1

LOCAL LEADERSHIP IN RURAL THAILAND Charles F. Keyes

University of Washington Originally published in Local Authority and Administration in Thailand, ed. by Fred R. von der Mehden and David A. Wilson. Los Angeles: University of California, Academic Advisory Council for Thailand (Report No. 1 - 1970 for the United States Operations Mission/Thailand), April 1 1970. Pp. 92-127. Reprinted in Modern Thai Politics. Clark Neher, ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1976). Pp. 219-50). Translated into Thai under the title of ผูน้ําทองถิ่นในชนบทไทย (Phūnam thôngthin nai chonnabot Thai [‘Local Leaders in Rural Thailand’]) translated by Phonchai Theppanya,

เชียงใหม่: มหาวิทยาลัย, คณะสังคมศาสตร ์(Chiang Mai: Department of Sociology-Anthropology, Faculty of the Social Sciences, Chiang Mai University, 1973.)

1. Introduction

Much of the discussion of local leadership in the literature on Thailand is

organized with reference to the units of the Thai administrative system. In these terms,

local leaders are to be found primarily at ‘village’ or ‘hamlet’ (muban), ‘commune’

(tambon), and ‘district’ (amphoe) levels. However logical this scheme may seem for

discussing local leadership, its use could lead to serious distortions in an analysis of the

subject.

To begin with, the Thai administrative system is only one source of authority

which sanctions local leaders in the eyes of the peasantry. Peasant custom also provides a

sanction for authority of some types of leaders. Authority of yet another type, namely that

which springs from knowledge of the workings of the national marketing system is also

recognized by the peasantry. In other words, the national sources of authority for local

leaders are not restricted to that of the bureaucracy and/or government, although this

latter source is by far the most important. In addition to local leaders whose authority

derives solely from peasant or from national sources, there are a number of leaders whose

authority derives from both sources. In other words, there are three types of local leaders

which must be distinguished from one another – those who are leaders because of

membership in national groups, those which are products solely of peasant social

structure, and those which are sanctioned by both peasant and national groups.

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There is yet another difficulty encountered if one were to divide up local

leadership roles with reference to their location at the three lowest levels of the

administrative system. The way in which the administrative system has been applied in

rural Thailand is not everywhere the same. Without going into great detail, I would note

that in some parts of Thailand, notably the Central Plains, the ‘natural’ peasant

community usually comprises several muban and yet is not equated with a single tambon.

Perhaps the most extreme example of lack of articulation between administrative and

peasant systems that has been described in the literature is the village of Bang Chan

(Sharp, et a1. 1953 and Phillips 1965) near Bangkok which includes seven muban located

in two different tambon which, in turn, are in two different amphoe. In other parts of

Thailand, including most of the northeastern region, the boundaries of the ‘natural’

community usually coincide with those of the muban. However, even in the northeast,

size of the ‘natural’ community can affect how it is incorporated in to the administrative

system.

While some ‘natural’ communities are too small, in the eyes of government

officials, to be permitted the status of muban, others are too large to be allowed to exist as

a single administrative unit. The old community of Renu, in Nakhon Phanom Province,

for example, is divided into four muban which belong to different tambon (Yatsushiro

1966).1

In the following survey of local leadership in rural Thailand, I will distinguish

local leadership roles according to whether they are sanctioned by peasant groups, by

national groups, or by both. These three types of roles, I will term ‘elders’, non-village

leaders, and ‘synaptic’ leaders. In addition, I will introduce a distinction between two

types of rural systems, termed the Central Thai type and the Northeastern type, which

exist in consequence of differences in the articulation between peasant and administrative

organization. These two different systems have quite important implications for the way

those who fill leadership roles of all three types are able to function.

2. Local Leadership, Peasant Style

1 In another context (Keyes 1969), I have explored in greater detail the question of how the local

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All of the literature on Thai villages stresses the leadership roles of village

residents who are headmen (puyaiban or kamnan), monks (phra), and teachers (khru),

roles which I will discuss in a moment. Less frequently discussed are those local leaders

or ‘elders’ (phuyai)2 whose statuses are a function entirely of peasant social structure

rather than a consequence of attachment to institutions which link village and nation also

society. While the number of ‘elders’ and the amount of power and prestige they have

varies considerably, the basic character of this type of leadership appears to be quite

similar for most villages for which information exists.3

Elders are involved, either individually or collectively, in a variety of contexts. In

most villages, elders are involved in management of certain community affairs such as

the maintenance village structures (wat, school, rest houses, etc.). On occasions when

money or labor is required for some village project such as a ceremony or construction of

a new building, the elders often function as an informal solicitation committee. Elders are

also called on to mediate between villagers in such disputes, as may, for example, arise

over land, destruction of property, and pregnancy of unmarried girls. In some areas,

particularly in the Northeast, elders may also help organize ‘home guard’ groups or

2 The term elders is somewhat misleading since most of the old people of village society do not perform important leadership roles (see fn 3). However, no adequate alternative has been discovered. 3 Information on village elders is available in almost all of the intensive village studies made by anthropologists. For this, and subsequent sections, I have based my discussion on the studies of Bang Chan (Sharp et al. 1953 and Phillips 1965), Bangkhuad (Kaufman 1960), and, to a lesser extent, on the studies of Sagatiam (Pfanner and Ingersoll 1962 1962; Ingersoll 1963 and 1966), Banoi (Piker 1964 and 1968), and Ban Hua Kok (Kemp 1968) for Central Thailand; on studies ofBan Nong Teun (Keyes 1962-1964 and 1966), Ban Nong Suung (Kirschs 1967), Ban Don Deng (Mizuno 1964 1965a 1965b 1966, and 1968) and, to a smaller extent , Ban Nong Khon (Klausner 1956), Ban Yang Terng (Kickert 1960), Ban Nonlan (Amyot 1964), and Ban Muang (Lux 1962 and 1966) for the northeastern region; on studies of Ku Daeng (Kingshill 1960), Ban Ping (Moerman 1965 1966 1967 1968, and 1969), and ‘South’ Village (Wijeyewardene 1967). There are, to my knowledge, no intensive studies of Thai-speaking villages, as distinct from Malay-speaking (i.e., Fraser 1960 and 1966), in Southern Thailand. I have also drawn considerably upon a number of surveys of villages, most particularly those carried out in Ubon Province under the auspices of the Thailand-Unesco Fundamental Education Centre (Madge 1957), in Tambon Renu, Nakhon Phanom Province by a joint Thai-United States Operations Mission team (Yatsushiro 1966a 1966b), in Udon Province under the direction of the Military Research and Development Center (Blakeslee, Huff and Kickert 1965), in Khonkaen Province by a team from Kasetsart University (Long, et al. 1963, in selected villages in Sakon Nakhon and Mahasarakham Provinces by a team of researchers from the Research Division of USOM/Thailand, National Research Council, Department of Public Administration, and Chulalongkorn University (Yatsushiro et al. 1966 and 1967; Bantorn 1966) and among Thai-Muslims in Songkhla Province by a member of the Kyoto Center for Southeast Asian Studies (Yano 1968). The survey work in villages in Sakon Nakhon and Mahasarakham Provinces (Yatsushiro e t al. 1967) remains the most systematic information for any one region of the country on local leadership.

