Morals of legitimacy in Naples: streetwise about legality, semi-legality and crime

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Morals of legitimacy in Naples: streetwiseabout legality, semi-legality and crime

Italo Pardo

European Journal of Sociology / Volume 36 / Issue 01 / May 1995, pp 44 - 71DOI: 10.1017/S0003975600007104, Published online: 28 July 2009

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0003975600007104

How to cite this article:Italo Pardo (1995). Morals of legitimacy in Naples: streetwise about legality,semi-legality and crime. European Journal of Sociology, 36, pp 44-71doi:10.1017/S0003975600007104

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I T A L O P A R D O

Morals of legitimacy in Naples:streetwise about legality, semi-legality

and crime

I N T H E 'Supplementary Note to the 1977 Reprint' of PoliticalSystems of Highland Burma, Edmund Leach eminently states thatabstract thinking that does not systematically rely on the in-depthknowledge of the empirical situation has little to contribute to ourunderstanding of the individual in society. It may encourage, instead,simplistic and misleading views. This powerful argument in socialanthropology, I believe, is bound to play a discriminative role inEuropean research, particularly in the urban situation. In an illustrationof this point, this article examines the moral, normative and practicalframework underlying ordinary Neapolitans' relationship to the formaldefinition of legality and crime, and to the corresponding 'coerciveapparatus' (Weber 1978: 313-14) (1). Steering clear of reductiveopposition of morality to rationality and to self-interest, I explore thisproblematic field through the detailed analysis of the gradation ofpositions between 'ideal' extremes—sociological and moral—in everydaylife. I look at the significance of the opposition legitimate/illegitimatefocusing on the way in which it informs people's attitudes to the 'greyarea' (Curi 1982) between the poles of legality and illegality on the onehand, and to crime and criminals on the other (2).

To understand the contextual significance of control and norm toaction, I suggest, we need to penetrate the culture of the citizens who arecaught in the difficulty of inner-city life. And we need to assess how thecomplications engendered by such difficulty relate to the rationality of

(1) Fieldwork has been based on the 1984-86 and subsequent up-dating field tripscombined use of participant observation, in this and other areas of the inner city,case-studies of people and situations, and oral (2) A separate essay (Pardo 1994), com-and written sources (published and unpub- panion to the present article, explores the his-lished). The ethnographic material discussed torical and contemporary context of the'unholyhere was collected in a neighbourhood of the alliances' between criminals and certain partscentre over a period of fourteen months in of the political and economic establishment.

44ITALO PARDO, University of Kent (Canterbury).Arcb.turop. social., XXXVI (1991), 44-71—0003-9736/93/0000-647 $7.30 per art. + $0.10 per page © 1993 A.E.S.

MORALS OF LEGITIMACY IN NAPLES

'lawyers' law' (Weber 1978: 760) intended as a contested metaphor forsocial order (Starr & Collier 1989: 3 ff.). This basically meansaddressing two intimately connected aspects of the intersection—in thepolitical, bureaucratic and legal field—between value, representationand order (Hamnett 1977). First, we must differentiate between crime(and criminals) and actions which bend, sidestep or generally fall belowthe strictly legal line but are nevertheless normally undertaken becausethey pose no serious challenge to the moral and socio-economic order inwhich ordinary people set their lives. Secondly, we must assess therelevance of this internal distinction in the field of illegality beyond thesimple dichotomy between conformity to and deviance from formalnormative rules (Moore 1978: Introduction). This analysis requires aninformed account of the relationship between the different kinds ofmotivations and actions that characterize the (relevant) levels of illegalityand the rationale underlying the ethics of censure and legitimacyrelevant to each level.

In the light of recent analysis (see, e.g. Parry & Bloch 1989; ArchivesEuropeennes de Sociologie 1991, vol. XXXII; Davis 1992; Pardo 1992,n.d.), we may safely postulate that the relationship between values,social norms and self-interest is neither fixed nor unnegotiable. Thespecific features of the principle of 'heterogeneity of morality' (Lukes1991a: Ch.i) that characterize real people's management of existence inNaples direct us away from the limitations of a generative model ofsocial change, a la Barth (1966), based on the marketistic notion of agoal-seeking actor guided by the logic of maximization of profit. We arereferred, instead, to the rationality of strong continuous interaction (3)between different resources and domains of existence—material andnon-material, monetary and spiritual, mundane and supramundane.There are important analytical advantages in studying the complexdynamism of this interaction through individuals' lives in a situation inwhich power may well be differently and imperfectly distributed(Martin 1977; Heath 1976) but differences in power and access toresources do not necessarily imply dependence and subservience.

My contention is that the empirical study of this strong continuousinteraction, central to our understanding of the processual relationshipbetweeen agency and structure (Abrams 1982; Giddens 1979), fostersthe classic argument that not only does formal law basically regulate the

(3) I originally used the expression 'con- carry mechanistic meanings (and implicationstinuous positive feedback' to describe this of equilibrium and non-equilibrium) whichprocess (see. e.g., Pardo 1992 and 1993). I certainly do not want to convey. 'StrongHowever, in agreement with some critics, I continuous interaction' is a better formulationrecognize that this expression may be seen to of what I want to say.

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partial control of a partial order (Moore 1978: 2-5; Starr & Collier 1989:7 ff.), but, like politics, it cannot afford to be weakly linked to orsuperimposed on the social context (Hamnett 1977: 4; Pitch 1983:120 ff.; Saltman 1985; Strathern 1985) and, like politicians, its rep-resentatives cannot afford to be the agents of a bureaucratized justice(Weber 1978: 979). As a result of the interaction above denned, thecomplex and changing definition of legitimacy among real peopleobservably transcends the opposition of law to custom (Moore 1978:14 ff.), or rational to irrational (Runciman 1991; Offe 1991; Lukes1991a, 1991b), and of powerful to powerless (Lukes 1974, 1987; Harris1986; Pardo 1993, n.d.; Prato 1993). Ordinary Neapolitans' view of whatis legitimate may not always agree with a Weberian notion of rationalityof law (Weber 1978: Chap. 8) (4)—often unmatched by formal law itself(Moore 1978; Starr & Collier 1989). This does not mean, however, thatit belongs to an irrational sub-system hopelessly marginal to mainstreamlegal philosophy, and therefore to the rhetoric of the 'nobility of pur-pose' of civil society, or that it is inescapably instrumental to the (moreor less) entrenched interests of political opportunism. Because therationality of such a definition plays a crucial role in the relationship ofmany citizens to 'the establishment', understanding it in depth is a taskas crucial to jurisprudence and the 'morality of law' (Fuller 1964) as it isto political philosophy (Lukes 1991a: Chap. 2), the theory of the state(Bobbio 1976), and, ultimately, the (re)consolidation of the democraticsystem (Cotta 1992; Bobbio 1987; Rusconi 1993).

The grey side of inner-city life

The reader is probably familiar with Naples' image as an un-governable city. Unemployment, corruption and crime, found in variousdegrees throughout Europe, are said to be so serious, deep-rooted andendemic here that the city is doomed to violence and anarchy. The inner-city quartieri (sing, quartiere, quarters) (5) are described as evidenceof such a destiny. It has been repeatedly argued that because life in themfosters poverty and amorality, they provide a cultural and socio-economicbreeding ground for both petty crime and organized crime, to the

(4) In particular, technical systematism, a formal government.impartiality, internal coherence, and explicity, (5) Neapolitans, like other Italians, use theas guarantees of 'equality before the law' word quarter to indicate both the council(Weber 1978: 979-80). Stirling (1968) raises districts and the neighbourhood where theystimulating issues in the relationship of these live, but this causes no confusion for it isaspects to personal morality in societies with always clear in which way the word is used.

