Trends in Southeast Asia Series: 1 l(2004)

Malaysia's 2004 General Elections: An Assessment

Haji Maarof bin Haji Salleh Noorashikin Abdul Rahman

Published by Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang

Singapore 1 196 14

E-mail: publish@,iseas.edu.sg World Wide Web: http://www.iseas.edu.sg/pub.html

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O 2004 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

The responsibility for facts and opinions expressed in this publication rests exclusively with the author, and hidher interpretations do not

necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the Institute or its supporters.

ISSN 02 19-32 13 July 2004

Editor's Note

This publication is a substantially revised version of the Seminar Presentation entitled "The 2004 Malaysian General Elections: An Assessment" by Haji Maarof bin Haji Salleh and Dr Noorashikin Abdul Rahman, held in ISEAS on 30 March 2004. The Editorial Committee wishes to thank Dr K S Nathan for editing the manuscript.

About the Speaker

Haji Maarof Haji Salleh is cz~rrently a Visiting Senior Research Fellow in ISEAS. He

holds a B.A. degree from the University of Singapore (1974), and a M.A. in Southeast

Asian Studies (2003) from the National University of Singapore. He has a teaching

certiJicate and has taught in schools and junior colleges before an eight-year stint at

hfajlis Ugama Islam Singapura (MUIS), the supreme Islamic religious authority in

Singapore, first as the Vice-President, and then as President. While in MUIS, he has

represented Singapore in meetings with Islamic religiozzls officials and leaders at both

regional and international levels. He is actively involved in community work and has

held leadership positions in many Islamic and social and educational organisations in

Singapore. He is a founding member of Yayasan MENDAKI. He writes articles on

Malay/Mzzlslim issues, and has built a network of friendship with other Muslim youth

leaders including those who are now active in the Malaysian political scene in UMNO,

PAS and keADILan.

JOURNEY TO THE MALAY BELT: OBSERVING THE llTH MALAYSIAN GENERAL ELECTION 2004 IN THE NORTHERN MALAY STATES OF

PENINSULAR MALAYSIA

Introduction

This paper is based on a field-trip observation of the General Elections in Malaysia

held on 21'' march 2004. It focuses on the so-called 'Malay Belt', i.e. the northern

Malay states of Peninsular Malaysia. For the whole of one week throughout the

campaigning period, this observer travelled, by private car, to visit places, attend

political gatherings, and talk to people on the elections: on the parties that contested,

on the candidates who were fielded, and the issues raised.'

There were several considerations for the choice of the 'Malay Belt':- First,

those are the Malay majority states, which both UMNO (the dominant party

representing the BN) and PAS as the two Malay-based parties, were contesting to gain

supremacy over the Malay votes. Second, in the previous election (1999), UMNO had

suffered heavy losses to PAS there. This time around, therefore, UMNO was

determined to regain the lost ground, whilst PAS buoyed by its success, had made

known of its confidence to not only retain Terengganu and Kelantan, but to also

capture Kedah, and perhaps Perlis. So, the Malay Belt had actually become the

battleground for the two Malay-based political parties to claim supremacy as the real

representative of the Malays. Third, as Islam is closely associated with the Malay way

of life, the 'Islamic factor' was understandably profiled prominently in the political

battle between the contesting parties. PAS has always claimed that their struggle for

Islam has been the main factor that won them Malay support, at the expense of

UMNO (or, Barisan Nasional). On the other hand, UMNO, being the dominant party

in the 14-party National Front coalition, could not afford to lose further ground. For

this reason, UMNO had to play the PAS' game, i.e. to profile Islam and to regain the

support of the Malays. So, there is an interest for many to know to what extent Islam

was being used in the political battle in the current election, in particular within the lb

Malay Belt.

Background to the llth General Elections

Malaysians went to the polls for their l lth General Elections on Sunday, 21 March

2004, after a campaign period of one week, beginning just after Nomination Day,

which was held on Saturday 13'" March 2004.

Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (also popularly known as 'Pak Lah')

called for the election after four months in the office. After having the premiership

baton passed to him by the previous Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Pak Lah

needed to be his own man. He needed to build his own power base. The election gave

him this opportunity. He could select his own team, and to decide who were to be

fielded, and who to drop. He wanted to sell his brand of manifesto and to ask for a

huge mandate from the voters so that he would have the 'blessed' authority to

implement his government's agenda.

Even prior to the election campaign, Pak Lah had his men pushing through

some 'product selling' of the kind of leadership he was providing, and the kind of

actions his government was taking. He was already being profiled as gentle friendly

'Pak Lah' with 'Islamic credentials' good enough to face PAS' challenges head on.

Federal Minister for Co-operative Development, Kasitah Gadam and Perwaja

strongman, Eric Chia, had already been brought to court to face trials for corruption.2 . --.

Voters' Profiles and the Election Issues

As election results are, among others, a reflection of voters' sentiments and choice, it

would help to understand what weree the profiles of the voters and what were their

sentiments that would have influenced their choices.

Throughout the journey, efforts were specially made to have conversations

with, or to talk to as many people as possible. Attempts were also made to ensure

these people come from all walks of life: politicians, party supporters (hard core or

otherwise), first-time voters, as well as fence sitters. The conversations were

conducted at all places possible: corners of political gatherings, food-stalls, party

posts, markets, offices as well as homes of voters. A total of 37 conversations were

made with individuals or groups of individuals. They give glimpses of people

involved in the General Election, at different places in Terengganu, Kelantan and

Kedah, and to a small extent Pahang.

Other than a useful guide to understand the profiles of the voters, these

conversations help to know the views and sentiments of the voters as well, issues that

were utmost in their minds, and their choices of the party to vote for, and reasons for

doing so. It is interesting to note that there are noticeable links between the expressed

views and sentiments of the voters and the General Election results. Generally, the

voters can be divided into several categories.

The first group comprised 'hard-core' party loyalists, either from UMNO or

PAS. They are usually older people who have been party supporters for many years.

For them, voting for either party has been a tradition that was impossible to change,

unless for very good reasons. Issues that were raised at the 1999 polls could be one

example.

Haji Ismail (or 'Abang Mail') and his wife Kak Yah of Kota Bahru, are

examples of PAS 'hard-core' loyalists. They are long-time PAS members, and have

been party workers for years, including being party officials in the party's Kota Bahru

division. They will never change allegiance from PAS to other parties because, for

them, it is only PAS that can be depended upon to uphold Islam regardless of what

shortcomings the party may have. For many such party loyalists, PAS is almost

synonymous to Islam. No one could belittle PAS without inviting their displeasure.'

UMNO too had its own hard-core loyalists such as Pak Ali Abdullah and

Cikgu Fuad Hassan from the Merbok constituency in Kedah. Pak Ali, a long-time

party stalwart, has consistently insisted that it is only UMNO (and BN) that is serious

about governance. He passionately defended UMNO as a truly and proven good party

which had struggled for the Malay cause, but had the party's reputations somehow

marred due to the irresponsible behaviour of some of its members.

The second group included those who were 'yet to decide7 on the choice of

parties or candidates. They can hrther be divided into two sub-groups. The first sub-

group was represented by the likes of Mohamad Shakil, young successful middle-

class businessmen and exposed to modew thinking. While expressing their preference >b

for Islam and morality, they also looked for other criteria: the capability of the parties

or candidates to deliver, i.e. how competent would they be in the administration of the

ward or the state. The second sub-group comprised people like Anwar Sheikh Abu

Bakar, the teacher from Sungai Petani, and Hussin, waiter at the Gunung Jerai

cafeteria. Both were quite nonchalant, if not totally uncommitted as to which party

they wished to vote for. Anwar was the complaining type: he complained against BN

for being cormpt, and he complained against PAS for being ineffective. Hussin, on

the other hand, was totally uninterested, poking fun at some of the candidates, calling

Mat Sabu, the PAS candidate, as 'hero Hindustan' (the Hindustani movie leading

actor), for example.

