"Myth of Early Islamic Government: The Legitimization of the Islamic Regime," Iranian Studies 24...

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The Myth of Early Islamic Government: The Legitimization of the Islamic RegimeAuthor(s): Haggay RamSource: Iranian Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1/4 (1991), pp. 37-54Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. on behalf of International Society for Iranian StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4310754 .

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Haggay Ram

The Myth of Early Islamic Government: The Legitimization of the Islamic Regime*

In January 1988, the Speaker of Parliament, Hojjat al-Islam 'Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, delivered a lengthy Friday sermon (khutbah) in which he discussed a "very important message" previously issued by the "leader," Ayatollah Khomei- ni. The message, as expounded by Rafsanjani, was a reiteration of Khomeini's well-known views on the nature and function of Islamic Government and, specif- ically, on the duties and privileges of the ulama as the political leaders of the Muslim community. The gist of the sermon was that "it is the jurists (fuqaha') who determine the Muslims' way of life under every condition and at any given time." In a world where "people extract economic minerals from the depths of the earth," where "war is waged for the conquest of space and Mars," and where "atom [bombs] are built. . . as weapons of intimidation," the Qur'an could not provide answers to all problems and issues. Indeed, Rafsanjani claimed, if "in the present age we are confronted with a million issues," only "one hundred thousand of these would have been relevant at the time of the Prophet." Thus the faqih is duty-bound to reign over the community and provide solutions to issues and problems that were unknown to seventh-century Arabia.,

The notion of an Islamic government headed by the ulama was not an abstract idea in the political experience of Iran at the time of Rafsanjani's sermon. By that time (1988) the Iranian people had already been under direct clerical rule for nearly a decade. However, in 1971, when Khomeini first introduced his views on "Islamic Government" in his famous tract, Vilkyat-i faqih (The Governance of the Jurist), this notion was considered original, if not a radical break from the mainstream of Shi'i thought. And, when immediately after the demise of the monarchical order Khomeini's people took concrete measures to put this idea into practice, the novelty of the enterprise was further accentuated.

* I wish to thank professors Peter Chelkowski, Farhad Kazemi, and Ami Ayalon for their review of the article and for their many valuable suggestions and cogent comments. 1. Ittild'at (daily, Tehran), 16 January 1988.



38 Ram

Given this and the general ambiguity surrounding the issue of legitimacy in Shi'i political thought,2 it is not surprising that with the collapse of the monarchy, the ruling ulama embarked upon an earnest campaign to legitimize the Islamic government they had installed in Iran. The ulama's first concem was to show that their own form of government was a continuation of Islamic tradition and culture rather than a departure from it. Thus, the leaders of the "new" Iran depicted their political program as a return to the pure and uncontaminated days of early Islam, taking the polity of the Prophet Muhammad and the first Imam, 'Ali b. Abi Talib, as the only valid model for the Islamic state. In other words, the regime under Khomeini turned to the Islamic state founded and gov- erned by the Prophet and later by the first Imam-or what we may call the "myth of early Islamic government"-as a means to legitimize its form of govemment in the eyes of the masses.

This paper discusses how the clerical regime utilized the myth of early Islamic government as a legitimizing instrument throughout the first decade of the revolution. More precisely, it seeks to unveil how the Iranian leadership attached the myth to its campaign to sanctify the Islamic revolution and the subsequent form of government, political leadership and Islamic society to which it gave rise. In- deed, the Iranian regime has used the most evocative myths of Shi'i Islam to maintain the revolutionary fervor of the masses at a high pitch during critical phases of the revolution. The transformed version of the "Karbala paradigm" with its leading protagonists recast as antagonists in an ongoing struggle between liberation and oppression was a prime example of such use of basic myths. This paper, however, intends to show how the Islamic government in Iran has assigned to Shi'i mythology a more "positive" role-that of construct- ing and sanctifying, rather than discrediting and undermining a regime.

2. On political legitimacy in Shi'ism and on Khomeini's innovative political thought see G. Rose, "Velayat-e Faqih and the Recovery of Islamic Identity in the Thought of Ayatollah Khomeini," in N. Keddie (ed.), Religion and Politics in Iran: Shi'ism from Quietism to Revolution (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1983), 166-88; N. Calder, "Accommodation and Revolution in Imami Shi'i Jurisprudence: Khumaini and the Classical Tradition," Middle Eastern Studies 18 (January 1982): 1-20; H. Enayat, "Khumaini's Concept of the 'Guardianship of the Jurisconsult'," in J. Piscatori (ed.), Islam in the Political Process (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 160-80; M. Bayat, "The Iranian Revolution of 1978-79: Fundamentalist or Modern," Middle East Journal 37 (1983): 30-42; S. Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980); A. Hairi, Shi'ism and Constitutionalism in Iran: A Study of the Role Played by the Persian Residents of Iraq in Iranian Politics (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977); A. Arjomand (ed.), Authority and Political Culture in Shi'ism (New York: State University of New York Press, 1988); idem, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam: Religion, Political Order, and Societal Change in Shi'ite Iran from the Beginning to 1890 (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1989); A. Lambton, "Quis Custodiet Custodos? Some Reflections on the Persian Theory of Government," Studia Islamica 5 (1955): 125-48; H. Algar, "The Oppositional Role of the Ulama in Twentieth Century Iran," in N. Keddie (ed.), Scholars, Saints and Sufis (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972), 231-55.



Myth of Early Islanic Government 39

In this paper I focus on the contents of post-revolutionary sermons that were delivered at the Tehran Friday congregational prayers during the first decade of the Islamic revolution.3 Friday sermons are an invaluable source for any inquiry into the Islamic regime's strategies of mass mobilization. No doubt, following the fall of the shah, the sermon (khutbah) emerged as a powerful device for con- solidating and sanctifying the clerical regime. Representing the most important element in the mass media, the Tehran Friday congregational prayers were specif- ically designed to expound and legitimize the policies of the Islamic government among the masses. As Farhad Kazemi observes,

Led by the important personages of Friday prayer leaders (imam-jum'ahs), these gatherings are significant indoctrination sessions in addition to having purely religious value of group prayer and affirmation of faith. These are occasions for informing and explaining government directions and decisions to the masses, for rationalizing and justifying them . . . or for denouncing foreign governments and world-wide imperialism.... The Friday prayer sessions and the use of the pulpit are among the most effective means for raising the political consciousness of the masses in support of regime policies. The clerics are most cognizant of the im- mense value of the pulpit for purposes of both indoctrination and mobilization.4

It is no secret that the profound religiosity of many Iranians has been utilized by the Islamic Republic for the political ends of mass mobilization, with the desired end result of regime support. Hence, the Khomeini regime repeatedly employed basic Shi'i symbols and myths in an endeavor to make the faithful understand where their obligations lay.

