on terror? human rights in southeast asia before and after 9/11

CASUALTIES OF THE WAR

ON TERROR?

HUMAN RIGHTS IN

SOUTHEAST ASIA

BEFORE AND AFTER 9/11Pablo Pareja Alcaraz

Serie: AsiaCasualties of the War on Terror? Human Rights in Southeast AsiaBefore and After 9/11

© Pablo Pareja Alcaraz© Fundació CIDOB, de esta edición

Edita: CIDOB edicionsElisabets, 1208001 BarcelonaTel. 93 302 64 95Fax. 93 302 21 18E-mail: [email protected]:http://www.cidob.org

Depósito legal: B-46802-2001ISSN: 1696-9987

documentos

Casualties of the War on Terror? Human Rights inSoutheast Asia Before and After 9/11

Pablo Pareja Alcaraz*

October 2003

* Licenciado en Ciencias Políticas y de la Administración por la UniversidadPompeu Fabra; becario de colaboración del Área de Derecho InternacionalPúblico y Relaciones Internacionales del Departamento de Derecho de laUniversidad Pompeu Fabra.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of international counter-

terrorist policies on the protection of human rights in Southeast Asia. As in

many other areas in the world, the first reaction of this region to the events

of September 11, 2001 was the condemnation of the terrorist attacks and

the offer of support to the United States. With the outbreak of the war in

Afghanistan and the emergence of internal pressures coming from Muslim

communities, the position of several Southeast Asian countries became

deliberately more ambiguous and nuanced. This was the case of Indonesia

and Malaysia, two states that have wavered in their support for the United

States and its goal to combat “rogue states” suspicious of hiding

international terrorists. At first sight, this situation does not seem surprising.

A more detailed analysis shows, however, that the situation is certainly more

paradoxical. Albeit with varying intensities, states like Indonesia and

Malaysia, which have expressed legal and moral reservations toward the

United States’ attempts to combat international terrorism, are also enforcing

internal laws that contradict international standards of human rights in

order to prosecute terrorist suspects. This duality is reinforced by a change in

the U.S. foreign policy agenda and the domestic political equations of these

countries. In the nineties, the United States was remarkably critical of the

human rights record of many Southeast Asian countries. Since 9/11, its

security concerns in the region have been accompanied by a decrease in the

level of criticism. This, in turn, has contributed to a very unpromising

scenario in which certain human rights have become the indirect casualties

of the war on terror.

Introduction: Aims and Structure

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, brought about a change inperceptions of global security. In the early nineties, the collapse of theSoviet Union and the end of the Cold War altered the traditionalunderstanding of security threats and risks through the emergence ofmultiple, non-state actors in international affairs and the spread ofinternal conflicts throughout the world (Diamond, 1999). The events ofSeptember 11 were not the first to demonstrate this new reality, but theirimpact on individual and collective perceptions of security was andcontinues to be remarkable.

Southeast Asia is no exception to this global trend. Philippine PrimeMinister Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was one the first world leaders tocondemn the attacks and to offer support to the United States. Similarly,in late September 2001, Malaysia and Thailand expressed their outrageand the need to take additional measures to combat internationalterrorism. The existence of a terrorist threat in the minds of manySoutheast Asian citizens was, nevertheless, not new. For decades, theregion had witnessed the intensification of terrorist activities and non-military threats (Chanda, 2003).

What was different now was the location of the attacks and their effecton the counter-terrorist measures carried out by some Southeast Asiancountries. In its efforts to prosecute international terrorists, the UnitedStates urged many states to pass new restrictive legislation and arrestindividuals perceived to be security threats. This trend was intensified bythe Bali bombing in October 2002, a dramatic event that highlighted theurgency to tackle the terrorist threat in Southeast Asia even more. Thedarkest side of the new situation was that many countries who “sought toentrench rights-restrictive policies moved quickly to take advantage of the newpolitical space afforded by the international war on terror.” (Human RightsWatch, 2003b, 175). In addition, the new environment brought to thesurface the challenges confronting many Southeast Asian leaders and their

Pablo Pareja Alcaraz

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Human Rights in Southeast Asia Before and After 9/11

8 Documentos CIDOB, Asia

Western counterparts when walking the fine line between maintainingpopular legitimacy, promoting human rights and preserving security.

However, the difficult accommodation between counter-terroristpolicies and human rights in Southeast Asia is not the result of theSeptember 11 attacks or the subsequent war on terror. This“confrontation” existed before and has been the subject of extensive debateson democratization over the last few decades. The impact of September 11on Southeast Asia in terms of human rights was the creation of a wider holein the region’s already fragile architecture. As U.N. High Commissioner forHuman Rights Mary Robinson clearly expressed:

“The taking of measures to combat terrorism is not new. They always existedand they always posed problems for human rights. But the problem hasintensified. September 11 gave a sort of legitimacy. Where states once criticizedthese measures, now what we find is a kind of tolerance.” (Robinson, 2002)

The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of the international waron terror on the protection of human rights in Southeast Asia, particularlyin Indonesia and Malaysia. As with any study of units of a subsystem, thereare limits to the responses these cases can give to all the events and realitiesof the region. The analysis of Indonesia and Malaysia can, however, offersome useful insights into the way the international war on terror hasbrought to the surface some of the main challenges confronting SoutheastAsia and the complex interplay between domestic and external factors.