Then, there was the third group of new and first-time voters, including young

housewives like Hasinah in Pantai Cahaya Bulan, Kelantan, and Ayu in Kelulut,

Terengganu. These people, claiming ignorance about politics, were more concerned

about earning decent incomes than the election; yet they admitted that they would

vote as instructed by their husbands. Hasinah decided to sell drinks because she finds

through business, she could earn a better income than if she had chosen to do office or

factory work. This implied an expression of frustration for the lack of job

opportunities. Ayu was of a similar case. She also narrated about what she heard

regarding unemployment among several young school leavers in Terengganu. She

herself was fortunate because she could run a seafood restaurant owned by her

mother. Like Hasinah, Ayu too would vote for BN because her husband said so.

Finally, we cannot overlook the group of people like Syed Ismail, the

trishawman outside the Siti Khadijah Grand Market in Kota Bahru, who was resigned

to his fate that his life would remain the same regardless of which party won the

election. People like him would most likely vote for either party depending on their

mood at the time they reach the voting booth!

One notable feature was the family-based voting, under which members of a

family would normally vote according to the tradition of the family, or according to

the preference of the head of the households. Haji Ismail, for example, expressed

strongly his desire to have all his children, all married, to vote for PAS.^ Hasinah and

Ayu, are other examples of housewives who were voting according to the husbands'

choice. The few Chinese voters in the PAS camp appeared pragmatic in their

political choice. They said they supported PAS because PAS had not stopped them

from doing their business and from practicing their Chinese way of life.

What were the issues highlighted in the current elections? Many voters

admitted the lack of 'major issues' in the recent election. This view was even

supported by senior PAS party officials like Nik Muhammad Abduh, youngest son of

Nik Aziz, the Menteri Besar of Kelantan, and Syed Azman, the PAS candidate for

Kuala Terengganu. This view was held, perhaps, in comparison to the 1999 elections

in which the arrest of Anwar Ibrahim, and all other issues related to it, i.e. the call to

rescind the Internal security Act (ISA), corruption and nepotism, and 'reformasi' had

turned into big political debates. This time around, however, though the 'Anwar issue'

was still being raised here and there, it no longer had the same appeal.5

Of course Islam was still one of the highlighted issues. At least, this was what

was projected by the two contesting parties, and must be based on their own

assumptions. PAS had its 'Islam Untuk Semua' (Islam for All) as part of the party's

manifesto. The party also profiled Tuan Guru Abdul Hadi Awang and Tuan Guru Nik

Aziz very prominently emphasizing the leadership of the ulama.

Not to be denied its Islamic credential, UMNO came out strongly to counter

PAS' challenge with its version of Islam as stated in BN's manifesto: 'Islam Hadhari'

or 'Progressive Islam'. Interestingly, perhaps to counter the 'ulama image' of PAS,

the BN had also put up posters portraying Abdullah Badawi raising his hands to say

the prayer (berdoa). Whilst PAS had criticized UMNO for its alleged actions to close

the Sekolah Agama Rakyat (Public Religious Schools), UMNO did the counter-

attacking by accusing the PAS government of victimizing innocent children through

the latter's decision to close the essentially UMNO-run KEMAS kindergartens in

~ e r e n ~ ~ a n u . ~

Ironically, those debates as well as claims and counter-claims on Islam, read

widely in the media, were never really big issues, or became the main concerns,

among general voters at the ground level. Only in the few ceramahs (small political

rallies) of both PAS and BN, were such issues mentioned. Even then, they were not

raised very seriously, but more in the manner that bring laughter rather than

provoking some serious thinking. At the grassroots, the debate on Islam was very

superficially done. Among staunch PAS supporters, they had already taken the view

that only PAS' version of Islam was the right Islam and that UMNO was not sincere

in their Islamic work. Similarly, there were UMNO supporters who knew about

'Islam Hadhari', but were not clear about its deeper meanings.

The UMNO loyalists, while accepting the fact that PAS had many ulama in its

leadership, preferred to continue attacking the party for its lack of capable people to

run a modern government or state. This incapability, the BN claimed, had caused the

people under PAS' rules in both Kelantan and Terengganu to remain poor and the two

states to remain undeveloped. Based on the conversations with voters, and having

attended a few ceramahs from both PAS and UMNO, the issues most highlighted can

be summarized as follows:

o Islam is still important in the life of voters in the Malay Belt.

o Yet, for most of them, they do not seriously raise the issues of 'moderate Islam

and hndamental Islam7, and 'Islamic state'.

o Even in talking about Islam, they do not show resentment against non-

Muslims.

o The Chinese voters (in particular those who are supporting PAS) are

concerned more with whether they can carry out their business and live their

Chinese way of life. They appear not to be complaining against any

discrimination by PAS governments both in Terengganu and Kelantan.

o Voters respond positively to the call that Islam must also bring development

and progress in life.

o Dissatisfaction against UMNO for not discharging their political

responsibilities honestly, betraying the people by their political

representatives, and for the widespread corruption.

o Dissatisfaction against PAS for the image they have projected about their

brand of Islam, about their approach of over-criticizing other people, and

about the party's incapability to bring progress and development in Kelantan

and Terengganu.

'Hard-core' party loyalists will remain with their traditional voting decision,

but there are an observable number of voters who give more thought before

casting their votes.

o Family-based votes are still strong, i.e. a person votes for a party according to

what has been the traditional affiliation of the family, and for a housewife, she

will normally vote according to the choice of her husband.

Election Results

True to predictions, the Badawi-led Barisan Nasional won a landslide victory, gaining

more than the two-thirds majority it needed to form a strong government.But what is

more surprising, though not totally unexpected is the trouncing of PAS by BN in

almost all the northern Malay state^.^

Table l

Breakdown of % of seats won by BN & PAS in General Elections, 1999,2004

I I I I

Terengganu 1 12.5 / 87.5 1 87.5 1 12.5

% of seats won in 1

State

Kelantan

% of seats won in

Kedah

Though PAS retained Kelantan, the party lost its two-thirds majority. In

Terengganu, BN succeeded in wresting the state from PAS. PAS'S dream of taking

over Kedah was shattered with its share of state seats drastically reduced from 33.33%

(1999) to 13.9% (2004). Similarly in Perlis, BN has increased its share of state seats,

whilst that of PAS dropped. Some analysts attribute the landslide win to Pak Lah not

BN

4.65

Perlis

BN

46.7

PAS

95.35

66.67

PAS

53.3

Source: computations of Elections results.

86.67

33.33

93.3

86.1 13.9

13.33 6.7

only for the 'feel good' factor, but also, as some argue, because of the Malaysian habit

of giving landslide victories to BN every time the nation had a new prime ~ k i s t e r . ~

Does the 'Islamic factor' have anything to do with BN's landslide win and

PAS' heavy defeat? It is something quite inconclusive. Firstly, though overall PAS

suffered heavy defeats in the Malay Belt, its total popular votes for the whole nation

rose from 15.0% (1999) to 15.8% (2004). This means that PAS has more or less

maintained its appeal among the Malay voters. Secondly, as argued above, Islam has

not really been a major election issue. Voters in the Malay Belt were not really in a

situation where they had to make a choice either for Islam, or not.

In addition to 'Islam', there were in my view, two more factors that were

crucial in determining the outcome of the elections: party leadership, and party

strategies. Regarding the 'Islamic factor' it is a fact that both PAS and BN had

resorted to the use of Islam for political gain. As argued, both parties are Malay-based

and to win the Malay heart and soul, both cannot avoid identifying with Islam, as the

Malays are always closely associated with the religion. The contest between PAS and

UMNO has always been in the claim and counterclaim of which party represents the

right Islam.

