ON SALESMANSHIP, BULLYING, AND TEACHING VIRTUE IN PHILOSOPHY

Reflections on Three Socratic Dialogues of Plato

Marlon Jesspher B. De Vera

General Introductory Remarks

I start with the outright assertion that one of the key

struggles for philosophy in the 21st century is the struggle for

relevance. In our increasingly globalized capitalist and

consumerist culture, the relevance of something is defined by its

value proposition, or in other words, it’s response to the

question “What are you worth?” For philosophy, responding to

this question in defence of its own relevance in the 21st century

is a difficult philosophical challenge in itself. Double-

clicking on this question necessitates the invocation of several

other associated philosophical questions, such as what it means

to be worthy, what are the important contexts of valuation that

need to be elaborated on, and given these meanings and contexts

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of valuations, how can philosophy become relevant in the 21st

century.

In the opening paragraphs of his book “The Grand Design,”

Stephen Hawking proclaims that…

“…philosophy is dead. Philosophy has not kept up with modern

developments in science, particularly physics. Scientists have

become the bearers of the torch of discovery in our quest for

knowledge.”1

This statement can be interpreted not only as an antagonism

against philosophy but also as an assertion of the value

proposition and relevance of science in the 21st century.

According to Hawking, the value proposition of science in the

present time is that scientific discovery now has the exclusive

claim to knowledge, even to knowledge that is conventionally

within the area of philosophical inquiry. Because of this, he

asserts that philosophy is not only irrelevant but is

functionally dead. Thus, for Hawking, philosophy is not only

struggling for relevance but it has already lost the struggle.

1 See Hawking, Stephen and Leonard Mlodinow. The Grand Design. New York: Bantam Books, 2010.

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Of course, it is impossible to imagine philosophy

surrendering to defeat so easily given just a few words from a

famous scientist and popular science writer. But such a

proclamation from someone like Stephen Hawking can serve as a

validation that philosophy’s struggle for relevance in the 21st

century is a real struggle, and there are external forces that

drive this struggle. Conceivably, there are also internal forces

within philosophy itself that drive this struggle. Thus,

philosophers must look at both these internal and external

factors and address the important philosophical questions on

philosophy’s value proposition in the present time. My instinct

is that, this struggle for relevance is not a new struggle in the

21st century, but is the same struggle that can be traced back

all the way to ancient philosophy.

Thus, this paper looks at three Socratic dialogues of Plato

from his early to middle period – the Phaedo, the Gorgias, and the

Protagoras, and through a synthesis of interpretative reflections

on key themes in the three dialogues, this paper attempts to

address key philosophical issues on philosophy’s struggle for

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relevance in the 21st century. The hypothesis is that lessons

can be drawn from these three dialogues on how philosophers can

respond to questions and challenges on philosophy’s relevance in

the present time.

Section 1: Plato as a Philosophy Salesman in the Phaedo

Introduction

In this section, I attempt to argue that Plato’s main intent

in the Phaedo is not to build and present an argument for the

immortality of the soul, but rather to elevate, promote, and in a

sense “sell” philosophy as the highest pursuit of humanity. As

an initial support for this argument, it is worth emphasizing

that the Phaedo presents in a somewhat dramatic manner how

Socrates spent the last day of his life philosophizing with his

students. Thus, it can be said that the setting of the Phaedo in

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itself already sets an appropriate backdrop against which

philosophy can be promoted as the ultimate human endeavour that

is worth undertaking, in the sense that even in the face of

death, the true lover of wisdom would still choose to spend his

or her remaining time on earth practicing philosophy.2

However, it would not be sufficient to simply rely on this

connection with the dialogue’s dramatic setting to assert that

the dialogue’s main purpose is to promote and “sell” philosophy.

Thus, I now attempt to strengthen this assertion further by

presenting three supporting arguments.

1. Plato’s main intent is to promote philosophy to the

Pythagoreans, and not to construct proofs for Pythagorean beliefs

2 I am reminded of Steve Job’s commencement speech to the Stanford University class of 2005 wherein he talks about death and how to use the reality of deathto discern whether something is truly worth doing. He says “...for the past 33 years, I have looked in the mirror every morning and asked myself: "If today were the last day of my life, would I want to do what I am about to do today?” ” For a transcript of the speech, see Stanford Report, " 'You've got to find what you love,' Jobs says," Stanford News, 14 June 2005, < http://news.stanford.edu/news/2005/june15/ jobs-061505.html> (28 Sep 2014).

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It is important to note that Socrates’ main discussants in

the dialogue, Simmias and Cebes, are Pythagoreans who had core

beliefs on the immortality of the soul, reincarnation, and the

notion that the body contaminates the soul. It can also be noted

that in the first part of the Phaedo, when Phaedo enumerates to

Echecrates the people who were present during Socrates’ death

(59b-c)3, Simmias and Cebes are identified as strangers, which

probably simply means that they they are from cities outside

Athens, but which could also imply that they are less acquainted

with Socrates and Socrates is likewise less acquainted with them,

as compared with the other students of Socrates who are locals of

Athens.

I assert that Plato’s main intent in the Phaedo is to

promote philosophy to the Pythagoreans, that is to persuade his

discussants who happen to be Pythagoreans that philosophy is the

highest pursuit of humanity, and not to prove certain Pythagorean

doctrines and beliefs through argumentation per se. Conceivably,

Plato had a certain degree of proficiency in the arts of3 All references made in this paper to the text of the dialogues of Plato are based on the compilation Cooper, John M. and D.S. Hutchinson, eds. Plato: Complete Works. Indianopolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1997.

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persuasion and selling, and one of the fundamental principles of

persuasion and selling is to first have a good understanding of

the psychology and points of view of your target audience or

target market, and to customize the way you communicate your

persuasive proposition based on this understanding to ensure that

your communication is relevant to them, and thus to increase the

probability that what you are selling would have a higher degree

of general acceptability to your target audience.4 Thus, it can

be said that Plato’s intent is to customize his persuasive

communication framework for Pythagoreans and this act of

customization entails that the core beliefs of the Pythagorean

school be integrated into his arguments to promote and sell

philosophy. Therefore, given Plato’s intent to sell philosophy,

invoking arguments that examine core Pythagorean beliefs was a

means towards an end rather than these arguments being ends in

themselves. Integrating Pythagorean doctrines into his arguments

4 Here I am influenced by my background knowledge on marketing and persuasive selling models which I have been exposed to in my experiences of working in the consumer goods industry. The basic principle in marketing or selling a product is to first have a comprehensive understanding of the needs (i.e. the pains and aspirations) of your strategic target consumer and to formulate yourintegrated marketing campaign based on this understanding.

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was necessary only because his target audience were the

Pythagoreans, or in a broader sense persons concerned with

questions that can be associated with Pythagorean beliefs (e.g.

the immortality of the soul), and such an integration is variable

in the sense that if the target audience in Plato’s dialogue were

not concerned with Pythagorean concerns, he would not deem it

necessary to invoke arguments on Pythagorean doctrines into the

dialogue.