With these observations in mind, the paper will first analyze thepromotion of human rights in this region throughout the 1990s. This willprovide a picture of the main regional trends and some of the obstaclesprecluding the effective democratization of Southeast Asia. The secondsection will look at the changes induced by the September 11 attacks intwo complementary dimensions: the foreign policy of the United Statestoward the Pacific region and the internal policies of many SoutheastAsian countries. The third section will provide a deeper study of twoindividual countries: Malaysia and Indonesia. While the first offers a goodexample of a corporatist regime in suspension between democracy and


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authoritarianism, the second can be regarded as a democratizing countryembedded in dramatic socio-political change (Dalpino, 2000). Finally,the last section will summarize the main lessons of the analysis and willdiscuss different scenarios for the next five years. Acknowledging thatforeseeing the future is always a risky exercise, the paper will conclude thatthe evolution of the trend toward the marginalization of human rightsand democracy in Southeast Asia will primarily depend on theinteractions between a limited set of factors.

The Promotion of Human Rights in Southeast AsiaOver the 1990s

A significant level of political diversity characterizes Southeast Asia:from the repressive military regime in Burma to the emergingdemocracies of Thailand and the Philippines, this region contains thewidest spectrum of political systems in the world. In general, however,authoritarian practices and inertias could be found in most countriesduring the 1990s. At least in part, this situation explains why this decadewitnessed the intensification of pressures upon Southeast Asiangovernments for greater openness, accountability, transparency and theeffective protection of human rights (Vatikiotis, 1996; Dalpino, 2000).

The origin of these pressures was both internal and external. Internally,the civil societies of many states were disillusioned by the incapability ofmany leaders to cope with complex economic, social and politicalchallenges such as the 1997 Asian financial crisis1. Externally, the end ofthe Cold War and the gradual normalization of diplomatic relations

1. The role played by these internal pressures needs further evaluation. The low levels ofaccountability and transparency, as well as the lack of plural media in many countrieswithin the region, make it difficult to evaluate the effective impact of demonstrationsand local pro-human rights movements on several governments.



between many Southeast Asian states and other international actors(especially the United States, Australia and the European Union) led to arise in the level of foreign pressures to take additional steps to protecthuman rights and accelerate democratic reforms. Although, as severalNGOs and authors have put forth, these pressures were generally affectedby ideological assumptions and were only activated after a major abuse ofrights had taken place, they played a significant role in publicizing humanrights violations and “forcing” some Southeast Asian governments tomodify their course of action (Donelly, 1999; Dalpino, 2000; HumanRights Watch, 2003a). Among others, the impact of external pressures onthe reduction of crimes perpetrated by Indonesian militias in East Timorsince 1999 constitutes a comprehensive example.

The intensification of both external and internal pressures did not lead,however, to a dramatic transformation of the relations between SoutheastAsia and the rest of the world. Over the decade, human rights graduallygained space in the agendas of Western actors, but economic, commercialand security interests remained the top priorities (Graham, 1995; Dalpino,2000). As Dalpino has pointed out, both the European Union and theUnited States used diplomatic and economic sanctions against Myanmar topromote dialogue between the military and the opposition forces. TheUnited States also used the Jackson-Vanick process to include human rightsclauses in its trade agreements with communist states. Albeit with varyingintensities, Australia took some diplomatic steps to help the spread of humanrights and democracy in Southeast Asia. In addition, for the first time sincethe Second World War, Japan decided to incorporate these issues into itsforeign policy toward the region (Dalpino, 2000; Jendrzenczyk, 2001).2

2. China’s criticism of crimes and abuses on ethnic Chinese in Indonesia over the 1990scould be considered part of these increasing pressures upon Southeast Asia. However,the complex character of Sino-Southeast Asian relations and China’s human rights’record in the past seem to suggest that these criticisms may be better understood interms of China’s domestic realities (rather than in terms of this country’s realcommitment to the effective promotion of democracy and human rights).

The decade of 1990s also witnessed the emergence of a morecoordinated and unified international action in Southeast Asia. Thecreation of the United Nations Transitional Authority for Cambodia(UNTAC) in the early 1990s constituted a watershed in the involvementof multilateral organizations in the region. Similarly, the measures taken bythe International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in response to theAsian financial crises which started in 1997 are indicative of the morecoordinated actions of international actors. Finally, the participation of theEuropean Union, Australia and the United States in the process that led tothe independence of East Timor also illustrates this trend toward moreunified strategies aiming at the promotion of democratic reform andhuman rights in Southeast Asia (Donelly, 1999; Dalpino, 2000).

Together, the aforementioned factors pushed the Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to include democracy and humanrights in its political agenda. Since this organization is based on theprinciple of non-interference, however, its role in promoting human rightsand democratic reform during the 1990s was limited to non-memberstates such as Vietnam, Laos, Burma and Cambodia (Donelly, 1999;Dalpino, 2000). In addition, six other factors reduced the organization’seffective capability to prevent and condemn human rights violations in theregion: first, ASEAN's difficulties in adapting its structures to the needsand dynamics of the post Cold-War international system (Anwar, 2001);second, differences of opinion among the organization's members on thebest way to approach human rights violations in countries such as Burmaor Cambodia; third, the philosophical and pragmatic debate about the(in)compatibility between human rights and the so-called “Asian values”(Donelly, 1999; Palmer, 2002)3; fourth, ASEAN’s limited resources forimplementing and enforcing the organization’s agreements; fifth, the


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3. For a more detailed analysis of the Asian values debate, see Bauer, J.R. & Bell, D.A.(eds.) (1999): The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.



impact on the organization’s balance caused by Suharto’s resignation anddemocratic change in Indonesia; finally, the damaging effects of the 1997financial crisis on most members of the organization, especially Thailand,Malaysia and Indonesia.

