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MythandtheSecretofDestiny:MirceaEliade’sCreativeHermeneuticsandtheYorùbáConceptofOríBYOLUDAMINIOGUNNAIKE

DestinyisthesecretofGod.

‐Hadīth(tradition)oftheProphetMuhammad

Orílodámi Ori(head/destiny)createdmeEniyankòó ItisnotmanOlórunni ItisGodOrílodámi OricreatedmeOríníídáni OricreatedusEnikanòíd’Órí NobodycreatedOri

‐YorùbásayingsThere’sadivinitythatshapesourends,rough‐hewthemhowwewill.

­WilliamShakespeare’sHamletV.iiThefault,dearBrutus,isnotinourstars,butinourselves.

‐WilliamShakespeare’sJuliusCaesarI.iiAndweshouldconsiderthatGodgavethesovereignpartofthehumansoulto be the divinity (daimon) of each one, being that partwhich, aswe say,

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dwellsatthetopofthebody,inasmuchasweareaplantnotofanearthlybutofaheavenlygrowth,raisesusfromearthtoourkindredwhoareinheaven.Andinthiswesaytruly;forthedivinepowersuspendedtheheadandrootofus from that place where the generation of the soul first began, and thusmadethewholebodyupright.

­Plato,Timaeus90a…There is alwaysakernel that remains refractory toexplanation, and thisindefinable,irreducibleelementperhapsrevealstherealsituationofmaninthecosmos…

‐MirceaEliade,Shamanism:ArchaicTechniquesofEcstasyWeholdthat…thecardinalproblemsofmetaphysicscouldberenewedthroughaknowledgeofarchaicontology.

‐MirceaEliade,CosmosandHistory:TheMythoftheEternalReturn

IntroductionNearlyeverytimeIputdownthereligiousmyths,poems,andbookswhichhavecaptivatedmesinceearlychildhoodtoreadaworkfromtheacademicstudyofreligion,Iamstruckwithasubtledis‐ease,anelusiveanduncannyfeelingwhosearticulationIfinallydiscoveredinOliverSacks’descriptionofhisencounterwithDr.P.,theeponymouspatientinTheManWhoMistookHisWifeforaHat:Yettherewassomethingabitodd.Hefacedmeashespoke,wasorientedtowardsme,andyettherewassomethingthematter—itwasdifficulttoformulate.Hefacedmewith hisears, I came to think,butnotwithhiseyes. These insteadof looking,gazing,atme,‘takingmein,’inthenormalway,madesuddenstrangefixations—onmynose,onmyrightear,down tomychin, up tomyrighteye,as if noting (evenstudying) these individual features, but not seeing my whole face, its changingexpressions, ‘me’asawhole. I amnot sure that I fully realized thisat the time—therewas just a teasing strangeness, some failure in the normal interplay of gazeandexpression.Hesawme,hescannedme,andyet….Ihadstoppedatafloristonmy way to his apartment and bought myself an extravagant red rose for mybuttonhole.NowIremoveditandhandedittohim.Helookedatitlikeabotanistor morphologist given a specimen, not like a person given a flower. “About sixinches in length,” he commented. “A convoluted red form with a linear greenattachment.”1

1OliverSacks,TheManWhoMistookHisWifeforaHatandOtherClinicalTales(NewYork:Simon&Schuster,2006),12‐14.

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PoorDr.Pwasfinallydiagnosedwithvisualagnosia,theinabilityofthebraintomakesenseofotherwisenormalvisualstimuli,typifiedbytheinabilitytorecognizefamiliarobjectsorfaces. Fromareligiousperspective,likeSacks’patient,muchoftheacademicstudyofreligionseemsafflictedwithitsownformof visual agnosia, prey to the “sudden, strange fixations” of academicfads, with a marked weakness, inability, or refusal to recognize theirreducible, holistic nature of religious phenomena and explain what theymean.Inandofitself,thisscientificoracademicgaze,whichturnsaroseinto“aconvolutedredformwithalineargreenattachment,”isharmlessenough,andcanevenbequiteuseful,butitgetsintotroublewhenitignoresitsownlimits,makespronouncementsaboutreligiousphenomenaonthebasisofitsagnosticvision,andtriestosubsumeotherperspectivesunderitself.Dr. P was able to recognize abstract shapes such as cubes, pyramids, andeven icosahedrons, andcould sometimes identify simple images bypickingoutakeyfeature(suchasEinstein’shairandmustache,Churchill’scigar,orhisbrother’sbuckteeth),butwhenconfrontedwithunrecognizableimages,Dr.P,likeanygoodacademic,wouldmakeinformedhypothesisbasedontheavailable data. Sometimes hewould be right, butmore often than not hewouldmistakeapictureofthedesertforapicnicscene,hisfootforhisshoe,andmostfamously,andhiswifeforahat.Given that the fully‐enlightened sagesworking in the study of religion arefewinnumber,itissafetosaythatmostofus,inonewayoranother,sharethe plight of Dr. P: when confrontedwith religious rites,myths, and otherphenomena,wejustdon’t“getit.”Andsowemustinterpretthephenomenaaccording to our own conceptual frameworks and severely limitedperceptual insights, more often than not producing descriptions andinterpretations that sound as strange to an initiate as a “a convoluted redformwithalineargreenattachment”doestous. Somescholarsacceptthatthisissimplythebestwecando,othersassertthatthe“convolutedredform”is just as good as or better than the “rose,” but still others do not. It isprobably abundantly clear by now that I belong to this third group,whichholdsthatreligiousphenomenaexpressandtransformrealityanditshumanperceptionsinauniqueandirreplaceableway.InmyresearchontraditionalYorùbáreligionandWestAfricanSufism,Ihaveseen far too many roses reduced to color and shape, distorted bymethodologieswhosephilosophicalpresuppositionsruncountertothoseoftheir subjectmaterial, andwitnessed theproblemsandevendangers theseacademic confusions pose for communities of practitioners. Theseexperienceshaveledmetocontemplatehow(shortofquittingtheacademytotakeupacareerasatraditionalscholarinTimbuktuorIfe)Icouldconveythepower,beauty,andaboveall,thelife‐affirmingandtransformingtruthsofthereligioustraditionsandphenomenaIstudyinanacademicsetting.That

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is,howcould I analyzeanddescribe, rigorouslyandacademically, religiousrites,doctrines,texts,andmythsontheirownterms?Onemethodologicalprecedent foraddressingsuchconcerns is found intheworkofMirceaEliade, thegreatRomanianhistorianofreligion, litterateur,and keeper of extensive journals. Eliade writes, “a religious phenomenonwillonlyberecognizedassuchifitisgraspedatitsownlevel,thatistosay,ifit is studiedas something religious. To try to grasp the essence of such aphenomenon by means of physiology, psychology, sociology, economics,linguistics, art or any other study is false; it misses the one unique andirreducible element in it—the element of the sacred.”2 However, he holdsthatthereis“nopurelyreligiousphenomena;”religionalwaystakesplaceinaparticularhistorical, linguistic, sociocultural, economic,etc. context. “Butthefactthatamythorritualisalwayshistoricallyconditioneddoesnottellus what a religious experience ultimately is. We know we can grasp thesacred only through manifestations which are always historicallyconditioned.Butthestudyofthesehistoricallyconditionedexpressionsdoesnotgiveus the answer to the questions:What is the sacred? Whatdoes areligiousexperienceactuallymean?”3Inthesamechapter,Eliadeconcludes,He[thehistorianofreligions]knowsthatheiscondemnedtoworkexclusivelywithhistorical documents, but at the same timehe feels that these documents tell himsomethingmorethanthesimplefactthattheyrevealtohimimportanttruthsaboutmanandman’srelationstothesacred.Buthowtograspthesetruths?... Butmoreimportant than any singleanswer is the fact that historiansof religions askedthisquestion. As so often in the past, a correct question may infuse new life into awornoutscience4Thisarticleisintendedasamethodologicalexerciseandexperimentinspiredby the above concerns. In the first part of this article, I will outline myinterpretationofEliade’shermeneuticalmethod,andapplythismethodologyinthesecondhalfofthearticletothemythico‐ritualcomplexoftheYorùbáconceptoforí(head/destiny).Finally,Iwillconcludebyevaluatingthecostsand benefits of this method, and compare it to similar methods used inComparative Theology, with a view towards further methodologicaldevelopments.PartI:Eliade’s“CreativeHermeneutics”Oneofthemostimportantandprolificfiguresinthehistoryofthestudyofreligion, Mircea Eliade left behind a legacy whose profound and wide‐reaching influence is perhapsmatchedonly by its controversy. One of the 2MirceaEliade,PatternsinComparativeReligion(NewYork:MeridianBooks,1968),xiii3MirceaEliade,TheQuest,HistoryandMeaninginReligion(Chicago:TheUniversityOf

ChicagoPress,1969),52.4ibid.

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mostsignificantaspectsofthislegacywasEliade’sefforttocreateandwritea study of religious phenomena as religious phenomena (not as historical,ethnological, sociological, or philosophical data), in order to refocusacademicinquiryondiscoveringwhatagivenreligiousphenomenareallyis,whatitmeans.Thisturnawayfromandagainstreductionismtowardsanew,“creative hermeneutics” of religious phenomena characterizes nearly all ofEliade’s academic work, and occupies a significant place in his extensivejournals and literary works.5 Nevertheless, Eliade’s methodology isnotoriouslydifficult touncoverandeventrickier topindown. Herarely, ifever,gaveafullaccountofhisuniquehermeneuticmethodology,notinginajournalentry,“inmywork,Ihavetriedtoelaboratethishermeneutics;butIhave illustrated it in a practical way on the basis of documents. It nowremains formeor foranothertosystematize thishermeneutics.”6 DouglasAllen writes, “But during the last year of his life, after noting that‘methodological’ criticisms brought against his conception of history ofreligions had increased, Eliade wrote the following: ‘The fault is, in part,mine;I’veneverrepliedtosuchcriticisms,althoughIoughttohavedoneso.Itoldmyselfthatsomeday,‘whenI’mfreefromworksinprogress,’I’llwriteashort theoretical monograph and explain the ‘confusions and errors’ forwhichIamreproached.I’mafraidI’llneverhavetimetowriteit.’”7AlthoughEliadeneverdidwritethismonograph,heleftbehindthousandsofpagesofscholarshipillustratinghismethods,andseveralscholarshavetakenupthetaskofexplaininghiselusivemethodology.My own understanding of Eliade’s method of “creative hermeneutics” islargelydrawnfromhisownworks,particularlyfromPatternsinComparativeReligion(andJ.Z.Smith’spairofarticlesonthiswork8),MythandReality,theforeword to Shamanism, and selections from his journals. The works ofDouglasAllenandBrianRenniehavealsobeeninfluentialinthisregard.9Eliadedefinedhisdisciplineasthe“historyofreligions”andoftenreferredtohimself as “the historian of religions” in his works. This terminology

5DouglasAllen,MythandReligioninMirceaEliade(TheoristsofMyth),firstedition(NewYork:Routledge,2002)MirceaEliade(1907‐1986),NoSouvenirs:journal,1957­1969/MirceaEliade;translatedfromtheFrenchbyFredH.Johnson,Jr.(NewYork:Harper&Row,1977);MirceaEliade,Myths,Rites,Symbols:AMirceaEliadeReader(NewYork:Harper&Row,1976)6Eliade,NoSouvenirs,313.7Allen,MythandReligioninMirceaEliade(TheoristsofMyth),xii.8SeeSmith,J.Z.“Acknowledgments:MorphologyandHistoryinMirceaEliade's"PatternsinComparativeReligion"(1949‐1999),Part1:TheWorkandItsContexts&Part2:TheTextureoftheWork.”HistoryofReligions,Vol.39,No.4(May,2000),pp.315‐331(Part1)andpp.332‐351(Part2)9seeAllen,MythandReligioninMirceaEliade(TheoristsofMyth)(2002);DouglasAllen,Structure&CreativityinReligion(ReligionReasonSer.:No14).FirstEdition(Berlin:MoutonDeGruyter,1978);BryanS.Rennie,ReconstructingEliade(Albany,NewYork:StateUniversityOfNewYorkPress,1996).