The results of the 1999 polls which saw PAS retaining Kelantan, capturing

Terengganu and increasing the party's votes in Kedah and Perlis have been popularly

interpreted, especially by PAS, as the party's success in winning the Malay vote in its

contest against UMNO. PAS, therefore, needed to sustain this support to prove its

claim. On the other hand, UMNO, especially the new leadership of Pak Lah, had to

strongly counter the argument that UMNO was losing the Malay ground. Pak Lah

needed to stem the 'green tide' of PAS and to ensure it performed better than it did in

the 1999 election.

It was in BN's strategic interest to portray PAS as representing 'rigid' and

uncompromising Islam that was only interested in promoting the Islamic state under

which two systems of government will be implemented, with non-Muslims being

treated as second-class citizens. By the ways it acted or by the speeches made by

some of its leaders, PAS had somehow justified this perception of being a rigid

Islamic party led by clerics who had no competencies in the art of modem . "

government.

On the other hand, BN had been aggressively making efforts in projecting

itself as 'soft' and 'flexible' on Islam. It proposed 'Islam Hadhari' in its manifesto,

i.e. the version of Islam that was progressive, not rejecting material well-being, and

was tolerant of a multiracial society. BN's Islam promised a one-system government

and offerd to the people several new 'Islamic faces'

For 'hard-core' party loyalists, such different Islamic profiles between the two

parties might not change much of their affiliations. For example, 'hard-core' PAS

members, like Abang Mail, would never take seriously any 'Islamic' claims by BN,

citing UMNO's collaboration with non-Muslims as evidence. Similarly, UMNO too

had its fair share of 'hard-core' members, like Pak Ali in Merbok. In the latter case,

whilst admitting cases of corruption and other abuses within UMNO, he still defended

UMNO as a good party for the Malay struggle, and blamed irresponsible UMNO

members for its bad name. To him, though UMNO's version of Islam might be

different, nevertheless it was still Islam.

However, the projection of the different versions of Islam could impact on the

perceptions of the younger Malays (besides the Chinese or other non-Muslims), and

especially those who were educated and critical. They included people like Mohamad

Shakil, who saw Islam as more than just a religion. They also wanted to know the

kind or brand of Islam that would be good for all. The way the 'Islamic factor' was

manipulated by the two contesting parties and how this affected the perceptions of

some sectors of the voters could have influenced the election results.

What about party leadership? In the 1999 polls, UMNO (and BN) was still

under Mahathir. His confrontational approach towards PAS, and especially its

fundamentalist and rather archaic version of Islam was perceived as belittling Islam

and the ulama. His treatment of the former deputy premier Anwar Ibrahim was

heavily criticized as being 'un-Malay', as many argue that it was never part of Malay

culture to publicly humiliate one's enemies. Other issues related to the arrests of

Anwar, like the ISA, corruption and nepotism have turned Mahathir and UMNO into

a target of hatred by the Malays. Thus, Mahathir's presence was a readily available

target of attack for PAS and other opposition parties to discredit UMNO and BN, and

consequentially win Malay sympathy and votes. The departure of ~ a h a t h G , on the

other hand, had deprived PAS of such a ready-made target for PAS.

In Mahathir's place there is Pak Lah who has been consistently profiled as a

'soft' and 'non-confrontational' personality. His 'Islamic studies' university

background also helped the new leader with the required Islamic credentials to meet

head on with PAS' 'ulama' leadership. Though Mahathir had also made consistent

calls for progressive Islam, and in that sense the idea of Islam Hadhari was not totally

new, the 'Pak Lah personality' made it more presentable and therefore marketable,

especially perhaps among young and more educated voters, as well as the 'fence

sitters'. His Islam Hadhari was projected to contrast with PAS' brand of Islam which

was perceived as 'rigid and theological'. In sum, with his kind of personality, Pak

Lah was an influential factor in changing some attitudes among voters in favour of

BN.

PAS too had a leadership change with Tuan Guru Abdul Hadi Awang

assuming the party's presidency upon the demise of the late Ustaz Fadzil Nor. While

Ustaz Fadzil was known as more humanist, has long-term vision, moderate and

accommodative and always at ease with the young and professionals, Abdul Hadi, on

the other hand, was perceived as stern and rigid. The way he appeared, i.e. in his

'jubah and sarban', and the many fiery speeches he made either in his regular

religious classes or as a politician, all have profiled him in the way his protagonists

wanted him to be perceived. The media, for example, succeeded in portraying him as

someone who was rigid, fundamentalist and always in the forefront of efforts to

establish an Islamic state in Malaysia's multiracial society. Under such circumstances,

it was quite a hard task for PAS to project itself as a party closely associated with the

young and professional Malays. Viewed fiom this perspective, the change in the

leadership certainly brought a shift in voters' views and attitudes toward both UMNO

and PAS, and this must subsequently have influenced voter behaviour in the 2004

election and its results.

The strategies adopted by both parties can be divided into long-term and short-

term. It was a general perception, even shared by some PAS sympathizers, that the

BN (in particular UMNO) had reacted very quickly to its 1999 defeats by taking

necessary measures to regain the lost ground. On the other hand, PAS, having

experienced the kind of euphoria over its great wins, might have been somewhat over-

confident. No one doubted UMNO's determination to win back the Malay vote

despite the differences in the immediate reaction of UMNO leaders after the 1999

polls. Most UMNO leaders appeared to acknowledge that the party needed to reform

and listen to the voice of the electorate, but this argument was rejected by Mahathir,

explaining the setback in terms of Malay ingratitude, lies spread by Anwar and all

other BA leaders, factionalism in UMNO caused by Anwar, and PAS' bribery in

promising heaven to its supporters.9

Knowing the great appeal of Islam among Malay voters, especially in the

Malay Belt, UMNO's answer to PAS'S Islamic challenge was to present 'Islam

Hadhari' as against PAS' 'Islam for All'. Much earlier, plans were drawn up to wrest

Terengganu from PAS. With the change of UMNO leadership in Terengganu, Pak

Lah was tasked to head the state's UMNO. He subsequently made frequent visits to

the state 'to sweeten the ground' and to win back Malay support. Surveys were also

conducted to study changing voting patterns and trends there. New findings were

subsequently established indicating clearly a positive change in voters' preference in

favour of BN. The 'gelombang biru' (blue wave) movement was then started with

'Serek Dok Weh' (we had enough) campaign launched 12 months before the General

~1ection.I' In addition, constant study of voters' profiles was also undertaken, and

plans to reach out to specific groups were subsequently made. The plan included the

fielding of fresh credible candidates and to go for Islam Hadhari.

On the contrary, PAS persisted in similar strategies that had brought the party

election success in the 1999 polls. Buoyed by the same success, PAS became more

confident in winning more Malay votes, including the plan to win Kedah for the 2004

election.

In Terengganu, PAS overlooked the fact that it had yet to develop a strong

political base there. Unlike in Kelantan, PAS had ruled Terengganu only for four

years.11 PAS' traditional loyal supporters, together with most of its senior leadership,

tended to employ the same old tactics of using religious sentiments to win vote. Their

support for PAS was merely based on Islam, without furthering the arguments into

other aspects like the context Islam was applied, how to appeal to no;-~uslim

audience, and about alternative views in Islam. PAS' concept of Islamic state was still

blurred, especially among more enlightened voters. Whilst PAS appeared to be unable

to collaborate with DAP, the party was seen as developing relations with some other

Chinese leaders. To some people, this reflected PAS' inconsistency.'*

From the perspective of short-term strategies, unlike BN which had done a

very great deal of work to improve its winning chances, PAS had fumbled because of

its inadequacies. Among the most glaring weaknesses of PAS were the party's

inability to adjust to the changes in the election rules, its reliance on the old and

unattractive approach of using religious sentiments to win votes, and its unfriendly

ways of dealing with the media. On the latter, PAS' meet-the-media sessions had

generally unpleasant endings with the Islamist party launching a barrage of criticisms

against journalists whom the party labelled as "BN agents'.