In spite of their limitations and weaknesses, the combination of thedifferent pressures analyzed in this section contributed to the gradualamelioration of the situation of democracy and human rights in SoutheastAsia over the 1990s. As Amnesty International and Human Rights Watchhave acknowledged, the past decade witnessed not only the reduction ofhuman rights violations throughout this region, but also the gradualstrengthening of transnational attempts to protect and promote them(Amnesty International, 2002; Human Rights Watch, 2003). Humanrights violations and obstacles to the work of human rights activists in theregion were still very significant in the year 2000, but there is generalagreement that improvements over the 1990s had a significant effect onthe region’s security environment, the level of democratic reform and theprotection of human rights.

Yet, the presence of a set of mutually reinforcing factors debilitated theregion’s fragile architecture for the promotion of human rights. As Dalpinohas outlined, the existence of weaknesses in the legal systems of manySoutheast Asian states, the uneven enforcement of rights, the absence ofpublic education about these rights, the lack of a strong civil society tocounterbalance governments and, more significantly, the unsolved issues ofcivil-military and communal relations posed important challenges to the“spread” of human rights throughout the region in the twenty-firstcentury. As the next section will discuss, the pre-existence of theseweaknesses clearly facilitated the relegation of human rights to a secondaryplace resulting from the renewed emphasis on security that followed theSeptember 11 attacks.


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The Impact of 9/11: Changes in US Policy andSoutheast Asian Reactions

In broad terms, the impact of the September 11 attacks on theprotection of human rights in Southeast Asia was their gradualmarginalization in favor of security concerns. In the 1990s, trade andcommercial interests had supplanted human rights as the centerpiece ofinternational dialogue in the region, but the combination of both issues inmany cases had proved useful for the promotion of democracy and humanrights. After September 11, the new focus on security and internationalterrorism relegated human rights to the periphery of the agenda, allowingsome Southeast Asian countries to approve and implement deliberatelyambiguous counter-terrorist measures.

In the United States, the reevaluation of foreign policy that followed theattacks led to a transformation of the country’s view of Southeast Asia. Thefear that Al-Qaeda terrorist networks could “migrate,” transforming theregion into a “second front” in the war on terror, changed the nature ofUS-Southeast Asian relations. As Chanda has put forth, “the benign neglectof Southeast Asia that marked the Clinton administration continued well intothe Bush administration until the shock of September 11 jolted relations backonto a security track.” (Chanda, 2003, 118). The nuances of most bilateralrelations gave way to the imperative of the war on terror.

In politico-military terms, this shift took two complementary forms. Onthe one hand, the United States muted its criticism of opportunisticrepression by some Southeast Asian governments in order to ensure theirsupport for the war in Afghanistan. As the 2002 Human Rights Watchdescribes, longstanding US concerns about human rights anddemocratization in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore were muted afterSeptember 11 (Human Rights Watch, 2003)4. In part, this was also the

4. In this regard it is important to note here the relative, when not absolute omission, ofhuman rights issues in the talks that President George W. Bush held in Washington withdifferent Southeast Asian leaders in late 2001 and early 2002.

case of the European Union and Australia, who opted for softer levels ofcriticism and sided with the US in the war on Afghanistan.Simultaneously, the US focus on security led to a rise in the level of militarycooperation with some Southeast Asian countries.

The first US counter-terrorist effort in the region was the Philippine-US joint “training exercise” aimed at the elimination of Abu Sayyaf, acriminal group whose linkage to the Al-Qaeda network has not beenproved to date. This effort was followed by the inclusion of Singapore inthe “Cobra Gold” exercises5, the most important framework for US-Southeast Asian military cooperation in the last two decades (Dalpino,2003). The result of these operations did not substantially change thesecurity environment in the region, but these examples reflectWashington’s growing concern about Southeast Asia in security terms.

Fears of this particular region becoming the “second front” ofinternational terrorism increased in January 2002. In a joint actionbetween police and intelligence forces, Singapore arrested severalmembers of Jemmah Islamiah, a regional network with some links toAl-Qaeda. Some documents seized from the organization during theoperation revealed plans to attack international institutions in SoutheastAsia, including several US diplomatic missions (McNally & Morrison,2002; Dalpino, 2003). Some months later, the killing of more than 200foreign tourists in Bali on October 12 aggravated US perceptions andgave way to a greater “securitization” of its foreign policy toward theregion. As a result, the greater involvement of the US in the domesticand regional affairs of Southeast Asia contributed to the partial recoveryof the high levels of influence and power that had characterized the USposition during the Cold War period.



5. Before September 11, these exercises only brought together military forces from the USand Thailand. Soon after the incorporation of Singapore into these activities, the Bushadministration announced the participation of Malaysia and the Philippines in the year2003 (Dalpino, 2003).

