Motivating Employees of the Public Sector: Does Public Service Motivation Matter

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

This article was downloaded by: [University of Georgia]On: 10 September 2010Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 917864718]Publisher RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

International Public Management JournalPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t737963440

Motivating Employees of the Public Sector: Does Public Service MotivationMatter?Simon Anderfuhren-Bigeta; Frédéric Varonea; David Giauqueb; Adrian Ritzc

a UNIVERSITY OF GENEVA, b UNIVERSITY OF LAUSANNE, c UNIVERSITY OF BERN,

Online publication date: 08 September 2010

To cite this Article Anderfuhren-Biget, Simon , Varone, Frédéric , Giauque, David and Ritz, Adrian(2010) 'MotivatingEmployees of the Public Sector: Does Public Service Motivation Matter?', International Public Management Journal, 13:3, 213 — 246To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/10967494.2010.503783URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10967494.2010.503783

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf

This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial orsystematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply ordistribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contentswill be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug dosesshould be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss,actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directlyor indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t737963440

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10967494.2010.503783

http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf

MOTIVATING EMPLOYEES OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR:DOES PUBLIC SERVICE MOTIVATION MATTER?

SIMON ANDERFUHREN-BIGET AND FREDERIC VARONE

UNIVERSITY OF GENEVA

DAVID GIAUQUE

UNIVERSITY OF LAUSANNE

ADRIAN RITZ

UNIVERSITY OF BERN

ABSTRACT: This article analyzes if, and to what extent, the public service motivation

(PSM) construct has an added value to explain work motivation in the public sector. In

order to address the specificity of PSM when studying work motivation, the theoretical

model underlying this empirical study compares PSM with two other explanatory

factors: material incentives, such as performance-related pay, and team relations and

support, such as recognition by superiors. This theoretical model is then tested with data

collected in a national survey of 3,754 civil servants at the Swiss municipal level. Results

of a structural equations model clearly show the relevance of PSM. They also provide

evidence for the importance of socio-relational motivating factors, whereas material

incentives play an anecdotal role.

INTRODUCTION

Motivated employees are the cornerstones of all organizations, as work motiv-ation is one crucial determinant of individual and organizational performance. Thisholds true in the private, the public, and the non-profit sectors. Work motivation isthus a great concern for both scholars and managers. Many paradigms and theorieshave sought to answer the longstanding question: ‘‘What motivates employees?’’This article focuses on the work motivation construct, applied to the public sector.

InternationalPublicManagementJournal

International Public Management Journal, 13(3), pages 213–246 Copyright # 2010 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

DOI: 10.1080/10967494.2010.503783 ISSN: 1096-7494 print /1559-3169 online

Downloaded By: [University of Georgia] At: 14:23 10 September 2010

It tries to identify the combination of extrinsic and intrinsic factors explaining whypublic employees show varying levels of work motivation. Its originality relies on theconstruction of an integrative model of three interrelated factors of work motivationin the public sector. This model combines competing but not mutually exclusivemotivational factors: public service motivation (PSM), team relations and support,and material incentives.

Competing hypotheses on the impact of various factors on work motivation are ofcourse rooted in more profound considerations of what drives the actions of humanbeings, resulting in differentiated visions of human rationalities. In a nutshell, humanbeings are either selfish or altruistic. According to this ideal–typical dichotomy, publicemployees are either ‘‘knights’’ or ‘‘knaves’’ (Le Grand 2006). In the literature on pub-lic administration and management, motivation of public employees has consequentlybeen studied from (at least) two opposing approaches. The first one, inspired by publicchoice theories, maintains that public employees behave according to ‘‘a canny max-imization of self-interest’’ (Sen 1995, 2). This conception of public employees’ motiveshas penetrated the public sphere, in Europe at least, in connection with the new publicmanagement (NPM) academic debate and subsequent practical reforms (Giauque2003; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). This vision of work motivation was concretelytranslated into the introduction of human resource management (HRM) tools orig-inally coming from private business management such as performance-related pay(Forest 2008; Perry, Engbers, and Jun 2009). This HRM strategy largely aims atmotivating public employees by the fulfillment of their extrinsic needs.

The second approach we consider here is the PSM construct (Perry and Wise 1990;Perry and Hondeghem 2008a). This construct is part of the broad category of ‘‘needstheories’’ of motivation (Perry and Wise 1990). It brings questions of values andidentity back into work motivation theories (Shamir 1991) and argues that publicemployees are stirred by higher-order drives. It clearly puts the emphasis on the dis-interested, altruistic, and pro-socially oriented work behavior in the public sector,even if a rational dimension (attraction to policymaking) is part of the construct(Perry and Wise 1990). The PSM construct can be seen as a counterweight to therational choice theories then dominating the field (Perry 2000; Perry and Vandena-beele 2008), which stressed that human behaviors may exclusively be explained byindividual psychological mechanisms related to self-interest (Dardot and Laval2009). In a word, the PSM construct was developed to broaden the theory of workmotivation in public organizations, and it postulates that public employees are spe-cial in that they behave differently from their private sector counterparts and are notdriven by extrinsic motives alone (Barrows and Wesson 2000; Blais, Blake, and Dion1990; Boyne 2002; Rainey 1983; Rainey 1982; Rainey and Bozeman 2000; Bright2009). Many empirical studies have so far measured the level of PSM in various pub-lic organizations (Perry and Hondeghem 2008c) and have then tested the antecedentsof PSM (e.g., socio-demographic factors), its outcomes (e.g., individual perform-ance), or its correlates (e.g., organizational commitment). For an overview, seePandey and Stazyk (2008). If the relationship between PSM and job satisfactionhas been studied in depth (Naff and Crum 1999; Park and Rainey 2007; Park andRainey 2008; Taylor 2007; Taylor 2008; Bright 2008; Steijn 2008), the impact of

214 International Public Management Journal Vol. 13, No. 3, 2010


PSM on work motivation remains clearly understudied. This article proposes to fillthis gap by analyzing the explanatory power of PSM for work motivation in the pub-lic sector. Furthermore, in order to address the relevance and specificity of the PSMconstruct when studying work motivation in the public sector, the theoretical modeland the empirical study need to compare and put into relation PSM with otherexplanatory factors of work motivation also drawn from ‘‘need theories’’ (i.e.,material incentives and team relations and support). So our research question is asfollows: ‘‘What is the added value of PSM compared with competing factors inexplaining work motivation in the public sector?’’

To answer this question, first, we have developed an integrative model that com-bines PSM, material incentives and team relations and support from the organizationas interrelated independent variables, with work motivation as the dependent variable.Then, we have tested this model, using a structural equation modeling (SEM)approach, with data collected in a national survey of 3,754 civil servants at the Swissmunicipal level. The main results of our empirical study show that PSM has a realadded value in explaining work motivation in the public sector. Team relations andsupport also appear to be an important motivator for public employees, while materialincentives are a poor predictor of work motivation. The negative correlation betweenPSM and our scale measuring extrinsic motivators shows that public employees moti-vated to serve the public interest are inclined to disregard monetary rewards. Thesepreliminary results suggest the relevance of the PSM construct for motivation theorieswithin the public sector and open promising new avenues of research.

THEORETICAL MODEL AND HYPOTHESES

Work Motivation

Work motivation is a longstanding topic in organizational studies (Levy-Leboyer2006). It is the primary determinant of performance for both private and public sec-tors. In organizational studies, several concepts are often confused (Maugeri 2004).On the one hand, satisfaction (in this case work=job satisfaction) is a psychologicalstate characterizing the interaction between an individual and his or her organiza-tion, between his or her expectations and the perception of the obtained results(Locke 1976; Michel 1994). On the other hand, different concepts focus on theattachment to the organization. Organizational commitment (e.g., Mowday, Porter,and Steers 1982; Meyer and Allen 1991) is a psychological state characterizing thelink between an individual and his or her organization, and it is closely related tothe decision to stay within the organization or leave it (Vandenberghe 2005).Organizational identification (e.g., Foote 1951; Hall, Schneider, and Nygren 1970;Ashforth and Mael 1989; Van Dick 2004) characterizes ‘‘the process by which thegoals of the organization and those of the individual become increasingly integratedor congruent’’ (Hall, Schneider, and Nygren 1970, 176), whereas work involvementaims at a comprehensive understanding of the way an individual projects him=herselfinto work and identifies with the job. This concept is related to the nature of the indi-vidual’s investment in his=her professional role (Michel 1994) besides other potential

DOES PUBLIC SERVICE MOTIVATION MATTER? 215


roles. Work motivation, however, is a process by which the employee decides to workhard and sustain his=her efforts. Because patterns can be identified in the actions ofemployees at work, this concept is of particular interest.

Many theories and definitions of this construct compete to explain what motivatespeople (Kanfer 1990). Apart from the diversity of conceptualizations and measure-ments, most authors nowadays agree with the basic premise that ‘‘the concept ofmotivation represents a hypothetical construct used to describe the internal and=or external forces producing the induction, the direction, the intensity and the per-sistence of behavior’’ (Vallerand and Thill 1993, 13). According to this definition,motivation is a meta-concept that comprehensively focuses on the effort and energydeployed by an individual when acting in a given setting. This construct relates to theindividual’s project(s), the general meaning that he=she attributes to his=her actionsand behaviors (Michel 1994). For a work organization, this energy should bedeployed toward organizational goals and objectives. ‘‘Orientation of the motivationconcerns the underlying attitudes and goals that give rise to action—that is, itconcerns the why of action’’ (Ryan and Deci 2000, 54).

Needs, motives, and values theories (Maslow 1954; Herzberg 1971; Herzberg,Mausner, and Snyderman 1959; Alderfer 1969; Deci and Ryan 1985) focus on theindividual (internal) or situational (external) determinants of behavior. They sharethe fact that motivation arises when individuals seek optimal satisfaction of certainneeds (Roussel 2000). ‘‘Need theories’’ were developed in the wake of Maslow’shierarchy of human needs (Maslow 1954). More associated with work motivationquestions, Herzberg’s two-factor theory (hygiene and motivation) posits that thesetwo categories function differently. The motivation factors increase satisfaction,while hygienic factors only serve to reduce dissatisfaction (Herzberg 1971). Later,self-determination theory introduced the intrinsic–extrinsic dichotomy into motiv-ation theories (Deci and Ryan 1985; Ryan and Deci 2000). Against the backgroundof these work motivation theories, several needs or motives can be identified in theliterature. Here we focus on three main categories of motivators: PSM, team rela-tions, and support and material incentives. The expected impact of each categoryof variables on work motivation is presented in the following paragraphs, beforebeing integrated in a global model.

