Kohlberg and Ethical Universalism

by

Kwok Wing Anthony Yeung

B.A. (Hons.), The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1990 M . Phil., the Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1992

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© Kwok Wing Anthony Yeung 1998

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ii

Abstract

This dissertation is a study of Kohlberg's moral psychology, which is a six-stage

model of moral development. Kohlberg claims that his stages form a universal invariant

sequence and that they are hierarchical, i.e., higher stages are better than lower stages.

Accordingly, he claims that Stage 6 morality, which centers on justice, is universally

valid. This ethic of justice is embodied mainly in respect for persons, fairness, and the

procedural principle of ideal role taking. Kohlberg claims not only that Stage 6 values and

principles are universally valid, but also that they are determinate. In other words,

reasoning in terms of these values and principles guarantees that, for each particular

moral problem, there will be a distinct solution on which all morally mature people could

agree. By making these claims Kohlberg is advocating a strong and traditional version of

universalism, which I call 'paradigm universalism.'

The dissertation is divided into five chapters. In the first two chapters I outline

Kohlberg's theory and explore its philosophical implications. In Chapter 3 I discuss

Kohlberg's debates with two important critics, Gilligan and Flanagan. Gilligan claims

that Kohlberg's emphasis on justice rather than care indicates a gender bias in his model.

Flanagan, on the other hand, argues that since morality is multifarious it is wrong to i

equate morality either with justice or care of a combination of both. While these criticism

do point out certain shortcomings of Kohlberg's theory, I argue that they do not seriously

threaten the universal validity of Stage 6 moral values and principles in general. Chapter

4 introduces the main philosophical arguments of this dissertation. In this chapter I argue

that (1) moral psychology is relevant to moral philosophy; (2) that the claim of hierarchy

for the Kohlbergian stages does receive significant support from his research; and

Ill

therefore (3) Stage 6 does plausibly reflect certain universal moral ideals. At the same

time I allow (4) that there is clearly certain cultural bias in Kohlberg's theory and (5) that

he is excessively optimistic about the determinacy of Stage 6 moral reasoning. In the final

Chapter, I reflect on the universalism-relativism debate in light of Kohlberg's theory. I

argue that paradigm universalism is too strong for Kohlberg to support, and that

universalism is acceptable only in a weakened form which I call 'minimal universalism.'

Contrary to the hope of paradigm universalists, this minimal universalism cannot serve as

a comprehensive theory for solving moral problems. Neither does it exclude all forms of

ethical relativism, but it does set important limits to any acceptable relativist theory.

T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

Abstract

Table of contents

Acknowledgment

Introduction

Chapter 1: Kohlberg's theory — the early model Section 1. The stage model Section 2: Empirical tests Section 3: Philosophical implications Section 4: Explanatory difficulties Section 5: Summary

Chapter 2: Kohlberg's theory — the late model Section 1: Modifications made in the late model Section 2: Empirical support Section 3: Postconventional moral conception Section 4: Philosophical implications updated

Chapter 3: Criticisms of Kohlberg Section 1: Gilligan and the ethic of care Section 2: Reply from Kohlberg and his school Section 3: Reflections on the Kohlberg-Gilligan debate Section 4: Flanagan and pluralism Section 5: Kohlberg's reply Section 6: Flanagan's counter-arguments Section 7: Reflections on the Kohlberg-Flanagan debate Section 8: Summary

Chapter 4: From moral psychology to moral philosophy Section 1: The relevance of psychology to moral philosophy Section 2: Supremacy and universality of Stage 6 Section 3: Summary

Chapter 5:A reflection on the universalism-relativism debate Section 1: A reflection on Kohlberg's universalist claims Section 2: Minimal universalism Section 3: From minimal universalism to limited relativism Section 4: The study of human good

Bibliography

Appendices

Acknowledgment

There are many people I wish to thank for their assistance and support in the

preparation of this dissertation. I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Earl

Winkler, for his guidance and encouragement. He patiently went through my rough,

disorganized drafts, gave advice on how to refine my arguments, and helped to shape this

dissertation as it is today. I owe much to Professor Lawrence Walker, with whom I have

studied moral psychology. His instruction provided me with a good foundation for

understanding Kohlberg's theory and moral developmental psychology in general. I am

also indebted to Professor Jerrold Coombs, who helped me clarify important ideas for

understanding Kohlberg's theory and method on the one hand, and its philosophical

implications on the other. I am also grateful to my proof-readers, Angela Yee, Emma

Poon and Jeaneette Lim.

Finally, I have to thank my wife, Carole Hang Fung Hoyan, who helped me edit

my final drafts, and advised me on the writing of the dissertation. I am most grateful for

her love and support.

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Introduction

The project

This dissertation is a study of Kohlberg's moral theory. Kohlberg is probably the

most important moral developmental psychologist of the century. What is especially

interesting about his theory is that it concerns not only the phenomena of human moral

development, but also the possibility of developing a certain universalist moral

philosophy based on these phenomena.

Kohlberg's theory and arguments suggest a strong version of universalism,

although he may not have advocated it explicitly. According to this universalism, there

are some ultimate and all-embracing moral principles and decision-making procedures

that determine the solutions of moral dilemmas in a definite way. Two questions then

follow. First, is it possible to develop any ethical theory based on empirical knowledge at

all? Second, does Kohlberg's research successfully defend the form of universalism he

wants to defend? If not, precisely what theory does his research support?