For Southeast Asia, the emphasis on security that followed theSeptember 11 attacks came at a bad time. By late 2001 the region wasstarting to pull itself out of the economic crisis and, for the first time inyears, the longstanding debate about the (in)existence of a clash betweenhuman rights and “Asian values” that had given many states an excuseto maintain repressive practices was fading. The terrorist acts ofSeptember 11 and the subsequent emphasis on security not onlyinterrupted this trend, but also provided some governments with newarguments to justify their policies. As Lim has pointed out,“Governments previously chastised (…) for human rights violations in theirinternal crackdowns on Islamic radicals (were) suddenly claiming that therecent events (vindicated) their own tough and generally unpopular securityactions” (Lim, 2001, 2).

Western interpretations of the impact of September 11 contrastedwith the views of many Southeast Asian citizens and regional observers.The idea that these attacks had changed everything and had placedterrorism at the top position of international threats to security did notmeet the realities of a region that has witnessed almost all types ofterrorism over the last fifty years. Public opinion in these countries wasoutraged by these dramatic events and condemned the attacks, but theview of September 11 as a new form of insecurity was simply viewed asan overstatement.

Although Chanda acknowledges several differences among thereactions of Southeast Asian countries, he identifies four broad phasesin the evolution of Southeast Asian-US relations in the aftermath ofSeptember 11 (Chanda, 2003). The first phase of “shock and sympathy”lasted for approximately one month and was characterized by adiplomatic rapprochement between the US and Southeast Asia, at leastin rhetorical terms. This brief phase gave way to the emergence ofconcern and anger at the US war in Afghanistan launched on October8. In a public speech at a mosque, Indonesian President MegawatiSukarnoputri affirmed that “No individual, group or government has the


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right to look for terrorists by attacking another country’s territory.”(Gopalakrishan, 2002). In a similar tone, Malaysian Prime MinisterMahathir Mohammed declared that “We should really not participate inwar. If we do, we will only help to escalate the problems because an all-outwar is the wrong solution, because many innocent people are going to bekilled.”(quoted in Chanda, 2003). These were not isolated reactions:albeit with different intensities, other Southeast Asian leaders expressedsimilar concerns and tried to distance themselves from US foreignpolicy towards Afghanistan. In most cases, the internal social pressuresthat propelled these declarations show the complex interaction betweendomestic and foreign factors in the areas of security, religion,democratization and human rights in Southeast Asia.

The third phase began with the discovery of the bomb plot inSingapore already mentioned. The importance of this event cannot beoverstated. Strengthening a trend that had begun right after theSeptember 11 attacks, this discovery altered the level of US attention tothe region on three complementary fronts. First, it led to a greater focuson non-traditional security threats. Second, it resulted in a greaterattention to regionalist structures in Southeast Asia, especially ASEAN.Third, it reduced the previous level of US emphasis on the promotionof democracy and human rights throughout the region. The signing ofthe US-ASEAN anti-terrorist treaty in August 2002 is illustrative ofthese three trends.

Finally, the fourth phase began after the October 2002 Bali bombingthat killed more than 200 tourists and placed “the war on terror on theregion’s front burner.” (Chanda, 2003, 119). This terrorist act, the worstin the history of Southeast Asia, increased US security concerns evenmore and heralded an unprecedented cooperation between local andforeign law-enforcement agencies.

As for internal transformations in Southeast Asian countries, theattacks of September 11 and the emphasis on security that followedthem gave way to three major changes. First, in countries like Indonesia,



police forces became ascendant over the military. In many cases, this“gradual” confusion of roles resulted in human rights abuses, such asaggressive crack-downs on peaceful demonstrators. Second, September11 fueled new problems for elected politicians with regard to their anti-terrorist policies. As the next section will show in more detail, someSoutheast Asian states not only used these policies to combatinternational terrorism, but also to prosecute political dissidents andother social groups. Whereas the public response to the use of policiesfor the former purpose was very limited, reactions of anger to the latterin some countries increased pressures on politicians not to commit orallow human rights violations. Finally, the new emphasis on securityand the international war on terror led to both the rise of Islamicextremism and the consolidation of Islamic moderates in SoutheastAsia, especially after the detention of Jemmah Islamiah and thedramatic Bali bombing, in January and October 2002 respectively(McNally & Morrison, 2002).

Two illustrative cases: Malaysia & Indonesia

As has already been seen, all countries in Southeast Asia condemnedthe September 11 attacks. In contrast, their respective responses to theUS-led war on terror were different, depending on the political natureof each government, the internal mobilization of each civil society andthe relative importance of Islam in each country’s domesticenvironment (Chanda, 2003). By November 2001 some SoutheastAsian leaders became aware that a pro-American position had politicalcosts at home. Simultaneously, some of these governments found newjustifications for longstanding repression in measures to counteractterrorism. This was clearly the case of Malaysia and, to a lesser extent,Indonesia. Both Malaysian and Indonesian leaders discovered thatsupport from important constituencies could be jeopardized if their


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support of the US bombing of Afghanistan, a Muslim-majority nation,seemed too unconditional in the eyes of civil society.