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posses (compare Huf 1966; Blakeslee, Huff and Kickert 1965; and United States

Operations Mission to Thailand, Research Division Staff 1967-8).

How does a villager become an elder? Sex and age are certainly important criteria

for determining to whom village authority is allocated. Except where women are

teachers, they are almost never found among the village elders. I interpret this as being

correlated with a fundamental division in peasant social structure whereby women are

expected to manage the internal affairs of families while men handle the external

relations. Even though women, as has been noted and commented upon by observers

from La Loubère in the 17th century on (La Loubère 1963 and compare Kirsch, n.d.),

have long taken a leading role in petty trading, such involvement, apparently, does not

lead to the acquisition of a voice in village affairs.

Beginning with the pioneering study of Bang Chan, reports on village life in

Thailand have all noted the importance of age as a criterion of local leadership. However,

this is not to say that the older a man, the greater his authority. Although the aged are

widely respected and are “active in routine temple affairs, in the care of priests, ritual

paraphernalia, and buildings” (Sharp et al. 1953: 85), it is the middle-aged who are

expected to perform most of the functions of elders discussed above. In surveying the

available literature, I have discovered that the vast majority of recognized elders belong

to the age group between 35 and 55. While it is true that most elders are middle-aged

men, it is not true that most middle-aged men are elders. Age like sex defines a

necessary, but not sufficient base for the determination of local leadership.

Recent studies have often used the membership lists of various village

committees, societies, and associations as a means for identifying who are the local

leaders (cf. Yatsushiro et al. 1966). In any village today one indeed finds that a veritable

array of such formal groups are said to exist, ranging from the older temple and school

committees to the more recently set up village development committee, cooperative

credit society, and farmers’ association. As these putative formal groups4 are often

chaired by or closely associated with those who fill the roles of headmen, abbots, or

headmasters, it would seem to follow that the status of elder is really the equivalent of

4 Those listed as members of village committees, associations and societies rarely ever function as groups (cf. Yatsushiro 1966a: 60). Even the one which often does, the wat committee, is still a recent creation of the government, having been initiated only in 1950 (Kaufman 1960: 112).

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being a member of the ‘entourage,’ to use Hanks’ term (Hanks 1965) of one of these

types of leaders. However, to so conclude would, I believe, distort the picture of local

leadership. While headmen, abbots and headmasters do attract coteries of followers, there

are often other leaders whose claim to authority stems from different criteria.

Although it is not possible to develop fully in this context an analysis of the status

system of Thai peasants5, it should be recognized that wealth, religious achievement,

management of activities with illicit and/or immoral overtones, and, perhaps, standing

within kin groups can also be translated into village leadership positions. Wealth-based

statuses can be attained not only by increasing the size of land holdings but also by

success as a ‘trader.’ Insofar as trading is restricted to such traditional peasant concerns

as cattle, the consequent status has significance only within village society.6 However,

those village-based traders who are involved in marketing networks which link village,

town, and metropolis must be considered as leaders of the same type as headmen, monks

and teachers who are also links in other networks connecting local and national groups.

Religious achievement is defined in reference to attainment of clerical status before

returning to the lay life and/or attainment of the status of lay leader in the temple.7

Although a reputation based upon organization of gambling games, production of village

whiskey, control of animal slaughter, or usury would seem to engender negative, rather

than positive, evaluations by a man’s fellow villagers, the individual who has such a

reputation often attains leadership positions because of the fear he inspires in others.

Leadership in kin groups has been noted in the studies under the supervision of

Yatsushiro (Yatsushiro 1966a and Yatsushiro et al. 1967) as being one basis for

determining village leadership. However, the rather amorphous character of peasant kin 5 1 am planning to treat this subject in another paper using material originally presented in a discussion of status and rank in the Thai-Lao village of Ban Nong Teun (Keyes 1964). I would only note here that Hanks’ seminal paper, “Merit and Power in the Thai Social Order” (Hanks 1962), is very suggestive of the type of considerations which need to be taken into account in analysis of Thai peasant social structure. 6 In-the Lao-speaking areas of Northeastern Thailand and Laos itself, men who demonstrated ability as cattle traders were accorded the title of hoi (Keyes 1964). In recent years, the use of this term has been extended, in Northeastern Thailand at least, to apply to those villagers who succeed as traders of other types of commodities. 7 Two lay positions associated with the temple sometimes provide access to power within peasant society. The most important lay role, where it exists, is that of ‘temple treasurer’ who can sometimes manipulate temple wealth through loans and investments. Another potentially important lay role is that of the layman who leads the congregation in their part of Buddhist ritual. Such men are universally respected, but are often not secular leaders because they are so old. Old men who are honored by being made ‘temple stewards’ (sarawat wat) are also rarely secular leaders.

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groups suggests the opposite – i.e., that leadership within the community leads a person’s

fellow kinsmen to look to him for advice and guidance. Before leaving the subject I

would add that ability as a magical or medical practitioner, with the exception, perhaps,

of the man who superintends the cult of the village guardian spirit found in Northern and

Northeastern Thailand (cf. Keyes 1964), does not seem to be a significant criterion for

attaining a village leadership role.8 The only possible exception is those few village-

based health officials whose roles, because they are links between local and national

groups, will be discussed below.