Yet there is another, perhaps more decisive, reason why the Islamic regime in Iran should employ myths to advance its own legitimacy. According to Mircea Eliade, a myth is a story which tells of the creation of a "sacred event" in "primordial time" or in the "cosmogony"; it deals with the origins of things. A myth, then, is the story of how something was created, "how, through the deeds of Supernatural Beings, a reality came into existence, be it the whole of reality, the Cosmos, or only a particular kind of human behavior, an institution." In Eliade's view, the activity which put this "sacred event" into order is exemplary, and so it becomes a paradigm of how things should be done ever after. This is so, Eliade explains, because of the belief that all things are endowed with life and that the source of all life, strength and efficacy is the supernatural force at work

3. All Tehran sermons which were delivered from 27 July 1979 (the date marking the reinstitution of Friday worship in Islamic Iran) to 28 May 1982 were found in a four-volume collection entitled, Dar maktab-i jum'ah: majmu'ah-yi khutbah-yi jum'ah-yi Tihran (hereafter Makiab), published by the Iranian Ministry of Islamic Guidance. The volumes were published separately, the first two in 1985 (1364 S.), the third in 1986 (1365 S.), and the fourth in 1988 (1367 S.). All subsequent Tehran sermons, delivered from June 1982 through December 1989, were collected from the Iranian dailies Ittild'dt and Kayhan. 4. F. Kazemi, Politics and Culture in Iran (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1988), 23.



40 Ram

in the beginning. Yet, as things recede in time from their origin, they lose their vitality and strength, and hence they decay and eventually die. The only way to restore them is to reenact the "sacred event," by repeating the activity which brought it into being in the first place. Simply put, whatever was achieved in the mythological past is not lost forever, for it may be restored and regenerated. In other words, mythical time is reversible; rebirth may follow mythical decline and death.5

A given regime may therefore seek legitimacy by portraying the activities of its constituent parts (government, institutions, leadership) as reenactments of a "sacred event." By claiming to be a repetition of a "sacred event" possessing the vitality, efficacy and paradigmatic virtues inherent in its sacredness, a regime may render itself exemplary and, consequently, worthy of emulation and perpetu- ation. Indeed, as they explored the ideas underlying totalitarian and autocratic regimes, Fredrich and Brzezinski observed that "A myth is typically a tale con- cerned with past events, giving them special meaning and significance for the present and thereby reinforcing the authority of those who are wielding power in a particular community."6

The contents of the Friday sermons demonstrate clearly that the Iranian regime resorted to the myth of early Islamic government to bolster its own legitimacy along the lines cited above. The regime clearly claimed that by repeating the exemplary activity of the Prophet and 'Ali ("Supernatural Beings") at the dawn of Islam ("primordial time"), it was able to reenact their ideal government, leadership and society (taken altogether, a "sacred event") which declined and perished over the course of time.7 Two sermons in particular, the first delivered by Ayatollah Sayyid Mahmud Taleqani in 1979 and the second by Ayatollah 'Abdul-Karim Musavi Ardabili in 1984, are dedicated to what may be termed the "creation" of an exemplary government by the Prophet of Islam, and its conse- quent decline and fall in due time.8

In both cases the preachers elaborated on the outcome of the Prophet's "Islamic revolution," namely, the establishment of an ideal Islamic government in Med- ina after the conquest of Mecca. It was, they claimed, an ideal government because of its just policy as outlined by the Prophet himself. Upon entering Mecca victorious, prayer leaders explained, the Prophet announced, "Every vain-

5. See M. Eliade, Myth and Reality (New York: Harper & Row, 1968). Eliade discusses the process of decline, death and rebirth more thoroughly in The Myth of the Eternal Return (New York: Harper & Row, 1954). 6. C. Fredrich and Z. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (New York & London: Praeger, 1961), 99. 7. It is important to note that the Iranian case is by no means unique. Like the Islamic revolution, previous great revolutions have also invoked the myth of a primordial event in order to present themselves as reenactments of it. For example, the French Revolution sought to reenact ancient Roman institutions, just as the Bolshevik Revolution derived its imagery from the great French Revolution. 8. See M. Taleqani, 24 August 1979, Maktab 1: 29-30; 'A. K. Ardabili, Ittila'at, 11 August 1984.



Myth of Early Islamtic Govertnment 41

glory (iftikhar) of the jaehiliyah is trampled under my foot, all profit of the jdhiliyah is trampled under my foot, and every privilege (imtiyaz) is trampled under my foot-all have been obliterated." And, the Prophet added, there were to be "no distinctions [between] an Arab and a non-Arab ('Ajami) . . . [between] white and black . . . the most dear to you are not mundane distinctions," but "righteousness" (taqvc). This ideal state of affairs remained, Taleqani and Arda- bili suggested, so long as the Prophet headed the Muslim community. How- ever, "time passed, the Prophet of God passed away, and gradually the same per- sons who carried the sign of the fulaqd' ["the released ones" -the infidel ances- tors of the Umayyads who were freed by the Prophet after the conquest of Mecca] on their foreheads attained influence in the [court] of the caliphate." Upon seiz- ing power these "released ones" literally returned the government to the state of jfhiliyah, to the system of distinctions, discrimination, exploitation and oppression. In other words, the exemplary "sacred event" (the Prophet's government and society) had lost its strength and efficacy as time passed, and subsequently it perished at the hands of the Umayyads.

When 'Ali assumed the caliphate, other prayer leaders observed, he made eamest efforts to restore the government of the Prophet. His success, however, was short-lived, for he was martyred and his government usurped in the 40th year of the hijrah (661 A.D.), just five years after the community swore allegiance to his rule. The "sacred event" faced another setback, and the "world of Islam suf- fered its greatest blow." Indeed, it was noted, without a government, Islam was covered with "dark curtains" for fourteen centuries; it had become "an orphan child [who] . . . has no guardian to manage [his] affairs and protect his posses- sions."9 Herein lies the grave need to restore the government, to reenact the "sacred event" of early Islam.