This dissertation is an attempt to reply to these questions. I will argue that

empirical studies are relevant to moral philosophy in a way comparable (though not

identical) to the way in which observations of particular events support general scientific

theories. But I will also argue that Kohlberg's research does not support the kind of

universalism he wants to defend. The only way we can defend universalism is to weaken

our universalistic claim by abandoning the idea that universal moral principles or

decision-making procedures can guarantee unique solutions for all moral problems. But a

kind of universalism, weakened this way, does receive significant support from

Kohlberg's research. In the course of developing this view I will explain what remains

universalitc about this "minimal" universalism.

Why moral psychology

That Kohlberg's research supports a weak version of universalism has great

significance. We live with a mixture of many moral intuitions. When philosophers

discuss moral problems, they cannot help starting from premises which they find

undeniable. Different philosophers begin with different fundamental intuitions, all of

which are believed by their proponents to be obvious, but people nevertheless disagree.

Bentham intuits that all pleasures are good and that they differ only in quantity. M i l l

agrees that pleasure alone is good but insists that pleasures differ in quality as well as in

quantity. Moore rejects the idea that all good is ultimately grounded in pleasure. And so

on. Who is to be the final judge?

If empirical data about moral development do support a certain kind of ethical

theory, we can say, as physicists may do, that there is no final judge, or rather that the

only judges we have are logic and the empirical data, at least ideally speaking. If I believe

that time and space are absolute, I am wrong in spite of my strong intuition that they are

so. In face of all the empirical evidence, it is no use for me to complain that it is

unimaginable that time and space are relative. Likewise, if empirical data about moral

development do support a certain kind of ethical theory, then there will be real hope that

we can settle some important controversies in moral philosophy.

Since Kohlberg's (1958) study, the cognitive developmental approach in moral

developmental psychology has become a distinctive field of study. Kurtines & Gewirtz

say that Kohlberg was "almost single-handedly responsible for a 'cognitive' revolution in

the moral development literature that paralleled the cognitive revolution that was taking

place in developmental psychology during the decades of the 60s and 70s."1

Kohlberg's developmental theory is a six-stage model of moral development.2 ,

Every stage represents a "form" of moral reasoning. Two claims of Kohlberg's are

especially important and philosophically interesting. First, he claims that development

through these stages is universally invariant. Everybody in different cultures develops

morally through the same sequence of stages. Second, when one moves from a lower

stage to a higher one, the moral adequacy of one's mode of reasoning increases. From

these two claims it follows that Stage 6 represents the universal destiny of moral

development, and hence represents the universal moral ideal. In this sense the moral

standard at Stage 6 is ultimate and supreme, and the standard constitutes a form of ethical

universalism.

> There are also other interesting philosophical claims in Kohlberg's theory. These

include his formalism, rationalism, objectivism, and constructivism. Kohlberg regards his

theory as a formalism in that moral adequacy is determined by the "form" of reasoning

behind particular moral judgments. It is rationalistic in that, firstly, moral correctness is

largely determined in terms of moral reasoning, and secondly, the correct way of moral

1 William M. Kurtines & Jacob L. Gewirtz, Prologue to "Part I: Cognitive Developmental Perspectives' In Moral Development: An Introduction, ed. William M. Kurtines & Jacob L. Gewirtz (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1995), 19. 2 Kohlberg also assumes the existence of a seventh stage. Stage 6 reasoning, being the most adequate form of reasoning, deals only with the question of what is the morally right thing to do. Stage 7 goes beyond Stage 6 in that it proceeds to address the quesiton of why one should be moral at all. It does not introduce any new moral principles or values, but accomodates morality by constructing a view about the relation between the individual and the universe: Generally speaking, Stage 7 involves an identity or unity with being, life, or with God, and moral life is an expression.such identity (Kohlberg 1984, p. 41). Since Stage 7

4

reasoning is nearly all one needs to be a moral person. It is objectivist in that there is a

method by which we can judge the validity of a moral judgment, which is independent of

personal feelings or opinions. But his objectivism takes a naturalistic form. It does not,

like Plato's theory of idea, regard moral values as something that exists totally

independent of the human mind or human activities. Rather, it manifests itself as a claim

that morality is a human construct. He calls this view "constructivism." Though the

validity of these claims is not the main concern of this dissertation, I will also discuss

these topics briefly.

Gilligan and Flanagan

Although Kohlberg's theory has become a powerful theory in the field of moral

psychology, it is not immune from criticisms. Many argue that Kohlberg's theoretical

model fails to provide a complete account of the kinds of moral reasoning people actually

employ. Some challenge his methodology, and some challenge his derivation of

normative claims from empirical phenomena. Some even deny that Kohlberg is studying

moral reasoning at all. The MJI method (Moral Judgment Interview, the method

Kohlberg uses to elicit the moral reasoning of his subjects), it is maintained, elicits

people's moral justification rather than their reasoning.4 The difference between moral

reasoning and moral justification is that, while the former is what the subject employs in

order to reach his decision, the latter is what the subject uses to rationalize his choice

after the choice is made. Therefore it can hardly be the case that Kohlberg's model is a

model about the reasoning that determines moral decisions.

has nothing to do with adequacy of moral reasoning as such, I will not discuss its status in detail in this dissertation. 3 As we shall see, the second idea has been weakened with the later development of Kohlberg's theory.