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indicates that there are two concepts at work: “History” and “Religion.”“Religion” or “religious” for Eliade is simply a designation for “the Sacred”which is simply the opposite of “the profane.” In his “archaic ontology,”which is the ontology Eliade attributes to the traditional, pre‐modern,religiousman(homoreligiosus),thesacredistranscendent,irreducible,andthe source of “Being”—what makes things real. It stands above and inoppositiontothemundaneworldoftheprofane:This “other world” represents a superhuman, “transcendent” plane, the plane ofabsolute realities. It is the experience of the sacred–that is and encounterwith atranshuman reality –which give birth to the idea that something really exists, thathence there are absolute values capable of guiding man and giving a meaning tohumanexistence. It is then,through theexperienceofthesacred that theideasofreality,truth,andsignificancefirstdawn,tobelaterelaboratedandsystematizedbymetaphysicalspeculation.10Thus“thesacred”isnothermeticallysealedfromtheprofane,butirruptsormanifests itself in the profane. Every instance of such a manifestation istermed a hierophany, and it is here that “History” enters, as everyhierophany is a “paradoxical coming‐together of being and non‐being,absolute and relative, the eternal and the becoming.”11 Thus, “Everyhierophanywe lookat isalsoanhistorical fact. Everymanifestationof thesacred takes place in some historical situation.”12 Anything in the worldcould potentially become a hierophany, in fact, Eliade writes, “in allprobability there is nothing that has not, somewhere, some time, beeninvested with a sacred value.”13 Just as Eliade’s “archaicontology”/methodology begins with a dialectic of the sacred (sacred vs.profane), there is a related dialectic on the plane of hierophanies: noteverythingisahierophanyallatonce,so“ineveryreligiousframeworktherehavealwaysbeenprofanebeingsandthingsbesidethesacred…Thedialecticof hierophany implies a more or less clear choice, a singling‐out. A thingbecomes sacred in so far as it embodies (that is, reveals) something otherthanitself.”14These hierophanies are the raw material for Eliade’s method, “For themoment we shall consider each separate thing—rite, symbol, myth,cosmogonyorgod—asahierophany;inotherwords,weshallseeeachasamanifestationofthesacredinthementalworldofthosewhobelievedinit.”15Furthermore, “each is valuable for two things it tells us: because it is a

10MirciaEliade,MythandReality(WorldPerspectiveSeries),1sted.(NewYork:Harper&Row,1963),139.11Eliade,Patterns,29.12ibid.,2.13ibid.,12.14ibid.,12‐13.15ibid.,10(italicsmine).

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hierophany,itrevealssomemodalityofthesacred;becauseitisahistoricalincident,itrevealssomeattitudemanhashadtowardsthesacred.”16Eliadeprivilegestheformer,andindoingsoplacestheemphasisonreligionin“thehistoryof religion:”17 “the religioushistorianmust tracenotonly thegivenhistory of a hierophany, but must first of all understand and explain themodality of the sacred the hierophany discloses.”18 Elsewhere, Eliadeexplains this priority of purpose as hermeneutics over history:19 “In otherwords,thehistorianofreligionsmakesuseofallthehistoricalmanifestationsof a religious phenomenon in order to discoverwhat such a phenomenon‘hastosay;’ontheonehand,heholdstothehistoricallyconcrete,butontheother, he attempts todecipherwhatever transhistorical content a religiousdatumrevealsthroughhistory.”20So far,Eliade’smethod issimplyto identifyhierophanies,manifestationsofthe sacred, and to attempt first, to understand the modalities of thetranshistoricalsacredtheyexpressinhistory,andthentotracethecourseofagivenhierophanythroughhistory.21Elsewherethesetwopartsaretermed“a morphology” and “a history.”22 The reason for this privileging ofmorphologyoverhistoryissimple:youcannotfollowathingthroughhistoryifyoudonotalreadyknowwhatitis;andmoreover,thismethodissupposedto ultimately help answer the questions, “What is the sacred?” and “Whatdoes a religious experience actually mean?”—questions more directlyaddressedbyEliade’smorphology.Buthowisthismorphologyconstructed?Howdoweinterpretthemeaningof a hierophany? Andwhat kindof hierophanies dowe look at: buildings,texts,rituals,myths?Eliadeconcludesthat“thesafestmethod,clearly,istomake use of all these kinds of evidence, omitting no important type, andalways asking ourselves what meaning is revealed by each of thesehierophanies.Inthiswayweshallgetacoherentcollectionofcommontraitswhich, aswe shall see later, willmake it possible to formulate a coherentsystemoutof thevariousmodalities….”23As J.Z.Smithhas illustrated inhis

16ibid.,2.17cf.MirceaEliade,Images&Symbols:StudiesinReligiousSymbolism(SanFrancisco:SearchBook,1969),29:“inthetitleof‘thehistoryofreligions,’theaccentoughtnottobeplacedonthewordhistory,butonthewordreligions.Foralthoughtherearenumerouswaysofapproachinghistory…thereisonlyonewayofapproachingreligion.”18ibid.,5.19cf.MirceaEliade,OrdealbyLabyrinth:ConversationsWithClaude­HenriRocquet(Chicago:UniversityOfChicagoPress,1984),142:“Ahistorianofreligions,whateverhisopinions…thinksthathisfirstduty,inpractice,istograsptheoriginalmeaningofasacredphenomenonandtheninterpretitshistory.”20Eliade,Shamanism,xv21seeEliade,Patterns,xiv:“TheaimIintend—thatofseeingjustwhatthingarereligiousinnatureandwhatthosethingsreveal.”22Eliade,Shamanism,xiii23Eliade,Patterns,8

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pair of articles “Acknowledgments: Morphology and History in MirceaEliade's ‘Patterns in Comparative Religion Parts 1 & 2,’” the term“morphology”(whichEliadeborrowsfromGoethe) iskeytounderstandingthisprocess.24SmithquotesEliadeaspraising“this[morphological]methodof delineating structures by reducing phenomena to archetypes.”25 Thismorphologystands inoppositiontoevolutionaryordevelopmentalmodels,whichareoftenteleologicalandprivilegethehistoricalconnectionsbetweenand amongst data; inmorphology, however, the formal relationship is theorganizingprinciple.Such historical inquiries are not off the table, but must come after themorphological work, as Eliade notes, “We shall therefore, only be able toconsidertheproblemofthehistoryofreligiousformsafterhavingexaminedacertainnumberofthem.”26SmithnotesthatEliadepromiseda“companionvolume” to Patterns, which would complement the latter’s morphologicalproject with a historical one, and argues that the foreword to Shamanismservesasanoutline to thisnever‐completedwork.27 Eliadeenvisionedhistotalworkas“avastsynthesisofmorphologyandhistoryofreligion.”28 Onthemorphologicalside,hedistinguishedhisworkfromtheevolutionaryanddevelopmental model en vogue at the time,29 and on the historical side,Eliade distinguished his method from phenomenology, “criticiz[ing] theahistorical approach of phenomenology, deploying technicalmorphologicalvocabulary to charge that a phenomenological account ignores the‘modifications’ and ‘degradations’ of the sacred brought about by culturalandhistorical‘conditions.’”30IntheforewordtoShamanism,Eliadeexplainsthisdistinctionfurther,"[Thephenomenologist]inprinciplerejectsanyworkof comparison, confronted with one religious phenomenon or another, heconfines himself to 'approaching' it and divining itsmeaning.Whereas the 24(ibid.):Part1andportionsofPart2illustratetheoriginsofEliade’smorphologyinGoethe’smorphologicalstudies,especiallythe1790work,TheMetamorphosisofPlants,inwhichGoethesoughttoshowhowallthepartsofaplantwhichdevelopedinsuccessionwereintrinsicallyidentical(allbeingleaf)despitetheirdifferencesinoutwardform,andtodescribethearchetypeoftheplant(fromwhichallplantsarelogicallygenerated),whichhehad“intellected”throughcontemplatingthevarietyofplantsinagardeninPalermo.25ibid.,Part1,p.322.26Eliade,Patterns,xvii.27Themulti‐volumework,HistoryofReligiousIdeas,couldbeseenassuchawork,butSmitharguesthatitisnot.Onp.339,Smithalsoperspicaciouslynotesthat“thatthethreeworksbyEliadethatIassociatedwithhishistorical‘companionvolume’inPart1‐Shamanism,Yoga,andTheForgeandtheCrucible‐haveincommonthattheyreverse,byavarietyofhumanactivities,thedownwardpath.Eachtechniquehasadirectionalitytowardtranscendence.ShamanismandYogaannihilatethehumancondition,alchemyaltersnaturalconditions.Ifthisbecorrect,thenthemorphologicalvolumeportraysamovementofthetranscendentaltowardthehuman;thepossiblepartialcontentsofthehistoricalvolumewouldseemtoillustrateamovementofthehumantowardthetranscendental.”28QuotedinSmith,Part2,332.29seetheforewordtoEliade,Patterns.30ibid.,333.

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historian of religions does not reach a comprehension of the phenomenonuntil after he has compared it with thousands of similar or dissimilarphenomena, until he has situated it among them; and these thousands ofphenomenaareseparatednotonlyintimebutinspace.”31The variety of phenomena is key to both themorphological and historicalprojects,andgivesusgreatinsightintoEliade’smethod.“Whateverpracticaldifficulties it causes, this very variety is what makes it possible for us todiscover all the different modalities of the sacred.”32 Of the historian ofreligion, Eliade writes, “Familiar with a considerable number ofhierophanies, his eye will have learned to decipher the properly religiousmeaningofoneoranotherfact.”33Simplyput,Eliadereadeverything,forgotnothing, and brought it all to bear on every thing. His morphology andinterpretive method consists of discovering the meaning of new religiousdata(hierophanies)bysituatingthemamongst thesystemsofrelationshipsbetweenpreviously studied hierophanies. These systems are archetypes34revealingthesamemodalityofthesacred. Eliadeexplainstheunionofthismorphologywithhistorythusly:Theverydialecticofthesacredtendsindefinitelytorepeataseriesofarchetypes,sothataheirophanyrealizedatacertain“historicalmoment”isstructurallyequivalenttoahierophanyathousandyearsearlieror later.Thistendencyonthepartofthehierophanic process to repeat the same paradoxical sacralization of reality as ininfinitum is what, after all, enables us to understand something of a religiousphenomenon and to write its ‘history.’ In other words, it is precisely becausehierophaniesrepeatthemselvesthatwecandistinguishreligiousfactsandsucceedinunderstandingthem.35As this passage indicates, “history” has unique and multiple meanings forEliade,andalthoughadetaileddiscussionofthisconceptisoutsidethescopeofthispaper(andwouldprobablyrequireamulti‐volumework),IwilltrytomentionafewaspectsofEliade’sconceptofhistorythataregermanetohis“creative hermeneutics.” In the foreword to Shamanism, he distinguisheshistory from historiography in that the former is the “specific plane ofmanifestation” of religious facts, whereas the latter is a chronologicalperspective. Moreover, given the irreducible nature of the religious, thehistory of religions is different from any other kind of history. “Though ahistory of religions exists, it is not, like all other kinds of history,irreversible.”36 This reversibility of history can only be understood if we 31Eliade,Shamanism,xv.32Eliade,Patterns,9.33Eliade,Shamanism,xvii.34AlthoughEliadecorrespondedwithJung,heusedthetermarchetypeinaverydifferentway,andeventuallydroppedtheterminordertoavoidJungianmisinterpretationsofhiswork.SeeMythandReligioninMirceaEliade,16335Eliade,Shamanism,xxiii36ibid.,xvii‐xvii

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recognize that for Eliade and/or homo religious,37 “all history is in somemeasureafallfromthesacred,alimitationanddiminution.”38However,thisfall is reversed by the process of the sacralization of the profane: thehierophany,the“eternalreturn”totheeternalsacred. “Yetinthehumblesthierophany there is an ‘eternal new beginning,’ an eternal return to anatemporal moment, a desire to abolish history, to blot out the past, torecreatetheworld.Allthisis‘shown’inreligiousfacts;itisnottheinventionofthehistorianofreligion.”39In this respect,we can see howone aspect of Eliade’s concept of “history”functions similarly to sacred history ormyth. In his “archaic ontology,” toknowathingmeanstoknowitsmythoforigin,theexemplaryhistoryofhowit came to be in illo tempore,because “facts showus that, for archaicman,reality is a functionof the imitationof a celestial archetype.”40 InPatterns,Eliadewrites, “Thusthough itmayseemparadoxical,whatwemaycall the‘history’ of primitive societies consists solely of themythical eventswhichtookplaceinillotemporeandhavebeenunceasinglyrepeatedfromthatdayto this.”41 However, the historian of religions must also deal with theserepetitions in profane time. While myth explains what things are byexplaining how they came to be in illo tempore, the historian of religionexplains what a thing is by discovering its archetype through itsmanifestations,its“becoming”inprofanetime.HereinliesthemagicofEliade’smethod.Ashewrites,“Toknowthemythsistolearntheoriginofthings…Forknowingtheoriginofanobject,ananimal,aplant, and so on is equivalent to acquiring amagical power over them bywhichtheycanbecontrolled,multiplied,orreproducedatwill.”42Similarly,byknowingthemyth,thesacredoriginorarchetype,thehistorianofreligionmakes a given religious phenomenon tractable, workable, systematic, andaboveall,meaningful.Thisprocessofuncoveringthearchetype,themodalityof the sacred, expressed through a hierophany, is likened to Platonicanamnesis(supra‐rationalrecollection),43albeitinahistoriographicmode:

37ThisslippagebetweenEliade’sownscholarlyperspectiveandthatofthetraditional,archaic,orreligiousmanheisattemptingtouncoverandexplainhasbeenthesourceofmuchcriticism,andisapointwewillreturntolaterinthispaper.38ibid.,xix.39ibid.,xvii.40MirceaEliade,Cosmos&HistorytheMythoftheEternalReturn(NewYork:Harper&Bros,1959),541Eliade,Patterns,397.42MirceaEliade,MythandReality(WorldPerspectiveSeries),firstedition(NewYork:Harper&Row,1963),13,15.43“Philosophicalanamnesisdoesnotrecoverthememoryoftheeventsbelongingtoformerlives,butoftruths,thatis,ofthestructuresofthereal.Thisphilosophicalpositioncanbecomparedwiththatofthetraditionalsocieties:themythsrepresentparadigmaticmodelsestablishedbysupernaturalbeings,nottheseriesofpersonalexperiencesofoneindividualoranother.”(Eliade,MythandReality,124)And,“Thepastthusrevealedismuchmorethan

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Through this historiographic anamnesis man enters deep into himself. If wesucceedinunderstandingacontemporaryAustralianorhishomologue,aPaleolithichunter,wehavesucceededin“awakening”inthedepthsofourbeingtheexistentialsituation and the resultant behaviour of a prehistoric humanity…A truehistoriographic anamnesis finds expression in the discovery of our solidaritywiththesevanishedorperipheralpeoples.Wehaveagenuinerecoveryofthepast,evenofthe ‘primordial’pastrevealedbyuncoveringprehistoricsitesorbyethnologicalinvestigations.44This, modern, academic, historiographic anamnesis is distinct fromtraditionalmythicalanamnesis,Butthereis thiscommonelement: theimportanceofpreciseandtotalrecollectionof the past. In the traditional societies it is recollection of mythical events; in themodernWestitisrecollectionofallthattookplaceinhistoricalTime.Thedifferenceistooobvioustorequiredefinition.Butbothtypesofanamnesisprojectmanoutofhis "historical moment." And true historiographic anamnesis opens, too, on aprimordial Time, the Time in which men established their cultural behaviorpatterns, even though believing that theywere revealed to them by SupernaturalBeings.45This reveals what I argue is the Platonic structure underlying Eliade’sontology, and ultimately hismethodology. Eliadewrites, “it could be saidthatthis ‘primitive’ontologyhasaPlatonicstructure;andinthatcasePlatocould be regarded as the outstanding philosopher of ‘primitive mentality,’thatis,thethinkerwhosucceededingivingphilosophiccurrencyandvaliditytothemodesandlifeandbehaviourofarchaichumanity…[His]greattitletoour admiration remainshis effort to justify this vision of archaic humanitytheoretically, through the dialecticmeans which the spirituality of his agemadeavailabletohim.”46 IsnotEliadeengagedinasimilar,ifnotidenticaltask?47 In his Journal he writes, “Our duty—as writers, scholars, andphilosophers—consists of reinterpreting, for the modern Westernconsciousness, theothermythological traditions, and firstof all thearchaic

theantecedentofthepresent;itisitssource.Ingoingbacktoit,recollectiondoesnotseektosituateeventsinatemporalframebuttoreachthedepthsofbeing,todiscovertheoriginal,theprimordialrealityfromwhichthecosmosissuedandwhichmakesitpossibletounderstandbecomingasawhole."(J.P.Vernant,"AspectsmythiquesdelamémoireenGrece,"JournaldePsychologie,(1959):1‐29—page7quotedinElicade,MythandReality,120).44ibid.,136.45ibid.,138.46Eliade,MythoftheEternalReturn,34‐35.47However,Eliadewritesonthesamepage,“RecognizingthePlatonicstructureofthat[archaic]ontologywouldnottakeusveryfar.”Idisagree,andinthelastsectionofthispaperwillarguethatthisrecognitionisverysignificantforunderstandingEliade’smethodologyandconclusions.However,thepurposeofthissectionismerelytosummarizeEliade’smethodologyashepresentsit.

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traditions…It’s not a matter of letting oneself be inspired by these exoticmyths and legends, but of creating poetically in a perspective inwhich thesignificanceandbeautyofthePolynesianmyths,forexample,arerevealedtothe readerwith a force equal toRilke revealing tohim themeaningof themythofOrpheus.”48But how does all of this practically work? I will present a few examplesbefore turning to “logic of symbols” which is Eliade’s expression for thestructure of the sacred revealed by hierophanies. On page 25 ofPatterns,Eliadeexplainshowthebasichierophanyofastonerevealsamodalityofthesacred, “A sacred stone will manifest one modality of the sacred at onemomentofhistory:thisstoneshowsthatthesacredissomethingotherthanthe cosmic surroundings, and like stone, the sacred is absolutelyinvulnerable, steadfast, and beyond change.” Due to its particularcircumstances, a hierophanymay become a symbol; for example, the blackstoneoftheKa’bawhich“infallingfromthesky,madeaholeinit,anditwasthroughthishole thatacommunication…couldbeeffectedbetweenheavenand earth. Though it passed theAxisMundi.”49 In thisway, a hierophanybecomesapartofasystem,andevery hierophany in fact supposes such a system…For instance, what I shoulddescribe as a cryptic, or insufficiently clear, local hierophany is the custom ofcarrying a green branch in solemn procession at the beginning of the spring;whereaswhatIwouldcalla‘clear’hierophanyisthesymboloftheCosmicTree.Yetbothreveal the samemodalityof the sacredembodied in plant life: the rhythmofrebirth, the never‐ending life that vegetation contains, reality manifested inrecurring creation, and so on. Whatmust be emphasized at once is thatall thesehierophanies point to a system of coherent statements, to a theory of the sacredsignificanceofvegetation[.]50Hereweseehowahierophany,withoutlettinggoofitshistoricalgrounding,isrelatedbacktoitsarchetpyeandintegratedintoasystemofhierophaniesthat reveal the same modality of the sacred. This is the morphologicalprocessunderlyingPatternsinComparativeReligion,andthemeansbywhichEliadedetermineswhatagivenhierophanysignifies. Thehistoricalprocessconsistsofexamininghistory for thesamehierophanyorhierophaniesthatreveal the same modality of the sacred, and are thus part of the samesymbolic system. “Thus firstly symbolism carries further the dialectic ofhierophanies by transforming things into something other than what theyappeartoprofaneexperiencetobe:astonebecomesasymbolforthecenteroftheworld,andsoon;andthenbybecomingsymbols,signsoftranscendent

48Eliade,NoSouvenirs,230.49Eliade,Patterns,227.50ibid.,8‐9.

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reality,thosethingsabolishtheirmateriallimitsandinsteadofbeingisolatedfragmentsbecomepartofawholesystem.”51Thissymbolicsystemor“logicofsymbolism”hasaspecialplace inEliade’smethodology and ontology, roughly analogous to Plato’s World of Forms.Thesesymbolicsystemsarenotconstructedbythehistorianofreligion,butrather uncovered or revealed by him. They exist “trans‐consciously” andautonomously, consciously in the mind of homo religious,52 andsubconsciously in his (and possibly modern man’s) dreams and instincts.“Whatwemay call symbolic thought allowsman tomove freely fromonelevelof reality toanother…[Symbols], aswehave seen, identify, assimilate,and unify diverse levels and realities that are to all appearancesincompatible.”53Symbols,likehierophaniesingeneral,paradoxicallybecomemore thanwhat theyarewhile remainingexactly the same. Theyuniteorbridge levels of reality in objects without negating any of them. 54 Thehistorianofreligionshasonlytointegratethehierophaniesinquestionintothis logic of symbolism to discover their relationship to the sacred andeverything else, and therefore their various levels of meaning. “In such aperspective this is not a closed Universe, no object exists for itself inisolation; everything is held together by a compact system ofcorrespondencesandlikenesses.”55This,insummary,isEliade’sontology,methodology,andhermeneutics.Thetranscendentsacredmanifestsitselfindifferentmodalitiesintotheplaneofprofane history creating hierophanies, historical events which reveal ormanifestagivenmodalityof thesacredor transhistoricalarchetype. Thesemodalities,andtheirmanifestationinhistory,areorganizedaccordingtothe“logicofsymbolism”whichgovernsthestructureof theUniverse(fromthesacredondowntotheprofane),connectingeverythingtoeverythingelseoneverylevelofreality.Thehomoreligiosusparticipatesinthesacredthroughreligiousrites,symbols,andmyths,andinhisworld,allorder,meaning,and

51ibid.,452;A“symbol”forEliadeistechnicallythatwhichmakesahierophanymorethanwhatitisinitself,orconstitutesa“revelation”whichcouldnotbeexpressedbyanyotherhierophany.Butinreality,itcouldbeanything,providedthatitembodiesorsymbolizesthewholesysteminquestion.SeeEliade,Patterns,448‐453.52seeEliade,NoSouvenirs,313:“FirstArgument:‘Thesacred’isanelementinthestructureofconsciousness,andnotamomentinthehistoryofconsciousness.Next:theexperienceofthesacredisindissolublylinkedtotheeffortmadebymantoconstructameaningfulworld.Iemphasizedthis:hierophaniesandreligioussymbolsconstitutealanguage,suigeneris,itnecessitatesproperhermeneutics.Inmywork,Ihavetriedtoelaboratethishermeneutics;butIhaveillustrateditinapracticalwayonthebasisofdocuments.Itnowremainsformeorforanothertosystematizethishermeneutics.”53ibid.,455.54Eliadearguesthatreligiousexperienceenablesmanhimselftobecomesuchasymbol,abridgeconnectingalllevelsofreality,andamicrocosminwhichallcosmicrealitiesarealsorealitiesofhisownbeing.SeeEliade,Patterns,455‐6.55Eliade,Images&Symbols,178.

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reality is derived through participation in the structureof the sacred. Thehistorian of religion attempts to distinguish hierophanies from profanethings(thedialecticofthesacred),discovertheirmeaningbylookingatwhatmodality of the sacred they manifest and/thus situating them within asymbolicsystemofrelatedhierophanies. Thelogicofthissystemwillallowhimtoidentifythesameandsimilarhierophaniesatvariousotherpointsinhistory and understand how they have been historically conditioned. Thisentire process will allow the scholar to answer the question:what does agivenreligiousphenomenonactuallymean?Beforemovingontothesecondsectionofthepaper,Iwanttopresentthreejournal entries of Eliade’s that help clarify his self‐identified purpose,precedent,andprocess,aswellasrevealthemagicofhismethodofcreativehermeneutics. Hedescribesanaspectof themotivation forhisscholarshipthus, “I want to show the cathartic function of a correct understanding ofmyth. It liberates (modern)man fromcertain inhibitionswhichmadehimincapableoflovinghisownprehistory(andhistory…).”56Helaterpresentsadiscoveryofaprecedentorpretextforhisworkandmethodasfollows:Inatextby[Henry]Corbin,Ihavefoundthesequotations:“RecitetheKoranasifithadbeenrevealedonlyforyourcase” (Sohrawardi). “If themeaningoftheKoranwere limited to the circumstances andpersonalities towhom itwas revealed, theKoranwouldhavediedlongago(BāgitIman,eighthcentury).Thesetwotextsalonecouldjustifythehistorico‐religioushermeneuticwhichcertainofusaretryingtodo(Corbin, myself, Ricoeur—and who else for the moment?). Point of departure: arevelation, although brought about in awell‐defined historicalmoment, is alwaystranshistorical, “universal,”and open to personal interpretations. In fact the term“interpretations” is not precise enough: it is a matter of a transmutation by thepersonwhoreceives, interprets,andassimilates therevelation. Formypart, I amgoing even further: the creative hermeneutic ofwhich I have been speaking in somanyofmyrecent studiesprovokesequivalent transmutationsevenwhenweareconfronted not with a “revelation” of the type of that of the Koran, but also withexotic(India,etc.)orarchaic(“primitive”)religiousforms.57And perhaps most illuminatingly, Eliade elaborates on this process oftransmutation:The meaning of my ‘learning’: I grasp the true meaning only after having gonethroughallthematerial(enormous,inert,somberdocumentation);Iwouldcomparemy immersion in the documents to a fusionwith thematerial—to the limit ofmyphysicalresistance:whenIfeelI’msuffocating,thatIambeingasphyxiated,Icomeback up to the surface. A descent to the center of dead matter, comparable to adescensus ad infernos. Indirectly, the experience of death. Drowned in the

56Eliade,NoSouvenirs,288.57ibid.,305‐6.