This is also probably the reason why the same distinctly

strong argumentation in favour of core Pythagorean beliefs,

particularly of the belief on the immortality of the soul, is

absent in many other dialogues of Plato. For instance, in the

Apology (40c-41c) Plato explores openness to either of two

possibilities about death, either death marks the end of

consciousness and perception or death marks the transition of the

soul from its current state to another state. Thus, in the

Apology Plato does not argue strongly for the conclusion that the

soul is immortal.

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I believe that in raising the question on what Plato’s main

purpose in the Phaedo is, it is important to draw the distinction

between the fundamental arguments in the dialogue, as opposed to

what can be called supplementary arguments which Plato invoked to

make his fundamental arguments more relevant and consequently

more acceptable to his target audience. Although Plato allotted

a significant portion of the dialogue towards constructing

arguments in favour of core Pythagorean doctrines, a more

holistic reading of the Phaedo would show that Plato’s arguments

towards elevating and promoting philosophy as the highest human

pursuit takes precedence over these supplementary arguments which

are only invoked as necessary elements in his persuasive

communication framework which is customized to fit the character

and psychology of a specific target audience or target market, in

this case the Pythagoreans or persons concerned with questions

that can be associated with Pythagorean doctrines.

2. Plato puts primacy on the discourse rather than on the

conclusions

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I also assert that in the Phaedo, Plato puts primacy on the

discourse rather than on the conclusions and given this, proving

the immortality of the soul or any other Pythagorean doctrine for

that matter cannot be the main purpose of the dialogue. Rather,

it is the promotion of the practice of philosophy and of the

culture of discourse and argumentation which is Plato’s primary

intent in the dialogue.

This can be clearly seen in how Socrates encourages Simmias

and Cebes to raise their objections (84c) to the argument that

has been constructed as of that point in favour of the belief on

the immortality of the soul. On one hand, this can be

interpreted as Plato endeavouring to further strengthen the

position that the soul is indeed immortal by demonstrating that

it can survive objections but on the other hand, this can also be

interpreted as Plato emphasizing that it is the process of

argumentation and philosophizing that led to the position, and

not the position itself, that is most important. The latter

interpretation can be reinforced by looking at how Socrates

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warned against misology (89d) as he saw how his audience became

discouraged after Simmias and Cebes raised their objections. In

this section of the Phaedo, Socrates makes an analogy between

misology and misantrophy and asserts that just because one

argument seems refuted does not mean that one should develop a

general repulsion against all arguments, in the same way that

just because one man seems evil does not mean that one should

develop a general hatred against all men. Socrates asserts that

most arguments are still worth engaging in, in the same way that

most men are neither absolutely good nor absolutely evil, and

thus clearly emphasizes that the practice of argumentation

retains its value even after a specific argument or position

seems to have lost its worth.

Immediately prior to narrating Socrates’ warning against

misology, Phaedo likewise tells a story of Socrates saying that

they should both take an oath to cut their hair if their argument

is defeated (89b-c). I believe that this is not to be taken to

mean that Socrates and Phaedo should take an oath to fight for

the preservation of the particular argument or position in favour

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of the immortality of the soul but rather, this could be taken to

mean that Socrates and Phaedo should be willing to take an oath

to defend a worthy argument in general. This latter

interpretation further reinforces the assertion that in the

Phaedo, it is the practice of argumentation and philosophizing

that Plato deems to be of primary importance rather than any

specific argument or position in particular.

This second supporting argument can be further supported by

looking at how Socrates eventually responded to the objections of

Simmias and Thebes (91d-107b). My reading of this section of the

Phaedo is that the way Socrates responded to the objections is

not straightforwardly aimed towards refuting the objections to

redeem the strength of the position that the soul is immortal.

Rather, the key objective of Socrates’ response to the objections

is to demonstrate that Simmias’ and Cebes’ personal doubts

regarding core Pythagorean beliefs, which conceivably they

already subscribe to being Pythagoreans themselves, can be

resolved through the practice of philosophy. If this reading is

accepted, it can then be said that in this section of the Phaedo,

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Plato elevates the practice of philosophy and argumentation to a

level that is above any doctrine or conviction that is obtained

by faith in the sense that philosophy could be the

metajustification behind faith.

I believe that this reading of sections 91d-107b of the

Phaedo as mentioned above is plausible as shown by the manner by

which Socrates addressed the objections of Simmias and Cebes.

Socrates addressed the objections by examining and exposing the

fundamental flaws and inconsistencies in the basic argumentative

frameworks of the objections. For instance, in responding to

Simmias’ objection, Socrates draws a clarifying distinction

between these two dualisms – composite versus non-composite and

visible versus invisible and consequently presents that raising

the objection would entail acceptance of a proposition (“the soul

is a harmony’) that is inconsistent with a stronger proposition

that has been earlier accepted (“learning is recollection”) (92

c-e). Likewise, part of Socrates’ response to Cebes’ objection

is a clarification of the distinction between mechanism and

teleology (98b-99d). A key element of the response also

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consisted of clarifying the distinction between the Forms and the

particulars that participate in the Forms (104b-107b) to refute

the argument that the soul perishes before the last of many

bodies in the same way that a weaver perishes before the last of

many cloaks. Thus, it can be said that Plato’s underlying

message in the responses to the objections of Simmias and Cebes

is that doubts against matters of faith can be resolved through

clarity of argumentation and that convictions derived from faith

can also be reinforced, strengthened, validated, and even

alternatively derived from philosophical argumentation.5

After narrating a myth regarding the afterlife, Plato makes

a statement in 114d which further reinforces the assertion that

one can risk on a belief out of faith (e.g. the belief on the

immortality of the soul) because such a belief is supported by

reason (e.g. the arguments in favour of the position that the

soul is immortal, as well as the arguments refuting the

5 This statement can be linked to Habermas’ discourse theory. A position thatis conventionally derived from faith can strengthen its claim to legitimacy byestablishing more robust bases of justification through discursive argumentation. See Habermas, Jürgen. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Translated by William Rehg. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1996.

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objections to it). Thus, in a sense, the practice of reason is

presented as the ultimate metajustification for all convictions

and positions, including ones that could otherwise be derived

from faith alone. This reading further reinforces the assertion

that in the Phaedo, Plato puts primacy on the discourse and on

the practice of philosophical argumentation rather than on

specific arguments and positions, particularly those that are

constructed to prove the immortality of the soul.

3. Plato differentiates philosophy by elevating it as a form of

transcendence

The grounding of my third and last supporting argument

towards the thesis that the main purpose of the Phaedo is to

promote and sell philosophy as the highest human pursuit is based

on showing how Plato differentiated philosophy by elevating it as

some form of transcendence. Here, I again make a reference to a

fundamental principle in persuasion and marketing, which is the

principle that in order make persuasion and selling more

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effective, the marketer or salesman must differentiate what is

being promoted from other things. This is to sharpen the

uniqueness of the thing being promoted and ultimately to make it

stand out as superior as opposed to other competing things.6 In

the context of the Phaedo, I believe that Plato made a clear

differentiation between philosophy and other human pursuits and

conducted most of this differentiation by elevating philosophy to

a level that is superior over, and transcendent of, other human

concerns and endeavours.

