affected society that are shaping themid-space. One can look at which dynamics within a conflicting societyblock free engagement between the grassroots bottom/local, mid-space,and top/national levels. It then can be questioned how gatekeepers mightovercome these blockages with the assistance of outside intervention.Outsiders can provide the environment needed to connect, and theycan train and strengthen gatekeepers’ capacities necessary to promotedialogue among conflicting parties, bridging vertical, horizontal, anddiagonal gaps. This might happen through granting access to informa-tion that creates an understanding of the conflict established not onlywithin local settings, which are usually inaccessible to the internationalactors, but also from an outside, meso, or macro perspective. A furtherpossibility is negotiation and leadership training that draws on alreadyexisting structures of legitimacy, in contrast to attempting to build anew and unfamiliar social hierarchy. This could entail, as seen in previousconsensus-building approaches in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire by the JapanInternational Cooperation Agency, the establishment of local committeemeetings in which local representatives chosen by their communitymembers participated to discuss their collective needs (JICA 2016).


This means gatekeepers are supported constantly in their role of devel-oping relationships of trust with opposed parties—bridge-building orspoiling when necessary—and working towards sustained ties. At thispoint, some of the recommendations presented in this section remain ona theoretical level but will be discussed in the following empirical chaptersand recapitulated in the concluding chapter.

Conclusion

Hybridity can be understood in different ways, being constantly shapedand re-shaped by the engagement of a myriad of actors and institutions(Mac Ginty and Sanghera 2012: 3–8). Hybrid peacebuilding seeks tounderstand peace and conflict as hybrid outcomes of a mixture of localand international norms situated within power structures and struggles.In hybrid peacebuilding, local communities can preserve their culturalvalues, norms, and practices while blending—not replacing—international(or universal) norms such as democratisation and the rule of law. It alsoencompasses a mixture of top-down and bottom-up approaches withinthe mid-space where both spheres meet and engage through a dynamicprocess of interactions involving all relevant actors.

How do we deal with this constantly shape-shifting concept in a waythat allows us to operationalise the insights it generates? To contributeto answering this question, this chapter has unpacked the concept of themid-space and applied a more fine-grained analysis of the peacebuildingagency of mid-space actors or gatekeepers who influence knowledgeformation and norm expectation within their local communities. Throughtheir social position, which grants them locally grounded legitimacy,access to information outside of their specific local context, and thus theability to create transformative relationships, gatekeepers could emergeas agents of hybridity and—most importantly—hybrid peacebuilding. Atypology that is attuned to the characteristics and skills of mid-spaceactors paves the way for a practical approach toward hybrid peacebuilding.As this chapter has demonstrated, this approach could include means ofengaging and training gatekeepers from an outside perspective, empow-ering their peacebuilding endeavours, and enabling access to informationthat could shape their perception of a conflict. Through this approach,local leaders could emerge as active users of hybridity as a tool foraccessing and sharing information and creating new understandings oflocal and international norms in an emancipatory way.


To create a deep understanding of the various ways mid-space actorscan get involved in peace processes and, subsequently, enhance the peace-promoting outcomes of their involvement, there has to be a more precise,yet comprehensive and adaptive, typology. This typology has the poten-tial to encompass all relevant assets of gatekeepers without compromisingtheir entrenchment in a highly complex environment. Hence, this chapterreconceptualises the typology of mid-space actors on the basis of thefollowing considerations. First, mid-space actors are enabled through theirunique social position to gatekeep their community from intruders. Thereare two aspects that shape this social position: access to different resourcesof power, both formal and informal, and a deep cultural and norma-tive understanding of their community and regional context. Secondly,through this combination they encompass certain characteristics that areinherently tied to these actors and are thus difficult or impossible toreproduce for outside actors. These characteristics include their abilityto forge transformative relationships, obtain locally grounded legitimacy,and gain access to information and resources. Thirdly, depending on theirperception of a conflict, mid-space gatekeepers might evolve into eitherbridge-builders or spoilers. Bridge-builders are actors who actively engagein connecting themselves and their community to other actors on thetop/national, bottom/local, and international levels. Spoilers are seenas doing the opposite by blocking passages and connections to others.However, spoiling does not inherently mean that actors are intentionallychoosing to sabotage the peace process. As pointed out earlier, their act of‘spoiling’ could be based on their assumption of what is valuable to themor their community at a given time or their view that the conditions ofinteraction need to be adjusted. Rather than perceiving spoiling as basedon inherently ill intentions, it can be seen as point of intervention andre-configuring what is on the negotiation table (Newman and Richmond2006: 109). This alternative view of spoilers demonstrates the need torevise the way peacebuilding actors are labelled and categorised.

A typology of mid-space actors according to their characteristics,resources, and forms of engagement with outsider interveners fills thegap between hybrid theory and peacebuilding practice. This typology notonly describes mid-space actors, and their characteristics and skills, butalso aims to keep the ever-evolving environment of social actors in mindand urges both scholars and practitioners to consider the complexity ofconflict-affected societies. Based on this premise, taking the analytical lensof hybrid peacebuilding as a baseline for understanding insider-partial


mediators as mid-space actors is proposed to provide an entry point formerging theoretical and practical approaches to hybrid peacebuilding.

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CHAPTER 5

The Power of Identity in HybridPeacebuilding: Buddhist Monks

in Post-Conflict Cambodia

Sophie Shiori Umeyama and Will Brehm

Introduction

Peacebuilding is a complex endeavour and relies on a multitude of actorsand organisations coming together in an effort to build a sustainablepeace that makes sense not only in international, regional, and localframeworks but also on the individual level. The actor- and relation-basedapproach to peacebuilding, with which this book deals, necessitates ananalysis of ideas beyond conventional politics, namely that of identitypolitics (Öjendal et al. 2018). Assuming actors play a fundamental rolein creating hybrid peacebuilding processes (Lutmar and Ockey 2018), itis important to further assess both the role of individual actors and their

S. S. Umeyama (B)Waseda University, Tokyo, Japane-mail: [email protected]

W. BrehmUCL Institute of Education, University College London, London, UKe-mail: [email protected]


81




https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67758-9_5

82 S. S. UMEYAMA AND W. BREHM

identity biases. Local actors are often granted natural authority withintheir environment (Gippert 2017). A monk, for instance, is well respectedby members of his community. Whilst that may seem like a source ofnatural potency as a mid-space actor able to build bridges both verticallyand horizontally, as detailed in Chapter 4, it is pivotal to acknowledgethat this simultaneously predisposes the actor to belong to and representan exclusive identity group (Peleg 2019).

The potential exclusivity of an actor’s identity group highlights poten-tial pitfalls from his or her background. If his or her identities adhere tohard lines, leaving little room for rapprochement to other identity groups,then internal belongingness transforms into an obstacle in hybrid peace-building. If the given ‘other’ or excluded group was part of the conflictthat constitutes the subject of peacebuilding, such constructs may severelyhinder mid-space actor’s ability of fulfilling their role.

Buddhist monks in the Cambodian peacebuilding efforts in recentdecades are cases in point (Kobayashi 2005). When monks in Cambodiamobilised society to overcome decades of domestic conflict (roughly 1970to 1998), some scholars attributed their efforts to nationalist impulses(Lee 2018). Notwithstanding such instincts, the peacebuilding activi-ties of monks must be understood in terms of identity: they helpedconstruct—and legitimised (Lee 2020a)—new narratives of belonging-ness, which subsequently mobilised support for peacebuilding efforts(see also Ledgerwood 2012). These new narratives included notionscommonly found in liberal peacebuilding, such as human rights and socialjustice. Monks were able to intertwine indigenous practices of religionwith international discourses, a phenomenon explored by some scholarsin hybrid peacebuilding theory (e.g., Mac Ginty 2010). In effect, monksbecame mid-space actors navigating local, national, and internationalspaces, becoming important actors in post-conflict Cambodia. How theyconnected across these different spaces was partly dependent on the iden-tity frames they held and constructed. It is this topic that is explored inmore depth in this chapter.

Much of the peacebuilding success of monks depends on their culturaland social legitimacy. In the language of hybrid peacebuilding, legiti-macy depends not only on the faith of religious followers, but also theconstant interaction between monks as peace activists and civil societygroups within and outside Cambodia (Zanker 2017). This interactionresulted in an amalgamation of international norms and standards coupledwith traditional concepts and practices (Richmond 2012). As mid-spaced

5 THE POWER OF IDENTITY IN HYBRID … 83

actors, however, monks also confront the country’s repressive authori-tarian regime (Kent and Chandler 2008), which at times constrain theircapacities as bridge-builders. In this regard, one of the broader issues ofhybrid peacebuilding has to do with the inability of monks to bridge gapsbetween grassroots actors and political and religious elites. Such failuresto unify desperate groups of people highlight the myriad interests at stakein any peacebuilding process. In extreme cases, such a failure runs the riskof exacerbating localised conflict and turning religious actors into spoilers,as outlined in Chapter 4.

This chapter engages with identity politics as well as identity networksbefore placing such concepts into the hybrid peacebuilding context. Thecase study of Cambodian Buddhist monks is then examined by assessingsuccesses and failures, leading to a discussion on mid-space actors as so-called ‘spoilers’ of peace processes before finally offering a conclusion.

Identity Politics

Identity constitutes a fundamental factor in creating group mentalities.Often identities are distinguished among “nations, races, ethnic groups,religious traditions, and ideologies” (Berreby 2008: 3). Those outside ofone’s group are ‘othered,’ which occurs both consciously and subcon-sciously. This process increases one’s own belonging to a group andconsolidates a margin of difference with one or more other groups. Iden-tities help construct what could be considered ‘In and Out’ groups, andfeelings of ‘Us and Them.’

This type of cognitive inclusion and exclusion is critical in under-standing the role identity plays in peacebuilding. Identity can create wallsthat actors must break down, overcome, or amend in efforts to achievea positive peace with a former—or still current—so-called ‘Out’ group.Deep-rooted identity conflicts, such as during the Rwandan genocide(Caldwell 2014), conflict in Kashmir (Chowdhary 2015), or struggle forwomen’s suffrage in various countries, can widen the gap between groups,sometimes resulting in horrific violence.

Power relations are intimately intertwined with identity. Korostelina(2013) for instance put forth that there exists a two-fold opposite rela-tionship between social identity and power, both of which create acomplex tangled process: national identity defines and is defined bypower systems, leading to first, the embedment of power within iden-tity concepts and second, the potential of defining power through the


lens of national identity. This insight is important as it highlights thatpower and power relations possess a place within national identity, thusaffecting, shaping, and giving meaning to identity, which in turn maylegitimise given power constructs and imbalances. An analysis of identitywithin the hybrid peacebuilding process thus goes beyond sole identityconsiderations and towards the concept of power relations.

In post conflict settings, identity conflicts can resurface during peace-building, potentially hindering or spoiling progress. Successful bridge-building between groups requires a careful understanding of identity andthe power relations among social groups. Where identity can become anobstacle, it can also become a tool. Separate identities must not alwaysclash; they can co-exist, they can intertwine, and they can encouragerapprochement with other groups (Jackson 1999). This is why nationalityor ethnic background are often closely correlated to religious affiliation,gender identification, and political identity (Kulich et al. 2018).

Identity is not mutually exclusive; indeed, it is highly intersectional.The intersectionality of identity, further discussed in Chapter 3, allowsdifferent identities to co-exist and even mutually construct each otherwithin the same space and even within the same actor (Collins 1998).This implies that identities overlap and layer; they do not necessarily causeidentity clashes. This insight offers potential for fruitful co-operationsamongst identities groups on a larger scale (McKeown 2013). Iden-tity intersectionality holds the promise for an enhanced peacebuildingfor actors from these separate yet mutually accepting groups, as thesedifferent groups may indeed, like identities, co-exist peacefully. Thus,identity can spoil bridge-building and meaningfully support it. How thisworks within the context of hybrid peacebuilding will be demonstratedbelow, followed by practical examples of prior cases where identity actedas both an obstacle and tool.

Identity in Hybrid Peacebuilding

In hybrid peacebuilding, the relationships between different actors andinstitutions are of utmost importance in pursuing the goal of lasting peace(Dibley 2014). Mid-space actors must establish transformative relation-ships in order to commence bridge-building activities (Kagawa 2020),which means that ties across actors and institutions must be meaning-fully strengthened to secure the onset and continuation of peacebuilding


efforts. Inherent to this are the different groups of actors and stake-holders, which congregate in numerous sub-groups, each with their ownand overlapping identity and power relations.

Hybridity lies in this diversity. Hybridity encompasses varied groupsof interest and background partaking in the peacebuilding process andworking on a positive peace suitable for all participants and beyond(Bargués-Pedreny 2018). The hybridity of relationships explained inChapter 3 assumes that varied groups exist and approach the tasks frommultiple points of interest. Identities are also relationally constituted andthus are defined in relation to others (Kyriakidou and Èzbilgin 2006).This is supported by the theory of ‘negative identification,’ which outlinesthat identities are constructed against the backdrop of other identities,thus creating a process of othering but also allowing fluidity of thecreated and maintained identities (Oswald Spring et al. 2010). Giventhat identities are not fixed, the way in which different actors affect eachother is difficult to predict within the identity networks. The functionand behaviour of each actor thus depends directly on the environmentin which it is required. The intersectionality of identities increases anactor’s fluidity in the peace process as more channels for interaction withdiverging identity groups are available. This means that actors endowedwith the task of building bridges within their community (and beyond)may fail to do so comprehensively because intersectional groups and sub-groups may not feel well represented by them. It is to this failure—whatcan be thought of as a ‘spoiler’ of peace—that we now turn in the nextsection.

Identity as Spoiler

Although mid-space actors hold the potential for bridging divides inhybrid peacebuilding, they also hold the potential to be spoilers. Onereason this can happen is because of identity. For instance, a mid-spaceactor may represent identity groups despised or anathema to the nascentnorms being constructed within a post-conflict society. In this instance,the mid-space actor might spoil the peace process. In general, actor-based approaches to peacebuilding have the potential to spoil the process.Such approaches intrinsically encourage the categorisation and compart-mentalisation of local actors by recognising diverging and potentiallyclashing identities, which brings the risk of instantiating false binaries and


enforcing a rigidity of the peace process that does not allow the accom-modation of identity’s natural fluidity, thereby risking the fluidity of thepeacebuilding process itself.

Whilst it is necessary to analyse how identities operate within theframework of hybrid peacebuilding it is also pivotal to consider howpeacebuilding can unintentionally entrench divisions between identities,which may obstruct progress. The binaries common to identity politicscan be reinforced when different identity groups are asked to join thepeacebuilding process, legitimising hard line identities (Uesugi 2020a).By establishing the necessity to involve diverging, separate identities,hybrid peacebuilding may indeed incentivise actors to solidify their iden-tity along hard lines. The opportunity for inclusion in the peacebuildingprocess may thus directly intertwine with the fortification of actors’identities (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013). It is therefore crucial toacknowledge these complex ways in which identities can both be informedby and inform the hybrid peacebuilding process. The case of Cambodiapresented below demonstrates the fluidity and intersectionality of identityin efforts to build peace. The role of Buddhist monks demonstrates waysin which mid-space actors can be both bridge-builders and spoilers.

Monks as Bridge-Builders

Cambodia suffered decades of civil unrest (see Etcheson 2005). For ourpurposes here, the unrest began around 1970, when the royalist-backedgovernment was ousted by a military regime friendly with Western powersfighting the communist government in neighbouring North Vietnam.Five years later, a communist regime came to power in Cambodia. Knownas the Khmer Rouge (KR), this regime aimed to create an agrarianutopia and destroy modern society. Buddhism was banned and countlessmonks were either defrocked or killed. In 1979, after the KR was over-thrown by a group of military defectors (with the support of Vietnam),a monastic community slowly returned to the country (Harris 2005).However, the civil in-fighting between different groups vying for powerdid not. Conflict among groups continued until 1998 when a single primeminister was finally elected. Although unrest can still be found today,many international organisations and countries perceive Cambodia to bestable. How this stability occurred is due to many factors. One such factorwas the role monks played in building peace across antagonistic groupswith divergent interests.


In Buddhist-majority Cambodia, monks possess an authority stem-ming from their ability to instantiate and mobilise a particular identitygroup as well as claiming representation of a higher religious authority.The social position of these monks as religious leaders thus constituteda rich potential source for influencing behaviour (Appleby 2008). Theinvolvement of Buddhist monastic community (known as the sangha) insocial issues has a long history dating back to colonial times in which theypursued goals against the French protectorate (Becker 1998), and in linewith anti-imperialism against Thailand and Vietnam (Lee 2020a). Whilsttheir engagement in the Cambodian peacebuilding process followingcivil conflict does not mark the beginning of Buddhist involvement insocial action, it does evidence a remarkable conscious resurgence neces-sitated by the severe suppression of the Buddhist tradition during theKR (1975–1979) and the People’s Republic of Kampuchea rule (1979–1991) (Öjendal and Lilja 2009). While the numbers of monks decreaseddrastically and their engagement ceased essentially in full, the significantinfluence connected to their professional and cultural importance endured(Yos Hut 1998).

For survivors of the KR regime, the “very sight of saffron-robedmonks, white-dressed elders, and Cambodians gathered around an altarcomfort[ed] them” (Mortland 2017: 172). The monks’ religious legit-imacy, extensive cultural knowledge, and strong social network weremeaningfully employed by those who partook in the reconciliationand peacebuilding process in Cambodia (Lee 2020a). With Cambo-dians accustomed to the leadership of monks, some sangha membersbegan participating in bridge-building once again, especially betweenminority groups and the wider Cambodian public (Kawanami and Samuel2013). Maha Ghosananda’s well-known peace march named dham-mayietra (walking for teaching/truth) mobilised popular support notonly domestically but also internationally. Importantly this ushered inthe bridge-building process by monks in Cambodia on a larger scale.Ghosananda also established temples, organised readings and religiousconferences, and attended United Nations delegations (Mahatthanadull2013). Other marches such as the sithiyietra (march for peace) soonsurfaced, with support from the Independent Monk Network for SocialJustice (IMNSJ) and advanced the role of marches as public awarenesscampaigns (Lee 2018). The IMNSJ and organisations such as Buddhismfor Peace evidence further initiatives by monks in creating positive peacein the country (Lee 2020a).


Alongside public events such as marches, Buddhist monks soonresumed charity programmes in support of their communities (Brehm2021). Faith-based groups such as the Dhamma Dana Associationdistributed scholarships and study materials; others offered work oppor-tunities, or sermons (Lee 2018). Some organisations provided aid forindividuals with HIV/AIDS, drug users, and economically challengedwomen; aid that transcends identity groups revolving around ethno-religious lines (ibid.).

Significant horizontal bridging has been achieved as a result of monks’efforts, which were eased by the strong networks that monasteries enjoywithin their social setting and communities (ibid.). Their continuousaccompaniment through people’s lives and traditions placed them in idealsituations to shape communities’ outlook on the peacebuilding process(ibid.). Socially active monks used the concepts of ‘Engaged Buddhism’to build and solidify bridges within their reach.

People reacting positively to the monks’ efforts originated from groupdynamics of identity. Concepts of respect, karma, and social responsibilityencouraged Cambodians to allow monks’ actions to take effect. Havingsaid this, negative preconceptions and a severely fractured Buddhist tradi-tion transformed this into a difficult task for Cambodia’s surviving monks,of which there were few after the collapse of the KR regime.

Political and economic identities further aided monks in their task ofbridge-building between “direct or indirect manifestations of a verticalgap in the society” (ibid.: 98). The negative perception of Cambodia’selite and their mistreatment of civil society unintentionally united mid-and lower-levels of society under an umbrella constructed on political-economic identity. The grouping-in of other identity categories such asreligion and ethnicity not only highlights the intersectionality of iden-tity but also demonstrates that monks were able to tap into manyidentity groups through the process of underlining a common identity,transforming so-called ‘Out-groups’ into a single ‘In-group.’

When assessing Cambodian monks’ involvement in the peacebuildingprocess it becomes evident that important successes have been achieved.In a post-conflict society faced with fractured identity notions, monksbegan bridging the gaps that separated people within their communities.Traces of identity structures and a deep-rooted respect towards monksenabled them to build bridges to those who agreed with these ideas.Their progress remains important in their communities as well as on thewider grassroots level when challenging the upper socio-political echelons.


Nevertheless, the same identity frames that enabled such success simulta-neously obstructed the monks’ progress in other ways—a paradox thatwill be discussed below.

Shortcomings of Bridge-Builders

Whilst the work of monks was often positive, it remained extremelyrestrained in its reach. Only a small number of monks today survived thegenocide, limiting their involvement in the post-conflict peacebuildingprocess. Endowed with importance in Cambodia’s society, monks enjoyedsignificant success in places they could reach. Their engagement in thepeacebuilding process and social action was not, however, universallyapproved. Some mainstream Buddhist orders, which nurture close rela-tionships with political authorities, claimed that peacebuilding monksoverstepped their purposes of non-violent and calm lives (Coward andSmith 2004). The monks’ efforts at peacebuilding, in other words, werenot normal sangha practice. This created a new chasm within the religiouscommunity, evidencing that their involvement did not only unite but alsodistance individuals and groups.

More importantly, however, the Buddhist monks’ horizontal bridgingsimultaneously widened vertical gaps. Much of Cambodia’s lay societynegatively perceived the government. In this way, a political-economicidentity took precedence over other identity groups, such as religion,ethnicity, or gender, creating a large coalition of diverse identities.Whilst this evidences the monks’ ability to bridge horizontal gaps bytranscending strict identity lines, it also demonstrates that vertical bridge-building between the government and civil society failed to a significantextent, consolidating or even widening such gaps. This is closely relatedto the nature of the conflict: distrust, anger, and distance to the govern-ment made sense in an environment that suffered from top-down violenceexemplified by the KR and subsequent regimes. The activism respondingto prior conflict can therefore be divisive in nature, especially consideringthe political backdrop in which it operates (ibid.).

The immense trauma and consequent negative identification of theofficial, top-level ‘Out-group’ made it extremely difficult, if not impos-sible, for monks to fulfil their role in bridging not only horizontal but alsovertical gaps. These vertical gaps, it should be noted, were not as extremeas in other neighbouring contexts. Monks in Myanmar, for instance,were given tacit consent of the government to use violence towards


certain ethnic groups, notably the Rohingyas (Selengut 2017). This led tothe emergence of Buddhist religious extremism against minority groups,something similarly found in Sri Lanka. The widening of vertical gapscarried through by Cambodian monks can thus be considered relativelyminor compared to other contexts.

Whilst government action lent itself to maintenance of the vertical gap,monks were also aware that they needed to actively challenge the govern-ment to achieve their aims (Lee 2018). These challenges were carriedthrough by peaceful means which, coupled with the government’s readi-ness to use force against monks (Keyes 2007), severely destabilised thegovernment’s accusation that monks were the source of disorder, therebyserving a blow to government legitimacy and obstructing the rebuildingof trust on behalf of citizens who perceived such violence as the worstaction by political elite since the KR regime (Sreang 2008). Overall,Buddhist leaders’ social engagement provoked harsh government crack-downs that not only delegitimised the top-level leadership but also clearlyhighlighted the vertical gaps that remained intact or un-addressed (Lee2020b).

This lack of transformative relationships with the governmentprevented monks from becoming efficient vertical bridge-builders,pointing at the difficulty of overcoming frames of othering that wereimposed on and by them during and post conflict. Although it is offundamental value in hybrid peacebuilding to involve different groups’participation in the peace process, it is also necessary to acknowledgethe potential over-burdening of one particular group. Consequently, astrong intertwined network of actors and institutions must be built inorder to avoid the possibility of failure when important groups (Uesugi2020b), such as the monks in this case, fall short of their duties to trans-form relationships and build large political coalitions united by a commonidentity.

In addition to political economic identities preventing sound trans-formative relationships between the government and monks, the abilityto bridge gaps between other communities also evidenced serious short-comings. As religious figures, monks naturally represent the Buddhisttradition. Yet, they also increasingly aligned themselves with strongnationalistic views. The exclusive nationalism supported by Buddhistleaders has the by-product of indirectly encouraging aggression towardnon-Khmer individuals in Cambodia (Lee 2020a). Through their adher-ence to nationalism, monks automatically alienated various groups of


Cambodia’s society, highlighting their likely inability to connect to thesegroups in a peaceful and meaningful way.

Buddhist monks in Cambodia face difficult identity groupings in theirenvironment, critically impairing them as mid-space actors (Kent andChandler 2008). The identities formed in the context of their envi-ronment constructed certain attitudes and prejudices that affected theirbehaviour, thereby preventing them from successfully bridge-building.Other challenges in organisational and policy-making fields further calledfor a widened network and cooperation with the monks in order toprevent failure (Appleby 2008). When assuming that mid-space actors’importance and unique qualities useful to the peacebuilding process ariseout of their wide-spectrum network with society and their transformativebottom-up approach, one must also consider that these characteristicsmay be compromised from the beginning as their position means theirinclusion in, or at least experience of, the conflict (Svensson and Lind-gren 2013). Given the deep root of these inherent challenges, such issuesmust be addressed explicitly before and during the peace process. Thecircumvention of such challenges requires deconstructing these charac-teristics, predisposing the actors to some forms of exclusionary behaviourin order to usher in a fundamental understanding of one’s own biases.Without such processes, as displayed in the case for these mid-spaceactors in Cambodia, memories and trauma from an identity-centredconflict complicate the prospects of peacebuilding whilst therefore alsoobstructing Buddhist monks’ tasks (Charbonneau and Parent 2013).