Elders sometimes acquire considerable power within a village. In doing so, they

must compete not only with other elders, but also with some of those who occupy the

more formal roles of headmen, monks, teachers, traders, and village-based health

officers. Consequently, before discussing some of the implications of competition for

power in villages, it is first necessary to examine those other roles which are also found

in villages.

3. Synaptic Leaders

In any peasant society there are villagers who act as links in the networks

connecting peasant and national groups. While the roles such villagers play are often

referred to in the literature as ‘brokerage’ or ‘middlemen’ roles.9 I prefer to use the more

general term, ‘synaptic leader’, recently introduced by Moerman (1969). In rural

Thailand, one can distinguish five types of synaptic leaders: headmen (both puyaiban and

kamnan), monks, teachers, those village traders whose entrepreneurial activities have led

them to establish regular ties with town-based merchants or dealers and village-based

health officials. Not every village system includes all of these roles, although every

peasant family falls under the jurisdiction of some particular puyaiban and kamnan,

belongs, except in the rare cases where they are adherents of Islam or Christianity, to

some temple congregation, and sends its children to some school. Moreover, the great

8 Saisth Pornkaew, a former District Officer and Assistant Governor in Ubon Province, informs me that in some parts of northeastern Thailand women who play roles as mediums/shamans (mophifa) are often influential in village affairs. 9 Most of the literature employing the term ‘broker’ can be traced to a key article by Wolf (1956). See also, Geertz (1959), Skinner (1968), and Press (1969). The term ‘middleman’ has had a more restricted usage, being applied primarily to roles in the market system (cf. Mintz 1956), and I will so use it in this paper.

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increase in the past 15-20 years of village shops, rice mills, and middlemen

establishments which handle such cash crops as rice, kenaf, and maize has led a large

percentage of the peasant populace to develop regular relations with village based traders.

In contrast, the number of peasants who patronize health centers is still a small

percentage of the total rural population, for such centers are restricted to only a few large

important villages, usually tambon centers.

3.1 Headmen

Although traditionally village headmen in Thailand emerged from among the

leaders of the peasant communities themselves, their roles were greatly altered by

administrative reforms initiated by King Chulalongkorn (1869-1910). During his reign a

centralized administrative system was devised which was felt would be far more efficient

for effecting the modernization of Thailand than the existing system which permitted

considerable local autonomy and variation. These administrative reforms were

incorporated into several successive acts promulgated between 1892 and 1914. In the

Local Administration Act of 1914, the basic principles of local administration which

were to have such a marked impact on the roles of village headmen were set out. These

principles, with only minor modifications, continue in force today.10

By law, the rural populace has been grouped into muban, the lowest-level units in

the administrative system, and muban, in turn, are grouped into tambon. The headman of

the muban is termed puyaiban, while the headman of a tambon is a kamnan. According to

the original conception, muban and tambon should be equivalent units throughout the

country, with muban consisting of approximately 200 people and tambon containing

between 10 and 20 muban (Cakrakrut 1963: 229 and 233-234). Again legally, puyaiban

are to be elected by the eligible members of a muban, while kamnan are to be elected by

the puyaiban from among those who reside in the same tambon (Snit 1967).

In practice, the implementation of this system has often departed from the legal

guidelines. The results of the implementation has created marked variation both in the

manner in which the administrative system is articulated with peasant social organization

10 For a fuller account of the administrative reforms of Chulalongkorn, see Damrong (1960) and compare Snit (1967).

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and in the types of muban and tambon and associated headmen roles which are to be

found in Thailand (cf. Reyes 1969).

To begin with, size of the ‘natural communities’ defined in reference to peasant

social structure has been a crucial factor in determining the relationship of such

communities to the administrative system. For example, the 4000 plus people who reside

in the village of Renu, That Phanom District, Nakhon Phanom Province, are divided

among four muban and two tambon (Yatsushiro 1966). On the other hand, some small

communities of less than 100 inhabitants in northeastern Thailand are included in the

same muban as neighboring communities (cf. Blakeslee, Huff, and Kickert 1965).

The size factor, however, accounts for only a small number of cases in which the

muban-tambon system poorly articulated with the natural communities of the peasantry.

For most of the Central Region of Thailand, the areas where the muban-tambon system

was first applied, there is almost no correlation between administrative and peasant units.

For example, the natural community of Bang Chan, located near Bangkok, can boast of

possessing seven puyaiban who are under two different kamnan (Sharp et al. 1953; also

compare, Kaufman 1960; Ingersoll 1963; and Kemp 1968). The Central Region contrasts

markedly with northeastern Thailand where most natural communities are also muban

(Blakeslee, Huff and Kickert 1965 and Yatsushiro et al. 1967). What I will term the

‘Central Thai type’, i.e., the situation where a natural community comprises a number of

muban without being isomorphic with a tambon, and the Northeastern type, that is, the

case where the natural community is equated with a muban, can be used to discuss

articulation between administrative and peasant systems for most of rural Thailand.11

Selection of headmen in those areas which belong to the Central Thai type follow

the legal guidelines. In other words, puyaiban are elected by those eligible living in the

government-determined muban, while kamnan are elected by puyaiban (Sharp et al.

1953: 37 et seq.; Kaufman 1960: 75-8). The functions of both puyaiban and kamnan are

11 Although there are at least a few cases in North Thailand where a muban is composed of several natural communities (Keyes 1969), it is likely that most northern villages are either like Ku Daeng in the Chiang Mai Plain (Kingshill 1960) which fits in to the Central Thai type, or Ban Ping, a Thai-Lue village in Chiang Rai Province (Moerman 1969) which is easily identifiable as being of the Northeastern type. Too little information exists for Thai-speaking villages in Southern Thailand to make any definitive statement about the situation there.

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solely those which are vested in them by the government (compare Sharp et al. 1953: 42-

45), for these roles have no place with in the traditional peasant system.