Public Service Motivation

In public management, empirical research about PSM has increased over the lasttwenty years (Perry and Hondeghem 2008b). In fact, it is one of the fundamental con-cepts of HRM in the public sector (Coursey and Pandey 2007a). PSM was initiallydefined as the ‘‘individual’s predisposition to respond to motives grounded primarilyor uniquely in public institutions or organizations’’ (Perry and Wise 1990, 368).Emphasizing altruistic values as major components of PSM, Vandenabeele definesPSM as ‘‘the beliefs, values and attitudes that go beyond self-interest and organiza-tional interest, that concern the interest of a larger political entity and that motivateindividuals to act accordingly whenever appropriate’’ (Vandenabeele 2007, 547).Because of this altruistic component PSM should be understood as a particular kind



of motivation (Perry and Hondeghem 2008b). Furthermore, it involves underlyingnormative concerns, such as political ideologies (Lewis 2010; Gailmard 2010). Inaddition, PSM is not a public sector-specific measure of work motivation, but is rathera particular type of motivation, particularly prevalent in the public sector but also rel-evant for studying volunteers’ motivations (Clerkin, Paynter, and Taylor 2009; Perryet al. 2008; Steen 2006). Its empirical operationalization is varied and subject tocontroversy (Wright 2008). Initially it was developed for the North American contextand was composed of four dimensions, namely ‘‘attraction to politics and policy-making,’’ ‘‘commitment to the public interest,’’ ‘‘compassion,’’ and ‘‘self-sacrifice.’’

As for a ‘‘needs theory’’ framework, PSM consists of fulfillment of higher-orderneeds. One can thus argue that the will to act in congruence or consistency (Festinger1957; Bandura 1986) with public values is a specific need or motive of public employ-ees. In doing so, individuals with a high level of PSM are likely to seek jobs in the pub-lic sphere (Perry and Wise 1990; Vandenabeele 2008b; Steijn 2008). They will also bemore satisfied with their jobs (Naff and Crum 1999; Bright 2008; Taylor 2007; Taylor2008). From a PSM perspective, the motivation of public employees is orientedtoward the realization of the values and goals of public service because they are partof the identity of certain public employees and therefore determine and justify theirbehavior (Perry and Vandenabeele 2008). In the literature, PSM seems to be substi-tuted for usual (non-domain characterized) work motivation measures, even if itsconceptual characteristics are closer to an identification or a value-fit construct.

That said, PSM, as an independent variable, is of particular interest because of itshypothesized desirable outcomes. It has consistently been reported that PSM is afactor of job satisfaction, as stated before, organizational citizenship behaviors(Kim 2006; Pandey, Wright, and Moynihan 2008), organizational commitment(e.g., Taylor 2007; Taylor 2008; Crewson 1997), as well as whistle-blowing (Brewerand Selden 1998). On the other hand, some authors relate PSM to organizational(Kim 2005; Ritz 2009) and individual (Leisink and Steijn 2009; Alonso and Lewis2001) performance, even though the empirical evidence for a positive relationship isvery small (Brewer 2008). Conversely, the PSM-performance relationship seems tobe mediated by job satisfaction and organizational commitment (Vandenabeele 2009).

Surprisingly, few studies have directly tested the hypothesis that PSM has an effecton work motivation. In a study looking at the motivational patterns underlying thechoices made by civil servants and students in Belgium, Vandenabeele and his collea-gues tested non-sector specific motivation theories. Their results show that PSM isan important and particular element of the motivational characteristics of publicemployees (Vandenabeele et al. 2004). The exploratory research conducted by Ceraseand Farinella (2006) on the motivation of Italian officials shows that three out offour dimensions of PSM1 are positively correlated to work motivation, when‘‘attraction to politics and policymaking’’ is positively correlated to a measure ofpoor motivation. Those results are, however, preliminary and need further analysis.Taylor’s study (2007) is also a dimensional analysis of PSM in relation to workoutcomes. According to the results of this study, the more compassionate public civilservants are, the less motivated to work they are. On the other hand, the more theyare committed to the public interest, the higher is their level of work motivation.



On the basis of these divergent empirical results, it is reasonable to take all fourdimensions of the PSM construct into account.We thus formulate the following hypoth-esis: PSM has a positive impact on work motivation in the public sector (Hypothesis 1).

Of course, PSM is just one specific factor explaining work motivation, and severalother motivational factors also have an effect on work behaviors (Vandenabeele andBan 2009). Both material incentives and team relations may play an important rolein the motivational process of civil servants. Comparative studies of the motivationalpatterns of public and private sector employees (Solomon 1986; Jurkiewicz, Massey,and Brown 1998) clearly suggest the appropriateness of an approach integratingadditional explanatory variables to which we turn now.

Material Incentives

Since the seminal work of Deci and Ryan (1985), the distinction between intrinsicdrives and extrinsic factors has become a classic among motivation theories. Whilethe former refer to the inherent satisfaction linked with undertaking an activity, thelatter concern the outcomes of the activity (Ryan and Deci 2000). Comparative stu-dies have consistently demonstrated that public employees have different motivesfrom private ones. In particular, they are more inclined to disregard extrinsic elementssuch as pay and other material rewards and to value intrinsic job characteristics.These empirical results are validated both in North America (Jurkiewicz, Massey,and Brown 1998; Lyons, Duxbury, and Higgins 2006; Rainey 1982; Crewson 1997)and Europe (Buelens and Van den Broeck 2007). Nevertheless, two-thirds of thecountries that belong to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Develop-ment, at different degrees, use or intend to implement performance-related payscheme (OECD 2005). Switzerland is one of the leading countries on the topic andhas implemented such a reward system at its three levels of governance (federal,cantonal, and municipal; Steiner 2000; Emery 2004).

At least for the public sector, the preference for intrinsic motivators might explainthe (partial) failure of performance-related pay reward schemes to enhance themotivational level of public servants and the performance of public organizations(Weibel, Rost, and Osterloh 2010; OECD 2005; Perry, Engbers, and Jun 2009).For instance, the studies of English civil servants by Marsden and colleagues(Marsden and Richardson 1992; 1994; Marsden, French, and Kubo 2001) show thatpublic employees, at least in the U.K., are skeptical about the usefulness of perform-ance-related pay: they doubt both its incentive and its rewarding effects. Thoseresults are largely confirmed in other countries (Pilichowski 2009). Relying on theseprevious findings, we formulate a second research hypothesis: Material incentiveshave a negative impact on work motivation in the public sector (Hypothesis 2).

Team Relations and Support

Intrinsic motivation may be attained when need-based components, opportunities,or incentives that fulfill the higher-level needs of individuals are satisfied (Bright



2009). And PSM has the capacity to fulfill higher order needs (Perry and Wise 1990).But PSM is not the only intrinsic motivator in the public sector, and several strandsof theories of motivation state that relatedness or group affiliation is one of the basicneeds of individuals (Maslow 1954; Fairbairn and Jones 1954; Epstein 1994;Baumeister and Leary 1995).

To complement PSM and material incentives as motivators, this study addressesthe need for public employees to have good relationships and to be supported orrecognized at work. Results from comparative studies give an idea about how thequality of team relations and support by the superior or the organization is impor-tant for public employees. For instance, they value more than their private counter-parts the possibility of having good interpersonal relationships with colleagues andco-workers (Posner and Schmidt 1996; Khojasteh 1993; Buelens and Van den Broeck2007). Vandenabeele et al. (2004) show that insertion in a team or affiliation withcolleagues is important for the motivation of public employees. Furthermore, therecognition from superiors might also have a strong motivational potential in thepublic sector (Khojasteh 1993; Rainey 1982; Vandenabeele et al. 2004). Therefore,it makes sense to put the emphasis on socio-relational components of the workingteam. In this respect, we take it as a given that good relationships and recognitionare two complementary elements of the need for relatedness. On the one hand, tobe part of a team is valued by employees because it creates physical and emotionalsecurity, facilitates the construction of a common social reality, is useful, andprovides means of social regulation (Stroebe and Stroebe 1996). On the other hand,the need to be recognized by colleagues and superiors highlights subjective andaffective elements of work motivation.

The French tradition of research on the sociology of work reminds us thatsocialization and good interpersonal relationships at work are important in termsof identity construction (Dubar 2005; Garner, Meda, and Senik 2006; Sainsaulieu1988; Dubar 1992) and are also a strong factor for well-being in the work setting.Recognition is founded in a humanist perspective on work relations and has beendefined as follows: recognition is a reaction expressed in the short term after aspecific or general action or behavior that the individual perceives to merit a positiveand personal response (Bourcier and Palobart 1997). Such positive feedback is adeterminative element of motivation and performance for the members of theworking team (Stajkovic 2003; Lamontagne 2006; Herzberg, Mausner, andBloch-Snyderman 1959). In a survey of employees of credit institutions, Whitener(2001) found a significant relationship between the degree of organizational commit-ment and employees’ perception of organizational support. Many scholars arguethat it is important, or even vital, to have positive experiences at work to enhancethe development of organizational commitment and work motivation. This feelingis the core of the concept of perceived organizational support, which measuresemployees’ ‘‘global beliefs concerning the extent to which the organization valuestheir contributions and cares about their well-being.’’ (Eisenberger et al. 1986,501) Employees are grateful for the support they receive, feel indebted to their enter-prise, and respond to the favorable treatment they receive by showing a strongercommitment to their employer (Eisenberger, Fasolo, and Davis-LaMastro 1990).



This psychological mechanism contributes to the consolidation of social exchangeand is linked to commitment in several studies (Hutchison 1997; Eisenberger, Fasolo,and Davis-LaMastro 1990; Eisenberger et al. 2001; Guzzo, Noonan, and Elron 1994;Shore and Tetrick 1991; Shore and Wayne 1993).

Finally, HRM practices emphasizing team support, and recognition as areward, build an organizational culture that stimulates creativity and innovation(Andriopoulos 2001; Jimenez-Jimenez and Sanz-Valle 2005; Martins and Terblanche2003). They lead to better production and financial results (Delaney and Huselid1996; Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi 1997) and induce employees to adoptdiscretionary behavior in line with the interests of the organization (MacDuffie1995).These empirical results generally confirm that socio-relational elements, suchas inclusion in a team and good relationships within this working team, are crucialfactors impacting work motivation. Hence recognition from superiors or colleaguesrepresents a non-pecuniary reward for employees, fulfilling their need for affiliationand relatedness. So our third research hypothesis reads as follows: Good teamrelations and support have a positive impact on work motivation in the public sector(Hypothesis 3).

Theoretical Model

Within a broad need theory of work motivation, this literature review leads us todevelop the hypothesized model of the present study. However, one additional pointshould be mentioned here. On the one hand, this study is precisely designed to assessthe respective contribution of PSM, team relations and support, and material incen-tives, on the explication of work motivation. On the other hand, because motivationarises when a combination of interrelated factors are met (Levy-Leboyer 2006), weshould postulate relations between them.