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documents, what is personal, original, living, inmedisappears, dies. When I findmyselfagain,whenIreturntolife—Iseethingsdifferently—Iunderstandthem.58This is precisely what I have tried to accomplish in the previous section,burying and fusing my own voice (and you, gentle reader) in Eliade’sdocuments andwords before coming up for air. I hope it has resulted inunderstanding. In thespiritof followingthemethodologyoutlinedabove, IattemptedtodothesameinconductingmyresearchontheYorùbáconceptof orí. However, in sitting down to write this next section, I was stillconfrontedbythe“magical”or“noetic”aspectofEliade’shermeneutics: theleapfromhistoricalhierophanytotranshistoricalarchetype.Thequestionofhow exactly this process occurs, how Eliade identified the archetype of agiven hierophany, is not clear from his scholarly work. Despite the self‐proclaimed empiricism of Eliade’s method, this initial leap, if empirical,seems based on the experience of something other than mere historicaldata.59Once,however,weacceptanumberofthese“leaps,”wecanbegintosee the consistency of Eliade’s logic of symbols and use these symbols asguideposts or exemplars that allow for and direct the interpolation andintegrationofnewhierophaniesamongstthem.ThisiswhatIattemptedtodointhefollowingEliadiananalysisoforí.Nevertheless,Eliade’sassertionthatthissystemofsymbols(andthesacredwhichitreveals)isautonomous,thatitisnotconstructedbythescholarorhomoreligiosus,seemsimpossibletoacceptwithoutembracingEliade’s/thearchaicontology.60 Wewill return to this issue later in the final sectionof

58ibid.,92;Thisprocessisstrikinglysimilar(althoughdescribedinslightlymoredramaticterms)totheprocessofComparativeReligiousReadingDescribedbyProf.FrancisClooneyatthebeginningofthefourthchapterofhisComparativeTheology:DeepLearningacrossReligiousBoundaries(Oxford:WileyandSons,2010).59Eliadehimselfwasinconsistentonthispoint:insomeplacesheseemedtoarguethatthehistorianofreligionneednotbelieveinthearchaicontologyofhomoreligiosus,butonlyneedacceptthatitwasrealfor,andletitguidehisstudyoftraditionalman.Inotherplaces,particularlyinhisjournals,Eliadeseemstoarguethatonlyscholarswhoaretruebelieversarecapableandqualifiedtointerpretreligiousphenomena.AllenquotessomeofhisearlyRomanianworksinwhichEliadewrites,“‘Onemustbelieveintheexistenceofthereligiousandmetaphysicalplanes…Youcannotjudgeaspiritualrealitywithoutknowingit,andyoudonotknowitwithoutcontemplatingitonitsownplaneofexistence.’Onlyby“lovingsupra‐sensiblerealities(i.e.,believingintheirexistenceandautonomy)canyoujudgeandacceptorrejectametaphysics,adogma,oramysticalexperience.”(Allen,MythandReligioninMirceaEliade,11).MyhypothesisisthatEliadedidinfactembracetherealityofthesereligiousandmetaphysicalplanesandconductedhisresearchaccordingly,andthathebelievedthatwhiletheidealhistorianofreligionwouldbelikehiminthisregard,experiencetaughthimthatitwaspossibleforpeoplewhowere“wrong”intheirontologytoprovide“correct”descriptionsofreligiousphenomena.60Aspreviouslymentioned,Eliadeisinconsistentonthispoint,insomeplaceshepresentsthisontologyasbelongingonlytoarchaicman,inotherplacesitseemsthisontologyappliestobothhimselfandarchaicman,andinyetotherinstancesitseemsasifthisontologyispresentedasthetruth,notjustforthehistorianofreligion,Eliade,orarchaicman,butforall

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this paper, but for the purposes of this exercise, I simply assume that thisontological assertionwas true for the traditionalYorùbáperson (which,byallaccountsseemsaccurate)andtrytobracketmyownontology.AlthoughIthinkIwasnomoresuccessfulthanEliadewasinhisownscholarship,Ileaveit to the reader to determine if the following application of hismethod isfruitfulornot.PartII:TheSecretofDestiny:TheYorùbáConceptofOríThedestinyofmanisinhisownsoul.

­HerodotusDue to the limitations of space and my erudition,61 I will not be able toprovide anything but a poor preview ofwhat a full application of Eliade’smethodologytothistopicwouldlooklike.Furthermore,thestructureofthissection will be uncharacteristic of his method, because while most of hisessays focus on a single set of symbolic structures or archetypal realities(such as “The Sky and Sky Gods,” or “Mythologies of Memory andForgetting”) initsvariousmanifestations, thisessaywillstartwithasingle,butmulti‐facetedhierophany,theYorùbámythico‐ritualcomplexoforí,andrelateitbacktothesesymbolicstructures.TheHeadThe head appears to have near universal symbolic significance acrossgeographyandhistory.FromMoaistatuesofEasterIsland,tohead‐huntingrites of Melanesia, the widespread ritual of coronation, the classical busttraditionofsculpture,andthedecorationofmanyformsofofficialcurrency(coins and now bills), the image of the head has been used to representpersonal essence, authority, and dominion. And this is no wonder: werecognizeoneanotherbyour faces,notourhands, so thehead is themostobvious sign of individuality; and in most anthropologies, ancient andmodern, theheadplaysa significant role ingoverning therestof thebody.The head is the part of the body closest to heaven, and is also a source ofknowledge, because other than the sense of touch, and the subtle sensesattested tobyarchaic traditions, thehead is the sourceof all sensorydata.The head is not only the source of knowledge, but also reveals the idea ofsourceororiginintheabstract.InlanguagefamiliesasdiverseastheIndo‐

humanity.SeethefirstchapterofPatterns,theconclusionsof“SymbolismoftheCentre”and“SymbolismandHistory”inImagesandSymbols,andTheMythoftheEternalReturn.61MostofmyreadinginthefieldofthestudyofreligioncouldandprobablydidfitinjustoneortwoofEliade’sbookshelves

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European,Semitic,andNiger‐Congo,thewordsforheadalsosignifysource,essence,origin,andleader.62But it is among theYorùbáof southwesternNigeria that thehierophanyoftheheadhasperhapsrealizeditsfullestexpressioninsculpture,song,poetry,prayer,ritual,andmyth. Thehead,ororí inYoruba, isatoncethephysicalhead(orí­odè, literally, “outerhead”), the innerrealityofapersonality(orí­inú, literally, inner‐head), the seat of consciousness, a guardian spirit orpersonal divinity, destiny/fate, the creator, and the all‐powerful immanentaspectofthetranscendentdeity(Olodumare). Althoughonemaybelongtothecultofoneorafewofthe40163orishas(deities)oftheYorùbápantheon,oríseems tobe theonlydivinityworshippedbyeachandevery traditionalYorùbá person.64 In the face of such a dizzying array of attributes, one isreminded of Eliade’s statement: “Hierophanies have the peculiarity ofseekingtorevealthesacredinitstotality,evenifthehumanbeingsinwhoseconsciousness the sacred shows itself fasten upon only one aspect or onesmallpartofit.Inthemostelementaryhierophany,everythingisdeclared.”65Similarly, the Yorùbá conception of orí seems like a dazzling gem ofuncountablefacets,anyoneofwhichcouldserveasthesubjectforanentirearticleorbook,butinthisshortspacewewilltrytoexamineafewoftheseaspectswithaviewtothewhole.TheMythofOríAccording to Yorùbá mythology, each person is created in heaven beforebeingbornintothehumanworld. ThebodyiscraftedbythegodOrishanla(Obatala) from primordial clay by the command of the Supreme God,Olodumare,whogiveslifetothenewpersonbybreathingapartofhimself,calledèmí, into the body. This èmí is the soul or vital force of the person,whichremainswiththebodyuntildeath,whenitreturnstoOlodumare(whomay then put it into another earth‐bound body). But before this newly

62r’as/roshinArabic/Hebrew,Sar/sirainPersian/Hindi,kichwainSwahili,olu/oriinYorùbá.TheYorùbáwordforsource/origin(orísun)isdirectlyderivedfromthewordforhead(orí).63Asymbolicnumberindicatingcompletionortotality(400)anditstranscendence(+1)cf.W.Abimbola,Ifá:AnExpositionofIfáLiteraryCorpus(London:OxfordUniversityPress,1977)64Ademuleyaquotesthefollowingtradition:

Orilababo ItisOríthatneedstobeworshippedTiabafiorishasile AndnotthedeitiesNitorioogunloniojoiponju ForcharmsareforthetroubleddaysOrienil’oniojogbogbo Onlyone’sorístandsbymaneveryday.

in“TheConceptofOriintheTraditionalYorùbáVisualRepresentationofHumanFigures.”NordicJournalofAfricanStudies16(2)(2007):212–220,p.216,cf.R.Abiodun,“VerbalandVisualMetaphors—MythicalAllusionsinYorùbáRitualisticArtofOri.”Word&Image3(3):252‐270JUL‐SEP1987.65Eliade,Shamanism,xvii.

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animatedperson leavesheaven,hegoes to thehouseofAjala, “thepotter,”whoischargedwithmakingorí­inú(innerheadsordestinies).Ajalaisoftendescribedasan irresponsiblerascalwho,duetohiscarelessness,makesallkindsoforí:good,bad,andotherwise.Eachpersonmustchooseanorífromthe potter’s storehouse, and this head determines (or is) a person’s fate inlife. This choice of destiny is witnessed only by Orunmila, the god of Ifádivination, and thiswitnessing is of the utmost importance, because in thedescent to earth, a person forgets everything about his “pre‐existence” inheaven. On earth, the only way he or she can learn anything about thischoiceoforí,hisdestiny,isbyconsultingOrunmila,knownaseléríìpín(thewitnessoffate/one’slot),throughIfádivination.66Ifá isadivinationsystemsomewhatsimilar to theChineseI­Ching,throughwhichbabalawos(priestsofOrunmila)selectandreciteasetofversesfromone of the 256 Odus (divinatory signatures roughly corresponding to“chapters”) thatcomprise itsoralcorpus. Theseversesusuallyconsistof amythological narrative inwhich a deity ormythological character consultsthe Ifá oracle about a particular problem, the oracle prescribes a specificsacrifice,andthedeityorcharacterperformsthesacrifice,resolvingtheissuewhichledhimtoconsultIfáinthefirstplace.67Forexample,OduIreteOfunsays:“Atefun‐tefun”PerformedIfádivinationforthe401divinitiesWhentheyweregoingtoApere(astateofperfection)“Atefun‐tefun”ThebabalawoofOriwhoperformedIfádivinationforOríWhenOríwasgoingtoApereTheywerealladvisedtooffersacrificeOnlyOrírespondedbyofferingthesacrificeThesacrificeofOríwasabundantlyrewardedOríishigherthenallOrisha(deities)ItisonlyOríwhichreachesApereNootherOrishacanhelpApartfromone'sOrí68NumerousotherversesofIfáattesttothesupremacyoforí,prescriberitualsand sacrifices to honor and propitiate it, assert its role in determining the

66cf.Abimbola(1977);W.Abimbola,"TheYorùbáConceptofHumanPersonality,"inLaNotiondePersonneenAfriqueNoire(Paris:ColloquesInternationauxduCentreNationaldelaRechercheScientifique,no.544.1971);Abiodun(1987).67EliadewouldhavefoundinIfáanidealexampleofhistheoryofmythandritual,“Mythassuredmanthatwhatheisabouttodohasalreadybeendone,inotherwords,ithelpshimtoovercomedoubtsatotheresultofhisundertaking.”Eliade,MythandReality,141.68Ifalola,personalcommunication‐seealsohttp://ifalola.blogspot.com/2008_02_01_archive.html

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fate of gods andmen alike, and even seem to identify itwith the SupremeDeity(Olodumare).69Interestingly, we find a structurally similar myth amongst the Igbo ofSoutheasternNigeria, theAkanofGhana, and furtherafield, in thePlatonicandneo‐Platonictraditionsofearlytolateantiquity. ChinuaAchebewrites,"The Igbo believe that a man receives his gifts or talents, his character—indeedhisportioninlifegenerally—beforehecomesintotheworld.Itseemsthere isanelementofchoiceavailable tohimat thatpoint,andthathischipresidesoverthebargaining.HencethesayingObuetunyanachiesikwu,"70meaning,“that'stheagreementhereachedwithhischi.”Thechifunctionsasa kind of guardian angel or spirit double,which determines the fate of thepersoninitscare,andservesasoneof,ifnotthecentralobjectofworshipinthetraditionalIgboworld.Indeedone’schimaybemorepowerfulthanallofthe other divinities. Thus it is said, “No matter how many divinities sittogethertoplotaman’sruin, itwillcometonothingunlesshischi is thereamongthem.”71However,apersonignoresoropposeshischiwithdisastrousconsequences,asAcheberelatesinthemythofthegreatwrestlerwhothrewallopponentsonearthandinthespiritworld,butwasdefeatedwhenhischiappearedandsmashed him to death with its little finger. When an Igbo man failsrepeatedly at an endeavor for no apparent reason, his fellows say “Chiekwero,”—His chi does not agree. The Yorùbá have virtually identicalexpressionsaboutorí(whenastrokeofluck,goodorbad,befallsus,wesay“it’s my head,” and Ifá attests that “No orisha blesses a man without theconsentofhisorí72).Furthermore,oneofitspraise‐names,orí­oorò“headatdawn,”73mirrorstheetymologyofchi,whichliterallymeans“daylight.”ThustheIgboSupremeDeity,whoisassociatedwiththesun,isknownasChukwu(Chiukwu, literally “great chi”)orChineke (Chinaeke, “Chiwhocreates”).AmongstcertainIgbogroups,anindividualconsecrateshisshrinetohischiatdaybreak,whenapriestbringsthechi“downfromthefaceofthesun.”74AmongsttheAkan,thevitalforce,orkra,isalsosaidtobearaycastfromthesunintothesoulduringitsheavenlypre‐existence.Thekraisalsoregardedas a guardian spiritordivine double, and the source of aperson’s destiny.