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employment and recruitment power of which the popolino (roughly,populace) are supposed to be easily exposed (6). Increasingly unpopularamong magistrates, businessmen, academics, and other key elites whoare becoming prominent in today's Naples, such a view has significantlyencouraged a sensationalist image of the situation, at the expense ofunderstanding.

As anthropologists well know, it is not always wise or useful toassume that res ipsa loquitur. The intricate relationship between whatappears and what actually goes on that has emerged from prolongedfieldwork among the popolino and the petty bourgeois stresses theargument of the present essay well beyond the point—which needsnonetheless to be made—that there is strong reason to question the'special' link between inner-city life and crime that is often establishedby the intellectual analysis of contemporary Europe. More precisely, itstrongly contradicts the intellectual and political value given to theabove outlined view of the situation.

Many ordinary Neapolitans conduct their lives without alwaysstrictly abiding by the law. Small transgressions such as those againsttraffic laws are common, and so are various activities that according toformal definition fall in the grey area between legality and illegality orare unequivocally illegal. Among these activities are managing all sortsof businesses without a licence, evading tax on income and production,cheating bills and fines, knowingly purchasing goods that are illegallyproduced, smuggled (7) or possibly stolen. However, given the principlethat the definition of what is criminal is a social process, classifying theseactivities as criminal would miss the point that their moral legitimacy isthe result of the processual redefinition of actors' moral and spiritualvalues, entrepreneurialism and understanding of formal law and ofpower (legal and criminal) more generally.

To be more precise, we need to ask whether we can safely assumethat these urban dwellers are irreparably corrupted by a 'criminalmentality', provide widespread moral support for the relatively limitednumber of criminals who live and operate in the inner city, and areculturally sympathetic with the corrupt in public life. I have recentlyexamined this last issue (see 1993), a sophisticated understanding of thefirst two must account for the significance of actors' own sense of rightand wrong—and the associated concepts of order, transgression and

(6) I have made a critical assessment of this raises a whole range of economic, political andway of portraying the popolino in a book-length ethical questions of wide significance on themonograph (n.d.). monopoly, or restrictive regulations, estab-

(7) Widespread dealing in smuggled goods, lished by the state on certain products andlike 'informal' provision of all sorts of services, sections of the market.

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condemnation—not only to their own self-image, behaviour and socialrelations, but also to contextual, structural restrictions and facilitations(Lukes 1991a: Chap. 2; Giddens 1979; Ortner 1984).

'Only failures, junkies, and real criminals do not work':negotiated legitimacies in the management of existence

The above-quoted statement vividly introduces an important aspectof the popolino's rationality. In accordance with their negotiatedunderstanding of the formal definition of legitimate action, theirmanagement of existence draws not on compliance with a normativeframework legitimated by 'tradition', as opposed to 'civil society', but onentrepreneurial handling of the blurring of boundaries between thecategories of modern organization of labour (Wallman 1984; Pahl 1984)and between those of legality and illegality. Whether they are formallyemployed or unemployed, the popolino I have met work hard to make aliving well above the poverty line and, unlike their petty bourgeoisneighbours who mostly identify with the values of organized labour,they exemplify an important aspect of the manageable relationship theyhave established between transgression and order when they describeindependent labour and free enterprise as meritorious and rewardingwork. Their market-oriented attitude, distance from proletarian values,and expectations and motivations underlie the grassroots consistencybetween the interaction that informs their lives and the culture ofpersonal ability intended as sape'fa' (literally, cleverness). A person whoce sap' fa' (is clever) is a skilful and resourceful person endowed with ablend of inner strength, determination and quickness of mind thatdenies ruthlessness. In the everyday reality of socio-economic compe-tition, the moral and normative sine qua non of this concept of sape' fa' isthat coping with life is a matter of developing the entrepreneurial abilityto construct monetary and non-monetary resources. Actors' deep-rootedcommitment to such a goal leaves socially and morally isolated the fewwho will not work because they lack initiative, give in to drugs, or findeasy money appealing.

Within this context, hard work is a necessary condition to thenegotiation of what the popolino call 'earthly purgatory' (8). It is both animportant means of accomplishing of one's task in life and evidence ofsuccess. Provided that they are not tossic'\i] (sing. tossic'[o], junkies), I

(8) Thus they describe their view of the of which they regard as negotiable and to ahuman condition, the inherent precariousness certain extent redefinable (Pardo 1989).

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was consistently told, it is those who lack initiative or the will to workhard who become criminals. This view is particularly strong amongteenagers who, linking entrepreneurial values to moral and ethicalprinciples which are more common among the petty bourgeoisie, appearto be taking their view of a fulfilled life further away from the field of thesemi-legal. They retain a certain degree of flexibility, but place theformal definition of what is legal and right within a new (and locallyrecognized) vision of ethical conduct that distinguishes more sharplyactivities which are unmistakably evil and criminal from activities whichare, after all, 'acceptable'.

It is in the terms of the complex rationale of sape' fa' that mostpopolino shun resignation to hopelessness, investing, instead, in a varietyof exchanges (often deferred and indirect) and drawing an income fromthe management of what is on offer or can be profitably 'created' in thelegal and semi-legal arenas. They show an equally strong motivation toavoid performing activities that involve a high risk 'e se comprommeter'ca legge (of becoming compromised with the law). The highest level ofcalculated risk they seem prepared to take is that involved in sellingtickets for clandestine lotteries (9). Giving a typical account, a ticket-seller said that he was aware that 'criminal bosses are behind the lot-teries, but nobody would think that I'm a criminal just 'cause I selltickets'. His female associate added : 'The police know this. If they catchus, they may take us in for questioning and fine us, but you don't getnicked for selling tickets, otherwise half Naples'd be behind bars' (10).The important point is that even when actors recognize that theireconomic performance into the grey area takes them objectively near thecriminal end of the spectrum, they still tend to describe such activities asprofitable and quasi-licit ways to earn an income (or extra-income), notas truly criminal or morally wrong. Certainly, these activities are notseen to provide, in themselves, sufficient reason for actors, or theirsignificant group, to question their personal honesty and goodness.

The category of 'real crime', unequivocally condemned instead as adomain of activity that sharply contrasts with ordinary people's cultureand actions, includes extortion, drug-dealing, and the criminals' violentinterpretation of social relations and competition over both power and

(9) The hundreds of ordinary Neapo- who know 'somebody who knows the rightlitans who do such selling in their homes, people'.streets, work-places, etc. retain a small (10) The clandestine lotteries are popularpercentage of the bets. Their links with the mainly because they have a reputation ofcriminal organization are very indirect, efficiency which is not matched by the state-through neighbours, work-mates, or friends managed ones.

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socio-economic resources. As part of a general tendency to judgepeople's behaviour on its own merits, the popolino describe real crim-inals—particularly the Camorristi(n)—as definitely negative figures.With only minor differences in emphasis, they and their petty bourgeoisneighbours draw on personal experience and common wisdom whenthey describe them as the holders of a monopoly of ruthlessness androotlessness which challenge the recognized order of social life. Theseabsolute examples of unredeemable evil embody a rare exception to thegeneral disposition to tolerance (also of sin and wrongdoing) enshrinedin the local culture of the relative negotiability of moral acceptance andsupramundane approval. Formal law's casuistic (see, e.g. Bettiol 1993;Tamburino 1993) legitimation of these criminals' ability to 'repent' (12)through cooperation with judicial enquiries finds no justification amongthe popolino, for whom they remain people who cannot be trusted orforgiven. Other prevalent themes are that they harass honest people whostruggle to make a living, promote wrong values among the young suchas arrogance, violence and a taste for easy money, and, perhaps aboveall, ruin their lives through drug-dealing, which they totally control andwhich is resented as the primary cause of the social disruptiveness thathaunts everyday life (13).

