MILITARY EMPLOYMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS:

A TECHNOLOGICAL IMMATURITY OR POLITICAL DISPENSABILITY?1

Presented at 8th European Symposium on Non-Lethal Weapons, 18-21 May 2015

Introduction

Different conflicts that have taken place in the last few decades significantly highlighted

the problem of tackling with civilian population and collateral damage. In the last few decades of

the 20th century, a universal respect for human life has become a crucial variable within the

international community, in general, and Western societies in particular.2 In this new political

reality, military seeks new technologies that have “greater precision, shorter duration, less lethality,

and reduced collateral damage... [as these technologies] may provide more effective power than

their larger and more destructive, but also more inexact and crude, predecessors”.3 While Non-

Lethal Weapons (NLW) seem to be the perfect answer for this military quest; to this day very "few

non-lethal weapons incorporating new technologies have actually been deployed on a large scale"4

and "operational use of available non-lethal weapons by the military has been limited”.5

While an employment of NLW, undoubtedly, demands a paradigm shift in military affairs;

the history of such fundamental changes proves that they can occur only under significant pressure

from the political leadership. In the case of NLW, this required pressure becomes even more

significant, as the military approach toward NLW has substantial political roots. The analysis of

the literature of the yearly 90s, the dawn of military conceptualisation of NLW, clearly shows that

not only their name (Non-Lethal Weapons) was chosen for political reasons,6 but their proposed

1Parts of this article were published in Ofer Fridman, ‘Non-Lethal weapons: A Technological Gap or the Mis-Defined

Requirement?’, Joint Force Quarterly, Vol. 76, 2015, pp. 71-77. 2Sjef Orbons, Non-Lethality in Reality: a Defence Technology Assessment of its Political and Military Potential, PhD

Dissertation, The University of Amsterdam, 2013, pp.28-30. 3David A. Koplow, Death by moderation: The U.S. Military’s Quest for Useable Weapons, (New York: Cambridge

University Press, 2010), pp. IX-X. 4Neil Davison, 'Non-Lethal' Weapons, (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 209. 5Ibid, p. 86. 6Steven Aftergood, ‘The Soft-Kill Fallacy’, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 50, Issue 5,

September/October 1994, pp. 40-45.

role was more political than military: “to add new options for policy makers in the ‘grey area’

between no application of military force and application of lethal military force.”7

While some may argue that the current detrimental situation with the military employment

of NLW is a result of a technological immaturity; this article suggests that it is an outcome of the

political dispensability. In other words, despite visible political sensitivity to civil casualties during

military operations, political leadership, in fact, do not pressure military organisation significantly

enough to fundamentally re-evaluate its doctrinal approach towards lethality.

A Technological Gap (or Lack of It)

Undoubtedly, law-enforcement agencies have been the major users of NLW for many years.

And despite the fact that NLW “were given no real priority in the context of Cold War military

planning,”8 most modern NLW available on the market are the result of the military funded

research. The requirements of the law-enforcement agencies are completely different from the

military ones, and therefore military oriented NLW have to be more versatile and more integrated.

As, obviously, there is no expectation that a soldier will replace his assault rifle with Taser X26,

FN 303 or the Oleoresin Capsicum Dispenser; non-lethal capabilities have to be integrated with his

lethal weapon systems. This argument, however, raises the question about the ability to bridge the

technological gapes related with such an integration.

Interestingly enough, military industries around the globe have already clearly

demonstrated the ability to integrate non-lethality with and within lethal systems. Analysing

different NLW developed and produced in the U.S., the best example is the M26 Modular

Accessory Shotgun System (MASS). It is an under-barrel shotgun attachment for the M16 that,

while preserving the lethal capability of the main rifle, simultaneously provides a soldier with an

additional capability of 12ga non-lethal ammunition.9 Other good examples are emerging systems

such as XM25 and 81mm Non-Lethal Indirect Fire Munitions (NLIFM). The first is a 25mm air

burst grenade launcher and its various lethality, from highly lethal to non-lethal, depends on the

7Charles Swett, Strategic Assessment: Non-Lethal Weapons, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special

Operations and Low-Intensity Office, 9 November 1993, p.13. 8Nick Lewer, Steven Schofield, Non-Lethal Weapons: A Fatal Attraction?, (London: Zed Books, 1997), p. 34 9Dan Parsons, ‘Army, Marine Corps Succeed in Rapidly Fielding Specialized Individual Weapons (UPDATED)’,

National Defence, January 2013.