Headmen, instead of being supported from below by their

constituencies, are suspended from the governmental

pyramid above, being responsible to, dependent on, and

largely controlled by district officials representing central

government. In this situation, headmen necessarily become

simply agents -- passive agents – of the government

bureaucratic hierarchy, which in some cases, at least, has a

low opinion of their capacities (Sharp et al. 1953: 45-6).

The authority which such headmen have, thus, derives only from the government

and not from the peasant system. Even recognizing that headmen are but the lowest

members of the government hierarchy, villagers still see the role as sufficiently attractive

to compete for it (Kaufman 1960: 76-78). However, this does not mean that villagers who

operate in the Central Thai type of system are happy with it (Sharp et al. 1953: 48-9).

While the headmen of the Central Thai type are not subjected to the often contradictory

pulls of local and national groups to the degree that other synaptic leaders are, they must

labor under the disabilities of being neither significant government agents since they are

responsible for only a small part of their home communities nor significant local leaders

since they are on a par, or only slightly above if they are kamnan, with several other men

in the same community who have the same positions.

Puyaiban of the Northeastern type are elected in the same manner as their

counterparts of the Central Thai type, but kamnan often hold their positions because of

being a puyaiban of a tambon village (ban tambon) rather than because they have been

chosen by their fellow puyaiban. Since the role of puyaiban is isomorphic with the role of

headman of the natural community, the consequent tensions of serving two constituencies

is often seen as a serious drawback by those who would aspire to the role. On the other

hand, the authority inherent in a role sanctioned by both national and peasant systems has

an obvious attraction for those who seek power at the village level, In the village of Ban

Ping, the fact that headmen are “squeezed between two powerful communities,” the

corporate village and the nation (Moerman 1969: 549), make the role undesirable in the

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eyes of villagers. In contrast, in several villages of northeastern Thailand (Yatsushiro et

al. 1967; Bantorn 1966; Kirsch 1967), the role of puyaiban is attractive precisely because

its synaptic qualities endow it with considerable power. It should be noted, in passing,

that in some villages, such as Ban Nong Teun studied by this writer, the role of puyaiban

is semi-hereditary and elections merely serve to confirm in office the man that everyone

knows should be headman, Such situations are rare, and are probably becoming rarer.

Kamnan of the Northeastern type are more powerful than puyaiban, if for no other

reason, because they are puyaiban of larger villages. However, they are forced, like

kamnan of the Central Thai type, to cope with so much government red-tape (recording

vital statistics, keeping records of numerous village activities, etc.) that the role is often

seen as something of a bore. For those kamnan who are so inclined, however, it is

possible to increase their power by playing off local and national demands to a greater

extent than can puyaiban. In at least two cases in northeastern Thailand with which I was

personally familiar, kamnan had become very powerful indeed, but I suspect that such

kamnan are relatively rare.

Before leaving the subject of headmen, it should be noted that there are several

other roles which are attached to the offices of puyaiban and kamnan. Such roles as

assistant puyaiban or assistant kamnan (sarawat tambon) are not very significant since

those who play such roles can rarely exercise authority independent of that of the

headmen themselves. The same is probably true for the so-called tambon doctor (mo

tambon), about whom little has been written. As for the tambon council (sapha tambon),

in those places where it exists, it seems likely that it is similar to village committees in

being made up of men who are already leaders for other reasons.

It should be obvious that puyaiban and, probably, kamnan, of the Central Plains

type are not likely to be any more important, and can be considerably less important, as

local leaders than are those who have become leaders by virtue of their manifesting

qualities recognized as significant in peasant culture. Moreover, they are probably

everywhere less important than synaptic leaders of other types. Puyaiban and kamnan of

the Northeastern type can be important leaders if they are able to exploit the sources of

power potentially available from their two constituencies. On the other hand, they can be

neutralized as leaders if they are unable to cope with conflicting pressures of these two

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communities. In sum, not all village headmen, be they puyaiban or kamnan, are to be

expected to be powerful local leaders. For the reasons discussed here, it can be asserted in

some confidence that in many peasant villages, the most important leaders will be other

than the headmen.

3.2 Monks12

There is little doubt that local monks have been and continue to be important

leaders in secular affairs. Popular monks are often in a position to influence hundreds and

sometimes thousands of people (cf. Amara 1969). Monks, as members of the Thai

sangha, can also be and have increasingly been, called upon to perform functions related

to government goals. The Dharmic ambassadors (thammathut) who travel about the

countryside attempting to strengthen the faith of the peasantry and the tribal missionaries

(thammacarik) are recent examples of monks who have been co-opted in to national

programs.13 These observations about the secular activities of monks notwithstanding, it

does not follow that all monks are important local leaders and/or important promoters of

national ideals. On the contrary, most monks are limited in their function to fulfilling the

basic aspect of Thai clerical roles, i.e., serving as crucial ingredients in the merit-making

activities of the Buddhist laity.

Although figures are unavailable, it still can be stated with some certainty that the

greater portion of monks in rural Thailand can be classified as temporary monks – that is,

men who are fulfilling a cultural ideal of serving in the monkhood for a short period of

time, usually between three months (a single lenten period) and one year (two lenten

periods). Most temporary monks are quite young, in their early twenties. Although even

young monks receive the deference of the laity as a consequence of their status, few of

them will remain in the monkhood long enough to translate their prestige in to leadership.

12 For information concerning the roles of monks in rural Thailand, see especially Ingersoll (1963 1966), Kirsch (1967), Klausner (1964), Moerman (1966), Pfanner and Ingersoll (1962), Vella (1960) and Wyatt (1964). 13 Concern has been expressed by some members of the sangha, as well as by outside observers, that involvement of monks in government projects is potentially dangerous because it might lead to politicization of the clergy similar to that which exists in Burma and Vietnam. As yet evaluations of such programs as the Thammathut and Thammacarik which would some judgment about whether or not these concerns are well-founded have not been made. I myself have recently carried out research on the Thammacarik program, and hope to present results of my research in a future paper.