Such strong moral censure of real crime is also an important indi-cation of the relative significance of money (Parry & Bloch 1989:Introduction), considering that the popolino value all that money canbuy and are well aware that criminals do make huge amounts of money.Local criminals use part of this money for self-promotion, through amixture of extravagantly pompous behaviour, acquisition of objects ofdesire and excesses of generosity. However, broadly reminescent of apoint made by Gambetta (1988: 135 ff.), their interest in the charismaticauthority enjoyed by the mythical villains of the past (14) is decisively

(11) I use this word reluctantly, especially mentality are basically different from those of aas a plural. As both observation and judicial Mafia type.enquiries suggest, there is little in common (12) In Italy, the criminal and terroristbetween the modern urban criminals conven- turncoats are widely known as pentiti (literally,tionally called Camorristi and those of the past repented).(Villari 1979 [1855]; Monnier 1965 [1863]; (13) Direct or indirect experience of theAlongi 1890; De Blasio 1973 [1901]). Today's moral, psychological and material tragedy ofCamorristi can be described as hardened crim- addiction has left in the lives of most locals ainals who, loosely organized in groups or bitterness and awareness of lost opportunities,'clans', control huge amounts of dirty money inadequacy and degradation that contrastthrough extortion, clandestine lotteries and the deeply with their values of management ofdrug business, but also through shops, work- existence.shops, and the building and leisure sectors. (14) The collective representation of old-Although they are strongly connected with style villains of the recent past, vividly sup-certain politicians, their organization and ported by the reminiscences of older people,


frustrated by the fact, obvious in the quarter, that their action mayembody some entrepreneurial hallmarks, but (pace Arlacchi) it pro-foundly denies the complex relationship between values, norms andself-interest which, by degrees of fulfilment, grants positive symbolicpower to ordinary people's entrepreneurship. Apart from its devastatingeffects on their received image, such a failure to meet the basicrequirements for a local person to feel and be recognized as someonewho is successful and moral stresses both their cultural insignificanceand the negative meaning given to their wealth, further restricting theirroom for manoeuvre as employers.

Semi-legal and illegal actions and social relations are incorporatedinto or excluded from actors' identity and universes of resources notsimply on account of their material value, but in accordance with thecriteria that justify respect for a person's accomplished embodiment ofsuccess. Real criminals' money is evil not in itself, but because itsymbolizes their violation of the morality of success and respect asvalues that cannot be imposed or transacted. And it is precisely suchviolation that places them irreparably outside the relatively flexible fieldof legitimacy. Lacking important moral credentials, criminals are widelyregarded as cowardly crooks whose strength 'amounts to using guns andbeing backed by like-minded scums' and whose performance, far frommeeting the aforementioned criteria of sape' fa', is fatally flawed by theabsolutely transgressive advantage they derive from their control ofviolence, prevarication and huge amounts of dirty money in need ofbeing laundered. To put it simply, in drawing the line between thelegitimate and the illegitimate in this field the popolino may well fail toestablish a formally acceptable distinction between legality and illegality,but their choices are characteristically influenced by the proportionalrelationship which they have established between the concepts of sape'fa' and self-worth, and those of success and failure. Even people whosay that they 'have friends in all walks of life' contribute to the collectiverepresentation of criminals' lack of authority by discerningly stating that'there is no honour or prestige in being a Camorrista'.

Real criminals are accordingly marginalized from the processes ofsocialization of ordinary life through their identification as 'people of theabbient". The word abbient' is used by the popolino to describe thedifferent 'environment' to which hardened criminals belong. It

grants them the normative credentials of 'men volino, Gay, and Pagano 1985) and writersof respect' who 'wouldn't harass honest people (see, e.g. Jouackim 1979). Comparable Britishgoing about their businesses'. Informative examples are described in Samuel (1981) anddescriptions of these criminals are given by Hobbs(ig89).local magistrates (Miller 1983; Roberti, Ier-

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encompasses more than the strictly criminal circle. Although locals donot usually liken the abbient' to a specific organization or sect charac-terized by a strict code of honour and by rituals of entrance, passage ofrank, punishment, etc., they do regard it as a culturally and sociallyseparate entity. Expanding on Gambetta's point on the power criminalsderive from intelligence (1988: 135 ff.), it is common wisdom in thequarter that the less they know about what goes on among ordinarypeople, the less they are likely to prevaricate. This indicates thatpeople's verbal and behavioural statements about 'being careful aboutwhat you say and do in the presence of those of the abbient" is correctlyinterpreted as rational precaution in the management of risk, not (oronly relatively) as the kind of submission dictated by fear.

The listed features of the complex relationship of ordinary people'sself-identity to semi-legality and crime are part of a broader situation inwhich actors appear to be generally aware of their basic legal rights andduties, of the associated laws and concept of order, and of the formaland 'informal' channels of the legal system. If we accept that incontemporary western democracies the agency/structure relationship isalways marked by degrees of reciprocal—if unequal and imperfect—influence, it is not surprising to observe that while the popolino dorecognize that 'a legge e legge (the law is the law) and that 'a legge nunammette ignoranza (law admits no ignorance), they do not behave orregard themselves as people who are overwhelmed by a normative/legalsystem which is imposed upon them by a hegemonic culture and socialapparatus, and against which they must struggle to survive. They dorecognize that often formal law runs counter to their interests but theygive legitimacy to it by acting in accordance with the belief that theirrelationship to the legal system is relatively negotiable. To carefulobservation, the practical value of such a belief introduces an intriguingdynamism in the classic Weberian relationship between dominance,legitimacy and authority (Weber 1978: Chap. 10).

My informants' universes include various 'representatives of the law'.When it is not possible to do otherwise, they mobilize policemen,employees of the judiciary (usually ushers, clerks and bureaucrats), andsolicitors to cope with legal problems. Their relationships with awocati(lawyers) is illustrative of their understanding of the system and of itsspecialized agents. Like other Europeans, Neapolitans give practicalimportance to the fact that many of those in power (political, financialand bureaucratic) are lawyers who often behave dishonestly anddishonourably; that the widely perceived value of formal ideals aboutthe objectivity of the law is aptly encapsulated in the maxim, fatta la


%e, trovato I'inganno (every law has a loop-hole), and that lawyersnotoriously control wide networks and shrewdly practise this maxim.Moreover, because they have developed varied resource options in thisfield, their obvious interest in these classic (Moore 1978: 1) assets oflawyers does not usually make them dependent—psychologically orotherwise—on one particular contact. Reflecting the way they generallymanage contacts, they tend, instead, to establish transactional relationswhich are often characterized by an element of co-culturality anddeferred exchanges, as lawyers gladly accept gifts that often remainapparently unreciprocated. Clearly, however, there is much more thanplain impertinence in the fact that the popolino call certain solicitorspagliette (sing, paglietta, cheap straw hats fashionable in the past) (15),and their other contacts in the judiciary, half dismissively, spicciafacenri(busybodies).