type of the ammunition.10 The second expand the existing capabilities of the M252 81mm mortal

into the field of non-lethality.11

Observing the achievements of the other industries in the field of integrated non-lethal

capabilities, it is important to point at Russia and Israel – two countries that have been intensively

involved in military operations in the past two decades. Russian industries successfully

demonstrated a range of non-lethal munitions based on irritant agents – munitions for RPG grenade

launchers, different caliber mortal shells, Heliborne KMGV-type dispensers and even 500 kg

cluster air-bombs.12 Alternatively, in Israel, the Israeli Military Industries (IMI) proposed the 120

mm stun-cartridge for tanks,13 and the private company, L.H.B. Ltd, offered an attachment of an

upgraded Russian made compact kinetic less-lethal pistol PB-4-2, as a foregrip to any lethal rifle.14

Despite the fact that none of these NLW has been employed on the large scale by any military,

the mere fact of their existence clearly shows the technological ability to produce integration

between lethal and non-lethal systems. To understand this lack of employment, it seems important

to analyse the current operational concepts of NLW and the military requirements from the further

technological development of these weapons.

(Mis-defined) Operational Concepts of NLW

While, for the military, the very idea of non-lethality might sound like an oxymoron, when

applied to weapons; since the early 1990s, NLW have been in the centre of the military professional

debate. The military employment of NLW is, undoubtedly, a fruit of American military thought,

as the U.S. Department of Defense was the first military to conceptually distinguish NLW from

other armaments, starting to pay more coherent attention to NLW in the early 1990s and igniting

the intensive discourse about the future of NLW in the military. Since then, the American military

has been the leader in conceptualisation of NLW and actual employment of these weapons.

10Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier, United States Army, Project Manager Soldier Weapons Briefing For

NDIA, 18 May 2010, [online], http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2010armament/TuesdayLandmarkBTamilio.pdf, [accessed:

20 March 2015]. 11The Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program, Annual Report 2013. 12Michael Crowley, Drawing the Line: Regulation of “wide area” riot control agent delivery mechanisms under the

Chemical Weapons Convention, Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons Project & Omega Research Foundation, April 2013,

p. 27-38. 13Israel Military Industry (IMI), 120mm STUN, M337 Cartridge, [online], http://www.imi-

israel.com/home/doc.aspx?mCatID=67059, [accessed 20 March 2015]. 14L.H.B. Ltd, Less-Lethal Multi-Purpose Pistol PB-4-2, [online], http://www.lhbltd.com/advanced.php?id=1,

[accessed: 20 March 2015].

Consequently, it seems right to focus the analysis of the military approach towards NLW on the

U.S.

Analysing the U.S. military approach toward NLW, this article focuses on a primary official

document that defines current and future military environments - TRADOC Pamphlet 525-66,

Force Operating Capabilities (FOC) – and compares it to different publications produced by the

Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD) – organization responsible for the development

and employment of NLW within the U.S. military

FOC is a very specific document that formulates future security environment and describes

specific military capabilities and requirements from future forces. Describing the complex nature

of future conflicts, FOC states:15

While the nature of war will remain a violent clash of wills between states or armed

groups pursuing advantageous political ends, the conduct of future warfare will

include combinations of conventional and unconventional, lethal and nonlethal, and

military and nonmilitary actions and operations, all of which add to the increasing

complexity of the future security environment.

In the section that formulates the desired Maneuver Support, the FOC continues:16

The major combat operation focus, coupled with the increasing likelihood of smaller-

scale contingencies, clearly establishes the need for a full spectrum force. This force

must be able to: execute full spectrum of forces; minimize noncombatant fatalities,

permanent injury, and undesired damage to property and environment; maintain

force protection, reinforcing deterrence; and expand the range of options available

to joint force commanders. All of these imperatives demonstrate a clear need for

nonlethal weapons, even in conjunction with lethal weapons, to achieve a decisive

outcome.

FOC describes future security environment as an increasingly complex one, which will include a

vast spectrum of operations, but it clearly states that non-lethal actions will be an unquestionable

part of the future conflict.

It seems that FOC emphasizes the strong demand to minimize collateral damage and

undesired harming innocent during future military confrontations. Moreover, FOC translates this

demand into feasible capabilities that should be provided by NLW. According to this document,

15Department of the Army Headquarters, United States Army, Force Operating Capabilities: TRADOC Pamphlet 525-

66, Fort Monroe VA, 7 March 2008, p. 17. 16Ibid, p. 88-89.