5

I will deliberately avoid discussing the last of the above objections. My project in

this dissertation is to explore and critically examine the claim of universality in

Kohlberg's theory. Since universalism only deals with the problem of universal moral

standards, we can avoid the intriguing problem about whether Kohlberg is measuring

reasoning or justification. Even if what Kohlberg measures is justification but not

reasoning, it still reveals something about the moral standards of people, for both moral

reasoning and moral justification presuppose certain moral standards. Whether one is to

reason about a moral problem or to justify one's moral decision, he has to rely on some

moral standards. He can be satisfied or dissatisfied with his moral justification as much as

he can with his reasoning. As far as he is dissatisfied with his moral justification, he will

either throw doubts on the standards behind his justification or admit that his moral

decision is not justifiable. Therefore, even if what the MJI method elicits is moral

justification, it still helps to reveal the moral standards of the subjects.

The first two questions, however, cannot be so avoided. If Kohlberg's account of

people's approaches to moral reasoning is incomplete, then one can reasonably doubt

whether his theory is universally applicable. If there is any problem in his research

method or in his basic ideas about the relation between psychology and philosophy, then

his arguments for his philosophical claims will not be sound. I will concentrate on two

principal critics of Kohlberg, Gilligan and Flanagan. Gilligan is doubtlessly the most

famous opponent of Kohlberg. She is a moral psychologist who used to work with

Kohlberg but became convinced that Kohlberg's model is flawed. Flanagan, on the other

hand, criticizes Kohlberg from a more philosophical perspective. They are not the only

4 This point is mentioned by Professor Coombs to me in a personal discussion.

6

opponents of Kohlberg's theory, but their criticisms represent principal objections from

the views of both disciplines. By considering their objections to Kohlberg we can have a

fairly complete understanding of both the strengths and weaknesses of Kohlberg's theory.

Structure of the dissertation

This dissertation is composed of five chapters. In the first two chapters, I will

explore Kohlberg's empirical studies, the various formulations of his theory, and their

philosophical implications. In Chapter 3 I will review Gilligan's and Flanagan's

objections to his theory. I will assess how well Kohlberg's views can survive these

objections. Then, in Chapter 4,1 will argue in support of Kohlberg's claim for the

supreme adequacy of Stage 6 moral reasoning, partially on the basis of relevant empirical

research. The final chapter will be a reflection on the universalism-relativism debate in

light of Kohlberg's theory and research. Based on what we have learned from the debate

between Kohlberg and his critics, I will propose a minimal universalism. In doing so, I

will also briefly discuss how universalism and relativism can be reconciled.

7

Chapter One: Kohlberg's theory — the early model

Kohlberg's developmental theory was changing almost all through his academic

life. His theoretical claims and study methods at different times are intricately related to

each other, and are impossible to be summarized in a few paragraphs. In order to provide

the reader with a relatively clear picture of Kohlberg's theory, I will describe his theory in

terms of an early model and a late model, using Kohlberg's two anthologies as

representatives of these models. The first anthology is The Philosophy of Moral

Development, published in 1981 (abbreviated as Kohlberg 1981 below).1 This anthology

is a collection of a number of Kohlberg's early papers, which were written between the

years 1967 and 1979. These include most of his seminal research in moral psychology, as

well as his early views on moral philosophy and moral education. The second anthology

is The Psychology of Moral Development, published in 1984 (abbreviated as Kohlberg

1984). This second volume also includes a few of Kohlberg's early papers, but starting

with Chapter 3 it represents the a substantially revised version of his theory, and reports

studies using revised research methods. Since the publication of the (1984) anthology, the

revision of the theory is largely complete, though there has still been some minor change

in the description of the top developmental stage (i.e., Stage 6).

For the sake of convenience, I will refer to the theoretical model as established up

to the publication of the (1981) anthology as the 'early model,' while referring to the

model developed since the (1984) anthology as the 'late model.' In this first chapter we

shall review Kohlberg's early model of moral development. Reference will be made

mainly to the (1981) anthology, but when necessary to other essays of his as well. The

1 Lawrence Kohlberg, The Philosophy of Moral Development (Cambridge: Harper & Row, 1981). 2 Lawrence Kohlberg, The Psychology of Moral Development (Cambridge: Harper & Row, 1984). Part 2 of the (1984) anthology, which is co-authored with Charls Levine and Alexandra Hewer, has been published as a monograph in 1983, namely, Moral Stages: a Current Formulation and a Response to Critics (Basel: S. Sarger, 1983). I will refer to this monograph by Kohlberg et al. 1983 in this dissertation.

8

first half of this chapter is a review of his psychological theory; after this we shall discuss

its philosophical implications. By doing so, I wish to discuss the initial formulation of

Kohlberg's theory, which sets out the basic issues and provides the historical context for

the understanding of the more recent development of his theory.

Section 1: The stage model

Kohlberg's research on moral development can be traced back to the late 1950's,

when he conducted research on a group of American school boys for his Ph.D. program.