These attitudes cannot be reduced to mere manipulations of the lawand its institutions. They are more appropriately seen as a demon-stration of actors' awareness of its limitations as a formal device toproduce social control (Hamnett 1977: Introduction; Moore 1978). Aspart of their management of existence, the popolino's nuanced view ofthe permissible—and more generally of moral, legitimate and orderlybehaviour—raises crucial issues of value and norm, providing anexample of how here as elsewhere in urban Europe (e.g. Hobbs 1989)real people construct strategies of control which transcend, in practicallife, the western jurisprudential principle of law as imposed law (Weber1978: Chap. 8: 753-84; Burman and Harrel-Bond 1979: Introduction;Lloyd-Bostock 1979). Of course, all sorts of social, economic andpolitical distortions are thus made possible. There is, however, no needto endorse the kind of radical 'legal pluralism' recently criticized byTamanaha (1993; but see also Pitch 1983: 122), or the determinismwhich he apparently suggests, to recognize that the sociologicalsignificance—and, in fact, the very existence—of these distortionsshould not be taken for granted. Nor do we have to assume that wheresuch distortions do occur they are the only or the most significantoutcome of the combination of a certain culture and constraints.

The popolino cast their choices into a moral, spiritual and behaviouralframework whose recognized rationale of 'fulfilment' puts almost equalemphasis on (relative) financial success and on satisfaction, honesty and

(15) Thus Neapolitans describe mediocre power. In the past these solicitors were centralbut cunning solicitors who manage to be useful figures in political clientelism (Allum 1973:by compensating their professional incom- 79 ft.). The symbolism of pagliette powerfullypetence with hectic network-constructing and indicates their cheapness as solicitors and aswith 'undignified subservience' to those in persons.

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the generosity associated with being good by doing good. The balancedcombination of all these aspects contributes substantially to theunpredatory character of actors' entrepreneurship and gives them reasonto feel worthy of the good attitude of their significant others. Moreprofoundly, the accomplishment of a fulfilled life within the moralboundaries of proper or acceptable behaviour thus defined, legitimatesactors' hope of being in 'God's grace' and of enjoying the memory of theliving after death—two crucial aspects, that is, of general well-being andsecurity (Pardo 1989, 1992). It is in the symbolic framework corre-sponding to the aspiration to this real (Davis 1992: Chap. 2) ultimateend (Stauth 1992: 226 ff.) that actors engage in various forms ofnegotiation of material achievement and formal, institutional moralityand, within limits, domesticate the problematic and the transgressive intheir lives. Case material on the relationships between criminals andordinary people in real life will help to further clarify this point,building towards the argument that the problematic nature of suchrelationships raises at once serious doubts about criminals' significancein inner-city Naples, and complex questions of interpretation, in politicsand law, of ordinary people's management of existence.

Problematic networks in the economics of self-worth

It is difficult to judge what truly remains in contemporary Naples ofthe stranglehold imposed for a long time by political corruption andorganized crime. With various degrees of articulation, exemplificationand explicity many Neapolitans say that organized crime has been madepossible by high-up complicity and that there is varied interest acrossthe political spectrum in promoting the image of a city populated by alarge number of criminals or potential criminals. And yet, criminalsappear to be losing control even of their traditional strongholds. I haverecorded, for instance, several cases of young members of criminalfamilies who have escaped the abbient'. Discussed in the neighbourhoodas exemplary and by the protagonists as difficult but possible, thesechoices invariably mean forgoing the financial advantages offered by acriminal life and severing social and emotional links. On a more importantlevel, the gulf between criminals' culture and ordinary people'sencourages the ethnographer to ask what role will whatever is left ofsuch a stranglehold be allowed to play in the 'new' political climate ?

This situation suggests that it is the individually negotiated re-lationship among morality, norm and action—not rigid or, vice versa,

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vague normative rules—that generates a gradation of positions betweenthe poles of 'acceptance', in the form of participation in crime orcomplicity with criminals, and 'discernment', in the form of takingcalculated risks in the definition and redefinition of personal position.

In this light, the combination of pragmatism, defiance, fearfulacquiescence and moral condemnation that marks actors' attitudetowards criminals would be too easily dismissed as an instrumentallyambiguous form of complicity. Bitterly censorious of criminality andcriminals, ordinary locals may, to a certain extent, use their criminalrelatives or neighbours to solve certain crises, and, 'for the sake ofpeace', they may grant a degree of aquiescence to them by ignoring theircrimes and omitting to report them to the police. Seldom, however, doesthis apparently comprehensive form of tolerance include the approvaland support which they regard as central to a person's choices, actionsand sense of well-being. Instead, they explain their commitment toavoid crossing chella ggent' (derogatively, those people) with the impera-tive, teng' famiglia (I've a family). They rarely use 'judgemental' wordssuch as Camorrista or criminal in public, preferring instead expressionssuch as 'those of the abbient" or 'those in the street', and sometimestransfer local villains to symbolically manageable domains by describingthem as 'childhood friends', 'the children of relatives' (or of friends), or'relatives who have taken the wrong way'. Not always, however, issubtlety possible, advisable or useful. An example of such difficulty isprovided by the experience of Lino, a locally popular stallholder,shopowner (typically, these activities are registered in his wife's andson's names) and social-service employee now in his forties whom Ihave described at length elsewhere (1993). As a preliminary, I note thatapart from a short-lived attempt in his youth to deal in smuggledcigarettes, the closest Lino has come to serious illegal behaviour is indodging fines and tax, performing unlicensed work activities, bettingregularly in the clandestine lotteries, and buying goods of dubiousorigins. Nevertheless, he claims relations of friendship—as we shall see,of questionable symbolic, emotional and transactional value—with somelocal villains.

One afternoon, Lino, his brother Luigi, and another friend visitedme for an after-lunch coffee. The conversation soon focused on theviolent quarrel we had witnessed that morning between a local villainand one of the shopkeepers whom for some time he had forced to buylarge amounts of bad quality merchandise which was probably stolen.Sharing the others' anger, sarcasm and contempt as they mentionedsimilar experiences, Lino gave a detailed account of how, in the round of

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a day, he had recently had his moped stolen, recovered through Gaetano(a young gang-leader), and then stolen again. He was setting up the stallwhen a friend informed him that the moped, chained in a nearby vtcolo,had been stolen—he had recognized the identity marks (i 6). Answeringmy questions, Lino said that the identity marks and the chain were notmeant to prevent thefts ('There's little you can really do againstdetermined thieves', he added), but respectively to distinguish hismoped from similar others and to deter joy-riders. Overstressed as itmay appear to the outsider, such cynicism about the reality of crime, notto be confused with fatalist tolerance, is explained partly as a response tothe problematic situation in which actors are forced to dwell, and partlyas an aspect of their symbolic and psychological protection against anysurprises. The corresponding strategies stress the need to watch eachother's properties—which, in spite of being usually described more as away to limit the damage inflicted by crimes actually committed than as atruly preventive measure, is in fact identifiable as an informal version ofwhat in Britain is known as 'neighbourhood watch' schemes (17). Therisks involved in reporting a crime to a friend or a relative are notexplicitely assessed, but actors' behaviour and (vague) statementsindicate that this 'legitimate defence' against crime and abuse is notbelieved to carry the risk of criminals' retaliation that—here as else-where (see, e.g. Hobbs 1989; The Spectator 26 March 1994, 9-11)—isassociated with reporting a crime to the police.