NLW should enhance the capability of Joint Force in an accomplishment of the following

objectives:17

(a) Discourage, delay, or prevent hostile actions; (b) Limit escalation; (c) Take

military action in situations where the use of lethal force is either not the preferred

option, or is not permitted under the established Rules of Engagement (ROE); (d)

Better protect our forces; (e) Disable equipment, facilities, and enemy personnel; (f)

Engage and control people through civil affairs operations and Psychological

Operations (PSYOP); (g) Dislodge enemy from positions without causing extensive

collateral damage; (h) Separate combatants from noncombatants; (i) Deny terrain to

the enemy.

The analysis of this fundamental document undoubtedly demonstrates that minimizing

collateral damage and noncombatant fatalities is a military capability required by the reality of

present and future conflicts, and NLW can be a practical tool in achieving this capability. It seems,

however, that these accurately defined requirements, emphasised by FOC, have been largely

misinterpreted by JNLWD – the body that is responsible for the actual development of NLW and

suitable concepts of operation.

To argue this misinterpretation, the analysis of different major publications produced

JNLWD is divided into two main parts. Firstly, it examines the DOD Directive 3000.3E, Policy

for Non-Lethal Weapons (2013). Secondly, it analyses NLW requirements as defined by JNLWD

in 2011. Each one of these analyses points at gaps between the requirements presented by FOC and

the ways in which JNLWD guides the development of NLW.

DOD Directive 3000.3E, states ten different capabilities, which NLW can provide to joint

forces. According to the directive, NLW have the potential to enhance the commander’s ability

to:18

(1) Deter, discourage, delay, or prevent hostile and threatening actions; (2) Deny

access to and move, disable, and suppress individuals; (3) Stop, disable, divert, and

deny access to vehicles and vessels; (4) Adapt and tailor escalation of force options

to the operational environment; (5) Employ capabilities that temporarily incapacitate

personnel and materiel while minimizing the likelihood of casualties and damage to

critical infrastructure; (6) De-escalate situations to preclude lethal force; (7)

Precisely engage targets; (8) Enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of lethal

weapons; (9) Capture or incapacitate high value targets; (10) Protect the force.

17Ibid, p. 88. 18US Department of Defence, Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons, Directive 3000.3E, Washington DC, 25 April 2013.

While this list of capabilities emphasizes the nature of NLW, it does not correspond with

the required capabilities as defined by FOC. For example, translating the complexity of the future

battlefield and undesired consequences of collateral damage, FOC accurately and flawlessly argues

that NLW has to be able to “dislodge enemy from positions without causing extensive collateral

damage” and “separate combatants from noncombatants”. Unfortunately these significant

characteristics are not in the DOD Directive, which in essence defines policy and, therefore, the

aims of the future development of NLW.

Non-Lethal Weapons Requirement Fact Sheet (NLWRFS) is an official document

published by JNLWD that identifies requirements for non-lethal effects. The JNLWD is interested

in investing and promotion of new NLW that can support the tasks listed in this sheet. For example

NLWRFS defines four following counter-personnel required tasks from NLW:19

(1) Deny access into/out of an area to individuals (open/confined) (single/few/many);

(2) Disable individuals (open/confined) (single/few/many);(3) Move individuals

through an area (open/confined) (single/few/many); (4) Suppress individuals

(open/confined) (single/few/many).

Similarly to the DOD Directive 3000.3E, this list again does not correspond with the desired

capabilities defined by FOC.

Furthermore, on the one hand, NLWRFS states that it addresses “specific non-lethal

capability requirements for U.S. forces operating in complex environments.”20 On the other, it

barely corresponds to the NLW desired capabilities and requirements as defined by FOC:21

The future Modular Force, specifically, must be provided with organic nonlethal

capabilities to disrupt, dislocate, disorganize, disintegrate, fix, isolate, suppress, and

destroy enemy functions. Joint force commanders (JFCs), furthermore, must be

provided with multifunctional/multirole lethality options in integrated multipurpose

system configurations … The future Modular Force Soldier must have the ability to

employ a wide array of lethal and nonlethal munitions based upon mission need and

force protection …

NLWRFS not only does not refer to whole spectrum of desired capabilities defined by FOC; it also

fails to address one of the most important requirements – NLW “must be provided with

19The Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program, Non-Lethal Weapons Requirement Fact Sheet, [online],

http://jnlwp.defense.gov/pdf/pressroom/NLW%20Requirements%20Fact%20Sheet%20Oct%202011.pdf, [accessed:

20 March 2015]. 20Ibid. 21Department of the Army Headquarters, United States Army, Force Operating Capabilities…, p.88

multifunctional/multirole lethality options in integrated multipurpose system.”22 NLWRFS fails

to define required NLW as weapons that have an adjustable level of lethality and are integrated in

multipurpose weapon systems; or, in other words, it fails to require the demand, as flawlessly

defined by FOC, for weapon systems that integrate together non-lethal and lethal capabilities.