The new election rules require parties to adhere to campaign ethics (like no

attack on personalities), proper displaying of political posters, and short period of

campaigning (i.e. 7 days). For BN, it had all the machinery that can be easily

galvanized to compensate whatever difficulties the new rules might have caused. The

mainstream media, as usual, was actively supporting BN. The media helped to explain

the BN manifesto in great detail, profiling a 'good and clean' image of Pak Lah,

introducing new BN candidates, carrying advertisements for BN while at the same

time exposing all kinds of mistakes and blunders made by PAS and other opposition

parties. So, for BN, the rules set by the Election Commission hardly affected them.

But for PAS, it had to fight against all odds, yet the party was not adequately prepared

to meet those new changes. Also, unlike BN, PAS fielded more or less the same old,

and in a few cases, candidates whose poor health was public knowledge. By fielding

many new candidates and 'fresh Islamic faces', BN created the impression of the

party's willingness to be responsive to public demands. With the 'no attack on

personalities' rule, PAS was practically deprived of its effective weapon to hit at its

opponents (unlike those in the 1999 polls), and consequently lost its 'power' of

attracting crowds.

The shortened campaign period exposed the ineffectiveness of PAS'

traditional ceramah approach as the party could not afford to organize too many

ceramah to reach out to voters due to logistical problems. In any way, the ceramah

was not a good indicator to measure the amount of votes the party could secure as

those attending the ceramah might not be voters from the ward. Furthermore, for

many, issues in ceramah have been heard being repeated again and again by almost

the same people. Since in the current election there were practically no new issues, as

mentioned earlier, and unlike in 1999, it would apparently be difficult for PAS to

sustain the interest of voters, especially those among the young and first time voters.

Another observation about the ongoing PAS ceramah is that they only

attracted those who were already with PAS. These supporters were not critical of PAS

and thus were unable to provide the type of feedback that PAS urgently needed to

strengthen the party. Relying on ceramah and getting a big crowd might have given

PAS the inaccurate impression on the extent of real support the party commanded.

Also, it did not help PAS to vary its strategies to attract different groups of voters.

As mentioned by Kamaruddin Jaffar, PAS State Assemblyman for Tumpat,

Kelantan, the party had failed to pay attention to the changes brought about by the

redrawing of boundaries and the new electoral registers, and their subsequent impact

on election outcomes. It failed, for example, to be effective in identifying with young

and first-time voters. BN, in particular PM Abdullah Badawi, had made significant

efforts to urge people to exercise their rights to vote on polling day, but there was no

such move by PAS. In my conversation with Nik Muhammad Abduh, he gave the

impression that PAS was satisfied with winning the young voters via organizing

competitive soccer for them. Yet, the real issue, as pointed out in my conversations

with Ayu and Hasinah, was in the finding of jobs for much of the school leavers. BN

must have come out more successfully in winning the young voters through its

promises of various development projects.

Conclusion

Viewed in the context of the contest for Malay support between UMNO (and BN) and

PAS in the northern Malay states (or the Malay Belt), the results of the 1 lth Malaysian

General Election meant that the Malay constituents had rejected PAS' agenda. But, b

does this mean the rejection of Islam, and the Islamic party, by the Malay voters as

well? My own answer to the question is "no".

Though Islam was still a factor in the election there, it was not a major issue

that determined the results. Having to win the Malay hearts, and acknowledging the

closeness of the Malays with Islam, the two contesting parties had understandably

resorted to bring Islam into their respective manifestos. PAS promoted 'Islam for All'

to signal its commitment to use religion to win Malay support, and to prove that its

brand of Islam was still relevant and would benefit the non-Muslims as well. And BN

had to counter-claim the right to represent the Malays through promoting 'Islam

Hadhari'--a progressive brand of Islam that would help Malays towards greater

success, and yet remaining the kind of Islam suitable for a multiracial society that

treats all equally.

For the Malays, having been assured that Islam was there to stay, their vote

this time was more determined by material promises of further development than by

promises of reaching heaven. An interesting point to note is the fact that this contest

of Islam was taking place within the framework of the nation's constitution. There

was no report of violence either. This has to be viewed positively. In the context of

current concerns regarding the rise of Islamic radicalism or militancy elsewhere,

Malays/Muslims in Malaysia have shown they are a moderate lot who are very much

in the forefront in strengthening a key feature of the democratisation process, i.e.

participation in the general elections.I3

This UMNO-PAS contest was also a manifestation of the worldwide

phenomenon among Muslims in looking for relevant Islamic interpretations and

models to cope with modernity. Viewed this way, I believe the whole process of

political and electoral contestation would have a moderating effect on both UMNO

and PAS. To win the Malay vote and confidence against the continuing threat from

PAS, UMNO must look credible in pursuing the Islamic cause. This will include

having credible 'Islamic faces' among its MPS and leadership. The 2004 General

Elections offered some promise in this respect.14

As for PAS, it has to improve on its perceived rigid stand, approach and image . .

in projecting Islam. It has to prove its competence in governance. Its 'hard core'

loyalists cannot expect to help PAS gain support, especially from among young and

professional people, just by arguing that PAS is Islam. PAS has to soften its 'rigid'

image, perhaps to also review the wisdom of pushing its brand of 'Islamic state'. PAS

is a political party, not a religion, therefore it ought to behave like a political party and

contest for support from all Malaysians.

A concern expressed by some non-Muslims is as follows: will the need to

counter the 'green wave' lead to the 'blue' (i.e. BN) turning 'green'? A prior question

would perhaps be this: can the 'green wave' make a comeback? Considering that PAS

secured about 15% of the popular vote in both the 1999 and 2004 polls, the party still

has its loyal supporters. The experience in both Terengganu and Kelantan suggests

that the Malay voters are capable of renewing their support for the Islamist party.

Both PAS and BN are not ignorant about how each party had lost in previous

elections. Each cannot repeat the same errors and weaknesses in order not to lose to

the other. Both must also realize that they can no longer take the Malay voters for

granted.

I think whether the blue is turning green, or the green is turning blue, is a

matter of perception. The word Islam itself cannot be preconceived as being

synonymous with danger, or something that one must be cautious and guard against.

If the political process enables Islam to realize its universal values for the benefit of

the whole world, the better approach is to support such a process to achieve the

desired outcome. In this sense, the issue of UMNO turning green or remaining blue is

not a critical one.

NOTES

1. The journey started from Johor and Pahang, andcovered, with the exception of Perlis, all the northern Malay states of Terengganu, Kelantan, and Kedah, and returned via the same route, and ended in Johor again.

2. These two arrests were given full publicity in the mainstream media and took place shortly after Abdullah Badawi assumed the premiership. Kasitah Gadam, a cabinet minister from Sarawak had since stepped down. Eric Chia's case for his involvement in Penvaja's heavy losses had been public knowledge for some years now.