It is important to note that even before examining the

arguments towards proving the immortality of the soul, Plato

already makes several assertions in the Phaedo which

differentiates philosophy from other human pursuits and elevates

it as a form of transcendence. For instance, Plato asserts that

philosophy is the highest kind of art (61a), that philosophy is

the practice for death (64a), that philosophy is an enabler to

transcend fear (68d-e), and that philosophical wisdom is true

virtue (69a-d). After constructing the initial arguments towards

proving that the soul is immortal, Plato makes further6 Or in marketing jargon, to create a unique selling proposition (USP).

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elaborations on the nature of philosophy in terms of transcending

the fear of death through philosophy (84e-85b) and in terms of

philosophy being some sort of passport to the company of the gods

(82c). The nature of philosophy is a recurring theme throughout

the dialogue and it can be said that Plato’s objective is not to

simply elaborate on the nature of philosophy, but to

differentiate philosophy from other human pursuits and ultimately

elevate it as the highest among all human endeavours.

Dualisms are also key recurring elements throughout the

dialogue and I likewise assert that Plato’s main intent in

invoking these dualisms is not to provide an argumentative

framework to prove the immortality of the soul, but rather to

differentiate and elevate philosophy against other human

pursuits. Early on in the dialogue (66a), Plato already invokes

what can possibly be considered as a dualism between approaching

an object with thought and reason alone versus approaching an

object with bodily sense perception. Plato clearly associates

philosophy with the former which he also clearly elevates as

superior over the latter. Plato goes on and states in 66e that

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“if we are ever to have pure knowledge, we must escape from the

body and observe things in themselves with the soul by itself.”

These statements, together with the earlier claim that philosophy

is a practice for death (64a) constitute the establishment of the

initial strong linkage between the practice of philosophy and the

soul. Plato juxtaposes the claim that it is reason and the love

of wisdom (i.e. philosophy) which nourishes the soul side by side

with the Pythagorean doctrine that indulging in bodily desires

and earthly concerns contaminates the soul.

The Phaedo then proceeds with the construction of arguments

towards the proof of the immortality of the soul. It is in the

affinity argument (70c-80b) where most of the dualisms are

invoked, and a key component of proving the immortality of the

soul is asserting the affinity of the soul with what can be

deemed as the superior side of each dualism and on the other

hand, the affinity of the body with the inferior side. This is

probably best summarized in the following passage from 80b:

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“Consider then, Cebes, whether it follows from all that has been

said that the soul is most likely the divine, deathless,

intelligible, uniform, indissoluble, always the same as itself,

whereas the body is most like that which is human, mortal,

multiform, unintelligible, soluble, and never consistently the

same...”

After putting forward the affinity argument towards proving

that the soul is immortal, Plato then brings back the previously

established linkage between the practice of philosophy and the

nourishment of the soul and presents an argument that can be

summarized as such - that the practice of philosophy is the key

enabler for the dualistic separation of the body and the soul,

and hence the immortality of the soul, to be fully realized (80b-

84b). This further supports the assertion that Plato’s main

purpose in invoking the dualisms in the affinity argument is to

differentiate the practice of philosophy from other inferior

human pursuits and elevate philosophy as a form of transcendence

from the body and all its associated inferiorities. Thus, the

assertion that the soul is indeed immortal seems secondary

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against the claim that only true lovers of wisdom (i.e. true

philosophers) can transcend the body towards this fully realized

state of immortality with the soul.

Also, Plato invokes the Pythagoren belief on reincarnation

(81e-82b) and implies that reincarnation as lower forms of being

(e.g. animals) would be the fate of people who are preoccupied

with non-philosophical pursuits during their lifetime, while on

the other hand makes a statement that true philosophers would

join the company of the gods (82c). Likewise, in narrating the

myth about the afterlife (107e-114c), Plato reserves the best

dwelling places in the afterlife for people who have practiced

true philosophy. Thus, it can be said that in a sense Plato

asserts that beyond the question of whether or not the soul is

immortal, the ultimate and most important concern is whether a

person has truly practiced philosophy in his or her lifetime.

Such an assertion truly elevates philosophy as the highest human

pursuit, even higher than the pursuit for immortality.

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Conclusion

In this section, I have presented three supporting arguments

for the thesis that the main purpose of the Phaedo is not to

prove the immortality of the soul but to elevate, promote, and in

a sense “sell” philosophy as the highest human pursuit. In

summary, it seems as though Plato demonstrates good marketing and

salesmanship for philosophy in the Phaedo in the sense that 1) he

crafted his persuasive communication framework in a way that is

relevant to his target audience (the Pythagoreans, or in a

broader sense, persons concerned with questions on Pythagorean

beliefs), 2) he clearly put primacy on what he was promoting

(philosophy and discourse) over supplementary elements that

helped him sell (arguments in favour of Pythagorean beliefs), and

3) he showed clear points of differentiation of what he was

selling (the practice of philosophy) which sharply contrasted it

against competition (other human pursuits) and emphasized that

what he was selling was at the highest level among all.

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At this point, I think this view of Plato as a philosophy

salesman, at least as a reading of the Phaedo, could be plausible

but if it turns out that certain objections would render this

view implausible, my only hope is that, at the very least, some

of the discussions here could be refined by a better mind and

could be turned into worthy attempts at philosophizing which

could serve as starting points for new philosophical discussions

on the Phaedo and beyond.

Section 2: Socrates’ Struggle against Bullies in the Gorgias

Introduction

In this section, I present my reflection on the tone of the

discussion in the Gorgias, particularly my thesis on how Socrates

perceives his role in his exchanges with the three other

discussants - Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles. I conducted the

initial phase of my reflection by re-reading the dialogue and

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allowing spontaneous and intuitive notions regarding the subject

matter I am reflecting on to surface. Afterwards, in the second

phase of my reflection, I attempted to take a somewhat detached

and objective view in order to identify and challenge the

underlying precursors behind these notions.7

I found the results of this mode of reflection quite

interesting. Initially, I thought of the role of Socrates in the

Gorgias as analogous to that of a heroic warrior single-handedly

defeating three significantly weaker opponents. I found myself

agreeing with almost every point in Socrates’ arguments. I also

found myself feeling as if I shared in Socrates’ sense of pride

and righteousness when he successfully exposed logical

contradictions in the positions of Gorgias (460d-461b) and Polus

(474b-c), as well as whenever Socrates would make some clever

remark on the inferiority of his interlocutors. Given this, it

7 I think that it is not an implausible assertion that such a practice of self-reflection is something that Plato himself would approve of since it involves questioning and examining your own ideas and the underlying premises and assumptions behind them.

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seemed clear to me that Socrates was indeed bullying his

discussants.

However, in the second phase of my reflection, I realized

that the initial notions described above were brought about by

the fact that I superimposed my reading of the dialogue against a

context wherein I am the audience and the judge. Probably, my

background as a philosophy graduate student who personally

prefers the Socratic brand of discourse over the oratorical

style, among other things, spontaneously led me towards these

initial notions. Thus, in conducting the second phase of my

reflection, I attempted to imagine the actual context against

which the dialogue was written and against the probable actual

setting where the discussion could have been conducted.

