Nature and Origins of We-Intentionality

Nature and Origins of the We-Intentionality.

UC, Berkeley -1st-May-2013

Guido Seddone, University of Sassari (Italy)

COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY, NORMS AND INSTITUTIONS: A PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION ABOUT HUMAN COOPERATION

Structure of the Project !I Linguistic-Theoretical Definition of Joint Actions and Cooperation 1) Nature and Origins of the We-Intentionality a. Definition of We-Intentionality – aa. [Groupness:] We-Mode and We-Authority [responsibility and reliability]

b.Belongingness and Being-with-an-other c.Break-up of the Community d.Belongingness as Plot of Language, Language Transmission and Social Collaborative Activities

e. Conclusion of the Section !2) Norms a. Symbolisation of the Social Collaborative Activities through the Language [Norms-Background] b. The Dialogical Dimension of the Normative c. Development of Institutions !II Social-political Aspects of Cooperation 3) Borders of Cooperation a. Collective Expectance and Participation b. Hierarchy and Obedience c. Culture of Freedom and Borders of Cooperation !4) Institutions and intersubjective Freedom a. Institutions and individual Freedom

b.Individuals and Society !!

Premise

For a definition of the double interdependence (among members and between each member and his/her group)

The target of this talk is to clarify the interdependence that is borne by a peculiar rational faculty (the We-intentionality) and that produces intentional and collaborative units (groups or social organisations) with a historical identity (the Self).

In contrast to Tuomela, I think that social organizations are not mechanisms of self-committing and control over individual commitments, but rather organisms with the final structure of self-preservation.

This self-preservation is borne by the personal engagement of the individual members and represents the essence of the double interdependence: among members and between each member and his group.


Intentionality, We-Intentionality and Language

Intentionality and we-intentionality are not evolved separately, but rather contemporary

The collaborative context is actually a holistic dimension in which rational beings develop a common symbolism (language), which semantically represents reality and improves daily interaction.


Intentionality, We-Intentionality and Language

The question is the following: what kind of phenomenon simultaneously involving language, intentionality and we-intentionality are we speaking about?

I claim that the right answer is that we are speaking about human social collaborative activities, which require that their members have specific cognitive characteristics and are able to bear cognitive devices such as language, symbolism, intentions and we-intentions.


What the We in We-Intentionality is.

We-intentionality does not imply a directness towards a group, but rather towards my group (member-perspective rather than observer-perspective)

Previous definition: Intentional unit of intentional individuals

Final definition: We is the other members plus myself as member

This means that the history, the identity and everything concerning the We is determined by each member considering himself as a member


What the We in We-Intentionality is.

I claim that the most important character of every social collaborative activities is their self-preservation over time by means of the personal engagement of their members.

In other words, they tend to resist and challenge the history and to assume a definitive shape.


We-Intentionality Isolated

We-intentionality is a personal intentional stance that has a double directedness: towards the social dimension and towards one´s own membership.

In fact, the bearer of a we-intention must be also a member of that We for having an active part in its existence, history and identity.

The concrete realization of We-Intentionality are social collaborative activities [SCA] that can be classified in occasional [O-SCA]and institutionalised [I-SCA]


We-Intentionality Isolated

O-SCA ☛ the membership depends solely on the accomplishment of the established target, after that the membership and the organisation are annulled

I-SCA ☛ the organisation is permanent or for quite a long time and is not tied only with a singular target but rather to a complex system of interdependence. The aim is the conservation, the development, the growth and the transmission of the social collaborative activities themselves.


Commitment in Joint Actions

A commitment is a special kind of intentional ascription having a direct relation with the group, i.e. it is a special we-intention.

The Latin word committere has a wide range of meanings but for our case it is particularly relevant the fact that it means both “to entrust something to somebody” and “to carry out a task” and “to allow something”.



My general definition of commitment:

A practical ought before the own fellows related entirely to the practical situation concerning the group of its bearer.

In the case of O-SCA, commitments are exclusively We-intentions for the accomplishment of the shared mission,

in the case of I-SCA commitments are a kind of personal engagement for the existence, the conservation, the growth and the transmission of one´s own social organisation/s.



Commitment-based theories consider cooperation as the outcome of intentional attitudes of individuals joining social activities.

For this reason they cannot provide a solution for the question of mistrust, furnishing an explanation of social organisation as entities permanently exposed to the risk of cooperative default.


Social Activities as Network of Agents

The notion of plural subject refers to the principle of unity of the whole, which claims that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

Although the principle is right, it implies that a general will can determine the destiny of the group and consequently of its members who can be reduced to instrument of an abtract group-mind.

This leads us to considerations about the despotic nature of some organisations that take individuals as instruments of a general will, rather than developing the concept of real cooperative shared occurrences.


Social Activities as Network of Agents

In my opinion, groups are organised and changed by individuals and this idea also gives an account of the historic and non-definitive nature of every social organisation.

This avoids having a sort of uprightness in the development of the shared enterprise, enabling us to understand the dynamism of the groups as internal effectiveness of their members.

The shape and the history of every organisation is hence actually managed by its attenders, although there are different levels of influences that a fellow can have on his/her group.


The Self

The notion of Self gives an account for the identity of the social organizations.

It plays an important role in the question concerning the mutual reliance among fellows by establishing a collective awareness about the group and inducing the individuals to put a certain faith in the common mission, values, historical identity and relevance


Belongingness

The notion of belongingness evolves that of Self because it explains the individual awareness to be member of a social organizazion as personal engagement for the preservation, conservation and development of the group.


Belongingness vs Commitment

We know that the we-authority arises from the commitments of the individuals who agree about social collaborative activities and that there is a direct interdependence between the duties and the personal engagement of each member and the success of the cooperative enterprise.

However, commitments produce a burdensome question about trust: How can I trust my fellows and be sure that the common mission will be accomplished by means of the agreed contributions of each member?



In order to avoid this circularity we have to go beyond the contract-centred approach end evolve a general principle of belongingness that explains the cooperative firmness.

Let´s consider this enunciation:

[A] From group y I received the task to make x, because We have the common target j and x is part of j. I have accepted this task and therefore I have committed myself.

[A] implies a contract-centred approach in the analysis of cooperation and takes in consideration only individual personal attitudes disregarding the common and objective dimension of the collaborative activity. I maintain that this is the reason of the circularity.



If we do not adopt a contract-centered approach we can stress the idea that personal engagement is vital for the existence, the development, the conservation and the transmission of the social collaborative activities upon which each human organisation relies.

The notion of belongingness ties the destiny of each member to destiny of the social organizations and explains the cooperative firmness and solidity in terms of personal engagement for the preservation of the group.



Thanks for the Attention

Nature and Origins of We-Intentionality

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