See some interesting discussions on Kelantan and the Islamization of politics and the politicization of Islam in contemporary Malaysia. According to Virginia Hooker, it was Clive Kessler who first noted this development during his fieldwork in Kelantan. Farish Noor offers his study on Nik Aziz, current MB of Kelantan, highlighting the Tuan Guru's ability to 'localize the universal and universalize the local' in his commentaries on the Quran so that Islam becomes a living reality in the daily lives of ordinary Kelantanese. See Virginia Hooker and Norani Othman (eds.), Malaysia: Islam, Society and Politics, Singapore: ISEAS, 2003. Haji Ismail told this writer how a party, by winning the support of a household head, will be assured of votes from other members of that household. A quick count on the total number of votes the party will get will then be possible. Several posters of Anwar, in particular that showed his beaten eyes, were displayed by both PAS and KeADILan to remind voters how the ex-DPM was badly treated by his BN government. There is a huge billboard outside the UMNO building near Marang showing the picture of children in a classroom without proper furniture and other facilities with a big caption: 'Kezaliman PAS' (cruelty of PAS). The picture is a criticism against the PAS government's closure of the KEMAS kindergartens in Terengganu. KEMAS is the acronym for the programmes run by the Community development Division(Bahagian Kemajuan Masyarakat) of the Ministry of Rural Development. The Straits Times, Thursday, March 4,2004. The General Elections that gave landslide wins to BN (or its predecessor, the Alliance) upon the appointment of a new Prime Minister are as follows: 1964 (Tunku Abdul Rahman Putera, the year immediately after the formation of the Federation of Malaysia), 1974 (Tun Abdul Razak), 1978 (Tun Hussein Onn), and 1982 (Tun Dr Mahathir). John Funston discusses this in his paper, "Election Fervour: Political Contest in Thailand and Malaysia", Paper No. 9, September 2000, ISEAS. See Berita Minggu Malaysia's interview with Idris Jusoh, the newly elected Menteri Besar of Terengganu, in Berita Minggu Malaysia, Sunday, March 28, 2004. See interview with Associate Professor Mohammad Agus Yusoff, published in Harakah, April 16-30,2004. Farish Noor wrote, in Malay, "Memikirkan Semula Pendekatan PAS" (Review of PAS' Approach), published in Harakah, April 16-30,2004. The writer observed a festive atmosphere taking place in the General Election, particularly in Terengganu and most obviously in Kelantan. Not only can one see the 'poster war' between BN and PAS, there are also attractive decorated party posters very enthusiastically put up by both parties. PM Abdullah Badawi had announced that all BN MPS must submit regular reports of their progress to him, other than calling them to remain 'clean'. Several states have also announced measures to ensure that the credibility of the party's ADUN (Ahli Dewan Undangan Negeri, or State Assemblymen) is upheld.

About the Speaker

Noorashikin Abdul Rahman is currently a Fellow in the Regional Social and Cultural

Studies Programme in ISEAS. She holds a B.A. with First Class Honours (Social

Sciences) from Edith Cowan University, Western Australia (1996), and Ph.D. from

the Department of Social Sciences, Curtin University of Technology, Western

Australia (2003). From January-August 1997, she sewed as a journalist with Berita

Harian (Malay daily), in Singapore Press Holdings. Her research interests are

labour migration (especially unskilled) and gender in Indonesia. Currently, she is

planning a research project which examines the impacts of out-migration of women

on migrant communities in Java. She has published in the area of migrant workers,

and is CO-editing a book with S. Huang and Brenda S.A. Yeoh entitled Contemporary

Perspectives on Asian Transitional Domestic Workers.

POLITICAL LEANINGS, CAMPAIGN STRATEGIES, AND PARTY WORKERS: FIELD NOTES FROM THE 2004 MALAYSIAN GENERAL

ELECTIONS

Introduction

Barisan Nasional's (BN) resounding victory in the 2004 General Elections (GE)

signalled a strong mandate for the leadership of Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi.

As pointed out by commentators, the 'Pak Lah factor', his apparent strong stance

against corruption, his vision of a moderate, inclusive and progressive brand of Islam

or Islam Hadhari and, the lack of a critical issue such as the Anwar saga that divided

the Malay vote in 1999 all contributed to BN's big win. Although these broader

factors do impact upon voting behaviour there are also a myriad of local factors that

may bear an influence on the choices voters make. The popularity of a candidate,

hislher raciallethnic and religious affiliation, local party machinery, campaign

strategies, local politics and voters' socio-economic profile may also swing votes in

favour of a certain political party. The following essay elucidates the array of factors

that bear an influence on political leanings, a person's political affiliation and voting

behaviour as observed from the ground during the recent Malaysian GE. It also

describes the perils and pleasures of various campaign strategies and to a certain

extent assesses its effectiveness. I reflect on these issues critically through descriptive

accounts of interactions with party workers and a segment of voters, and by attending

political ceramah, and accompanying a politician on a campaign trail.

Methodology

The accounts and stories in this essay are based on a one-week fieldwork in

Peninsular Malaysia during the period of campaigning. I spent four days observing

BN's and Barisan Alternatif S (BA) campaigning in the parliamentary seat of Kelana

Jaya, Selangor, an urban constituency with a very mixed socio-economic background. 1-u.

I was also given the privilege to accompany and observe Datuk Azalina Dato'

Othman Said and her team of Puteri UMNO in their efforts to woo voters and to boost

BN's campaign in the hot seat of Perrnatang Pauh, Penang where Datin Seri Wan

Azizah (wife of the former deputy premier Anwar Ibrahim) was contesting against

Imam Firdaus, the imam of the National Mosque to defend BA's seat and also her

husband's stronghold. The accounts in this essay are in no way intended to be a

representative sample as the people quoted are met upon by chance. However, to

ensure that I am exposed to supporters from both sides, I chose to attend both BN's

and BA's campaign events.

Political Leanings

I spent quite a bit of time talking to voters who were mainly in their twenties. Most of

them were educated, urbane and from the middle-class. Primarily I wanted to know

their political leanings and the underlying reasons thereof. These people range from

active party members, to voters who are non-active politically and to those who have

no interest in politics and have never exercised their rights to vote. Economic and

political stability ranked highest among the BN supporters I spoke to. For all of them,

it was only "natural" to support BN given their track record in bringing economic

prosperity and political stability to Malaysia. PAS'S exclusionist Islamic state was

also a main concern for those I spoke to because they primarily view Malaysia as a

multi-ethnic and multi-religious country. Hudud laws were viewed as being in

opposition to the modern and highly urbanised way of life they are accustomed to.

These views are reflected in the following quotes:

Q: Which party do you support and why?

A: BN of course. Look around you [we were having coffee in a cafe in Kuala Lumpur City Centre, or KLCC for short] who do you think made this happen if not for BN. I would not risk this, the future of our country in the hands of those who do not have any experience in running a country. I don't think Malaysia can ever be an Islamic state like what PAS is talking about. Look at us we are not just Malays but there are also Chinese, Indians and other races in Malaysia. It's beyond my imagination that Malaysia can progress if we embrace PAS and hudud. How is

that going to be possible? Maybe PAS can work for people in the kampong because perhaps they have different concerns. But for us here in the city life is very different. Just look around you, Malaysia has become a global city. Would PAS be able to continue to develop Malaysia like this if they get into power? I doubt so. [Hussein, 28, computer programmer]

Q: Why do you support BN?

A: BN has given us development and stability. I'm not saying that BN is perfect; of course they have their flaws but I don't think I can trust any other party. I treasure the freedom, peace and mobility that my family and I have enjoyed under BN. I'm not sure if we would still be able to enjoy these if PAS gets into power. As a woman, I'm also concerned if I would be treated justly if we embrace PAS'S brand of Islam and hudud. Okay, so the opposition is talking about corruption. I admit BN has flaws. No one is perfect but I am not confident that the opposition would be free of that if they get into power. Humans are just humans there will always be those that abuse their power. [Hanifah, 26, retail manager]

The above views were indeed not uncommon and were echoed by the rest. It is

apparent that the people I spoke to had already made up their minds and were not

ambivalent about which party they were going to vote for. Social issues such as

corruption, disparity between the rich and the poor, elitism, rising cases of serious

crimes and the increasing cost of living raised by opposition candidates in political

ceramah and exposed in media publications and campaign flyers of opposition parties

did not resonate strongly among the BN supporters I spoke to. It could perhaps be

attributed to their comfortable middle class and urbane backgrounds or it could also

be because PAS, the strongest opposition party in Malaysia, did not strike a chord

with them. It was quite obvious that PAS'S "extreme" Islamic image and stance

bothered the respondents the most. Moreover, these respondents mostly come from

families who are BN loyalists that could also influence their support for BN. The

people I spoke to admitted that they had never attended an opposition political

ceramah, had never bothered to read publications that are published by the opposition,

such as Harakah, and had never bothered to seek information through alternative

medium such as websites regarding the opposition. Their views on the opposition (in \b

particular PAS) were more or less shaped by information transmitted through

mainstream media and those exchanged in everyday conversations.