Islam, Hojjat al-Islam Sayyid 'Ali Khameneh'i explained, "is like a house usurped by a usurper; the people of the house want to regain their possession." Throughout the period of usurpation, as long as the government was removed, many "erroneous changes" were made in that house. Justice turned into oppression, independence into dependence and submission, equality into discrimination, and tawhid (unity of God) into shirk (polytheism). In short, with the expira- tion of the "sacred event"-or "true" Islamic government-the "House of Islam" was transformed into the house of jdhiliyah. It was therefore necessary to re- build the house immediately by establishing "a govemment emanating from God and from the people."'0 Only then would Islamic society regain its past glory and its moral and material superiority. "

Within this context, prayer leaders repeatedly presented the Islamic revolution as a reenactment of the Prophet's own "Islamic revolution." And, because the revolution in seventh-century Arabia had given rise to an impeccable and just Islamic government, so would the Islamic revolution in twentieth-century Iran give way

9. A. Jannati in a speech before sermon, Ittila'at, 2 June 1984. 10. 15 February 1980, Maktab 2: 35-7. 11. 'A. Khameneh'i, 21 March 1980, ibid., 78.



42 Ram

to an immaculate government. Both revolutions and their respective goals and achievements were presented as one. Thus, many prayer leaders proclaimed that 22 Bahman 1357 S./ll February 1979-the day marking the victory of the Islamic revolution-was "reminiscent of the victory of the Noble Prophet over the infidels and the establishment of an Islamic society in the town of Yathrib [Medina]."'2

According to prayer leaders, there are abundant reasons why the Islamic revolution and the Islamic government in Iran are "reminiscent" of, or reenact, the Prophet's revolution and government. The primary reason concerns the circumstances surrounding the victories and achievements of the two revolutions and the fact that "There are similar aspects between what had come to pass on the Noble Prophet and his companions ... in the beginning of Islam, and what has come to pass [today] on the nation of that Prophet.....13 In a lengthy sermon delivered in December 1981, for instance, Rafsanjani informed his audience of the similarities between Iran's revolution and that of the Prophet. He began by observing that when Iran waged its revolution during the period of 1978-79, the world was divided between two omnipotent superpowers-the United States and the Soviet Union. By comparison, he claimed, "In the time of the Prophet . . . two superpowers dominated the world: Iran in the East and Byzantium in the West; Iran with its colonies, and Byzantium with its satellites (iqmar)." Fur- thermore, Rafsanjani continued, both contemporary Iran and seventh-century Arabia were considered parts of the "third world"; both "lagged behind from the standpoint of civilization," and so no one believed that they would be able to become the "bearers" of a new civilization. Neither friend nor foe expected these revolutions to be victorious, and they were all proven wrong. In both cases the notion of exporting the revolution was first subjected to "ridicule and mockery" by enemies who thought that it constituted "no serious danger to the . . . exploitative and imperialistic relations of the region." Thus, the "Khosrows [the Sasanian kings] and the Reagans of the world" labeled the leaders of the two revolutions-the Prophet and Khomeini-as "sorcerers," "lunatics," and "deluded," only to witness the world overwhelmed by Islam.

This and more: as the two revolutions proved to be a serious threat to the old order, similar measures were taken by enemies in order to prevent their eventual victory. In the days of the Prophet, Rafsanjani explained, the Quraysh and the Arab chieftains imposed an economic boycott on the Prophet and the Bani- Hashim. Likewise, the world powers put Iran under an economic blockade. "The Abu-Jahls, the Abu-Lahabs, the Abu-Sufyans . . . and their like [the Prophet's chief opponents] have been revealed today in the Carters, the Reagans, the Mitterands ... and their like." When this failed, the enemies tried to pacify the Prophet: they wanted "to buy off the Prophet," offering him economic privileges and material benefits to win him over to their side. The Prophet, however, condemned their deceitful approach and was unwilling to compromise with the

12. Khameneh'i, 6 February 1981, ibid. 3: 85. Also see idem, 13 June 1980, ibid. 2: 183-5; and idem, Ittild'dt, 7 February 1987. 13. 'A. A. Rafsanjani, 25 December 1981, Maktab 4: 155.



Myth of Early Islamic Govertiment 43

communications of God. In a similar manner, Rafsanjani explained, "Until this very day we have not encountered one instance where the Imam [Khomeini] . . . has given himself permission to reduce and corrupt [even] the most trivial Islamic injunction for the interests of the day or for compromising with the superpowers."

There are, according to Rafsanjani, other common circumstances surrounding the two revolutions. There is, for instance, the issue of war refugees. The Iran-Iraq War brought an influx of Iraqi emigres seeking sanctuary in Iran. These, he claimed, resembled the muhajirun ["Emigrants"] who, together with the Prophet, found sanctuary with the anSar ["Helpers"] of Medina following their flight from Mecca in 622 A.D. In this respect, Iran's conduct toward the war refugees was identical to the an$dr's conduct toward the companions of the Prophet. Like Iran's Muslim society today, which was doing its utmost to accommodate the helpless refugees, so did the ansar prefer the Prophet's companions "before themselves, though poverty afflict them" (Qur'an 59:9). "There, Abu-Jahl and Abu-Lahab have made [them] homeless. Here, Saddam ... [has] made [them] homeless." There was no difference.'4

According to other prayer leaders, additional parallels were not lacking. First among them was the staunch support of the dispossessed (mahrtumin) and the disinherited (musta?'afin) classes of society for the cause of the two revolutions, as opposed to the well-off classes who resisted the revolutions from the outset. Thus, it was the "barefoot people" who were first "to say yes to the Prophet"; it was the "middle classes and the lowest classes of society," those who "had no role in the management of the affairs," who rallied behind the movement of the Prophet-they were the "truthful helpers" of his revolution. Accordingly, "In our revolution too, you saw and knew from the very first day that . . . the mustaz'afdn of society have been carrying the heavy burden of the revolution on their shoulders."15