In this research Kohlberg interviewed his subjects and asked them to solve hypothetical

dilemmas in order to see how they reasoned morally.3 The project ended up with six

typologies of moral conceptions. These typologies provided him with the foundation for

developing his stage model of moral development.4

Kohlberg's theory then develops into a six-stage cognitive model, in which every

stage represents a distinct form of moral reasoning. Each "form of moral reasoning"

involves a way of resolving "moral conflicts," by which he means conflicts of claims. He

then calls a principle that serves the purpose of resolving moral conflicts a "principle of

justice" (Kohlberg 1981, p. 143). For Kohlberg, the relation between justice and morality

is so close that they are hardly distinguishable from each other. This strong correlation

between justice and morality is an important theme of his early works, and his model is

often understood as a "justice" model of morality.

1.1 Stage descriptions

In the (1981) anthology, each stage is defined in terms of (1) a set of criteria for

judging the morally right from the morally wrong, and (2) a set of motives for moral

3 See Appendix 1 for a list of the hypothetical dilemmas employed by Kohlberg in his research. 4 For details about the research see Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Development of Modes of Moral Thinking and Choice in the Years 10-16" (Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1958).

9

behavior. The stages fall into three different levels, the preconventional, the conventional

and the postconventional. Below is a brief review of the definitions of the stages.5

Preconventional Level

The morality of this level is marked chiefly by an apparent egocentrism. The

Tightness and wrongness of actions are judged on the basis of their physical consequences

in relation to the subject himself/herself. It is not perfectly accurate to say that people at

this level are selfish, for an alternative to a self-oriented morality is still not available to

them. Rightness and wrongness are interpreted " in terms of either the physical or the

hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors) or in terms

of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels."

The preconventional level is composed of two stages. Stage 1 morality is called

'Punishment and Obedience Orientation.'' At this stage the subject interprets rightness in

terms of obedience and wrongness in terms of disobedience and punishment. The motive

for moral behavior is simply to avoid punishment. "The avoidance of punishment and

unquestioning deference to power are valued in their own right."

At Stage 2, the Instrumental Relativistic Orientation, rightness of actions is still

understood in terms of self-interest. However, unlike Stage 1, in which people understand

rightness in terms of the avoidance of punishment alone, reward comes into play at this

stage. Whatever brings about good results for the self is right. Cooperation with others in

one's own interest starts to make sense to the subject. Therefore, "elements of fairness,

reciprocity, and equal sharing are present, but they are interpreted in a physical and

pragmatic way." Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours."

5 The stage descriptions reported here are first published in 1970, in his paper "Education for Justice: A Modern Statement of the Socratic View," which has become a chapter of his (1981) book (see Kohlberg 1981, pp. 29-48, esp. 17-19). In reporting his stage descriptions, I have tried to retain many of Kohlberg's own words, which I put inside quotation marks.

10

The motivation at this stage for right behavior is "to obtain reward, have favors returned,

and so on."

Conventional Level

At the second level, which Kohlberg calls the 'conventional level,' the subject's

moral concern is extended from the self to the group one belongs to. Such a group can be

one's family, one's nation, or a social group of any other kind. "Conformity" with the

expectations of one's group, "loyalty to it," and "actively maintaining and supporting its

order" are considered the right things to do. The conventional level is also marked by a

recognition of the difference between intentions and immediate consequences, and the

judgment of rightness and wrongness proceeds in light of intentions (see the definition of

Stage 3). The conventional level includes Stage 3 and Stage 4.

At Stage 3, The Interpersonal Concordance or "GoodBoy — Nice Girl"

Orientation, the central concept of moral rightness is that of social approval. What makes

an action right is that it "pleases or helps others and is approved by them." There is much

conformity to stereotypical images of what constitutes majority or "natural" behavior.

"Behavior is frequently judged by intention — the judgment "he means well" becomes

important for the first time. One earns approval by being 'nice.'" The motive for moral

behavior is the avoidance of "disapproval and dislike by others."

At Stage 4, the Society Maintaining Orientation, the orientation becomes one of

"maintenance of the social order." "Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing

respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for its own sake." The motive

for moral behavior becomes the desire to "avoid censure by legitimate authorities and

resultant guilt."

Postconventional, Autonomous, or Principled Level

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"At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral values and principles which

have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding

these principles, and apart from the individual's own identification with these groups."

This level has two stages, namely Stage 5 and Stage 6.

At Stage 5, The Social-Contract Legalistic Orientation, right actions are defined

in terms of "general individual rights" and consensus among individuals (or, in

Kohlberg's own words, "standards that have been critically examined and agreed on by

the whole society"). The "legal point of view" is acknowledged, but with "an emphasis on

the possibility of changing law in terms of the rational consideration of social utility

(rather than freezing it in terms of Stage 4 'law and order')." "There is a clear awareness

of the relativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis on the

procedural rules for reaching consensus. Aside from what is constitutionally and

democratically agreed on, the right is a matter of personal 'values' and 'opinion,'" and

"free agreement and contract" become "the binding elements of obligation." The motive

for moral behavior is "to maintain the respect of the impartial spectator judging in terms

of community welfare." In short, the Stage 5 moral conception is a mixture of social

contract, human rights, and utilitarianism.

Stage 6 is The Universal Ethical Principle Orientation. Moral Tightness is defined

by "the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to

logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract

and ethical (the Golden Rule, the Categorical Imperative); they are not concrete moral

rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of justice, of

the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity of human

beings as individuals." The motive for moral behavior is "to avoid self-condemnation."

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1.2 Features of the stages

Three features are essential for understanding Kohlberg's concept of moral stage.