69SeeAbimbola(1971),Abiodun(1987),B.Lawal,“Ori:TheSignificanceoftheHeadinYorùbáSculpture”JournalofAnthropologicalResearch,41:1(Spring,1985):91‐103;B.Lawal,“Orilonise:TheHermeneuticsoftheHeadandHairstylesamongtheYorùbá.”TribalArtsII:2(Winter2001/Spring2002)70ChinuaAchebe,“ChiinIgboCosmology.”MorningYetonCreationDay(London:HeinemannEduc.,1975),165.71ibid.72Abimbola(1971),81.73Abiodun(1987),257.74SeeAchebe(1975).

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Justbeforeachildleavesheaven,itdeclaresthemannerinwhichitwantstolive and the plans it will achieve in life. This declaration is known as thenkrabeaor“destiny”(literally,thatwhichyoustipulatewhenleaving). Fateisdeterminedbyone’skra,givenbyNyameorchosenbyone’sself.75Thus,aclosebrushwithdangerelicitsthesaying,“butforhiskrathatfollowedhim,hewouldhavedied.”76Likeoríandchi,thekraisworshippedasaseparatedeity, even as an immanent, personal aspect of the Supreme, Lunar GodNyame. During life, “thehonhom[divinebreathor soul] is always coupledwiththekra;butwhereasafterdeaththekralaboursupasteephillinordertoreachheaven, theretosubmit to the judgementofNyankopon[theSolardemiurge], thehonhom fliesback toNyame in the shapeof abird.”77.Afterjudgment by the solar deity Nyakopon, the kra is condemned to bereincarnated in its familial line “until one of [its] descendants achieve[s] apurekra, that is,hasbecomeasaman‐pa,agoodspiritualbeing,whichcanthenbecomeoneagainwithNyame'seternalkra.”78In his essay, “The One and Only Transmigrant,” Ananda Coomaraswamyidentifies the eponymous being with the “the solar self,” the Hindu deityPrajapati, who according to the Vedas “‘moves in the womb and ismultifariouslyborn;’‘ThePersonexpiresandsuspiresinthewomb,andthenheisbornagain,whenthou,OBreath,givestlife;‘Thoualone,OSun,artbornaboutthewholeworld,’whoasthesacrificialPerson‘waspouredoutuponthe earth from East to West.’”79 Coomaraswamy comments “by thisPrajapati,thisbodyofoursissetupinpossessionofconsciousness,heasitsdriverpassingonfrombodytobody,overcomebythebrightordarkfruitofhis acts, or rather thoseactsofwhichhe, asour InnerMan, is theactuatorandspectatorratherthanthedoer.”80 Hereweseeaverydifferentculturalcoloring, but the near‐supremedivinity and description of Prajapati as theactuatorandspectatorofallindividualactionisalsoappliedtothekra,chi,andorí.81Infact,apossibleetymologyfororíisorí,literally“itsees/finds.”Nevertheless, the structure of the West African cluster of myths isrecapitulatedevenmore closely in theMythofEr fromPlato’sRepublic.AttheendofBookX, Socrates relates the taleofaGreekwarriorwhodied inbattleandwastakenhometobepreparedforburial,butwasrevivedtwelvedayslateronhisfuneralpileandrelatedhisvisionoftheotherworld.Inhis

75Meyerowitz,27:Onyanenkrabeannikwatibea—“WhatGodhasdestinedcannotbeavoided.”76ibid.,24.77ibis.78ibid.79Commaraswamy,MajorEssays,72‐73.80ibid.81SeeAbimbola’s(1971)discussionoftheconceptofese“leg”(meaninghumaneffortandactivity).“Evenifoneispredestinedtosuccessbythechoiceofagoodorí,onecannotactuallyachievesuccesswithouttheseuseofone’sese”(85‐6).

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“death,” Erwitnessed souls traveling betweenHeaven andEarth, the threeFates, Lachesis (the past), Clotho (the present), and Atropos (the future),workingthespindleofNecessityandweavingthedestiniesofmen:Hear theword of Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity.Mortal souls, behold a newcycleof lifeandmortality.Yourdaimonwillnotbeallotted toyou,butyouchooseyourdaimon;andlethimwhodrawsthefirst lothavethefirstchoice,andthe lifewhich he chooses shall be his destiny. Virtue is free, and as a man honors ordishonors her he will have more or less of her; the responsibility is with thechooser—Godisjustified.'[…]Allthesoulshadnowchosentheirlives,andtheywentintheorderoftheirchoicetoLachesis,whosentwiththemthedaimonwhomtheyhadseverallychosen,tobetheguardianoftheirlivesandthefulfillerofthechoice:thisdaimonledthesoulsfirsttoClotho, anddrew themwithin the revolutionof the spindle impelled by her hand,thusratifyingthedestinyofeach;andthen,whentheywerefastenedtothis,carriedthemtoAtropos,whospunthethreadsandmadethemirreversible,whencewithoutturninground theypassedbeneath the throneofNecessity;andwhen theyhadallpassed,theymarchedoninascorchingheattotheplainofForgetfulness,whichwasa barren waste destitute of trees and verdure; and then towards evening theyencampedby the river of Unmindfulness, whosewater no vessel canhold; of thistheywereallobligedtodrinkacertainquantity,andthosewhowerenotsavedbywisdom drank more than was necessary; and each one as he drank forgot allthings.82Here we clearly see, thousands of years and miles apart, the very samemythical structure, theparadoxical choiceofdestiny, thedivinenatureandguardianfunctionofthischosendestiny,andthemankind’sforgetfulnessofallthisduringhisentryintotheworld.Furtherlikenessesarerevealedwhenwe consider that another one of orí’s praise names is àyànmó, which inordinaryYorùbámeansfateordestiny,butwhichliterallymeans“thatwhichis affixed to one.”83 The orí, like the daimon, is chosen and irrevocablyattached to one. One of themyths of Ifá testifies to this aspect of orí, andlinksittotheconceptofreincarnationseenintheAkanandVedicaccounts:“OnedayOrunmilagatheredallof thegodstogetherandaskedthem, ‘Whocan accompany his devotee on a distant journey over the seas withoutturningback?’Eachdeity,includingOrunmila,boastsofbeingabletodoso,butuponfurtherexamination,alloftheirclaimsproveempty.ThegodsarealldumbfoundedsotheyconsultIfá,whichtellsthemthatitisonlyoríthatcan ‘accompany his devotee on a distant journey over the seas without

82FromPlato’sTheRepublic,<http://www.davidson.edu/academic/classics/neumann/CLA350/ErMyth.html>83Abiodun(1987),263.EventheshapeofthespindleandthroneofNecessitycloselyresemblethatoftheìborí,thealtarfortheoríanditscontainertheilé­oríwhichinturnserveasmodelsfortheYorùbároyalcrowns.Cf.B.Lawal,“Àwòrán:RepresentingtheSelfandItsMetaphysicalOtherinYorùbáArt.”TheArtBulletin,83:3(Sep.,2001):498‐526;H.Drewal,J.Pemberton,andR.Abiodun,“Yorùbá:NineCenturiesofAfricanArtandThought.”AfricanArts23:1(Nov.,1989):68‐77,104.

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turning back,’ becausewhenever a person dies, his personal shrines of theother gods are cast away, but his head accompanies him even into thegrave.”84Similarly, in the fourth chapter of the thirdEnnead,Plotinus describes thedaimonparedos,theguardianspirit that is theguideof thesoul throughoutlifeandindeath.85Porphyry,oneofPlotinus'disciples,recordedthat,FrombirthPlotinushadsomethingmore thandidothers. AnEgyptianpriestwhohadcome toRomeandmadehisacquaintance througha friendwanted togiveanexhibitionofhiswisdomandaskedPlotinustocomeseehisownattendingdaimonevoked.Plotinushavingreadilyconsented,theevocationtookplaceinthetempleofIsis, for the Egyptian said that this was the only pure place in Rome. When thedaimonwassummonedbeforetheirveryeyes,agodcamewhowasnotoftheorderofdaimonsandtheEgyptiansaid:'Blessedareyouwhohaveagodforadaimonandnot a companion of a lower order!' Plotinus thus had as a companion one of themoredivinedaimons, andhekepthis divine eyecontinuously raised towards thiscompanion.86SocratesspokeofhisowndaimonintheApology,“Forpreviouslythefamiliardivinatory voice of the daimon always spoke to me quite frequently andopposedmeeveninverysmallthingsifIwasabouttodosomethingIshouldnotrightlydo.”87Similarly,Galenwrotethat,“Thecauseofthepassions,thatis, of inconsistency and the unhappy life, is not to follow in everything thedivinity(daimon)withinoneselfwho isof thesamestockandhasa similarnature to the one who governs the whole cosmos.”88 In the same vein,Abimbolawrites:Broadlyspeaking,therefore,onecansaythatwhenapersongoestoconsultIfáallhe is doing is finding out the wishes of his orí. Ifá is merely the mouthpiece, anintermediarybetween the inquirer andhis orí. Ifá carries themessageofOrí andthegodstothesupplicantandcarriesthesacrificesmadebythelattertoOríandthegods…Thegodsthemselveshavetheirownorídirectingtheirdailylife.Likehumanbeings,thegodsknowthewishesoftheiroríbyconsultingIfá.89

84Abimbola(1977),133‐42.85seeHenryCorbin,TheManofLightinIranianSufism(GreenOaks,IL:OmegaPublications,1994);pp.13‐37foramorethoroughexpositionofthissymbolofthe“HeavenlyTwin.”86Porphyry,LifeofPlotinus10.14‐30.Translation2005byRobertK.Clark.From<http://www.prometheustrust.co.uk/Meadow_2/Greek_Philosophical_Terms/greek_philosophical_terms.html>.IntheFourthEnnead,Plotinusdescribedapartofthesoul,itshead,thatremainsintheheavenlyrealmsandneverfallsintothesufferinganddispersionofthematerialandtemporalworld.87Plato,Apology31‐32Translation2005byRobertK.Clark88quotedinChristopherGill,TheStructuredSelfinHellenisticandRomanThought(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),280.89Abimbola(1977),115.