The second phase of my reflection led me to think that

contrary to Socrates being the bully, he was actually being

bullied by his three interlocutors in the Gorgias, and the whole

dialogue presents how Socrates struggled against the three

bullies. I believe that this is a plausible thesis considering

that oratory was held in high regard in ancient Greek society and

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many young men who belonged to the higher societal classes sought

instruction from teachers of oratory. Also, Socrates himself

described oratory as a knack for flattery (463b) and thus orators

were skilful in persuading audiences by appeal to emotions and

popular opinions. Moreover, in the course of the dialogue,

Socrates presented a number of counter-intuitive and unpopular

positions like for instance, his position that suffering

injustice is preferable over acting unjustly (469c). Thus, it

can be argued that in the Gorgias, Socrates is the unpopular

minority8 that is being bullied by his interlocutors.

In the remainder of this section, I shall explicate on three

characterizations of what I deem to be Socrates’ struggle against

his three bullies. In the following explication, I shall attempt

to show that Socrates ended up neither as a clear victim nor a

clear victor, with his struggle having its share of both

8 The conceptions that oratory was held in high regard and that Socrates was an unpopular minority in the probable actual setting of the Gorgias were arrived at mostly based on impressions I got from discussions on the dialogue as well as from John M. Cooper’s introductory notes to the dialogue. There are also at least a few parts of the dialogue which directly support these conceptions. For instance, in 513c, Callicles says, “...but the thing that happens to most people has happened to me: I’m not really persuaded by you.” Also, towards the end of the dialogue, in 521d, Socrates says, “I believe thatI’m one of a few Athenians ... to take up the true political craft and practice the true politics.”

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frustrations and small triumphs. In spite of this, he

nonetheless struggled with honour by remaining uncompromisingly

steadfast with his convictions and with the brand of

philosophical discourse that he espouses.

Socrates’ Frustrations in his Struggle against the Bullies

In reflecting on the tone of the discussion in the Gorgias, I

attempted to “step back” to get a “zoom out” view after re-

reading the dialogue. One of the general insights I had in doing

this exercise is the impression that Socrates’ struggles against

his three bullies throughout the dialogue are full of episodes of

frustration and the frustrations mostly came about during

Socrates’ attempts to fight off his bullies using his own

strength, meaning during Socrates’ attempts to make his

interlocutors conform to the standards of the philosophical mode

of discourse that he is espousing, instead of employing the

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oratorical style of conversation that Gorgias, Polus, and

Callicles are skilled in and accustomed to.

This observation also seems sensible when thought about in

terms of the thesis that Socrates is being bullied by his three

discussants in the Gorgias. When a person is being bullied, the

bully recognizes that in some relevant sense, he or she has power

or dominance over the person being bullied, and the bully

leverages on this advantage in power relations in the act of

bullying. The person being bullied would often find that

fighting off the bully by meeting the bully’s strength and sense

of power and dominance head on would prove to be frustrating, if

not futile.

There are episodes of frustration throughout the dialogue,

as Socrates converses with each of his three discussants. In

observing these episodes of frustration, the reader also gains

insights on the rules of discussion that Socrates teaches, as

opposed to the oratorical style that is being practiced and

espoused by his interlocutors.

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For instance, in 449b-d, Socrates makes a request to Gorgias

to engage in their discussion by providing clear and concise

responses in a question-and-answer style of dialogue, instead of

the long and vague speeches that are the norm in oratory9, and

Socrates expresses delight10 when Gorgias initially seems to

comply. However, shortly after, Gorgias reverts to the style of

conversation that he is accustomed to, that is by providing vague

answers to Socrates’ questions, and Socrates struggles in

clarifying what Gorgias means in his responses. Socrates even

invokes an anecdote derived from a song usually sung in drinking

parties (451d-452d) as a device in his attempt to clarify

Gorgias’ response, as if to imply, out of frustration, that

Gorgias’ answers are so unclear that they might as well have been

coming from an inebriated man in a party. Nonetheless, despite

his frustration, Socrates still makes it a point to emphasize

9 Very early in the dialogue, in 447b-c, Socrates makes it clear that he is only interested in engaging Gorgias in a discussion and not in hearing one of Gorgias’ oratorical speeches. He says, “As for the other thing, the presentation, let him put that on another time, as you suggest.”

10 In 449d, Socrates says, “By Hera, Gorgias, I do like your answers. They couldn’t be shorter!” Although, I also sense that there is an underlying mockery in this comment of Socrates.

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that he is not attacking Gorgias’ person but is simply making

sure that the points raised in their conversation are of utmost

clarity (453c, 454b-c). In 457c-458b, Socrates expounds further,

in what seems to be a careful attempt to ensure that Gorgias is

not offended. Socrates emphasizes that his main objective in

engaging in a discussion with Gorgias is not to win the argument,

but rather to simply clarify the subject matter being

discussed.11 Socrates’ sense of frustration can be sensed in

this part of the dialogue as well when he proposes to terminate

the discussion if Gorgias is not aligned with this objective

(458a-b).

Socrates’ frustration is also apparent in his exchanges with

Polus. For instance, in 462c-d, Socrates is evidently irritated

that Polus did not clarify first what he meant by saying that

oratory is just a knack before going back to asking him if he

thinks that oratory is admirable. Out of his frustration,

Socrates dictates to Polus the questions he should ask to clarify

Socrates’ position (462d). In 463c-d, after Socrates dictates11 In 457e-458a, Socrates says, “And what kind of man am I? ... one who, however, wouldn’t be any less pleased to be refuted than to refute.”

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the question that Polus should ask and he obliges, Socrates makes

a comment that somewhat mocks Polus’ capability to understand the

responses of Socrates. Socrates makes a similar comment in 465e

after a lengthy explanation on what he meant by his claim that

oratory is an “image of a part of politics.”12 In these parts of

the dialogue, Socrates emphasizes that in engaging in the brand

of philosophical discourse that he espouses, clarity of

understanding, achieved by asking the right clarifying questions,

is equally important as clarity of speech.

Another insight on the rules of discussion that Socrates

espouses can be obtained from taking note of how Socrates

responded to Polus’ attacks on his position that it is better to

suffer injustice than to act unjustly (468e13, 470c14, 471a-d).

After explicitly stating in 471d that he thinks that Polus has

“neglected the practice of discussion,” Socrates expounds on the

12 Socrates says, “Perhaps I’ve done an absurd thing: I wouldn’t let you make long speeches, and here I’ve just composed a lengthy one myself. I deserve tobe forgiven, though, for when I made my statements short, you didn’t understand and you didn’t know how to deal with the answers I gave you, but you needed a narration.”

13 “As if you wouldn’t be envious...”

14 “Why, even a child can refute you...”

30

oratorical style of refutation that has no place in philosophical

discourse – refutation “by witnesses,” and refutation “by vote,”

the same that is employed in law courts (471e-472d).

Moving on to Socrates’ exchange with Callicles, it can be

said that Socrates is initially more optimistic about his

conversation with Callicles as compared to his preceding

exchanges with Gorgias and Polus. Socrates seems to respond

positively to Callicles’ rather lengthy speech (482c-486d)

primarily because of his sober and sensible assessment of

Socrates’ conversations with Gorgias and Polus as well as his

relatively clear account of his conception of what is naturally

just.15 Socrates’ initial optimism is evident in how Socrates

compares Callicles to a worthy stone against which a soul of gold

can be tested, given that Socrates believes that Callicles

possesses the qualities of knowledge, good will, and frankness

(486d-488b). In a sense, Socrates also emphasizes here that

15 Although it can also be said that Callicles’ initial lengthy speech alreadyhad traces of bullying, particularly evident in the comment made by Callicles in 484c, implying that Socrates must abandon philosophy in favour of “more important things.”