In late November, Indonesian President Megawati asked PresidentBush to end the bombing before Ramadan and large demonstrationsagainst the US strikes on Afghanistan erupted in October in Indonesiaand Malaysia (Jendrzeczyk, 2001; Human Rights Watch, 2003b). OnNovember 30, Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah AhmadBadawi announced that Malaysia might amend its security laws to dealmore efficiently with “modern day terrorism”, prompting warnings thatthis could lead to further repression of peaceful political dissent(Johnson, 2003). In Indonesia, the government arrested activistMuhammad Nazar on November 20 for having hung banners at acampus rally calling for a referendum on the political future of Aceh andcriticizing the military. Although Indonesian President Megawati wasable to counterbalance external and internal pressures for new norms,the Bali bombings of October 2002 added new pressures and facilitatedthe comeback of laws once used to detain critics of former PresidentSuharto (McNally & Morrison, 2002; Human Rights Watch, 2002).

The following subsections will analyze in more detail the sequence ofevents in Malaysia and Indonesia, the two Muslim-majority countries inSoutheast Asia, paying special attention to the complex interplaybetween domestic and external forces in each country.

Malaysia: The Internal Security Act as a Tool for PoliticalRepressionThe attacks of September 11 had a dangerous effect on Malaysia’s use

of internal security legislation. For several decades, the Internal SecurityAct (henceforth, ISA), a preventive detention law originally enacted inthe 1960s to fight a communist rebellion, had been widely abused as atool to stifle peaceful political dissent. Both state and non-state actorshad criticized this abuse. On the one hand, Malaysian human rightsgroups, the Malaysian Bar Council and international human rights



groups had repeatedly called for the repeal of the ISA. In addition, theUS and the European Union had been sharply critical of the arrest,flawed trial, imprisonment and physical mistreatment of severalpolitical dissidents such as Mahathir’s former heir apparent, AnwarIbrahim, who was detained in 1998. While the criticism of the formeractors remained after September 11, the criticism and concern of thelatter was muted as Mahathir offered cooperation in intelligencegathering and investigations into alleged Al-Qaeda cells.

This international “mutism” and the emphasis on security thatfollowed September 11 “allowed” Prime Minister Mahathir to justifythe use of the ISA on counter-terrorist grounds. Presenting the lawspassed by the United States and the United Kingdom to combatinternational terrorism as a defense of the ISA, Mahathir declared onOctober 2002 that “It is more necessary than ever. Even the rich countries,the so-called liberal democracies, have decided that there is a need for somepreventive action to stop people from doing things that are harmful. Peoplehave been detained in other countries now, just as we detain people becausethey are a threat to security.” (quoted in Human Rights Watch, 2003b).These remarks by the Malaysian prime minister clearly illustrate themarginalization of human rights to a secondary position and theconsolidation of security as the main concern for many Southeast Asiancountries in the post-September 11 scenario.

In broad terms, the detrimental use of the ISA has taken threedifferent forms since 2001. First, this law has been used to detainpolitical activists and members of opposition parties without a trial.Under Section (73) 1 of the ISA, police units may detain anyone for upto two months, without warrant or trial and without access to legalcounsel, if they have “reason to believe” that that person has acted or islikely to act “in any manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia.”After this period of time, the Minister of Home Affairs can extend thedetention without trial for up to two years, without submitting anyevidence for review by the courts, by issuing a detention order (Human


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Rights Watch, 2002). In the last two years, Malaysian police forces havedetained more than 60 members of opposition parties on suspicion thatthey had links with Islamic extremist organizations. In spite ofMahathir’s claims that they pose a threat to both national andinternational security, however, no significant proof has been submittedto judiciary bodies to date (Kent, 2003).

Second, the ISA provisions that allow for restrictions of assembly,association, expression, movement, residence and employment havebeen used to disperse both peaceful and non-peaceful public protests.While the former use seems to be accepted by a majority of Malaysians,the latter has received severe criticism from local and internationalNGOs and significant sectors of Malaysian civil society (McNally &Morrison, 2002). Finally, the Mahathir government has used the ISA tosuppress political opposition by restricting media and academicfreedom. In early October 2001, more than sixty university lecturersalleged to be engaged in anti-government activities were warned byofficial authorities, transferred or fired (Katoppo, 2002). In order tojustify these operations, the government has alleged the control ofuniversity student associations by the main opposition party, the PartiIslam Se-Malaysia. In addition, Mahathir has publicly declared that theobjective of this pledge is to check the poisoning of students’ minds sothat they “stick to the original purpose of entering universities to gainknowledge and not to indulge in anti-government activities.” (quoted inHuman Rights Watch, 2002).

The root causes for this increase in the level of political oppression areto be found in Mahathir’s goal of enhancing national and internationalsecurity while strengthening his political position at the expense ofopposition parties. The relative “mutism” of international actors such asthe US or the EU, however, has contributed to the marginalization ofhuman rights in Malaysia. Especially since last winter, both EU and USrepresentatives have emphasized that the fight against terrorism doesnot justify the wholesale use of internal laws to suppress dissent, but




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their more permissive approaches to human rights violations inSoutheast Asia in the aftermath of September 11 cannot be ignored.Contradicting declarations in July 2001 that a meeting betweenPresident George W. Bush and Mohammed Mahathir could only takeplace if there were progress made on Anwar’s case and on the treatmentof political dissidents, the US administration avoided any reference toMalaysia’s human rights record or abuse of the ISA in the October 2001APEC summit in Shanghai (Jendrzeczyk, 2001). In addition,responding to the new US security concerns in Southeast Asia, GeorgeW. Bush agreed to receive the visit of President Mahathir in May 2002to thank Malaysia for its efforts against international terrorism.