Monks as Spoilers

Analysing how identity can both be useful and obstructive in bridginggaps raises the question whether the participation of mid-space actorsplaced in the settings of identity frameworks is a positive or negative qual-ifier. In conflicts that evidenced discord along clear identity lines, doesbelonging to one of the conflicting ‘In-groups’ benefit the peacebuildingprocess or hinder it? Participants in the process recognise the unique posi-tion that mid-space actors can fill, considering their natural inclusion insociety; however, they also tend to ignore how identity can predisposethese actors to pursue a certain kind of bridge-building and consequentlytype of peacebuilding. Such considerations are pondered when the mid-space group in question demonstrates hyper-evident ideologies which can


become problematic, as is done with rebel groups (Swain and Öjendal2018). When the group is overtly peaceful, non-problematic, and inpursuit of a peacebuilding process favoured by other actors, no evidentpotential for spoiling the process is addressed explicitly. The identityframes that can turn bridge-builders into spoilers, however, are covert,complicated, and often difficult to trace clearly. It is thus important toacknowledge these mid-space actors’ resistant positions within existingidentity groupings in order to recognise the potential prejudices that theycan add to the peacebuilding process.

That is not to say that certain mid-space actors such as monks shouldbe excluded or restrained in the peacebuilding process. Rather, this servesto demonstrate two points: first, mid-space actors such as monks arepositively supported by existing identity concepts which endow themwith authority and agency, thereby allowing them to reach their commu-nities on profound and meaningful levels through ‘locally groundedlegitimacy’ (Uesugi 2020b); second, however, if these identity structuresencompass othering of groups that should be included in and benefi-ciaries of the peacebuilding process, their role as bridge-builders maybe obstructed, turning them into spoilers. Indeed, the violent Buddhistmovement in Myanmar is case in point. Through their placement withinthe conflict, mid-space actors have the ability to identify clearly theexisting conflicts which are pressing issues amongst identity groups;employing their authority to address these conflicts, however, can leadto at least two opposite outcomes: building bridges, or burning them.Due to the intrinsically deeply held character of identity, it is difficult toavoid such spoiling: according to one’s own ideas and views, actions thatalienate Others—such as the Cambodian government’s stance towardsmonk’s peacebuilding activism—likely makes sense.

Rather than abandoning such activities, however, it should be precededor coupled with a critical understanding of one’s standpoint. Despitepotential efforts in enhancing mutual understanding, tolerance and coex-istence, it remains considerably difficult to break free from conceptsdeeply rooted in one’s identity as a kind of circular reasoning occurs. Yet,without recognising the roots of these oppositions, truly lasting peacethat addresses misconceptions and underlying discord between identitygroups in the post-conflict society can hardly be made (Richmond 2002).Whilst a positive peace may arise out of the peacebuilding process, divi-sion will still likely grow alongside the peace. At this stage, one mustconsider external actors’ and scholars’ projection of their ideas to a


foreign, unsuitable setting. Divisions, or in more positive terms diver-sity, are not necessarily bad. Indeed, they should be preserved wheresuitable. Addressing identity in the peacebuilding process is not to erasethese distinctions but to use them efficiently in the pursuit of hybridpeacebuilding in practice.

Conclusion

This chapter argues for the need to include identity frames within thestudy of hybrid peacebuilding from an analytical and practical stand-point. It has suggested that identities play a crucial role in bridging thegap between horizontal spaces for local peacebuilding initiatives and thevertical involvement in government-led peace agendas as identity forma-tions of Buddhist monks have reflected in their agency as actors in thecontext of their ability to position themselves as bridge-builders in post-conflict Cambodia. As mentioned, this is concomitant to the relevanceof identity frames as an important factor in the articulation of otheringthat also defines the politics of exclusion and inclusion within conflict andpost-conflict societies.

Identities become a double-edged sword as a tool and obstacle inthe success and failure of peacebuilding agendas. Although monks inCambodia have been able to perform a wide-range of activities and tacticsto horizontally intervene and contribute to peacebuilding processes, thevertical spaces for formal peace processes have not been readily open forthem, which also leaves the question of whether it is possible for onegroup to bridge gaps at the horizontal and vertical levels. Nevertheless,the centrality of identity frames is still an important aspect of hybridpeacebuilding as it illuminates important aspects that must be consideredin hybrid peacebuilding.

The interaction and cooperation of monks with local and internationalcivil society groups begs the question of their role in mobilising popularsupport for peace processes. After all, religion is only one part of the polit-ical equation as such sectors as women’s groups, trade unions, youth andstudent organisations, and business groups have to be behind the peaceprocess as well (Laurent Baregu and Landsberg 2003). In fact, this raisessome concerns regarding the relationship of the monks with such organ-isations and the degree of cooperation they can foster in order to bridgethe gaps between the horizontal and vertical spaces for peacebuilding.In this regard, this issue turns to the possibility that the ability of the


monks to bridge the gaps between horizontal and vertical spaces is largelydependent on the manner they are able to take advantage of or createlinkages with sectoral groups, which can help them achieve their goals inthe peacebuilding process. Of course, this is an issue of the capacity ofthe monks to cooperate with other Out-groups. In this case, the successof Buddhist monks to fulfil their role as mid-space actors can be deter-mined by their ability to converge these multiple interests and points ofcontention with the goal of intervening in the peace process.

The chapter’s conceptualisation within the context of hybrid peace-building has acknowledged that identities could not and should notremain in neat categories given the ability of a single religious groupto transgress across different spaces. The following chapter examines theBangsamoro civil society’s hybridisation that has emanated from the inter-action and combination of local and international resources, which haveprovided an opportunity for non-state actors to support and intervenein the formal peace process. For future research, it would be valuableto compare and contrast the role of ethno-religious and other identitygroups that operate in different contexts. In Asia, the violent conflict inMyanmar, for example, operates more closely along ethnic and religiousdivisions, which runs in contrast to the case used in this chapter. AlthoughCambodia is a relatively heterogeneous state, the political factions withinthe government run along ideological lines and are typically not based onracial or ethnic groups, which take into account as to why the mid-spacerole of the Buddhist monks has been largely undermined.

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CHAPTER 6

Frictional Binaries: Hybridity, Civil Society,and Liberal-Local Peacebuilding inMindanao

Ferth Vandensteen Manaysay and Jovanie Camacho Espesor

Introduction

International and local civil society organisations (CSOs) have typi-cally been included within the conceptual and theoretical discussionsof liberal and post-liberal peace approaches. On the one hand, liberalpeace approaches identify civil society actors as key players in peaceand conflict resolution because of their crucial role in fostering demo-cratic principles and institutions. Civil society is assumed to run inparallel with liberal peacebuilding because it provides platforms for greaterparticipation and accountability from the state in the context of peaceprocesses. Post-liberal approaches, which are referred to as the ‘localturn’ (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2016; Mac Ginty 2015, 2016) in

F. V. Manaysay (B)Ateneo de Manila University, Quezon City, Philippinese-mail: [email protected]

J. C. EspesorDepartment of Political Science, Mindanao State University, General SantosCity, Philippinese-mail: [email protected]


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100 F. V. MANAYSAY AND J. C. ESPESOR

peacebuilding, on the other hand, emphasise the importance of localpower structures. This takes into account as to why the emergence ofthe hybrid peace, for example, has highlighted the need to empowerlocal civil society actors. The local turn in peacebuilding recognises theagency of sub-national actors and practices towards the goal of effectivepeacebuilding in collaboration with international entities (Leonardssonand Rudd 2015; Mac Ginty 2011). Critics of the local turn in peace-building, however, highlight the dangers of romanticising the concept ofhybridity. One of the main issues stressed against the local turn in peace-building has focused on the inability of hybrid peace to practically andconceptually transcend beyond the dichotomised categories of ‘illiberal-local’ and ‘liberal-international’ which overlooks local power structureson the ground. For civil society, this has resulted to the detachmentof international interventions from local realities and marginalisation ofcommunity-based organisations (Popplewell 2018).

This chapter contends that discussions on liberal-local hybridity canmost meaningfully gain from asking questions not only about theprocesses of internationalisation and localisation, but also about the waysin which hybrid mechanisms are able to produce more or less stableoutcomes. The goal is therefore to describe not only the competitive,but also the co-constitutive relationships between international and localactors. By turning into the agency of civil society actors, it suggests thatthe concept of hybridity, which is often represented using dichotomisedcategories (i.e. ‘liberal-international’ and ‘illiberal-local’), tends to over-simplify the conceptual intricacies and dynamic relationships betweentop-down and bottom-up peace approaches (Mac Ginty 2010). These‘new binaries’ (Richmond 2009: 229) have been theorised as oppositionalforces. Such binaries, however, disregard that local ownership and inter-national governance are not always in contestation with each other. Theanalysis in this chapter contributes to the debates on hybridity by illus-trating how civil society actors are able to negotiate the frictional binariesbetween liberal institutions and resources vis-à-vis local practices, powerrelations and norms.

This chapter demonstrates these arguments using examples from thesubnational conflict community of Mindanao in the southern regionof the Philippines. Mindanao provides important insights as a casefor this chapter for two reasons. First, Mindanao’s civil society servesas an excellent case to examine hybrid peacebuilding because of thestrong international-local linkages in the region. Many non-governmental

6 FRICTIONAL BINARIES: HYBRIDITY, CIVIL SOCIETY … 101

organisations (NGOs) and community-based organisations (CBO) haveplayed an important role in peacebuilding and serve as recipients oflarge amounts of humanitarian aid and development assistance. Severalinternational organisations and foreign governments have been involvedin peacebuilding activities in Mindanao, including the United StatesAgency for International Development (USAID), Japan InternationalCooperation Agency (JICA), United Nations (UN), World Bank (WB),European Union (EU), New Zealand Agency for International Devel-opment (NZAID), and the International Committee of the Red Cross(ICRC), among many others. The presence of liberal democratic institu-tions in the Philippines, however, has entailed that the government didnot require state-building mechanisms from the external actors, which isdifferent from the large-scale peacebuilding missions and humanitarianinterventions in such neighbouring countries as Cambodia and Timor-Leste. Uesugi (2018: 8), nevertheless, has also observed that “there isa noticeable cleavage stemming from the qualitative difference betweenthe nominal application of a liberal governance system and whether sucha system operates properly on the ground.” This is due to the existenceof local authoritarianism despite the overarching national democracy inthe Philippines. Some scholars describe this phenomenon as “competitiveauthoritarianism” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004) that generates “systemicincoherence” due to the existence of opposing forces “when elementsof democracy and autocracy are combined” (Davenport and Armstrong2004: 541). After all, the protracted conflict in Mindanao has been aresult of the failures of existing liberal-democratic institutions to accom-modate the interests of the ethnic minorities in the region (Kagawa 2020;Abuza 2016).

Second, Mindanao has been considered as a “hybrid political commu-nity” (Deinla 2018) which is characterised by the amalgamation and inter-action between liberal-formal and illiberal-informal actors. This entailsthat local and international CSOs function in intimate local power struc-tures, which are based on the dynamics amongst political lords, insurgentsand millenarian families, and marginalised communities (Espesor 2017).The existence of these power players means that the success of liberal-international actors has been dependent on the manner they are ableto enmesh themselves within these local networks. In this case, illiberal-local actors cannot be conceptualised without the examination of theinfluence of liberal-international actors. In Mindanao, it is not unusualto find locals who have been engaged in international NGOs or have


participated in long-term and short-term UN-supported projects. Theserealities have demanded some amount of localisation and international-isation, which affect the manner both local and international actors areable to operate in not only the local contexts, but also within the purviewof the external entities they identify themselves with such as internationalorganisations. In this regard, there is also a necessity to elucidate whetherlocal peacebuilding and civil society empowerment efforts are intended tohold local governments accountable to their actions and to foster “trans-formative relationships” (Kagawa 2020) between formerly antagonisticidentity-based (e.g. ethno-religious, regional, women) communities. Insome ways, liberal-international organisations have also empowered localCSOs to determine their own peace agendas. Local CSOs are strategicagents to penetrate and cascade exogenous liberal norms in the conflictzone.

The rest of the chapter is divided into four sections. It begins with aconceptualisation of hybrid peacebuilding and civil society. It emphasisesthe role of civil society as a recipient of international and local norms,ideas, and practices, which may sometimes lead to unequal and asymmet-rical encounters between international and local actors. The second partpresents the role of civil society in internationally-supported peace anddevelopment assistance programmes in Mindanao. In this case, CSOs aresituated in hybridised contexts which entail that local and internationalentities are not able to implement their objectives without compro-mising and taking into account the dynamics of their relationships withother key players. Building on the attempts of the preceding chaptersto problematise the practical dimensions of hybrid peacebuilding, thethird part describes the following as sites of liberal-local hybridity vis-à-vis civil society involvement in Mindanao: people’s diplomacy, indigenouspeople’s participation, and women empowerment. The case of the civilsociety in Mindanao supports the notion that peacebuilding is a hybridprocess of international and local factors (norms, actors, and agencies).The chapter concludes that there is a need to examine the ways in whichthe hybrid peace approach is able to take into consideration how localcivil society actors can possibly leverage international contexts by tappinginto the resources they can gain from liberal-international peacebuildinginstitutions.


Hybrid Peacebuilding and Civil Society

Civil society comprises a wide range of local and international actors,which may include both independent and quasi-government actors(Marchetti 2015). In hybrid peacebuilding, civil society actors haveusually been characterised based on their ability to navigate throughlocal actors (e.g. community leaders, local security groups, political elites,CBOs, and NGOs) and international political players (e.g. UN offi-cials and decision makers, international organisations, regional bodies,foreign states, and other international donors). In post-conflict contexts,Richmond (2011: 5) contends that civil society actors have provided avehicle for the liberal peace agenda’s emancipatory promises based on“grounded legitimacy, being derived from local agency as well as inter-national liberal norms.” Mac Ginty (2011) has coined the term “hybridcivil society” to support his argument about the need to incorporate theagency and power of local actors. As a process, hybridisation is depen-dent on the negotiation of opposing forces in which the amenability ofliberal-international actors are confronted with local resistance and indige-nous alternatives. In this regard, there has been a tendency to ignore andunderestimate indigenous expressions of civil society. Mac Ginty (2010:398) has perceived this issue this way:

Indeed, it is useful to think of entities (individuals, communities, insti-tutions) as being hybridised from the outset. In this view, social andpolitical processes—such as peacemaking, peacebuilding or postwar recon-struction—involve the interaction of a series of already hybridised actorsand structures.

Many scholars have attempted to illustrate the usefulness of hybridity asan alternative approach to the inability of liberal peacebuilding to engagelocal actors in post-conflict societies (Wallis et al. 2018; Belloni 2012;Uesugi 2020). The questions and criticisms about liberal peacebuildingapproach have always been about the suitability of introducing value-laden institutions into the fragile and volatile conditions of post-conflictcommunities. Hybridity has been touted as a response to the critiquethat liberal peacebuilding approach has not allowed for the emergenceof local forms of conflict resolutions and governance dynamics. In manycases, democracy-building and economic development projects have been


labelled as peacebuilding initiatives without adequate support by interna-tional actors in resolving the different grievances on the ground (Burke2012). Mac Ginty (2011: 7) accentuates the necessity to create a “newunderstanding of how liberal internationalism operates, especially in itsdealings with the local.” The contention is therefore geared towards theability of the hybrid peacebuilding approach to obtain grounded legiti-macy from the actors in the peace process and to foster a more inclusiveapproach in peace and conflict resolution (Richmond 2011: 28). Thismeans that more attention must be slanted toward ‘the local’ in the formof grassroots local agencies and indigenous people (Mac Ginty 2011:47). Hybridity has also been conceptualised as a space where interna-tional and local actors produce constitutive and competitive interactionswith each other. For example, hybridity has been used to interrogatethe ability of local actors to resist the top-down approaches of liberal-international actors (Jackson and Albrecht 2018), analyse the relationalaspects of peacebuilding between local and international actors (Boege2018), and consider the ways in which hybridised environments haveimpinged on gendered powers relations (Grenfell 2018).

Hybridity, however, is not without its limitations as demonstrated inChapter 2. Hybridity has often been criticised for the concept’s over-stretched notions about the boundaries and interactions between liberaland local actors. Millar (2014), for example, has observed that hybridityhas been conceptually used in different strands of the post-liberal peaceliterature (e.g. hybrid peacekeeping missions, hybrid criminal tribunals,hybrid governance, and the hybrid peace) without taking into considera-tion the multiple layers of relations behind this approach. In this regard,he has proposed the need to clarify the institutional, practical, ritual, andconceptual definitions of the hybrid peacebuilding approach. Campbell,Chandler and Sabaratnam (2011) have also emphasised that following astrict binary schema between liberal-international and illiberal-local actorsmay pose some limitations in terms of the different sets of questions whichcan be asked about the political logics of inclusion and exclusion withinthe peace process. In the same manner, Boege’s (2018: 115) researchon Bougainville’s peace process also highlights the necessity to perceivehybridisation from a relational perspective, which basically involves thepresence of “fluid and dynamic process of interaction between ‘local’ and‘international’ actors.”

Another criticism about the hybrid peacebuilding has to do with thedangers of the romanticisation of the traditional approaches of the local,


which may be inherently in opposition to liberal values such as humanrights, gender equality, and democratic order (Anam 2018). Grenfell’s(2018: 237–252) fieldwork in Timor-Leste, for example, has providedan account of the clash between “customary” and “modern” forms ofspatiality in relation to violence against women. In Timor-Leste, thedependence of women in their partners has been institutionalised throughmodern modes of production work, which have also compounded thelevel of violent experiences of women in the country. In India andIndonesia, meanwhile, hybrid peacebuilding has contained armed sepa-ratist movements at the expense of the fundamental liberties and humanrights of the marginalised sectors of the population (Wilson 2020: 115).In these cases, hybridity presents a double-edged sword of the constraintsconfronting locally-brokered agreements and the illiberal character of thepeace process which ignore the rights and voices of minority groups.

In consideration of these criticisms, the use of hybrid peacebuildingapproach in this chapter is therefore not aimed at demarcating thedichotomised logics between liberal and local hybridity given that theboundaries between these binaries are not always fixed. In Mindanao, forexample, the interventions of Islamic and non-liberal “hybrid facilitators”have provided an alternative approach to the Bangsamoro peace process(Uesugi 2018; Santos 2013). In the same manner, as in the case of thecommunity-based peace activities of the Buddhist monks in Cambodia,locally-initiated peacebuilding may not necessarily represent the aspira-tions of the local people (Lee 2020). Instead, the goal of this chapteris to set out from these categories to examine the spaces of hybriditybetween international (e.g. international CSOs, UN, EU, Asia Founda-tion, etc.) and local (e.g. community leaders, local NGOs, sectoral bodies,etc.) actors, which cannot be neatly categorised as liberal and non-liberal.In this regard, Simangan (2018) has used a similar approach in her studyabout the entanglements between international-liberal institutions andilliberal-local elites in Cambodia based on the analytical utility of thehybrid peacebuilding approach (Mac Ginty 2011; Björkdahl and Höglund2013). In her study, she finds that the persistent resistance of liberal normsfrom local elites has resulted to negative hybrid peace in Cambodia wherepeace can be described as neither liberal nor emancipatory. In the caseof Mindanao, the critical analysis of the agency and encounters of civilsociety actors provides a conceptual space away from the dichotomisednotions of the liberal-local hybridity.


Civil Society and Peacebuilding in Mindanao

It is critical to emphasise some contextual differences between Mindanaoand other cases within the hybrid peacebuilding literature. Mindanaohas often been portrayed based on the political and economic rootsof the conflict in the region. Politically, the genesis of the conflict inMindanao can be traced all the way back to the colonial past of the Philip-pines, which was problematised through the unsuccessful integration ofMuslim minorities within the Catholic-dominated country. In the MuslimMindanao, there was a perceived struggle between the two religions withChristianity as the anti-thesis of Islam (Tadem 2008: 102). The conflicthas mainly been a result of the rejection of the Moro communities againstthe decision that their ‘ancestral domain’ should be integrated into theterritory of the Philippines. The overarching struggle of the conflict hasbeen an attempt by groups within the region to obtain the right to self-determination or independence, which has evolved into a decades-longsecessionist movement (Kagawa 2020).

The complexity of the Bangsamoro peace process, of course, has todo with the presence of competing peace processes which have beenrunning simultaneously under the same territory (Abuza 2016). The firstthat formed was the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), createdin the 1960s by Moro leaders who wanted to achieve self-determinationfor the region. This has culminated with the 1996 final peace agree-ment between MNLF and the Philippine government. In 1984, the MoroIslamic Liberation Front (MILF), however, broke off from the MNLFlargely from what is viewed as a disagreement of the leaders towards whatthe goals of the organisation should be. By splitting the organisation, ithas also resulted in many other much smaller actors, some more radicalthan others. For example, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) was established in1991 as an offshoot organisation from the MNLF, whist the BangsamoroIslamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) broke away from the MILF. Althoughthe peace process between the MILF and the Philippines government hasbeen institutionalised due to the signing of the Comprehensive Agree-ment on the Bangsamoro (CAB) and the legislation of the BangsamoroOrganic Law (BOL) the recent episodes of political violence by insur-gent groups in the Southern Philippines, including the Zamboanga siege(2013), Mamasapano incident (2015), and the Marawi crisis (2017), havealso indicated that the peace process is still in a fragile and unstablecondition.


Civilian communities, meanwhile, have been confronted with thepossible eruptions of Islamic State-inspired violence and greater militari-sation due to the recent imposition of martial law. In this sense, thereis no clear-cut answer as to whether Mindanao can be considered as awar zone (taking into consideration the presence of breakaway groupslike the BIFF and ASG), a conflict area (mostly because of the rampantcycles of violence and extra-judicial killings during elections and terroristand organised criminal activities), or a post-conflict society (due to the1996 peace deal with the MNLF and the 2014 CAB and 2018 BOL withthe MILF). Nonetheless, the grassroots rivalries between political clansand landlords have also been a matter of concern for peace activists inthe region. Such conditions produce “negative hybrid peace” in whichliberal norms are challenged, and a repressive status quo is maintained(Richmond 2015: 54).

A major lesson from the Mindanao peace process was the realisationthat the government cannot and should not do it alone. There is a needto consult with civil society actors who are demanding for participa-tion since the peace process impacts the lives of the local stakeholders.After all, the “failed experiment” of the peace deal with the MNLF hasindicated that autonomy and economic growth are not necessarily mutu-ally inclusive. The fall of the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos duringthe 1986 Peoples Power Revolution is often seen as one of the majorfactors which have enabled the growth and development of civil societyin the Philippines. In fact, the role of civil society actors in the country’ssocio-economic and political development has been enshrined within the1987 Philippine Constitution’s Article II (Declaration of Principles andState Policies), Section 23, which states that it is the policy of the state“to encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral organi-sations that promote the welfare of the nation.” This takes into accountas to why civil society participation has been institutionalised as one ofthe fundamental laws of the land. It is not hard to imagine that the samepolitical condition has enabled civil society in Mindanao to engage thegovernment in the peace process.

In addition, the passage of the 1991 Local Government Code (RA37160) has also provided an enabling legal environment for the directparticipation of civil society actors in the local governance. The growth ofthe civil society and the development of the peace process have coincidedwith the trend towards greater democratisation and decentralisation ofpolitical power and economic-decision making process in the Philippines.


These conditions have also opened sectoral representations for women,indigenous people, youth, urban poor, and farmers, among others. InMindanao, there is an expectation that local CSOs should play an activerole in the consultative process of provincial and regional peace andorder councils which also provide the accreditation for them. It goeswithout saying that support for civil society actors has been one of corefeatures of international peacebuilding in Mindanao. Civil society actorsin the region have gained a broad level of support from many interna-tional NGOs and donor agencies. Aside from the development aid fromforeign governments and financial institutions, many local CSOs have alsoworked with international NGOs, including the Catholic Relief Services,Asia Foundation, and International Crisis Group. International organi-sations frequently support local CSOs in the form of technical-logisticalassistance, facilitation services, and capacity-building programmes.

There have also been attempts from international actors to work withlocal civil society groups to create different platforms for reconciliationat the grassroots level. MILF’s reliance on the expertise of internationaland local civil society groups, for example, is evident in the establishmentof the Bangsamoro People’s Consultative Assembly (BPCA), which hasbeen instrumental in providing important inputs and policies regardingthe negotiated autonomy with the Philippine government. In Mindanao,Rood (2005: 21–29) enumerates that the involvements of civil societygroups in peacebuilding efforts are three-fold: (1) dialogue betweencommunities (e.g. Bishops-Ulama Conference in support of bridging thesectarian divide and preventing communal violence in Mindanao); (2)horizontal spaces for peace (e.g. the establishment of ‘peace zones’ inMindanao as a concerted effort between local and international organisa-tions); and (3) vertical involvement in peace policy-making (i.e. the goalof the civil society to influence the peace process through consultativeand collective action efforts. Local CSOs, however, have been prone tothe capture of both national and local elites. In a report from the AsiaFoundation on development assistance in the region, Parks, Colletta andOppenheim (2013: 120) note that:

… patronage and corruption are so deeply entrenched that the well-designed plans and aims of donors rarely result in transformative impacts,and more often than not, actually reinforce traditional political power andpatronage structures. In sum, aid in Mindanao has become yet another


source of contestation among local actors, as well as a self-perpetuatingindustry for donors, government, and NGOs, alike.