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Permanent monks, that is, monks who have been in the clergy for 10 years or

more,14 are potentially important leaders. Although some permanent monks, including

most in the Thammayut Order,15 prefer to emphasize the other-worldly qualities of their

roles, it is likely that most permanent monks do perform secular functions as local leaders

and/or as proponents of national programs. A permanent monk, particularly if he be an

abbot or ‘preceptor’ (upatchaya), who takes an active interest in lay affairs is not a person

to be crossed by either local leaders or government officials for the laity who belong to

his congregation would follow the lead of such a monk in preference to that of a local

leader or official. Bound as a monk is by the Buddhist and Thai value of not displaying

strong feelings, a monk would rarely publicly oppose another person, but passive reaction

to some proposal can be as devastating as open contradiction.16 It is politic for those who

wish to initiate a project in a village which as one or more respected monks to consult

first with such monks (cf. Kaufman 1960: 118; Ingersoll 1963: 122-3).

The question that should be asked about the leadership roles of local monks

should not be phrased in terms of whether or not monks can exert influence for there is

no doubt that permanent monks can and do. Rather, the crucial information one needs to

have is whether or not a particular village has any permanent monks. In fact, many

village temples in Thailand have only temporary monks (cf. Keyes 1966 and Moerman

1966). Although peasants in these villages may be influenced in their secular activities by

popular monks who reside in neighboring temples, those who are influenced most are

villagers which belong to congregations of temples which do have one or more

permanent monks. In short, although a majority of villagers in Thailand have monks

14 Monks who have served more than one year, but less than ten are often in something of an ambiguous position. Although they may achieve quite high clerical ranks and perform important clerical administrative functions, they are still viewed as potentially temporary by most of the laity. There are some exceptions, especially of men who had been a novice for a number of years prior to becoming a monk. Nonetheless, it is probably generally true that monks of this group are never as important as those who have been in for more than ten years in matters of secular leadership. 15 The vast majority of village temples are affiliated with the Mahanikai Order, but Thammayut temples are found in some rural areas, particularly in Phu Thai (Kirsch 1967 and Yatsushiro et al. 1967) Mon and/or Mon-influenced (Ingersoll 1963 and 1966) villages. 16 In one situation which I observed, a district officer had decided to have a Buddhist ceremony in association with the opening of a bridge. However, he had not consulted with the local clergy in making this decision. In announcing the ceremony to his congregation, the local abbot was able to use the fact that the ceremony was to be of a type peculiar to the area to comment “won’t anybody teach the district officer about local customs?” The point was not lost on the people in congregation.

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residing in their local temples, a much smaller number of villages actually have monks

who are able to exert their influence in secular affairs.

3.3 Teachers

Peasants respect village schoolteachers because of their influence over the

children of the community, their status as government officials, their high educational

attainment, and their knowledge and sophistication about the larger world. However, not

all schoolteachers can be considered as important local leaders. To begin with, most

teachers were not members of the community in which they teach before they were

posted there. Moreover, they can be transferred at any time. Consequently, there is

always a tenuousness about the attachment of a teacher to a particular village although, it

must be granted, teachers shift jobs far less often other government officials. This

tenuous attachment is accentuated by the fact that many teachers do not reside in the

villages in which they teach (Yatsushiro 1966; Keyes 1966; Kirsch 1967). If they

congregate in larger centers, such as tambon villages, they become a distinctive group of

whom only a few will become leaders (cf. Kirsch 1967). It should also be noted that a

sizeable percentage of teachers are females. Although female teachers do have

considerably more prestige than wives of farmers, they rarely perform any leadership role

except in the very narrow context of local school affairs. Finally, and perhaps most

importantly, schoolteachers are far more concerned with pleasing their national (i.e.,

bureaucratic) constituency than they are with satisfying the demands of villagers because

their advancement in salary and status depends upon it (cf. Keyes 1966).

All these factors notwithstanding, it is still true that in villages which have

resident schoolteachers, it is quite common to find at least one, often the headmaster,

playing an influential role in village affairs. The teacher is recognized by villagers as a

man of authority because he is the only villager, other than the headman, whose role

permits him independent access to an important sector of the bureaucracy. His advice is

also sought because villagers recognize that he has certain types of knowledge which

they do not have. In brief, while not all villages, even those with schools, have resident

teachers, many villages still do count among their local leaders, one or more

schoolteachers.

14

3.4 Traders

The emergence of village entrepreneurs in recent years is a phenomenon which

has not yet received much attention despite its obvious importance. It is no longer always

the case that peasants who wish to sell their produce or purchase consumer items must

make direct contact with town-based middlemen. Most larger villages, as well as many

smaller ones, today have one or more shopkeepers and rice millers. Some villages also

have middlemen who perform important functions in the marketing of such village

produce as kenaf, cotton, corn, pigs, etc. While some village traders are non-villagers,

particularly “Chinese” (Kirsch 1967), who have chosen to live in a village, the majority

are local people who have been able to obtain enough capital to set themselves up in

business. Such capital is increasingly obtained in consequence of temporary employment

of peasants in non-farms jobs, particularly in Bangkok (cf. Keyes 1966 and Kirsch 1966).

Those peasants who become village traders today play totally different roles than the

traditional traders in cattle and the vendors of sweets. The contemporary traders are true

entrepreneurs in a modern sense.

Perhaps the most common village-based traders are shopkeepers. Many shops are

marginal operations which carry only a small number of items and make only very small

profits (see, Kaufman 1960: 59-60). Those who run such shops hardly have any claim to

positions as leaders. In contrast, shopkeepers whose larger operations make it possible for

them to become wealthier than ordinary farmers (Kirsch 1967 and Keyes 1966) or who

are involved in extensive credit arrangements with other villagers (Long et al. 1963: 91)

are often influential in village affairs.

Mechanized rice mills can be found today dotted throughout rural Thailand. In

1961 in Khon Kaen Province, for example, “there were 755 of these units . . . rather more

than eight per tambo[n]” (Long et al. 1963: 66). The millers not only provide a local

service, but are also involved in trading the rice received in payment for milling and the

bran produced in the milling process. Some millers have become quite wealthy and it

seems likely that a majority are significantly better off than the average farmer. Their

wealth, and, in some cases, their connections with rice merchants, can be a basis for their

obtaining a voice in village affairs.