First, according to the PSM theory, individuals decide to enter the public servicefor reasons other than material or financial ones. For them, salary is not their pri-ority, and the maximization of this kind of reward does not correspond to theirideals. For instance, individuals imbued with self-sacrifice values do not expect muchof the material incentives. Conversely, empirical studies indicate that an increase inextrinsic motivators may even reduce the positive impacts of intrinsic factors (i.e.,PSM) on work motivation. Such a ‘‘crowding-out effect’’ (Frey and Jegen 2001)was empirically attested for volunteers (Frey and Goette 1999) and blood donors(Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997) as well as for PSM-oriented civil servants (Georgel-lis, Iossa, and Tabvuma 2008; Weibel, Rost, and Osterloh 2010). Thus, we expect anegative correlation among PSM and material incentives. An empirical result of thiskind would suggest the potentiality of such an undesirable effect. Second, primarysocialization is one of the most important antecedents of PSM (Perry 1997). There-fore, individuals having a high level of PSM enter the public sector with a similar setof values. Those common ‘‘belief systems’’ facilitate their identification with othermembers of the team (Van Dick et al. 2004). Conversely, it has been demonstratedthat the level of PSM is influenced by the organizational environment of publicemployees (Moynihan and Pandey 2007; Perry 2000; Taylor 2007; cited by Taylor



2008) and that the quality of the relationship with colleagues and superiors is one ofthe most critical factors of this environment (Perry and Porter 1982). Finally, thedisinterested motivation of public service motivated employees is both targeted tothe whole society and to their organization and colleagues (Kim 2006; Pandey,Wright, and Moynihan 2008). Thus, it is likely that such a motive will exert apositive influence on how they value working in a pleasant and supporting team.In a nutshell, we expect a positive relationship among PSM and team relationsand support. Third and last, individual and collective performances rewarded bymaterial incentives depend generally on good team work. Likely, performanceappraisals often assess the individual’s capacity to be a team player. Additionally,recognition and appreciation of superiors are preconditions to receive materialrewards such as pay bonuses or career advancement. For all those reasons,we also expect a positive relation between material incentives and team relationsand support.

Therefore, the resulting model integrates simultaneously the relationships amongthe independent variables and their effects on the dependent one (see Figure 1). Inthis respect, SEM is particularly appropriate for such research design.

DATA AND METHODS

Data Collection and Sample Characteristics

The primary data for this study were collected in a national survey of civil servantsat the Swiss municipal level. Apart from the municipalities in the Italian-speakingpart of Switzerland, virtually all the 2,636 Swiss municipalities were contacted bymail and invited to take part in a national survey on the motivations of Swiss public

Figure 1. Theoretical Model.



servants. In order to raise participation, the municipal authorities were promised abenchmark report containing the survey’s key results. In the end, 279 municipalitiesparticipated in the survey, which was either paper-based or administered online. Themunicipalities themselves were responsible for its distribution amongst their employ-ees and also provided us with some basic statistics (number of employees, percentageof males and females, supervisory and non-supervisory employees, etc.) to assess theresponse rate and the representativeness of the sample accurately. At the end of thisprocess, the survey was given to 9,852 civil servants, from whom 3,754 question-naires were returned, yielding a response rate of 38.1%. Table 1 displays the demo-graphic description of the sample.

The sample includes municipal civil servants of various hierarchical levels,mostly (51.4%) frontline employees. They perform a variety of job tasks (7.4%participate in the formulation or planning of public policies, 50.9% are in chargeof the implementation of public policies, and 41.7% supply internal services).Seventy-nine percent were German-speaking and 21% French. This correspondsroughly to the language distribution of the resident population of Switzerland(Ludi and Werlen 2005).

TABLE 1

Demographic Description of the Sample (N¼ 3,754)

Variable Percentage Variable Percentage

Gender Linguistic regionMale 54.40 Swiss-German 79.00Female 45.60 Swiss-French 21.00

Educational level Hierarchical positionSecondary school 4.20 Apprentice, trainee 4.20Professional apprenticeship 44.70 Auxiliary 0.80High school diploma 7.70 Employee 51.40Upper professional apprenticeship 22.30 Manager 27.20University degree 17.60 Senior manager 15.30Other 3.50 Other 1.10

Age� Time with organization�

15–19 4.70 <1 12.2020–29 12.90 2–5 27.9030–39 21.30 6–10 23.6040–49 29.70 11–15 9.9050–59 25.70 16–20 11.8060–69 5.80 21–25 6.30Mean (Years) 42.26 26–30 4.20

31–35 2.60>36 1.00Mean (Years) 10.34

�Classified in years.



Measures of the Variables

All measures consisted of items with response options on a 5-point Likert-typescale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree; see Appendix A for listof items and details). This type of measurement is, by nature, ordinal, even if research-ers assume for practical reasons that they are continuous (Blaikie 2003, 24). However,we know that ‘‘continuous methods can be used with little worry when a variable hasfour or more categories, as long as normally distributed categorical variables aregiven’’ (Bentler and Chou 1987, 88). In this study, we meet both prerequisites: ourLikert-type measures have five categories, and multivariate normality should notcause trouble as the usual coefficients of distribution (skewness and kurtosis) donot reach established cut-off criteria (Kline 2005), as shown in Appendix A.2

The constructs of PSM and work motivation were measured with previously testeditems. On the other hand, team relations and support (TRSS) and material incentives(MIS) relied on items we developed ourselves in the wake of attested scales. How-ever, for questionnaire-size concerns we could not insert all the questions. Therefore,we have chosen and adapted items from previous work3 to reflect how our inde-pendent constructs (TRSS and MIS) are valued, from a motivational perspective,by the respondents. Given this fact, we were very cautious when testing our measure-ment instruments. In this respect, we relied on model generating confirmatory factoranalysis (CFA) procedure (Byrne 2001). Prior to analysis of the full structural model,a two-step procedure was carried out for the construction of the measures of theindependent variables. First, the reliability of the independent scales was tested sep-arately following a model generating CFA approach and modified according to fitindices and size of factor loadings. This process led to the construction of three scalesto measure how public service motivation (PSM), material incentives (MIS), andteam relations and support (TRSS) motivate civil servants. Second, a simultaneousfactor analysis of all the independent variables was done to verify cross-loading itemsand to assess the discriminant validity of the scales. Such an approach, in oppositionto the creation of summative scales assessed with Cronbach’s alpha, has severaladvantages. It does not postulate ‘‘a priori’’ equal weighting of items and takes intoaccount all their variations (or characteristics; variances and error terms) when putin relation with their construct. On the other hand, coefficient of reliability is oftenmisleading (Sijtsma 2009) and is highly influenced by the number of items (Cortina1993). Nonetheless, for comparative purposes, Cronbach’s coefficient of reliability isprovided as an indication (see Appendix A).

Work Motivation

Many different operationalizations of work motivation compete in the literature.But the core of the concept consists of a sense of commitment to the job and a will-ingness to put effort into work (Maugeri 2004). Two items measuring the genericconcept of work motivation were adapted from Wright’s study because of a previoustest in a civil-servant work setting (Wright 2004). The first was I am always totallycommitted to my work no matter how many difficulties there are; this captures the



commitment facet. The second item was I’m always ready to start early in the morningand finish late at night to get the job done; this captures employee eagerness. Becausefit indices and factor loadings cannot be estimated correctly in CFA with fewer thanfour items, the reliability of the scale was inferred from the Cronbach’s alphacoefficient of reliability displayed in Appendix A (.55). Cronbach’s alphas underthe 0.60 threshold are often considered to be poor (Kline 2000). But, as the workmotivation scale has only two items, we consider this level as not problematic. More-over, these two items are not only quite strongly correlated (.42), but they are clearlymore associated compared with all other variables in the study (see Table 2). Finally,when inserted in the final SEM model, both items have a factor loading superior tothe 0.40 accepted threshold (Motiv 1¼ .57 and Motiv 2¼ .74), which suggests theyare part of the scale of Work Motivation.

Public Service Motivation

The various conceptualizations of PSM have resulted in different operationaldefinitions. In this study, Perry’s multidimensional measure is taken as the baseline(Perry 1996). We reduced the set of items to a 14-item scale including items for all fourPSM dimensions. The items were chosen based on previous research in the psycho-metric testing of a PSM scale (Coursey and Pandey 2007b; Coursey et al. 2008; Kim2009; Vandenabeele 2007, 2008a). We intended to keep the PSM scale in this studyas close as possible to Perry’s instrument (1996). Some adjustments were howevernecessary. For instance, the wording of some items was slightly adapted to fit thenational context of this study, while preserving themeaning of the items. All items weretranslated into German and French. The question whether PSM is second-order for-mative or reflective4 still remains open (Wright and Christensen 2009). Though a casecan be made for understanding PSM as a second-order formative construct, we stuckto a reflectivemeasurement, as suggested byCoursey et al. (2008). Ourmeasure of PSMresulted in a four-dimensional figure with two items per dimension. This scale is verygood in terms of its psychometric characteristics (v2¼ 101.492, df¼ 16, p-value¼ .000,TLI¼ .98, CFI¼ .99, NFI¼ .99, p-value of close fit¼ .99, RMSEA¼ 0.04). For thefirst order, all standardized factor loadings were above usual threshold (0.58–0.93)and were acceptable for the second order (0.35–0.84). Even though ‘‘attraction topolicymaking’’ had a factor loading below the general threshold of 0.40, we decidedto keep it in the final model to adhere to the most widely used four-factor operationa-lization of PSM. Finally, the inter-item correlations (see Table 2) provide furtherinsights on the discriminant validity of the PSM dimensions, as all pairs of retaineditems are not only highly and significantly correlated, but their association is alwaysthe greatest, compared with other items related to other constructs.

Material Incentives

From a behavioral point of view, material incentives such as pay, performance-related pay, or career advancement are extrinsic factors of motivation (Ryan and



TABLE

2

Intercorrelations

Pearsons

Correlations

(Shared

Variance)

12

34

56

78

910

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

1.Motiv2

1

2.Motiv1

.423��

(.1789)

1

3.Superior

recognition

.161��

(.0259)

.053��

(.0028)

1

4.Colleagues

Recognition

.143��

(.0204)

.095��

(.0090)

.489��

(.2391)

1

5.Relationships

w=colleagues

.131��

(.0171)

.069��

(.0047)

.373��

(.1391)

.403��

(.1624)

1

6.Highwage

.014

(.0001)

.014

(.0001)

.248��

(.0615)

.213��

(.0453)

.226��

(.0510)

1

7.Payper

perform

ance

.051��

(.0026)

.086��

(.0073)

.240��

(.0576)

.178��

(.0316)

.204��

(.0416)

.518��

(.2683)

1

8.Career

.028

(.0007)

.044��

(.0019)

.261��

(.0681)

.201��

(.0404)

.258��

(.0665)

.483��

(.2332)

.594��

(.3528)

1

9.Bonus

exceptional

perf

.048��

(.0023)

.052��

(.0027)

.174��

(.0302)

.125��

(.0156)

.136��

(.0184)

.259��

(.0670)

.437��

(.1909)

.340��

(.1156)

1

10.Pol1

.070��

(.0049)

.030

(.0009)

.047��

(.0022)

.038�

(.0014)

.012

(.0001)

.027

(.0007)

�.076��

(.0057)

�.001

(.0000)

�.010

(.0001)

1

11.Pol2

.083��

(.0068)

.060��

(.0036)

.047��

(.0022)

.042�

(.0017)

.018

(.0003)

.016

(.0002)

�.057��

(.0032)

.025

(.0006)

�.004

(.0000)

.844��

(.7123)

1

(Continued

)

225


TABLE

2

Continued

Pearsons

Correlations

(Shared

Variance)

12

34

56

78

910

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

12.Civ

Int2

.177��

(.0313)