Nevertheless, local CSOs have maintained a crucial role in theMindanao peace process given that minority groups (e.g. Moros and non-Muslim ethnic communities) have very restricted powers in the nationalpolitical landscape. Civil society groups have wide-ranging and broadly-defined activities in the region, including peace movements and alliances,peace education and research, relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction,truth commissions and investigative missions, grassroots ceasefire moni-toring, dialogue and consultations, interfaith dialogue, arts and culturefor peace advocacy, and peace journalism (Abubakar 2007). From thisview, the dependence of the MILF peace negotiators, for example, onBPCA’s recommendations suggests that civil society actors have becomesupplementary players in the peace process by pushing for strategiesagainst political violence in the region. Most notably, local and regionalCSO networks (e.g. Mindanao Caucus of Development NGO Networksand Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society) have been instrumentalin terms of fostering ‘transformative relationships’ and creating diagonalplatforms for negotiations. In this regard, an adequate degree of inter-national support opens an opportunity for civil society organisations tostrengthen their capacity in building and maintaining ‘transformative rela-tionships’ as part of the peace process. Kagawa’s (2020) critical analysisof the mid-space actors in the context of the Bangsamoro, for instance,includes the involvement of Ulama leaders, who have not only supportedhumanitarian endeavours in the region, but have also served as a religiousblanket for local and national peacebuilding efforts.

In this sense, the role of the civil society can also be attributed tothat of mid-space actors or gatekeepers (see Chapter 4) who have thecapacity to wield some influence in knowledge formation and possesslocally-grounded legitimacy as agents of hybrid peacebuilding. This isconcomitant to the ability of local actors to have access to differentsources of power, i.e. formal and informal, due to their normative under-standing of the contexts and complexities on the ground. Local andinternational resources, on the one hand, can enable CSOs to playthe role of ‘bridge-builders’ who have the ability to navigate them-selves across different levels of peace engagement. On the other hand,however, locally-based actors can also unintentionally become spoilers


especially when their interests and demands constrain the peace process(see Chapter 5).

Surprisingly, peacebuilding activities have not been evenly spreadwithin the southern part of the Philippines. Many local CSOs havepointed out that international peacebuilding has not been extensivelyentertained in the region if it is not supplemented by developmentaland financial interventions, which target such sectoral needs as educa-tion, livelihood, and healthcare. Some NGOs, for example, have pointedout the challenge of getting people to participate in their programmes,which is why community-based activities in Mindanao have been gearedtowards particular interests (e.g. youth, women, indigenous people, etc.)to narrow down the sets of local grievances that need to be addressed.Peace education, for example, is popular area of work which most localand international CSOs have engaged in because it covers not only educa-tional institutions in Mindanao, but also grassroots communities whichare willing to learn about better inter-faith relationships and ethnic toler-ance. In peace education programmes, local NGOs have usually followedinternationally-accepted frameworks such as the curriculum of Univer-sity for Peace in Costa Rica on intercultural respect, harmony, and activenon-violence (Bacani 2004).

Two points are worth emphasising about the dynamics of civil societyinvolvement in Mindanao. The first is that despite the violent conflictthe (flawed) liberal-democratic system of the Philippines has still providedsome openings for the growth of civil society in Mindanao. Morada andTadem (2006: 429) have noted that “these openings for civil society aremeant to promote not only popular participation but also local account-ability and transparency.” This is quite different from the experiencesof the authoritarian post-conflict countries in Southeast Asia such asCambodia and Timor-Lester where foreign liberal influence in peace-keeping missions was needed to achieve peace. There has also been asignificant level of variation in the activities of civil society actors, whichare not completely captured by “outsiders” such as international devel-opment groups and security analysts. In reality, “conflict dynamics in onecommunity may contrast starkly with conflict in neighbouring communi-ties where, due to a different configuration of political actors, family orclan networks, ethnic cultural groups, security forces, and/or insurgents,local conflict conditions may be very different” (Schuler et al. 2013).

The second point is that the presumed tensions within the hybridityliterature between illiberal-local and liberal-international communities


have not always been clear-cut. This is also perhaps reflected in the lack ofcomprehensive and critical studies about the wider range of peacebuildinginitiatives within the region. In Mindanao, some organisations have drawnfrom discourses and practices from both local and international sources.The presence of these organisations has resulted to a broad range ofprogrammatic concerns which are not only rooted in communities, butare also located within the radars of international actors. Liberal-local rela-tions contribute to the hybridisation of the peace process. Hence, it isimportant to identify the areas of dynamic entanglements between localand international actors (Boege 2018: 117).

Sites of Liberal-Local HybridPeacebuilding in Mindanao

Hybrid peacebuilding encourages the everyday processes of local-international exchange which demands a process of recalibration andre-negotiation in the relationships between the local and internationalactors in the course of peacebuilding. It is therefore productive tothink about hybridity as a continuum in which locally-based organi-sations are able to frame their personal grievances within the widerdiscourses of the international community. In this sense, the specificinterplay of the hybridised relationships between the international andthe local actors produces a space for accommodation and resistance toliberal peace agendas. In Mindanao, as implicated in the above discussion,the success of local CSOs and community leaders are largely depen-dent on the manner they are able to take advantage of “skills that allowthem to manoeuvre within the intricate power relations that are part ofconflict-affected communities” (Espesor 2017: 78).

Three spaces of hybrid peacebuilding engagements in the region,where there have been considerable encounters and entanglementsbetween local and international actors, are people’s diplomacy, indige-nous people’s participation, and women empowerment. The first examplein this section shows the ability of local and international CSOs to createinnovative and non-formal mechanisms to address the shortcomings ofthe formal peace process. It supports the contention that hybrid struc-tures may enable local and international actors to strengthen the potentialof their engagements. The second example, meanwhile, illustrates theways in which local actors are able to utilise international ideas to frametheir grievances. The presence of international treaties and agreements on


indigenous people’s rights, for instance, has provided an opportunity forCSOs to enhance their call for inclusivity in the formal peace process. Asdiscussed in the third example, the goal of empowering women within theformal and informal aspects of the peace process has also been accompa-nied by the hybrid cooperation between local and international actors. Inthese cases, the objective of local and international actors has been theencouragement of non-elite actors to exercise their agency and diversifythe local voices within the peacebuilding process.

People’s Diplomacy

People’s diplomacy has been considered as one of the key innovations ofthe civil society in achieving their role as a third party in the Mindanaopeace process. This was pioneered by the Initiative for InternationalDialogue (IID) which introduced the idea of ‘South-to-South Solidar-ity’ as a new framework for peacebuilding and international developmentintervention. As a Mindanao-based international NGO, IID was foundedin 1988 with the goal of promoting human security, democratisation, andpeople-to-people solidarity. Aside from their work in Mindanao, IID hasalso been very active in other parts of Southeast Asia, including Myanmar,Southern Thailand, West Papua, and Timor-Leste. One of the achieve-ments of IID was the formation of the Mindanao Peoples Caucus (MPC)which has served as a platform for conflict-affected grassroots commu-nities and organisations in the region. Several NGOs have supportedthis platform, including the Community and Family Services Interna-tional (CFSI), Salaam-Mindanao, and Habitat for Humanity, rangingfrom rehabilitation and livelihood projects for displaced communities topsycho-social interventions and relief operations for victims of trauma.

In 2001, IID provided technical assistance to MPC for the formationof Bantay Ceasefire (Ceasefire Watch), a grassroots and community-basedceasefire-monitoring network aimed at connecting the Philippine govern-ment’s top-down strategies with the civil society’s bottom-up efforts inMindanao. This civil society-led initiative provided an opening for localorganisations to independently monitor and verify ceasefire violations withinternational organisations. It can be considered as one of the first “cit-izen security” mechanisms and “hybrid structures” (i.e. local-internationalcivil society information exchange) within the evolving peace infrastruc-tures of the Mindanao peace process. In an online interview with the


Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (2019), IID’sregional coordinator Marc Batac has noted that:

IID’s Moro and Mindanao partners sought the assistance of civil societyand IID in helping to galvanize a response and projection of theirvoices and perspectives into the entire peace process. IID then proceededto establish platforms and networks to concretize this accompaniment,forming the Mindanao Peoples Caucus (MPC)—a Tri-people (Moro,settlers and Indigenous peoples) network that engaged the peace process.

In essence, the success of Bantay Ceasefire provided a venue for thePhilippine government and MILF to recognise the need for the expan-sion of a civilian-led and third-party mechanism, which targeted the activeparticipation of Mindanao-based and foreign civilian monitors (Iglesias2013: 4). In addition, Bantay Ceasefire also supported the IndependentFact-Finding Committee (IFFC) under the Notre Dame University PeaceEducation Centre, the Maguindanao Professional Employees’ Associa-tion, and Cotabato City Media Multipurpose Cooperative. IID assistedthis movement by involving groups from the Global South, especiallyfrom the member-states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN). In effect, this initiative has provided an opportunity forconflict-affected communities in the region to share their experiencesand best practices in resolving the security challenges facing them. Thishas also proven that local CSOs in Mindanao are capable of mobil-ising support from organisations at the national and international levels.Eventually, Bantay Ceasefire resulted to a broad consortium of peaceorganisations in the country dubbed as Mindanao Peace Weavers. Therehave also been attempts from the part of the Philippine governmentto include an International Monitoring Team (IMT) within the formalceasefire monitoring structure. As discussed in Chapter 8, Japan, alongwith some member-countries of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation(OIC), was part of this team. The official monitoring system, however,was constrained by the lack of independence and influence of the IMTand Local Monitoring Teams (LMTs) at the grassroots level. These gapshave been addressed by civil society-led initiatives such as Bantay Ceasefire(Colleta 2006: 27).

The strong networks between local and international CSOs have there-fore provided an opening for the Bantay Ceasefire to promote people’sdiplomacy based on the concepts of good governance, peace monitoring,


and citizen participation. In this case, there is blurred notion of theinternational and the local given that the CSOs in this initiative cannotbe easily characterised using liberal peace agendas. For the most part,the formation of this civil society initiative was a hybrid process, whichgave priority not only to the participation of international actors, butalso to the wishes of the local actors. It also raises the need to under-score the role of the civil society, for example, in terms of their influenceduring the critical junctures of the peace negotiations. Nevertheless, itis important to highlight that broad-based civil society coalitions areimportant in promoting non-violent mechanisms and mobilising popularsupport towards the peace process. In this case, the diverse involve-ment of and cooperation between the international and local actorsin the peace process has been considered as beneficial because of theways in which they have enhanced the legitimacy and the credibility oftheir political claims. From this perspective, it can be surmised that thiscooperative mechanism has opened a window of opportunity for localand international CSOs to create spaces of cooperation (as shown inthis book’s conceptualisation of mid-space actors). After all, the hori-zontal and vertical functions of the civil society actors have providedthem with foundations for their diagonal functions as bridge-builders andgatekeepers.

Indigenous People’s Participation

In Mindanao, civil society groups have generally focused on three broadcategories relevant to the rights of the indigenous peoples and minoritieswhich are embodied in the international legal system: rights to protec-tion, empowerment, and preservation of identity. The rights pertainingto protection and empowerment are perhaps the more controversial cate-gories given that the status of indigenous peoples and minorities hasalways been a matter of political debate. There has been an expectation forthe Philippine government to provide indigenous peoples in the regionwith special protections based on the assumption that such minoritygroups have been subjected to protracted historical, socio-political, andeconomic injustices within the purview of colonisation and forced dispos-session of lands, territories, and resources. From this perspective, localand international CSOs, for example, have pointed out that the peaceprocess has not fully enshrined the equitable participation and protectionof indigenous peoples and non-Muslims.


More concretely, there have been different proposals to address thisproblem. One of the most prominent solutions has emanated from theinclusion and development of the concept of ‘ancestral domain’ as partof the power-sharing mechanisms for the proposed Bangsamoro polit-ical entity. The formulation of the ancestral domain started during theTripoli Agreement of 2001, although this concept came into publicconsciousness as a result of the signing of the 2007 Memorandum ofAgreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD), which was aimed at addingmore villages to the autonomous region in the southern Philippines. Theagreement, however, was scrapped after the Philippine Supreme Courtdeclared it unconstitutional. CSOs supported the ancestral domain aspectof the peace process not only because it could foster an enabling legalenvironment for the realisation of one of the important aspects of the1997 Philippine Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), but also becauseof the possible institutionalisation of the land rights of the indigenouspeoples and non-Muslims within the Bangsamoro peace process. Becausethey were not included in the official peace process between the govern-ment and MILF, indigenous peoples have formed a major part of themembership of the civil society networks in Mindanao.

The efforts of Mindanao-based civil society coalition movements forindigenous people’s security of tenure in ancestral domain coincided withthe approval of the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indige-nous Peoples (UNDRIP). The Institute for Autonomy and Governance(IAG), for example, has contributed in helping indigenous movementleaders deepen their understanding of how existing legal regime promotesindigenous rights. Eventually, the ancestral domain has been included asBOL’s core feature. The global recognition of the indigenous rights mayhave helped create the openness of the Philippine government to enter-tain the term of ancestral domain. The proposed autonomous entity ofBangsamoro attempts to address the needs of the indigenous peoples inthe region, including their freedom of choice and the protection of theirrights. Rood (2014), as part of the Asia Foundation’s involvement as apeace mediator, raises challenges for the indigenous rights, including therecognition of their ancestral domains:

Indigenous people’s organisations and their allies, though, point out thatwhat is missing from this is a recognition of their ancestral domains(plural). Immediately, lobbying sprang up both in the media and inCongress, and has found an echo among some members of the legislature


… The MILF has been firm on this matter, regarding those who pressthe case for recognition of plural ancestral domains as “spoilers” who arediluting the meaning of the Bangsamoro people and the Moro’s ancestraldomain.

Whilst international donors have been instrumental in supporting thefinancial needs of local NGOs some community leaders have notedthat their intervention has not always been developed based on carefulplanning. Nonetheless, there is an expectation from these ‘outsiders’to be integrated and consulted for the areas and types of assistancethat local NGOs need. There have also been unwritten preferencesfrom international donors to mainly engage with large CSO coalitionsinstead of working with smaller organisations. Rural-based organisations,for example, have been excluded in internationally-organised trainings.The unequal level of resources among local NGOs can additionally beconnected to the inability of some grassroots actors to grasp the complexmonitoring systems and concepts which are being brought in by inter-national donors. In some cases, international development projects failbecause of the lack of coordination between the international donorsand local partners. In the case of conflict management mechanisms, localindigenous CSOs also lament that international donors usually ask themto introduce new liberal-based systems of governance even though thenorms and practices at the grassroots level are different. Such practicesneither set out with conventional values of liberal peacebuilding, andproduces tension with the local actors. Richmond (2012: 4) argues thatthere are dilemmas produced by the encounters between liberal-formalinstitutions and illiberal-informal actors:

From the perspective of the international actor agency revolves aroundhow to use its capacity to legitimately induce a top-down liberal peace,so addressing the local causes of conflict. From the perspective of its localsubjects agency revolves around how to both learn from peacebuilding orstatebuilding in order to address root causes, and how to merge interna-tional support or prescriptions with local political frameworks necessary forlocalized autonomy and identity. However, many of those advocating thisare, in fact, quite sympathetic to the peace process and have been oper-ating for years under a “tri-people” framework trying to promote peaceand development in Mindanao by bringing together Muslims, Lumads, and“settlers” (Christians whose family origins are from outside Mindanao).


Nevertheless, peace negotiators have also learned that the need to gaininput from civil society is not only a local but also a global trend inthe light of the inclusion of the rights of the minorities and indigenouspeoples in the proposed Bangsamoro autonomous region. Internationalorganisations like the UN Development Programme (UNDP), mean-while, have offered technical assistance and funding to advocate for theparticipation of indigenous peoples. It goes without saying that indige-nous people’s organisations also pushed for the expansion of their rights atevery step of the way. The support of international actors has been instru-mental in enhancing the capacity of local groups to undertake broaderengagements in the form of policy consultations. A major success whichlocal actors have viewed in their peace engagements is the improvedawareness of the government about the legitimacy of the core grievancesof the minorities in Mindanao and the necessity to address the differenthistorical injustices they have encountered.

Women Empowerment

Gender inequality has emerged as one of the leading issues within thehybrid peacebuilding literature (see Grenfell 2018; George 2018). Inthe issue of the Mindanao peace process, the international communityhas often lauded the presence of the women in the negotiating team ofthe Philippines. In this regard, there have been numerous provisions toadvance women’s rights and participation in the Bangsamoro autonomousregion. At first glance, it can be said the gender provisions of the BOLhave been heavily influenced by the commitment of the Philippines tosuch international legal instruments as the UN Security Council resolu-tion 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. After the BOL’s passage, theUN Women, for example, commented that:

These provisions create a positive environment for women’s participationand gender-responsive governance. However, the advocacy and supportfrom communities, NGOs and other actors—and the buy-in and supportfrom government officials—will be vital to guarantee women’s rights andgender equality. Women’s participation in the new government is criticalto meeting women’s needs in laws and policies. These should be craftedin an inclusive process with women, youth and indigenous peoples. Theymust also consider the conflict, including threats of violent extremism, thathas constantly challenged the region.


Such a statement, however, indicates that women empowerment withinthe peace process has not only been achieved through the politicalopportunity structures embedded with global gendered norms, but alsothrough the efforts of the local actors. The government’s previous leadnegotiator Professor Miriam Coronel-Ferrer, for instance, has noted thatthe civil society groups in the Philippines have been overwhelminglycomprised of women (Santiago 2015: 13). In particular, the internationalengagements of Mindanao-based CSOs have ranged from organisingconsultative meetings and capacity-building programmes to writing reso-lutions and the policy agendas of women for the proposed autonomousregion of Bangsamoro. In this sense, women’s civil society groups can betreated as hybrid spaces due to the high level of engagements that theyhave with international organisations and agendas. They can be consid-ered as local in that the main goals of these organisations are focused onthe development of Bangsamoro, but at the same time they can be seenas international because of their engagements with external actors.

The gendered hybrid spaces, however, can also be viewed outside theboundaries of the formal peace process. In particular, women’s NGOshave played an extremely important role in the different areas of localpeacebuilding such as peace monitoring, conflict mediation and resolu-tion, and gender-based planning. Some women leaders have also formedpeace platforms and networks which have partnered with international aiddonors (e.g. Bangsamoro Women Solidarity Forum, Mindanao HumanRights Action Network, and the Kadtabanga Foundation). These women-led platforms have been active in informal mechanisms such as BantayCeasefire in which they have been applauded for their roles in highlightingthe rights and concerns of women in times of conflict (Arnado 2012:13). In Mindanao, it is worth noting that women’s engagement in thepeacebuilding activities are also embedded within hybridised power struc-tures which are composed of formal players such as the local and nationalgovernment agencies and such informal actors as clans and ethnic groups.Some women leaders have also been involved in preserving their tradi-tional approaches through clan organising as a form of conflict resolution.Hall and Hoare (2015: 107) note that women have also participated inthe implementation and preservation of hybridised conflict managementmechanisms for clan-based conflicts (e.g. rido):

Rido does not generally target women and children, but when violenceerupts between clans, Muslim women act as pacifiers and documenters…


Women NGO representatives working on security and peacebuilding arecognisant of the serious challenges faced by IDP women and rido-burdened Muslim women. Nonetheless, they have not been able to mapthese out in the formal peace process in terms of specific mechanisms orprogrammatic commitments by the future Bangsamoro Government.

In some cases, local CSOs have also used international spaces to amplifytheir agendas. The Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society, for example,has often partnered with the UN Women to diversify their understandingof gender issues (Hall and Hoare 2015). In Mindanao, these empiricalexamples show that there is an intersection between local NGOs andtheir foreign donors. Although the Philippines has made advancementsin terms of the formal participation of women in politics and the peaceprocess, local CSOs can be considered as hybrid spaces where genderissues have flourished. These spaces have allowed women to exercisetheir agency whist navigating the different tools and mechanisms avail-able to them at the local and international levels. It can also be surmisedthat international engagements towards women empowerment for theMindanao peace process have opened spaces for transformative form oflocal involvement.

In this regard, the participation of women in peacebuilding activi-ties has emancipatory elements as evidenced by the local agencies of thecivil society groups through localised and internationalised approachesto peacebuilding. However, this also leaves an important question ofwhether hybridised contexts have provided an opening for the represen-tation of women on the ground. It also raises similar questions on theability of minorities and vulnerable populations to enhance their participa-tion given that these concerns also offer an opportunity to operationalizehybrid peacebuilding. Such key issues warrant further investigation fromthe purview of hybrid peacebuilding as they directly affect the dynamicsof inclusion and exclusion in peace processes.

Conclusion

The sites of liberal-local hybridity discussed in this chapter imply the needto contextualise the spaces of interaction between dichotomised categoriesin peacebuilding. The experiences of civil society groups in Mindanaoillustrate the ways in which local and international actors operate withinhybridised environments. The interactions between these “new binaries”


have been characterised by resistance and accommodation. From the viewof the local actors, international donors, for example, can be consid-ered as a double-edged sword. Whilst international actors can enhancethe capacity of local CSOs, the former’s lack of engagement with thepolitical realities on the ground can also create tensions between them.International actors, meanwhile, is expected to have a dynamic relation-ship with local actors beyond financial support. As such, the encountersbetween local and international actors must be analysed in terms of agen-cies, norms, and spaces. In the case of Mindanao, it is also important toanalyse hybridity by taking into consideration not only the institutions,but also the practices and the competitive and cooperative relationshipsamongst the actors across multiple levels of interaction. Encounters oflocal and international organisations particularly raise important issuesabout the tendency of post-liberal approaches to recognise some degreesof emancipation with the support of international agents.

In the hybrid peacebuilding literature, the international-local interfaceof the actors has typically been seen as a unidirectional mechanism inwhich the international affects the local. For future research, it wouldbe worth examining the ways in which local actors can contribute inthe expansion of international peacebuilding agendas. Of course, thisis deeply connected to the challenges confronting the institutionalisa-tion of civil society participation in peace processes. Theoretically, oneof the remaining constraints facing the hybrid peacebuilding approach isto develop a practical tool to consider how top-down approaches (i.e.influence of international declarations on national peace processes) canamalgamate with the bottom-up agendas of CSOs to impinge not onlyon the peace process, but also on policy outcomes such as human rights.

As mentioned, one of the main criticisms about hybrid peacebuildinghas been about the use of dichotomies. The process of hybridisation, ofcourse, could not and should not be merely confined within the neatcategories of the international and local actors. Mac Ginty (2011: 46),nevertheless, underscores that whist hybrid peacebuilding tends to bifur-cate between the spheres of ‘local’ and ‘international’ “it does seem thatmany international peace-support actors are more comfortable thinkingabout and exercising material forms of power, while local communi-ties in some settings tend to think about power in terms of legitimacyand moral standing.” This chapter does not intend to suggest the prob-lematic approval of situating the self-representations of actors. Instead,it contributes to the existing knowledge on hybrid peacebuilding by


citing concrete examples based on the perceived level of entanglementsbetween local and international actors. The varying levels of success ofcivil society actors in these examples, however, show that hybridisedcontexts can somewhat produce different outcomes. This entails hybridi-sation is inherent in the dynamics of conflict that may also lead tothe bourgeoning of the everyday local spaces whereby international andtransnational relations of power may co-constitute one another.

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CHAPTER 7

Rise of China’s Developmental Peace:Prospects for AsianHybrid Peacebuilding

KwokChung Wong and Fujian Li

Introduction

The previous chapters of this book have focused on exploring thechanging environments of peacebuilding using hybrid peacebuildingtheory. As a new player in the area of peacebuilding, and primarilyfocusing on Asia, the rise of China’s peacebuilding is open to a greatdeal of debate. While China has been an extensive contributor to UnitedNations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO), the theory and practicesof Chinese peacebuilding have never been made clear by the Chinesegovernment. This chapter aims to identify the traits of Chinese peace-building based on its model of developmental peace and on evidence inChinese practices on the ground. By so doing, it attempts to determine

K. Wong (B)Graduate School of International Culture and CommunicationStudies, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japane-mail: [email protected]

F. LiInstitute of Asian Studies, China Foreign Affairs University, Beijing, Chinae-mail: [email protected]


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128 K. WONG AND F. LI

whether China’s peacebuilding model can be categorized as a form ofhybrid peacebuilding.