As it was shown, the DOD Directive 3000.3E and NLWRFS clearly mis-define the NLW

required capabilities and mislead the development of future NLW decreasing the chance of new

emerging non-lethal technologies to answer the demands of future complex security environment.

It seems right to argue that these two noteworthy documents pave the way for NLW in an incorrect

way, allowing an adaptation of “off-the-shelf” law enforcement technologies instead of developing

and employment of military oriented NLW.

While this analysis suggest a general confusion of military organisations regarding the

present and the future of NLW, this article does not claim that this situation is the only outcome of

the military’s vain management. History proves that an adaptation of revolutionary technologies is

a very expensive and uncertain affair that can be done only under significant pressure and support

from the political leadership. An employment of NLW, which comes against the very character of

military organisation, falls under this definition, and, therefore, this article argues that the main

problem is concealed in the lack of political necessity to minimize civil casualties that, in their turn,

lead to the military unemployment of NLW.

Political Dispensability of NLW

In the last decades of the 20th century, there is a traceable increase in the value which the

general international community bestow upon human life, particularly within Western societies.

There are two major historical roots for this increasing value of human life. The first one is the

devastating first half of the 20th century which culminated the industrialization of death and the

introduction of the most destructive indiscriminating weapon – the nuclear bomb. The second root

is the forty years of Cold War and life under the constant shadow of global destruction. These two

roots, based on democratic culture and traditions, modern ethical and moral issues, have created a

desire for a world without war or, at least, a demand that indispensable armed conflicts have to be

22Ibid.

far less lethal.23 The best examples of such a restraint, in the application of lethal capabilities, are

NATO’s operation in Afghanistan or U.S. forces supporting NATO’s air operations in Libya.

While it might be suggested that social-political reality in the beginning of the 21st century

demands from the military a significant decrease in the lethality of conflicts;24 as it was discussed

above military organization do not employ NLW, weapons that seem to be the perfect answer for

this military quest. In other words, while it seems that political reality demands a larger

employment of NLW, military does not follow this emerging necessity. To answer this puzzle, a

better understanding of the political-military relations is required.

History of revolutionary changes in military affairs suggests that military organisations are

ready to alter their approaches to wars only facing unmet challenges.25 Combining this

understanding with the famous Clausewitzian claim that “war is a mere continuation of policy by

other means”;26 it seems right to argue that these unmet challenges have to be defined by political

leadership, rather than military organizations themselves. Political leadership, in its turn,

undoubtedly draws its inspiration from different political pressures applied on it domestically and

internationally. In other words, political leadership defines challenges to its military according to

the needs and requirements of domestic and international political aspects and military adopts itself

accordingly (see figure 1).

23Sjef Orbons, Non-Lethality in Reality…, p.29. 24Sjef Orbons, Non-Lethality in Reality...,p.29 25Richard O. Hundley, Past Revolutions Future Transformation: What Can History of Revolutions in Military Affairs

Tell Us about Transforming the US Military?, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999) 26Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1989), p.87.

This conceptual chain of events suggests that as far as new challenges can be met within

the existing military framework, the military will adopt, slowly evolving according to the emerging

political-military environment. Only in the case when the nature of the new challenge, defined by

political leadership in the light of domestic and/or international aspects, is fundamentally different

from the existing military capabilities, the military performs a revolutionary change (see figure 2).

Regarding the case of NLW, the previously presented analysis suggests a puzzling picture,

where on the one hand the political environment seems to call for the reduction of civil casualties,

but on the other, military doesn’t see this challenge as something that demands revolutionary

changes (see figure 3). Therefore it is important to analyse the nature of these political aspects and

the levels of their real influence on the political leadership.

Domestic Political Pressure to Reduce Civil Casualties during Military Operations

It seems right to argue that the increase in the value of human life that was discussed above,

supposed to create domestic political pressure on the political leadership and therefore demand to

reduce civil casualties on the battlefield. In other words, the perception that human life is a

universal value expected to stress political leadership, demanding its military to employ less lethal

options. A deeper analysis of this aspect, however, suggests entirely different situation that can be

explained by two trends.

The first trend assumes that in the 21st century people indeed value human life significantly

higher than before. This appreciation, however, has been translated largely into general

unwillingness to sacrifice one’s own life and the lives of his relatives, rather than a universal value.