.175��

(.0306)

.056��

(.0031)

.086��

(.0073)

.038�

(.0014)

�.025

(.0006)

�.047��

(.0022)

�.018

(.0003)

�.031

(.0009)

.231��

(.0533)

.232��

(.0538)

1

13.Civ

Int1

.236��

(.0556)

.149��

(.0222)

.063��

(.0039)

.095��

(.0090)

.039�

(.0015)

�.028

(.0007)

�.083��

(.0068)

�.049��

(.0024)

�.046��

(.0021)

.204��

(.0416)

.179��

(.0320)

.446��

(.1989)

1

14.Comp2

.102��

(.0104)

.020

(.0004)

.067��

(.0044)

.072��

(.0051)

.082��

(.0067)

�.010

(.0001)

�.061��

(.0037)

�.021

(.0004)

�.041�

(.0068)

.109��

(.0118)

.104��

(.0108)

.184��

(.0338)

.150��

(.0225)

1

15.Comp1

.122��

(.0148)

.088��

(.0077)

.088��

(.0077)

.109��

(.0118)

.107��

(.0114)

.028

(.0007)

.001

(.0000)

.035�

(.0012)

.010

(.0001)

.125��

(.0156)

.142��

(.0201)

.205��

(.0420)

.171��

(.0292)

.376��

(.1413)

1

16.Self-Sacr.2

.132��

(.0174)

.162��

(.0262)

.030

(.0009)

.056��

(.0031)

.057��

(.0032)

�.080��

(.0064)

�.044��

(.0019)

�.021

(.0004)

�.038�

(.0014)

.070��

(.0049)

.073��

(.0053)

.323��

(.1043)

.221��

(.0488)

.204��

(.0416)

.202��

(.0408)

1

17.Self-Sacr.1

.095��

(.0090)

.137��

(.0187)

.044��

(.0019)

.065��

(.0042)

.065��

(.0042)

�.010

(.0001)

.002

(.0000)

.024

(.0004)

.011

(.0001)

.139��

(.0193)

.127��

(.0161)

.266��

(.0707)

.213��

(.0453)

.155��

(.0240)

.189��

(.0357)

.405��

(.1640)

1

Note.In

grey,correlationsamongitem

smeasuringthesameconstruct.Meancorrelations¼0.1227.Meansharedvariance

¼0.0369.

��Sig.0.01(bilateral);� Sig.0.05(bilateral).

226


Deci 2000). Four items were used for the Material Incentive Scale (MIS). It is impor-tant for me to have a high wage is rather similar to the one used by Jurkiewitcz,Massey and Brown (1998). Two items focus on the desire for pay per performance:It is important for me to have a high pay per performance, and It is crucial for me thatthere are bonuses to reward exceptional work. The fourth item of this scale capturesthe importance, for public employees, to have good career perspective. This scale hadacceptable reliability (v2¼ 46.026, df¼ 2, p-value¼ .000, TLI¼ .94, CFI¼ .99,NFI¼ .99, p-value of close fit¼ .009, RMSEA¼ 0.08). The standardized factorloadings ranged from 0.49 to 0.83. Moreover, the four items are well interrelated,and this compared with items related to other constructs (see Table 2).

Team Relations and Support

The quality of team relations and support from supervisors are underestimatedintrinsic factors. This scale contains three items that measure the importance ofreceiving positive feedbacks from superiors and colleagues as well as the valuationof good working relations with colleagues. As the number of items is not sufficientto proceed to a CFA, Cronbach alpha was computed as an indication of reliability(.69). In the final model, their factor loadings range from .57 for relationship withcolleagues to .70 for supervisor recognition, providing further evidence of theirassociation with the Team Relations and Support Scale (TRSS). Here again, the dis-criminant validity of the construct is supported by the level of inter-items correla-tions. The three items are strongly related also in terms of their relations with allthe other items (see Table 2).

Results of the Simultaneous Factor Analysis

The intermediary model (correlation of independent variables) fitted the data well(v2¼ 410.694, df¼ 83, p-value¼ .000, TLI¼ .97, CFI¼ .98, NFI¼ .97, p-value ofclose fit¼ 1.000, RMSEA¼ 0.03). All factor loadings are above the usual threshold,signifying that all items are well related to their respective latent construct. Therelatively low levels of correlations among the constructs provide further evidencesof their discriminant validity.

Common Method Bias Prevention and Diagnostic

Research on organizational behavior using self-reported surveys is oftenconfronted by common method bias (Podsakoff and Organ 1986). This issue is seeneither as a critical methodological point threatening the validity of conclusions aboutobserved relationships among variables (Podsakoff et al. 2003) or as an overstatedissue for survey-based research (Spector 2006, cited by Pandey, Wright, andMoynihan 2008). Questionnaire design and data collection strategies, and post-hocanalyses of the data, are two ways either to attenuate potential measurement biasesor to verify whether or not they are present and potentially influential (Podsakoffand Organ 1986). Anonymity in questionnaire administration, in data collection



and analyses, as well as clarification of the purpose of the study are important forattenuating common method biases (Podsakoff et al. 2003, 888, cited by Pandey,Wright, and Moynihan 2008). For that reason, our data collection was strictlyanonymous. We also accompanied our invitation to fill the questionnaire with acover letter explaining the goals of the study and the general ethic of scientificresearch. Respondents were explicitly asked to answer freely the questions andreminded that no data will be transmitted to their employers. In addition, most itemsused in this study were taken from previous research, and all self-developed itemswere carefully designed.

One of the major problems with self-reported survey data concerns the indepen-dence of the constructs as they may correlate with each other (Podsakoff et al.2003). Therefore, two complementary empirical analyses of common method biaswere carried. First, at the suggestion of Podsakoff et al. (2003), Harman’s single fac-tor test (with unrotated principal components) was performed with all the items ofthe study. It revealed the presence of six distinct factors among the seventeen itemsof the study.5 Second, we made use of an analysis of the correlations and shared var-iances among the items. Table 2 shows that the average correlation among all theitems is low (.12) as well as the average shared variance (.04). Furthermore, the itemsused to create each scale are highly correlated, and always more than with any otheritems of the study. According to these statistical results, we consider that commonmethod bias, if it exists in the current study, is not very important and should notinterfere with interpreting the results.

Statistical Methods

This study relied on the SEM approach, which is particularly relevant when asses-sing a causal model with complex constructs (Hayduk 1987). SEM combines the twofamiliar multivariate techniques of factor analysis and multiple regression analysis.The main difference between SEM and traditional multivariate techniques is the sim-ultaneous estimation of a series of separate, but interdependent, multiple regressionequations. SEM is recommended to represent theoretical concepts better by usingmultiple measures to reduce measurement error. Furthermore, it improves themeasurement of relationships between constructs by taking into account the measure-ment error in the constructs (Hair et al. 2009). In comparison to conventionalregression analysis, SEM has several advantages. First, as the items are not computedas summative scales, all their respective variances are taken into account when testingthe model of regression. Second, it is particularly relevant for complex scales such asPSM, which is a second order construct. Finally, the purpose of the present study isto assess if an integrative model containing PSM, compared and in relation tocompetitive sources of motivation, can provide a comprehensive understanding ofwork motivation in the public sector. In this respect, SEM estimation is particularlyappropriate for this aim. It provides simultaneously the impacts (regression weights)of the independent variables on the dependent one and their relations (correlations),as well as a number of fit index providing information on whether or not thetheorized model is in adequacy with the configuration of the empirical data.



The empirical analysis applied reflective CFA for construction of the independentscales and SEM with Amos 17.0 full information maximum likelihood (FIML;Arbuckle 2008a) estimation to test the causal or structural model. Even though itwould be more appropriate to apply diagonally weighted least squares estimationor weighted least squares mean and variance adjusted estimation, because the usualmaximum likelihood estimator using covariance or correlation matrix does not fullytake into account the ordinal nature of the used measures, and, as a consequence,factor correlations and factor loadings may be underestimated and v2 values inflated(Byrne 2001; West, Finch, and Curran 1995; Finch, West, and MacKinnon 1997), wechoose FIML because it is suitable to estimate models using ordinal measures (Jor-eskog and Moustaki 2006). In addition, FIML is a good method to handle missingdata. It avoids a reduction of the sample caused by the covariance matrix creationand the exclusion of cases, either with likewise or pairwise deletion (Wothke andArbuckle 1996), and is superior to data imputation methods (Olinsky, Chen, andHarlow 2003). Hence, FIML provides estimators that have less bias and are lesssensitive to sample variability (Enders 2001). That is why ‘‘FIML appears to bethe best method for handling missing data for most SEM applications’’ (Allison2003, quoting Duncan, Duncan, and Li 1998).

Model fit is assessed by inferential v2 and several descriptive goodness-of-fit indi-ces. Since the v2-statistic is known to be inflated for samples with N> 200 (Kelloway1998), v2 is referred to here as descriptive information rather than a strong inferentialtest upon which a model is accepted or rejected. In addition to v2, root mean squareerror of approximation (RMSEA), comparative fit index (CFI), normed fit index(NFI), and the Tucker-Lewis fit index (TLI) were consulted as fit indices in line withtheir respective usual thresholds: TLI> .95, CFI> .95, NFI> .95, RMSEA< .06,according to Hu and Bentler (1999).

RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics

Table 2 provides bivariate, and Appendix A the univariate, statistics of the itemsand scales used in this study. (For practical reasons, we provide statistics usingsummative scales, but the final model was estimated with their respective items.)Means (in Appendix A) for Work Motivation and TRSS are high. At first sight,public employees of Swiss municipalities appear highly motivated, and they highlyvalue relationships with colleagues as well as a confident and supportive workenvironment.

Structural Equation Modeling Results

As it is common practice in SEM, several models were specified and tested. Forinstance, we have tested a model using two other motivational factors particularlyrelevant within the public sector. These were job security, which contributes a priorito its attractiveness (Vandenabeele 2008b; Lewis and Frank 2002), and work-life



balance (Buelens and Van den Broeck 2007; Lindorff 2009; Worrall, Cooper, andCampbell-Jamison 2000; Worrall and Cooper 2007), which are both elements parti-cularly valued by public employees. Demographic variables such as gender, level ofeducation, and organizational tenure were also considered in preliminary models.Those control variables were omitted from the final model for two reasons. First,the model had a very bad fit. Second, those variables had no influence (non-significantfactor loadings; no increase in theR2 of WorkMotivation) on the dependent variable.

Consequently, the final model estimated was fairly simple, with three constructsrooted in three non-exclusive theoretical perspectives competing to explain the workmotivation of municipal civil servants. The results of the structural model provideevidence supporting the relevance of this approach. Appendix B shows all theparametric characteristics of the structural model. This model reached generallyaccepted thresholds and was well fitted (v2¼ 580.936, df¼ 109, p-value¼ .000,TLI¼ .96, CFI¼ .97, NFI¼ .96, p-value of close fit¼ 1.000, RMSEA¼ 0.03). Suchan adequacy between the hypothesized model containing three interconnectedmotivational factors impacting on a general measure of work motivation suggeststhe coherence of such an approach. Figure 2 presents the standardized estimatesfor the final model. Finally, in the context of the study, this three-factor modelexplained 22% of the variance in work motivation.