It was widely recognized that the loss of the moped was quite seriousfor Lino because the financial damage would be aggravated by hishaving to limit his activities until he could manage to get a replacement.As the thieves were said to belong to Gaetano's band, he, encouraged byhis significant others, decided to approach Gaetano, ask for his help, andpromise a 'gift' for whoever would find the moped. He did not do solightheartedly because he knew that Gaetano was a ruthless criminal andthat, in his own words, 'You may well know these people sincechildhood but becoming obligated to them is always dangerous'.However, he also knew that, because he enjoyed an unequivocallylegitimate place in the local community, he did not need to worry aboutthe risk of moral pollution involved in such a direct—but temporary—liaison with a real criminal. Moreover, as in this case Gaetano's power tointervene was too obviously direct for obligation to occur on trulyproblematic grounds, the promised gift and Lino's outspoken gratitude

(16) Since 1994 small motorcycles in Italy the prevention of crime, basically involve acarry number plates, but they can still be formal commitment to watch over each other'sdriven without a licence. homes.

(17) These schemes, set up by residents for

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would be sufficient reciprocation. Shortly after he spoke to Gaetano,Lino, acting on a tip-off, recovered the moped, only to find, on closingthe stall late that evening, that it had been stolen again by othermembers of Gaetano's band.

This time Lino gave the moped up for lost. In spite of scorn being socheekily added to injury, he saw no reason either to change his mind andturn to the police, who are regarded as useless in these matters, or toreport this second offence to Gaetano, whose performance haddemonstrated local people's privately expressed conviction that theCamorristi's attempts to impose themselves as insubstitutable resourcesare pointless. Not only did Gaetano obviously lack authority or—per-haps worse—the will to put the locally legitimated idea of justice beforepredatory and criminal self-interest, he was also guilty of profoundlyoffensive disregard for Lino's dignity. Whether or not Gaetano reallyhad any choice, his performance had been self-destructive andnarrow-minded; if by choosing to 'make justice' he would haveextracted important (though limited, in today's situation) non-materialbenefits, by failing to act in tune with the local community's recognitionof Lino's predicament, he ended up emphasizing the transgressivecharacter of his criminal culture and sense of priorities. Moreover, thefact that Lino was less surprised by the second theft than by Gaetano'shelpful attitude when he first approached him vividly illustrates crim-inals' loss of control over an important aspect of their intepretation ofsocial exchange, protection.

Confronted, on the other hand, with the objection that omitting toreport crimes to the police could be described as a facilitation of crime,Lino typically insists that it is a matter of degree, not only of acquiescencebut also of responsibility. Too often, he says, the police fail to prosecuteorganized crime; for which, he concedes, their corruption may well notbe the only, or the main, explanation because policemen who do notacquiesce do not live easily. This is complicated by the fact that thepopolino may well be convinced that police action will probably not ridthem—and the city—of the criminals, while continuing to jeopardizetheir informal and semi-legal dealings, but in their multifacetedresource-systems policemen are often contacts who intriguingly coexistwith criminals like Gaetano. Through one of these policemen, 'onPeppino (18), Lino and many others negotiate or avoid paying the finesfor tax-dodging in their trades, obtain trading licences and a place fortheir stalls in a highly competitive market-environment, learn in a

(18) The honorific [d]'on (Fern.: [d]'otma) is granted to ordinary people and to usefula mark of respect which can be indifferently contacts.

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timely way of being 'watched' by the police, or have minor chargesdropped. People are ambivalent about the likes of him. In recognition ofhis help and (limited) authority, he is given gifts and is allowed to shopfree at many shops and stalls (monetary bribes appear to be seldominvolved); but, although his behaviour is described as 'understandable,considering that the police are paid miserably', he is unequivocallydescribed as a dishonest and untrustable busybody.

Coping with disruptive behaviour through mediation

The combination of moral and practical motivations underlyingactors' general cynicism about criminals suggests that their contempt isnot, in substance, an overstatement of independence. There is noobnoxiousness in the fact that criminals are mobilized, when theconclusion is reached that no other useful option is left, to cope withcrises caused directly by them or relatively indirectly by their presencein the neighbourhood. Moreover, even in such extreme circumstancespeople go to great lengths to try to domesticate the inevitable moraldilemma, danger of pollution, and practical risks by approaching themthrough intermediaries.

The complex but speedy resolution of an important crisis caused inLuigi's life by a criminal 'favour seeker' illustrates the rationale bywhich ordinary locals draw the line between the 'licit' and the 'illicit' intheir relationships—however indirect—with criminals. Like many otherpopolino, Luigi, a council employee who also runs a shop jointly with hiswife Anna, has constructed a rewarding universe of material andnon-material (19) resources starting from a position of social disad-vantage, long-term unemployment, and poor education (20). As a state-ment of personal dignity and sape' fa', he says that he does not askfavours of people whom he dislikes and that he has never been involvedin crime; and yet he solved this crisis with the help of a criminal. 'It allbegan', Luigi said, 'when a local Camorrista asked me "the favour" tosell my flat, saying that it was wanted by his boss as a wedding gift forhis daughter'. Luigi explained that he and his family had only tem-porarily moved out, because the flat had been damaged by the 1980

(19) Including contacts with policemen, adays not all the popolino send their children tobureaucrats, politicians, clericals, trade union- school as prescribed by law, but there is aists, solicitors, and other professionals. strong tendency among parents of Luigi's age

(20) Like many of his generation, Luigi left and younger, to encourage their children toschool before finishing statutory education continue their education up to university level,(corresponding roughly to 'O' levels). Now-

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earthquake and needed repairing. This, however, was their home. Theywere deeply affectionate to it; how could he possibly sell it? Knowledgeof the housing problem in central Naples and of the spiritual, emotionaland moral meanings that characterize the popolino's culture of the houseand the related transactions (Pardo 1992) did not stop the Camorristafrom 'advising' Luigi to think again.

As Luigi obviously needed the flat for himself, this criminal wasclearly doing more than breaching formal law. He, like Gaetano, waschallenging basic values in the order of moral and socio-economicrelations, providing an example of the kind of abuse against which, olderinformants argue, charismatic villains provided some form of defence inthe past. This argument cuts no ice with the Luigi's generation, but it isprimarily the younger and generally better educated popolino whodecisively emphasize self-reliance, through the use of 'legitimatecontacts', in coping with problems caused by criminals. Their imagin-ation caught by the recent enquiries into tangentopoli (bribesville)(2i),young informants argue that of course chella ggent' are violent anddangerous but their power can be further limited. In accordance withthe general feeling among ordinary Italians that some justice may be inthe making, they also say that the magistrates of mani pulite (cleanhands) who are doggedly prosecuting criminals and the corrupt notableswho have colluded with them can be trusted to play a crucial role in thenew situation.

Many in the quarter wonder, however, how far these magistrates—po-pular heroes who are clearly not easily bought—will be allowed to go.This form of scepticism is stronger among Luigi's generation. In thecase we are examining he behaved as most of his contemporaries couldbe expected to behave. Faced with the threat of violence by anotoriously violent criminal, he chose the tactics of negotiation, in whichthe 'power of reason' plays the crucial—though not necessarilyobvious—role. He has often used what he describes as his instru-mentally-minded contacts in the legal system, especially in connectionwith his business; in this case, however, he ruled out both theseresources and formal legal routes as time-wasting and potentiallydangerous. He mobilized, instead, a local boss, Amalia, through hisfriend Genny, a seller of falsely labelled clothing and leather accessorieswho is not a criminal but has contacts in the abbient'. The widow of alocal boss, Amalia is known for her aggressive behaviour but has neverbeen involved in bloodshed or drug-dealing, and people give her credit

(21) This is a mixture of bribery, pursuit of private interest through public office, corruption,and collusion with criminals.