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Lawal identifies this divine orí (belonging to both gods and men) withOlodumare, the Supreme Deity and “head” of the Yorùbá pantheon on thebasisofanumberofsayings,prayers,andversesofIfáthatdescribetheminthesameterms,arguingthatoríis“anaspectoftheSupremeBeing.”90InthefirstoftwoparallelnarrativesfromdifferentOduoftheIfácorpus,Orí,inthehumbleformofthelittleconeofhisaltar,rollsinandsplitsthesacredkolanut of àshe (spiritual power/energy) with ease after all the other orisha(deities)hadtriedandfailedtoaccomplishthis.HeisenthronedinHeaven,whichinfuriatestheotherorishawhoattackandtrytodethronehimintheirjealousy,butOrísubdueseachoneofthemandsetsthemtotheirparticularcosmictasks.91Lawalpointsoutthattheverbfor“subdue”usedinthisversedá,canalsomean“tocreate.”Soorícanbeseenascreatingalloftheorishaandassigningthemtheirroles,somethingnormallyattributedtoOlodumare.In the secondnarrative, the orisha plot againstOlodumare and ask him toabdicatethethrone.Heagreesontheconditionthattheyruletheworldontheirownforsixteendays. Olodumare,whoisthesourceofashé,theforcethat animates the entire cosmos, cuts off its flow, and the world stopsworking. The orisha, ashamed, return toOlodumare (referred to asOlórí ,theLord,literally“theownerofthehead”)andpayhomagetohim.92DuringtheRomanEmpire,as in theYorùbáandAkancivilizations,subjectspaidhomagenotonlytotheirownpersonaldivinity(geniusinLatin)butalsotothatoftheEmperororKing.93TheRomangeniuswasalsoatutelaryandguardian deity who controlled man’s fortune, and like orí, had a“generative/creative” aspect (from which the modern English term isderived)asitwasetymologicallyderivedformtheIndo‐Europeanrootgen­,meaning“tocreate.”94InTheMan of Light in Iranian Sufism,Henry Corbin conducts an extensiveanalysisofclosely‐relatedsymbolsandguardianspirits,demonstratinghowthey had been identified with the angels of the Abrahamic religions andZoroastrianism, the Active Intellect of Peripatetic Philosophy, and the“PerfectNature”ofHermeticismdescribedas“‘thephilosopher’sAngel’—thephilosopher’s initiator and tutor, and finally as the object and secret of allphilosophy, the dominant figure in the Sage’s personal religion. Again andagain,thesedescriptionsstrikethefundamentalnote:thePerfectNaturecanonlyrevealitself ‘inperson’toonewhosenatureisperfect…eachofthetwosimultaneouslyassumesthepositionoftheIandtheself—imageandmirror:myimagelooksatmewithmylook;Ilookatitwithitsownlook.”95 90Lawal(1985),92‐4.91ibid.,cf.Abiodun(1987),261‐392Lawal(1985),opcit.93SeeAbiodun(1987),Meyerowitzopcit,andJ.C.Nitzsche,TheGeniusFigureinAntiquityandtheMiddleAges(Columbia:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1975).94cf.Nitzscheopcit.95H.Corbin,ManofLight,17.

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The 17th Century Shīcite philosopher Qāzī Sacīd Qommī, similarly assertedthat“the facethatGodshowstoman is the facethatmanshowstoGod,”96andhiscontemporaryandfellowphilosopherMullaSadraheldthateachsoulcomes froma specifiedpointoforiginamongst thespirits’pointsoforigin,and the location of this point is specified by its connection to or beinggovernedbyoneof theNamesorAttributesofGod. Thispointoforigin isalso the soul’s point of return of to God. This Divine locus or origin andreturn isunique to every individual soul and thus thepath traversed fromthesouloutintotheworldandbacktoGodisalsounique(thereareasmanypathstoGodastherearesouls),andisdetermined,obviously,bythelocationofthispoint.Infact,onecouldsaythatthispathiswhatthesoul“becomes”as it goes through life headed back towards God. Therefore, the uniquenatureofeachsoul,andwhatitbecomes,i.e.,thepathittakes,isdeterminedbythisuniquelocus,whatitis,was,andwillbeindivinis:When humans ask God to guide them along the straight path in verse six of theQur’an’s first chapter, they therefore ask for nothingbut guidanceupon theirownpath,whichwill lead to their felicity. This iswhy Sadra goes on tomake a subtledistinction between the different paths available to a person and the pathappropriatetohimorher:‘ItisjustasGodsays,Anddonotfollowthepaths,fortheywill divert you from God’s path [6:153], that is, the pathwhich is for you containsfelicity and salvation,’…What Sadra seems to have inmindhere is that since eachindividual has a path to God specific to him or her, the other paths which areavailabletohimorherarenotactualoptionsintermsofhisorherreturntoGod.Apersonhastheoptiontotreaduponthem,butthetruthis,inaccordancewithhisorherinnatedisposition,thereisonlyonepaththatisopentohisorhersoul,anditisthatpath thatmustbefollowed.Sadra thensaysthatnoteveryonewhoreturnstoGodwillattainfelicity.This isbecause, inaccordancewith thedivinedecree,therearesomewhomustendupinmiseryandwretchedness,andsomewhomustendupin felicity. Thus, while all souls return to God, some meet what classical IslamictheologyreferstoasGod’sattributesofbeauty,whicharemanifestedthroughsuchdivinenamesas“thegentle,”“thekind,”and“theloving;”whereasothersmeetGod’sattributes of majesty, which are manifested through such divine names as “theoverpowering,”“thevengeful”,and“thewrathful.”97Hereagain, thedivineoriginofdestinyand itssimultaneousunitywiththesoul are emphasized, along with the resulting paradox of the unity offreedomandfate.Inallofthesediversemanifestationsofmythanddoctrinewecanseethesamemodalityofthesacred,thesamearchetypalrealitythatshinesthroughthemythoforí.

96SeeH.Corbin,EnIslamIranien:Aspectsspirituelsetphilosophiques,TomeIII:Lesfidelesd’amouretShi’ismeetsufisme.LivreIII:RuzbehanBaqliShiraziandtheSufismoftheFidelesd’Amour.(Paris:Gallimard,Bib.desIdees,1972).97Dr.MohammedRustom,personalcommunicationand“FromPhilosophicLanguagetoMythicDiscourse:MullaSadra’sAnthropologyoftheAfterlife,”paperdeliveredatAmericanAcademyofReligionConferenceinMontreal,2009.

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TheMeaningoftheMyth:Character,Destiny,Divinity

Characterisdestiny.­Heraclitus

BíOríbafe’ìwàIfOrimarriesIwa(character)BíÌwàbafeoríAndIwamarriesOriAiyeagúnrégéTheworldwillbewell

‐Yorùbásong

Olodumare,Olori,Olorun,Eleda,OluÌwàSupremeBeing,LordofHeaven,Creator,LordofExistence

‐PraisenamesforOlodumareOríeni,l'ElédáeniOne'shead/destinyisone'screator

‐Yorùbásaying

Hewhoknowshimself,knowshisLord­‐HadīthoftheProphetMuhammad

Now we must emerge from this process of immersion in the varioushierophanies and systems of symbols described above to answer thequestion: what does it all mean? Eliade himself gives us a key tounderstandingthisparticularmodalityofthesacred:ForPlato,philosophyhelpsyouremember the Ideas;moreprecisely to rememberthe situation of the soul in post‐existence and pre‐existence when the soulcontemplatedtheIdeas.FortheAustralians,initiationrevealstoyouthatyouwerealreadyhere,intheseplaces,inthedawnoftime,inillotempore,youweresuch‐and‐suchcivilizinghero. Thismythicalpersonageservesasamodel: theinitiatesmustrepeatwhathe did in thebeginning. But through the initiation,youdiscover thatthis mythical personage is you yourself—as you appeared for the first time.Ultimately, you are a repetition of yourself—as you were in the beginning,exemplary.98Thismythicalthemecanbeanalyzedaccordingtothefollowingelements:1)forhomoreligiosus,character,reality,andhappinessareattainedbyaligningoneself with, or participating in, one’s own unique archetype, 2) thisarchetype is atonceone’sdestiny, ideal self, andguardian spirit,whatonewasinillotempore,3)homoreligiosus“wants”tobewhathe(hisarchetype)

98Eliade,NoSouvenirs,182;Eliade,Myths,RitesandSymbols,55.

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“is”,and“is”whathe“wantstobe”(hisdestiny);thatis,manishisarchetype,andhisarchetypalselfchooses/manifests/createshisdestinyinaccordancewithitsownnature,4)Thisarchetypalselfisdivineandopensupontothetranscendent sacred. Eliade’s creative hermeneutic reveals this samesymbolic logic, or modality of the sacred, manifesting itself in themythologies of orí, kra, chi, daimon, guardian angel, “solar self,” “PerfectNature,”and“divinelocusoforigin/return,”inspiteoftheirvastlydifferentculturalandhistoricalcontexts.IntheYorùbácase,apersonlearnsanddevelopsgoodcharacter(ìwà,whichalso means existence; things exist only insofar as they have character) byconsulting the Ifá oracle about a significant event or decision in his life.Through a mythical narrative from the Ifá corpus, a person’s orícommunicatesitswishesandwhatitwoulddo(orhasdoneinillotempore)inthisevent,revealingtheway(thenecessaryrituals,taboos,andsacrifices)forthepersontore‐integratehimselfwithhisarchetype,realizinghisdestinyandbecomingimmortal(astheprayercontainedinIfásays,orímídamidaIye,Nòkúmó, Iregbogboni t’emi, Ìmólèni tiÀmàkìsì—Myorígiveme life,empowermetoovercomemortality/Ishallnotdie,Letallgoodthingsbelongtome,Aslightbelongstothegodofsunrise99).Butwhataboutthepersonwithabadorí(olóríbúrúkú)?Ifhisarchetypeordestinyistonothavecharacter/existence,ishestillfulfillinghisdestinyandmanifestinghis archetype? Theanswerdependsonperspective. Fromthehumanside, looking“up,”wehave forgottenthenatureofourorí,andso itwouldseemthateitherone’sbadactionsspoiledone’sgooddestiny,orthatone’sbaddestinythwartedone’sgoodefforts(hencethesayingenil’oríreretikòníìwà,ìwàl’omab’oríreje—thepersonwithgooddestinybutwithoutcharacter,itischaracterthatwillruinhisgooddestiny).Butfromthedivineside,looking“down,”allofaperson’sdecisionsarereallyjustrepetitionsofhisprimordialchoiceoforí, in fact, theperson is justamanifestationofhisorí, an unfolding in time of all of its potentiality, hence the saying ori enil’Eledaeni—“one’soríisone’sCreator.”100Sofromthehumanside,destinyischaracter(characterseemstodetermineone’s destiny), but from the divine side, character is destiny (destinymanifestsitselfascharacter). Bothperspectivesareright,butthedivineorarchetypalperspectiveismoresobecauseitisontologicallypriororsuperiortothehumanone.Sotheunfortunatesoulwitha“bad”oríisstillfulfillinghisdestinyandmanifestinghisarchetype,buthisoríorarchetypalself,althoughmorereal thanhiminandof itself, is lessreal thanagoodorí. As Ifásays,

99quotedinAbiodun(1987),263.100Wecanimaginetheconeoforíwithitspointataparticularlocationonthe“faceofthesun,”thefaceofdivinity.Thispointismanifested,expandedoutwardanddownward,toformthecircleofaperson’slife.

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“Orikanoburun’ileIfe;t’iwanikanlosoro”101—“ThereisnotonebadoríinIle‐Ife (the sacredcity,here symbolizingheaven), it is cultivating characterthat is difficult.” Because orí occupy a higher ontological place than theirhumancounterparts,relativetopeople,theyarenotbad,butsomearebetterthanothers, that is, some lead to livesofbetter character thanothers. Butwhatofhumanwillandresponsibility?This question has been taken up bymany anthropologists and scholars ofAfrican Philosophy who have argued that the Yorùbá concept of orí isfatalist,102soft‐determinist,103orvoluntarist,104orthattheoríislikeFreud’sunconscious.105 Theirextensivedebateshaveformedthebasisofdozensofarticles and fascinating studies, but from theEliadean perspective, they allcommit the classic error of approaching a religious phenomenon asphilosophy. FromhismentorNaeIonescu,Eliade inheritedthenotionthatthere are three planes of knowledge and reality: the religious, thephilosophical,andthescientific,eachwithanappropriatemethodofinquiry.Theworstsinascholarcancommitistoconfusetheselevelsintryingtousea “lower” method to understand a “higher” level (i.e., trying to study thephilosophical as empirical science, or the religious as philosophy).106 Byseeking to reduce it to philosophy or psychology, these scholarsfundamentallymisunderstandwhat the orímyth actually is, and thereforemisinterpretwhatitsays.107However,thisdoesnotmeanthatphilosophicalor systematic exegesis of a myth is impossible, as Eliade writes, “mythexpresses in action and drama what metaphysics and theology define 101QuotedinFayemi,“HumanPersonalityandtheYorùbáWorldview:AnEthico‐SociologicalInterpretation”TheJournalofPanAfricanStudies,2:9(March2009),170102SeeBarryHallen,TheGood,theBad,andtheBeautiful:DiscourseAboutValuesinYorùbáCulture(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,2001);E.B.Idowu,Olodumare,GodinYorùbáBelief(London:Longmans,1970);E.O.Oduwole,“TheYorùbáConceptsof‘Ori’andHumanDestiny:AFatalisticInterpretation.”JournalofPhilosophyandDevelopment2(1&2):40–52;S.Oladipo,“PredestinationinYorùbáThought:Philosopher’sInterpretation.”Orita:JournalofReligion.XXIV(1&2):34–51.103SeeO.A.Balogun,“TheConceptsofOriandHumanDestinyinTraditionalYorùbáThought:ASoft‐DeterministicInterpretation.”NordicJournalofAfricanStudies16:1(2007):116–130;S.Gbadegesin,'Ènìyàn,TheYorùbáConceptofaPerson',”inP.H.CoetzeeandA.P.J.Roux(eds)TheAfricanPhilosophyReader(2nded.):175‐191;M.A.Makinde,“APhilosophicalanalysisoftheYorùbáConceptofOriandHumanDestiny.”InternationalStudiesinPhilosophy,17:1:54‐69;S.A.Ali,“TheYorùbáConceptionofDestiny:ACriticalAnalysis.”JournalofPhilosophyandDevelopment1&2(1):100–106.104KolaAbimbola,YorùbáCulture:APhilosophicalAccount(YorùbáCultureinContext)(Turnhout:IrokoAcademicPublishers,2005).105RobinHorton,“SocialPsychologies:AfricanandWestern.”AnessayaccompanyingMeyerFortes’OedipusandJobinWestAfricanReligion(Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress),41‐82.106Allen,MythandReligioninMirceaEliade,9.107SeeEliade,MythandReality,148,“everyattempttointerpretGreekmyth,atleastwithinacultureoftheWesterntype,isinsomesortconditionedbytheresponseoftheGreekrationalists.”Eliade’sdiscussionofthemisinterpretationofGreekmythscouldapplyequallywelltothecaseofYorùbámythologyinWesternacademicinstitutions.