A few comments should also be made on the association among the explanatoryvariables. All the independent variables were significantly related (PSM <–>MIS[�.08], PSM <–>TRSS [.20], MIS <–>TRSS [.45]). The observed associationbetween PSM and material incentives is negative as expected. This empirical findingsupports the general findings of a potential crowding-out effect by extrinsic moti-vators and provides mild support for the view that if public managers implementsuch incentive schemes when PSM plays a strong role among their employees, adetrimental effect on motivation can be expected.

Hypotheses Testing

Hypothesis 1 postulates that PSM has a positive impact on work motivation. Inthe context of this study, we demonstrated that PSM accounted for the largest shareof the explained variance of work motivation (standardized factor loading¼ .40).The fact that PSM is a strong factor in work motivation in the public sector wasalso confirmed by a supplementary test: When we added PSM to the two otherindependent variables (TRSS and MIS), the percentage of explained variance inwork motivation rose from 0.6% to 22%.6 A test of the same two models, withand without PSM, executed with ordinary least squares linear regressions, led tosimilar results. This result strongly supports inclusion of PSM as an important moti-vational factor in the public sector.

Hypothesis 2 asserts that material incentives have a negative impact on workmotivation in the public sector. Results from the structural model do notstrongly support this, as MIS is positively related to motivation. One must becautious in the interpretation of such an effect as the regression weight fallsbarely short of statistical significance using conventional tests (p-value¼ .106).



Figure

2.

FullStructuralModel.

231


Furthermore, the standardized coefficient is rather low (.045) and thus supportsthe suggestion that material incentives only weakly support work motivation inthe public sector.

Hypothesis 3 suggests that the perceived quality of team support, measured interms of recognition from superiors and colleagues, and the quality of relationshipwith teammates, has a positive impact on work motivation. The findings of thisempirical study clearly support this hypothesis. Team relation and supportaccounted for the second largest part of the explained variance of work motivation(standardized factor loading¼ .17).

LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

This study has two main limitations. The first one is how generalizable empiricalresults stemming from the Swiss municipal context are. The second one concernsthe use of self-developed measures. First, as the findings presented in this studyconcern Swiss public employees at the municipal level, we should be cautious aboutnot interpreting the results as a general judgment of the motivational patterns of allpublic employees, or even of all Swiss public employees. Switzerland is a federal statecharacterized by the principle of subsidiarity between the local authorities, thecantons, and the federal level of government. Local authorities thus have a great dealof autonomy under the federal constitution, but are under certain restrictions at thecantonal level. The municipal level of government is primarily characterized by astrong logic of service provision and by the closeness of elected politicians and publicservants to citizens. Furthermore, in our sample the biggest cities in Switzerland (e.g.,Zurich, Geneva, Basel, and Bern) were underrepresented, which also leads to a sup-plementary caution when extrapolating the results obtained to the behavior of Swisspublic servants in general. The second cautionary note concerns our measures. If theuse of self-developed items calls into question the reliability of the results and theircomparisons with previous findings, we nevertheless maintain that those items werecarefully designed to capture, as well as possible, the particular factors of motivation.

The purpose of this article was to assess empirically the relative impact of PSM asa work motivation factor. Drawing on a literature review of the ‘‘need perspective’’on motivation, we have identified two other potential sources of public employeemotivation: material incentives as extrinsic factors, and team relations and supportas intrinsic factors. These three variables were then integrated in a structural modelin order to test their respective influence.

The main findings support PSM as a strong predictor of work motivation in thepublic sector. Furthermore, PSM has an explanatory added value in comparison withcompeting factors. In addition, alongside PSM, socio-relational factors such as recog-nition from colleagues and superiors and good relationships with colleagues are goodpredictors of work motivation. This need to interact in a supportive work environ-ment might not be a specific feature of public work, but it has its roots in the deepesthuman need for social relationships and recognition. This last point hints at a socialidentity theory of work motivation. Identification, in the context of the workplace,



can have multiple targets, and co-workers is one of them (Van Dick et al. 2004).Finally, this study also supports the view that material incentives are poor predictorsof work motivation in the public sector.

This study opens new research avenues. A replication of this study with better andvalidated measures of satisfaction with co-workers and superiors as well as materialincentives would probably bring further insights. In particular, it would be of greatinterest to perform the same analysis with other HRM practices in order to assesstheir impact on work motivation in the public sphere. Given the lack of research inthis area, it would be interesting to assess different kinds of HRM practices in orderto better identify their influence. This kind of research would also be of great interestfor HRM practitioners. Furthermore, like other studies analyzing the effects of PSMas an overall construct with several dimensions, it is conceivable to think of differenteffects for each of its four dimensions (Vandenabeele 2009; Taylor 2007). One mayalso consider supplementing this quantitative cross-sectional study with in-depthqualitative interviews with public agents.

Our results also raise normative questions regarding the NPM reform trend, atleast as it has developed in Europe. They provide further evidence for the view that,if work motivation in the public sector depends on intrinsic factors such as PSM orthe desire to interact in a supportive and cooperative environment, reforms that raisethe role of extrinsic incentives (such as pay for performance) could miss theirintended goals. At least one major human resource management measure inspiredby NPM, pay-for-performance, could be counter-productive from this perspective(Weibel, Rost, and Osterloh 2010; Perry, Engbers, and Jun 2009). Detrimental effectson motivation in the public sector are the result. Further comparative research withadministrative services that have implemented such approaches and, as control cases,traditional administrative services might provide further evidence on this debate.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This article is part of a broader research project (n� 100012–116083) financed by theSwiss National Science Foundation. The authors would like to thank the reviewersand the editor of IPMJ for their astute comments and suggestions, which contributedto the improvement of the present article. A previous version was presented to the14th International Research Society on Public Management Conference in Bern2010. The authors are grateful for the discussion they had with the participants.

NOTES

1. In this study, the measured dimensions of PSM were: ‘‘attraction to policymaking,’’‘‘commitment to the public interest,’’ ‘‘self-sacrifice,’’ and ‘‘bureaucratic governance.’’ The lat-ter dimension was developed by Vandenabeele (2008a) to suit the European context. It reflectstraditional principles of European public services such as equality, equity, or continuity.

2. 3 for Skewness and 10 for Kurtosis.3. Delery and Doty (1996) on strategic human resource management, the work of

Jurkievicz and Massey (1997) on motivational factors. We were also inspired by the items



designed by Spector (1985) for job satisfaction subdimensions and by the battery developed byBourcier and Palobart (1997) on work recognition.

4. The reflective-formative issue concerns the specification of a model of measurement(for an extensive discussion, see Jarvis, MacKenzie, and Podsakoff 2003). It refers to criticalissues faced when constructing scales: direction of causality between items and scales, correla-tions between the items, possibility to delete items of the same scale, and location of themeasurement error term. Of course, when turning to a second order construct, as PSM is,the issues are the same and refer both to the relations between items and subscales (or dimen-sions), and to the relations between the dimensions and the construct. For PSM, the pendingquestion refers to whether or not PSM is a second-order formative construct. The underlyingissues are whether or not the four subdimensions should be part of the PSM construct, andhow those subdimensions are related.

5. Results of the rotated (varimax) factor analysis show that at the exception of the‘‘self-sacrifice’’ and the ‘‘commitment to the public interest’’ dimensions of PSM that loadon the same factor (an overlap that is well known in PSM research; Wright 2008), all the itemsare related to their respective constructs.

6. Fit coefficients for the model without PSM: v2¼ 191.750, df¼ 24, p-value¼ .000,TLI¼ .954, CFI¼ .976, NFI¼ .972, p-value of close fit¼ .975, RMSEA¼ 0.043.

REFERENCES

Alderfer, C. 1969. ‘‘An Empirical Test of a New Theory of Human Needs.’’ OrganizationalBehavior and Human Performance 4(2): 142–175.

Allison, P. 2003. ‘‘Missing Data Techniques for Structural Equation Modeling.’’ Journal ofAbnormal Psychology 112: 545–557.

Alonso, P. and G. B. Lewis. 2001. ‘‘Public Service Motivation and Job Performance: Evidencefrom the Federal Sector.’’ American Review of Public Administration 31(4): 363–380.

Andriopoulos, C. 2001. ‘‘Determinants of Organisational Creativity: A Literature Review.’’Management Decision 39(10): 834–841.

Arbuckle, J. L. 2008. Amos 17.0. Computer software. Chicago: SPSS Company.Ashforth, B. E. and F. Mael. 1989. ‘‘Social Identity Theory and the Organization.’’ Academy

of Management Review 14(1): 20–39.Bandura, A. 1986. Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory.

Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.Barrows, D. and T. Wesson. 2000. ‘‘A Comparative Analysis of Job Satisfaction Among

Public and Private Sector Professionals.’’ The Innovation Journal 5(1): 1–21.Baumeister, R. and M. Leary. 1995. ‘‘The Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal

Attachments as a Fundamental HumanMotivation.’’ Psychological Bulletin 117: 497–497.Bentler, P. M. and C.-P. Chou. 1987. ‘‘Practical Issues in Structural Modeling.’’ Sociological

Methods Research 16(1): 78–117.Blaikie, N. 2003.Analyzing Quantitative Data: From Description to Explanation. London: Sage.Blais, A., D. E. Blake, and S. Dion. 1990. ‘‘The Public=Private Sector Cleavage in North

America: The Political Behavior and Attitudes of Public Sector Employees.’’ ComparativePolitical Studies 23(3): 381–403.

Bourcier, C. and Y. Palobart. 1997. La Reconnaissance: Un Outil de Motivation pour vosSalaries [Recognition: A Motivating Tool for Your Employees]. Paris: Les Editionsd’Organisation.



Boyne, G. 2002. ‘‘Public and Private Management: What’s the Difference?’’ Journal ofManagement Studies 39(1): 97–122.

Brewer, G. A. 2008. ‘‘Employee and Organizational Performance.’’ Pp. 136–156 in J. L. Perryand A. Hondeghem, eds., Motivation in Public Management: The Call of Public Service.Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brewer, G. A. and S. C. Selden. 1998. ‘‘Whistle Blowers in the Federal Civil Service: NewEvidence of the Public Service Ethic.’’ Journal of Public Administration Research andTheory 8(3): 413–439.

Bright, L. 2008. ‘‘Does Public Service Motivation Really Make a Difference on the JobSatisfaction and Turnover Intentions of Public Employees?’’ American Review of PublicAdministration 38(2): 149–166.

Bright, L. 2009. ‘‘Why Do Public Employees Desire Intrinsic Non-Monetary WorkplaceOpportunities?’’ Public Personnel Management 38(3): 15–37.

Buelens, M. and H. Van den Broeck. 2007. ‘‘An Analysis of Differences in Work MotivationBetween Public and Private Sector Organizations.’’ Public Administration Review 67(1):65–74.