The reasons given by an entrepreneur in his early forties who was an active

BN member on why he thought PAS was not a credible opposition suggests the

potency of mainstream media in shaping a voter's opinion. At that point in time,

Abdul Hadi's claim that "a vote for PAS is a ticket to heaven" made front page news

in most major newspapers. The controversial claim obviously did not go down well

with voters like Zailani (and many others like him) as reflected in the following quote:

I note the importance of having an opposition. No government can be perfect so there must be people in there to check on them. But look at PAS, do you think they can be effective? Look at what they are claiming, a vote for them is a ticket to heaven? This may attract the kampong folks who are more simple-minded but us the more educated, we know that life is not that straightforward. All they talk about is heaven or hell. Only Allah knows best who goes to heaven or otherwise. But what about life here in this world. What about now? What experience do they have in running a country? We need an opposition but they must be credible and able to give constructive criticism and not just create sensationalism. [Zailani, early forties, an entrepreneur]

In my conversations with opposition party members, a factor that featured

prominently in spurring their political leanings is undoubtedly their disillusionment

with the government. This often stemmed from a personal experience in which they

felt the authorities had treated thein unjustly. An example is the case of Azman, an

active member of Pemuda KeADILan. I first met him at BA's operation room in

Kelana Jaya. As I got to know Azman better he told me why he became a supporter of

KeADILan and believed in their cause. According to Azman an experience that he

described as "police brutality" during the Anwar saga convinced him that he should

fight for social justice through joining a political party such as KeADILan:

At first I didn't know who's right or who's wrong. I like to hear both sides of the story so I attended some of the gatherings, demonstrations and ceramah at that time. At one of the gatherings there was a scuffle between the police and Datuk Seri's supporters. I somehow got caught in it and they got me. One of the policemen hit my leg with his baton repeatedly. My

foot became swollen and I couldn't walk properly for a week! When I got back to the kampung my mother asked what happened to me. I just kept quiet. From then on, I started questioning. I read more and attended meetings. Datuk Seri's trial is a joke! Is that justice? I don't think so. That is how I ended up joining KeADILan. I'm doing this for the future of this country. [Azman, early twenties, active KeADILan member]

The stark contrast in the conversations I had with BN and BA party workers I

feel is worth noting here. Barely five minutes into our meeting, Azman launched into

a verbal attack on Pemuda UMNO and related how a group of them threatened a son

of an opposition candidate the night before and prevented their entourage from

campaigning in an area. He lamented how these cases never get reported in the media

despite the party filing a police report pointing out how biased the media was. He also

went on to describe how BA campaign posters had been vandalised by supporters of

BN especially those featuring Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim and dumped outside the

operation room. I asked to see those posters but to my dissapointment he said they had

been thrown away. The night before meeting Azman I had spent the whole night with

BN party workers visiting various operation rooms. In my conversations with these

workers these sorts of complaints against the opposition never arose. It was not my

interest to judge who is speaking the truth or not. However, the difference in the

conversations I had with BN and BA party workers interest me most because it

reflected their views and emotions and how they are responding to politics and the

General Elections on the whole. Azman's actions could stem from real frustrations

and anger or it could be a strategy to voice out an alternative story and to impress

upon a foreign person. I suppose the lack of local media exposure in favour of the

opposition could also explain why party workers from the opposition resort to

whatever available opportunity they had to relate incidents that reflect unfavourably

of BN and also to campaign for their party. In the next section, I reflect upon an

experience attending political ceramah with BN supporters.

Political Ceramah

Whilst I was in Selangor, I stayed with two friends who are sharing a house Subang

Jaya. One was an active BN supporter who was also a member of Puteri UMNO, the

women's youth wing of UMNO headed by Datuk Azalina Dato' Othman Said. I

managed to twist their arms to accompany me to attend political ceramah both by BN

and BA. The reason I did so was to solicit their reactions regarding the ceramah and

the candidates from both sides. The first ceramah we went to was one organized by

BN featuring an MCA candidate who was running for the Parliamentary seat of

Kelana Jaya. At nine, people started gathering under a makeshift marquee erected in a

parking lot sandwiched by two blocks of low-cost government flats in a part of

Subang Jaya. I expected people from the neighbouring blocks to come in droves to

listen to the speakers but much to my disappointment a majority of the people in the

crowd were party workers. There must have been not more than 100 people or so. I

looked around to see if people were standing outside their flats or were peering their

heads out of their windows to listen to the speakers. However, it was apparent that

most of them kept indoors.

The pasar malam (night market) in the adjacent parking lot was most

definitely packing a bigger crowd. The rather poor turnout (in my opinion) made me

ponder about the effectiveness of ceramah in reaching out to voters especially the

fence sitters. The speakers belted similar rhetoric highlighting BN's credible record of

bringing progress and prosperity to the country and vague promises to work even

harder to ensure greater success. Their voices blared through the loudspeakers

occasionally interrupted by weak claps of support from party workers who made up

the majority of the audience. As it was an area that had a majority Chinese population,

the speakers strategically emphasised the inclusiveness of BN and the multi-ethnic

and multi-religious nature of its members. A male UMNO party member who was

chairing the ceramah also spent a considerable time convincing MalayIMuslim voters

that it was not unIslamic to choose a non-Muslim as a leader. Clad in a songkok and

wearing a batik shirt he spoke eloquently and quoted a few hadiths and verses from

the Koran to support his message. This showed that Islam was a very significant

factor in political campaigning even in urban Malaysia. The parliamentary candidate

took the stage last and spoke in stuttering Malay appealing for support and again

waxing lyrical about BN's good record. Missing was an engagement in local issues

and proposal of grandiose plans to address pressing social issues in Kelana Jaya. It

was very obvious that the candidate had decided best to ride on BN's good name as

his campaign platform.

The following day again at my insistence, my friends and I went to another

ceramah. This time around it was one that was organized by PAS. My friend's

apprehension to attend the ceramah with me is worth highlighting here as it was an

indication of various factors that shape a voter's perception of a certain political party.

First, she thought she was betraying BN by attending an opposition party's ceramah.

She was also worried that she might be "attacked" by PAS supporters who might

think that she is a spy being a member of Puteri UMNO. The next thing that

concerned her was that she does not wear the hijab and was afraid that PAS

supporters would taunt her! My first thought on this was that she was just being silly

and paranoid. However, on hindsight her reactions were indicative of her impression

of PAS. The first reason understandably reflected her loyalty to BN and UMNO. The

last two reasons revealed rather pointedly her parochial views of PAS as an extremist

religious party. Eventually she relented and agreed to come with me after her

housemate agreed to accompany us. I was very fortunate as I got more than what I

bargained for that night--the housemate's cousin who was visiting also came with us.