An important concept to consider is that of the mid-space actorsdiscussed in Chapter 4. These mid-space actors can help to bridge thegap between the top or national level of peacebuilding undertaken amongelites and the bottom or grassroots level of peacebuilding undertakenby locals because peacebuilders use the mid-space as ‘transit zones’ inwhich peacebuilders of all levels can interact with each other (Uesugiand Kagawa 2020). Sometimes mid-space actors can function as ‘gate-keepers’ that reach across the different cleavages of society in the vertical,horizontal and diagonal gaps because these actors perform functions thatcannot be effected by outsiders. However, while mid-space actors have thepotential to become bridge-builders, they can also become peace-spoilers(Uesugi 2020), where they may impede a peace process or deny interna-tional access to their local community. It is important to understand thatappearing to be a peace-spoiler does not necessarily mean that these actorsaim to spoil the peace process, rather it can simply mean that they wantto readjust their position or bring in new actors to increase the numberof stakeholders that can strengthen the peace process, as in the case ofBangsamoro in the southern Philippines (Kagawa 2020). It is particu-larly important to consider the concepts of mid-space actors and adaptivepeacebuilding that were introduced in Chapter 3 because China’s style ofpeacebuilding is beginning to show the traits of these existing concepts.Adaptive peacebuilding is a process through which both peacebuildersand local communities come together to learn the means of creatingsustained peace (de Coning 2018). Thus, adaptive peacebuilding operatesaccording to the principle that peacebuilders should not lock themselvesinto a unified, standardised approach to peacebuilding, but should tryto adapt to the unique local situation of each society in need. At times,the assumption of using a single unified approach, such as internationalpeacebuilding as a tool to ‘fix’ conflict-affected societies can be a harmfulmentality. In fact, sustainable peace is only likely if complex social systemsfix themselves (Luhmann 1990).

This chapter aims to examine China’s developmental peace and askswhether it can be recognised as a variation of hybrid or adaptive peace-building. The chapter also investigates whether China should continueits current approach in the future by referring to evidence provided byChinese engagement with the post-conflict societies of Myanmar andAfghanistan/Pakistan. Given that a great deal of the extensive scholarship

7 RISE OF CHINA’S DEVELOPMENTAL PEACE … 129

on peacebuilding is written from a Western perspective, it is imperativeto consider the Chinese perspectives and mindset towards peacebuildingbefore dismissing the Chinese style of peacebuilding as illiberal or lackinghuman rights. To clarify the impact that the rise of China’s developmentalpeace has on the environment of international peacebuilding, this chapterfirst examines the traits and background of developmental peace, whichis followed by an analysis of how the Chinese approach is related toexisting approaches of hybrid and adaptive peacebuilding. Case studiesare then presented to provide evidence of Chinese developmental peacein practice in countries suffering from conflict, such as Myanmar andAfghanistan/Pakistan.

Traits of Developmental Peaceas Chinese Peacebuilding

This section explains the origins of China’s concept of developmentalpeace and how China’s previous experiences in using developmentalpeace at home led to shaping this concept into a model of economicdevelopment-facilitated peacebuilding. There are three main reasons forChina pursuing an alternative model of developmental peace to existingliberal models: (1) its own experiences of being a developing, commu-nist/socialist country; (2) its non-intervention foreign policy; and (3) itsdesire to develop peace abroad to compensate for its lack of peacebuildingpolicy at home.

World’s Largest Developing Country

China is both one of the largest economies in the world and the world’slargest developing country. It not only has the largest economy in Asia,but also has the incentive to contribute to the stability of the region toensure the realisation of President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative(BRI) in the hope that this initiative will contribute to the economicgrowth of China and partners in Asia and Africa. It is important to notethat China is an Asian country that has taken a different path from otherAsian countries (e.g. Japan) in its modernization and has not adoptedliberal democracy by Western standards. This means that it is highlyunlikely that China would follow what the West has been doing in rela-tion to liberal peacebuilding. Some may also see China as one of the fewremaining communist/socialist countries in the world. For example, in


2010, the then Vice President Xi Jinping wrote a paper advocating theimportance of studying Marxism with Chinese characteristics and saidthat its core agenda is scientific development and that the contradictionsof Western capitalism would eventually lead to regression (Xi 2010). It isundeniable that Chairman Mao Zedong’s China was communist, that itactively exported revolution and that it backed communist regimes over-seas, such as Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge (Wang 2018). However, thereis little evidence of exporting revolution being shown by the Chinesegovernment after the nation’s reform and opening in the late 1970s.

Given that China is also a new player in international peacebuilding,where existing actors such as the United States (US) and Japan havealready made clear achievements, to be a major contributor to such peace-building, it cannot simply replicate processes that previous actors havealready implemented, and thus must take a different approach to providetangible evidence that it is an active and responsible member of interna-tional society, contributing to peace. Therefore, China may take a socialistapproach towards issues such as peacebuilding; however, in reality, whenthe Chinese government refers to China a ‘socialist state’, it uses thisterm more as part of a narrative directed towards its domestic audience.On the international stage, China’s approach to peacebuilding is basedon non-intervention, respect of the host country’s sovereignty, and mostimportantly, as will be seen in the following section, provision of aidwithout strings attached.

Further, China’s attempt to seek an alternative style of peacebuildingdoes not mean that desires to go against the West. In fact, it is moreinterested in cooperating with established norms than fighting with them.However, as Johnston (2003) states, China does not want to be simplya blind follower of the US order, even if it has been the biggest bene-ficiary of that order. There are two possible reasons for this: the first isnational pride and the second, and arguably more important reason, isthat China does not always follow rules that were made when China wasmostly absent from international affairs (i.e. before 1978) (Glosserman2020). Feigenbaum (2018) states that China prefers existing ‘forms’ butnot always ‘norms’. That is, China agrees that concepts such as peace-building are important; however, it does not prefer the norm of liberalpeacebuilding established by Western actors when China was not partic-ipating in international geopolitics during its isolationism in the 60s and70s. Unlike Johnston (2003), Feigenbaum (2018) considers China a


revisionist power (ibid.), but neither of them refer to China as a ‘revo-lutionary’ power. China provides mainly supplemental institutions to theexisting global institutions. For example, the Asian Infrastructure Invest-ment Bank adds to the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank;the BRI to the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation and theShanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO); and developmental peace toliberal peacebuilding. China does not intend to reject the existing formsbut it operates under different norms.

Non-intervention and Respect for Sovereignty

While China itself is the largest developing country in the world, itaims to support other developing countries by using the methods itemployed to lift itself out of poverty. China must provide this support ina way that respects the sovereignty of the host country, following China’snon-intervention principle. This principle has guided China’s foreignpolicy ever since it was first established in the Bandung Conference in1955 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MOFA] of the People’s Republicof China 2014) under the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, andwas reemphasised in the s Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Tech-nical Assistance to Other Countries during Premier Zhou Enlai’s tourto Africa in 1964 (Zhou 1964). However, it is important to note thatnon-intervention does not mean indifference, just as abstaining from aparticular United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution does notnecessarily mean being against the resolution. China is not against inter-ventionism, but it must be with the host country’s consent or under themandate of the UN Security Council. Ruan (2012), a scholar at the ChinaInstitute of International Studies, states that China is against the style ofmilitary interventionism in which the West has shown. For example, theWest’s regime-change intervention in Libya ostensibly provided humani-tarian aid and acted on the responsibility to protect (R2P), and its creationof highly complicated situations and regional strife in Afghanistan andIraq. Ruan (2012) adds that the world needs to pay more attention tonew players such as China entering the field of international peace, andspecifically to become familiar with China as a new actor in internationalpeacebuilding. China’s official position in peace-related activities abroadcan be summarised with Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s remarks that Chinawill continue to uphold the peaceful, legitimate and constructive nature


of its style of conflict resolution with Chinese characteristics (Xinhua2018b).

‘Developmental Peace’ as Chinese Hybrid Peacebuilding

The concept of developmental peace originated from a small group ofscholars in China. One of these notable scholars is He Yin (2019b),who states that developmental peace is a significant departure fromliberal peace because it is based on China’s peaceful rise and interna-tional aid practices, adding that developmental peace aims to achievepolitical stability that is supported by strong institutions and economicdevelopment. Abb (2018) adds that developmental peace is based onChina’s own experience of strong state-led development and overseeingof political reforms and on China’s principle of maintaining the stability ofgoverning institutions and providing foreign aid with no political stringsattached. However, Johnston (2003) notes that China is neither a blindfollower nor a radical revisionist of current norms, so it is inaccurate toconsider that developmental peace aims to develop into a new normor become the antithesis of existing models of peacebuilding such asliberal peacebuilding. Rather, developmental peace mainly functions asan alternative Chinese approach to peacebuilding, particularly consid-ering that the premise that development can facilitate lasting peace isshared by major international and Asian institutions such as the Interna-tional Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the Japan InternationalCooperation Agency (JICA). The main difference with China’s devel-opmental peace and others is that China aims to preserve the standingpolitical parties in the host countries, whereas liberal peacebuilding aimsto create democracy in the post-conflict society through the expansion ofliberal institutions. International organisations such as the IMF and theWorld Bank lean more towards the liberal model in holding that develop-ment will eventually lead to democratisation, as per modernisation theory(Limpach and Michaelowa 2010).

China needs to take advantage of its materialistic power and formulatean approach that will distinguish its style of peacebuilding from that ofexisting actors such as Japan. At the same time, it needs to uphold thenon-intervention principle that forms the core of Chinese foreign policy.Numerous times in the past, the Chinese government has expressed itsinterest in expanding its role in international peacebuilding. For example,President Xi Jinping’s New Year’s Speech of 2020 highlighted the many


domestic achievements of China, but also emphasised the importance ofits BRI and of building a shared community for all humanity (Xi 2020).However, despite the positive signs of China aiming to adopt a greaterrole in international peacebuilding, it does not have any official doctrinesor policies at home which constitute as a pillar of a ‘Chinese model’ ofpeacebuilding. Butler and Wheeler (2012) state that despite its active rolein UNPKO, China has yet to play a significant role in peacebuilding.However, this lack of official statement is exactly what China needs: nota standardised template to implement in each conflict area, but a flex-ible and adaptive peacekeeping policy based on China’s core values ofdevelopment-led peace and non-intervention.

While it may appear contradictory to connect developmental peace(which would be likely to lead China to engage in top-down government-to-government approaches of peacebuilding) with hybrid peacebuilding(which requires a bottom–up grassroots approach), the superficial discon-nect between China’s developmental peace and style of liberal peace-keeping have been rapidly changing as China engages with more complexAsian conflicts. In fact, in practice, China’s developmental peace hasbeen adopting a similar eclectic approach to the approach adopted byhybrid and adaptive peacebuilding. As stated in the Encyclopaedia Britan-nica (2017), eclecticism is a philosophical idea of practices that choosedoctrines from a wide variety of schools of thought but do not completelyadopt the parent system. When considering the US style of peacebuildingthat is considered to operate according to neoliberal values, Matyok et al.(2011: 127) draw from the work of Galtung to argue that actors suchas the US should use eclectic development to expand capitalist ideologiesthat can include both socialist and African local structures, so that it ispossible to be considerate of local practices even if they do not meet thestandards of liberal peace. Liberal peacebuilding models have previouslybeen criticised for being overly top-down and institutionalised (Mac Gintyand Sanghera 2012). However, it is important to remember that non-intervention remains at the core of Chinese foreign policy despite that factthat at times, China try to enshrine local ownership when putting morefocus on local issues. Given that developmental peace does not have astandardised approach, China is allowed to take an eclectic approach withthe different types of conflict in Asia, which mean that developmentalpeace shares some traits of adaptive peacebuilding because both China’sdevelopmental peace and adaptive peacebuilding are process-orientedpragmatic approaches (de Coning 2018).


As stated, non-intervention remains at the core of Chinese foreignpolicy and thus, when China is engaging in international peacebuilding,the host country’s sovereignty is respected through China’s develop-mental peace. This approach is useful when trying to build trust withthe host government. For example, China’s mediation between Sudanand South Sudan enjoyed support from both sides, despite Beijing’s poorrelationship with Juba resulting from the fact that China did not forceoutcomes but mainly set the stage for the conflicting parties to negotiate(ICG 2017). In addition, the RAND Corporation’s research on China’sforeign aid reveals that among the three types of foreign aid (i.e. grants,interest-free loans and concessional loans), China prefers to give conces-sional loans, while the US mostly provides grants (Wolf et al. 2013).China’s preference for giving aid is vulnerable to criticism. For example,US Vice President Mike Pence made critical remarks against China, refer-ring to its ‘debt diplomacy’ in Sri Lanka (The Hudson Institute 2018).The West does not consider China a democracy, so traditional donorssuch as the US sometimes become sceptical of Chinese practices abroad.In fact, China is similar to Japan in relation to providing foreign aid.In addition, accusing China of engaging in debt diplomacy is simplisticbecause China has forgiven significant debts of its partners such as Cubaand Cambodia (Rapoza 2019). As stated, this is similar to Japan, who in2012 forgave US$3.72 billion worth of debt for Myanmar and restartedloans (Reuters 2012).

The feature that most differentiates developmental peace from existingmodels of peacebuilding is its ‘no political strings attached’ policy. Alltypes of government can receive Chinese aid, so long as the recipientgovernment respects the One China Policy by not recognising Taiwan.For China, regardless of the recipient’s type of government, all coun-tries should enjoy equal rights and opportunities for development. Thisalso connects to the concept that is introduced later in this chapter,whereby China focuses on the right to development as a basic humanright. Other Asian countries such as Japan displays a similar style. Forexample, in 2018, Japan was criticised by the West for continuing toprovide developmental aid to Cambodia despite Prime Minister HunSen’s move towards authoritarianism, which discouraged most Westernactors from engaging with Cambodia (Kasai and Adams 2018). Given thatChina is not a member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operationand Development (OECD), it has even fewer restrictions on the type ofrecipient government to which it can provide aid, which allows China


more flexibility in how it supports the development of other developingcountries. As a new player in international peacebuilding, China must usethis flexibility to its advantage to engage with countries such as Myanmar,Pakistan and Afghanistan, with whom Western countries may have diffi-culty directly engaging. To some extent, this can be considered a unique‘niche’ for peacebuilding of non-Western countries such as China andJapan.

Thus, China’s developmental peace is based on its own experience asthe largest developing country in the world that does not pursue theliberal model of peacebuilding. Instead, China adopts a more process-oriented pragmatic approach to peacebuilding, maintaining the firm beliefthat all countries, regardless of their government type, should enjoy thebenefits of economic development, and that such development will facil-itate lasting peace in conflict-affected societies. China is not a memberof the OECD and is less constrained by existing international institutionsin relation to providing foreign aid to developing countries. However,given that it is a new player in the field of peacebuilding, China still hasmany weaknesses compared with experienced players such as Japan. Later,this chapter discusses that China does not have the necessary nongovern-ment organisations (NGOs) to replicate the Japanese model, and thishas resulted in hindering the ability of the Chinese to deliver effectivedevelopment aid directly aimed at grassroots operations. The followingtwo case studies examine the application of China’s developmental peacein the post-conflict societies of Myanmar and Afghanistan to provideunderstanding of developmental peace in practice.

Case Studies

The following two case studies of Myanmar and Afghanistan/Pakistanexplore the practice of developmental peace in post-conflict societies.Strictly speaking, both Myanmar and Afghanistan (with some parts ofPakistan) have ongoing conflicts that require careful attention from inter-national society. The developmental peace conducted in these countrieshas induced a shift in the Chinese approach from non-intervention towhat Lin (2019) refers to as ‘constructive intervention’. The followingcase studies provide understanding of Chinese peacebuilding on theground in conflict-affected societies to provide evidence that China’sdevelopmental peace resembles existing hybrid peacebuilding models.


The case studies identify the unique Chinese characteristics of develop-mental peace as well as its shortcomings.

Myanmar

BackgroundChina shares a border with Myanmar. As neighbours, Sino–Burmeseofficial relations began in 1950, shortly after the establishment of thePeople’s Republic of China. China and Myanmar often call each other‘paukphaw’, which translates to ‘sibling’ or ‘intimate’, demonstrating thatthe two countries have enjoyed close relations ever since their diplo-matic relations were established (Geng 2006). China’s engagement withMyanmar is also based on the Sino-Burmese Joint Declaration (signed29 June 1954), which emphasised that China and Myanmar’s relationsshould be based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (ibid.).That is, China approached Myanmar with a policy of non-intervention.However, China’s non-intervention approach to Myanmar encountereddifficulties when constant ethnic fighting between Myanmar’s armedethnic groups and the Tatmadaw (Myanmar military) began spilling overthe Chinese border, killing Chinese civilians and damaging Chinese prop-erty. In March 2015, four Chinese citizens were reported by the Chinesestate media to have been killed in a misjudged bombing by the Myanmarair force, and two months later, another mistake killed five more citizensand injured more (Panda 2015; Tiezzi 2015). In addition to fightingspilling over into China, there has been a surge of refugees crossing theChina-Myanmar border, which compelled China to take more robustactions to address the problem of the ethnic conflict in Myanmar.

A turning point for Sino-Burmese relations was when Aung San SuuKyi became the state counsellor of Myanmar in 2016, ruling through acivilian government alongside Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, who hasbeen Myanmar’s commander-in-chief since 2011. At that time in 2016,the Chinese government considered how Aung San Suu Kyi becomingstate counsellor would change the political situation in Myanmar andhow China should react to the shift in Myanmar’s new political envi-ronment. Zhang (2020) claims that with the rise of Aung San Suu Kyi,Myanmar became a diarchy, but the same problems (e.g. ethnic tensionsand economic underdevelopment outside the capital) remained despitefinally having a civilian-led government, alongside the military govern-ment of Myanmar. He adds that the eight occasions on which President Xi


Jinping met with Aung San Suu Kyi and the four times he met with MinAung Hlaing were mainly about addressing ethnic tensions in Myanmar(ibid.). This demonstrates that China recognises that the crux of Myan-mar’s conflicts is centred on the various ethnic groups that have been inconflict with the Tatmadaw, and that if China is to realise its geopolit-ical, strategic and economic incentives in the BRI, it cannot remain a sideplayer in Myanmar, adhering to its principles of non-intervention, butwould have to directly engage in Myanmar’s internal conflict.

While most Western media outlets have focused their attention on thehumanitarian crisis with the Rohingyas in Rakhine State, other ethnicminorities, such as the Wa and Kachin minorities, have also been engagedin armed conflict with the Myanmar government. Therefore, the situationin Myanmar requires a targeted approach that needs to adapt to the localsituation of the many ethnic groups.

Developmental Peace in the Mid-SpaceWhen considering locating mid-space actors in the ethnic conflicts ofMyanmar, China recognises that ethnic tensions are at the heart of mostconflicts in Myanmar. Thus, the armed militia of these ethnic groups, suchas the United Wa State Army (UWSA), are gatekeepers in the mid-spacein Myanmar, and China often must go through these players to engagedirectly with the grassroots groups. However, the importance of China’sclose relations with and potential leverage over the Tatmadaw cannot beunderstated because China is one of the few international actors thathave the potential to mediate ethnic conflicts in Myanmar. Sun (2019)claims that over the six years of Chinese mediation in Myanmar, Chinacame to the conclusion that the distrust between the Myanmar govern-ment and the country’s ethnic groups was too great for any negotiationsrelated to power sharing to occur or to have any positive effect, and top–down negotiations provided little incentive for locals to support the peaceprocess.

Thus, China has sought to transform the relations between theTatmadaw and the armed ethnic groups through economic develop-ment and to reduce the incentives for fighting. China considers thatthrough this approach, the Tatmadaw will be forced to realise that theycan no longer defeat armed ethnic militias permanently, thus allowingethnic groups to be beneficiaries of economic development, which willincrease the resilience of these groups to conflict caused by the scarcity ofresources. China’s developmental peace supports this process by bringing


Myanmar into the BRI megaproject, for example, through the construc-tion of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), which willencompass Tengchong city and Kachin State’s capital Myitkyina, theRuili-Muse gate of northern Shan State and the Mengding-Chinshwehawgate, close to Wa and Kokang (Sun 2019).

Returning to the example of the UWSA, the border province of WaState has received such extensive development through Chinese invest-ment that it resembles a Chinse province more than it does Myanmar.A report by the BBC reveals that Wa State uses the Chinese Yuan as itscurrency, Mandarin is widely spoken in the state, and basic infrastructuresuch as water, electricity and even mobile telephone signals are providedacross the border from Chinese companies (Fisher 2016). The report addsthat the UWSA protects Wa State from the Tatmadaw and that Wa Statehas enjoyed prosperous relationships with the Chinese owing to its prox-imity with China (ibid.). For Chinese development to penetrate on theground in Myanmar (or in the case of the Wa State, to penetrate acrossthe border), China must also have considerable leverage over the UWSA.In fact, the UWSA is armed by the Chinese, and China uses this army asa buffer against the Tatmadaw to push for potential benefits elsewhere inMyanmar, for example, with the Kyaukpyu Port oil pipeline in RakhineState (Lintner 2019). Given that it is armed with sophisticated militaryhardware from China, it is unlikely that the UWSA can be defeated by theTatmadaw. Thus, the two conflicting parties should be more compelled tonegotiate, and without fighting, the Wa State’s grassroots have the oppor-tunity to enjoy many of the beneficial effects of Chinese development aslong as China maintains positive relations with the UWSA.

In the Kachin state, China has assumed the role of a mediator betweenthe Kachin Independence Organisation and the Myanmar government.Without China, it would have been difficult for any talks to occur betweenthese two parties because they harbour a great deal of distrust of eachother (Sun 2013).

It is also important to consider the position that the Tatmadaw takesin the ethnic conflicts in Myanmar. Just as the armed ethnic militias aregatekeepers that can allow or prevent Chinese development from reachingtheir people, the Tatmadaw can also act as a gatekeeper. With the rise ofAung Sun Suu Kyi’s civilian government, Myanmar was effectively turnedinto a diarchy. Therefore, it is important for outside actors such as Chinato maintain close relations with both the civilian and the military govern-ment of Myanmar. China has also armed the Tatmadaw over the years.


Chen and Ning (2020) argue that Beijing needs to stop prioritising theeconomic benefits of arms sales to Naypyidaw and consider halting thesesales because there have been many cases where China has suffered casu-alties from the spillover effects of the war. If China stops the supply ofarms, it would be unrealistic for the Tatmadaw to defeat all the armedethnic groups in Myanmar, compelling parties at conflict in Myanmar tomake peace and work together for economic development.

This principle also applies to the UWSA because they are also armedby the Chinese, and as fighting continues, leading to the stagnation ofChinese development in Myanmar, China should feel obliged to useits leverage over the Tatmadaw and the UWSA to negotiate for peace.Reporting on development in Myanmar, the Irrawaddy (a Burmese news-paper) states that recently pledged 4 billion yuan (US$580 million)over three years to support Myanmar’s economic development, and thatbetween 2014 and 2019, China invested a total of 4.9 billion yuan(US$690 million) focused on the sectors of infrastructure, agricultureand education (Thiha 2020). Without positive relations between Chinaand both the civilian and the military governments of Myanmar, Chinesedevelopment aid cannot reach the grassroots. Without positive relationswith mid-space actors such as the UWSA, China would not be able toaccess Wa State despite its geographical proximity to the Chinese border.

Another case in which China attempts to engage in developmentalpeace in Myanmar is in the Rakhine crisis. With the Rakhine crisis,China has surprisingly taken a step back towards non-intervention, advo-cating the importance of allowing only the directly concerned parties(i.e. Myanmar and Bangladesh) to negotiate repatriation of the Rohingyarefugees. The role China took between the two was that of a mediator,proposing the Three Point Plan as a three-step approach to ceasing theviolence, repatriating the refugees and facilitating the economic develop-ment of the Rakhine State. However, this Three Point Plan has receivedcriticism from international actors. For example, Joy (2018) claims thatthe first point of the plan, which calls for a ceasefire, is no longer relevantbecause the violence has mostly ceased; that in relation to the secondpoint of the plan, China’s role during the signing of the influential repa-triation pact between Myanmar and Bangladesh is not clear; and that inrelation to the third point of the plan, China understates the severity ofthe crisis by considering that it can be solved through economic under-development. Human Rights Watch (2018) reported that there are nosigns in Myanmar that the refugees will be safe when they return to


Rakhine, despite China’s offer to provide the Rakhine State with prefabri-cated homes to enable refugees trapped in Bangladesh to return (Xinhua2018a). From the perspectives of the West, China struggles to addressproblems such as the Rakhine crisis. For example, it is claimed that Chinais not ready to tackle sensitive issues, unlike traditional donors, becausethe Chinese government faces similar problems at home (Richmond andTellidis 2014).

Given the unique situation of Myanmar, in which civilian and mili-tary leaders are juxtaposed, China must constantly engage with bothAung San Suu Kyi’s civilian government and Min Aung Hlaing’s militarygovernment. Over the years as China has engaged with Myanmar, Chinahas realised that ethnic groups are gatekeepers and any peace processmust begin with transforming relations between the ethnic groups andthe Myanmar government, particularly the Tatmadaw. This realisationdemonstrates that China has adapted to the local situation of Myanmarand has aimed to transform the relations between the conflicting partiesthrough economic development such as the BRI’s CMEC to decreaseincentives for fighting. However, China’s use of a similar approach toeffect economic development in the Rakhine State has not had withsimilar success.

Afghanistan and Pakistan

BackgroundAfghanistan and Pakistan are considered as one case study because China’speacebuilding efforts in Afghanistan cannot be divorced from China’sengagement with Pakistan. This situation dates back to 1962 in the ColdWar, when both Afghanistan and Pakistan expected China to play the roleof a mediator, but at the time, China’s Premier Zhou Enlai did not wantChina assuming the role (Khalil 2018). In fact, Pakistan did not becomeChina’s strategic partner until after the Sino-Indian War in 1964. In addi-tion, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, China supported theMujahideen insurgency against the Soviets, which resulted in strained tiesbetween China and Afghanistan, but also Afghan’s belief that Pakistanwas behind the insecurity in Afghanistan (ibid.). Further, there are manycurrent reports that the Taliban is in the Western Balochistan provinceof Pakistan (Notezai 2019), and the fact that Osama Bin Laden wasfound and killed in Pakistan in 2011 demonstrates how closely Pakistanwas involved with Afghanistan and the Taliban. This also means that


China’s close relationship with Pakistan also gives the Chinese access tothe Taliban.