First, a moral stage is a structured whole, a total way of thinking. The moral stage of a

subject is not determined by any particular moral judgment he/she makes, but by the

salient features of his/her process of moral reasoning as a whole. This structural

wholeness can be further explained by the introduction of Kohlberg's form-content

distinction. He defines moral content as the judgment of what is morally right in a

particular situation, and moral form is defined as the way in which a subject reasons in

order to arrive at that judgment. This usage of the terms .'form' and 'content' is somewhat

atypical in philosophical writings, but is crucial to the understanding of Kohlberg's so

called "formalism." Kohlberg observes that individuals tend to employ the same "forms"

of moral reasoning when faced with different moral problems, and hence for one

particular subject there is a particular "form" of reasoning which represents his "total way

of thinking." It is this total way of moral reasoning instead of the "content choices" that

defines the moral stage of that subject (Kohlberg 1981, pp. 120-2).

A second feature of the moral stages defined by Kohlberg is that of a universally

invariable sequence. The order of the stages (from Stage 1 through Stage 6) represents the

chronological order of their appearance in the moral development of human beings.

Except in situations where keeping up with one's moral standards is excessively

threatening to the self, people never (1) skip stages or (2) reverse stages in their

development. This sequence is expected by Kohlberg to be constant in all (or almost all)

individuals regardless of their society or culture. However, it is not expected that every

single person goes through the whole sequence from Stage 1 to Stage 6. It is possible for

an individual to stop at a particular stage in his development, failing to proceed any

further. It is also not expected that every stage appears in every society or cultural group.

It is possible that there exists a society in which no member is capable of exceeding a

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certain stage of moral development. Indeed Kohlberg embraces a mild version of "social

evolutionism." Some societies can be less developed (morally) than others in that their

members stop their development at a lower level, and thus in them the highest stages

entirely fail to exist (Kohlberg 1981, p. 128). However, whatever stage an individual

reaches, he/she has to develop through the sequence of earlier stages to arrive there

(Kohlberg 1981, pp. 120 & 122).

A third essential feature is the hierarchical nature of moral stages. There is a

normative side and an empirical side of the hierarchical claim. On the normative side, it

means that later stages are better than earlier stages. Proving that the later stages are more

adequate than the early ones is an important task for Kohlberg. He claims that there are a

number of criteria by which the later stages can be judged to be better. He supposes that

these criteria are widely accepted and need no justification. We shall discuss these criteria

in detail shortly.

On the empirical side, the hierarchical claim means that the sequence reflects a

certain logical order. Higher stages "include lower stages as components," that is, lower

stages are "reintegrated" in higher ones. People at higher stages have no difficulty

comprehending moral concepts of lower stages and employing them in their reasoning,

while those of lower stages do have difficulty in understanding and employing the

concepts of higher stages. Very few people can understand two stages above their own

modal stages, and many do not understand any stage above their own at all. Also, people

tend to prefer higher stages to lower stages (or, more precisely, prefer statements that

instantiate higher-stage moral reasoning to those instantiating lower-stage one) as far as

they can comprehend them (Kohlberg 1981, p. 137).

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1.3 The claim of hierarchy of the moral stages

Among all the features of the Kohlbergian moral stages, their hierarchical nature

is most important to our discussion. A n ultimate concern of this paper is to examine the

question of whether any universal moral standards exist. The claims of structural

wholeness and of universal invariable sequence are purely empirical. Although I believe

that these empirical claims are not totally irrelevant to normative ethics, their relation to

ethics is less direct than the claim of hierarchy. The hierarchical claim is itself strongly

normative, and hence it deserves close examination. How do we judge that the stages are

hierarchical? Kohlberg uses two criteria to explain this, one cognitive and the other

normative.

The cognitive criteria: integration and differentiation

Kohlberg's theory of moral development is a cognitive-developmental model. In

this model, moral maturity is closely related to cognitive maturity. Higher stages are

cognitively more sophisticated. Kohlberg describes these cognitive sophistications by

saying that higher stages are more integrated and differentiated than the lower stages. The

increasing integration and differentiation, Kohlberg claims, explain why the stages form

an invariant sequence. To him, there is an inner logic in the sequence of the moral stages;

the new integration and the new differentiation made at each stage logically depend on

those made in its preceding stage (Kohlberg 1981, p. 137).

The idea of integration is quite clearly presented in Kohlberg's writings. A higher

integration means a wider scope of applicability, better equilibrium,6 greater stability, and

greater consistency (Kohlberg 1981, pp. 135-136, & 147). To explain this, we can start

with the comparison of the conventional level and the postconventional level. The

conventional level has its values defined within the context of a particular community,

6 Equilibrium seems to mean the balance between the perspectives of different parties involved in a moral problem. See Kohlberg 1981, pp. 211-214.

15

while postconventional morality strives to define values independent of any particular

culture or subculture. There is clearly a difference in the scope of applicability between

the two levels. Kohlberg states that conventional morality defines "good behavior for a

Democrat but not a Republican, for an American but not for a Vietnamese, for a father

but not a son" (Kohlberg 1981, p. 135). This seems to be an overstatement, as the Stage 4

society-maintenance conception of morality surely can assign the rights for people of

different roles in the society, and thus prescribe right behaviors for both fathers and sons.

The point he actually wants to make is probably this: when there are real conflicts

between different parties, there exists no higher principle available within the

conventional moral conception to resolve the conflicts, especially when these parties

come from different societies.