By contrast, prayer leaders claimed, those who "are living in ease and opulence" (mutrafin) opposed the Prophet's mission and undermined his cause; they repeatedly reminded him, "We are surely disbelievers in what you are sent with" (Qur'an 34:34). They found fault in the loyalty and devotion of the mustaz'afln to the Prophet, rhetorically asking, "Shall we believe in you while the meanest follow you?" (Qur'an 26:111). They laid down conditions for joining the Prophet's movement, demanding segregation between themselves and the mustaz'afin: "We cannot sit . . . with them in the mosque; we cannot sit [together] in one assembly; we cannot sit with them in one row." The Prophet, however, paid them no heed and put his trust in his true adherents, the mustaz'afin. Indeed, his revolution was waged for no other cause but for the liberation of the mustaz'afin from the claws of oppression. In a similar manner,

14. Ibid.,155-62. For similar expressions see Khameneh'i, 14 March 1980, ibid. 2: 67-8; idem, 6 February 1981, ibid. 3: 85-90; and Falsafi, before sermon, Ittila'at, 20 April 1985. 15. Khameneh'i, 20 June 1980, Maktab 2: 195-6; idem, Ittild'di, 16 April 1983.



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"in the present situation of the Muslim community, and in our revolution too, these great wealthy individuals and notables, the owners of the great banks and industries . . . or the great feudalists and landlords, have not helped the revolution from the outset." Moreover, "they held the Imam and his movement in contempt because they are barefoot." And, because the Islamic revolution, too, was a revolution of the oppressed, the government should do its utmost to live up to their expectations for material improvement.16

The goals of the two revolutions were also considered identical. Or, as Khameneh'i put it (December 1982),

One important phenomenon in human history is the phenomenon of the prophetic mission, which we today, in the Islamic Republic, claim to be pursuing. . . . There are many parts in [the prophetic mission] that are common to the opinion and the belief of the Islamic Republic.'7

What, then, were those "parts" in the prophetic mission which were shared by the Islamic revolution? This question was usually addressed in sermons by refer- ence to a portion of Qur'anic verse 7:157, according to which the Prophet "removes from them their burden and the shackles which were upon them." This is to say, they explained, the Prophet was sent by God to remove "These mental, intellectual and dogmatic fetters that the world of shirk and kufr imposed on the thought and meditation of the people"; "to open the chains and the iron collars which were upon the hands and feet of the people." In other words, the Prophet's mission was to obliterate the "regime of classes" (nizdm-i tabaqati) and the "vain" (bdtil) "laws, customs and traditions" that were forced upon the people. In short, the Prophet had a mission to "free the people from all moral and material bondages" introduced in the jdhiliyah and to institute justice, freedom, and equality, instead of the prevailing systems of oppression, discrimination, and superstition.'8

The same principles held, prayer leaders observed, for the goals of the Islamic revolution in Iran. Indeed, the toppling of the monarchical regime, they said, was aimed at the termination of a jphiliyah epoch, with all its manifestations. In the wak-e of the shah's overthrow, however, prayer leaders still contended that the "prophetic mission" had yet to be fully realized throughout the country. The shah had gone, Taleqani proclaimed in September 1979, but Iran must continue to stand up against his "imposed culture," "imposed economy," "imposed laws," and "police limitations." The Iranian people, he exclaimed, were still encum- bered by the same "burden" and the same "shackles" that the Prophet had resisted. The "shackles" that were imposed on the people by "the treacherous regime of the tdghat" ["tyrant," "illegitimate ruler"] still remained, and if Iran was ulti-

16. See Taleqani, 7 September 1979, Maktab 1: 49-50; Khameneh'i, 20 June 1980, ibid. 2: 195-6; idem, 17 April 1981, ibid. 3: 171-2; and Rafsanjani, 25 December 1981, ibid. 4: 160-2. 17. Kayhan, 4 December 1982. Also see Khameneh'i, Ittild'dt, 20 April 1985. 18. See Taleqani, 7 September 1979, Maktab 1: 49; Khaineneh'i, 23 May 1980, ibid. 2: 155-7; and Khameneh'i, Kayhan, 4 December 1982.



Myth of Early Islamic Government 45

mately to follow the way of the Prophet, the people should continue "to deliver ourselves and deliver others."'19 As time passed, prayer leaders were prepared to proclaim the realization of the Prophet's mission. It is important to stress that statements to this effect gathered momentum in the aftermath of President Abul Hasan Bani-Sadr's impeachment in mid-1981 as the new regime gained a firmer hold over the country and, consequently, enjoyed a degree of confidence and stability hitherto unexperienced. The Islamic revolution was therefore depicted as,

the answer to the call of the Prophet of fourteen centuries ago, [when] he encountered sedition (filnali) throughout the world. . . . The Prophetic mission is . . . a festival [for us]; festival, meaning a return to and a re- newal of a great memory. Today our society . . . has renewed the memory of the beginning of Islam.20

Accordingly, after the annihilation of the jdhiliyah regime, both revolutions established an Islamic govemment founded on revelation (not man-made law) and indebted to justice, freedom and equality. Thus, it was stated, the monarchical government was "a hundred eighty degrees at odds with the Prophet of Islam," since it introduced nothing but "abjectness, perplexity, terror and misfortune" in all affairs of society. Today's government, however, could not be compared with the previous regime, because it "takes guidance from the Prophet . . . in all affairs."2' First, like the Prophet, the Islamic government operated "on the basis of divine revelation only, [and] . . . on the basis of God's inspiration and guidance." The Qur'an said of the Prophet: "Nor does he speak out of desire. It is naught but revelation that is revealed" (53:3-4). Likewise, the "propagation" (tabligh) of divine revelation by the Islamic government of Iran was "a must and an obligation."22

Moreover, the Islamic government of Iran rendered all "distinctions and discrimi- nations" null and void. All were to be equal before the law and enjoy total freedom-even members of the non-Muslim communities. Such was also the policy of the Prophet who, upon establishing a government in Medina, proclaimed that no race, family, tribe, or individual in his realm would possess privileges or distinctions on any level above others. Hence, even "Bilal the Ethiopian, a black, weak [man], without a nation or a tribe, was appointed to the exalted

19. 7 September 1979, Maktab 1: 49-50. 20. Khameneh'i, Iltila'at, 20 April 1985. For similar expressions see idem, Ittila'ai, 1 January 1983; F. Harandi, before sermon, Iltila'at, 8 January 1983; and Khameneh'i, Ittild'at, 17 December 1983. 21. Harandi, before sermon, Iitild'dt, 8 January 1983. 22. Khameneh'i, 15 August 1980, Maktab 2: 266-7. It is noteworthy that the regime's pledges to operate on the basis of "revelation only" were especially typ- ical of the first two years of the revolution, when the new and inexperienced leaders had not yet had the opportunity to confront social and economic problems for which revelation provided no answer. Statements of this kind subsided signifi- cantly in later years, as the regime found itself more and more compelled to come up with concrete measures to resolve Iran's mounting problems and to allay the resulting social discontent.