31

someone who wishes to engage in philosophical discourse must

possess these three essential qualities.

However, it soon becomes evident that Socrates’ initial

optimism with Callicles is short-lived as the discussion makes

its way to the same atmosphere of frustration. Throughout their

discussions about “the orderly life” and the distinction between

good and bad pleasures, Callicles kept on responding to Socrates

with arrogance and mockery, showing disinterest, bordering on

contempt against philosophical discourse and against the points

that Socrates attempts to make clear and argue for (some examples

of such responses – 489b-c, 491a, 494e, 497b, 499b, 511a, 513d,

514a). Socrates’ initial optimism with Callicles seems to have

fuelled him with some patience though as he struggles to continue

with the discourse for quite some time. However, the discussion

eventually leads to the peak of frustration, when in 506c,

Socrates had to resort to summarizing the discussion with

Callicles from the beginning and finishing the discussion by

himself. Towards the end of his discussion with Callicles,

Socrates seems to concede that the discussion will not arrive at

32

a resolution. He simply makes some final remarks on his position

and proceeds to narrate the eschatological myth that concludes

the dialogue, but not without one final attempt to assert that

the positions he was arguing for were not refuted by his three

interlocutors (527a-c). Before doing so however, Socrates’

frustration becomes most apparent in certain portions of the

latter parts of the dialogue particularly in the aggressive

questioning that takes a rather personal character in 515a-b and

in claiming that sophistry is more admirable than oratory in

520b.

Socrates’ Small Triumphs

Even though it can be said that the dialogue concluded in a

frustrated standoff, it can also be asserted that Socrates did

have some small triumphs in the Gorgias and these were achieved at

points where Socrates was able to turn his opponents’ initial

33

strengths into weaknesses that can be used against them in

discourse.16

For instance, it is Gorgias’ bloated ego (as evident in how

he is portrayed in 449a-c) that led him to admit out of shame

that he would teach justice to someone who came to him, which

resulted to a logical contradiction in his position as pointed

out by Socrates in 460d-461b. Likewise, it is Polus’ tendency to

quickly make aggressive and provocative statements that appeal to

popular opinion which led him to admit that acting unjustly is

more shameful than suffering injustice (474c) since doing so is

consistent with his instinct that is aligned with popular

opinion. This resulted into a logical contradiction in Polus’

position as well.

Socrates’ interlocutors recognized how he led Gorgias and

Polus into logical contradictions in their positions. Polus

calls what Socrates did to Gorgias as “a sign of great rudeness.”

16 Again, this observation can be better appreciated when thought about in terms of the thesis that Socrates is being bullied by his three interlocutors in the Gorgias. Often, in an actual episode of bullying, since the bully is evidently “stronger” than the person being bullied, the best chance to win against the bully is in being able to turn the bully’s own strength against himself or herself, instead of fighting off the bully with the bullied person’s own strength.

34

Callicles reiterates this in 482c-483d and also points out that

Socrates tricked Polus in a contradiction by working the mischief

of blurring the distinction between nature and law in the

discussion. However, I believe that it is not the ultimate aim

of Socrates to simply win the arguments against Gorgias and

Polus. Rather, his deeper intent in leading Gorgias and Polus

into logical contradictions in their positions was to demonstrate

that the oratorical style cannot be used to build the strength of

an argument. This is evident in Socrates’ response to Callicles

(486d-488b), emphasizing the qualities of knowledge, good will,

and frankness as essential in the practice of philosophical

discourse – the same qualities that seem to be lacking in those

who employ the oratorical style. Socrates affirms that it is

their excessive sense of shame that led Gorgias and Polus towards

logical contradictions in their positions and in doing so,

Socrates seemingly implicates the importance of intellectual

courage in philosophical discourse.

Socrates’ Honourable Struggle

35

All in all, it can be said that although it is evident that

the whole dialogue is characterized by frustrations in struggling

against bullies, and despite having only a couple of small

triumphs against Gorgias and Polus, Socrates nevertheless

struggled honourably in the Gorgias. Socrates struggled

honourably by remaining steadfast with his primary conviction –

that of practicing philosophical discourse alone when engaging in

discussion. As has been shown in earlier parts of this section,

even in the most frustrating situations, Socrates kept on putting

forward the standards of philosophical discourse as opposed to

oratory – clarity of speech, clarity of understanding,

conciseness, objectivity, knowledge, good will, frankness, and

intellectual courage. It can be said that Socrates was

attempting to somehow persuade his discussants on the superiority

of philosophical discourse over the oratorical style and his

repeatedly showing his contempt and little respect for oratory

was necessary and aligned with this intent.

36

Socrates’ honourable struggle is also evident in his

persistence in arguing for his position that the orderly life is

the way by which humankind should live. Despite Callicles

clearly responding with mockery and disinterest, Socrates

persevered in building his argument, up to the point of

conducting the discourse by himself. By doing so, Socrates stays

true to his statement that his primary intent in discussion is

not to win the argument but to make as clear as possible the

subject matter being argued and the positions being argued for.

Moreover, perhaps Socrates’ honourable struggle can best be

characterized using terminologies that Socrates himself employed

in the dialogue (521d) – “to take up the true political craft and

practice the true politics.” True politics is not concerned with

flattering and pleasing people but is ultimately engaged in the

pursuit of what is good and what is true. Socrates went through

the entire discussion, with utmost care to ensure that he

practiced nothing but true politics, and it is because he

demonstrated such integrity that it can be said that he struggled

37

honourably against his bullies. Socrates even integrated this

conception of true politics into his eschatological myth, in the

account where naked judges would judge naked souls in the

afterlife17 (523d-524b).

Conclusion

In this section, I presented my reflection on the tone of

the discussion in the Gorgias, mainly by expounding on the idea

that Socrates was being bullied by his interlocutors in the

dialogue, contrary to the alternate notion that Socrates was

single-handedly bullying Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles in the

discussions. It is asserted that the idea that Socrates was

17 This eschatological myth can be conceptually associated with Rawls’ conception of the veil of ignorance in the original position. It can also be said that this conception of the veil of ignorance in the original position isalso consistent with the rules of discussion that Socrates espouses in his brand of philosophical discourse. See Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition.Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999.

38

being bullied by his discussants in the Gorgias is plausible and

sensible when thought about in terms of the probable setting

where the dialogue could have actually taken place. This idea

was further explicated through a discussion of the episodes of

frustration throughout the dialogue in Socrates’ exchanges with

Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles, while pointing out insights on the

rules of discussion that Socrates put forward along the way.

Socrates’ small triumphs against Gorgias and Polus were then

discussed briefly, followed by an argument that despite not being

a clear victim nor a clear victor in his struggle with the

bullies in the dialogue, Socrates nevertheless struggled

honourably by demonstrating utmost integrity in remaining

committed to his brand of philosophical discourse.

In more general terms, I think that Socrates shows in the

Gorgias one of the better ways of responding to bullying during

discussions, and to bullying in general. Socrates shows that one

can emerge with dignity in a dialogue, or in any scenario for

that matter, despite being an unpopular minority.