This point can be made clear by considering Kohlberg's explanation of

consistency. In Kohlberg's terminology, "the different definitions of right for Republicans

and Democrats, for Americans and Vietnamese, for fathers and sons" are enough to

constitute "self-contradiction" (Kohlberg 1981, p. 136). This makes conventional

morality less consistent than postconventional morality. At first glance, the use of the

term 'self-contradiction' is illegitimate. How can different definitions of the rights of

different parties cause se/^contradiction? They might contradict each other, but surely

nobody is contradicting himself. I believe I should follow the policy of the American

government, therefore I should fight against the Vietnamese communists. Where is the

inconsistency in my belief?

Kohlberg does not state this clearly, but a plausible answer might go like this:

Suppose I am the American soldier. My society tells me that the North Vietnamese are

evil, or that they have evil intentions, and I must fight against them. Following the values

of my society I see them as evil. But so far as I accept that I am right because I am

following the values of my society, I have to admit that the Vietnamese I fight is also

16

right because he, too, is only doing what his society requires. But this appears to

contradict the belief that the North Vietnamese, or their intentions, are evil. It is in this

sense that conventional morality is inconsistent.

Similarly, conventional morality is more consistent than preconventional morality.

For instance, a preconventional thinker judges that it is good to do something if it benefits

herself. When another person, out of self-interest, does something which conflicts with

her interests, she will naturally say the other is wrong. What she may not be fully aware

of is that her judgment is only based on her own interest. If she recognizes this, she will

have to say that the other is also doing the right thing, because the other is also acting

according to his own interest. Again there is no way for resolution unless our protagonist

can draw upon a value system which takes the needs or claims of both parties into

consideration. For a case like this, a morality of the conventional level could serve as

such a mediating value system.

From the above interpretation one can infer that the scope of applicability,

stability, and consistency are very much one and the same thing. Kohlberg himself does

say that universality and consistency are closely linked (Kohlberg 1981, p. 135). The

reason for their close relation is apparent in the above examples. With a wider scope of

applicability, a set of moral standards can handle more moral conflicts with more

consistency, hence it is less vulnerable to challenge from different value systems and less

subject to change, i.e., more stable. A l l these concepts are unified under the name of

integration.

From this point of view, the hierarchy of the Kohlbergian stages can be

understood in a simple way. Preconventional morality defines morally right behavior in

terms of personal interests, and has the narrowest scope of applicability. When conflicts

emerge between individuals making compromise impossible to achieve, conventional

17

morality provides solutions. Conventional morality presupposes a community of some

kind, e.g., a family, a society, or a social organization, where there are conventional

norms that are designed to stipulate the right thing to do in different situations of conflict.

People can therefore determine the right solution when conflicts arise between them.

But conventional morality has its limits too. The most obvious one is that it

presupposes the absolute value of a particular set of conventions and social institutions.

Therefore when conflicts arise between communities, or between individuals from

different communities, there is no higher authority to whom to appeal in resolving these

conflicts. Thus, it is essential for moral progress that they find some universalizable

standard to determine a mutually acceptable method of resolution. This is exactly what

leads to postconventional morality.

We can now see how higher stages are more integrated than lower stages. They

are more integrated because their scopes of applicability for conflict resolution are wider.

Preconventional morality is applicable to the individual only. Conventional morality is

applicable only to people within a community. Postconventional morality is applicable to

the entire human species. By virtue of wider scope of applicability for conflict resolution,

each stage is also more consistent and stable.

Moral stages are also hierarchical in that they are cumulative, i.e., the later stages

include the earlier stages as their elements (Kohlberg 1981, pp. 180, 190). Sometimes

Kohlberg even says that there is a "logical order" among the stages, and this logical order

requires that every stage must "imply" its lower stages (Kohlberg 1981, p. 137). Such

wording is highly misleading and cannot be understood literally.7 A better understanding

7 The use of the word "imply" is misleading because it leads us to think that the definition of a morally right behavior at a lower stage can be logically derived from that at a higher level. If this is so, what is regarded as morally right at a lower stage would be necessarily regarded as right at a higher level too. But this is obviously not the case in Kohlberg's theory. What is admitted as morally right at a lower stage can be, and is often, rejected at a higher stage due to the change in the moral conception held by the subject.

18

of the cumulative nature of stage progression is made possible by Kohlberg's statement

that every stage is a structure which "includes elements of earlier structures but

transforms them in such a way as to represent a more stable and extensive equilibrium."

Seen in this light Kohlberg's talk of implication or logical order has at least two

meanings. The first is that the moral standards represented by the lower stages are

"available to, or comprehended by" the higher-stage thinker, though the thinker shows a

preference for the higher stages over the lower stages (Kohlberg 1981, p. 137). The

second meaning is that the values of the lower stages are in one way or another adopted

by the higher stages, though the values then function quite differently from the way they

did at the lower stages. Kohlberg illustrates this by comparing Stages 4 and 5.

I said that the superiority of Stage 5 is partly a cognitive superiority, that the judgments of Stage 5 are more cognitively complex (differentiated) and more cognitively inclusive than Stage 4 judgments (inclusive meaning that Stage 5 ideas include Stage 4 ideas as elements or parts). I cited, as an example, the cognitive perspective of Stage 5 as compared to Stage 4.1 claimed that Stage 5 ideas arose from a social contract, utilitarian, "prior-to-society" law-making perspective, while Stage 4 judgments arose from a "member-of-society" law-maintaining perspective. As contrasted to Stage 5, at Stage 4 the authority of laws does not rest on free contract but rests directly on divine, natural, or societal authority. Laws are not judged functionally as revisable in the light of maximizing utility or public welfare, but maintaining laws is necessarily utilitarian in preventing disorder. In including Stage 4 considerations of authority and functions of law, the Stage 5 perspective is cognitively better (Kohlberg 1981, p. 190).