Afghanistan shares a much shorter border with China that does withMyanmar, but the importance and implications of China’s relationshipwith Afghanistan are no less significant than China’s relationship withMyanmar. In 2001 when George W. Bush invaded Afghanistan to retaliateagainst the September 11 attacks, China provided moral support to theUS action. However, this support was only verbal because China did notwant to be seen by the Islamic world as directly supporting what was seenby many as an anti-Muslim NATO coalition, fearing that this would fuelfurther extremism in the Xinjiang province (Zhao 2013). It is interestingthat the Chinese government decided to support (but did not providephysical support) the US during the US invasion of Afghanistan despiteSino-US relations being at an all-time low because of the 1999 bombingof the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by NATO, which occurred onlytwo years before the September 11 attacks (Hui 2019). When the warended, China emphasised that the post-war Afghan peace process shouldbe ‘Afghan owned and Afghan led’, and the Chinese have maintained thisnarrative to the present day (Xinhua 2020). To support the peace processbeing Afghan owned and Afghan led, China’s permanent representativeto the UN, Zhang Jun, stated at a plenary meeting in the UN GeneralAssembly that the Afghan-owned and Afghan-led peace process must besupported by international actors such as the US in the existing peacetalks, while China would also promote peace talks through internationalorganisations such as the SCO and through China-Afghanistan-PakistanForeign Ministers’ Dialogues (Xinhua 2019b). China also stated that itwould continue to support Afghanistan’s economic development throughimplementing a bilateral memorandum of understanding with the BRI tohelp Afghanistan boost trade links in the region (ibid.).

China is interested in the peaceful resolution of the war in Afghanistanfor two principal reasons. First, China wants to prevent the spilloverof religious extremism from neighbouring Afghanistan into its relativelyshort western boarder of the Xinjiang province. Foreign Minister Wang Yipraised Afghanistan’s efforts in taking effective measures against the EastTurkestan Islamic Movement, and in ensuring Afghanistan’s increasedcooperation with China through participation in the BRI (MOFA ofChina 2019). However, China also wants to protect its BRI inter-ests in Pakistan. The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), oftenregarded as the BRI’s flagship project, is constantly under threat of from


militant groups in Pakistan that have links to the Taliban (Biberman andSchwartz 2019). Chinese analysts also say China has benefited greatlyfrom the temporary order created by the US presence in Afghanistan,and if the US is to withdraw entirely from Afghanistan, it must be donein an ‘orderly fashion’ to avoid creating any sudden power vacuums inthe region (Zhao 2013). After the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, itwill be the responsibility of regional actors such as China to supportAfghanistan’s reintegration into Asian economy. Thus, China’s interestin order in the region and its economic interests related to the BRI inAfghanistan continue to compel China to engage proactively in aidingthe peace process in Afghanistan.

Developmental Peace in the Mid-SpacePakistan is an important strategic and economic partner for China.Economically, Pakistan provides China with the valuable Gwadar Port,which enables Chinese access to the Indian Ocean, and strategically,both countries have a common regional rival—India. In addition, China’srelationship with the Afghan government deteriorated significantly whenChina supported the Mujahideen insurgency during the Soviet invasion.Meanwhile, Pakistan and Afghanistan have enjoyed close, but not alwaysfriendly, relations with each other in the past (Khalil 2018). For example,Pakistan often exploited Afghanistan’s vulnerabilities such as its weak stateand practiced predatory politics against it, such as attempting to install amujahideen government in Kabul after Soviet withdrawal in 1989 (Akhtar2008). As stated, during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistanwas also accused by Afghanistan of causing the insecurity of Afghanistan.Given that insecurity in the Balochistan province in Pakistan has threat-ened the wellbeing of the CPEC, China needs to bring its close economicpartner, Pakistan, together with a less familiar actor, Afghanistan, tojointly address the cross-border instability that could potentially threatenthe BRI. In addition, Pakistan and Afghanistan have often approachedChina to request its mediation between the Afghan government and theTaliban, and Kabul have expressed interest in being a part of the BRIin connection with the CPEC (Bokhari 2019) if stability is attained inAfghanistan. Therefore, in theory, it is possible for China to engageAfghanistan directly, but it would be more effective to also engagePakistan because the conflict involves a cross-border regional problem forboth Afghanistan and Pakistan. Overall, China’s approach to Afghanistanhas three levels. On the international level, China and the US engage


Afghanistan through international organisations; on the regional level,China engages Afghanistan through Pakistan; and on the ground levelin Afghanistan, the engagement is bilateral between Beijing and Kabul,and will possibly include the Taliban.

Pakistan plays an important role of giving China access to thelocal Afghan gatekeepers: the Taliban. The China-Afghanistan-PakistanForeign Ministers’ Dialogue has been conducted on an annual basissince 2017. In the first meeting between Chinese Foreign Minister WangYi, Afghan Foreign Minister Salahuddin Rabbani and Pakistani ForeignMinister Khawaja Muhammad Asif, the basic premises of the coopera-tion among these countries were outlined, emphasising the importanceof bringing Afghanistan to peace through mutual trust, with the issueof counterterrorism being mentioned briefly (MOFA of the People’sRepublic of China 2017). In 2018, when the three foreign ministers(with the new foreign minister of Pakistan, Shah Mahmood Qureshi)met again, the issue of counterterrorism and the Taliban received greaterattention (MOFA of the People’s Republic of China 2018). Finally, in2019, the three countries continued to underline the importance ofcounterterrorism and the greater commitment of Afghanistan to partici-pating in the BRI (MOFA of Afghanistan 2019). Given that the Talibaninsurgency is a regional problem that spills over the borders of Pakistanand Afghanistan, it is important for China to include both countries inresolving tensions in the region and the threat of terrorism. Of course,there is always the option for China to engage directly with the Taliban,but this would contradict China’s principle of non-intervention if itconducted such engagement without the consent of the Afghan andPakistani governments.

In talking with the Taliban, China emulates the approach it has takenwith other parties such as Myanmar and recognises that the Taliban insur-gency is the root cause of the instability in Afghanistan. While the UShas also initiated talks with the Taliban, US diplomacy alone is insuf-ficient in bringing stability to Afghanistan. For example, in September2019, US President Donald Trump called off a scheduled meeting withthe Taliban after a bomb attack in Kabul killed 11 people, includingone US soldier (Sediqi 2019). Another difficulty in engaging in talkswith the Taliban is that they have refused to talk to the ‘puppet govern-ment’ of Kabul and have demanded direct talks with the US; however,this attitude has changed considerably after the many years of fightingin Afghanistan (Jackson 2018). China’s recognition of the Taliban as a


gatekeeper is important because it shows that China has considerableadaptability in its approach to Afghanistan. It could even be arguedthat China is practising Track II diplomacy in this case. For example,in top-down government-to-government talks, China remains flexible ininvolving many stakeholders, such as Pakistan, the Afghan government inKabul, and the US, related to the conflict, which is seen in the establish-ment of a Quadrilateral Coordination Group consists of China, the US,Pakistan and Afghanistan that was characterised as a peace mechanismfor strengthening unity and forming consensus (Global Times 2017). Inaddition, China has organised direct talks with the Taliban as well, withthe consent from Kabul, but specifics of these talks remain classified fornow.

China realises that it cannot rely only on the top-down government-to-government approach in Afghanistan because national identity andunity has never been strong in Afghanistan (K.R. He 2019a). Forexample, Dupree (2002) notes that despite the rich cultural heritage ofAfghanistan, attempts to facilitate national unity have seen mixed successbecause Afghans took little pride in their country’s heritage before thewar, and even less after. Since Afghanistan’s state unity is so weak, itis important for outside intervenors such as China and the US to helpAfghans first to consolidate a common national identity, or at least tostrive for a common goal through the establishment of a ‘transformativerelationship’. Kagawa (2020) argues that a transformative relationship isan asset that enables mid-space actors to connect with each other throughshared norms and experiences. Through a transformative relationship,gatekeepers can help to rebuild broken trust and relationships betweenconflicting parties.

Jackson (2018) states that on the ground, the Taliban have relin-quished their cruel and brutal ways of the past and are attempting to showa different face—that they can do everything the government can do, butbetter. That is, the Taliban were once peace-spoilers who denounced theUS-led Afghan government in Kabul as a ‘US puppet’ (Sediqi 2019), butare now trying to compete with the government in Kabul as a providerof public goods to the grassroots communities in Afghanistan. Given thatthe Afghan government is mainly focused on the reconstruction of majorcities, the rural areas are run mostly by the Taliban, who appoint villageelders as civil servants to monitor schools and hospitals or collect taxes invillages, and at times, to provide connections to Kabul (Jackson 2018).The precise extent of the Taliban’s control is difficult to judge, but in


many areas, it is an accepted fact that the Taliban are in charge evenwithout flying its flag (ibid.).

Given that it is difficult to nurture the creation of a national identity inAfghanistan in the short term, China is investing in constructing a trans-formative relationship between the Taliban and the government in Kabulthrough working towards a common goal of rebuilding Afghanistan.Because Afghanistan needs foreign aid to rebuild its war-torn country,China has already shown positive signs that it wants to incorporateAfghanistan into the BRI, connecting it with the CPEC in Pakistan. Anoverseas analyst on Afghanistan claims that Afghanistan’s natural resourceswould be better exploited by neighbouring countries, and that China,with its economic resources, happens to be the only country capableof doing so (Sarwar 2020). While this may omit consideration of otherpotential regional actors such as India and Japan, China is definitely oneof the closest sources of foreign aid for both Kabul and the Taliban ifthey decide to cease direct violence and to compete with each other toattract foreign aid or investment such as is offered through Chinese devel-opment projects included in the BRI. This is similar to the CMEC inMyanmar, where special economic zones could be established and wherean increase in the number of stakeholders in these projects would lessenthe likelihood of direct violence that could jeopardise development andlead to losing the support of the locals. Both Kabul and the Taliban couldbe empowered by development projects because the Taliban too haveshown signs that they require local support with the help of village elders,transforming their gatekeeper role from peace-spoiler to bridge-builder.

However, it is always useful to remember that China still considers itselfan outsider to Afghanistan’s problems. Through the Istanbul Process,a platform created for Afghanistan to discuss regional issues with itsneighbours, China has pushed for reconciliation processes for local ethnicgroups in Afghanistan (Hu 2018). In relation to specific development aid,one of the first forms of infrastructure that China built in Afghanistanwas hydraulic engineering, and as water begins to flow, there will beelectricity and other developments (Sun 2014). For the future, Presi-dent Xi Jinping has encouraged Chinese companies to actively invest inAfghanistan (ibid.), but of course these investments will only occur if thesituation becomes stable in Afghanistan. Therefore, there are clear andstrong incentives for the Taliban to become bridge-builders if they arecompeting with Kabul for governing rights of the country, as continuedfighting and violence will scare investors away.


Shortcomings and a Step Forward

Chinese peacebuilding through developmental peace is by no meansperfect. It is a new approach that has many loopholes that make it a targetof criticism from the West. One of these weaknesses is the lack of ChineseNGOs that can support the bottom-up process. China’s NGOs are under-developed, not only because they are too tightly controlled by Beijingbut also because at times, they are seen as jeopardising government aims,such that even environmental NGOs can be subjected to strict regula-tions (Feldshuh 2018). In contrast, many Japanese NGOs are familiarwith the situation at the grassroots level (MOFA of Japan 2017) becauseJapan conducts its Official Development Assistance (ODA) through theseNGOs and has public-private partnership organisations such as the JapanPlatform that provide emergency humanitarian aid, and enable the coor-dination of government and private sector funding with NGOs (JapanPlatform 2019). Unlike Tokyo, Beijing has not shown the same type ofsupport for local NGOs in the host county it operates, such as Myanmar.For example, Chen and Ning (2020) argue that in Myanmar, communi-ties that are located away from the city centres may not feel the benefitsof the BRI, and thus, such communities would prefer a Japanese NGOto construct a school or dig a well in their local village.

A potential remedy for this problem is that China would substitutethe role usually played by NGOs with Chinese State-Owned Enterprises(SOEs), similar to the way in which Japanese NGOs and JICA coordi-nate the public and private sectors to efficiently deliver ODA to the hostcountry (JICA, n.d.). A study conducted in Myanmar demonstrates thatmany Chinese SOEs are conducting grassroots projects, where smallerChinese private companies provide logistics support for larger companieswhile also engaging with local companies (Dunn et al. 2016). However,the problem with Chinese SOEs substituting Chinese NGOs does littleto improve Myanmar’s general negative public perception of China.In a policy brief written by the International Growth Centre presentsevidence that Chinese companies on the ground are subject to negativebias because they are from China, and that this bias is greatly reducedwhen the foreign company is from Japan (Yao and Zhang 2018). In fact,Dunn et al. (2016) note that Chinese SOEs are generally aware of theenvironmental and social impacts of investment, but that these compa-nies often lack the capacity to address issues related to these impacts,thus these researchers suggest that Chinese SOEs should collaborate and


share experiences with established foreign companies on the ground. Incontrast, private companies are more difficult to monitor and often rely onthe knowledge of their local partners for information on environmentaland social impacts of investment (ibid.). This reveals the inexperienceof Chinese companies operating in grassroots development comparedwith experienced foreign actors such as the Japanese private sector. AsChina becomes more engaged in peacebuilding, these shortcomings canbe addressed more effectively with closer coordination between Chineseactors and their local counterparts such as private companies and NGOs,as well as between Chinese actors and established foreign actors such asJapanese companies and NGOs.

Another common criticism directed against China is the lack ofpromotion of human rights. In Myanmar, Human Rights Watch (2018)criticised the rushed repatriation process of the Rohingyas, where theissue of citizenship has never been addressed. In defence of China, itcan be argued that the Chinese have a fundamentally different under-standing from the West of what constitutes basic human rights. Whilethe West considers metaphysical concepts such as identity as a basis ofhuman rights, as seen in the Rakhine crisis, China considers human rightsof groups such as the Rohingya refugees are met by ensuring the equalright to live a life with dignity under the economic development thatChinese BRI projects can bring to the Rakhine State. Xinhua (2019a)(China’s state media agency) reported that China, on behalf of 139 statesin the UN, called for the full realisation of the right to development for allpeople in 2019, stating that all people should have equal rights to partic-ipate in development and ensure ‘a life of dignity’. With Afghanistan, itis also possible that China will continue to engage with the governmentto improve the standard of living for the locals as violence ceases anddevelopment is allowed to occur.

It is also possible that Chinese peacebuilding based on developmentalpeace can drive the overall peacebuilding environment in the regiontowards being more elite driven. The Chinese style of developmentalpeace emphasises the fact that stable government-centred policies aremost efficient in helping a developing country achieve economic develop-ment, as was true for Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and China.Currently, there is no clear evidence that China has been in close coop-eration with grassroots mid-space actors such as local NGOs. Some ofChina’s local engagement that is not with the official government of thehost country is mainly with local armed groups such as the UWSA. To


some extent, engagement with such groups still represents a somewhatelite-driven process because the unarmed civilians do not always have a sayin the decision-making process between the UWSA and the Tatmadaw.However, it is also important to recognise that local armed groups arealso a type of mid-space gatekeeper. For example, Kagawa (2020) arguesthe importance of building a transformative relationship with Bangsamororebel leaders.

Another example of China focusing their relationship mainly on localelites is seen in their relationship with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelli-gence (ISI) that plays a role of gatekeepers to the Taliban in Afghanistan.Taliban commanders stated that the power of the ISI is “as clear as thesun in the sky” (Waldman 2010). While they are not a puppet of the ISI,the Taliban are often at the mercy of the ISI’s power and the ISI haspreviously arrested Taliban leaders with the aim of disrupting peace talksbecause Pakistan does not want peace in Afghanistan. However, withoutthe ISI, the Taliban find it difficult to even host meetings (ibid.). Westernpowers have a troubling relationship with the ISI as there is little evidencethat the US and international pressure has had any impact on safe havensin Pakistan for the Taliban (ibid.). Because of the ISI’s profoundly impor-tant role in Afghanistan and its deep connections with the Taliban, andbecause of China’s close relations with the Pakistani government, theChinese are granted access to the ground level of Afghan communitiesunder the Taliban’s control. Unlike the ISI, China’s main interests inAfghanistan are economic, that is, China seeks peace in Afghanistan forthe sake of the BRI.

Given the amount of geopolitical competition in Asia, peacebuilding inthis region may not always be based on altruistic motives. For example,the geopolitical implications of China’s engagement with the Taliban inbringing peace to Afghanistan for the BRI may be only a by-product ofChina’s close relationship with Pakistan to counter India. In addition,China may exercise its leverage on the UWSA only to prevent excessiveforeign influences on Myanmar using the UWSA as a buffer with theTatmadaw. The West, with its epistemology of liberal peace has done thesame by facilitating regime change to sweep out authoritarian regimes andreplace them with Western friendly democracies, giving rise to argumentsthat Western regimes are more interested in being agents of transforma-tion than helping with conflict resolution (Orakzai 2015). The Chinesemodel is not perfect by any means, currently, China continues to collab-orate with government and local elites more than with local grassroots


groups. This may be because China itself does not have a well-developedsystem of civil society and NGOs to support its developmental peace onthe ground. Perhaps this is where actors such as Japan who have thenecessary tools such as NGOs can supplement China’s efforts after Chinagains unique access to mid-space actors through developmental peace.

Conclusion

At the beginning of the chapter, we asked whether China’s developmentalpeace represents a form of hybrid peacebuilding: the answer is yes and no.China’s developmental peace has transcended its previous foreign policyprinciple of non-intervention, and has pushed China to engage not onlywith the host country’s government through a top-down approach, butalso with a much wider variety of local actors to pursue the bottom-upapproach of hybrid peacebuilding. However, given that China is still abeginner in hybrid peacebuilding, it faces criticism from both interna-tional and local communities for its lack of engagement with grassrootsgroups. Therefore, it may be more accurate to say that China’s develop-mental peace is a style of Asian peacebuilding that has traits of or thepotential for hybrid peacebuilding. China is aware that no standardisedtemplate of peacebuilding can address the wide variety of different conflictscenarios, and that peacebuilding must be adaptive to the different typesof conflict faced in different regions.

As the second largest economy in the world, China is keen to bean active player in international peacebuilding. In Myanmar, whereChina was traditionally constrained by its non-intervention principle, theChinese government was eventually compelled to address the root prob-lems of ethnic unrest as border clashes became more serious, causing casu-alties among Chinese citizens. China’s peacebuilding goal in Myanmarwas to increase the resilience of local ethnic groups through the BRI’sCMEC so that these ethnic groups longer had to compete with theTatmadaw for scarce resources. China has engaged with gatekeepers suchas the UWSA and maintained friendly relationships with these gate-keepers, leading to a type of development in Wa State that made thestate look like a Chinese province. In addition, China has not forgottenits fundamental principle of non-intervention, as seen in the fact that itcontinues to engage with the Tatmadaw to convince both sides to ceaseviolence to allow development to occur in Myanmar under the BRI.


To enable development in Afghanistan, China must collaborate withits local economic and strategic partner, Pakistan, because the conflictin Afghanistan is a cross-border regional problem for both China andPakistan. Through mediating the peace process between Pakistan andAfghanistan, China created the opportunity to engage with the Taliban,who were the key gatekeepers, and to address the root cause of theinstability in Afghanistan. Because the Taliban are competing with theAfghan government in Kabul as a provider of public goods, the Talibanare more interested in the peace and development that the BRI offers.Given this interest, the Taliban could be transformed from a peace-spoilerto a bridge-builder because they want to attract more Chinese investmentin the areas they occupy.

However, China’s developmental peace also attracts criticism. Thelack of the presence of Chinese NGOs at the grassroots level of thehost country severely hinders China’s ability to deliver aid to grassrootscommunities that are located away from the cities that receive Chinese aidand are the focus of BRI projects. Even when China attempts to remedythis through its SOEs to directly target remote communities in the hostcountry, the negative image of China held by the people in countriessuch as Myanmar and Afghanistan makes it difficult for China to effec-tively deliver aid in such areas. China has also been criticised for notplacing sufficient emphasis on the importance of human rights when ithas served as a mediator. However, this criticism mostly arises becauseof the mismatch between China and the West over what constitutes basichuman rights, and which aspect of basic human rights must be prioritised.The Chinese focus more on the physical side of human rights, prioritisingproviding grassroots groups with the right to economic development andto live a life in dignity because for China, economic development is one ofthe best ways to realise human dignity. Meanwhile the West, puts morepriority on ideas such as human rights and democracy, with economicdevelopment coming afterwards.

As conflict situations change around the world, processes of peace-building must continue to adapt and evolve. Complex conflicts involvingethnic minorities in Myanmar and non-state actors in Afghanistan canno longer be solved through a standardised approach of expandingliberal institutions as guided by the model of liberal peacebuilding. Newapproaches such as hybrid peacebuilding, which places strong emphasison the interactive nature of the top-down and bottom-up process, andadaptive peacebuilding, which changes the course according to the needs


of the society concerned, are considered vital for peace to be sustainable.China has employed the model of developmental peace and attemptedto apply it to neighbouring countries suffering from conflict, such asMyanmar and Afghanistan, through collaborating with its neighbours,Bangladesh and Pakistan, respectively. China’s developmental peace sharesmany traits and similarities with the Japanese style of peacebuilding, whichwill be elaborated in the following chapter of this book. Unlike liberalpeacebuilding, China’s developmental peace does not apply a standardisedapproach, but treats each conflict as a unique situation that requires Chinato continue adapting its approach to ensure it is responsive to changingrealities on the ground. In this sense, China’s developmental peace isadaptive. However, this developmental peace needs to be improved sothat it can achieve closer engagement with the grassroots level, trans-forming China’s developmental peace into a fully developed model ofhybrid peacebuilding.

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https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Yao-Zhang-2018-Policy-Brief.pdf

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CHAPTER 8

Japan’s Peacebuilding andMid-Space Actors:A Bridge Between theWest and the Rest

Yuji Uesugi and Anna Deekeling

Introduction

In the previous chapters, it was discussed how the hybrid peacebuildingtheory might transform existing approaches to peacebuilding. The aimwas to solidify the theoretical framework of an operationalisation of thehybrid peacebuilding theory so that it can better address the realitiesof peacebuilding in Asia. In contrast, this chapter takes an inductiveapproach and examines Japan’s approaches to peacebuilding, which isdefined by the Japanese government as “consolidation of peace” and“nation-building” (MOFA 2007).

Before turning to the main task, three core premises of this study arerecapitulated here. First, mid-space actors who enjoy access to differentsources of power, both formal and informal, and maintain a deep cultural

Y. Uesugi (B) · A. DeekelingWaseda University, Tokyo, Japane-mail: [email protected]



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160 Y. UESUGI AND A. DEEKELING

and normative understanding of their community, can assume the func-tion of a gatekeeper (Uesugi 2020). Second, these gatekeepers possessinherent characteristics that cannot be emulated by outsiders. Theseinclude transformative relationships (the ability and willingness to interactwith key stakeholders outside one’s immediate social sphere), locallygrounded legitimacy (a collective trust of the constituency gained throughtheir knowledge and power), and laissez-passer (a special access to infor-mation and resources that are closed to strangers). Third, depending onthe circumstances, these gatekeepers become either bridge-builders whocan cross over the existing cleavages or spoilers who can oppose andjeopardise ongoing peacebuilding efforts.

A logical corollary of these propositions is that outside intervenorsneed to identify mid-space actors and work with them and, if necessaryand appropriate, help them serve as bridge-builders. This chapter is anattempt to evaluate Japan’s peacebuilding efforts from that angle. Thefollowing sheds light on three cases of outstanding Japanese engagementwith mid-space actors in conflict-affected localities in Asia—Timor-Leste,Myanmar and Mindanao, the Philippines. Features of Japan’s peace-building approaches are outlined first, and then, empirical records ofJapan’s peacebuilding efforts in the above three cases are examined.Before concluding the chapter, the shortcomings of Japanese approachesare also discussed.

Features of Japan’s Peacebuilding

This section highlights distinctive and unique characteristics of Japan’speacebuilding approach. An inherent trait of Japan’s peacebuilding isfound in the origin and the genesis of modern Japan, a non-Westernnation-state located at the eastern offshore end of the Eurasian conti-nent (Umesao 1957/1967). Japan’s defeat in the Second World War(WWII), and most notably its post-war Constitution, has shaped the basicfoundation of Japan’s peacebuilding approach. In the following, featuresof Japan’s peacebuilding approach are outlined from three angles: (1)historical traits, (2) aid architectures, and (3) three recurrent practices.

Historical Traits as a Bridge-Builder

Having undergone a difficult modernisation process in the nineteenthcentury and embarked on a costly colonisation of its neighbours in the

8 JAPAN’S PEACEBUILDING AND MID-SPACE … 161

first half of the twentieth century, Japan learned the lesson that the senseof emancipatory local ownership is a key to successful modernisation anddevelopment. Japan once endeavoured to establish the Great East AsiaCo-prosperity Sphere, in which Japan was conceived to serve as a bridgebetween the colonial powers in Europe and their colonies in East Asia,with an aim of establishing an autonomous regional order that wouldemancipate East Asia from European control (Ikeda 2008). After thisdream was shattered, Japan sought to present its representational self-image as a peacebuilder in the post-WWII world (Iwami 2016). Along thesame line, Japan has promoted its own capacity as a bridge-builder (Black2013), this time, bridging between developed countries in the West anddeveloping countries in general but especially in Southeast Asia. TheJapanese government justifies this role not only through its geograph-ical location but also through its own experience as a former developingcountry trying to catch up to the West in the nineteenth century, and inthe aftermath of the fierce defeat of WWII.