39

Section 3: Can there be a Teacher of Virtue? – Socrates’ Doubt in

the Protagoras

Introduction

In this section, I attempt to argue that Socrates’

inclination in the Protagoras towards a negative position on the

question of whether or not virtue is teachable is founded on

strong doubts on whether there can be a teacher of virtue. In

other words, the key barrier against teaching virtue is that

there seems to be no qualified teacher of virtue, at least based

on the discussions in the Protagoras.

First, I provide explication on Socrates’ conception of what

teaching is and what it entails by showing that for Socrates,

teaching requires a teacher’s mastery of the subject matter being

40

taught. Next, I argue that in the exchanges between Socrates and

Protagoras in the dialogue, Protagoras appeared to be an

unqualified teacher of virtue primarily because he did not

demonstrate a strong mastery of virtue. Lastly, I speculate that

based on Socrates’ conception of the nature of virtue expressed

in the Protagoras, it is plausible to assert that he also has

strong doubts on whether the subject matter of virtue can be

mastered by anyone at all.18

Teaching Requires Mastery

Before examining Socrates’ position in the Protagoras on the

question of whether or not virtue is teachable, Socrates’

conception of what teaching is and what it entails must be

18 The discussions in this section likewise make reference to the Meno, in line with John M. Cooper’s suggestion in his introduction to the Protagoras. It is found that indeed, consulting the Meno is helpful in getting a relatively clearer picture of Socrates’ ideas on the nature of virtue and his position on the question of whether or not virtue is teachable.

41

expounded on first. Socrates’ account of this is not very

explicit in the dialogue but is implied in the manner by which he

questions Hippocrates and Protagoras.

Early on in the dialogue, when Socrates questions

Hippocrates on what Protagoras is and what he expects to become

by going to Protagoras (311b-312e), Socrates implicates in his

remarks that teaching requires a teacher’s mastery of the subject

matter being taught.19 This can be seen in the analogies that

Socrates uses in his questioning (311b-c). If one desires to

become a physician or a sculptor, one must go to a person who is

an expert on the subject matter that one wishes to learn – to a

physician or a sculptor, respectively. As Socrates proceeds with

his questioning, he makes the distinction between two types of

education – technical instruction, within which an education from

an expert physician or sculptor could be categorized, and general

education wherein Socrates cites learning grammar, music, and

wrestling as examples (312b). Nonetheless, it can be seen that

learning about the subject matters considered by Socrates to fall19 Or its corollary, that learning entails learning from a master or an expertof the subject matter that one wishes to learn.

42

within the scope of general education likewise entails taking

lessons from a teacher who has mastery of these subject matters –

“from your grammar instructor or music teacher or wrestling

coach.”

This notion of Socrates on how teaching entails mastery on

the subject matter being taught is further reinforced through

similar analogies when Socrates asks Protagoras directly what

students would get from him if they study with him, and

Protagoras gives a vague reply.20 To elaborate on his question,

he again provides analogies which implicate that if one wishes to

learn something, that person must go to someone who is a master

of the particular subject matter that the person wishes to learn

(318b-d).

On the other hand, in the Meno, Socrates is more

straightforward in asserting the claim that teaching requires

mastery of the subject matter being taught. Early on in the

dialogue, when Meno asks Socrates whether virtue can be taught or

20 In 318a-b, Protagoras says, “Young man, this is what you will get if you study with me: The very day you start, you will go home a better man, and thesame thing will happen the day after. Every day, day after day, you will get better and better.”

43

not, Socrates responds by saying, “I am so far from knowing

whether virtue can be taught or not that I do not even have any

knowledge of what virtue itself is.”21 It can be said that this

response touches on an even more fundamental concern in the sense

that Socrates claims that before one could even examine the

question of whether virtue is teachable or not, and more so

attempt to teach it, one must first have an understanding of what

virtue is.22 On the claim that teaching entails mastery of the

subject matter being taught, Socrates is more explicit in putting

this claim forward in 96a-b.23

21In 71a.

22 Linking this remark more directly to the thesis argued for in this section,it can be further said that for Socrates, before anyone can claim to be a teacher of a certain subject matter, that person must be certain that the particular subject matter is teachable. And before one can figure out whethera subject matter is teachable, that person must have mastery and understandingof the fundamental nature of the subject matter. Therefore, for Socrates, teaching requires mastery of the subject matter being taught.

23 Socrates says, “Can you mention any other subject of which those who claim to be teachers not only are not recognized to be teachers of others but are not recognized to have knowledge of it themselves, and are thought to be poor in the very matter which they profess to teach? Or any other subject of which those who are recognized as worthy teachers at one time say it can be taught and at other times that it cannot? Would you say that people who are so confused about a subject can be effective teachers of it?”

44

Protagoras Proved to be an Unqualified Teacher of Virtue

After showing in the previous section that for Socrates,

teaching entails a teacher’s mastery of the subject matter being

taught, it is next shown that in the dialogue, Protagoras, who

claims to be a teacher of virtue, proved to be an unqualified

teacher because he was not able to demonstrate mastery and

understanding of the subject matter of virtue.

After Socrates initially asserts his position that virtue is

not teachable (319b), Protagoras’ response first through

storytelling (320d-323c) and then through argumentation (323d-

325b) can be said to result to a plausible account of 1) how

every person has a share of virtue and 2) how virtue is indeed

teachable. After presenting this account, Protagoras claims in

328b-c that even though every human has share in virtue, he is

“more advanced in virtue” compared to others and is thus

qualified to teach students how to be virtuous. From this point

on, Socrates endeavours to put to test Protagoras and his claim

45

about himself being a qualified teacher of virtue, primarily by

examining Protagoras’ understanding of his own account of the

nature of virtue.

The recurring theme in Socrates’ examination of Protagoras

is the discussion on the unity of virtue, particularly the

question on whether virtues are different from each other or if

virtues conventionally deemed as different actually constitute

just one and the same virtue. When Socrates throws this question

to Protagoras in 329d, Protagoras’ initial position is that

virtue is a single thing and the different virtues (e.g. justice,

temperance, and piety) are its parts that are different from each

other both in terms of their natures and in their functions, and

it is possible for a person to have some virtues and not have the

others (329d-e). After Socrates proceeds with his questioning

however, Protagoras admits that justice and piety resembles each

other while also making a dismissive remark as if to imply that

such an admission does not drive any relevant point.24

Nonetheless, the incoherence in Protagoras’ position becomes more

apparent in 333b when Socrates catches him to have agreed to two24 “Anything at all resembles any other thing in some way.”

46

contradictory propositions – that a certain thing has only one

opposite and that wisdom is different and distinct from

temperance.

Socrates begins to question Protagoras again on his position

on the unity of virtue in 349b after which Protagoras puts

forward the more refined position that virtues are indeed similar

to each other but courage is different from the rest of virtues

in the sense that a person can be lacking in all other virtues

and yet still be courageous (349d). In the discussions that

follow, Socrates builds up his argument that all virtue is wisdom

and is thus one and the same. The discussion ends in an

embarrassing admission from Protagoras in 360d-e that courage is

essentially wisdom about what should and should not be feared and

is thus not dissimilar to other virtues as he initially claimed.