He says here that Stage 4 morality is a law-maintaining.perspective, while Stage 5

morality represents a law-making perspective. The recognition of the law-making

perspective implies the recognition of the law-maintaining perspective, for it is useless to

make law without having the law maintained or followed. What distinguishes the law­

making perspective from the law-maintaining perspective is that, the law-making

perspective recognizes that law is made by human beings to serve human goals. As it is

Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Claim to Moral Adequacy of a Highest Stage," 632.

19

made to serve human goals, it can also be violated or changed when doing so serves

human goals better.

It seems that the Stage 4 subject may possibly be aware that laws are made for

human goals as well. However, as he/she treats the laws as societal authority, he/she

seems to be unable to take into consideration the point that the legal system should be

adjustable to human goals. In this sense Stage 5 is cognitively better than Stage 4. The

recognition that law is made to serve human goals deprives law-maintenance of its

ultimate value status. Nevertheless, it allows law-maintenance to retain some of its value

as far as it carries out its proper function. The social order, for the Stage 5 reasoner, is

what people have agreed upon, or would agree upon to the extent that they are rational, in

forming social rules of cooperation so as to enable everyone equally to pursue his/her

own good. If a law clearly fails in this function, there is no reason to maintain the law.

Kohlberg does not illustrate how each stage includes the elements of its

predecessors. However, it is not hard to understand how this works. Stage 2 is an

orientation of exchange for one's own good. This orientation still acknowledges the value

of avoidance of punishment, since avoidance of punishment is certainly a kind of good.

Stages 3.and 4 are oriented to social norms and social order, but they do not negate the

value of self interest. Conventional morality may sometimes require a person to sacrifice

his/her personal interests, but it surely does not define the pursuit of personal interest as a

moral evil.

The idea of increasing differentiation, on the other hand, refers to the increasing

separation of "ought" from "is," and the separation of non-moral value judgments from

moral ones (Kohlberg 1981, p. 135). Consider the conception of right at different stages.

At Stage 1, having a right is confused with having power or authority, and obligation (i.e.,

what one should do) is defined as demand from external authorities. At Stage 2, the

20

concept of right and the concept of obligation are differentiated from external authority.

Having a right is now defined as having the ability to control one's own behavior and

one's possessions. On the other hand, an obligation is understood as what is required in

order to achieve one's goal. By defining right and obligation in this way, Stage 2 is still

confusing right and the ability to control, and obligation is confused with or limited to

prudence. At Stage 3, people are able to separate right from ability to control on the one

hand, and obligation from means to desired ends on the other. They define rights in terms

of group expectations. According to their understanding, one has to earn his/her rights by

doing things that his/her society expects him to do. For instance, one has the right of

property because one earns it by working hard. Obligation is defined in terms of the social

role one plays. Despite these advances, the Stage 3 conception of right is still confused

with expectations and demands assigned to the individual according to his/her role. Stage

4 transcends Stage 3 by separating rights and obligations from particular role

expectations. There are rights which are awarded by society to particular members

according to the roles they play, but there also exist rights which represent freedoms that

all members of society are entitled to, and the latter have priority over the former.

Obligation is likewise defined in terms of (1) one's membership in society, and (2) the

responsibility of the role one voluntarily enters.

By introducing rights and obligations that one has due to his/her membership in

society, Stage 4 differentiates right and obligation from any particular role expectations.

However, they are still confused with societal expectations. At Stage 5, the subject

proceeds to separate these concepts. Rights become something prior to society. Freedom

is valuable for its own sake, and should not be limited by society unless it is incompatible

with the like freedom of others. Obligation is defined in terms of a rational concern for

the welfare of others. At Stage 6, there are universal rights of just treatment in addition to

liberty rights. Rights represent universalizable claims that each individual can make on

21

others. Obligation is defined in terms of respect for others' rights. By defining obligation

as concern for the welfare of others, Stage 5 reasoning is somewhat incapable of

differentiating supererogation from duty, whereas Stage 6 reasoning sharpens the

demarcation (Kohlberg 1981, pp. 215-219).

The claim that higher stages are better than lower ones because they are more

differentiated is itself not particularly interesting. Since 'more differentiated' means

greater ability to distinguish moral values from non-moral ones, saying that the more

differentiated is better amounts to saying that it is better to distinguish moral values from

non-moral ones than to mix up the two. What is more interesting, however, is his

particular view about what constitutes non-moral values: self-interest at level 1, and

social norms at level 2. The presupposition behind his claim that greater differentiation

makes a stage better is that personal interest and social convention themselves do not

provide moral justification to a behavior. Of course such a presupposition is a normative

one, and therefore the criterion of differentiation is not purely cognitive. But now let us

go to another topic, namely the normative criteria.