Japan’s own history of encounter with and infringement by the West,as well as its experience of post-war reconstruction under ‘colonial arro-gance’ (Richmond 2018) of the US, has equipped Japan to refineinternational peacebuilding to be a more reflective and adaptive under-taking (de Coning 2018). Utilising its own experience of modernisationby adopting Western systems and adapting them to fit with the domesticcontext, Japan has projected itself as a great example of how to exploitoutside intervention for its own advantage and prosperity.

Aid Architectures

Official Development Assistance (ODA) has been a substantial tool forJapan’s peacebuilding efforts. Although ODA started mainly as reparationpayments for WWII to Japan’s neighbours, the Japanese government usedit to promote its own economy through contracting Japanese compa-nies for infrastructure and development projects in Asia (Reilly 2013).This is a prototype of a win-win approach that Japan advocates. Underthe policy of ‘Boomerang Economy’, private investments and conces-sional loans by Japanese investors supported large-scale infrastructureand capital-intensive investments in developing countries (Seekins 2015).For example, in 2016, 51.1% of bilateral Japanese ODA was used foreconomic infrastructure and services, while 59% was for trade promotingincentives for developing countries (OECD 2018: 349). In addition,


Japan’s private enterprises play an important role in Japan’s aid archi-tectures beyond the Government-to-Government level. Around 38% ofJapan’s multilateral ODA is privately funded in cooperation with theWorld Bank Group (ibid.: 347). Also, an increasing number of Japanesecompanies engage with local businesses in developing countries (ibid.:346).

Japan’s ODA has two principal aid modalities: Yen loan and technicalcooperation. The former was implemented by the Japanese governmentin partnership with Japanese private enterprises. This public-private part-nership (PPP) is also known as the ‘flying goose’ model of economicdevelopment. The PPP was formed as a vehicle for delivering Yenloan projects, which symbolise Japan’s long-term commitment to andguarantee for continuing interest in the successful development of itsinvestment destinations. In the area of infrastructure and developmentassistance, the PPP has been a driving force for Japan’s ODA. On tech-nical cooperation, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)has led numerous human resource development projects which contributeto empowering mid-space actors to function as bridge-builders and thusinsider-partial mediators for their communities. Complementary collab-oration between JICA and Japanese Non-Governmental Organisations(NGOs) in the execution of Japan’s ODA is another spearhead of Japan’speacebuilding approach, which is called the ODANGO. In short, the twinengines of Japanese approaches are the PPP and the ODANGO.

It is undeniable that a large portion of Japan’s ODA pours intoeconomic development, concentrating on building key infrastructuresto boost the economy of both Japan and developing countries. Japan’sprivate sector collaborates with the Japanese government and continuesto play a vital role in this endeavour (MOFA 2008). As Japan has locatedits PPP for economic development under the ‘peace through devel-opment’ narrative, it would be misleading to omit the contributionsmade by Japan’s private companies to peacebuilding. While they haverecently begun to undertake an increasing number of community devel-opment projects in conflict-affected areas, so far these projects involveonly national actors and their interface with mid-space actors remainsunderexplored.


Three Recurrent Practices

The recurrent practices of Japan’s efforts can be classified into three:(1) apolitical nature, (2) request-based, and (3) non-interference. Whilethey are closely intertwined with one another, all of them point to anunderlying Westphalian virtue: primacy of Government-to-Governmentrelationships.

Japan has been reluctant to get involved in politically sensitive issues.With this, Japan’s ODA has kept an apolitical nature, revolving aroundJapanese expertise in areas of technical solutions and support. This prac-tice is closely linked with Japan’s emphasis on economic development,particularly through infrastructure development via Yen loans. In 2003,when the Japanese government revised its ODA Charter, it decided touse its foreign aid to facilitate democratic development abroad. Still,the approach remained distinctive from that of Western donors. Ichi-hara (2017) called this an “ostensible” departure from Japan’s traditionalpolicy as Japan’s democratic support centred around helping state insti-tutions, in effect avoiding unnecessary conflicts with the aid-recipientgovernment.

The second recurring practice is that Japan’s ODA projects are in prin-ciple formulated based on requests from the aid-recipient government.Although Japan can maintain a certain degree of leverage on the finaldecisions through offering advice and technical support to key figuresin the aid-recipient government, this practice has given the aid-recipientgovernments a sense of security that Japan would not bluntly intrude intotheir internal terrain, which resulted in lowering their protective barrierof sovereignty.

The third practice is represented by Japan’s non-interference stance,which enabled Japanese actors to engage in situations where access wasdenied for Western donors. This non-interference posture of Japan helpedits peacebuilding actors gain an initial advantage by reducing suspicionsin the minds of internationally isolated actors. On the contrary, Westerndonors suffered a deficit of trust due to their intrusive approach thatexploited aid as a concealment for regulating the behaviour of an aid-recipient society so that it would follow ‘universal’ models/standards.The principle of non-interference, which can be traced back to theUnited Nations Charter (Chapter 1, Article 2.7), served as a Westphalianframework for Japan to invest in developing countries without criticisingunpleasant policies of its counterpart.


Japan’s Peacebuilding Approaches in Practice

Having outlined the orthodox features of Japan’s peacebuilding efforts,it is now time to turn our attention to the core quest. While main-taining an orthodox approach of mainstreaming the Government-to-Government interface, some Japanese actors made innovative departuresfrom the recurring patterns in three distinctive peacebuilding settings inAsia—Timor-Leste, Myanmar and Mindanao. The records of Japaneseengagement in these cases are scrutinised by focusing on the interac-tion of Japanese actors with mid-space actors who hold the capacitiesto bridge vertical, horizontal and diagonal gaps that hamper the peaceprocess (Uesugi 2020).

Mid-space actors possess attributes of their unique social positionthat is rooted in access to varying sources of power and their deepcultural and normative understanding about the community they control.Acknowledging the importance of mid-space actors and their function ofplacing restrictions on the outreach of an outside agency can enhancethe potential of external actors for working with local actors outside theimmediate range of governmental control. This point is worth notingif one subscribes to an assumption that acquiring sufficient and accu-rate knowledge about the local context and dynamics is a prerequisitefor successful outside intervention. Japan’s official peacebuilding actorssuch as JICA have worked through the central government of an aid-recipient country, and often collaborated with Japanese NGOs to carryout projects at the grassroots. This pattern of partnership can face a diffi-cult challenge, however, when the central government does not have itsgrip on subaltern communities at the grassroots level. Under such circum-stances, for Japanese actors to operate in areas beyond the reach of thecentral government, they would have to earn the trust of mid-space actorsand help them build bridges over existing cleavages.

The mid-space actor typology introduced in Chapter 4 of this studysuggests that outsiders may support mid-space actors by empoweringthem as bridge-builders, often through offering them technical andpolitical skills training, and sharing information that can widen theirperspectives about the conflict dynamics and domains. Building upon thetypology, this section explores the following two inquiries. How haveJapanese actors and mid-space actors interacted with each other in thepeacebuilding process? How have Japanese actors supported them tobetter serve as bridge-builders? To clarify these questions, the following


section examines the empirical records of Japan’s peacebuilding activitiesin Timor-Leste, Myanmar and Mindanao, where Japan has engaged inthe capacity development of mid-space actors including key gatekeepersin the respective peacebuilding processes.

Timor-Leste

BackgroundJapan’s engagement in Timor-Leste was unprecedented as Japanese actorsstarted their support to Timor-Leste before Timor-Leste became indepen-dent in May 2002. The conventional approach of Japan’s ODA was basedon the Government-to-Government agreement. Nonetheless, before asovereign authority was established in Timor-Leste (except that the UNTransitional Administrator was given the legal authority to govern by theUN Security Council), the Japanese government set the priority of itssupport to Timor-Leste in three areas: (1) human resource development,(2) infrastructure rehabilitation, and (3) rural development. Althoughnone of JICA’s projects had specific features of peacebuilding (JICA2008: 12), they were introduced under the ‘fast-track’ scheme to meet theurgent needs on the ground. JICA initially hesitated to extend its supportto security and justice sectors as it was understood that Western donorswere interested in engaging in these sectors where Japan’s resourcesand expertise were limited (ibid.: 14). Accordingly, many humanitarianaid and development projects delivered by the Japanese actors includingNGOs were apolitical in nature.

In Timor-Leste, the timing of Japan’s intervention went againstconvention, but the repertoire of its peacebuilding efforts remainedunvaried. After all, the basic philosophy of Japan’s peacebuilding engage-ment was that any humanitarian aid and development projects couldcontribute to peace in a post-conflict society (MOFA 2011). For example,Japanese Ambassador Iwao Kitahara proudly stated, under the banner of‘water of life’, that providing clean water for all could reduce the risk ofchildren being infected by illness, and claimed that “if people are healthy,so is the country” (Embassy of Japan in Timor-Leste 2009).

Engagement with Mid-Space ActorsNevertheless, there were two innovative approaches made by Japaneseactors to engage with mid-space actors in Timor-Leste. The first casewas initiated by the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) who were deployed to


the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET). Thesecond initiative was led by a Japanese NGO called the Okinawa PeaceAssistance Center (OPAC).

Japan deployed its SDF engineering unit to UNMISET, authorisedunder Chapter VII of the UN Charter to take all the necessary meansto achieve its mandate. Although Japan’s engagements were limited tonon-coercive activities, it was the first time that Japan sent its SDFs to aUN peacekeeping operation acting under Chapter VII. SDF’s engineersdeployed to UNMISET took part in an innovative programme namedthe Recovery, Employment, and Stability Program for Ex-combatants andCommunities in Timor-Leste (RESPECT) that aimed to address someof the immediate needs of mid-space actors in the rural areas of Timor-Leste. RESPECT encompassed over 300 projects that were funded bythe Japanese government, channelled through the United Nations Devel-opment Programme (MOFA 2011). SDF engineers who were deployedon the ground to undertake rehabilitation of damaged infrastructureswere mobilised to offer ‘technical support’, or more precisely on-the-jobtraining, to former members of a liberation army called the FALINTIL.Because of their long-term commitment as guerrilla fighters in the jungle,many of the FALINTIL senior members were in poor physical conditionand had a weak education background, and thus more than 1,300 formerFALINTIL combatants were not recruited in a newly established defenceforce and the police (Uesugi 2014a; Howe and Uesugi 2015).

After independence in May 2002, FALINTIL veterans who feltneglected raised their voices against their government. They became amajor source of instability in a newly born state as they maintainedtheir influence over their former cadets and members of the community.Therefore, Japan’s attempt to engage with frustrated mid-space actorsthrough RESPECT had the potential to evolve into a sound peace-building strategy. Nevertheless, RESPECT did not go beyond a stop-gapmeasure to provide livelihoods (daily allowance) to mid-space actors inTimor-Leste, albeit it was conceived as a capacity development opportu-nity for former combatants to facilitate their reintegration into the civilianlife (MOFA 2011: 96). Japan’s involvement remained at the superficiallevel and no Japanese actors were available to follow up the initial contactswith mid-space actors developed through this undertaking. In 2006, frus-trated actors both inside and outside the security apparatus turned against


the peacebuilding process and led their followers to cause a security distur-bance in Dili that shook the earlier investments and achievements in thesecurity sector of Timor-Leste (Uesugi 2014b, 2018a).

The next example of Japan’s engagement in the mid-space wasattempted by OPAC, which was founded by one of the authors of thischapter. While most of the Japanese NGOs which operated at the grass-roots level in Timor-Leste followed the conventional Japanese approach,OPAC together with JICA launched an unprecedented project called theCommunity Peace for Development in 2010 (which lasted until 2016).Before the launch, OPAC had worked with JICA in 2002, 2005, 2006,2009, and 2010, inviting around 25 prominent mid-space leaders fromTimor-Leste to Japan each time for training (over 125 trainees in total).The trainees included, for example, district administrators (an equivalentof a governor), civil servants, police officers, village chiefs, NGO repre-sentatives, youth group leaders and former members of the clandestinemovement (OPAC, n.d.).

Building on the multiple networks developed through these trainingprogrammes, OPAC earned the trust of two key local counterparts ofthe project: (1) the National Directorate for Prevention of CommunityConflict (NDPCC), that was under the Secretary of State for Security,and (2) the Comoro Village Council (Higuchi 2013). The NDPCC wasestablished in 2008 after the Government of Timor-Leste failed to preventthe crisis in 2006, with an aim of preventing community-level conflictsfrom posing threats to the nation-wide stability (Ribeiro 2008). One ofthe major concerns for the NDPCC at the time of joint project planningwas fragile security situations in Comoro Village, located at the outskirtsof the capital city where a large number of youth from various rural areasgathered to find jobs, and several martial arts groups (gangs) were organ-ised to offer a sense of protection and belonging to vulnerable peoplewho were away from home (Lopes 2009).

After consultation with the NDPCC leadership, OPAC’s assistance forthe NDPCC’s effort to address the security concerns in Comoro Villagewas divided into two: (1) national level efforts geared toward capacitydevelopment of mid-space actors, and (2) sub-national level effortsrevolved around establishing platforms for information sharing throughmulti-level networks (Higuchi 2013). OPAC extended its support tobuild platforms and networks for dialogue among mid-space actors at thenational level, which included the staff of the NDPCC, the Secretary of


State for Youth, various national NGOs specialising in conflict preven-tion, youth organisations, and district and sub-district police commanders(OPAC 2011).

This initiative led to the institutionalisation of the Conflict Preventionand Response Network (CPRN) which brought together both state andcivil society actors in Timor-Leste working toward peacebuilding (Belun2014; da Costa 2013: 32–35). Upon the launch of the CPRN, an NGOcalled the Belun, established with support from the Center for Interna-tional Conflict Resolution at Columbia University, played an importantrole (Cutter et al. 2004). Because OPAC was collaborating with both theNDPCC (a government actor) and the Belun (a civil society actor), anational-level platform for dialogue was constructed rather smoothly.

OPAC’s second major activity was implemented in Comoro Village,where repeated skirmishes between rival martial art groups occurredfrequently (Scambary 2019: 122). Upon the introduction of activitiesaimed at contributing to conflict prevention in Comoro Village, OPACconsulted with the Comoro Village Council. One of the highlights ofOPAC’s sub-national level activity, implemented jointly with the NDPCC,was a village-wide workshop on conflict prevention that received endorse-ments from the Comoro Village Council and a local monastery. In theworkshop, mid-space actors such as traditional leaders (liurai), represen-tatives from youth and women’s organisations, and leaders of martial artsgroups, all assembled in one place to analyse the security challenges theyfaced and discuss ways to overcome them (OPAC 2011).

Even though the effects of OPAC’s intervention are unverifiable andit is difficult to establish the causal relationship, OPAC sought to insti-tute contacts with mid-space actors, whilst a decade was invested innurturing relationship and earning their trust before the project waslaunched officially.

At the same time, the CPRN was kept as a consultation and infor-mation sharing forum at the national level, and no formal mechanismwas institutionalised between the national level and the sub-national levelin the CPRN. While bridge-building support made by OPAC could havebeen amplified to cover a much wider geographical range beyond ComoroVillage, such attempts did not bear fruit and OPAC’s efforts were limitedin terms of their impact and the scope. Therefore, what OPAC endeav-oured in the mid-space in Comoro Village cannot be generalised asJapan’s peacebuilding approach in Timor-Leste. Still, this case deserves


more than a passing notice as it demonstrates that approaches elicitedfrom the hybrid peacebuilding theory would work in a real situation.

Myanmar

BackgroundJapanese engagement in Myanmar, particularly after the military coupd’état in 1988, has deviated from that of the West. It provided muchneeded support for Myanmar in times of diplomatic isolation andeconomic decline (Seekins 1992; Reilly 2013). Although Japan hadbeen one of the top donors among the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, it had to act in concertwith the West when economic sanctions were placed on Myanmar. Afterthe birth of democratic government in 2011 and with the sanctions beingpartially lifted, Japan resumed its ODA to Myanmar in 2012, whichamounted to over 82% of the total foreign aid that Myanmar receivedfrom the OECD countries in 2013 (MOFA 2018).

Japan’s flagship development aid to Myanmar has been Yen loans forinfrastructure projects which aimed to promote sustainable economicdevelopment. Besides the major infrastructure projects that wouldsupport the central government’s National Comprehensive DevelopmentPlan, Japan has allocated its ODA projects in Myanmar’s border stateswhere ethnic armed groups reside. Japan carries out its infrastructureprojects under the PPP scheme, in which the Japanese private sectorplays a pivotal role. For example, in 2013 JICA launched a RegionalDevelopment Project for Poverty Reduction that covered all seven statescontrolled by ethnic armed groups (i.e., Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kayah,Mon, Rakhine and Shan). In 2020, the Government of Myanmar andJICA signed loan agreement which included the Regional InfrastructureImprovement Project (JICA 2020a).

These projects are apolitical in nature as their expected outcomesincluded reducing poverty in and inequality among Myanmar’s borderingstates (JICA 2020b). At the same time, a new development was witnessedas these Yen loan projects were introduced in conflict-affected areas as apeace dividend, which had been avoided before as such an attempt coulddrag Japan into a politically challenging situation.


Engagement with Mid-Space ActorsOne of the most noteworthy peacebuilding approaches in Myanmar canbe found in efforts made by The Nippon Foundation (TNF), a JapaneseNGO (to be more precise, public interest incorporated foundation),which has operated in Myanmar since 1976 (TNF, n.d.). Its humanitariansupport in the areas of health and education continued even during theperiod of military rule in Myanmar (ibid.). In concert with the shift ofthe Japanese government’s policy toward Myanmar in 2012, TNF beganits quiet diplomacy in the area of Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts. The Chair-person of TNF, Yohei Sasakawa, who was appointed as the Special Envoyof the Government of Japan for National Reconciliation in Myanmarin 2013, took advantage of TNF’s four decades of commitment in thecountry when he started a peacebuilding project that aimed at fosteringconfidence-building between the central government and armed ethnicgroups. To establish an initial contact with leaders of armed ethnic groups,he sought support from Katsuyuki Imoto, a Japanese Buddhist monkand the head of another Japanese NGO that was set up to collect ashesof former Japanese soldiers who died in Myanmar during the Battle ofImphal in 1944 (Nojima 2019). Imoto played an instrumental role inthe launch of the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), a coali-tion of 12 opposition groups, which created a united front to negotiatewith the Myanmar’s central government (Molloy, unpublished). Throughthis endeavour, Imoto earned the trust of not only gatekeepers in armedethnic groups in Shan, Karen, Kayah and Mon States, but also of Presi-dent Tein Sein who asked Imoto to serve as a go-between (ibid.; Imoto,n.d.).

Since then, TNF has supported a series of national dialogues amongdifferent stakeholders and adversaries, which had little guarantee ofinstant and visible outcomes. With self-sufficient financial resources atits disposal, TNF did not have to be accountable to donors, and thushad a luxury of operating with a long timeframe. It did not even need a‘success’ story to attract further funding and to marshal sufficient finan-cial resources to continue the project. It could afford to wait for thetime to become ripe for the peace process to evolve naturally. This was ahuge advantage of TNF acting as a reliable patron for mid-space actors,since most of the official peacebuilding actors of the OECD members,including those of Japan, had to be transparent and accountable to donors(and their tax payers) and were expected to bring positive results in a rela-tively short timeframe. In fact, unlike other actors, TNF did not have to


claim its contribution to the peace process, which allowed it to operatefrom behind the scenes. It served as an enabler and convener of the peacedialogue by paying travel expenses on behalf of the armed ethnic groups,but it did not interfere with the substance of the peace dialogue (Mori2018).

In concert with the progress made at the negotiation table, TNFprovided positive incentive in a timely manner as a peace dividend forcommunities which signed a ceasefire agreement (Molloy, unpublished).Its combined funding scheme worked to its advantage, and its ability todeliver what was required gave TNF additional strengths. While TNF hasits pooled fund at its disposal, since 2013 it has been granted funds fromthe Japanese government to provide humanitarian aid to the people inconflict-affected areas under the control of armed ethnic groups (TNF,n.d.).

Furthermore, being the Special Envoy of the Government of Japanas well as TNF’s Chairperson, Sasakawa assumed a hybrid function andperformed quiet multi-track diplomacy at all levels (Track 1, 2 and 3).He was in a position to manoeuvre his official capacity to marshal Japan’sODA and to link up with the highest-ranking officials in Myanmar’scentral government. At the same time, he could also distance himselffrom the official endeavours by the Japanese actors such as the JapaneseEmbassy and JICA in Myanmar to circumvent the situations that arediplomatically too sensitive.

Desmond Molloy (unpublished: 11), who served as an aid to Sasakawain TNF’s Myanmar Liaison Office describes TNF’s approach as “Sus-tained Incremental Trust Establishment and Support”, which is in essencea trust-building approach. TNF maintained its independence from theWestern donors throughout the process, which enabled it to remain moreadaptive and flexible to dynamics on the ground, while promoting variousforms of peace dividend through a conflict sensitive approach (ibid.).

In addition to peace dialogue support in the field, TNF invested inhuman resource development of the Tatmadaw (the armed forces ofMyanmar). Instead of criticising the Tatmadaw, TNF helped to initiatethe necessary reform by themselves, believing that it was not wise topush them into a corner, which could have made them feel isolated andinduced radical reactions. Each year since 2014, TNF invited around10 highest-level commanders, including the Commander-in-Chief MinAung Hlaing, of the Tatmadaw as well as high-ranking officers from theMinistry of Border Affairs (also under the control of the Tatmadaw),


including the Minister Lt. Gen. Thet Naing Win and Lt. Gen. Ye Aung,to Japan (Sasakawa 2014; IUJ 2019a). TNF also funds a programmecalled the Training Program for Capacity Development for LeadershipPotential for Government Officials at the Ministry of Border Affairs inMyanmar offered by the International University of Japan (IUJ 2019b).All these concerted efforts constitute Japanese investment in relationship-building with Myanmar’s mid-space actors as well as their empowermentand capacity development.

Let us recapitulate Japan’s peacebuilding engagement with Myanmar’smid-space actors. The above discussion shows two points. First, it wasessential that appealing incentives were provided to both the centralgovernment and the state governments (under the control of armedethnic groups) to earn their trust so that Japanese actors were permitteda broader and deeper outreach in the bordering states in conflict with theTatmadaw. Second, it was useful for Japanese actors to remain patientand stay within the parameters set by the central government so thatthey were not seen as demanding and threatening, while extendingits altruistic support for the most vulnerable people in conflict-affectedcommunities to help increase the legitimacy of mid-space actors who wereinclined towards peace. The case of Japan’s peacebuilding engagement inMyanmar was indicative of the fact that when disciplinary acts by the Westcan exert pressure on the recalcitrant gatekeepers to alter their behaviour,an alternative conciliatory approach based on long-term commitment anda trustworthy relationship can induce them to explore alternative options.

Mindanao

BackgroundJapan’s engagement in Mindanao deserves special attention as it encom-passes long and broad cooperation across various stakeholders, andincludes not only development assistance but also mediation and facil-itation services in the peace process. Japan’s engagement in Mindanaodeparted from a more conventional style in December 2002 when PrimeMinister Junichiro Koizumi announced the “Support Package for Peaceand Stability in Mindanao” (Ochiai 2019; Ishikawa 2014; MOFA 2002).

Under the new policy, JICA employed both conventional and inno-vative approaches. The former revolved around the assistance providedto the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), which wasestablished in 1990 as an official sub-national entity responsible for the


administration of the territory, based on the 1974 Tripoli agreementmade between the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the MoroNational Liberation Front (MNLF). A more innovative approach wasemployed in the second peace process, this time with the GPH and theMoro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which is the focus of this section.

Engagement with Mid-Space ActorsJapan’s innovative approaches to mid-space actors in Mindanao can befound in four domains. The first interaction was made possible withthe launch of the MILF Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA), anorganisation created to undertake the formulation of the BangsamoroDevelopment Plan (JICA 2015a). The second connection was madethrough another MILF organisation called the Bangsamoro Leadershipand Management Institute (BLMI), which served as a vehicle of capacitydevelopment for the MILF combatants and emerging gatekeepers. Thethird point of contact was developed through Japan’s engagement inthe International Monitoring Team (IMT) through which JICA’s devel-opment experts were given access to non-permissive areas beyond thecontrol of the central government. The fourth encounter was the Consol-idation for Peace (COP) in Mindanao, a series of Track 1.5 mediationefforts created to provide opportunities for mid-space actors to exchangetheir views on the peace process (Ishikawa 2014: 87–92).

The BDA was established by the Central Committee of the MILFin 2002. While the BDA had close ties with the MILF, its leader-ship was not drawn directly from the MILF (Kilmesova 2015: 223).Instead BDA’s leadership was composed of respected members in theMaguindanao area, many of whom were medical doctors and formermembers of the Bangsamoro Development Council, a civil society organ-isation (ibid.). In other words, the BDA consisted of various gatekeepersand assumed a leadership role in not only fulfilling its mandate ofreconstruction, rehabilitation and development in the conflict-affectedcommunities in Bangsamoro but also transforming itself as a key lynchpinfor peacebuilding (Abubakar 2019: 194).