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dialectically.108”Infact,theexperienceofthesacredistheoriginofallsuchdiscourse, as the mythology engendered by such experience is “laterelaboratedandsystematizedbymetaphysicalspeculation.”109However,anysuch attempt at systemization must maintain the “opening to theTranscendent” inherent in themythandnotconfusethe levelsofexistenceunifiedinthesymbol.Fromthismethodologicalstandpoint, Iarguethat theacademicaccountsoforías fatalism, soft‐determinism,orvoluntarismareallcorrect,butalsoallwrong because they are all premised on the absolute difference between apersonandherorí.Thefatalistsassertthatapersondoesnothaveanyfreewillorchoicebecauseitisone’soríandnotone’sselfthatdeterminesone’sfate.Thesoft‐deterministsholdthatone’sorícanbealteredorinfluencedbyone’shard‐work,sacrifices,andcharacter,while thevoluntaristsarguethatone’s orí is simply what one makes of oneself given the uncontrollablecircumstancesoflife.Alloftheseaccountsfindbothsupportandoppositionin the religious rites, myths, and orature of the Yorùbá. This union ofopposing attributes and perspectives (coincidentia oppositorum in Eliade’slanguage) characterizes not only orí, but myths in general. Eliade writes,“mythrevealsmoreprofoundlythananyrationalexperienceevercould,theactualstructureofthedivinity,whichtranscendsallattributesandreconcilesall contraries…[this] coincidentia oppositorum is one of the most primitivewaysofexpressingtheparadoxofdivinereality.”110In the case of orí, thecoincidentia oppositorum of fate and freewill can beunderstoodby considering thatorí is also thenexusof thehumanand thedivine. In orí, humanwill (choice) is not separate from divinewill (fate),hence the paradox of the heavenly “choice of fate.” A person always haschoice,but shehasalreadymade this choice indivinis, in illo tempore. Butthis illudtempus isnot thehistoricalpast,but rathertheeternalpresentofmythandritual;so,conversely,aperson’sfateissealed,buthehimselfsealsit every time hemakes a decision. In thewords of one Yorùbá priest, “it(emi)chooseswhatitwillcometodo…Soalsoitistheactoftheselfwhenitiswith the supremedeity (Olorun).” 111 The choice oforí inheaven is thearchetypeandsourceofall thechoicesapersonwillevermake in life, andthishumanchoiceisnototherthanthedivinechoice.Weareultimatelynotother thanourorí, and throughourorí,wearenotother thanOlodumare,and so our choices, all of our exercise of free will, is not other than ourdestiny.Itisonlywhenweleavetheunityofeternityandthesacredandareplunged in profane time and multiplicity that these aspects seemcontradictoryandparadoxical,asintheYorùbásaying“akúnlè,ayanèdá,A

108Eliade,Patterns,418.109Eliade,MythandReality,139.110Eliade,Patterns,419.111Hallen,TheGoodtheBadandtheUgly,52.

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dáyá tán, ojú nkán ni—We knelt (in heaven) and chose our destinies, butwhenwearrivedonearth,webecameimpatient/troubled.”112Inconclusion,oríisourdivineself,morepowerfulthananyorisha,andbeingidentifiedwithOlodumare,istheindividual,personalaspectoftheSupremeBeing,“thefaceGodturnstowardsus.”113Justastheouterorphysicalhead(orí­odè) is thevesselof the innerhead(orí­inú)anddeterminesthe fateofthe rest of the body, humans are the chosen vessel of Olodumare anddeterminethefateoftheworld,asIfásays:…awagegebieniyan, Weashumanbeings,awaniOlodumareyan WearetheGod’select,latilotunileayese, designatedtorenewtheworld,Eni­ayanniwa... Wearethechosenones.114But our destinies do not absolve us from effort and struggle, in fact theydecreeitforus/wehavechosenitforourselves.AsIfásays:IfádivinationwasperformedforStruggleWhowascomingfromheaventoearthWeareonlystrugglingAllofusThosewhochosegooddestiniesarenotmanyWeareonlystrugglingAllofusWeareonlystruggling115In thisparticular struggle todescribeanaspectofYorùbámythology, as inanyexegesisofmyth,wefindthatnoexplanationcouldeverbecomplete.InEliade’s words, “…There is always a kernel that remains refractory toexplanation, and this indefinable, irreducible element perhaps reveals therealsituationofman inthecosmos…”116 Andyet in theYorùbácase,orí isboththeimpossiblekernelthatencapsulates“therealsituationofmaninthecosmos”andthesolutionwhichbreaksitopen.NoonebutthelittleconeoforícouldcrackthesacredkolanutofOlodumareandsetthecosmosinorder. 112Abimbola(1977),113;cf.Boethius’ConsolationofPhilosophyinwhich“theangelofPhilosophy”(hisgenius)comestohimandresolvestheparadoxofGod’sforeknowledgeandGod’sjudgmentbyshowinghimthatGodisoutsideoftime,andthatfree‐willandforeknowledgeareunitedintheatemporal.113Olodumarehasnoshrines,cult,orimagesintraditionalYorùbáreligion.114B.A.Ademuleya,“TheConceptofOriintheTraditionalYorùbáVisualRepresentationofHumanFigures”NordicJournalofAfricanStudies16:2(2007):214.TheYorùbáwordforperson,ènìyàn,ishereetymologicallyandmythicallyderivedfromthephraseeniayan“onewhoischosen.”115Abimbola(1977),147;cf.Ibnal‐cArabī’sdiscussionof“thestrugglers”inhisexegesisoftheQr’anicverse,“youdidnotthrow,whenyouthrew,butGodthrew.”InW.C.Chittick,TheSufiPathofKnowledge(Albany,NewYork:StateUniversityOfNewYorkPress,1989),211.116Eliade,Shamanism,xiv.

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PartIII:ConclusionandCriticismHavingattemptedtooutlineanddemonstrateEliade’screativehermeneutic,Iwillnowtrytoevaluatethebenefits and limitationsof thisapproach,andcompareittoComparativeTheologicalapproaches.J.Z.Smithwrote,“Ihaveoften observed to students that amethodological or theoretical position isnot some magic wand that makes problems disappear. Each positionassumedentailscostsandconsequences.Thequestionisnotoneofdecidingon solutions, but of choosingwhat set of costs one iswilling to bear.”117 Iagree wholeheartedly with Smith’s assessment. Every methodology is alimitationofinquiryandexposition(oneaskssomequestionsandnotothers,and writes down some things, passing over others in silence), so scholarsmust assess their own goals, the nature ofmaterial, and the nature of thedifferentmethodologicalapproachesavailabletothemwhendecidinghowtoapproachatopic.Eliade’s creative hermeneutic hasmany strengths: it attempts to approachreligion as religion, without reducing a religious phenomenon to its givenpsychological,historical,orpoliticaldimensions,whileatthesametimenotignoringtheseotherdimensions. Thismethodologyrequiresthescholar totaketheworldviewpresentedinthesubjectofinquiryseriouslyandallowitto “transform” himorher. However, this personal dimension, the need tovirtuallyadopt theperspectiveof theobjectof inquiry, isboth thegreateststrengthandweaknessofthismethod. Suchataskisincrediblydemanding(perhapsevenimpossible)fortheseriousscholar,andwhilethisHerculeanlabormayallowthescholartoproducecreativeandcoherentinterpretationsofmythsandsymbolsthatarecongruouswiththetraditions inwhichtheyreside,itraisesmanymoreissuesaboutthevalidityofsuchefforts.Withoutdelving into the messy politics of representation, suffice it to say that thepossibility, desirability, and accuracy of sucha project depends uponone’sepistemology and ontology. The emerging field of Comparative Theologyoffers some importantways of responsibly and rigorously addressing this“personalandtransformative”aspectofthiskindofwork,butIwillreturntothisshortly.I believe this is themain reason thatEliade’sworkhas fallenoutof vogue;leaving aside the largely ad hominem political critiques, most criticism ofEliadehas focusedon the slippagebetweenhisownpersonalontologyandviewsandthoseofthe“archaicman”hesoughttorepresent.118Inalmostallof his works, it is difficult to distinguish Eliade the man from Eliade the

117Smith(2000)“Part2”,351.118T.Masuzawa,InSearchofDreamtime:TheQuestfortheOriginofReligion(ReligionandPostmodernismSeries)(Chicago:UniversityOfChicagoPress,1993).

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scholar from Eliade’s “archaic man,” indeed passages from his journalsfrequently find their way into his books without significant alteration.Moreover, Eliade was clearly profoundly and personally shaped by thematerial he studied, to the extent that the line between “this is how theprimitive sees the world” and “this is how the world is” vanishes andreappearslikeaghostinEliade’swritings.This isnotnecessarilyaproblem,but it isapositionthatmeritsexpositionanddefense. One cannotdescribehowa religiouspersonviews theworld,without (even if only implicitly) adopting some kind of rudimentaryunderstandingof how theworld is; i.e.,whether or not things exist, or thelawsofnatureareregular,ortimeandspaceexistinacertainway,etc. Allkindsofcoherent,mutuallyexclusivepositionsarepossible,andeachhasitsown methodological consequences. If we take Eliade’s ontology to beidentical or at least very similar to the “archaic ontology” outlined in hisworks(andIbelievewehavegoodreasontodoso), thenI thinkwewouldfind that it has a strong resonance with our understanding of theperspectivesof so‐called“archaicpeoples.” In fact,Eliade looksto“archaicman”inmuchthesamewayashis“archaicman”lookedtomythicalfigures:asdistantexemplarsthatcanbeusedtocreateorder,meaning,andrealityinthe world. This “creative” or even “performative” aspect of Eliade’shermeneutichas,unfortunately,beenlostonmostofhiscritics.Nevertheless, the ontological foundations of Eliade’s methodology areparticular, and being particular, are not universally held. It would bedifficult, and perhaps very interesting, to try to apply Eliade’s method totraditionswhichrejectthisontology,suchaspost‐modernorpsychoanalyticcircles,orevenearlyMadhyamikaBuddhistphilosophy.119 However,Eliadeclaims that his “archaic ontology” is not a priori, but is rather empiricallyderived from his sources, indicating that perhaps his methodologicalontology could be transformed by new sources of data. This potential forreflexivityisagreatstrengthofthemethod.Intheexerciseofthispaper,IfoundthatEliade’smethodallowedmetoseeconnectionsthatIhadneverpreviouslyimaginedbetweentheYorùbámythswithwhichIwasraisedandothermythsandconcepts,butthewayinwhichImade these connectionswas certainly intuitiveandnot systematic. Afterfollowingup a given intuition about the relationship between, say, orí andgenius,Iwouldsystematicallylookforsimilaritiesanddifferences,butwhileEliade’smethodwasveryhelpfulinderivingmetaphysicalmeaningabout“agivenmodalityofthesacred”fromthesesimilarities,andhistoricalmeaningfrom their differences, it limited my examination of the aspects of thetranscendent sacred (assuming Eliade’s ontology) revealed by theirdifferences. 119SeeEliade,AHistoryofReligiousIdeas,forsuchefforts.