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for successfully managing clandestine lotteries in a large area. Pleasedwith Amalia's serious handling of the complex business of becoming amediator in such a delicate dispute (Gulliver 1977), Luigi described howshe became more hospitable and agreed to help only after havingconducted a 'proper enquiry' into the matter. Taking for granted that insuch extraordinary circumstances Luigi's legal ownership of and 'sen-timent' for his home gave him no special advantage, she interviewedhim to make sure, she said, that he really needed the flat, and, then,made two telephone calls, one to a woman dealer in smuggled cigarettesand clandestine lotteries who lived in the building where Luigi's familywere temporarily staying and who confirmed Luigi's predicament, theother to the villain who had threatened him.

Luigi's detailed account of this second telephone conversation and ofthe events that followed gives us insights into the way in which those ofthe abbient' (in this case two persons with very different images) handlethis kind of transaction. Amalia used much verbal elaboration andindirectness to say that having been interested in Luigi's story by afriend, she had taken the poor man's case to heart and would appreciateif her interlocutor could kindly spare the time to discuss briefly thematter. As her request was promptly granted, she, clearly gratified,hung up and, having re-stated her sympathy for the injustice Luigi wassuffering, had her child 'properly' dressed by her home-help, and thendrove the whole party to the bidder's place. Once there, they werewarmly welcomed by the man's wife who made a point of playing withthe child, congratulating Amalia on his looks and vivacity. Havingestablished such a relaxed atmosphere, the woman called her husband to'inform' him that Amalia and two friends were honouring them with avisit. As the man joined the party, the usual coffees were drunk andAmalia gave her account of Luigi's (widely known, she pointed out)housing predicament and, without mentioning injustice or sentiment,she made a passionate appeal on Luigi's behalf, trusting, she said, in thebidder's good-heartedness and his having a family too. Her concern,argument and conciliatory attitude appeared to be persuasive enough forthe Camorrista to forgo strictly self-centred and immediate interest, andto become more sympathetic without having to lose face. The wholetransaction had now shifted to a moral ground which he was prepared tounderstand, making it easier for him to appreciate the future returnsfrom his improved relationship with this powerful woman, and the(limited) beneficial effects of the 'good-hearted' action he was beingasked to make on his ruthless image as a criminal of nowadays. Havingthus far ignored Luigi and Genny, he now meaningfully began address-

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ing them as 'on and promised to help. Luigi was not bothered againabout his property.

The relation of interest to values and norms in the mediation ofAmalia requires attention. Luigi, who remains cynical about the bidder,is both disenchanted and apologetic about her. 'She belongs to theabbiente anyway', he says, while declaring, in the same breath, that shedeserves his gratitude. This attitude is partly reflected in what he toldher once the meeting with the bidder was over. Having praised herability and prestige in such powerful circles, he ritually expressed hisgratitude and recognition of the morality of her performance saying,'Onn'Ama', avit' fatt' 'na bon'azion', 'a Madonn' v'o renn" fonn' Amaliayou've done good, the Madonna'll repay you). Judging by the way Luigireported this statement to me, he used the intensely emotional bodylanguage and voice inflexion that I have seen various other locals use tomake it clear that they are truly grateful. He added: 'sto semp' a di-sposizion" (I'm always at your disposal). What people mean when theystate their gratitude to a criminal is a particularly complex question. Forexample, to understand the real value of Luigi's additional remark wemust understand the role played by people like Genny in the economicsof gratitude and obligation. Genny's action shows that links with theunderworld via kinship, friendship or business may elect a person to therole of broker through whom it becomes relatively safe, and licit, toliaison with criminals in coping with certain crises. However, thesetransactions are necessarily rare and require a strongly motivated brokerbecause obligation is expected to occur between the favour-seeker andthe broker and between the latter and his criminal contact, carryingproblematic implications for the broker. As for the favour-seeker,contemporary criminals know that they cannot always force ordinarypeople to reciprocate and that a true feeling of obligation is out of thequestion as the discerning popolino of nowadays have widely transform-ed traditional motivations of respect for powerful villains into ratherempty expressions of tolerance through unspecified gratitude.

As Luigi expected, he has not heard again from Amalia. Her'mid-level' of criminality yields enough power to make her a real boss,without necessarily involving the ruthlessness that characterizes insteadcriminals like Gaetano and the 'unfair bidder'. Unlike violent andpredatory criminals, villains like Amalia seem to enjoy a degree ofcredibility when they behave 'morally', and therefore have reason tobe content with the unspecified gratitude and generally positive attitudeof the limited number of locals whom they have helped. Thesignificance of these intangible results of Amalia's efforts to her self-

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identity as a boss is not easily assessed, but their mitigating effect on thenegative aspects of her involvement in crime appears to be sufficientlyrewarding to motivate her to continue to be occasionally 'helpful' in asituation in which mid-level criminals make a point of showing that theyare 'good-hearted' and devout persons, also participating in pilgrimagesand celebrations. Let us expand on this point.

Poorly explained as 'self-advertisement' for the promotion of crim-inals' services (Gambetta 1988: 142 ff.), such behaviour directs us toexamine further the relationship between morality, norms and action atthis level of criminality. For the popolino, I have said, real criminals areevil persons whose sins are unforgivable and cannot be atoned for. Mostimportant in this culture (Pardo 1989), as they are believed to have nohope to save their souls before or after death, their participation in andlavish donations to local religious celebrations are widely dismissed asvane—as well as hypocritical—attempts to improve their image. Suchmoral/spiritual hopelessness does not seem to extend to the level ofcriminality embodied by Amalia. In spite of her efforts to conform withimportant aspects of ordinary people's culture, she, like 'real criminals',does not enjoy the key resource (Gambetta 1988: 132 ff.) of their trust.However, without expecting them to waive self-interest, actors do makesome allowances for the villains who are not involved in the mostdespicable dealings and who do not use violence systematically. As theabove analysis indicates, it would be misleading to regard the relatively'less stained' local reputation of villains like Amalia as evidence of their'co-culturality' with the popolino. At the same time, their 'moral' and'religious' behaviour cannot be strictly explained as wilful, instrumentalmanipulation of popular symbolic life; it is rather an aspect of theirmotivation to maintain a relatively acceptable image in their neigh-bourhood, realistically hoping to lower the risk of people's ostracism.Thus, Amalia remains a boss who is not evil and is occasionallygood-hearted.

On a different level, the rest of this section addresses the problem ofdifferentiating between levels of criminality by examining the distortingrole played by criminals in local social relations through direct links withordinary people. While I was in the field, Luisa had a fight with Rosa, anew neighbour who was widely disliked because of her arrogance andcriminal kin. Although neither Rosa nor her husband are criminals(Rosa works at home for a factory and her husband is a trader) theirproblematic relations played the key role in motivating her neighbours'overt ostracism; instead, it is worth noting, of intimidating them intoshowing acceptance (or even subservience) as perhaps would have

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happened in the past. These contacts also contributed to make a trivialdispute belonging by definition to the realm of civil law transpass intothat of criminal law. According to Luisa's and another neighbour'sseparate accounts, the dispute over the maintenance of a common areaalmost degenerated into physical violence because Luisa reacted toRosa's shouted abuse by threathening to disclose what she knew abouther (22). Neighbours' conciliatory intervention did not stop Rosa fromcontinuing to take issue, with the obvious intention of provoking aserious crisis which would—from her point of view, hopefully—lead to achiariment' (clarification) (23), and therefore to an improvement in hergeneral position. She did so dangerously and obliquely, by mobilizingwhat she thought were her best resources, her criminal kin. As Luisa,believing she had right on her side, refused to offer a public apology,threats were made about shooting Lino in the leg (male criminals rarelyattack women physically). Promptly informed by one of his daughters,Lino acted quickly, knowing that criminals' threats are better takenseriously. With Luisa's approval, he asked a childhood friend, anotorious criminal, to intervene on their behalf. Through a complexprocess which deserves separate analysis, the dispute was thus rituallysettled as the combination of neighbours' sympathy and potentialviolence embodied by the criminals mobilized through friendship byLino and Luisa proved sufficiently powerful to counterbalance theviolence threatened by the criminal contacts enjoyed through kinship bytheir opponents. Knowing that the whole building was watching andlistening, the two women calmly stated their cases in the neutralhallway, acknowledged their torts (respectively of unneighbourly,provocative behaviour and of 'staining insinuation' (24)), and then shookhands; their husbands and the criminal sponsors declared that it was ashame that such misunderstandings should occur between 'reasonable'and 'good' people.