In other words, in the 21st century, societies do not send their sons and husbands to war as easier,

as it was in the past; and if they do, they demand from their leadership (and therefore their military)

to minimise the casualties of the military personnel to the operationally possible and politically

defendable minimum. Moreover, this narrow appreciation of the human life has contributed to the

general apathy among public opinion towards civil population in the conflict zones, due to the fact

that society’s relatives (military personnel) sacrifice their lives there, by this justifying civil

casualties.

The second trend suggests that, regardless this very relative appreciation of human lives,

the increasing transparency of the military activity in the 21st century will create public moral

tolerance, thus demanding to minimise civil casualties on the battlefield. To deal with this emerging

domestic political pressure, the political leadership with its military have developed different ways

to justify civil casualties as an unavoidable part of the military activity that is intended to save more

lives than caused deaths. The fact that ‘our’ lives are more precious than the lives of the enemy’s

civilians, as discussed previously, only eases this justification process.

The analysis of these two major trends clearly shows that domestic political pressure to

reduce civil casualties during military operations is very weak, and the political leadership has

developed effective mechanisms to minimise its influence on political-military decision-making

processes. Consequently, it seems right to argue that the demand to reduce civil casualties, and

therefore to employ NLW, will not be an outcome of domestic public opinion.

International Political Pressure to Reduce Civil Casualties during Military Operations

During the last several decades, the number of civil casualties caused by military operations has

become an important argument in international relations. Different international players (states, as

well as non-state organisations) more frequently and more powerfully make use of this argument

to criticise military activity of their international opponents, and therefore create pressure on their

political leadership to withdraw military activity or, at least, minimise civil casualties.

Consequently, it seems right to argue that this international political pressure is expected to stress

political leadership demanding its military to employ less lethal options.

However, an analysis of the foreign policy of different countries involved in military

operations in the 21st century suggests that these countries developed mechanisms that help them

to withstand international pressure, thus minimising its influence on political-military decision

making process. The best three examples are Russia, the U.S. and Israel.

In the Russian case, to fend international (mainly Western) criticism off, the Kremlin has

developed a narrative of ‘Double Standards.’ Facing international criticism Russian leaders

powerfully dismiss it, arguing that their activities comply with international law, at least with the

same degree as Western actions do, which, according to Russian view, are illegal themselves. The

American leadership, in its turn, minimises possible international criticism by building coalitions:

as many states are involved in the military activity as less pressure will be applied on the U.S.

decision makers themselves.

In Israel, the situation is different. The Israeli leadership believes that it is under unjustified

constant international political pressure. Tel-Aviv decided, long ago, that the outcomes of their

military activity and the number of civil casualties have nothing to do with the international

pressure. In other words, Israel believes that even an unprecedented low number of civil casualties

during their operations will not decrease the already high level of the international pressure.

Consequently, as the battle for the international public opinion is lost in advance and tight relations

with the U.S. will protect Israel in the Security Council, the international pressure has little

influence on the Israeli political-military decision making process.

Conclusions – Is There Future for Military Employment of NLW?

On the one hand, unfortunately, the presented above analysis does not suggest a feasible

future for NLW. Political leadership is not stressed enough (domestically or internationally) to

demand fundamental changes from their military organisations. Consequently, under insignificant

political pressure, military organisations choose to adopt their existing capabilities (precision

strikes, selective weapon systems, strict the rules of engagement, etc.), rather than employ NLW.

On the other hand, during the last several decades, military operations themselves have

deviated from previous wars, where victory was considered solely by military terms. The winning

of the “hearts and minds” has become a vital factor in achieving the final aims of military

operations.27 Military organisations begin to understand that the achievement of a comprehensive

victory demands support from the local population;28 and therefore, harming civilians, in most

cases, will increase their involvement against the military and delay the successful end of

operations.

Consequently, it seems that the future of NLW does not lie in the hands of politicians, and

NLW will be eventually employed not because of political costs of civil casualties, but due to their

military effectiveness. However, as history of military innovations suggests, without political

demand, it can be a very long process.

27Tracy J. Tafolla, David J. Trachtenberg, John A. Aho, ‘From Niche to Necessity: Integrating Non-Lethal Weapons

into Essential Enabling Capabilities’, Joint Force Quarterly, issue 66, 3rd quarter 2012, p. 72. 28See Robert Mandel, The Meaning of Military Victory, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006); Roger W. Barnett,

Asymmetric Warfare, (Dulles: Brassey's, 2003).