15

Until very recently, the individuals who played middlemen roles in the marketing

of village produce were almost entirely town-based (cf. Kaufman 1960: 67). This

probably continues to be the situation for most of Central Thailand where commercial

rice production has long existed (Ingram 1955). In some villages of north and

northeastern Thailand where production for the cash market has only recently become

significant, there are a few cases of villagers who have attained positions as middlemen.17

Because of the necessity of maintaining close relations with town-based traders and

because of their importance to the economic well-being of other villagers, peasant

middlemen often have the potential for manipulating considerable power in the village

context. They are particularly important in the transmission of information which might

lead to an expansion or contraction of village production for the cash market.

It is not uncommon to find men who combine two or three of the trader roles.

Such combinations are made possible by their ability to utilize connections with town-

based merchants for one purpose for establishing connections for another purpose. In

addition, they are more likely than other villagers to have the capital to invest in

expanded operations. Those who combine trading roles naturally increase their stature

within the community.

3.5 Health officials

Little needs to be said about health officials in relation to local leadership for,

although little has been written about them, there are certain characteristics of their roles

which make it unlikely that very many such officials will become local leaders. To begin

with, there are few health officials posted in villages. The situation in Khon Kaen where

“to serve more than 800,000 people in the [province], there is only a single hospital, three

first-class medical centres, and sixteen second class centres” (Long et al. 1963: 15) is not

atypical of most of Thailand. Moreover, the public health officers and midwives/nurses

who man the second-class health centers located in villages rarely do more than perform

a few minimal health-related functions (vaccination, inoculation, delivery of babies, and 17 In the village of Ban Nong Teun in which I worked, a man who was both rice miller and shopkeeper had also taken on a middleman role for the marketing of village-produced charcoal. In the tambon village of Ban Khwao in Mahasarakham Province, one man had become a middleman in the pig trade and several other men had started a middleman operation for the marketing of kenaf produced by a number of villages in the area.

16

treatment of minor ailments and wounds) which have little prestige value for villagers

even though they may be appreciated. Finally, many health officials who work in

villages, live in nearby towns and commute. Consequently, they have little stake in the

village in which they carry out their responsibilities. For these reasons, it is likely that

health officials are only very rarely important as local leaders.

4. Factions in Thai Villages

In any village, only a small number of middle-aged men will become important

village leaders whether they be elders or synaptic leaders. One should not count as

significant leaders either those old men who serve as temple stewards (sarawat wat) or

those, among the elders, who are really members of the entourages of headmen, abbots,

headmaster, or traders, although such men may play crucial parts in village decision-

making by advising those in the key roles and by assisting in the implementation of such

decision. The small scale of village society and the impingement of national institutions

greatly restrict the amount and type of power which can be exercised by any village

leader. Nonetheless, the attractions of power, so evident at the national level, are not

totally lacking in rural Thai communities.

Competition for power in at least some Thai villages takes the form of

factionalism.18 Although one might expect factionalism to be most pronounced in villages

of the Central Thai type (see above), Phillips’ observation about Bang Chan appears to

refute this hypothesis:

In this type of cultural situation, one does not find arising

the type of community power struggle or schisms

apparently characteristic of many peasant villages (Phillips

1965: 38; emphasis in original).

While Kirsch suggests that factions may have been present in Bang Chan, but

went unobserved owing to the size and fragmentation of such a community (Kirsch 1967:

75), I suspect that factions are indeed absent in Central Thai type villages because the

poor articulation between administrative and peasant systems has so confused lines of

18 On the character of factionalism in small-scale communities, see Nicholas (1965), Siege1 and Beals (1960) and Spiro (1968).

17

authority (cf. Sharp et al. 1953: 45-48). In contrast, in the corporate communities of the

Northeastern type, the possibilities of acquiring and utilizing local power are much

greater. Consequently, it is to be expected that competition for power in this type of

village will also be much greater.

Although, to my knowledge, Kirsch (1967: 70-77) is the only one to have

described and discussed Thai village factionalism in any detail, other hints from the

literature (see, especially, several of there ports in Yatsushiro et al. 1967) suggest that

factionalism is quite widespread in rural Thailand. Factional disputes are most readily

apparent in the elections of headmen (Kirsch 1967; Bantorn 1966 cf., also, Spiro 1968)

since headmen often arrogate a considerable portion of the power available to village

leaders. However, factions can continue to be important at other times if there are one or

more leaders who have followings which are sufficiently large to challenge the followers

of a headman.

Factional disputes in Thai villages, as in the case of a Burmese village described

by Spiro (1968), rarely lead to division or dissolution of a village. One reason for this is

because village factions, like national factions in Thailand, are never fixed groupings

since individuals often shift their allegiances when they perceive that their personal

interests will be better served by doing so. Moreover, the cultural value on maintaining

harmony serves to prevent public confrontations. Finally, and most importantly, most

peasants perceive that the power available within the village context is very small indeed

when compared to that exercised by non-villagers. Being a member of the entourage of a

powerful official, or more recently, politicians, may appeal to some villagers far more

than aspiring to a power position within the village.

Although factionalism never reaches major proportions in rural Thailand, it

remains an important in considerations of village leadership. In attempting to identify

who are the key people in a village whose support is necessary for the mobilization of

villagers for some activity, it is necessary to recognize that only a few men will wield real

power. The other identifiable leaders, be they ‘elders’ or ‘synaptic leaders,’ will most

likely belong to the ‘entourages’ of the key men. To identify who are the most powerful

figures in a community, I would suggest that one should begin by attempting to

reconstruct the most recent election for headman. While a headman himself may not be

18

the most powerful individual, for he could be a pawn of another man, the competition for

this position is likely to crystallize factional disputes.