46 Ram

position of a muezzin" under the Prophet's leadership in Medina.3 Indeed, it was argued, Iran's Islamic government not only resembled that of the Prophet, it was an exact replica, a comprehensive reenactment of the Prophet's government. Rafsanjani, for instance, told his audience of the impression a foreign national had following a visit to the Iranian Majlis: "When [he] entered the Islamic Con- sultative Assembly, [seeing] the deputies sitting together and eating their simple luncheon, he said ... that we [enjoy] the atmosphere of the advent of Islam. Whatever we [saw in] . . . the mosque of the Prophet, we see today in the Islamic Consultative Assembly."24

Three sermons are noteworthy in this respect, since they explicitly proclaimed Iran's Islamic revolution, Islamic government, and Muslim community as supe- nor to those of the Prophet. These sermons implied that Iran's efforts to reenact the myth of early Islamic government produced an achievement that superseded the "sacred event" of the Prophet. It is important to stress that all three sermons were delivered in the aftermath of the so-called Third Revolution-president Bani-Sadr's dismissal in June 1981 and the following repression of the opposition-which marked a turning point in the consolidation of clerical rule. This is to say, the growing stability of the Islamic regime allowed it to say things which otherwise would have remained unsaid or considered blasphemy.

At any rate, it was Rafsanjani who first claimed, during "Unity Week" in Jan- uary 1982, that the harmony and cooperation among government functionaries and among the different cabinet ministries was unprecedented in history: "In past Islamic history . . . even at the time of the government of the Prophet himself, the administrative cadres who managed the country were not concordant with each other in this fashion."25 Likewise, in May 1982, Ayatollah Muhammad Rabbani-Amlashi praised the people's self-sacrifices and struggles in the Iran-Iraq war. Within this context he quoted Khomeini as saying, "Our people are better than the community of the Apostle." "Yes," Rabbani-Amlashi confirmed, "they are better." At the time of the Prophet, he explained, the people often ignored his advice and "raised uproars" when called to join in jihad. By contrast, today practically every family had given martyrs "in the way of Islam and the Mus- lims," but "they don't make even the smallest demand from the Islamic Repub- lic." In short, at the advent of Islam only a limited number of people, perhaps only "Qasim and 'Ali Akbar," were like today's Iranian society; Iran's people, he concluded, were the "most beloved nation, they are loved by God, they are God's chosen, they are the heirs of God on earth."26

The third sermon was given by Ardabili in June 1989, following Khomeini's death and the appointment by the Council of Experts of Khameneh'i as his successor. Ardabili particularly admired the swift transfer of power which was

23. Khameneh'i, 23 May 1980, ibid., 155-6. For similar statements see idem, 7 March 1980, ibid., 62-3; and idem, fttil'dt, 1 January 1983. 24. Ittila'dt, 8 January 1983. 25. 8 January 1982, Maksab 4: 182. 26. 14 May 1982, ibid., 415-6.




achieved without any delay or struggle. The most "sensitive moment" in a revolution, he said, "is the loss of the leader." In principle, he explained, when a leader dies, a revolution "becomes weak," and even "the sympathizers of the revolution . . . tire themselves out in debates over the distribution of power." For instance, Ardabili continued, "the Islamic revolution" of the Prophet received a mortal blow when the Prophet passed away, as disputes over succession led to the tragedy of Karbala. Moreover, "The day after the departure of the Prophet was called the day of apostasy" (yawm al-irtidad), or "the day of sedition" (yawm al-fitnah), because, so we are told, "all but three of those who sided with the Prophet apostatized." Such were the disastrous effects of the Prophet's death. The leader of the Islamic revolution was also gone, said Ardabili. On the day he died "friends became fearful and foes ... were filled with hope"; both expected the revolution to wither away. That day "came and went," however. Neither the fear of friends nor the hope of foes materialized. Indeed, the death of Khomeini was a great tragedy, but "This revolution has shown that, upon the death of the leader, it has not only survived, but has become more stable." This demon- strated that the durability of Iran's Islamic revolution was greater than that of the prophet.27

Thus far, I have examined the Islamic regime's attempts to legitimize itself by proclaiming a successful reenactment of the Prophet's part in the myth of early Islamic government. Let us turn now to examine how the Islamic regime has drawn upon 'Ali's part in the myth for the same legitimization purposes.

I have indicated above that the Islamic regime viewed 'Ali's bid for the caliphate as a successful, albeit short-lived, attempt to restore the ideal government of the Prophet. Thus, 'Ali's caliphate itself can, in some respects, be regarded as a reenactment of the Prophet's myth of Islamic government-of the "sacred event" he had brought about with the advent of Islam. The Islamic regime, however, has claimed to supersede the myth of the Prophet. It is therefore not surprising that it also found no fault in claiming that Islamic Iran was superior to, and functioning better than, the Islamic state during 'Ali's caliphate.

In the first two or three years after the overthrow of the shah, prayer leaders still held Iran's Islamic government to be a reenactment of 'Ali's, no more and no less. They were therefore keen on stating that "This government [of Iran] is a continuation of the government of 'Ali b. Abi Talib."28 "Do . . . you not suppose that by establishing the Islamic Republic and by our revolt against America and all the superpowers . . . we are reviving the ideal of . . . 'Ali? Is this not our assumption?"29 Declarations of this type were heard in later years as well,'0 but two sermons, both delivered by Rafsanjani after Bani-Sadr's dismissal

27. Ittila'Cit, 24 June 1989. 28. Rafsanjani, 24 July 1981, Makiab 4: 316. 29. Khameneh'i, 1 August 1980, ibid., 246. For similar expressions see Taleqani, 24 August 1979, ibid. 1: 30-32; and Rafsanjani, 23 October 1981, ibid. 4: 51. 30. Hojjat al-Islam Dr. Hatemi, for instance, stated in August 1986, that "The government [of Iran] takes pride in being able to follow the Commander of the Faithful. . . . This government is following the Commander of the Faithful"



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and in the midst of the crackdown on the opposition, implied that 'Ali's government and society were inferior to those of the Islamic Republic. Once again, this is an example of the Islamic regime's newfangled stability giving rise to bold and outright assertions hitherto not found in its political rhetoric.