Thus, on several occasions, particularly during discussions

on the unity of virtue, Socrates exposes that Protagoras does not

have a coherent understanding of the nature of virtue and since

for Socrates, teaching requires the teacher to have mastery of

47

the subject matter being taught, Protagoras is an unqualified

teacher of virtue.

In can also be said that one important contributor to

Socrates’ judgment of Protagoras as an unqualified teacher of

virtue is his disapproval of the oratorical style of speech

typical of sophistry which Protagoras often employs in his

responses, as opposed to the philosophical style of discourse

that Socrates practices and promotes. In 331c, after Protagoras’

admission that justice and piety resemble each other, and

Protagoras says, “If you want, we’ll let justice be pious and

piety just,” Socrates reacts in a rather strong way which

explicates and clarifies the brand of philosophical discourse

that he would like to engage in.25 In 333c, Socrates stresses

his characterization of the type of philosophical discussion that

he would like to engage in – one that puts primacy on

argumentation rather than on personal politics or the politics of

25 Socrates says, “Don’t do that to me! It’s not this ‘if you want’ or ‘if you agree’ business I want to test. It’s you and me I want to put on the line, and I think the argument will be tested best if we take the ‘if’ out.

48

opinions.26 In 334d, after Protagoras gives a speech that is

well-applauded, Socrates expresses his disdain for long speeches

and to some extent, threatens that he would need to end the

discussion if Protagoras is unwilling to provide clear and brief

answers (335c). This resulted to Prodicus intervening to arrive

at a compromise (337c-338b). Beginning in 339a, Protagoras

invokes poetry in his questioning and although Socrates himself

offers his own interpretation of the poem in question (342a-

347a), afterwards he undermines discussions about poetry (347c-

348a), as something that is “no different from the second-rate

drinking parties of the agora crowd.” These episodes in the

dialogue support, to some extent, the assertion that at least a

part of Socrates’ judgment of Protagoras as an unqualified

teacher of virtue is driven by Socrates’ aversion against the

oratorical style of speech that the sophist Protagoras practices.

Can Virtue be Mastered by Anyone at all?

26 Socrates says, “I am primarily interested in testing the argument, althoughit may happen both that the questioner, myself, and my respondent wind up being tested. “

49

Apart from deeming Protagoras to be an unqualified teacher

of virtue given the notion that teaching requires mastery of the

subject matter being taught, Socrates also expresses strong

doubts in the Protagoras on whether virtue can be mastered by

anyone at all. Early on in the dialogue, Socrates seems to

already make an indirect expression of this doubt when he

admonishes Hippocrates to be cautious about the teachers he would

go to especially if such teachers claim to teach about matters of

the soul27 (313a-c).

Socrates expresses more clearly his doubts on whether virtue

can be mastered, and therefore taught, by anyone at all when he

cites examples of sons of virtuous fathers not being virtuous

themselves both in the Protagoras (319e-320b) and in the Meno

(93c-94e). These examples are important supporting elements to

Socrates’ position that virtue cannot be taught because they

implicate that although there are people who can be deemed

virtuous (i.e. possessing virtue), these same people do not seem27 A category within which conceivably, Socrates would deem virtue to fall under.

50

to have mastery of the virtue they possess such that they are not

able to teach even their own sons about these virtues. Although

Protagoras’ response to Socrates seems plausible – that the

teaching of virtue is in a sense “democratized,” such that

everyone in a society is eager to teach everyone else especially

the young about virtue so that everyone has equal likelihood of

becoming virtuous regardless of the family or class that a person

belongs to – his response hardly addresses the doubt on whether

anyone can truly master virtue to the point where someone becomes

a qualified teacher of virtue, consistent with the sense of

teaching that Socrates is inclined towards i.e. in the same sense

that technical instruction and general education are conducted.

Along the same line of discussion, Protagoras’ argument that the

reason why people who act contrary to standards of virtue are

punished is that virtue can be taught by correction (323d-324d)

can be challenged by pointing out that although people in a

society can collectively recognize offenses against virtue (in

the same way that people can also collectively recognize virtue

51

when it is evidently possessed by a certain person)28, and

likewise decide to punish an offender in order to correct a

certain behaviour that is offensive against virtue (given the

ability to recognize what virtuous behaviour is the opposite of

the offensive behaviour), recognition still does not necessarily

entail mastery and understanding of virtue. Thus, consequently,

the common capability of humans to recognize virtues and their

opposites when they are present does not necessarily entail that

virtue is teachable in the same sense that subject matters

included in the practice of technical instruction and general

education are taught.

It can also be said that Socrates’ doubts on whether anyone

at all can master virtue is founded as well on his conception of

the nature of virtue. His notions on the unity of virtue and on

virtue being wisdom are already mentioned above. The notion that

virtue is wisdom, particularly the sort of wisdom which directs

the soul to the good, is likewise presented in the Meno (e.g. in

88c-d) and so is the notion on the unity of virtue (e.g. in 72e28 Which can be linked to Protagoras’ argument that everyone has some share invirtue.

52

ff). In general, it can be said that Socrates’ conception of

virtue is that it has an “essence”29 which also makes all virtues

one and the same30. Although Plato makes it clear that this

“essence” has very close affinity with wisdom and knowledge, it

is also made clear that it is not the same sort of wisdom and

knowledge that is associated with subject matters that can be

taught through technical instruction or general education.

Although Socrates elaborates in the Protagoras that the sort of

wisdom or knowledge that has affinity to the “essence” of virtue

has something to do with the capability to employ the art of

measurement over the power of appearance in making choices and

even likens the art of measurement to arithmetic and is thus

labelled as knowledge (356c-357b), Socrates postpones the

elaboration on what sort of knowledge the art of measurement

exactly is (357b-c) and contents himself for the meantime on the

establishment of the proposition that the art of measurement is a

kind of knowledge. This brings back the question on whether

29 What follows from the ongoing discussion is that this “essence” is wisdom or is closely associated with wisdom.

30 This is expounded in the Meno 74a ff.

53

anyone can have a full grasp of this “essence” of virtue and thus

become a qualified teacher of virtue in the same way that

presumably a physician or a grammar instructor can have a full

grasp of the “essence” of medicine or grammar in such a way that

the physician or grammar instructor can be deemed as qualified

teachers of the respective subject matters they have an expertise

in. Proceeding to address this question again considering

Socrates’ notions about virtue mentioned above inevitably entails

further elaboration on his conception of the nature of virtue.

In the Meno, Socrates invokes the idea about learning as

recollection31 (81c-e) which eventually becomes pivotal as he

clarifies his position on whether or not virtue is teachable.

Towards the end of the Meno (97a until the end of the dialogue),

Socrates makes a distinction between knowledge and true belief or

opinion and argues that neither is inferior as compared to the

other in the sense that both can lead to and be directive towards

correct action. Because it seems in the dialogue that no one can

be deemed to have a coherent understanding of what virtue is,

31 This is also one of the key themes discussed in the Phaedo.

54

Socrates is compelled to not categorize virtue as knowledge, more

precisely within the sorts of knowledge that can be learned by

recollection. Instead, he categorizes virtue as true opinion

which “comes to those who possess it as a gift from the gods

which is not accompanied by understanding.”32 This brings the

discussion to Socrates’ assessment of the exchanges between him

and Protagoras towards the end of the dialogue wherein Socrates

imagines their discussion telling them that they seem to have

both fallen into inconsistencies – Protagoras by claiming that

virtue is not knowledge and Socrates for claiming that virtue is

not teachable (361a-c).