(22) Luisa was referring to rumours of participate. The expression chiariment appliesRosa's 'improper' past sexual life. only to serious disputes between peers; it

(23) The symbolism of 'clarification', by no would not be used for the settling of 'ordinary'means associated exclusively with disputes quarrels, or to describe situations like the meet-involving criminals, is complex and overlaps ing between Luigi and the criminal bidder,the categories of arbitration and mediation (24) The significance of Luisa's information(Gulliver 1977: 15-16 and n. 1). In brief, a was stressed by the fact that she was notclarification ritually brings the opponents to accused of the much more morally compro-'explain' and negotiate their positions in the mising offence of slander (which would havepresence of third parties of undisputed auth- been a valuable resource for Rosa in the dis-ority. In particularly problematic cases, clarifi- pute settlement). As criminals are increasinglycation may well be part of a broader process marginalized from social life, it is ordinaryinvolving several meetings and elaborate people who seem to be advantaged in compe-behind-the-scenes negotiations in which a rela- tition over this resource of information,tively large number of people may actively

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The wishful element (on Rosa's side) in such declarations, thoughsymbolically powerful, had no immediate practical effect. In recognitionof Lino's and Luisa's higher moral ground (25), the party moved intotheir flat for a coffee, leaving the door ajar as a positive symbolic state-ment that a new understanding was being successfully negotiated, notimposed through violence or threats. The door carries distinctivemeanings of protection and separation among the popolino of Naples(Pardo 1992: 263). In the contemporary situation of competition anddiffused criminality, it constitutes a physical, psychological and sym-bolic barrier against envy and petty-crime (26). People say that now-adays they leave the door open only when there is a death in the family(Pardo 1989), or when they feel particularly safe. This was, therefore,also a clear indication that now Lino and Luisa expected no danger fromoutside their home and their problematic guests posed no danger for themoral community. As the crisis was being solved, this show of relativetrust and conviviality served the important purpose of letting thesignificant group be in no doubt about the reconciliation between thetwo women and their households and, above all, about the newcomers'negotiated acceptability. The remaining grudges were kept carefullyprivate in the interest of all concerned, including other neighbours whowere involved in the incident only as peace-makers but now enjoy therelative tranquillity of a situation in which Rosa's household is making apoint of being accepted, instead of imposing itself. Lino and the woman'shusband left together, thus advertising the new situation in the quar-ter (27).

The complexity of ordinary people's attitudes to crime and criminalsis emphasized further by the relationship of the petty bourgeoisie tothese issues of moral and practical control. These locals embody animportant variable in the economics of imperfect competition. Ideally,their concept of personal dignity and relationship to formal law admitsno tolerance of the described blurring of boundaries, and their moralityis too inflexible for them to accept as legitimate behaviour the negotiatedchoices and exchanges that characterize the honesty of the popolino.

(25) Lino's and Luisa's moral image and (Pardo 1992: 263 n. 22).position are beyond dispute in the neighbour- (27) As I have experienced, going to the barhood. Moreover, it was accepted that Luisa's together to mark the settlement of a dispute,opponent had wrongfully chosen to summon or, more usually, being invited to do so by theher friends, and it was obvious that Lino and mediator, is a way of publicly stating its suc-Luisa enjoyed the unqualified sympathy of cessful negotiation. In the case of serioustheir neighbours. disputes, this is the first stage of a strategy

(26) In today's situation steel doors and which includes communal lunch in a publicalarms are common. Their protective power is place (see, e.g. Pardo 1993: 89).strengthened by symbolic actions and objects

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Sometimes they manage to abide by their principles (see, e.g. Pardo1992: 262); more generally they compromise. Not only, for example, dothey factually acquiesce in illegality through participation in the marketdemand for illegally produced and marketed goods and services; but,basically reminding us of the exchanges involving people like Genny,they use their popolino network to do things that they are ashamed orunable to do personally, such as placing bets at the clandestine lotteriesor obtaining the cooperation of drug dealers in their efforts to help theirchildren out of drug addiction (28).

Morals of legitimacy: acquiescence, defiance of criminalityand identification with mani pulite

Bringing together key issues raised by this ethnography of therelationship between legality, semi-legality and criminality in Naples,we can reasonably say that ordinary people's liaisons with criminals arerestricted to coping with serious crises caused directly or indirectly bycriminals. From the moral, social and financial point of view, actorsregard these liaisons as problematic, regardless of whether they can beexplained normatively or facilitated by access to brokers like Genny.People like Lino and Luigi may well have gained access to sufficientlystrong rational ground in such dealings through their mastering ofinformation and suitable moral resources in mobilizing criminals as'friends', not as protectors who sell their services (29). They also appearto have established a degree of control over the emotions and uncer-tainty (especially regarding the risk of compromising reciprocation)involved in such transactions (Silver 1989). Nevertheless, theseadvantages do not blind them to their 'friend's' evil identity and mar-ginality as criminals, or, more generally, to criminals' tendency tobestow their 'friendship' within the very narrow limits imposed by theirpredatory self-interest and, when they are at the receiving end oftransactions, to reciprocate on their own terms.

The ruthless and rootless identity of real criminals means thatobligation to them costs dearly. They will only sell their protection onincreasingly uncompromising instrumental terms in exchange for thebuyer's loyalty, support and services. This is precisely the price mostpopolino are unwilling to pay, as they subject obligation to discerning

(28) Elsewhere (n.d. and, briefly, 1992: 257 (29) Gambetta (1988) proposes the use ofn. 9) I have described the popolino's strategies the economic metaphor in the study of thefor coping with this kind of problem. Mafia.

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decisions based on the relationship among morality, norms andentrepreneurialism. When criminals are involved, people seldom feel amoral obligation to gratitude or reciprocation (30), stressing the pointthat criminals' moral and normative position finds little or no support intheir occasional 'favour-bestowing'.

Of course, less resourceful individuals have less room for manoeuvre.However, we have found that our interpretation has much to gain fromtrying to account for the strong motivation of ordinary people to engagein negotiation and mediation, instead of polarization, in managing theirexistences. Within the limits outlined earlier, occasional and temporarytransactions with criminals are rarely seen as sufficient reason to identifya person as a criminal; nor, as has been rightly suggested (Gambetta1988: 129-130), should our analysis do so. One also soon discovers thatit is always very clear to all those involved that these problematicresources carry a danger of moral pollution because of the ever-presentrisk of becoming associated with criminals in the local collective im-agination. Not only, then, are actors unpleasantly aware of being caughtin a situation caused by the very presence of their would-be benefactors,they also express a defiance of criminals that raises in itself seriousdoubts about the hypothesis that such a situation may be self-perpetuating.