It is true, in the two sermons (the first delivered in July 1981 and the other in July 1982),31 Rafsanjani was probably aware that claiming Iran's superiority to 'Ali's government and society might offend the religious-minded audience. He was therefore careful in both cases to note that "the rank of 'Ali . . . is more sublime than that of other people," and that "If we and our Imam [Khomeini] were the dust on 'Ali's feet . .. it would have been an honor for us." He also stressed that 'Ali's society was "the model of the society we live in today." And he summed up his disclaimer by noting that what he was about to say should not be viewed as a comparison between Iran's and 'Ali's governments or between Imam 'Ali and Imam Khomeini; his intention, he explained, was only "to delin- eate the situation under which that ['Ali's] government operated."

Nonetheless, in order to substantiate the assessment that Iran's government and society were functioning better than 'Ali's, Rafsanjani began his two sermons by tracing the parallels and not, as one might expect, the differences, between the two Islamic states. First, he referred to 'Ali's determination to institute justice in his realm by confiscating all "unlawful fiefs." These, in turn, were placed under the control of the treasury and dispensed for the benefit of the people at large. This, Rafsanjani claimed, resembled the Islamic Republic's "Foundation of the Dispossessed" (Bunyad-i mustaz'afin), which was created for the same purpose. Second, Rafsanjani pointed to the state functionaries and governors of the third caliph, 'Uthman, whom 'Ali discharged on account of corruption and oppressive conduct. When 'Ali wanted to bring them to justice they all escaped and found sanctuary with Mu'awiyah in Syria. This, Rafsanjani said, resembled certain ambassadors employed by the shah's ancien regime who were engaged in corruption for dozens of years. When the Islamic government ordered their return to Tehran to face investigation and trial, they found asylum in France.

Third, Rafsanjani continued, was the internal opposition 'Ali faced during the battle of Siffin (657 A.D.), when the kharijites stopped the Caliph short of victory by withdrawing their support for his army. This, he said, was like the internal opposition the nation was encountering in the war against Iraq; they too were trying to weaken the country from within and hence cripple Iran's decisive victory. Rafsanjani used this example of turmoil to trace one final parallel between 'Ali's caliphate and the Islamic Republic of Iran, namely, the conduct of the leaders in the face of violent opposition. Both 'Ali and the present leaders of Iran tried to lead regular lives. Although they all ran the risk of being assassi- nated, they did not allow terrorists to restrict their movements within the coun-

(Ittild'at, 23 August 1986). For similar expressions see Jannati, Iuiia'dt, 2 June 1984; Falsafi, Ittild'at, 16 May 1987; and Ardabili, lItild'al, 5 May 1988. 31. 24 July 1981, Maktab 3: 318-21; Kayhin, 10 July 1982.




try. Indeed, 'Ali, as well as many of Iran's present leaders, met violent deaths, precisely because all of them refused to become captives of their assailants.

Having delineated all possible parallels between 'Ali's state and the Islamic Republic of Iran, Rafsanjani then asked a supposedly unexpected question: if the two governments and societies resembled one another, why was it that those of 'Ali disintegrated, while those of Iran were only strengthened as a result of chal- lenges from within and without (or why "has this govemment lasted and become stronger day by day, whereas that government, the government of 'Ali . . . fell?")? The key to the answer, Rafsanjani announced in the two sermons under examination, lay in "the disposition of the people" in both periods and in the fact that "the people of this time are rightly and justly better than the people whom 'Ali . .. reigned over." That is to say,

The stabilizing force of the government of the [Islamic] Republic, the source to the difference between these days and those days, and the [reason] why the government of 'Ali fell and why the government of the Islamic Republic has become stronger in spite of the blows on its head . . . are the people-they are the pillars of a powerful government.

Indeed, in those days "the people could not endure 'Ali's justice, they could not endure 'Ali's decisiveness." On the other hand, today's people were "decisive"; they were "devout," "revolutionary," and above all, they were willing to endure the government's justice and cooperate with it to the utmost degree. In con- tradistinction to the situation in 'All's days,

When the Islamic Republic proclaimed its economic [program] and began to carry it out, the unlawful financiers and the wealthy people who remained [in Iran], not to mention the lawful [ones], declared their loyalty to the country and were willing to hand over the keys to their facto- ries and proceed to the [war] front. We are not lacking such people.

Thus, the ideal model for all time, the ministries of the Prophet and 'Ali, had become outdated by Iran's Islamic regime and Muslim community laying the foundations for a new, superior polity-a "sacred event" in Eliade's terminology. This contemporary "sacred event" was exemplary and a paradigm for how things should be done ever after, because it, too, was brought about by a "Supernatural Being," Ayatollah Khomeini. It should be noted that Khomeini's virtually un- limited constitutional powers notwithstanding, article 107 of the 1979 Constitu- tion of the Islamic Republic defines his position merely as "leader" (rahbar). Likewise, throughout the first decade of the revolution, prayer leaders have been careful to define Khomeini's position, powers, and virtues precisely as they were outlined in the constitution. They have also reiterated Khomeini's well-known views, as expounded in his Vildyat-i faq!h, on the jurist's right to temporal power. They have been particularly fond of making commentaries on the Qur'an and the hadith (also found in Vildyat-i faqih) in order to justify Khomeini's



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temporal authority.32 Thus, Khomeini has been portrayed as an individual who, although vested with nearly infinite authority, was nonetheless a mortal.

This interpretation of Khomeini, however, was only one side of the coin. Just as the Islamic revolution, the Islamic Govemment, and the Muslim nation of Iran have been rendered as a reenactment of the myth of early Islamic government, so has the "leader," Khomeini, been portrayed as a mythological hero equal to the Prophet and 'Ali, who first brought about the "sacred event" at the dawn of Islam.