In sum, the emphasis on security that followed the September 11attacks, the internal situation of the country and the reconfiguration ofUS and, to a lesser extent, EU priorities in Southeast Asia led to therelegation of human rights to a very unprivileged position. Mahathirextended the much-berated Internal Security Act to detain oppositionactivists who were alleged to have links with Middle-East-basedterrorists, disperse public protests and curb the political activities ofstudents and academics. However, some judicial decisions andinitiatives by the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia were viewedas having bolstered respect for human rights principles, while thejudiciary was striving to improve its sagging public image.

Indonesia: From Initial Reluctance to the GradualAccommodation of Anti-Terrorist LawsThe Indonesian approach to human rights and security issues in the

post-September 11 scenario differs from the Malaysian experience. Inbroad terms, this country’s response to non-traditional security threatsand political dissent has gone through two different phases over the lasttwo years. As different authors have pointed out, through 2001 andmost of 2002 the government of Megawati Sukarnoputri argued thatthe passage of extensive anti-terrorist measures and the precipitous

arrests of Islamic activists would only help polarize the fragile politicalenvironment and probably lead to more violent reactions (Chanda,2003; Human Rights Watch, 2003b). Although some may argue thatthis shows the real commitment of Megawati’s government todemocratization and human rights, a more plausible explanationsustains that she feared alienating the Muslim constituencies needed forre-election in 2004.

Whether this was the case or not, however, the year following theSeptember 11 attacks did not witness the emergence of more restrictivelaws or a significant rise in the prosecution of political dissent inIndonesia. This is not to say that the protection of human rightsexperienced a clear amelioration in 2002. In spite of restoring somepolitical stability to Indonesia during this period of time, PresidentMegawati Sukarnoputri failed to deal with several human rightschallenges such as continued violations of international human rightslaw by military forces, pervasive corruption, religious violence in Malukuand Poso, separatist conflict in Papua and Aceh, and attacks on humanrights activists (Human Rights Watch, 2003b). In part, these failuresstemmed from the administration’s lack of will to stand up to supportersof the Suharto regime, but the absence of strong international pressuresin the months that followed September 11 also played a role.

The second phase in the evolution of Indonesia’s position vis-à-vissecurity and human rights began after the Bali bombing on October 12,2002. The dramatic nature of this event put President Megawati undertremendous international pressures to issue anti-terrorist legislation andarrest leading Islamic activists. In what Katoppo has defined as a shiftfrom “musyawarah to Musharraf ”6, the US multiplied its diplomatic



6. Musyawarah is an Indonesian word describing a democratic process of deliberation andconsultation moving toward consensus. Musharraf is General Pervez Musharraf,Pakistan’s self-appointed, authoritarian “chief executive”, who has become a key USally in the war on terrorism.


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efforts to convince Megawati’s administration of the need for newregulatory measures and processes to face non-traditional securitythreats in Southeast Asia (Katoppo, 2002). In a similar way, bothAustralia and, to a lesser extent, the EU increased their criticism ofIndonesia’s weak response to international terrorist networks.

The immediate result of these pressures was the signing of twopresidential decrees in late 2002 and the proposing of new anti-terrorlegislation to the Indonesian Parliament. The decrees, which containa vague definition of the term “terrorism” that could be used to targetpolitical dissidents, allow for the detention of suspects by the policefor up to seven days on the basis of scant preliminary evidence andthen for up to six months without charge. More importantly, somehuman rights organizations have expressed their concern that thesenew measures may “allow the military to resume the role in lawenforcement that for decades –especially during the Suharto era– led toserious human rights abuses.” (Human Rights Watch, 2003b, 176).Under the new regulatory regime, the military would be allowed toconduct arrests and investigators would have the power to go throughpersonal mail and to tap any form of communication. In addition,while it is true that intelligence-gathering actions have to be reviewedby judiciary bodies, the weak nature of the Indonesian court systemand the existence of corruption at many levels of the judiciary makethis system of judicial review a very limited guarantee for the effectiveprotection of human rights.

In this new regulatory framework, it is not surprising that peacefulcritics of government policies were put on trial for allegedly “spreadinghatred” toward government officials in December 2002 (McNally &Morrison, 2002). Justifying its actions against this vaguely definedoffense, frequently used by Suharto against perceived political enemies,Megawati’s administration has taken a stronger stance on themaintenance of internal security and, in turn, has joined Malaysia in thetrend toward a gradual marginalization of human rights.

In contrast to the limited societal response to the abuse of the ISA inMalaysia after September 11, the dramatic change in the government’sapproach to security threats and anti-terrorism has fueled concern andanger among many Indonesian citizens. A majority of the populationseems to agree that new policies must be devised to counteract the actionsof terrorist networks, but many Indonesians oppose new legislation thatcould be used to suspend civil and human rights, the rule of law anddemocratic freedoms (McNally & Morrison, 2002). As Katoppo has putforth, “the last thing most Indonesians want is a return of the antisubversionlaws used by Indonesian military government from 1963 to 1998, whichallowed for unlimited detention and suspension of all rights of anyonesuspected of opposing the government.” (Katoppo, 2002, 2). With regard totheir perception of US foreign policy after September 11, manyIndonesians seem to be troubled by the consolidation of US unilateralismand its growing insensitivity toward its allies (Johnson, 2003)7.