The ceramah was held at a parking lot in what appears to be a lower middle-

income housing area of Seri Setia. Judging from the party symbols that adorned some

of the houses, it was quite clear that there were many PAS and BA supporters in the

area. Two speakers spoke ahead of Puan Mastura, the candidate for the state seat of

Seri Setia. She was a professional in her early forties and a mother of six children and

was educated in the United States. The first two speakers were very eloquent and

spoke mainly about BN's edge over PAS in campaigning. Issues such as the

monopoly BN had over the media, the vandalisation of posters and also the credibility

of PAS candidates who managed to secure seats in the 1999 elections were

highlighted. When it was finally Puan Mastura's turn she spoke in a calm and

composed manner in a mix of Malay and English. She raised the issue of rising rates

of serious crimes in Selangor, cost of living and the disparity between the rich and \L

poor. She noted that BN had no qualms about spending hundreds of millions building

a new airport and other costly projects such as the KLCC which is only accessible by

the upper middle class, but have yet to do something to renovate the central bus

station in Pudu Raya utilised mostly by the lower classes. This she pointed out

reflected the elitist nature of BN and their lack of concern for the lower classes. At

that juncture, she reminded the audience that the people had the power to elect those

who represented their interest in this election in order to make a difference in their

lives. She also spoke about BA's plans of prioritising education and making sure

those from the lower classes would not be disadvantaged. She explained BA's plan of

giving away free textbooks, waiving fees for major examinations and re-instating

scholarships for overseas tertiary education.

Puan Mastura also noted that PAS is not just a party for Muslims but for all

citizens of Malaysia. She emphasised that PAS is not telling everyone to convert and

embrace Islam but instead is promoting the people to be a God-fearing society in

order to overcome some of the social ills such as heinous crimes like rape and heroine

addiction. The three of us (excluding the housemate's cousin who wears a hijab)

stood out like a sore thumb in the crowd. There must have been about fifty people

who attended the ceramah, most of them male supporters sporting beards and the

characteristic green songkok. There were a handful of women from around the

neighbourhood who were noticeably middle-aged or even older who came to listen to

Puan Mastura. Despite feeling uneasy because of the differences in the way we were

dressed, we were not subjected to stares by PAS supporters as I anticipated. In fact

they were receptive of our presence and offered us chairs to be comfortasble.

On the way home, I asked my friends what they thought about the speakers

and PAS and BA now that they had attended the ceramah. They thought that the

speeches were much better than BN's the night before. They debated for a while on

the issues raised by Puan Mastura but they admitted being impressed and surprised by

Puan Mastura's disposition and her educational background, and also the speakers

who warmed up the podium before her. It actually spurred my friend to want to attend

Datin Norli's ceramah (the BN candidate running against Puan Mastura for the state

seat of Seria Setia) just to see what she had to say so that she could make a calculated . "

comparison! Later on in the night as we were having supper my friend told me that

she still had not decided whom to vote for the parliamentary seat of Kelana Jaya. She

said her mother was not keen on casting her vote because the candidate running for

the seat was Chinese and now that she had attended the PAS ceramah she thought BA

was "quite good" after all.

The anecdotes I just described illustrate how race, publicity and campaign

strategies could impact upon voting behaviour. It was quite interesting to note how

my friend's extreme perceptions of PAS mellowed over a period of three dours. Based

on the quality of speeches at both ceramah, I thought PAS fielded better candidates

than BN. However, the impact of the ceramah in garnering votes and support was

rather questionable. Judging from the crowd, the people who made up the audience

were the converted or loyal party supporters. Given that BN certainly had the clear

support of the media, BA and PAS had to work the ground harder to dispel negative

perceptions and win votes. I doubted the ability of the opposition to do so especially

in a BN stronghold given the tight one-week period of campaigning. The opposition

obviously needed to have a long-term strategy to gain supporters and win the hearts of

the fence sitters and young voters who are apathetic about politics. The following

section describes the work of Puteri and Pemudo UMNO and its platform to gain

long-term support for the party.

Gerak Motor and Puteri UMNO

Through talking to party workers I also had the opportunity to learn more about the

activities of Pemuda and Puteri UMNO during the election period as well as outside

the election period. On a visit to BN's operation room in Kelana Jaya I was

introduced to Gerak Motor, a new unit within Pemuda UMNO's branch in Selangor.

Zailani, the leader of the unit explained to me the role of the Unit in the election

campaign and its long-term objectives. Primarily, the unit aims to spread UMNO's

message to youths who are members of motorbike gangs to become more politically

aware and to make them realise the importance of UMNO for the survival of the

Malay race in the country and the country's continued development. The Unit was

established a few months before the General Elections and had been organising T V

motivational and social courses for its nearly 300 members. Zailani admitted that

most of the Unit's existing members had already been members of Pemuda UMNO in

Selangor but he said that the Unit will continue its social and motivational programs

to attract youths who are especially members of motorbike gangs to become Pemuda

UMNO members.

I was kindly invited to join Zailani and his team to follow them in making the

rounds to the various BN operation rooms in the Subang JayaIKelana Jaya area to

understand better their role in the one-week campaigning. Apart from providing

moral support to operators of various Operation Rooms, the unit acted as a conduit in

distributing supplies of publicity resources such as posters, party flags, banners and

other BN paraphernalia. They were also summoned to accompany candidates to

political ceramah in order to form a crowd and provide support at the ceramah.

Zalaini and his team members were certainly spirited supporters of UMNO and it was

quite fascinating to observe their dedication. He explained that most of his team

members had applied for leave from work in order to focus their energies in helping

out with the one-week campaign.

I was also curious about the role of Puteri UMNO in the elections. I was told

that that the Malaysian GE 2004 was the first in which Puteri had participated lin a

federal election. Observing the activities in BN operation rooms, I noted that Puteri's

role is to manage the database of voters in the various electoral constituencies and to

disseminate publicity materials such as handbills and manifestos. I was given the

privilege to accompany Datuk Azalina and her team of Puteri from Pengerang, Desaru

in boosting BN7s campaign in Permatang Pauh, Pulau Pinang on Saturday, the last

day of campaigning. I arrived in Desaru on Friday morning. I had intended to observe

how Azalina and her team of Puteri were helping to boost BN7s campaign in Johor.

Instead I was told that she would be leaving for Permatang Pauh that evening upon

the Prime Minister's request to help campaigning there. I was invited to join the

entourage and we left Desaru at dusk.

After a night of driving from Desaru, we arrived in Permatang Pauh nearing

dawn. We managed to catch a couple of hours of sleep before having breakfast and

assembling again to be briefed by Azalina of Puteri's campaign strategy for the day.

The technique was to make house-to-house visits in the various kampungs in the area

in which support for BN and BA was 50-50. I was informed that members of Puteri

from the local branch who had been campaigning and disseminating BN publicity

materiaIs for the past one-week had been taunted by BA supporters who comprised of

youths on motorbikes. As such, we were told to take extra precaution and remained in

the group we were assigned to which had one male driver accompanying us. The

tactic for the morning was to follow Datin Seri Wan Azizah's campaign trail (she was

also expected to spend the whole day making house-to-house visits) in an effort to get

close to voters and spread BN's message.

We started off the day in a 16-car convoy that carried BN party symbols and

drove around Permatang Pauh. Finally we stopped a Kampung Terus and Azalina and

her team visited some residents in the area. Wan Azizah and her entourage had just

left. There were mixed reactions from the residents of Kampung Terus to BN7s

presence. There were riders on motorbikes that jeered at us and there were also others

that cheered us on. A couple of elderly men on their way to the paddy fields decided

to stop and engage some of the members of our entourage in a debate. They mainly

complained of the apathy displayed by BN candidates when a massive flood hit the

area a few years ago. They also raised the issue of favouritism in the election of local

resident committees. Some of the members of Puteri tried to pacify the men and

appealed to them to give BN another chance as they are now fielding new candidates.