Byrne, B. M. 2001. Structural Equation Modeling with Amos: Basic Concepts, Applications, andProgramming. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Cerase, F. P. and D. Farinella. 2006. ‘‘Explorations in Public Service Motivation: The Case ofthe Italian Revenue Agency.’’ Paper presented at the European Group for Public Admin-istration Conference, Milan, Italy, September 6–9.

Clerkin, R., S. Paynter, and J. Taylor. 2009. ‘‘Public Service Motivation in UndergraduateGiving and Volunteering Decisions.’’ The American Review of Public Administration39(6): 675–698.

Cortina, J. M. 1993. ‘‘What Is Coefficient Alpha? An Examination of Theory and Applica-tions.’’ Journal of Applied Psychology 78(1): 98–104.

Coursey, D. H. and S. K. Pandey. 2007a. ‘‘Content Domain, Measurement, and Validity ofthe Red Tape Concept: A Second-Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis.’’ AmericanReview of Public Administration 37(3): 342–361.

Coursey, D. H. and S. K. Pandey. 2007b. ‘‘Public Service Motivation Measurement: Testingan Abridged Version of Perry’s Proposed Scale.’’ Administration and Society 39(5):547–568.

Coursey, D. H., J. L. Perry, J. L. Brudney, and L. Littlepage. 2008. ‘‘PsychometricVerification of Perry’s Public Service Motivation Instrument: Results for VolunteerExemplars.’’ Review of Public Personnel Administration 28(1): 79–90.

Crewson, P. E. 1997. ‘‘Public-Service Motivation: Building Empirical Evidence ofIncidence and Effect.’’ Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 7(4):499–518.

Dardot, P. and C. Laval. 2009. La Nouvelle Raison du Monde. Essai sur la Societe Neoliberale[The World’s New Rationality. Essay on the Neo-Liberal Society]. Paris: La Decouverte.

Deci, E. L. and R. M. Ryan. 1985. Intrinsic Motivation and Self-Determination in HumanBehavior. New York: Plenum Press.

Delaney, J. T. and M. A. Huselid. 1996. ‘‘The Impact of Human Resource ManagementPractices on Perceptions of Organizational Performance.’’ Academy of ManagementJournal 39(4): 949–969.

Delery, J. and D. Doty. 1996. ‘‘Modes of Theorizing in Strategic Human ResourceManagement: Tests of Universalistic, Contingency, and Configurational PerformancePredictions.’’ Academy of Management Journal 39(4): 802–835.



Dubar, C. 1992. ‘‘Formes Identitaires et Socialisation Professionnelle [Identity Forms andProfessional Socialization].’’ Revue Francaise de Sociologie 33(4): 505–529.

Dubar, C. 2005. La Socialisation: Construction des Identites Sociales et Professionnelles[Socialization: Construction of Social and Professional Identities]. Paris: A. Colin.

Duncan, T., S. Duncan, and F. Li. 1998. ‘‘A Comparison of Model- and Multiple Imputation-Based Approaches to Longitudinal Analyses with Partial Missingness.’’ StructuralEquation Modeling 5(1): 1–21.

Eisenberger, R., S. Armeli, B. Rexwinkel, P. Lynch, and L. Rhoades. 2001. ‘‘Reciprocation ofPerceived Organizational Support.’’ Journal of Applied Psychology 86(1): 42–51.

Eisenberger, R., P. Fasolo, and V. Davis-LaMastro. 1990. ‘‘Perceived Organizational Supportand Employee Diligence, Commitment, and Innovation.’’ Journal of Applied Psychology75(1): 51–59.

Eisenberger, R., R. Huntington, S. Hutchison, and D. Sowa. 1986. ‘‘Perceived OrganizationalSupport.’’ Journal of Applied Psychology 71(3): 500–507.

Emery, Y. 2004. ‘‘Rewarding Civil Service Performance Through Team Bonuses: Findings,Analysis and Recommendations.’’ International Review of Administrative Sciences70(1): 157.

Enders, C. K. 2001. ‘‘The Performance of the Full Information Maximum LikelihoodEstimator in Multiple Regression Models with Missing Data.’’ Educational and Psycho-logical Measurement 61(5): 713–740.

Epstein, S. 1994. ‘‘Integration of the Cognitive and the Psychodynamic Unconscious.’’American Psychologist 49(8): 709–724.

Fairbairn, W. and E. Jones. 1954. An Object-Relations Theory of the Personality. New York:Basic Books.

Festinger, L. 1957. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Evanston, IL: Row Peterson.Finch, J. F., S. G. West, and D. P. MacKinnon. 1997. ‘‘Effects of Sample Size and

Nonnormality on the Estimation of Mediated Effects in Latent Variables Models.’’ Struc-tural Equation Modeling 4(2): 87–107.

Foote, N. N. 1951. ‘‘Identification as the Basis for a Theory of Motivation.’’ AmericanSociological Review 16(1): 14–21.

Forest, V. 2008. ‘‘Performance-Related Pay and Work Motivation: Theoretical and EmpiricalPerspectives for the French Civil Service.’’ International Review of Administrative Sciences74(2): 325–339.

Frey, B. and L. Goette. 1999. ‘‘Does Pay Motivate Volunteers.’’ Institute for Empirical Econ-omic Research. Zurich: University of Zurich.

Frey, B. S. and R. Jegen. 2001. ‘‘Motivation Crowding Theory.’’ Journal of Economic Surveys15(1): 589–611.

Frey, B. S. and F. Oberholzer-Gee. 1997. ‘‘The Cost of Price Incentives: An EmpiricalAnalysis of Motivation Crowding-Out.’’ The American Economic Review 87(4): 746–755.

Gailmard, S. 2010. ‘‘Politics, Principal-Agent Problems, and Public Service Motivation.’’International Public Management Journal 13(1): 35–45.

Garner, H., D. Meda, and C. Senik. 2006. ‘‘La Place du Travail dans les Identites’’ [‘‘The Roleof Work for Identities’’]. Economie et Statistiques 393–394: 21–40.

Georgellis, Y., E. Iossa, and V. Tabvuma. 2008. ‘‘Crowding Out Public Service Motivation.’’CEDI Discussion Paper 08-07, Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University. http://www.cedi.org.uk/?q=node/62

Giauque, D. 2003. La Bureaucratie Liberale: Nouvelle Gestion Publique et RegulationOrganisationnelle [The Liberal Bureaucracy: New Public Management and OrganizationalRegulation]. Paris: L’Harmattan.



Guzzo, R., K. Noonan, and E. Elron. 1994. ‘‘Expatriate Managers and the PsychologicalContract.’’ Journal of Applied Psychology 79(4): 617–626.

Hair, J. F., Jr., W. C. Black, B. J. Babin, and R. E. Anderson. 2009. Multivariate DataAnalysis, 7th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall.

Hall, D. T., B. Schneider, and H. T. Nygren. 1970. ‘‘Personal Factors in OrganizationalIdentification.’’ Administrative Science Quarterly 15(2): 176–190.

Hayduk, L. 1987. Structural Equation Modeling with Lisrel: Essentials and Advances. Vol. 13,Applied Psychological Measurement. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Herzberg, F. 1971. Le Travail et la Nature de l’Homme [Work and the Nature of Man].Paris: EME.

Herzberg, F., B. Mausner, and B. Bloch-Snyderman. 1959. The Motivation to Work.New York: John Wiley.

Hu, L. and P. Bentler. 1999. ‘‘Cutoff Criteria for Fit Indexes in Covariance StructureAnalysis: Conventional Criteria Versus New Alternatives.’’ Structural Equation Model-ing 6(1): 1–55.

Hutchison, S. 1997. ‘‘A Path Model of Perceived Organizational Support.’’ Journal of SocialBehavior and Personality 12: 159–174.

Ichniowski, C., K. Shaw, and G. Prennushi. 1997. ‘‘The Effects of Human ResourceManagement Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines.’’ The AmericanEconomic Review 87(3): 291–313.

Jarvis, C., S. MacKenzie, and P. Podsakoff. 2003. ‘‘A Critical Review of Construct Indicatorsand Measurement Model Misspecification in Marketing and Consumer Research.’’Journal of Consumer Research 30(2): 199–218.

Jimenez-Jimenez, D. and R. Sanz-Valle. 2005. ‘‘Innovation and Human Resource Manage-ment Fit: An Empirical Study.’’ International Journal of Manpower 26(4): 364–381.

Joreskog, K. and I. Moustaki. 2006. ‘‘Factor Analysis of Ordinal Variables with FullInformation Maximum Likelihood.’’ Unpublished manuscript.

Jurkiewicz, C. and T. Massey Jr. 1997. ‘‘What Motivates Municipal Employees: A Compari-son Study of Supervisory vs. Non-Supervisory Personnel.’’ Public Personnel Management26(3): 367–377.

Jurkiewicz, C. L., T. K. Massey, and R. G. Brown. 1998. ‘‘Motivation in Public and PrivateOrganizations: A Comparative Study.’’ Public Productivity & Management Review 21(3):230–250.

Kanfer, R. 1990. ‘‘Motivation Theory and Industrial and Organizational Psychology.’’Pp. 75–170 in M. D. Dunnette and L. M. Hough, eds., Handbook of Industrial andOrganizational Psychology. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.

Kelloway, K. E. 1998. Using Lisrel for Structural Equation Modeling: A Researcher’s Guide.Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Khojasteh, M. 1993. ‘‘Motivating the Private vs. the Public Managers.’’ Public PersonnelManagement 22(3): 391–401.

Kim, S. 2005. ‘‘Individual-Level Factors and Organizational Performance in GovernementOrganizations.’’ Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 15(2): 245–261.

Kim, S. 2006. ‘‘Public Service Motivation and Organizational Citizenship Behavior in Korea.’’International Journal of Manpower 27(8): 722–740.

Kim, S. 2009. ‘‘Revising Perry’s Measurement Scale of Public Service Motivation.’’ AmericanReview of Public Administration 39(2): 149–163.

Kline, P. 2000. The Handbook of Psychological Testing. London: Routledge.Kline, R. B. 2005. Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling, 2nd ed. New York:

Guilford.



Lamontagne, S. 2006. Pourquoi la Reconnaissance au Travail Contribue a la Motivation et auBien-Etre des Travailleurs? [Why Work Recognition Contribute to the Motivation andWell-Being of Employees?]. Master’s thesis, Universite Laval, Quebec, Canada.

Le Grand, J. 2006. Motivation, Agency, and Public Policy: Of Knights and Knaves, Pawns andQueens, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Leisink, P. and B. Steijn. 2009. ‘‘Public Service Motivation and Job Performance of PublicSector Employees in the Netherland.’’ International Review of Administrative Sciences75(1): 35–52.

Levy-Leboyer, C. 2006. La Motivation au Travail: Modeles et Strategies [Motivation at Work:Models and Strategies], 3rd ed. Paris: Editions d’Organisation.

Lewis, D. E. 2010. ‘‘Measurement and Public Service Motivation: New Insights, OldQuestions.’’ International Public Management Journal 13(1): 46–55.

Lewis, G. B. and S. A. Frank. 2002. ‘‘Who Wants to Work for the Government?’’ PublicAdministration Review 62(4): 395–404.