5. Non-Villagers as Local Leaders

Two types of non-villagers are potentially able to exert influence in village affairs

owing to their regular contact with peasants. The first type includes those officials,

primarily at the district level, who have bureaucratic responsibility for administering

and/or controlling the local populace. The second comprises those town-based

middlemen who purchase peasant produce. A third type, namely those who can be termed

politicians, may be emerging, but as yet, too little information is available to be able to

say anything about the character of present relationships between politicians and

peasants.19

Other non-villagers, such as higher level government officials, officials belonging

to other than line ministries (e.g., the military officers who serve in Mobile Development

Units) and high-ranking monks are occasionally found to exert significant influence in

peasant affairs, but, since these cases are relatively exceptional, I will not discuss them

here.20

5.1 Officials and Local Leaders

The main types of officials whose duties bring them into regular contact with

peasants are the district officer (nai amphoe), or his agents, community development

workers (patthanakon), and the police (tamruat).21 Enough has been written on the

character of the Thai bureaucracy in general (see, for example, Mosel 1957; Riggs 1966;

19 Politicians comprise those who have competed for positions in provincial assemblies (sapha chanawat) or in the national parliament (sapha haeng chat). Those who compete for positions in municipal assemblies (sapha thet saban) have no necessary relationships with peasants since most peasants live outside of municipalities. Those who compete for elective positions in tambon councils (sapha tambon) are, probably not politicians, but men whose prior claim to local leadership has lead them to be elected (see above). On the relationships between politicians and villagers in a previous period when elections existed see Phillips (1958) and Wilson and Phillips (1958). 20 Some high-ranking officials maintain patronage relations with specific villages. One reason why such relations exists is because a man was born in a particular village, or was a temporary monk in some particular village temple. These relationships are most conspicuous in the context of thot kathin ceremonies (presentation of robes and offerings to monks after the end of Buddhist Lent) which are often sponsored by high ranking officials in village temples. Considerably more research on patronage of this type needs to be carried out before we can fully understand its significance as a type of local leadership. 21 For the most part, those officials who perform what might be called in American terms county agent roles (e.g., rice officers), have only irregular and unsystematic contact with villagers.

19

Siffin 1966 and Sutton 1962) and on the district office in specific (e.g., Sakda 1960 and

Thailand, Ministry of Interior, Department of Local Administration 1967) for me to be

able to dispense with any general discussion of the functions of the district office. Rather,

I should like to emphasize the fact that the district officer, and/or his agents, are the most

significant embodiments of the power of the state recognized by the peasantry.

Accepting, as the vast majority of peasants do, the legitimacy of the state, they also

accept the authority of the district office. This should not be interpreted, however, as

meaning that leadership of the district officer in matters relating to the lives of the

peasantry is unequivocally accepted by villagers. As should be obvious by now, peasants

recognize two sources of political authority, one sanctioned by peasant social structure

and the other sanctioned by the state. In cases in which local and national interests

conflict, the peasantry will, if permitted, follow their own ways in preference to those

prescribed by the government. Since the district officer and his subordinates do not live

in the villages, they are often unable to prevent peasants ignoring, subverting, or even

rejecting dicta communicated through the district office. On the other hand, the district

officer can call in to play certain coercive forces to ensure the compliance of the

peasantry. The ability to strike a balance between allowing the peasants to go their own

way and coercing them to conform with government will today distinguishes the

outstanding district officer.

Many district officials are limited in their ability to act as local leaders by their

attachment to the traditional system of kin müang (lit., ‘to eat the country’), which has

recently been termed the prebendary system so as to avoid the connotations of corruption

(“G.N.P.” 1969). District officials are, of course, not the only officials to expect that they

will receive more than normal fees, i.e., prebends, from those who must call upon them to

perform their prescribed functions (see below regarding the police). However, peasants

are more aware of this system with reference to the district office than they are with

reference to any other official agency save the police since the majority of their contacts

with officials are with those in the district office. Every registration required by law,

every application for permission to engage in some activity touched on in the legal code,

every favor asked is, potentially, an occasion for proffering a prebend. It is not surprising,

thus, that there is a reluctance on the part of peasants to have more contacts with district

20

officials than are necessary. Even the officials who reject the kin muang philosophy are

not necessarily more significant local leaders than those who do not because the

expectation that the system is applicable on all occasions is a firm part of the peasant

conception of how one must deal with officials.

Although the role of community development worker (patthanakon) is formally a

part of the district office bureaucracy, it deserves separate treatment because those who

play this role are expected to be much more involved in village affairs than are any other

government officials. While the community development program continues to expand,

the roles of community development workers have not received much attention since the

early 1960’s when the evaluations of the first major implementation of the community

development program took place. Nonetheless, what little evidence there is suggests that

conclusions reached in those first evaluations are still valid today. In his survey of

patthanakon, Yatsushiro (1964; also compare Keyes 1966) has reached some conclusions

about the characteristics of community development workers which are important for our

determination of the degree to which they can act as local leaders. On the positive side,

community development workers are in regular contact with villagers and, thus, are more

aware of village problems and needs than are any other officials. In addition, those

patthanakon who are from a rural background and/or from the same region as the

villagers with whom they work are often able to empathize with villagers in their

outlooks on life. Finally, community development workers are recognized by villagers as

officials who are attempting to improve rural life rather than suppressing certain peasant

practices. On the negative side, community development workers are relatively powerless

because of their low positions in the bureaucracy. Many find rural life difficult to cope

with because they are from urban and/or different regional backgrounds or because they

are single females. Finally, all community development workers must needs identify with

the government more than with the village because their careers depend upon the

approval of their bureaucratic superiors. On balance, I would conclude that while

community development workers may improve communications between local and

national groups, it is the rare patthanakon who can play an important leadership role in

local affairs. To do so requires that the community development worker both win the

21

support of villagers and be able to obtain an official ear for his recommendations. Such

combinations are extremely difficult to effect.##

Peasant attitudes towards the police are almost universally the same -- namely, the

police are feared and often disliked or hated. Villagers prefer to keep contacts with the

police to a minimum for such contacts are rarely pleasant. Police come to the villages to

suppress such peasant practices as producing “home-brew,” cutting trees for lumber, or

slaughtering large animals. When villagers must go to the police in connection with a

crime, they often find the police uncooperative unless they can outbribe the supporters of

the criminals (cf. Anonymous 1968). For such reasons, one could probably look in vain

for a policeman, other than those who are close relatives of villagers, who is able to

influence, as distinct from coerce, peasants in their actions.