The BDA was recognised as Japan’s legitimate counterpart for territo-ries in Mindanao beyond the reach of the central government before thecomprehensive peace agreements were signed between the GPH and theMILF. It gave Japan a channel to provide a peace dividend to conflict-affected communities in Bangsamoro to entice mid-space actors into thepeace process. Japan also contributed to the capacity development of the


BDA (JICA 2015b) and, through the BDA, Japanese actors such as theJapanese Embassy and JICA were able to implement a variety of grass-roots development projects under the rubric of the Japan-BangsamoroInitiatives for Reconstruction and Development (J-BIRD) for the mostvulnerable people in conflict-affected areas in Bangsamoro (Kilmesova2015: 224).

The BLMI was established as a dividend of an agreement between theGPH and the MILF (Conciliation Resources 2012). It was a trainingfacility for MILF mid-space actors to enhance their capacities in prepara-tion for the establishment of the new Bangsamoro Government (ibid.;Abubakar 2019; Mabasa 2018). The GPH contributed to the opera-tional fees while the Japanese government, under the Grant Assistance forGrassroots Human Security Project, constructed the facility for the BLMI(ibid.; Felongco 2011). Under the Comprehensive Capacity Develop-ment Project for the Bangsamoro, JICA used the BLMI as a springboardto offer an alternative livelihood to the MILF combatants that could rein-force the efforts of the MILF gatekeepers who were supportive of thepeace process (JICA 2017; 2018).

The IMT was established in October 2004 in response to the cease-fire agreement made between the GPH and the MILF in 2003. Itis an unarmed cease-fire monitoring team originally composed of themilitary, police and civilian personnel from Malaysia, Brunei and Libya(MOFA 2010). Japan announced its participation in the IMT in July2006 in a statement titled “Japan Takes a More Active Role in theMindanao Peace Process” (MOFA 2006). Unlike other countries thathave despatched their military or police officers to the IMT, Japan endeav-oured to add a new department specialising in social and economicdevelopment to the IMT and send JICA personnel to that department,so that they would act as hinges of Japan’s development assistance inconflict-affected areas in Bangsamoro. Through the IMT’s activities ofcease-fire monitoring, Japanese representatives were able to access deepinto communities affected by conflict and communicate needed informa-tion on the ground back to the Japanese Embassy and the JICA office inManila for project formulation (Uesugi 2015).

Because of this special engagement in the grassroots communitiesunder the control of the MILF where access was not granted to ordinaryaid workers, Japanese actors were able to establish regular contact withmid-space actors in the hinterland. Legitimate requests for support madeby gatekeepers were transmitted, along with the situation analysis on the


ground made by Japanese actors in the IMT, to the Japanese Embassyin Manila, which were often responded to with tangible measures underthe banner of the J-BIRD in a timely manner. This combined efforthelped Japanese actors to earn the trust of mid-space actors who wereencouraged to support the peace process (ibid.).

The COP in Mindanao was another unprecedented attempt for JICAas it sought to engage itself with political exercises. Under the COPfrom January 2006 till June 2014 JICA organised six seminars withthe Universiti Sains Malaysia (Ishikawa 2014; JICA 2019). The COPstarted as an opportunity for mutual learning among sub-national stake-holders from different conflicts in Asia—Mindanao, Aceh and SouthernThailand. In the first two seminars and the fourth seminar, the partici-pants drawn from these conflict-affected areas shared their lessons (JICA2014). The third seminar, which was held in 2008 when the officialpeace talks for Mindanao had been stalled, was given a special task toserve as an alternative channel to the official mediation process. Theseminar focused on the peace process in Mindanao and the participantswere limited to mid-space actors in Mindanao such as civil society repre-sentatives, religious leaders, scholars, journalists and government officials(ibid.). Sachiko Ishikawa (2014), who was JICA’s interlocutor for theCOP, argued that the COP provided an optimal platform for addressingneeds and exchanging perspectives of the civil society actors in Mindanao.When the formal peace talks resumed as a result of the breakthroughsummit meeting held in Japan in August 2011, the fifth seminar was heldin January 2012 with Track 1 stakeholders such as representatives of theARMM government, all governors in the ARMM, and Members of theCongress (JICA 2019). After the comprehensive peace agreements weresigned in March 2014, the last seminar was held in Hiroshima, Japan,in June 2014, at which President Benigno S. Aquino III and MILF’sChairman Al Haj Murad Ebrahim were present. This time, the COPwas set out to further solidify the work for an inclusive framework ofthe peace process in Mindanao, and remaining issues were discussed andtrust relationships among the participating gatekeepers were consolidated(ibid.).

These COP sessions provided safe-space for formal and informal actorsto interact with each other, which promoted mutual understanding anda pivotal shift in the recalcitrant gatekeepers’ perspective, from isolationand power-hoarding to recognising the value of interaction and trust-building (Ishikawa 2014: 87–92). The COP broadened Japan’s horizons


of engagement, as Japanese actors such as JICA have been recognisedas trust-worthy and productive contributors to the peace process. TheCOP took the advantage of existing family ties between actors in Malaysiaand Mindanao that provided a basis for earning trust of mid-space actors(Ochiai 2019), who could reach out to various stakeholders outside theirown immediate sphere. Their presence helped establish the COP andnurtured it as a broader and more resilient network of interaction anddialogue.

The most important function of the COP was that it provided plat-forms for mid-space actors to interact not only with each other but alsowith other key stakeholders at different levels and intermediaries fromoutside. It gave gatekeepers, who were not allowed to participate in theofficial peace talks, a channel to express their concerns. In effect, the COPfunctioned to bridge horizontal, vertical and diagonal gaps. Throughthis bridge, Japanese actors gained informal access to mid-space actorsfrom different domains such as the MILF rebel community, the ARMMcommunity and the Christian community, and a chance to build trustwith them. For instance, two innovative Japanese ventures in Mindanaoemerged through discussion with mid-space actors at the COP. The firstone was the dispatch of JICA’s staff to the IMT, and the second one wasthe channelling of Japan’s ODA to conflict-affected areas in Bangsamorothrough the BDA (Uesugi 2015).

A detailed analysis of the interaction between Japanese actors and mid-space actors in Mindanao illuminates both strengths and existing gaps inJapanese approaches to peacebuilding. The lessons drawn from the casestudy of Mindanao are twofold. First, JICA has served as a spearhead ofJapanese initiatives and has attempted various innovative measures whichtranscended recurrent patterns of Japan’s peacebuilding practice. Second,JICA’s innovative initiatives were designed to create a conducive envi-ronment for mid-space actors to interact with each other and exert theirinfluence on the formal peace process, and they did not interfere with thesubstantive aspects of the peace process.

Shortcomings of Japan’s Approach

The previous section discussed innovative approaches of Japanese peace-building applied in Timor-Leste, Myanmar and Mindanao, which show-cased ways that Japanese actors engaged with mid-space actors inconflict-affected zones. What the previous section did not cover includes


shortcomings and negative effects/consequences of Japanese efforts.Hence, this section elucidates these unexplored aspects and suggests away forward to overcome these shortcomings.

Shortcomings

The first limitation is associated with Japan’s strength of being seen asnon-threatening. Japanese actors are only allowed to enter into non-kinetic permissive environments. This principle also applies to JapaneseSDF personnel as part of the pacifist doctrine enshrined in the JapaneseConstitution (Dobson 2003). While this policy of staying away from coer-cive measures has reassured aid-recipient governments of Japan’s altruisticmotives for engagement, it severely limited the parameters within whichJapanese actors were allowed to operate.

The second limitation is related to the fact that Japanese support isrequest-based, which gives the aid-recipient government decisional powerabout what projects are to be pursued and where (Uesugi 2014a: 215–220). This practice prevented Japanese actors from reaching those whowere diametrically opposing the aid-recipient government. In Mindanao,while the COP provided a platform for the rebel and governmental repre-sentatives to meet, it did not include representatives of certain key powerholders. For example, ‘warlord politicians’ who had vested interests inthe existing order and thus were hostile to the peace process that couldshake their power-basis, were not integrated into various Japan’s effortssuch as the COP (Espesor 2017). It is beyond the scope of this chapterto verify the cognitive impact which Japanese engagement had on theperceptions of mid-space actors. Rather it seeks to shed light on the factthat Japanese actors in each case established diagonal relationships withmid-space actors and facilitated vertical as well as horizontal interactionsconstructively among them.

As the hybrid peacebuilding theory indicates, it is vital for peace-builders to be able to engage with as many stakeholders as possibleto bridge existing cleavages. Underestimating the problem of unequalrepresentation of mid-space actors in the peace process and the influ-ence of local power structures that involve actors other than the primaryinterlocutors at the negotiation table can reinforce existing gaps in thedistribution of aid and development (Taniguchi 2019). As proven inthe case of Timor-Leste, marginalised and frustrated groups can under-mine peacebuilding endeavours and amplify disparities which already exist


in a society rather than leading to equitable and sustainable growth(Mac Ginty 2008; 2010). Japan’s avoidance of politically sensitive issues,as well as unequal distribution and accessibility of aid for a broadrange of mid-space actors, can cause existing conflicts to deteriorate, bywidening disparities on the ground, and furthering discrimination towardsmarginalised groups.

A Step Forward

The question is how to circumvent political, socio-economic and psycho-logical blockages placed by the central government in the channels thatlead to crucial mid-space actors in the hinterland, who are consideredhostile to the incumbent government or the ongoing peace process.One way to avoid this central dilemma is to acknowledge that peace-building endeavours are inherently ‘political’ (Hughes 2012: 102–103).Development projects have an indirect socio-economic impact, and theycan influence dynamics in the local context and reshape existing powerrelations. The decision over which project is to be implemented has signif-icant political implications for the prospect of peacebuilding. Thus, asdemonstrated in this chapter, Japanese actors can continue to utilise theirhumanitarian and development assistance as positive incentives to enticeboth the government and mid-space actors to move towards a peacefulsettlement. Yet, they should be aware of the unintended political conse-quences that their apolitical intervention could bring, and keep theirefforts responsive, adaptable and flexible in relation to the fluctuatingpolitical landscapes (de Coning 2018).

On this point, Japan should stay within accepted parameters and refrainfrom using the fact that peacebuilding is inherently political as an excuseto infringe upon the sovereign rights of other countries. Mutual trustremains a key factor for guaranteeing smooth execution of peacebuildingefforts. This brings us back to the dilemma of selectivity. The most prag-matic response is to uphold its long-term commitment and stay patientand tolerant towards slow progress in peace processes. While Japanesepeacebuilding actors can mobilise reinforcement from the developmentcommunity, including its private sector, they are essentially equipped withtwo tools for providing peace dividend: Yen loans and technical assistance.Japan needs to come up with more effective ways (including optimalcombinations of various aid modalities and projects) to employ a set of


incentives at its disposal to facilitate its access to and cultivate a trust-relationship with mid-space actors who have broken or dubious ties withthe aid-recipient government. At the same time, Japan should be open tovarious types of possibilities for expanding its horizon and gaining deeperaccesses to hidden mid-space actors in the hinterland.

Conclusion

This chapter adopted the typology of mid-space actors introduced inChapter 4 to verify the overarching theoretical arguments of this book. Itexamined in what way Japanese peacebuilding actors operated in threeconflict-affected areas focusing on their relationship-building attemptswith gatekeepers, and how Japanese actors were able to approach andcollaborate with them. Throughout the journey, this chapter strove toclarify where Japan already holds its potential for becoming a ‘hybridpeacebuilding facilitator’, a bridge between the Western interventionistsstyle of peacebuilding and the anthropological approaches indispens-able for realising emancipatory peacebuilding (Uesugi 2018b; Richmond2018).

Mid-space actors such as FALINTIL veterans in Timor-Leste,commanders of the Tatmadaw and armed ethnic groups in Myanmar, andrebel commanders and warlord politicians in Mindanao were all consid-ered ‘illiberal’ by the Western donors, as they did not root their leadershipin rational or democratic legitimacy, but their source of power lay in theirprestige and lineage. Thus, Western donors were reluctant to treat theseactors as legitimate in their dialogue-building approaches. Although secu-rity and intelligence actors of the West do not hesitate to collaborate withthese ‘illiberal’ elements, developmental actors of the West are usuallycovered with a façade and their ethical codes prohibit them from engagingwith these actors. On the contrary, Japanese actors explored this turbu-lent passage by nurturing the relationship with these ‘illiberal’ mid-spaceactors. In this respect, the notions of ‘non-interference’ and ‘apoliti-cal’ allowed Japanese actors to approach seemingly ‘illiberal’ gatekeepers.On this point, Japan has also utilised its private sector involvement ineconomic development to counter acts of spoiling by addressing materialneeds of gatekeepers and their community. Japan’s distinctive stance onthe primacy of trust-building through long-term commitment and mutualrespect has worked well in the three cases examined in this chapter.


By scrutinising Japan’s ability to work between the central govern-ment and mid-space actors, and to fill the gaps between locally groundedapproaches and those of Western donors, this chapter arrives at theconclusion that Japan has manifested its potential as a ‘hybrid peace-building facilitator’. Japanese approaches were instrumental in bridgingexisting cleavages between mid-space actors and Western donors, whichcontributed to achieving emancipatory local ownership and sustainingpeace in conflict-affected communities in Timor-Leste, Myanmar andMindanao (Manantan and Simangan 2019).

Being a non-Western member of the OECD, Japan identifies itselfas a bridge between the West and the Rest. This underlines Japan’sself-identity as a bridge-building nation, which is represented by its “kake-hashi” policy (Black 2013). Because Japan has been recognised as anintegral part of the OECD or the Global North, its unique positionalityand potential as a hybrid peacebuilding facilitator have been overlooked.But it does not mean that Japan can automatically claim such a role. Japanhas demonstrated its capacity to act as a hybrid peacebuilding facilitatorbetween Western approaches and locally grounded approaches in threespecific cases in Asia. If Japan would be able to overcome its shortcom-ings such as the lack of inclusiveness and access to mid-space actors inthe hinterland, Japan might be able to emerge as a full-fledged hybridpeacebuilding facilitator. While it is beyond the scope of this chapter toinvestigate Japan’s peacebuilding involvement outside of Asia, if Japan canfulfil similar functions elsewhere, Japan could rightfully claim its role as abridge between the West and the Rest.

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CHAPTER 9

Conclusion: Alternative Theory and Practiceof Peacebuilding in Asia

Yuji Uesugi, Anna Deekeling, Sophie Shiori Umeyama,and Lawrence McDonald-Colbert

Introduction

The aim of this volume is to highlight shortcomings in the practicalapplication of hybrid peacebuilding. A typology of mid-space actors ispresented to function as a bridge for the existing gap between theory andpractice. Insider-partial mediation is put forth as a suitable medium foraddressing the blockage between academic knowledge and operationali-sation on the ground without compromising the premises of complexity

Y. Uesugi (B) · A. Deekeling · S. S. Umeyama · L. McDonald-ColbertWaseda University, Tokyo, Japane-mail: [email protected]


S. S. Umeyamae-mail: [email protected]

L. McDonald-Colberte-mail: [email protected]


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188 Y. UESUGI ET AL.

and hybridity. This assumption is then tested in two case studies from aninsider perspective, highlighting additional key factors to be consideredwhen engaging with mid-space actors. Identity was explored through thecase of Cambodian Buddhist monks whilst the case study of Mindanaoanalysed the role of civil society. The case studies of China and Japanprovided perspectives of outside intervenors focusing on their peace-building endeavours in Asia. The aim of this closing chapter thus is tointegrate these findings and conclude whether or not the gap betweenhybrid peacebuilding theory and practice has been bridged.

Complexity and Hybridity

Chapter 3 assessed hybrid peacebuilding from a complexity perspec-tive, highlighting crucial takeaways for the successful operationalisationof hybridity. Adaptive peacebuilding (de Coning 2018) was furtherdiscussed as an approach which engages well with complexity. Both adap-tivity and hybridity address the concerns of a complex systems approachto peacebuilding, though the sites of their emphasis vary. An adaptivemethodology of peacebuilding that emphasises flexibility marries well witha hybrid epistemology for which inclusion and openness is paramount.The contentions of this chapter served as the theoretical foundationupon which Chapter 4 developed hybrid peacebuilding into a practicalapplication via constructing a typology of mid-space actors.

Complexity theory provides a deeper understanding of how dynamicand multifaceted systems like societies can lapse into conflict. Socialsystems must be self-sustainable and resilient so that they can respond andadapt to external or internal impulses. Resilience manifests within socialinstitutions that are rooted in the unique contexts of a society; powerstructures, cultural practices etc. are important sites to ensure robust-ness in the face of pressure. Thus, peace must be built upon the internalstrengths of a conflict-affected society in order to ensure its sustainability(de Coning 2016). It is therefore imperative that local peacebuilders areactive participants in the peacebuilding process so as to foster resilienceand achieve sustainable peace. The role of outside intervention is tofacilitate the process of societal transformation through supporting thecapacity of local mid-space actors to initiate and nurture long-lastingrelationships.

Adaptive peacebuilding proposes a complexity-informed approach thatcan respond to shifting dynamics on the ground, including inter-actor

9 CONCLUSION: ALTERNATIVE THEORY AND PRACTICE … 189

relations. Hybrid peacebuilding underlines the significance of payingattention to the idiosyncratic context of each conflict-affected society andadvocates for the inclusion of a broad array of representatives in the peace-building process (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013). The primary concernfor adaptive and hybrid peacebuilding is the centrality of dynamism inthe relations between actors; how they constantly influence one another,how their interactions influence them, and how such feedback affectsthe peacebuilding process over time and space (Richmond and Mitchell2012).

A complexity-informed approach illuminates the varying capacities ofparticipating actors and highlights the implications of these capacities forpeacebuilders. Chapter 5 demonstrated that identity can be mobilised fora dual capacity of connector and divider. Identity itself is further partof complex emergence and intersectionality, thus transforming over time.Chapter 6 amplified this finding through its discussion of the role of civilsociety in Mindanao. It stressed that use of oversimplified binaries––‘lib-eral’ and ‘illiberal’ actors—can block pathways to relationship building toactors on the ground. Chapter 6 further accounted for the omission ofsupport for certain actors and found that their inclusion or exclusion has adirect impacting on a peace process by destabilising local power balances.A complexity-informed approach cautions prospective interveners that thesocial context in which actors exist must be taken into account and thatintervention may lead to unpredictable outcomes. Actors are not inher-ently trapped in a single, fixed identity such as ‘illiberal’. Rather, theiridentity is subject to change and is influenced by their position withinrelationships and surroundings.

The premise of complexity and hybridity lies in the careful consid-eration of all dynamics whilst maintaining adaptivity to change. Conse-quently, how can one conceive of a practical approach that would navigatethrough constantly evolving complexity, emerging relations, and unpre-dictability? Chapter 4 addressed this question by discussing a typology ofmid-space actors, which could be used by outsiders when extending theirsupport to a conflict-affected society.

Mid-Space Actors and Hybridity

Mid-space actors are defined as local leaders who are equipped withunique social attributes that support their function as gatekeepers fortheir respected communities. To fulfil this role, they encompass the ability


to tap into various sources of power, both formal and informal, whilepossessing a deep cultural and normative understanding of their locality.They can develop distinctive capacities that enable them to connectwith actors beyond their immediate sphere of influence. These capaci-ties include (1) transformative relationships (the ability and willingnessto interact with key stakeholders outside one’s immediate domain), (2)locally grounded legitimacy (a collective trust of the constituency in theirleadership, which is generated and justified through leaders’ access topower, cultural norms, and other information and resources), and (3)laissez-passer (a special access to idiosyncratic information and resourcesthat are unattainable to strangers). Because outside intervenors usuallydo not possess these critical capacities, it is essential that they identify andcollaborate with these mid-space actors in order to create positive impactson the peace process.

The empirical studies of this volume demonstrated that mid-spaceactors emerge as either bridge-builders or spoilers depending on theirrelational positionality in time and space regarding the conflict and peaceprocess. This suggests that acts of spoiling committed by mid-space actorsshould not be linked to their inherently ‘illiberal’ nature or selfish motives.Instead, they may obstruct access of other stakeholders simply becausethey wish to protect their community from unknown outside interven-tion, or to draw attention from and deliver messages to outsiders. Theiract of spoiling may be a side-effect triggered by other efforts to bridge adifferent gap (Newman and Richmond 2006).

In Chapter 5 Cambodian Buddhist monks served as an example ofmid-space actors who succeeded in bridging horizontal gaps amongdifferent communities yet failed to establish a needed vertical bridgeto reach the top/national stakeholders. It was argued that the identityof these monks functioned in both ways: it facilitated the horizontalbridge-building while hindering the vertical bridge-building. Identity isintertwined with the three capacities as the consciousness of self andothers can (1) influence the decision (or perceived ability) to approachoutsiders, (2) help create intra-community bonding that grants legiti-macy, and (3) deny the access of outsiders to internally shared knowledge.The case study of Cambodian monks indicated that recognising thedisposition of mid-space actors’ identity was key to appreciating thebridge-building prospects in this particular context. It also suggestedthat the identities of mid-space actors influenced the perceived relationsbetween them and other stakeholders at different levels or spheres and


shaped the ability of mid-space actors to connect stakeholders and createdaccess-points for dialogue.

Chapter 6 discussed how civil society organisations in Mindanaocontributed to the establishment of a shared identity among differentactors, especially between international actors and local communities,including marginalised groups who were initially excluded from the state-led peace process. The case study demonstrated the dichotomisation ofcommonly employed narratives in peacebuilding, as was done for local vs.international. By exposing these polarised spaces of interaction, it becameclear that the concept of ‘illiberal’ actors is a phenomenon imagined by‘liberal’ actors. ‘Liberal’ actors’ domination of the discourse led to theultimate classification of ‘illiberal’ actors. Such a classification reinforcesan oversimplified binary of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, hindering equal and inclu-sive participation of all relevant stakeholders in the peace process. Whilethis can be seen as a negative effect of the local-liberal binary, throughadopting the international (or liberal) norm frameworks mid-space actorshave marshalled resources from outside of their immediate social realmand translated their needs into the narratives of international actors.

By functioning as cross-cultural translators, civil society representativesin Mindanao established a diagonal bridge between the local/bottom andinternational actors, channelling external resources and aid toward thegrassroots. They also succeeded in connecting horizontal gaps betweendifferent communities by building transformative relationships to cutacross social cleavages on the ground. Yet, the biggest challenge theyfaced was the lack of effective vertical links to the top/national level,which prevented them from realising a more inclusive approach topeacebuilding.

Chapters 7 and 8 demonstrated how the identity of an outside inter-venor would affect the ability of outsiders to engage with mid-spaceactors. Chapter 7 revealed that due to its state centric focus and elite-driven modality, the Chinese peacebuilding approach lacks connectionswith potential mid-space actors who can articulate the grassroots realityregarding the subaltern needs on the ground. China may have to diver-sify its own peacebuilding agencies beyond conventional state actors toinclude Chinese State-Owned Enterprises or expand its partnership withnon-state actors in the recipient country to overcome this limitation.In addition, the lack of a critical stance against authoritarian regimeshas given Chinese endeavours a reputation of supporting illiberal peace,although China refrains from meddling in the internal affairs of other


states. While strict adherence to the Westphalian principle helped establishtrusting relationships between the two Asian donor governments and aid-recipient governments, such a practice may induce negative repercussionsfrom the Western donors as Asian ‘pragmatic’ approaches can under-mine Western ‘dogmatic’ approaches. Japan has succeeded in projectingits efforts as complementary to those of the Western donors, given thatJapan’s fundamental polity is democracy. On the other hand, China, asa non-democracy, faces difficulties convincing Western donors that itsefforts are complementary in the same way as Japan. The question ofhow China and Western donors can find a way to coordinate with eachother without converting their fundamental polity and identity remains.

Chapter 8 revealed that Japan maintained a dual identity as a successfulexample of modernisation and post-WWII recovery, which helped Japanto function as a bridge between the West and Asia. This dual identityprovided Japan with the necessary access and expertise to engage withmid-space actors in a meaningful manner. As Japanese aid functions withinframeworks set out by a recipient government, Japanese peacebuildershave been able to build connections to actors that might be blocked forWestern donors. At the same time, unlike China, Japan identifies itself as acivilian power and is unable to offer military aid and sanctions to warringfactions, thus it lacks leverage over recalcitrant mid-space actors. Never-theless, Japan’s grassroots-based and community development projectshave been operated by Japanese NGOs often in partnership with theJapan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and/or the Japaneseembassies in the respected countries, which has given Japan an extensivereach and commitment to actors on the ground. With this Japan was ableto create a unique access point for communication and point of interac-tion with mid-space actors. The type of interactions are various, such ascapacity-building, community development and facilitating discussion.

The two cases jointly illustrated that the identity frames of outsideintervenors have shaped their approaches to peacebuilding and influencedtheir engagement with mid-space actors in the aid-recipient societies.