In sum, the post-Bali bombing scenario has forced Indonesia to facethe difficult dilemma of how to conduct a firm policy againstinternational terrorism without sacrificing its fragile experiment withdemocratization and both civil and human rights. As Katoppo andChanda have suggested, the real choice is not between security ordemocracy and human rights, as many defenders of the Suharto eramaintain, but the new international emphasis on anti-terrorism seemsto have provided them and some members of Megawati’s governmentwith new excuses for containing the advance of human rights inIndonesia (Katoppo, 2002; Chanda, 2003).



7. The renewal of links between the US and the Indonesian military in late 2002, theannouncement by US Secretary of State Colin Powell in late 2002 of a new $50 millionprogram to assist Indonesian security forces in the campaign against terrorism and the$16 million package approved by the US Congress to improve the capabilities ofIndonesian police forces seem to have mitigated these perceptions, but mostIndonesians remain concerned about the pre-emptive doctrine of the US and itsgrowing interference in the affairs of other countries (Ressa, 2002; Johnson, 2003).

Conclusions: Lessons and Future Trends

The ideas expressed in previous paragraphs lead to four mainconclusions. First, the attacks of September 11 and the emphasis onsecurity that followed them have given way to the relegation of humanrights to a secondary place in many Southeast Asian countries. Althoughsome international actors such as the US or the EU have tried toemphasize the need to counteract terrorism and the urgency ofpromoting democracy and human rights in this region, their greaterattention to the former has debilitated previous concerns and criticismswith regard to respect for civil and human rights. In turn, this attitudehas provided the political leaders of some countries with new argumentsto justify the marginalization of human rights policies on counter-terrorist grounds.

Second, as the experiences of Malaysia and Indonesia have shown, thistrend has not taken a single form. In the case of Malaysia, the relative“mutism” of the international community toward Mahathir’s abusiveuse of the ISA helps explain the gradual marginalization of civil andhuman rights in this country. In contrast, the case of Indonesia pointsto the growing international pressures that followed the Bali bombingas one of the main explanatory factors of Megawati’s more restrictivelaws. Moreover, while Malaysia has witnessed a clear marginalization ofhuman rights and democratization efforts in the last two years, theexperience of Indonesia is somewhat more ambiguous.

Third, it is important to note here that this trend toward theprioritization of security and the relegation of human rights to asecondary front is not exclusive to Southeast Asia. Although theyacknowledge different intensities and forms, several reports by AmnestyInternational and Human Rights Watch put forth the idea that this isindeed a global trend (Amnesty International, 2002; Human RightsWatch, 2003a). Mary Robinson’s decision to resign as the UN HighCommissioner for Human Rights in late 2001 on the basis that


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counter-terrorism had endangered the international structure of humanrights protection points in a similar direction.

Finally, the cases of Indonesia and Malaysia have revealed the complexinteraction between domestic and international factors in the areas ofsecurity, democratization and human rights in Southeast Asia. Bothregional and national structures for protecting human rights are fragileand permeable to internal and foreign pressures. This situation not onlyillustrates the extent to which the advancement of human rights in theregion depends on the political will of elected leaders, but it also revealsthe weaknesses of current regional structures in Southeast Asia and thecrucial role played by certain international actors.

The aforementioned conclusions suggest three possible scenarios forthe near future of human rights in Southeast Asia. In the first scenario,the emphasis on security will remain and this trend toward therelegation of human rights to a secondary place will deepen. In thesecond one, the current trend will gradually be reversed and humanrights will receive greater attention. Within this scenario, the securitydiscourse may take two different forms. On the one hand,improvement in human rights may be compatible with the emphasison security if certain international actors decide to take a more criticalposition vis-à-vis human rights violations and are able toaccommodate human rights policies in their security strategies. Onthe other hand, the progressive amelioration of human rights may befeasible if the emphasis on security loses momentum and civil societieswithin Southeast Asian countries put additional pressures on theirrespective governments. Finally, the third scenario foresees thecrystallization of the current situation without any substantialmodification.

Which of these different scenarios is most likely to occur? In general, onemay argue that the “desecuritization” of the foreign policies of internationalactors such as the US or the EU is very unlikely in the near future and that,as a result, the likelihood of a serious accommodation of human rights intheir foreign policy agendas is certainly limited. This analysis is,



nevertheless, not sufficient. Granted, foreseeing the future is never an easytask, but the analysis of four different factors and their impact on the futureof human rights in Southeast Asia can shed some light.

First, the emphasis on security and the international promotion ofhuman rights in the next few years will primarily depend on theforeign policy priorities of the United States and, to a lesser extent, theEuropean Union, Japan and other international actors. Althoughcontinuism seems to prevail in the definition of foreign policy amongmost of these actors, these priorities are, nevertheless, not static. Theemergence of strong internal pressures coming from their respectivecitizenries may force the current US administration and othergovernments to come up with better mechanisms to reconcile securityconcerns, human rights and democratization. More significantly, avictory of the democrats in the 2004 US presidential elections maylead to a change in security perceptions and international prioritiesand, in turn, may have the knock-on effect of creating new pressureon human rights and democratization in US strategy towardSoutheast Asia.