Lindorff, M. 2009. ‘‘We’re Not All Happy Yet: Attitudes to Work, Leadership, and HighPerformance Work Practices Among Managers in the Public Sector.’’ The AustralianJournal of Public Administration 68(4): 429–445.

Locke, E. A. 1976. ‘‘The Nature and Causes of Job Satisfaction.’’ Pp. 1297–1350 in M. D.Dunette, ed., Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology. Chicago: RandMcNally.

Ludi, G. and I. Werlen. 2005. Le Recensement Federal De La Population 2000: Le PaysageLinguistique de la Suisse [2000 Federal Census: Linguistic Landscape of Switzerland]. Neu-chatel, Switzerland: Office Federal de la Statistique.

Lyons, S. T., L. E. Duxbury, and C. A. Higgins. 2006. ‘‘A Comparison of the Values andCommitment of Private Sector, Public Sector, and Parapublic Sector Employees.’’ PublicAdministration Review 66(4): 605–618.

MacDuffie, J. 1995. ‘‘Human Resource Bundles and Manufacturing Performance: Organiza-tional Logic and Flexible Production Systems in the World Auto Industry.’’ Industrial &Labor Relations Review 48(2): 197–221.

Marsden, D., S. French, and K. Kubo. 2001. Does Performance Pay De-Motivate, and Does ItMatter? London: Center for Economic Performance, LSE.

Marsden, D. and R. Richardson. 1992. Motivation and Performance Related Pay in thePublic Sector: A Case Study of the Inland Revenue. London: Center for EconomicPerformance, LSE.

Marsden, D. and R. Richardson. 1994. ‘‘Performing for Pay? The Effects of Merit Pay onMotivation in a Public Service.’’ British Journal of Industrial Relations 32(2): 243–261.

Martins, E. C. and F. Terblanche. 2003. ‘‘Building Organisational Culture That StimulatesCreativity and Innovation.’’ European Journal of Innovation Management 6(1): 64–74.

Maslow, A. 1954. Motivation and Personality. New York: Harper & Row.Maugeri, S. 2004. Theories de la Motivation au Travail [Theories of Work Motivation]. Paris:

Dunod.Meyer, J. P. and N. J. Allen. 1991. ‘‘A Three-Component Conceptualization of Organizational

Commitment.’’ Human Resource Management Review 1(1): 61–89.Michel, S. 1994. ‘‘Motivation et Implication Professionnelles’’ [‘‘Motivation and Professional

Involvement’’]. Pp. 381–399 in M. De Coster and F. Pichault, eds., Traite de Sociologie duTravail. Brussels, Belgium: De Boeck & Larcier.

Mowday, R. T., L. W. Porter, and R. M. Steers. 1982. Employee-Organization Linkages: ThePsychology of Commitment, Absenteeism, and Turnover. New York: Academic Press.



Moynihan, D. P. and S. K. Pandey. 2007. ‘‘The Role of Organizations in Fostering PublicService Motivation.’’ Public Administration Review 67(1): 40–53.

Naff, K. C. and J. Crum. 1999. ‘‘Working for America: Does Public Service Motivation Makea Difference?’’ Review of Public Personnel Administration 19(4): 5–16.

OECD. 2005. La Remuneration Liee aux Performances dans l’Administration [Pay-PerPerformance in Public Administrations]. Paris: OECD.

Olinsky, A., S. Chen, and L. Harlow. 2003. ‘‘The Comparative Efficacy of ImputationMethods for Missing Data in Structural Equation Modeling.’’ European Journal ofOperational Research 151(1): 53–79.

Pandey, S. K. and E. C. Stazyk. 2008. ‘‘Antecedents and Correlates of Public ServiceMotivation.’’ Pp. 101–117 in J. L. Perry and A. Hondeghem, eds., Motivation in PublicManagement: The Call of Public Service. New York: Oxford University Press.

Pandey, S. K., B. E. Wright, and D. P. Moynihan. 2008. ‘‘Public Service Motivation andInterpersonal Citizenship Behavior in Public Organizations: Testing a PreliminaryModel.’’ International Public Management Journal 11(1): 89–108.

Park, S. M. and H. G. Rainey. 2007. ‘‘Antecedents, Mediators, and Consequencesof Affective, Normative, and Continuance Commitment. Empirical Tests ofCommitment Effects in Federal Agencies.’’ Review of Public Personnel Administration27(3): 197–226.

Park, S. M. and H. G. Rainey. 2008. ‘‘Leadership and Public Service Motivation in U.S.Federal Agencies.’’ International Public Management Journal 11(1): 109–142.

Perry, J. L. 1996. ‘‘Measuring Public Service Motivation: An Assessment of ConstructReliability and Validity.’’ Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 6(1):5–22.

Perry, J. L. 1997. ‘‘Antecedents of Public Service Motivation.’’ Journal of Public Administra-tion Research and Theory 7(2): 181–197.

Perry, J. L. 2000. ‘‘Bringing Society In: Toward a Theory of Public-Service Motivation.’’Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 10(2): 471–488.

Perry, J. L., J. L. Brudney, D. Coursey, and L. Littlepage. 2008. ‘‘What Drives MorallyCommitted Citizens? A Study of the Antecedents of Public Service Motivation.’’ PublicAdministration Review 68(3): 445–458.

Perry, J. L., T. A. Engbers, and S. Y. Jun. 2009. ‘‘Back to the Future? Performance-RelatedPay, Empirical Research, and the Perils of Persistence.’’ Public Administration Review69(1): 39–51.

Perry, J. L. and A. Hondeghem. 2008a. ‘‘Building Theory and Empirical Evidence AboutPublic Service Motivation.’’ International Public Management Journal 11(1): 3–12.

Perry, J. L. and A. Hondeghem. 2008b. ‘‘Editors’ Introduction.’’ Pp. 1–14 in J. L. Perryand A. Hondeghem, eds., Motivation in Public Management: The Call of Public Service.New York: Oxford University Press.

Perry, J. L. and A. Hondeghem, eds. 2008c. Motivation in Public Management: The Call ofPublic Service. New York: Oxford University Press.

Perry, J. L. and L. W. Porter. 1982. ‘‘Factors Affecting the Context for Motivation in PublicOrganizations.’’ Academy of Management Journal 7(1): 89–98.

Perry, J. L. and W. Vandenabeele. 2008. ‘‘Behavioral Dynamics: Institutions, Identities, andSelf-Regulation.’’ Pp. 56–80 in J. L. Perry and A. Hondeghem, eds., Motivation in PublicManagement: The Call of Public Service. New York: Oxford University Press.

Perry, J. L. and L. R. Wise. 1990. ‘‘The Motivational Bases of Public Service.’’ Public Admin-istration Review 50(3): 367–373.



Pilichowski, E. 2009. ‘‘Does Performance-Related Pay Work?’’ Public Management Outlook30: 1–17.

Podsakoff, P. and D. Organ. 1986. ‘‘Self-Reports in Organizational Research: Problems andProspects.’’ Journal of Management 12(4): 531–544.

Podsakoff, P. M., S. B. MacKenzie, J.-Y. Lee, and N. P. Podsakoff. 2003. ‘‘Common MethodBiases in Behavioral Research: A Critical Review of the Literature and RecommendedRemedies.’’ Journal of Applied Psychology 88(5): 879–903.

Pollitt, C. and G. Bouckaert. 2004. Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis.Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Posner, B. and W. Schmidt. 1996. ‘‘The Values of Business and Federal GovernmentExecutives: More Different Than Alike.’’ Public Personnel Management 25(3): 277–289.

Rainey, H. G. 1982. ‘‘Reward Preferences Among Public and Private Managers: In Search ofthe Public Ethic.’’ American Review of Public Administration 16(4): 288–302.

Rainey, H. G. 1983. ‘‘Public Agencies and Private Firms: Incentives, Goals, and IndividualRoles.’’ Administration and Society 15: 207–242.

Rainey, H. G. and B. Bozeman. 2000. ‘‘Comparing Public and Private Organizations:Empirical Research and the Power of the A Priori.’’ Journal of Public AdministrationResearch and Theory 10(2): 447–469.

Ritz, A. 2009. ‘‘Public Service Motivation and Organisational Performance in Swiss FederalGovernment.’’ International Review of Administrative Sciences 75(1): 53–78.

Roussel, P. 2000. ‘‘La Motivation Au Travail: Concepts et Theories.’’ [‘‘Motivation toWork: Concepts and Theories’’]. LaNote du LIRHE 326-00, Laboratoire Interdiscipli-naire de recherche sur les Resources Humaines et l’Emploi. http://lirhe.univtlse1.fr/publications/notes/326-00.pdf

Ryan, R. M. and E. L. Deci. 2000. ‘‘Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations: Classic Definitionsand New Directions.’’ Contemporary Educational Psychology 25(1): 54–67.

Sainsaulieu, R. 1988. L’identite au Travail: les Effets Culturels de l’Organisation [Identity atWork: Cultural Effects of Organizations], 3rd ed. Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationaledes Sciences Politiques.

Sen, A. 1995. ‘‘Rationality and Social Choice.’’ The American Economic Review 85(1): 1–24.Shamir, B. 1991. ‘‘Meaning, Self and Motivation in Organizations.’’ Organization Studies

12(3): 405–424.Shore, L. and L. Tetrick. 1991. ‘‘A Construct Validity Study of the Survey of Perceived

Organizational Support.’’ Journal of Applied Psychology 76(5): 637–643.Shore, L. and S. Wayne. 1993. ‘‘Commitment and Employee Behavior: Comparison of

Affective Commitment and Continuance Commitment with Perceived OrganizationalSupport.’’ Journal of Applied Psychology 78: 774–774.

Sijtsma, K. 2009. ‘‘On the Use, the Misuse, and the Very Limited Usefulness of Cronbach’sAlpha.’’ Psychometrika 74(1): 107–120.

Solomon, E. E. 1986. ‘‘Private and Public Sector Managers: An Empirical Investigation ofJob Characteristics and Organizational Climate.’’ Journal of Applied Psychology 71(2):247–259.

Spector, P. 1985. ‘‘Measurement of Human Service Staff Satisfaction: Development of the JobSatisfaction Survey.’’ American Journal of Community Psychology 13(6): 693–713.

Spector, P. 2006. ‘‘Method Variance in Organizational Research: Truth or Urban Legend?’’Organizational Research Methods 9(2): 221.

Stajkovic, A. D. 2003. ‘‘Behavioral Management and Task Performance in Organizations:Conceptual Background, Meta-Analysis, and Test of Alternative Model.’’ PersonnelPsychology 56: 155–194.



Steen, T. 2006. ‘‘Public Sector Motivation: Is There Something to Learn from the Study ofVolunteerism?’’ Public Policy and Administration 21(1): 49–62.

Steijn, B. 2008. ‘‘Person-Environment Fit and Public Service Motivation.’’ International PublicManagement Journal 11(1): 13–27.

Steiner, R. 2000. ‘‘New Public Management in Swiss Municipalities.’’ International PublicManagement Journal 3: 169–189.

Stroebe, W. and M. Stroebe. 1996. ‘‘The Social Psychology of Social Support.’’ Pp. 597–621 inE. Higgins and A. Kruglanski, eds., Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles.New York: Guilford Press.