Given what has been said thus far in this section, Socrates’

criticism of his own arguments and of his position that virtue

cannot be taught can be evaluated. The main criticism is founded

on the assertion that if virtue is essentially wisdom or

knowledge, then it must be teachable. A response can then be

provided as such: Indeed, it seems that virtue has an “essence”

and this “essence” is wisdom or knowledge or has a very close32 In 99e-100a

55

affinity to wisdom or knowledge, but not knowledge in the same

sense as medicine or grammar are considered knowledge. The key

difference is that it appears that virtue cannot be learned by

recollection and so it seems that no one can have a full

understanding and mastery of its nature. Since teaching, at

least in the same sense wherein medicine and grammar are taught,

requires mastery of the subject matter being taught, it follows

that virtue cannot be taught.

Conclusion

All in all, based on the discussion presented in this

section, it appears that Socrates’ position in the Protagoras that

virtue is not teachable stands, and this position is primarily

grounded on strong doubts on whether there can be a qualified

teacher of virtue. In examining the question of whether or not

virtue can be taught, Socrates’ notion of what teaching is and

what it entails is closely associated with the sense of teaching

in which the practices of technical instruction and general

56

education are practiced. Thus, Socrates’ notion is that teaching

requires the teacher to have a mastery of the subject matter

being taught. In the case of virtue, it seems that no one,

whether Protagoras or anyone else, can have a coherent

understanding of the nature of virtue, and thus, even though

virtue is wisdom or knowledge, it is not the sort of knowledge

that can be taught.

Section 4: Insights on Philosophy’s Struggle to be Relevant in

the 21st Century

The interpretative reflections on the Phaedo, the Gorgias,

and the Protagoras that have been presented on this paper can be

synthesized into insights towards a response to the important

philosophical issues and challenges related to philosophy’s

struggle to be relevant in the 21st century. Thus, it can be

shown that lessons can be drawn from ancient philosophy on how

philosophy can respond to questions about its value proposition

57

in the present time because these were the same questions that

had be addressed by ancient philosophers during their times.

First, it can be suggested that present-day philosophers can

adopt the philosophical salesmanship demonstrated by Plato in the

Phaedo to be more responsive to the ever evolving needs of

society in the 21st century. Philosophers must first have a

clear understanding of the real needs, desires, pains, and

aspirations of present-day society in order to identify the

appropriate touch points and communication channels where

philosophy can be effectively advanced as not only a relevant

undertaking, but also as the highest human pursuit. In doing so,

philosophers can leverage on some fundamental principles in sales

and marketing, such as the formulation of a unique selling

proposition in order to promote and “sell” philosophy, in the

same manner that Socrates promoted philosophy to the Pythagoreans

in the Phaedo, as argued in Section 1. At first this might not

seem as a plausible approach especially for purists but a clear

distinction must be made between “selling” and “selling out.” It

must be understood that “selling” philosophy does not violate its

58

integrity and destroy the value and sophistication of

philosophical discourse, but rather, it could be an important

tool towards advancing philosophy as the highest pursuit of

humanity.

Second, it can be suggested that present-day philosophers

must struggle honourably against intellectual bullying despite

the apparent frustrations of the struggle, in the same way that

Socrates struggled honourably against his three bullies in the

Gorgias. It is inevitable that disciplines with greater popular

support would advance certain hegemonic ideologies to the point

of bullying disciplines that espouse ideologies that are less

popular and are thus deemed less relevant. The struggle against

intellectual bullying is definitely frustrating especially if one

is convinced of the value and integrity of one’s convictions

despite having disproportionately less popular support. However,

philosophers must continue with the struggle and recognize that

in scenarios of bullying, triumphs can often be found by

leveraging on the bully’s own strength and turning this same

strength against the bully. In the case of science bullying

59

philosophy, the strength of science lies in its capability to

present logical and empirical evidences for its claims and to

demonstrate the pragmatic relevance of scientific discoveries.

Thus, conceivably, in philosophy’s struggle against this

particular case of bullying, philosophers can leverage on this

very same strength of science, to challenge the claim to

authority of empiricism and the associations made between

relevance and pragmatism. An elaboration on this discussion on

the tactical strategies on how philosophy can triumph in such a

case of bullying can be the subject of another paper altogether.

At this juncture, it is simply suggested that what is truly

important is for philosophy to continue to struggle against

intellectual bullying and remain true to the value and integrity

of philosophical discourse despite the frustrations of the

struggle, and by doing so, philosophers can hold on to a certain

hope of a triumph against this bullying.

Third, it can be suggested that present-day philosophers

must continue to challenge and expose false teachers who claim an

unjust monopoly on wisdom and knowledge, in the same way that

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Socrates challenged and exposed Protagoras in the Protagoras. One

key strength of philosophy lies in its capability to draw from an

extremely broad and rich set of ideas and methodologies in the

formulation of its arguments, and thus, philosophers must

likewise leverage on this strength to challenge claims to

authority that are grounded on arguments with narrow bases of

justification. If it is accepted that philosophy is ultimately

concerned with truth and wisdom, then challenging and exposing

false teachers must continue to be part of the business of doing

philosophy. This can likewise be an important role of philosophy

and important element in philosophy’s claim to relevance in the

21st century.

Conceivably, the three suggestions discussed above can

contribute towards a more robust response to the issues and

questions on philosophy’s struggle for relevance in the 21st

century. It can also be posited that part of how science argues

for its own relevance in the present time is along the same three

areas discussed above in the sense that, 1) science has been

successful in “selling” itself as the ultimate pursuit of

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humanity, 2) science has been triumphant in the dynamics of

bullying through its strengths in empiricism and pragmatism, and

3) scientists have made strong claims to their legitimacy as true

teachers of knowledge and truth. Thus, conceivably, it is also

in these same three areas that philosophy can defend its own

relevance in the present time. However, it must also be made

clear that philosophy’s struggle for relevance in the 21st

century goes beyond the conflict between science and philosophy,

and this struggle must ultimately be concerned with strengthening

the value proposition of philosophy in the current contexts of

valuation for relevance, instead of “defeating” other disciplines

and undermining the value propositions of these disciplines.

General Concluding Remarks

In this paper, I have presented interpretative reflections

on key themes in three Socratic dialogues of Plato – the Phaedo,

the Gorgias, and the Protagoras – and synthesized these reflections

towards a possible response to some important questions and

issues related to philosophy’s value proposition and its struggle

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for relevance in the 21st century. Thus, it was shown that

present-day philosophers can draw lessons from ancient philosophy

in responding to present-day challenges because there is

considerable probability that the same challenges were already

faced by ancient philosophers during their time. In closing, I

would like to suggest emphatically that present-day philosophers

must remain true to the value and integrity of the practice of

philosophy despite the unique dynamics of the challenges of the

21st century. Hypothetically, this is perhaps the most important

advice or reminder that Plato and other ancient philosophers

could give present-day philosophers when they are consulted

regarding the challenges that philosophy faces in the present

time.

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