5.2 Town-Based Middlemen

The influence of town-based middlemen to whom Thai peasants sell their produce

is, predictably, limited primarily to the economic sphere. In this restricted, but highly

important context, middlemen can be significant local leaders. The expansion of kenaf

and corn production in Northeastern Thailand (Chaiyong et al. 1962), the introduction of

new agricultural techniques in a Northern village (Moerman 1968) and the obtaining of

needed capital through loans by commercial rice producers in the Central Plains (Kamol,

1957) have all involved town-based middlemen. The importance of such

middlemen in economic development must not be underestimated. However,

considerably more research needs to be done on the way in which relationships between

peasant and middlemen are established and maintained. Suggestive here is the argument

put forth by

Ward (1960) that such relationships normally are more than strictly economic.22

6. Local Leadership, Some Implications for Rural Development in Thailand

It is axiomatic in the development literature that change can be induced in peasant

communities only if local leaders can be convinced of the merits of proposed innovation

22 During the course of my research in Ban Nong Teun, I discovered at a number of village ceremonies that members of the families of Mahasarkham middlemen were present. One son of a kenaf merchant commented to me that he was far better liked by villagers than were town-based officials because he could speak the local language and enjoy village customs.

22

so that they will stimulate others, either through example or through persuasion, to accept

the change. Having completed a survey of the types of local leadership roles which are

relevant to rural Thailand, the problem, now, is to identify which of them are most crucial

for development programs.

In cases where changes relate specifically to one of the institutions at the village

level (temple, school, health center, or office of headman), the relevant leaders will be

those most closely connected to the institutions. For example, it would be expected that

local monks, not the headman, elders, or other local leaders, would carry out changes

initiated by the Sangha hierarchy. Such institution-specific changes account, however, for

only a very small part of rural development programs. Most programs aim a t the general

improvement (whatever this term may mean) of village life. Consequently, we shall

concern ourselves here with general development.

At this point it is necessary to reintroduce the distinction I made between the two

different types of local leadership patterns which obtain under what I have termed the

“Central Thai” type and the “Northeastern” type. I would suggest that for villages of the

Central Thai type that almost all local leaders have been neutralized by the extremely

poor articulation of peasant and administrative systems. As Sharp et al., have noted:

For the Bang Chan community as such there is no

organized agency capable of initiating, sanctioning, or

carrying through any consistent community action, in short

there is really no adequate structure of local government

(Sharp et al. 1953: 47).

The implications of this conclusion are devastating. From the point of view of

villagers, there exist almost no channels for communicating their desires upwards save in

the cases where such communications are restricted to the educational and religious

networks. For government officials and town-based middlemen who wish to introduce

changes in to a Central Thai type village, the difficulties are nearly as great. Headmen

can be used to transmit information, but they cannot be depended upon to implement

programs because they have little power within their home communities. The alternatives

to using headmen are either working with peasants individually (as middlemen do) or to

give up in despair, as I am sure many officials must often fee1 inclined to do. Perhaps

23

means have been found to cut through the confusion in Central Thai type villages for

Central Thailand continues to increase in prosperity; but, if so, there have been no

descriptions of such means. It is perhaps not coincidental that the students of Thai

peasant society who have most stressed the individualism of Thai peasants have worked

in Central Thailand (Phillips 1965 and 1969; Piker 1964 and 1969).23

Turning now to the Northeastern type of situation, it is obvious that some local

leadership roles can be quickly ruled out as being less important than others. With

reference to those found in villages, I would exclude from a list of important roles both

“temporary” monks and village-based health officers. I would also exclude those

individuals who are members of the entourages of more powerful village leaders. In this

category I would put the assistants of puyaiban and kamnan, teachers who are not

headmasters, and most of those who have been termed village elders. Among those who

play non-village roles, I would exclude most (but not quite all) community development

workers since they occupy rather weak positions and almost all police because of the

marked negative attitude of villagers towards those who fill police roles.

Remaining at the village level, although not existing in every village, are the roles

of headman (puyaiban or kamnan), permanent monk, headmaster, trader (within the

limits discussed above) and those elders who are faction leaders. While structurally the

headman role is potentially the most powerful, the tensions inherent in the role may

inhibit an incumbent from realizing that power and may discourage powerful elders from

offering themselves as candidates for the position (Moerman 1969). It follows that

determination of which village leadership roles actually exist, which of them are the most

important, and whether or not middlemen and individual peasants. Political development,

in contrast, seems to be relatively absent in Central Thailand and there may even have to

be political regression to a breakdown in patterns of local authority as a consequence of

23 A distinction between economic development, defined with reference to increased standards of living of individual peasants, and political development, defined with reference to increased involvement of peasants in decision-making processes of national groups, is perhaps called for at this point. What Central Thailand has experienced has been economic development made possible by relationships between middlemen and individual peasants. Political development, in contrast, seems to be relatively absent in Central Thailand and there may even have to be political regression to a breakdown in patterns of local authority as a consequence of the poor articulation of administrative and peasant systems of social organization.

24

the poor articulation of administrative and peasant systems of social organization.

Factionalism is significant must be made in reference to specific cases.

For introducing and implementing government programs, the district office

remains the key channel and the district officer the most important role. For initiating

strictly economic change, however, it would appear that the town-based middlemen are

more critical than are officials. Too little attention has been paid, I believe, to the critical

functions performed by middlemen. One major difference between middlemen and

officials, it might be noted, is that middlemen are often more sensitive to the nuances of

village life in the areas where they maintain relations with peasants than are officials.

Another difference is that middlemen are usually permanent residents of a particular

place whereas officials are transferred every few years.

It has been argued in this paper that local leadership in rural Thailand is a function

of two types of authority, that sanctioned by peasant social organization and that

sanctioned by national groups. Where the two types of authority have been badly meshed,

as in the Central Thai situation, those who fill leadership roles are unable to function very

efficiently in introducing social change. In the Northeastern type of case, the two types of

authority are better articulated. If those who exercise either or both types of authority in

the Northeastern type of context are properly recognized, communication of development

ideas and programs can be greatly facilitated. Yet, even for this situation, a fundamental

problem remains -- namely, the conflict between peasant and national interests which is

often stimulated by the introduction of change. Until a key to the resolution of this

problem has been found, local leadership in rural Thailand, where it has not been

undermined by ill application of administrative reforms as in Central Thailand, will

continue to be couched in a relatively traditional idiom.

25

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