More precisely, actors' own motivations and choices—and not leasttheir identification with the protagonists of mani pulite—give us noreason to assume that there is necessarily a proportional relationshipbetween criminals' interest in creating a market for such services, theirability to do so, and people's willingness to purchase such services. Wehave found that condemnation of real criminals goes far beyond vaguestatements, linking directly to two crucial aspects of ordinary locals'culture of fulfilment that justifies the expectation of supramundanebenevolence (31), a legitimate moral reputation and a sense of self-worth. Given their negotiated positions in the legal/illegal spectrum, thisimportant link strongly contributes to devaluate arguments on theirweak morality and indolent disposition to escape the responsibilities oflife. Stressing the tension between the positivism of juridic rationality(which is only theoretically neutral) and people's rationality (which ispractically aware of the necessary balance between morality, norms andobjective constrictions in real life), micro-analysis suggests that thecomplex rationale that explains the inclusion of certain semi-legal

(30) As many informants have repeatedly (31) I have argued in detail (n.d.) that merit,stressed, this may be dangerous, but does not thus intended, brings about much more thanamount to a real transgression of the values the expectation of favours and protection,normally attached to obligation.

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activities into the domain of the permissible also explains actors' un-equivocally negative attitude towards real criminals.

The observation of the young appears to indicate one possiblesolution to the dilemma in which their parents seem to be caught. Thevalue they give to sape' fa' inevitably allows a certain amount of'wheeling and dealing' in the grey area between legality and illegality;but their better control over education and information helps them tocast their actions in a complex interplay between entrepreneurial spirit,the pride of being—as they say— popolino and Neapolitans, a drive toachieve embourgeoisement and respectability, and a strong emphasis ondeserving the respect and support of their families—in life and afterdeath. This rationale of strong continuous interaction between thematerial and the moral and spiritual, central to the relationship ofcontrol to legitimacy, authority and representation, is paralleled by theseNeapolitans' positively cautious expectations of mani pulite, to theobvious disappointment of certain political circles. More specifically, thecomplexity of these attitudes towards parts of the legal system, mirroredby those towards politics and organization of society (Pardo 1993 andn.d.: Ch.6 and 7), offers an illustration of the individual in contemporaryurban Europe that invites reflection well beyond the categories, howeverdialectical, of law and crime, dominance and subalternity, legitimacyand illegitimacy. Intriguing questions, indeed, arise as to what would bethe auspicable changes in the representatives of the law's image, but alsoas to what in this urban situation should be considered to be criminaland prosecuted, and by what degree; what degree of de-criminalizationis socially (rather than simply legally) advisable and feasible; and, moregenerally, what should be, instead, subject to redefined principles oflegislation.

During the preliminary fieldwork for a long term research project ofthe elite, my new informants reminded me of a question widely recog-nized in the sociological tradition (see, e.g. Weber 1978: 980) as theysaid that the sharks who control certain sectors of politics and the mediahave done more than thank their lucky stars that organized crime exists;they have systematically blown the phenomenon out of proportion,making political corruption, including tangentopoli, seem a 'venial sin'and undemocratic 'solutions' a necessary evil. The study of ordinarypeople's discerning attitude towards crime and criminals suggests thatsuch a view is in many ways justified. Not only, however, does therationality (Runciman 1991) of their management of the tension betweenlaw and crime in real life expose the mechanicism of views of them asculturally subaltern underclass slanted, or subject, to the laws of crime.

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More importantly, it brings to light an underlying complexity in theapparently obvious conclusion that in contemporary urban society wesimply cannot think of asymmetrical power relations as structurally set.

In a way that may help to clarify central issues in modern socialtheory; we have found that the negotiated balance between moral andpractical risks—and gains and losses—in the social relations at themicro-level depends on the definition and redefinition of the normativepositions of the persons involved. Of course, arguing this point does notmean arguing for relativism of moral judgement (32). Because actors'lives are structured not by fatalism but by entrepreneurial ability tomanage the strong continuous interacation between different resourcesand domains of thought and action, the significant balance in such aprocess of definition and redefinition is not determined a priori by thepower of criminal patrons over powerless clients, by political clientel-ism, by individuals' position in relation to formal production andconsumption (Pardo 1992, 1993), or by inequality inherent in formallaw and its coercive apparatus. In fact, as I argue elsewhere at length(n.d.), not democracy or 'the state' but—much less dramatically—theinterests of ideological polarization seem to be jeopardized, as politicalexpediency (Pitch 1983: 129-30) and traditional tendencies to hegem-onic (legal and political) domination are significantly challenged.Unequivocally in line with criticism of dichotomous interpretations ofpower relations (e.g., Lukes 1974, 1987, 1991a; Harris 1986; Herzfeld1987; Prato 1993), these issues of morality in the relation of agency tostructure places the ball firmly in the court of legal and political phil-osophy. The important question is, of course, whether there is, in therelevant institutions of civil society, the ability—and the will—to re-spond adequately, addressing the necessary (Lukes 1991a: 31-2) balancebetween ideological interventionism, guaranteeism and indiscriminateliberalism (Pitch 1983).

Conclusion

Ordinary citizens' positions in the grey domain between legal andcriminal life in inner-city Naples suggests that it would be a mistake toforce (for the benefit of legal positivism) the morality of their actions andmotivations into some modern version of the 'dichotomy' betweenmaterial and moral (and spiritual) interest and between law and custom— between the rational and objective and the irrational and partic-

(3a) Lukes' (1991a: Chap. 1, esp. p.6 ff.) sophisticated discussion makes this abundantly clear.

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ularist. It would be equally mistaken to force political and jurispru-dential responses to the problem of expanding the realm of legality inthis setting into the straightjacket of class politics (opposing 'bourgeoislegality' to 'proletarian legality') and party electioneering.

On a broader level, this case of Naples demonstrates the point thatthe ethnographic analysis of the complex relationship of personalmorality, choice and action to norms in civil society serves much morethan the simple purpose of making suggestions to be translated into lawor policy. The gloss and interests of ideology quite apart, this level ofanalysis encourages us to ask key questions about purposes and prin-ciples, and about control, value and representation. There is clearly noneed to cast our understanding of what goes on outside the formal rulesof law into short-sighted (or instrumental) political rhetoric to realize itsrelevance to the necessary rethinking of the relationship of the conceptof social order (partially) enshrined by law to the individual in society.

Of course, it is the relation of domination, as a special case of power,to legitimate authority (Weber 1978: 941-948) that is contentious here.The ethnographer of this urban situation may reasonably suggest that atthis critical juncture in Italian and European history it is the crucial, andauspicably 'integrative' (Rusconi 1993: 321) task of the legal sys-tem—and of its changing political background—to provide credibleanswers to the questions raised by the difficulty of contemporary life,and that such a task may well require engaging in a kind of rethinkingthat, beyond mere tolerance, recognizes the structral significance ofordinary people's culture and actions. This process may producechanges in formal law and political approach. More importantly, it mayencourage the new kind of participation in civil society and trust in itsrelevant representatives that are found in embryo especially among theyoung. In a nutshell, by furthering our empirical knowledge of theindividual in the system, micro-analysis helps us to identify criticalquestions to ask about the mainstream problem of redefining politicalrepresentation and law in a way that addresses the nature, as well as theformal aspects, of the morals of legitimacy in real life.

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Morals of legitimacy in Naples: streetwise about legality, semi-legality and crime

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