Alternative Approaches to Peacebuilding

Chapters 7 and 8, which examined the efforts of two leading peace-builders in Asia, China and Japan respectively, illustrated two alternativeapproaches to peacebuilding. These approaches, whilst sharing somesimilarities, are distinct and both represent a considerable deviation


from conventional Western-style peacebuilding. Chinese ‘developmentalpeace’ approaches focus on large infrastructure and thus resemble theeconomic peacebuilding approach discussed in Chapter 2. Unlike theWestern liberal peacebuilding, Chinese approaches are not liberal value-driven, foregoing concerns for democracy and human rights and focusinginstead on technical construction projects. Both Chinese and Japaneseapproaches respect the sovereignty of the aid-recipient country and retainthe decision-making power of national governments. Whereas Japaneseapproaches include bottom-up feedback mechanisms to involve on-the-ground beneficiaries, Chinese endeavours lack such a dynamic and thusface a significant inclusivity gap.

The lack of sufficient bottom-up projects that encourage local owner-ship and participation of grassroots communities means that Chineseapproaches miss an imperative aspect of hybrid peacebuilding. Chineseapproaches further lack the capacity to build trusting relationships anddiagonal bridges between international and grassroots actors as theydo not engage sufficiently with the hinterland. These deficits preventChina from functioning as a truly hybrid peacebuilder. However, dueto the size and magnitude of aid capacity China possesses, the influenceof Chinese approaches on the conventional peacebuilding endeavourscannot be underestimated. Unless guided in a more inclusive direction,Chinese approaches threaten to dismantle the nuanced understanding ofinteractive processes of peacebuilding developed by hybrid peacebuildingtheory. As proposed in Chapter 7, peacebuilding actors such as Japancould collaborate with China to supplement the shortcomings of Chineseapproaches by relying on trust-relationships with mid-space actors whohave access to the communities at the grassroots level.

Chapter 8 discussed strengths and weaknesses of Japanese peace-building by examining three cases of Japan’s involvement in Asia in whichJapanese actors attempted to engage with mid-space actors in conflict-affected areas without compromising their positive relationships with therespective national governments. As an integral member of the Organisa-tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Japan canoperate within the framework of the OECD standards and when appro-priate it can influence the behaviour of Western donors, ensuring theirefforts to support mid-space actors in building horizontal, vertical anddiagonal bridges across societal cleavages.

Both China and Japan enjoy unique positions that allow them toengage and work with ‘illiberal’ actors who are side-lined by Western


peacebuilders. Japan’s strength lies in its ability to remain within accept-able parameters that exist between local norms/customs and Westernstandards/principles, whilst China’s strength stems from its immensematerial power, enabling it to formulate and finance numerous develop-ment projects. Japan could assist China in identifying acceptable parame-ters, although their geopolitical rivalry may hinder cooperation. Collabo-ration between these two Asian leaders has a potential for constructing anew innovative and effective alternative to Western liberal peacebuildingon the ground.

Key Findings

This study sought to bridge contemporary gaps between hybrid peace-building theory and practice so as to achieve its effective operational-isation. It explored how engagement with mid-space actors and theiraccumulated local understanding might aid intervenors in supporting on-the-ground peacebuilding. Guided by the insights of complex systemtheory and the mid-space actor typology, four empirical studies wereconducted: two from an insider’s perspectives (Cambodia and Mindanao),and two from outsider’s perspectives (China and Japan).

This study was based on the premise that theory and practice shouldwork hand in hand to enhance each other’s advantages. Theories providegeneral guidance on what and how to analyse but they need to be comple-mented by analytical lenses such as complexity and hybridity so that theoutcomes can be adapted to fit into the contextual reality. In practice,these analytical lenses help peacebuilders visualise a shared and systemicunderstanding of the local situation, allowing them to stay flexible andadaptive, and thus tuned.

Hybrid peacebuilding theory demands consideration of the inherentcomplexity of social systems and inclusivity of all relevant stakeholders.The scope should therefore not be fragmented by limiting it to individualelements of system. It is important to pay attention to the micro rela-tionships among actors in a local context, and the macro field of theseactors and their environment. Conflict-affected societies should not beseen as static structures. Rather, they are dynamic possesses and constantlyemerging relationships, highlighting that outsiders can only be relevant ifthey remain open and responsive to such changes in the environment ofintervention.


This volume tackled the question of how to connect the altruisticmotives of external interveners to both national elites and grassrootsactors through engaging with mid-space actors. It is the contentionof this book that external interveners can assist the emergence of ahybrid peace based on locally grounded legitimacy by engaging withgrassroots stakeholders alongside the national elite. This in turn can beachieved through the mobilisation of mid-space actors who themselveshave legitimacy grounded in their interactions with local constituencies.These mid-space actors can provide access points for wider society, actingas bridges between the international community, national governments,grassroots organisations and local communities. These mid-space actorscan be sourced from a plethora of locations. They may be cultural leaders,religious leaders, of NGO members. The Bangsamoro People’s Consulta-tive Assembly (BPCA) and the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA),discussed in Chapters 6 and 8 respectively, are some good examples of amid-space agency introduced in this book. Both institutions were estab-lished by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) as a forum fordiscussion and a site of engagement with local populations. The BPCAwas instrumental in providing inputs and evaluating policies regardingthe negotiated autonomy between MILF and the Philippine government.The BDA offered a venue for international actors to engage with sub-national communities and the beneficiaries on the ground to formulateresponsive development plans. Mid-space actors such as the BPCA andthe BDA provide the essential function of network-creation, acting asan entry-point and mediator between international or national bodiesand those communities most affected by conflict. The relationships builtby mid-space actors are able to be utilised to build trust within localcommunities for peacebuilding efforts and confer commitment down-stream from top-level to bottom-level participants. Collaboration betweenlocal, national and international actors creates deeper understanding,streamlines communication and aids in information-sharing and normdiffusion. This means that national-level efforts are going to be moreamenable to local conceptions of peace and justice, while simultaneouslymanaging expectations to strengthen against spoiling.

Conclusively, this study demonstrated that mid-space actors couldprovide a viable focal point for encouraging the establishment of self-resilient social institutions from within without dictating the contentof such emergences. It also showed that the conceptual framework ofhybridity could improve current models of peacebuilding. Ultimately, this


volume highlighted the need for an understanding of local peace narra-tives in the context of complex post-conflict societies. It also emphasisedthe need for a commitment to responsiveness and trust-building fromoutside actors to their insider counterparts. Overall, it contributes to thegrowing literature on peacebuilding by underlining the significance ofawareness for change from within, which would lead to sustainable andresilient institutions of peace.

References


de Coning, C. (2018, March). Adaptive Peacebuilding. International Affairs,94(2), 301–317.

Mac Ginty, R., & Richmond, O. P. (2013). The Local Turn in Peace Building:a Critical Agenda for Peace. Third World Quarterly, 34(5), 763–783.

Newman, E., & Richmond, O. P. (2006). Peace Building and Spoilers. Conflict,Security & Development, 6(1), 101–110.

Richmond, O. P., & Mitchell, A. (2012). Hybrid Forms of Peace: From EverydayAgency to Post-Liberalism. London: Palgrave.




Index

A

Access, 4, 17, 30, 61, 64, 66, 68,70–72, 74–77, 109, 128, 139,141–143, 148, 149, 159, 163,164, 173, 174, 176, 179, 180,190, 192, 193, 195

Adaptive peacebuilding, 9, 14, 37, 38,51–55, 128, 129, 133, 150, 188

Adaptivity, 40, 41, 49, 50, 54, 188,189

Analytical, 2, 6, 15, 17, 28–30, 45,47, 54, 59–61, 73, 77, 93, 105,194

Approach, 1, 2, 7–9, 11, 15, 16,23, 26–28, 30, 31, 37, 38,41, 42, 49, 51–53, 55, 60–63,71–75, 81, 85, 91, 102–105,120, 128–130, 132–137, 139,140, 142–144, 146, 149–151,159–165, 167, 168, 171–173,179, 188–191, 193

Asia, 1–3, 5, 13, 17, 22, 26, 94, 105,108, 115, 127, 129, 131, 133,

148, 159–161, 164, 175, 180,188, 192, 193

Assistance, 2, 6, 17, 25, 38, 75, 101,102, 108, 112, 113, 116, 117,131, 162, 167, 172, 174, 178

BBackground, 64–66, 68, 82, 84, 85,

129, 166Behaviour, 10, 24, 26, 28, 38–41, 44,

46, 48, 53, 64, 66, 74, 85, 87,91, 163, 172, 193

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 13,16, 129, 131, 133, 137, 138,140–143, 145–150

Binary(ies), 5, 6, 15, 16, 29, 31, 66,85, 86, 100, 104, 105, 119, 189,191

Bottom-up, 16, 24, 76, 91, 100, 112,120, 149, 150, 193

Bridge-builder, 7, 10–12, 16, 42, 46,60–62, 64, 66–69, 71, 77, 83,86, 90, 92, 93, 109, 114, 128,145, 150, 160–162, 164, 190

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2021Y. Uesugi et al. (eds.), Operationalisation of Hybrid Peacebuildingin Asia, Security, Development and Human Rights in East Asia,https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67758-9

197

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67758-9

198 INDEX

Bridge-building, 8, 10, 11, 15, 61,64, 66, 67, 72, 73, 76, 84,87–89, 91, 168, 180, 190

Buddhism, 86–88Buddhist Monks, 2, 10, 15, 65, 66,

82, 83, 86, 88, 89, 91, 93, 94,105, 170, 188, 190

CCambodia, 2, 3, 5, 13–15, 65, 82,

86, 87, 90, 91, 93, 94, 101, 105,110, 134, 194

Capacity-building, 72, 74, 75, 108,118, 192

Change, 4, 8, 10, 38, 40, 41, 43–46,48–53, 66, 74, 136, 148, 150,189, 194, 196

China, 2, 3, 5, 13, 14, 16, 127–151,188, 191–194

Chinese, 13, 14, 23, 127–130,132–142, 145–150, 191, 193

Civil society, 13, 16, 47, 82, 88, 89,93, 99, 100, 102, 103, 106–110,112–115, 118, 119, 121, 149,168, 175, 189

Civil society organisations (CSOs), 2,13, 99, 101, 102, 105, 108–111,113–116, 118–120, 173, 191

Cleavages, 7–9, 28, 60, 128, 160,164, 177, 180, 191, 193

Communication, 26, 42, 47, 60,62–64, 74, 192, 195

Communities, 4, 5, 25, 31, 42,43, 50–53, 60, 63–65, 69,72, 74–76, 88, 90, 101–103,106–108, 110–113, 117, 120,128, 144, 146, 148–150, 162,164, 171–174, 180, 189–191,193, 195

Complexity, 2, 5–9, 14, 15, 29,38–46, 48, 50, 54, 55, 63, 66,74, 77, 106, 188, 189, 194

Conflict, 11, 15, 23, 24, 29, 31, 38,40, 45, 46, 50–52, 55, 60–67,71–77, 82, 83, 86, 87, 89,91–94, 99–102, 106, 107, 110,116–118, 121, 129, 132, 133,135–139, 142, 144, 148–151,163, 164, 168, 170, 172, 174,178, 188, 190, 195

Conflict-affected, 8, 16, 17, 24–26,29, 31, 63, 65, 70, 71, 75, 77,112, 113, 128, 135, 160, 162,169, 171–176, 179, 180, 188,189, 193, 194

Context, 5, 8, 11, 13, 24–26, 29, 30,39–42, 44–48, 50–52, 54, 55,62, 65, 66, 73, 75, 77, 83, 84,89, 91, 93, 94, 102, 103, 109,119, 121, 164, 178, 189, 190,194, 196

Contextuality, 40, 46–48Cultural background, 60, 63Culture, 5, 25, 26, 109

DDemand, 2, 67, 74, 110, 111, 194Descriptive, 5Descriptive lens, 2, 5, 73Development, 5, 14, 23, 24, 31, 43,

52, 53, 107, 108, 110, 115, 130,132, 134, 135, 137–141, 145,147, 149, 150, 162, 163, 165,167, 169, 172–174, 177–179,195

Developmental peace, 16, 127–129,131–135, 137, 139, 146, 147,149, 151, 193

Development projects, 103, 116, 145,161, 162, 165, 178

Diagonal gap, 62, 65, 67, 75, 128,164, 176

INDEX 199

Dialogue, 15, 27, 59–62, 64, 70, 72,75, 109, 143, 168, 170, 171,176, 191

Dynamism, 5, 40, 44, 54, 66, 189

EEconomy, 51, 129, 142, 149, 161,

162Elites, 30, 62, 65, 72, 83, 88, 90,

103, 105, 128, 147, 148Emergence, 4, 15, 25, 30, 38, 39, 44,

45, 90, 100, 103, 189, 195Empirical, 2, 7, 13–15, 31, 76, 119,

160, 165, 190, 194Empower, 16, 27, 100Engagement, 3, 5, 9, 26, 45, 46, 50,

54, 60, 61, 67, 70, 72–75, 77,87, 89, 90, 109, 111, 117–120,128, 136, 140, 143, 147–149,151, 164, 165, 167, 169,172–174, 177, 192, 194, 195

Environment, 8, 11, 39–41, 46–52,54, 63, 71, 73, 75, 77, 82, 85,89, 91, 104, 107, 115, 117, 119,127, 129, 147, 176, 177, 194

FFeminism, 6, 7, 29

GGap, 6, 8, 11, 13, 17, 21, 30, 62, 64,

65, 68, 73, 75, 77, 83, 88–91,93, 113, 128, 176, 177, 180,188, 190, 193, 194

Gatekeepers, 7, 8, 10, 11, 14–16,42, 43, 45, 60, 63–68, 70–77,114, 128, 137, 138, 140,143–145, 148–150, 160, 165,170, 172–176, 179, 189

Grassroots, 4, 10, 15, 28, 62, 65, 68,69, 88, 104, 107–110, 112, 113,116, 128, 135, 137–139, 144,146–151, 164, 167, 174, 191,193, 195

Grassroots actor, 30, 83, 116, 193,195

HHistory, 50, 64, 87Horizontal gap, 62, 65, 89, 190, 191Hybridisation, 1–7, 9, 11, 25, 27, 30,

94, 103, 104, 111, 120Hybridity, 1–7, 14–16, 21, 22, 25,

26, 29–32, 37, 39–43, 45, 48,49, 54, 60, 61, 63, 70, 76, 85,100, 103–105, 110, 111, 120,188, 189, 194, 195

Hybrid peace, 4, 100, 102, 105, 195Hybrid peacebuilding, 2–7, 9–17,

22, 23, 26–29, 31, 37, 38, 40,41, 49–51, 54, 60, 61, 63, 76,78, 82–86, 90, 93, 94, 100,102–106, 111, 117, 119, 120,128, 133, 135, 149, 150, 180,187–189

Hybrid peacebuilding theory, 2, 5, 6,9, 12, 17, 21, 28–31, 82, 159,169, 177, 188, 193

IIdentity, 2, 3, 6–12, 15, 16, 25,

29, 30, 42, 50, 51, 64, 66, 73,82–94, 114, 116, 144, 145, 147,188–192

Identity Politics, 81, 83, 86Impact, 2, 6, 13, 24, 30, 42–44, 47,

71, 73, 107, 108, 129, 146–148,168, 177, 178, 190

Influence, 2, 4, 5, 8, 10–12, 30, 38,43, 46, 48, 53, 64, 68, 69, 74,

200 INDEX

76, 87, 101, 108–110, 113, 114,120, 148, 166, 176–178, 189,190, 193

Information, 30, 39, 42, 44, 54,61–66, 68, 70–72, 74–77, 112,147, 160, 164, 167, 168, 174,190, 195

Insider, 2, 3, 14, 28, 196

Insider-partial mediator, 6, 15, 31, 62,70–72, 78, 162

Insider perspective, 188

Institutions, 15–17, 22, 23, 26, 30,31, 39, 42, 47, 48, 50, 51, 63,64, 76, 84, 90, 99–103, 105,108, 110, 116, 120, 131, 132,135, 150, 163, 188, 195, 196

Integration, 39, 106

Interaction, 1, 5–7, 22, 25, 26, 31,39–45, 47–50, 54, 55, 63, 64,70, 76, 77, 82, 85, 93, 94, 101,103, 104, 119, 120, 164, 173,175–177, 189, 191, 192, 195

International, 1, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11–13,15, 23, 25–27, 29, 30, 38, 46,47, 55, 59, 62, 63, 65, 69–77,81, 82, 86, 93, 94, 99–104,108–114, 116–121, 128–132,134, 135, 137, 139, 141, 142,146, 148, 149, 161, 191, 193,195

Intervener, 3, 4, 6, 9–11, 25, 50,72–75, 77, 189, 195

Intervention, 3, 4, 6–10, 12–14, 26,27, 30, 38, 41, 45, 51–54, 60,62, 71, 72, 75, 77, 100, 101,105, 110, 112, 116, 131, 161,164, 165, 168, 178, 188–190,194

Iteration, 52

JJapan, 2, 3, 5, 13, 14, 17, 113,

130, 132, 134, 135, 145–147,149, 160–163, 165, 166, 169,170, 172–175, 178–180, 188,192–194

Japan International CooperationAgency (JICA), 75, 101, 132,146, 162, 164, 165, 167, 169,171–176, 192

KKnowledge, 13, 25, 26, 38–40, 43,

45, 52, 55, 60–62, 72, 74–76,87, 109, 120, 147, 160, 164,187, 190

LLegitimacy, 4, 11, 24, 45, 61, 63, 64,

68–70, 72–75, 82, 87, 90, 103,104, 109, 114, 117, 120, 172,179, 190, 195

Liberal, 3, 5, 13, 16, 22–24, 26, 29,31, 49, 63, 70, 101, 103–105,107, 129, 132, 133, 135, 148,150, 189, 191, 193

Liberal peacebuilding, 5, 14, 16,23–30, 49, 63, 82, 99, 103, 116,129–133, 150, 151, 193, 194

Local actors, 3, 4, 26, 27, 38,49, 61, 62, 70, 72, 82, 85,100, 102–104, 109, 111, 114,116–118, 120, 149, 164

Local/bottom, 15, 59, 62, 63, 68,69, 75, 77, 191

Locally grounded legitimacy, 3, 4, 11,27, 61, 69, 70, 76, 77, 92, 195

Local stakeholders, 3, 9, 59, 107Local turn, 3, 22, 24, 25, 63, 99, 100

INDEX 201

MMarginalisation, 100Mediation, 7, 15, 42, 62, 64, 71, 73,

75, 118, 134, 137, 142, 172,173, 175, 187

Mediator, 61, 71, 72, 74, 115,138–140, 150, 195

Methodology, 15, 39, 40, 52–55, 188Mid-space, 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 15, 43, 46,

60–63, 69, 70, 72, 75, 76, 91,94, 128, 137, 167, 168, 195

Mid-space actor, 2, 4, 6–9, 12,14–17, 28, 31, 59–61, 63, 64,67–70, 72, 73, 75–78, 82–86,91, 92, 94, 109, 114, 128, 137,139, 144, 147, 149, 159, 160,162, 164–168, 170, 172–180,187–195

Mid-space gatekeepers, 2, 4, 7, 9, 10,77, 148

Military, 14, 86, 131, 136, 138–140,169, 170, 174, 192

Mindanao, 2, 3, 5, 12–14, 16, 17, 47,70, 75, 100–102, 105–120, 160,164, 165, 172, 173, 175–177,179, 180, 188, 189, 191, 194

Myanmar, 5, 13, 16, 17, 69, 89, 92,94, 112, 128, 129, 134–141,143, 145–151, 160, 164, 165,169–172, 176, 179, 180

NNation, 107, 130, 180National, 1, 2, 4, 12, 22, 65, 69, 82,

83, 108, 109, 113, 118, 120,130, 162, 167, 170, 193, 195

National elites, 65, 195National top, 4, 15, 17, 59, 62, 63,

65, 68, 75, 77, 190, 191Negotiation, 7, 42, 48, 65, 66, 71,

72, 74, 75, 77, 103, 111, 171,177

Non-governmental organisations(NGOs), 2, 101, 103, 105,108–110, 112, 116–119, 135,146, 147, 149, 150, 162, 164,165, 167, 168, 192

Non-interference, 163, 179Non-intervention, 129–137, 139,

143, 149

OOperationalise, 2, 5, 9, 30, 31, 43, 76Outside, 1–4, 10, 11, 15, 25, 26,

30, 45, 47, 60, 61, 64, 68–70,74–77, 82, 116, 118, 136, 138,144, 160, 161, 164, 176, 180,188, 190–192, 196

Outsider, 2–4, 8–10, 14, 23, 26, 30,31, 61, 68, 72, 75, 110, 116,128, 145, 160, 164, 189–191,194

Outsider-neutral mediators, 71–73Outsider perspective, 2, 75, 194

PPeace process, 2, 8, 9, 11–13, 15, 27,

28, 42, 43, 47, 51, 60, 61, 65,66, 71, 74, 75, 77, 85, 86, 90,91, 93, 94, 104–120, 128, 137,140–142, 150, 164, 170–178,189–191

Philippines, 2, 5, 12, 47, 75, 100,101, 106, 107, 110, 115,117–119, 128, 160

Pitfall, 5, 12, 25, 29, 82Platform, 13, 64, 70, 74, 75, 99, 108,

109, 112, 113, 118, 145, 146,167, 168, 175–177

Political Power, 15, 69, 70, 107, 108Post-conflict, 12, 15, 22, 23, 59, 62,

66, 67, 73, 82, 85, 88, 89, 92,

202 INDEX

93, 103, 107, 110, 128, 132,135, 165, 196

Power, 2, 4–7, 10, 12, 13, 16, 30,48, 49, 51, 52, 60, 63–68,70–72, 74, 76, 77, 83–86, 100,101, 103, 104, 109, 111, 118,120, 121, 131, 132, 137, 142,148, 159, 161, 164, 177–179,188–190, 192–194

Practical, 5, 8, 12, 15, 17, 30, 60, 61,84, 93, 102, 104, 120, 187

Practical approach, 73, 76, 189

RRadical Openness, 40, 46, 47Relationality, 4, 6–8, 40, 42, 43, 54Relations, 7, 16, 24, 40, 41, 43, 45,

46, 50, 54, 60, 61, 63, 64, 67,70, 75, 83–85, 100, 104, 111,121, 136–142, 148, 178, 189,190

Relationships, 2, 4, 7, 9, 17, 22, 23,31, 43, 44, 52, 62, 64, 65, 67,71, 76, 84, 85, 89, 100, 102,110, 111, 120, 138, 144, 149,163, 175, 177, 189, 192–195

Religious Actors, 83Resilience, 43, 49–52, 74, 137, 149,

188Resistance, 25, 103, 105, 111, 120Responsibility, 4, 72, 73, 88, 131,

142Role, 4, 7, 9, 11, 13, 16, 38, 41,

42, 45, 50, 52, 60, 61, 64, 67,69, 71–73, 75, 81, 82, 86, 89,92–94, 99, 101, 108, 109, 112,114, 118, 133, 138–140, 143,145, 146, 148, 162, 169, 170,173, 180, 188, 189

SSelection, 52, 53Shortcomings, 15–17, 23, 89, 90,

111, 136, 146, 147, 160, 176,177, 180, 187, 193

Skills, 60, 61, 72, 74–77, 164Social position, 30, 60, 63, 65, 68,

71, 76, 77, 87, 164Society, 7, 8, 26–28, 31, 32, 39,

42, 44–46, 48–52, 60–63, 65,70–73, 75, 82, 85, 86, 88, 89,91, 92, 107, 108, 128, 130, 132,135, 151, 163, 165, 178, 188,189, 195

Socio-economic, 178Southeast Asia, 110, 112, 161Sovereignty, 4, 14, 27, 130, 131, 134,

193Spoiler, 16, 42, 43, 60, 64, 66–68,

74, 77, 83, 85, 86, 92, 109, 116,160, 190

Stakeholders, 1, 3, 4, 7, 12, 17, 26,30, 31, 42, 52, 53, 62, 72, 85,128, 144, 145, 160, 170, 172,175–177, 190, 191, 194, 195

Sustainability, 3, 188System, 7, 8, 25, 29, 37–55, 83, 101,

110, 113, 116, 128, 133, 188,194

TTheory, 3, 5, 6, 8–11, 21–23, 25, 30,

37, 39–41, 48, 53, 54, 64, 85,127, 132, 142, 187, 194

Timor-Leste, 5, 13, 17, 23, 45, 101,105, 112, 160, 164–168, 176,177, 179, 180

Top-down, 16, 39, 50, 59, 63, 71,76, 89, 100, 104, 112, 116, 120,133, 144, 149, 150

Transformative relationships, 8, 10,50, 60, 63, 66–68, 70, 72,

INDEX 203

74–77, 84, 90, 102, 109, 144,145, 148

Trust, 4, 67–69, 72, 76, 90, 134,143, 144, 167, 168, 170, 172,176, 178, 190, 195

Trust-building, 171, 175, 179, 196Typology, 6, 17, 42, 43, 45, 46, 50,

54, 59–61, 67, 68, 72–74, 76,77, 164, 179, 187–189, 194

UUnited Nations Peacekeeping

Operations (UNPKO), 127, 133United Nations (UN), 22, 23, 29, 38,

73, 87, 101, 105, 141, 147

Universal, 27, 76, 163Universal norms, 5

VValues, 5, 10, 13, 23, 26, 27, 29, 30,

47, 67, 70, 76, 90, 105, 116,133

Variation, 27, 42, 52, 110, 128Vertical gap, 62, 65, 89, 90

WWestern actors, 130, 134

Operationalisation of Hybrid Peacebuilding in Asia - OAPEN

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