To begin with, virtually all prayer leaders referred to Khomeini plainly as "Imam," without calling him by name. For instance, when they wished to turn the attention of their audiences to issues that were discussed or ordered by Khomeini, they usually began by announcing that "the Imam said" or "the Imam commanded" (Imdmfarmuidand). They also referred to Khomeini as an "Imam- like (imam-gunah) leader" and extolled "the holy presence of the Imam of the community (imam-i ummat)."33 It is possible that by calling Khomeini "Imam" prayer leaders had in mind the conventional meaning of religious leader or prayer leader. Yet it seems that with regard to Khomeini the prayer leaders expanded the use of the term beyond its common meaning, until it reached the point at which they used the designation to imply that he was almost of the same rank as the twelve "rightful" Imams of the Shi'ah, or perhaps of the same rank as the last Shi'i Imam who was to return from Occultation as the expected messiah.34

32. References to the authority of Khomeini in his post as the vilayar-i faqih were usually made to counter allegations by the opposition that clerical rule violated the principle of "government by the people" and that it provided for "class rule" and for "a new dictatorship." See, for instance, H. 'A. Montazeri, 14 September 1979, Maktab 1: 56-60; idem, 30 November 1979, ibid., 158-62; Khameneh'i, 27 June 1980, ibid. 2: 207-8; idem, 6 March 1981, ibid. 3: 120-22; Rafsanjani, 23 October 1981, ibid. 4: 51-9; idem, 27 November 1981, ibid., 116-17; M. Rabbani-Amlashi, 11 December 1981, ibid., 136-7; Y. Sane'i, before sermon, Kayhan, 4 December 1982; Khameneh'i, Ittil'dt, 21 May 1983; Rafsanjani, IttilW'it, 14 August 1983; A. Emami-Kashani, Ittild'ct, 12 November 1983; Raf- sanjani, Ittila'dt, 14 November 1987; Jannati, before sermon, Ittild'at, 16 January 1988, Khameneh'i, ItUild'da, 6 February 1988; and Ardabili, Itila'at, 21 January 1989. The appointment of Khameneh'i to the post of the vildyat-i faqih after Khomeini's death in June 1989 revived references to the faqih's political authority and his right to rule, for obvious reasons. See, for instance, Rafsanjani, Ittild'da, 10 June 1989; M. Yazdi, Ittila'at, 24 June 1989; and, 'A. Q. Khaz'ali, before sermon, Ittild'dt, 1 July 1989. 33. See, for instance, Rafsanjani, 24 July 1981, Maksab 3: 316; and idem, 9 October 1981, ibid. 4: 198. 34. M. Fischer, for example, explains that on the eve of Khomeini's return to Iran in 1979, "This waiting for the return of the marja'-i taqlid led to elaborations of similarities between 'Imam' Khomeini and the awaited Twelfth Imam, who will usher in an era of justice before final judgment" (Iran from Religious Dispute to Revolution [Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1980], 177-8).




At any rate, it seems that the abstention from referring to Khomeini by name was intentional in order to create an indirect equation between the Imams and Khomeini, or at least between the decrees of the Imams and those of Khomeini. And the fact that the title "Imam" belonged exclusively to Khomeini and was subsequently withheld from Khameneh'i, his successor to the post of the vildyat, supports the impression that only the former was seen as enjoying the infallibility of the Imams. It was precisely for this reason that after Khomeini's death Rafsanjani conferred the title of "the Leader of the revolution" (rahbar-i inqildb) upon the new leader, while adding that there were certain titles that should be reserved solely for Khomeini; he "must retain in the future and always his distinctive titles." "One of these titles," Rafsanjani concluded, "is 'imam' or imdm-i ummat, which we cannot permit our leaders of today or of the future to use."35

Other statements in Friday sermons confirm that Khomeini was seen as "the Imam," or at least as a man possessing the virtues of the Prophet and the Imams. For one, prayer leaders have called him "the 'Ali of our age," "the beloved son of 'Ali," or "the pupil and disciple of 'Ali"; they have pointed to his "decisive, prophet-like (payghambar-guinah) leadership," his "prophet- like mag- nanimity," or his "prophet-like message". For another, they have applauded his "resolute leadership which our nation has not seen from the Prophet's days to this very day," and asserted that "when he speaks ... we feel as though we were listening to the [words of the] Prophet."3

Equating Khomeini with the Prophet of Islam was not limited to the examples above. Obedience and submission to Imam Khomeini were likened in sermons to obedience and submission to the Prophet of Islam. Khameneh'i recalled that 'Ali was the symbol of submission (taslim) to the Prophet: "When the Prophet told him 'Stay in Mecca,' he stayed, [and] when the Prophet told him 'Remain in Medina,' he remained." Moreover, when the Prophet "told him 'Go to war and put your life on the line,"' he did just that. And, Khameneh'i added,

Today, too, we can perform this duty. The reason why our revolution was victorious is that we have [practiced] . . . submission; we followed that man whose command to us was the command of God and whose wisdom [is] the wisdom of God. . . . He said, 'Risk your life,' and we did so. He said, 'Sit down in the corner,' and we sat down. He said 'Proceed with your fists clenched,' and we proceeded.... [This is] submission to the leader.37

35. Ittiela'ai, 1 July 1989. 36. See, for instance, Khameneh'i, 18 January 1980, Maktab 2: 1; idem, 16 May 1980, ibid., 147-9; Emami-Kashani, 26 February, ibid. 4: 269; Khameneh'i, Ittild'at, 12 February 1983; idem, Ittild'at, 17 December 1983; Amini, before sermon, Ittild'di, 13 October 1984; Khameneh'i, Ittila'at, 3 March 1984; and Harandi, Ittila'dt, 21 January 1989. 37. Khameneh'i, 30 May 1980, Maktab 2: 166-7; idem, 4 July 1980, ibid., 212- 13.