Second, the evolution of ASEAN and other regional structures islikely to affect the democratization process and the extension of humanrights in many Southeast Asian countries. In past years, the internalsituation of Indonesia has undermined ASEAN’s efforts to become aclear international interlocutor and address the different challengesconfronting Southeast Asia. The incorporation of some of the countrieswith the worst human rights record in the region in the late 1990s andthe so-called “ASEAN way” (a mixture of consensus and a set oftechniques to bypass, rather than resolve, conflict) have also affected theorganization’s potential as the motor for democracy and human rightsin Southeast Asia. In the near future, the crystallization of these factorsmay not only weaken the fragile regional structure even more, but alsofacilitate a greater marginalization of human rights. In spite of theseconsiderations, however, the possibility of a stronger ASEAN shouldnot be dismissed. As Dalpino put forth in early 2001:


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“Despite ASEAN’s present deficits in addressing human rights issues from aregional perspective, (certain) developments provide some evidence that a turntoward a more pro-active role is possible and even likely (…) With regard to anASEAN human rights policy, the task at this point is not necessarily in recastingthe ASEAN way, but in accelerating it.” (Dalpino, 2001, 12).

The third factor affecting the future of human rights in Southeast Asiais related to the discovery of new links between regional terroristorganizations and international networks such as Al-Qaeda. If Palmer’ssuspicions are true and the known linkages between several SoutheastAsian terrorist groups, Al-Qaeda and some “rogue” states constituteonly the tip of the iceberg (Palmer, 2002), new discoveries may increaseinternational pressures on Southeast Asian states to combat terrorism,therefore providing some political leaders with additional excuses forcircumventing human rights and delaying democratization.

Finally, the interaction between Southeast Asian political leaders andcivil societies will be crucial for the future of human rights in the region.In past years, some elected leaders such as Malaysian Deputy PrimeMinister Mahathir have shown ambiguous commitments towardsdemocratization and human rights while deciding on and implementingmeasures to enhance internal and regional security. Other leaders, likeIndonesian President Megawati, have demonstrated a greater political willfor change, but the unsolved civil-military and communal relations posenew challenges to their experiments with democracy and the protection ofcivil and human rights. In both cases, the rise of pro-human rights socialmovements may be crucial. As has already been explained, internalpressures coming from society play a prominent role in shaping thepolitical decisions of Southeast Asian leaders. If Chanda is correct when hesuggests that the next few years are likely to witness the gradual ascendanceof pro-democracy and pro-human rights groups in Southeast Asia, thentheir pressures on some governments may lead to the gradual reversal of thetrend toward the marginalization of democracy and human rights(Chanda, 2003). The political future of the region and the protection ofcivil and human rights remain, nevertheless, considerably uncertain.

References

Amnesty International “The Backlash – Human Rights at Risk Throughoutthe World”, Press Release 04/10/2002: www.ai.org

Anwar, D.F. “ASEAN’s Enlargement: Political, Security, and InstitutionalPerspectives”. In: Mya, T. & Gates, C.L., ASEAN Enlargement: Impactsand Implications, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001.

Chanda, N. “Southeast Asia After September 11”. In: Hathaway, R.M. &Lee, W. (eds.), George W. Bush and Asia: A Midterm Assessment, AsiaProgram, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center forScholars, 2003. P. 117-130.

Dalpino, C.E. “Human Rights in Southeast Asia: Issues for the Twenty-FirstCentury”, SAIS Policy Forum Series, Report Number 10, 2000.

Dalpino, C.E. “The Bush Administration in Southeast Asia: TwoRegions? Two Policies?”. In: Hathaway, R.M. & Lee, W. (eds.), GeorgeW. Bush and Asia: A Midterm Assessment, Asia Program,Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.2003. P. 03-116.

Darusman, M. “The National Human Rights Commission of Indonesia”. In:Racahagan, S.S. & Tikamdas, R. (eds.), Human Rights and the NationalCommission, Kuala Lumpur: HAKAM (National Human Rights Society).P. 76-84.

Diamond, L. Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press.

Donelly, J. “Human Rights and Asian Values: A Defense of ‘Western’Universalism”. In: Bauer, J.R. & Bell, D.A. (eds.), The East AsianChallenge for Human Rights, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.1999. P. 60-87.

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Human Rights Watch Malaysia’s Internal Security Act and Suppression ofPolitical Dissent, A Human Rights Watch Backgrounder, 2002:http://hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/malaysia-bck-0513.htm

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Jendrzeczyk, M. “Human Rights Trends in Southeast Asia”, Statementbefore the House Committee on International Relations, Asia and PacificSubcommittee, December 12, 2001.

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Katoppo, A.“Casualties of U.S. War on Terrorism: Human Rights andDemocratic Reform”. In: Open Society News (Democracy in SoutheastAsia: A Hard Road Ahead) (Fall-Winter) 2002/03.

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McNally, C.A. & Morrison, C.E (eds.) Asia Pacific Security Outlook 2002,An APAP Project, Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange.

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Racahagan, S.S. & Tikamdas, R. “The Human Rights Commission ofMalaysia Act 1999”, in Racahagan, S.S. & Tikamdas, R. (eds.), HumanRights and the National Commission, Kuala Lumpur: HAKAM (NationalHuman Rights Society) 1999, P. 173-202.



Ressa, M. “Indonesia: A Haven for Terrorists?”, CNN.com, August 1,2002.

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on terror? human rights in southeast asia before and after 9/11

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