Taylor, J. 2007. ‘‘The Impact of Public Service Motives on Work Outcomes in Australia: AComparative Multidimensional Analysis.’’ Public Administration 85(4): 931–959.

Taylor, J. 2008. ‘‘Organizational Influences, Public Service Motivation and Work Outcomes:An Australian Study.’’ International Public Management Journal 11(1): 67–88.

Vallerand, R. J. and E. E. Thill. 1993. Introduction a la Psychologie de la Motivation[Introduction to the Psychology of Motivation]. Paris: Vigot.

Van Dick, R. 2004. ‘‘My Job Is My Castle: Identification in Organizational Contexts.’’International Review of Industrial and Organizational Psychology 19: 171–203.

Van Dick, R., U. Wagner, J. Stellmacher, and O. Christ. 2004. ‘‘The Utility of a BroaderConceptualization of Organizational Identification: Which Aspects Really Matter?’’British Psychological Society 77: 171–191.

Vandenabeele, W. 2007. ‘‘Toward a Public Administration Theory of Public ServiceMotivation: An Institutional Approach.’’ Public Management Review 9(4): 545–556.

Vandenabeele, W. 2008a. ‘‘Development of a Public Service Motivation Measurement Scale:Corroborating and Extending Perry’s Measurement Instrument.’’ International PublicManagement Journal 11(1): 143–167.

Vandenabeele, W. 2008b. ‘‘Government Calling: Public Service Motivation as an Elementin Selecting Government as an Employer of Choice.’’ Public Administration 86(4):1089–1105.

Vandenabeele, W. 2009. ‘‘The Mediating Effect of Job Satisfaction and Organisational Com-mitment on Self-Reported Performance: More Robust Evidence of the PSM-PerformanceRelationship.’’ International Review of Administrative Sciences 75(1): 11–34.

Vandenabeele, W. and C. Ban. 2009. ‘‘The Impact of Public Service Motivation in an Inter-national Organization: Job Satisfaction and Organizational Commitment in the EuropeanCommission.’’ Paper presented at the International Public ServiceMotivation Conference,Bloomington, IN, June 7–9.

Vandenabeele, W., R. Depre, A. Hondeghem, and S. Yan. 2004. ‘‘The Motivational Patternsof Civil Servants.’’ Viesoji Politika Ir Administravimas 13: 52–63.

Vandenberghe, C. 2005. ‘‘L’engagement Organisationnel dans le Secteur Public: QuelquesDeterminants Essentiels’’ [‘‘Organizational Commitment in Public Sector: Some EssentialDeterminants’’]. Telescope 12(2): 1–10.

Weibel, A., K. Rost, and M. Osterloh. 2010. ‘‘Pay for Performance in the Public Sector:Benefits and (Hidden) Costs.’’ Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory20(2): 387–412.

West, S. G., J. F. Finch, and P. J. Curran. 1995. ‘‘Structural EquationModels with NonnormalVariables: Problems and Remedies.’’ Pp. 56–75 in R. H. Hoyle, ed., Structural EquationModeling: Concepts, Issues, and Applications. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Whitener, E. M. 2001. ‘‘Do ‘High Commitment’ Human Resource Practices Affect EmployeeCommitment? A Cross-Level Analysis Using Hierarchical Linear Modeling.’’ Journal ofManagement 27(5): 515–535.



Worrall, L. and C. L. Cooper. 2007. ‘‘Managers’ Work-Life Balance and Health: The Case ofUK Managers.’’ European Journal of International Management 1(1–2): 129–145.

Worrall, L., C. L. Cooper, and F. Campbell-Jamison. 2000. ‘‘The Impact of OrganizationalChange on the Work Experiences and Perceptions of Public Sector Managers.’’ PersonnelReview 29(5): 613–636.

Wothke, W. and J. Arbuckle. 1996. ‘‘Full-Information Missing Data Analysis with Amos.’’SPSS White Paper. Chicago: SPSS Company.

Wright, B. E. 2004. ‘‘The Role of Work Context in Work Motivation: A Public Sector Appli-cation of Goal and Social Cognitive Theories.’’ Journal of Public Administration Researchand Theory 14(1): 59–78.

Wright, B. E. 2008. ‘‘Methodological Challenges Associated with Public Service MotivationResearch.’’ Pp. 80–100 in J. L. Perry and A. Hondeghem, eds., Motivation in PublicManagement: The Call of Public Service. New York: Oxford University Press.

Wright, B. E. and R. K. Christensen. 2009. ‘‘Public Service Motivation: Testing Measures,Antecedents and Consequences.’’ Paper presented at the International Public ServiceMotivation Research Conference, Bloomington, IN, June 7–19.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Simon Anderfuhren-Biget ([email protected]) is a research assistantand PhD candidate at the University of Geneva. He is finishing his doctoral thesis onPSM in Switzerland. His research interests include organizational sociology, HRMpractices, well-being at work, and value-laden motivations.

Frederic Varone ([email protected]) is Professor of Political Science at theUniversity of Geneva. His current research interests include comparative publicpolicy (e.g., sustainable management of natural resources, regulation of biotechnol-ogies), program evaluation, and public sector reforms (e.g., New Public Manage-ment, liberalization and privatization of public services).

David Giauque ([email protected]) is Assistant Professor at the University ofLausanne, a member of the Institute of Political and International Studies, and amember of the Swiss Public Administration Network (SPAN). His current researchinterests include comparative public administrations (e.g., public managementreforms), human resources management in the public sector, sociology of organiza-tions and public administrations (e.g., sociology of public employees, relationshipsbetween political actors and bureaucrats).

Adrian Ritz ([email protected]) is Assistant Professor of Public Administra-tion. He is a member of the executive board of the Center of Competence forPublic Management at the University of Bern and member of the Swiss PublicAdministration Network (SPAN). His current research interests include motivationand performance in public organizations, public management reforms, and humanresources management in the public sector.



APPEN

DIX

A:LIST

AND

DET

AILSOFTHEVARIABLE

SAND

ITEM

S

TABLE

A.1

ListandDetailsoftheVariablesandItem

s

Allitem

sweremeasuredusinga5-pointLikert-typescale

(1¼strongdisagreem

ent,5¼strongagreem

ent)

Variable

Name

Item

Name

Mean

St.

Dev.

Skew

ness

Kurtosis

Item

sWording(English)

Work

motivation

Motiv1

3.79

1.073

�0.724

�0.109

I’m

alwaysreadyto

begin

earlyin

themorningandto

stoplate

atnightto

dothejob.

Mean�¼

4.11

Motiv2

4.44

0.675

�1.230

2.197

Iam

alwaystotallycommittedto

mywork

nomatter

how

manydifficultiesthereare.

Cronbach

¼.55

.Team

relations

andsupport

Superior

recognition

4.50

0.774

�1.950

4.623

Positivefeedback

from

myhierarchicalsuperiorisvery

importantforme.

Mean�¼

4.44

Colleagues

recognition

4.24

0.863

�1.209

1.558

Positivefeedback

from

mycolleagues

isveryim

portant

forme.

Cronbach

¼.68

Relationshipsw=

colleagues

4.56

0.732

�2.081

5.454

Itisim

portantformeto

havegoodworking

relationshipswithmycolleagues.

Material

incentives

Highwage

3.57

0.977

�0.544

0.156

Itisim

portantformeto

haveahighwage.

Payper

perform

ance

3.19

1.284

�0.278

�0.949

Itisim

portantformeto

havehighpayper

perform

ance.

Mean�¼3.46

Career

3.38

1.205

�0.433

�0.639

Itisim

portantformeto

havegoodcareer

perspectives.

Cronbach

¼.700

Bonus

exceptional

perf

3.66

1.225

�0.727

�0.376

Itiscrucialformethatthereare

bonusesto

reward

exceptionalwork.

(Continued

)

243


TABLE

A.1

Continued

Allitem

sweremeasuredusinga5-pointLikert-typescale

(1¼strongdisagreem

ent,5¼strongagreem

ent)

Variable

Name

Item

Name

Mean

St.

Dev.

Skew

ness

Kurtosis

Item

sWording(English)

PSM

Pol1

3.35

1.216

�0.312

�0.820

I’m

veryinterested

inpolitics.

Mean�¼3.51

Pol2

3.19

1.229

�0.182

�0.911

Iliketo

discuss

politicalsubjectswithothers.

Cronbach

¼.69

Civ

Int1

4.01

1.040

�1.074

�0.652

Iconsider

publicservicemycivic

duty.

Civ

Int2

3.64

1.049

�0.530

�0.218

Itisim

portantformeto

contribute

tothecommon

good.

Comp1

3.76

0.981

�0.554

�0.119

I’m

often

reminded

bydailyevents

how

dependentwe

are

ononeanother.

Comp2

3.76

1.065

�0.652

�0.554

Most

socialprogramsare

toovitalto

dowithout.

Self-Sacr.1

3.14

1.022

�0.143

�0.259

Ithinkpeople

should

giveback

tosocietymore

than

they

get

from

it.

Self-Sacr.2

3.24

1.037

�0.215

�0.385

Iam

oneofthose

rare

people

whowould

risk

personal

loss

tohelpsomeoneelse.

� Based

onsummativeindexes.

244


APPENDIX B: STRUCTURAL ESTIMATES FOR THE FULL MODEL

TABLE B.1

Structural Estimates

Variables and Items

RegressionWeights

(Unstandardized)p-value(.001)

StandardizedFactor

Loadings Variance R2

Work motivation .224Motiv 1 (1)a .568Motiv 2 .824 �� .744

TRSS .354 (��)Colleagues recognition (1) .690Relationship w=colleagues

.707 �� .574

Superior recognition .908 �� .697MIS .392 (��)High wage (1) .640Pay per performance 1.661 �� .811Career 1.415 �� .735Bonus for exceptional job .956 �� .490

PSM .150 (��)PSM_Policymaking (1) .345 .119Pol 1 (1) .923Pol 2 1.002 �� .915

PSM_Civic Interest 1.441 �� .876 .767Civ Int 1 (1) .614Civ Int 2 1.193 .726

PSM_Compassion .920 �� .561 .314Comp 1 (1) .648Comp 2 .969 �� .579

PSM_Self-Sacrifice 1.095 �� .694 .481Self-Sacr. 1 (1) .599Self-Sacr. 2 1.144 �� .675

aSet to (1) for identification purpose.��Statistically significant at p< .001.

TABLE B.2

Bilateral Associations

Variables Correlations Covariances p-value (.001)

TRSS <–> PSM .196 .045 ��

MIS <–> PSM �.082 �.020 ��

MIS <–> TRSS .446 .166 ��

��Statistically significant at p< .001.



TABLE B.3

Regression Path on Dependent Variable

MotivationRegressionWeights

p-value(.001)

StandardizedFactor Loadings

TRSS .176 �� .172MIS .044 .106 .045PSM .632 �� .402

��Statistically significant at p< .001.



Motivating Employees of the Public Sector: Does Public Service Motivation Matter

Documents

Transcript of Motivating Employees of the Public Sector: Does Public Service Motivation Matter