In the meantime, Azalina was engaging some elderly women in conversations and

reminded them to vote and the importance of BN for the survival of the Malay race in

Malaysia. We went from one area after another and Azalina and her entourage posed

for photographs with children, women and gave away BN paraphanelia in an effort to

increase BN's presence and publicity in the hotly contested seat. At one point in time,

she came face-to-face with Wan Azizah and exchanged pleasantries. They both

wished each other well for the last day of campaigning.

After lunch things started heating up as Azalina decided to change tact and

visited areas that were known to have a majority of KeADILan supporters. We were

broken up into groups to visit different kampungs and I followed Azalina to visit areas

that were known as "black spots" or those that are known to have highest support for :L

keADILan. The atmosphere was certainly more hostile. At one point in time we were

even stopped by a gang of motorbike riders who told us to go away. Despite being

treated very rudely (one of the men hurled expletives at us), Datuk Azalina retained

her composure and reminded the men that they live in a democracy and hence BN had

the right to campaign in the area and they had no right to prevent her from meeting

residents there. After much haggling we were finally allowed to walk around in the

area. No one wanted to open their doors and we were totally brushed off.

The experience in Permatang Pauh was certainly an eye opener for me about

how passionate Malaysians can get over politics and the importance of campaign

work. Although Wan Azizah managed to retain her seat, she had only won by a few

hundred votes this time around--a stark contrast to the results in the 1999 elections.

BN's tactic of fielding the imam of the National Mosque had certainly paid off in

gaining more ground in the 2004 elections as compared to 1999. The slimmer margin

of victory registered by Wan Azizah may suggest that the Anwar issue is starting to

wane even among his own people given that Pak Lah is now at the helm and not Tun

Dr Mahathir, the man identified as Anwar's greatest nemesis. What struck me most

was the dedication of members of Puteri in campaigining in the area. Given the

experience of the day, it was certainly quite terrifying to put oneself in a situation

where you would be vulnerable to supporters from the opposition who had shown that

they could get rather aggressive.

According to Azi, the vice head of Puteri in Permatang Pauh, since the start of

the campaigning period, some 20-30 members of Puteri had been going around daily

to many kampungs in Permatang Pauh in a motorbike convoy to campaign for BN.

The convoy was first initiated by Datuk Azalina when she visited Permatang Pauh the

day after nomination day. Local members of Puteri continued on with the effort after

she left. Azi related that as the week progressed they were encountering more

difficulties as more supporters of the opposition started gathering in Permatang Puah.

It was uncommon that they would be jeered at, verbally abused or even spat at. There

were times when the opposition supporters would block their way and would not

allow them access to certain areas. However, Azi and other team members pressed on

with their effort and recruited some members of Pemuda UMNO to accompany them

on their house-to-house visits for safety reasons. According to her she felt confident

because prior to the elections, members of Puteri were given proper training on how

to carry out campaigning work.

Azi who was in her mid-twenties had quit her factory job in order to dedicate

herself to BN's campaigning work and Puteri's operations in the area. According to

her she chose Puteri over her job because her employers were getting stricter and it

was getting increasingly more difficult to get leave from work to attend training

sessions prior to the elections. Azi is one among many hundreds who have joined

Puteri. The branch in Permatang Pauh boasts 700 members and I was told that there

were 40 branches of Puteri in the whole of Pulau Pinang. The huge turnout of Puteri

members and their spirited cheers at the briefing by Datuk Azalina at UMNO's

headquarters on the night before Election Day was very impressive and indicative of

Puteri's influence in Penang. According to Azi, most Puteri members are recruited via

informal networks of contacts. Puteri organises on-going social and recreational

activities to attract young women into becoming politically aware and to know more

about UMNO and BN. She stressed that from her experience, youths would not be

attracted to Puteri if it stresses on politics from the start. She thought the social and

motivational courses organized by Puteri were certainly crucial in drawing and

attracting new members to Puteri.

The house-to-house visits were undoubtedly important as it helped boost BN's

presence in Pennatang Pauh and paint a more positive image of the party in the

keADILan stronghold. I can't help but wonder how much difference house-to-house

visits, especially in the eleventh hour of campaigning, can help swing votes in favour

of a certain political party. Long-term programmes to nurture loyalty to and

appreciation for a certain party--similar to the work done by Puteri UMNO and

Pemuda UMNO--could perhaps make a bigger difference to a political party's

popularity and performance. The organized network of Puteri in Pennatang Pauh and

the outreach programmes of Pemuda UMNO from the Gerak Motor unit in Selangor

are certainly important in reaching out to young voters who can be apathetic about

politics. I have been told that the incentives of being affiliated to a political party can

be many--for example especially when seeking referrals in applying for loans. I L

Although that could be a strong draw for political parties to be able to attract

members, my observations in the field suggest that the apparently stronger network

of UMNO youths does not stem merely from these incentives. However, it must be

acknowledged that UMNO is obviously better positioned in terms of resources to be

more innovative in reaching out to young people as compared to the opposition.

Conclusion

My observation of the Malaysian General Elections in Kelana Jaya, Selangor and

Permatang Pauh, Pulau Pinang illustrate the complex interactions of factors that shape

the political leanings of electors, their voting behaviour, as well as their perceptions of

a certain political party. It also describes the pleasures and perils of campaign work

and, to a certain extent, critically assesses the effectiveness of certain campaign

strategies. These observations are based more on interactions with young voters and

party workers and by participating in some campaign activities. This essay is not

meant to be conclusive of BN's as well as BA's performance in the sites in which the

observations were made but more to stimulate further research by analysts interested

in Malaysian politics.

Acknowledgement: The names of party workers and interviewers used in this essay are pseudonyms to protect their privacy. I owe a debt of gratitude to Dr Sharon Siddique of Sreekumar Siddique International Ltd for putting me in contact with Datuk Azalina Dato' Othman Said during the course of my one-week fieldwork in Malaysia.

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3(99): James Cotton, Peacekeeping in East Timor: an Australian perspective, July 1999.

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l(2000): Zakaria Haji Ahmad, Khoo Kay Kim, K S Nathan, Hari Singh, Meredith Weiss and John Funston, Trends in Malaysia: Election Assessment, January 2000.

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4(2000): Chalongphob Sussangkarn, Thailand: Toward a Sustainable Recovery, February 2000.

5(2000): John Funston, ASEAN and the Principle of Non-Intervention - Practice and Prospects, March 2000.

6(2000): C. P. F . Luhulima, Scope of ASEAN's Security Framework for the 21st Century, April 2000.

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5(2004): Hadi Soesastro and Jomo Kwame Sundaram, The Outlook for Indonesian and Malaysian Economies 2004, February 2004.

6(2004): Chan Heng Chee, US Policy in Asia, February 2004.

7(2004): Rizal Mallarangeng, Khoo Boo Teik, Ho Khai Leong, Kavi Chongkittavorn, Robert H. Taylor and Tim Huxley, Political and Security Outlook 2004: Political Change in Southeast Asia, February 2004.

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Series Editors Aris Ananta

Chin Kin Wah

Editorial Committee Lee Hock Guan

Sakulrat Montreevat

Guest Editor K S Nathan

Papers in this series are preliminary in nature and are intended to stimulate discussion and critical comment. The Editorial Committee accepts no responsibility for facts presented and views expressed, which rests exclusively with the individual author. No part of this

publication may be produced in any form without permission. Comments are welcomed and may be sent to the author at the

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. http://www.iseas.edu.sg

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies was established as an autonomous

organization in 1968. It is a regional research centre for scholars and other

specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia, particularly the many-faceted

problems of stability and security, economic development, and political and

social change.

The Institute's research programmes are the Regional Economic Studies

S, including ASEAN and APEC), Regional Strategic and Political Studies

and Regional Social and Cultural Studies (RSCS).