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Moreover,aspreviouslydiscussed,Eliadedoesnotprovideajustificationfortheleapfromareligiousphenomenontoitsarchetypethatmakesthewholecomparative project possible. I hold to the Hermetic principle that“everythingisineverything,”andthusanythingcanbereadintoanything.Givenaparticularmyth, Imayseeasymbolof theunionof thedivinewiththe human,while another scholarmay see a symbol of patriarchy, and yetanother may see it as an expression of repressed libido or class conflict.Whichoneofusisright,andinwhatway,andhowdowetell?IfEliadehadbeen more consistent and transparent in his presentation of his ownphilosophicalpositions,Ithinkhecouldhaveansweredthesequestionsandmadehismethodologythatmuchstronger.However,itisalsoprobablethatEliadewasengaginginakindofupaya,orintentionalruse.Byconcealinghisphilosophical presuppositions, he may have made his work and theconclusionshederivedfromitmorepalatabletohiscolleagues.In the end, I deemedmy exegesis of themyth of orí according to Eliade’screativehermeneuticstobealimitedsuccess, inthatitprovidedananswerto thequestionofwhat themythmeanswithout reducing themyth to thisinterpretation,closingthedooronotherinterpretations,orcuttingthemythoff from the sacred. However, I found that this method limited theexplorationofdifferenceamongstthesourcematerial,anddidnotallowforadiscussionofwhy Iheldmy interpretation tobe “more correct” thanothervalid interpretations, i.e., my own philosophical presuppositions. In onesense,Eliade’smethodologyallowedmetobehonestinthatitpermittedmetotakethemythseriouslyandasapplicabletomylife,hereandnow;anditfurther allowed me to demonstrate the kind of intuitive, associativeprocesses that are at work whenever I try to understand or explainsomething. However,IthinkitmademedishonestinthatIwasnotabletopresentasufficientlyclearboundarybetweenmyinterpretationofthemythandthemythitself.I think it would have been better to take an approach more similar to atraditionalcommentary;thatis,topresentthereaderwithafulleraccountoftheYorùbásourcesbeforebeginningthecomparativeprocess,asthiswouldallowhimorhertodevelopamorecompleteresponsetotheparticularmythbefore moving on to examine others. But this was not Eliade’s style ormethod. Moreover,hismethodmakes it all tooeasy to readwhateveronewants intoanygivenreligiousphenomenon,andthis isdangerousnotonlyfor the scholar seeking to accurately portray a religious phenomenon, butalso for the scholar who, like Eliade, is looking for new ways ofunderstanding the world. There is not much new about one’s oldpresuppositionswrappedindifferentmythologicalclothing.ThisisperhapsComparativeTheology’sgreatestadvantagewhencomparedto Eliade’smethodof doing a comparative study orhistory of religion. By

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emphasizing and even foregrounding his commitments, the comparativetheologian is paradoxicallymore open to revising them and distinguishingthemfromthoseinherentintheobjectofstudy. WhereEliadestrives forakindoftranscendentscholarlyobjectivity,ComparativeTheologythrivesonthe transformation of a particular scholarly subject. This, I believe, is thefundamental difference that separates these otherwise strikingly similarmethods.Comparative Theology and the comparative study of religion (what EliadecalledtheHistoryofReligions)haveagreatdealincommon.Asmentionedearlier, Eliade’s method of research through transformative reading bearsstriking similarities to Clooney’s description of the analogous process inComparativeTheology in the fourth chapterofDeepLearning; both seek totaketexts,rites,andauthorsfromdifferenttraditionsseriously,ontheirownterms, and discoverwhat they can say to us today; both view this task ashavingbeennecessitatedby theexplosionofdiverse religiousperspectivesinto public and academic spheres (compare the first pages of Eliade’sTheQuest to those of Clooney’sDeep Learning); and both try to achieve thesegoalswhile holding themselves to the highest standards of academic rigor.This simultaneous commitment to deep religious or metaphysical insightsand a critical evaluation of academic facts is perhaps the most importantelement shared by the Eliadean tradition of the Comparative Study ofReligionandthatofComparativeTheology.Infact,Eliade’stwodimensionsof “History” and “Religion,” as defined above, are closely mirrored byClooney’sdimensionsof“Comparative”and“Theology.”120However, as noted above, Comparative Theology differs from theComparativeStudyofReligioninthat,intheformer,theparticularreligiouscommitments of the scholar are the explicit starting point of investigation,whereasthebracketingof thesecommitments isoneof the first thingsonemustdointhelatter.AsClooneywrites,Comparativetheologymustnotbeconfusedwithcomparativereligion,sincefaithisanecessaryandexplicitfactorintheformerandnotinthelatter,whereitsinfluencemight even be ruled out. But the fields need not be separated entirely, sincecomparative theology still has to measure up to expected disciplinary standardsregardingthereligionsbeingcompared.121Transparencyandvulnerabilityarekeytothismethod,tothetransformativeencounter with ideas and texts from a different religious tradition. Theexplicit acknowledgement of one’s convictions not only makes themtransparent to the reader,butalso tooneself; and in coming to termswithone’s convictions as convictions, as “deeply held truths,” the comparative

120Clooney,DeepLearning,10‐11.121Clooney,DeepLearning,12.

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theologiancanbecomemoreawareofthefactthattheseconvictionsarenotuniversally apparent or held, making him or her more open to differentperspectives. Ironically,comparativetheology’semphasisontheparticularand the personal opens it up to a broader universe of traditions andperspectives. The vulnerability engendered by this openness is the key toallowing the study of different religious traditions to transform thecomparative theologian’s own understanding not only of the subjectmaterial,butofhisorherownconvictions.While Eliade seems to have taken a similar approach to his material, thisaspect of “vulnerability” and “transformation” was not explicit in hisacademic works, and seems markedly absent from the works of otherscholarsofComparativeReligion,suchasEliade’sstudentJ.Z.Smith.Eliade’sevocationof thedictum“read theKoranas if ithadbeen revealedonly foryourcase”revealstheimportant,althoughofteninvisible,rolethatthiskindof reading plays in his methodology. Comparative theology takes up thisexistentialconcerninparticularlyproductiveways,andbyexplicitlyfocusingonthismethodofengagingwithreligiousobjectsofstudy,providesaflexibleframework in which both methodology and epistemology underlying theprocess of comparison can be explicitly justified and simultaneouslytransformedbytheworkitself.One of the greatest weaknesses of Eliade’s method lies in the fact that hedoesnotexplicitlydefinehisunderlyingepistemologyandontology,leavinghimopentocritiquesofhisseemingly“magical”methodofintuitingmeaningfrom hierophanies, and accusations of trying to pass of his own beliefs asthose of archaic man. The methodology of Comparative Theology allowsscholarsofmultiple religious traditions, to firstof allnameandclaim theirownpositions,however complicated theymaybe, vis‐à‐vis thematerialonquestion and lift the curtain separating the reader from the scholar’sepistemologyandpersonalperspective.Thissecondtransparencyallowsthescholar to explain, defend, and perhaps even revise the intuitive processesthat are so often an integral part of this kind of work. I believe Eliade’sPlatonic ontology and epistemology is what allowed him to make theintuitive leaps fromparticular hierophanies to universal “modalities of thesacred,”but Ibelievepartof the reasonhenevergotaround towritinganexplicit expositionofhismethodwas that theacademic climateofhis timewas becoming hostile to seemingly “mystical” ideas such as the Platonicrecollectionheespoused.Thisfactiseventruertoday,andalthoughClooneydoesnotexplicitlyoutlinea particular epistemology or metaphysics underlying the process of doingcomparativetheology,hismethodallowsindividualscholarstodoso,andforthe experience of encountering different epistemologies and ontologies tochangeone’sown. Thisdouble transparency, of commitmentsandof theirrelationtoone’smethodology,canbeaneffectiveantidotetotheproblemsof

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“puppeteering,” wherein scholars use their objects of study as a thindisguisesfortheirownviews,andofthereductionofareligioustraditionorphenomenontoascholar’slimitedgraspofit.Clooney’s account strikesme as simply amore honest description ofwhatgoesonwhenIreadandwritepapers. InemployingEliade’smethod, Ihidmy own commitments from the reader, and my relationships with thevarioustextsIread,bothofwhichIbelievewerekeyinallowingmetogaintheinsightsandintuitionswhichconnectedGreek,Akan,andYorubamythstooneanotherandtomorecontemporaryphilosophicalconcerns.If I were to have conducted this methodological exercise according to themethods outlined by Clooney, I could have described howdelving into thesourcematerial from theGreek and Islamic traditions (whichhave shapedme as much, if not more than the Yoruba traditions of my forefathers),particularly certainpassageswhichdidn’tmake it into thearticle, radicallychangedthewayIunderstoodthemythsoforí,andconversely,howstudyingthe myths of orí profoundly changed the way I understood aspects of theGreekandIslamictraditions.Perhapsmosttelling,however,wasthewayinwhichthisprojectcreatedanewcrystallizationofmyunderstandingoffateandfreewill,anissuethathastroubledmesincechildhood.But comparative theology, in its current forms, has a particularly Christiancoloring, and the expositions of its approach seem disproportionatelyinfluencedbyChristianandHindutraditions. The languageofvulnerabilityand emphasis on personal experience strikes me as particularly ChristianandCatholic,however, thisneednotbeaproblem. ToClooney’s credit,hehasleftaccountsofthemethodologyofComparativeTheologyopenenoughtobetakenupandmodifiedbyscholarsfromdifferentreligioustraditions.Itwillbeinterestingtoseeiffieldisflexibleenoughtoaccommodatedifferent(i.e.Islamic,African,andother“indigenous”)traditionsofstudyingmultiplereligionswhichmayresultinmarkedlydifferentapproaches.Themainpointis, in Clooney’swords, “Noone needs to put aside faith and itshopewhenworking as a scholar, although we do need to be able to learn vulnerablywithoutlettingevendeeplyheldtruthsbecomeanobstacletolearning.”122OliverSacksoncecomparedDr.P,hispatientwithvisualagnosia,toasimilarcase, “But the saddestdifference between themwas thatZazetsky asLuriasaid, ‘fought toregainhis lost facultieswiththe indomitable tenacityof thedamned,’whereasDr.P.wasnotfighting,didnotknowwhatwaslost,didnotindeed know that anything was lost. But who was more tragic, or moredamned—themanwho knew it, or themanwho did not?”123 Despite theflawsofEliade’smethod,onesimilarlywonderswhetherhe,inhisquestfor 122Clooney,DeepLearning,13.123Sacks,TheMan,16.

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transcendentreligiousmeaning,orhispost‐moderncritics,intheirrejectionoftheveryidea,aremorelost.Onafinal,personalnote,althoughIfoundEliade’screativehermeneuticstobepowerful tools forcomparativeanalysisof thekindIhopetoconduct inthefuture,Iworrythatitcantooeasilyturnthehierophanies,thewindowsonto the transcendent that it studies, intomirrors, reflecting theprior‐heldbeliefs of the scholar. Thus, if I were to be completely honest, my mainmethodologicalinspirationcomesnotfromthe20thcenturystudyofreligion,norfromthepredominantlyChristiantraditionofComparativeTheology,butrather from the 12th‐13th century Andalusian Muslimmystic Ibn al‐cArabī,whowrote,Ingeneralmostmenhave,perforce,anindividualconceptoftheirLord,whichtheyascribetoHimandinwhichtheyseekHim. So longas theReality ispresentedtothemaccordingtoittheyrecognizeHimandaffirmHim,whereasifpresentedinanyother form, theydenyHim, flee fromHim, and treatHim improperly,while at thesame time imagining that they are acting towardHim fittingly. Onewhobelieves,believes only in a deity he has created in himself, since a deity in “beliefs” is aconstruction. They see only themselves and their own constructions withinthemselves…. So beware lest you restrict yourself to a particular tenet, for youwouldforfeitthetrueknowledgeofwhatis[theReality].Therefore,becompletelyandutterlyreceptivetoalldoctrinalforms,forGod,MostHigh,istooAll‐embracingandGreattobeconfinedwithinonecreedoranother.124Orashesaidmorepoetically,Myheartcantakeonanyform:Ameadowforgazelles,Amonasteryformonks,AtempleforidolsTheKa'baforthecirclingpilgrim,ThetablesoftheTorah,ThescrollsoftheQuran.MyReligionisLove;Whicheverwayitscaravanturns,ThatismyreligionandmyfaithBibliographyAbimbola,Kola.YorùbáCulture:APhilosophicalAccount(YorùbáCultureinContext).Turnhout:IrokoAcademicPublishers,2005.

124IbnAl‐cArabī,TheBezelsofWisdom(trans.R.W.JAustinClassicsofWesternSpiritualitySeries),Newedition(NewYork:PaulistPress,1980),137.

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