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Similarly, the swearing of allegiance to Imam Khomeini and the swearing of allegiance to the Prophet have been viewed by prayer leaders as equally meaning- ful. Khameneh'i, in July 1980, cited the Qur'anic verse, "Surely, those who swear allegiance to you [the Prophet] swear allegiance to Allah; the hand of Allah is above their hands" (48:10), implying that allegiance to Khomeini meant allegiance to the Prophet. Khameneh'i then added,

Today the Muslim nation has once again sworn allegiance to their Imam. Just as this verse has come down as an address to the great Prophet of Islam, we are addressing the Imam of the nation: 0 great Imam! Those people who have once again sworn allegiance to you have sworn allegiance to God. This hand which swore allegiance to the Prophet and to the Imam is, in effect, swearing allegiance to God.38

Equating the Prophet with Khomeini also included an appraisal of the way by which identical trends and circumstances in the lives of the two had led to the revolutions under their separate leadership. For instance, some prayer leaders spoke of the Prophet's and of Khomeini's "emigration" (hijrat)-the former from Mecca to Medina in 622, and the latter from Iran to Turkey (and later to Iraq) in 1964-as a precondition for the subsequent successful "Islamic revolutions" under their commands. Both were banished to live in exile, only to return years later to overthrow the existing order. Indeed, they concluded, a "revolution is not possible" without a prior "emigration," as the lifetime careers of the Prophet and Khomeini clearly illustrated.39

It is interesting to note the correspondence between the Prophet's hijrah and his return in later years to initiate a triumphant "Islamic revolution," as well as Khomeini's alleged success in reenacting a similar course of events, and Joseph Campbell's interpretation of "the myth of the hero."40 Campbell traces three common phases which every mythical hero undergoes, namely, "departure," "initiation," and "return." He explains:

A hero ventures forth from the world of common day into a region of supernatural wonder: fabulous forces are there encountered and a decisive victory is won: the hero comes back from this mysterious adventure with the power to bestow boons on his fellow man.41

Indeed, both the Prophet and Khomeini underwent similar ordeals: they departed from their "world of common day," and returned to lead victorious Islamic revolutions and thus "bestow boons" on their respective societies. Khomeini may therefore be viewed as an outstanding embodiment of the Prophet's myth of the

38. 4 July 1980, ibid., 212-13; idem, 12 September 1980, ibid., 301. 39. See 'A. Mahfuzi, before sermon, Ittild'dt, 4 October 1986; and Khameneh'i, Kayhdn, 6 November 1982. 40. J. Campbell, The Hero with a Thousand Faces (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968). 41. Ibid., 30.




hero. It is thus not surprising that during a 1988 sermon, the attending crowd shouted the following two slogans:

The Commander-in-Chief is the leader-his command is the command of the Prophet (farmandah-yi kull-i quvd rahbar ast-farman-i iu farmdn-i payghambar ast).

The guarantor of unity is the ruler-his decree is the edict of the Messen- ger of God (7dmin-i vahdat vali-yi amr ast-farman-i iu hukm-i rasul-i khudast).42

Also, in their endeavors to equate Khomeini with the "Supernatural Beings" of early Islam, prayer leaders never refrained from ranking him alongside, or immediately after, God and the Hidden Imam. Thus, during the Iran-Iraq war it was said, "God thanks, the imdm-i 'a$r [Imam of the Age] thanks, [and] our beloved Imam thanks, this nation for its self-sacrifices."43 Likewise, on account of the people's support for the government it was said, "You have gladdened the heart of the imam-i zamdn [Imam of the Age], you have gladdened the heart of the Prophet, and you have gladdened the heart of the Imam."44 And finally, the opposition groups that wreaked havoc on Iranian towns and provinces were "committing an offense against God, against the Apostle and against the commands of the Imam."45

Finally, to be a divinely guided leader, as Khomeini was clearly perceived to be, also meant that he possessed divine qualities and, as a consequence, the power to render all difficulties null and void. (This is, in effect, what the great sociologist Max Weber describes as "the appearance of a personal savior, whether wholly divine or a mixture of human and divine; and of the religious relationship to that savior as the precondition for salvation."46) Thus, Ayatollah Hosayn 'Ali Montazeri asserted (December 1979) that the Qur'anic verse "That is the grace of Allah: He gives it to whom He pleases" (67:21) actually referred to Khomeini. God, Montazeri explained,

has always given of his grace. Yes, the most exalted grace for the [nation] are the leaders who guide [them] to . . . happiness. . . . This favor . . . [is] the favor of . . . a leader who is able to guide the nation, who is decisive . . . and at the same time wise, knows the way, seeks the welfare of the nation, and always has the nation in his mind.4'

In a similar manner, in April 1981 Khameneh'i stated that Khomeini was a "divine phenomenon" and a "divine word," who was able to solve all the nation's

42. Ittila'at, 16 January 1988. 43. Emami-Kashani, 12 March 1982, Maktab 4: 292. 44. Rafsanjani, 25 September 1981, ibid., 9. 45. Khameneh'i, 12 June 1981, ibid. 3: 246-7. 46. Cited in N. Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium (New York: Oxford Univer- sity Press, 1961), 51. 47. 14 December 1979, Maktab 1: 175-6.



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hardships and difficulties. He took the Qur'anic verse 8:7, "Allah desired to manifest the truth of what was true by His words," as proof of his assertion. In- deed, he said, "Among [the] divine words is the existence of the Imam of the nation." And he Immediately added, "This great man ... makes all difficulties easy (dsan mikunad)." When the nation was faced with "great difficulties," Khameneh'i concluded, they were soon "eliminated" through "the measures of the Imam and the decisive conduct of the Imam."48 In short, there were none who could "stand up against the environment' but for "the divine prophets and the Imams." God had granted them "special favors," so they were able "not just to resist the influence of the environment but also to change the environment and deliver the people." Imam Khomeini, too, was "the greatest grace of God to the people" and had succeeded in "solving all difficulties in the name of God."49

We see, then, that the Islamic revolution and Iran's society and leadership together have been portrayed as an all-inclusive reenactment of, and in some respects a greater achievement than, the myth of early Islamic government. In- deed, the thread that runs through all the sermons discussed is the implication that Iran's clerical regime has laid the foundation for a new, contemporary "sacred event" which possesses the efficacy and strength of the dawn of Islam. The prayer leaders also implied that this contemporary "sacred event" was a paradigm, for it too was established through the activity of a "Supernatural Being." Hav- ing acquired all the characteristics of a "sacred event" -vitality, efficacy and paradigmatic virtues-the Islamic regime should thus be safeguarded by the nation of Iran, and indeed, perpetuated at all costs.

Haggay Ram, Department of Middle Eastern and African History, Tel Aviv University

48. 3 April 1981, ibid. 3: 153-4. 49. Rafsanjani, 9 October 1981, ibid. 4: 36. For similar statements see Khameneh'i, 20 March 1981, ibid. 3: 142.



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