The normative criteria: prescriptivity, universalizability

Kohlberg emphasizes that higher stages are not merely cognitively superior, but

also normatively so. To argue for the normative superiority of higher stages, he begins

with the formalist's convention that an adequate moral judgment must have certain

formal properties. These are, essentially: prescriptivity, primacy, and universality

(Kohlberg 1981, pp. 135, 171, 191).9

9 In many places Kohlberg also mentions "reversibility" and "equilibrium" as formal properties which determine the adequacy of certain moral judgments. However, it seems reasonable to suppose that these properties are not independent of universality. To the extent a moral judgment is universalizable, it should be equilibrated and reversible as well.

22

Though Kohlberg does not explicitly say so, prescriptivity and primacy of moral

judgment come together to form a parallel with differentiation. What prescriptivity means

is that moral judgment represents "a distinct concept of an internal duty" (Kohlberg 1981,

p. 191). Thus understood, "prescriptivity" seems to mean something close to what

philosophers mean by 'categoricalness.'10 Primacy, on the other hand, means the

"superiority of moral considerations over non-moral ones" (Kohlberg 1981, p. 191). The

two combine to form a distinct deontological conception of morality. This is what the

criterion of differentiation is all about. Differentiation is the subject's ability to separate

moral from non-moral values, and make moral judgments only with reference to moral

values. Universality, on the other hand, parallels the criterion of integration. Given that

integration has much to do with the scope of applicability and equilibrium, as we have

already seen, the parallelism between universalizability and integration is clear, and needs

no further elaboration here. Universalizability means that a moral judgment has to be one

which "all people can act on" (Kohlberg 1981, p. 191). This obviously echoes the Kantian

conception of morality presented by his Categorical Imperative. Kohlberg is confident

that these formal requirements of moral judgments are fairly noncontroversial (Kohlberg

1981, p. 173). Granted these requirements, Kohlberg infers that higher stages are more

adequate as they yield moral judgments which conform more completely to these formal

requirements.

In Kohlberg's view, prescriptivity and universality are closely related. A highly

prescriptive principle implies valuing something independently of other factors. This

independence in turn implies that the value of the particular thing at stake is recognized

under all circumstances, which entails universality. Consider Dilemma I A (I call it

1 0 This use of the word 'prescriptivity' sounds, of course, a little strange for philosophers. The word 'prescriptive' is usually contrasted with 'descriptive', and has no necessary connection with "internal duty". What we usually regard as related to internal duty are rather concepts like "unconditionality" or "obligatoriness". To be faithful to Kohlberg's own wording, 1 will still use the word 'prescriptivity' to refer to the formal character of moral judgments that they are expressions of internal duties. But the reader should bear in mind that it means something like unconditionality or obligatoriness.

23

'Bob's dilemma,' see Appendix 1 for details of the dilemma). When considering whether

Joe (=Bob in the dilemma quoted in our appendix) should tell on his brother, a Stage 1

subject deliberated in terms of the probabilities of Joe getting beaten up by his father or

by his brother. His answer was a typical preconventional response because it had its basis

in personal interest, which showed little or no awareness that an adequate moral judgment

should be universalizable. He does not answer with a moral judgment that is universal or

that has any impersonal or ideal grounds. In contrast, a Stage 6 subject said that one

should keep one's promise "regardless of who it (sic) was." By saying this he implies that

a moral judgment should be universally applicable. Stage 6 subjects would also say things

like "Morally I would do it in spite of fear of punishment," implying that a moral

obligation should be an ideal (more or less) independent of personal interests. When

asking "Is it morally right?", Stage 6 subjects are asking something different from the

question about avoiding punishment (Stage 1), prudence (Stage 2), conforming to

authority (Stages 3 and 4), and so on (Kohlberg 1981, p. 170).

The same is true for people's reasoning about the moral value of human life.

Kohlberg observes that the value of human life becomes increasingly independent of the

factual properties of the life in question, which means for him that the "prescriptivity" of

the value of human life increases with the stages (see Appendix 2). Similarly, and closely

related to prescriptivity, the order of the stages also shows an increase in the universality

of the moral value of human life. At Stage 1, only the lives of important people are

valued. At Stage 3, only the lives of those who are close to the subject are important. But

at Stage 6, everyone's life is taken seriously (Kohlberg 1981, p. 135). "With each stage,"

writes Kohlberg, "the obligation to preserve human life becomes more categorical, more

independent of the aims of the actor, of the commands or opinions of others, and so forth"

(Kohlberg 1981, p. 171).

24

To the extent that higher stages reflect a higher awareness of the notion that a

moral judgment should be universalizable, and that higher stages better disentangle moral

values from non-moral ones, they better instantiate the properties of universalizability and

prescriptivity. When he says that higher stages better disentangle moral values from non-

moral ones, Kohlberg has presupposed some particular view about what moral values are

and what they are not. The above discussion indicates that for Kohlberg neither prudence

nor conformance to authority is a moral value. For him, moral values have much to do

with equality, fairness and respect, which we shall see more clearly later.

1.4 Explaining stage progressions

How do stage progressions happen? Kohlberg says that the key factor determining

stage progressions is disequilibrium. As we have seen in section 1.3, Kohlberg claims that

the reason the stages form an invariant sequence is because the higher stages are more

consistent and equilibrated. What is implicit is that, since higher stages are more

equilibrated, a person will develop into his/her +1 stage (the stage next to his/her own) if

(1) he/she is aware that his own stage is not equilibrated enough, and (2) the +1 stage is

cognitively available to him/her. The result is, of course, that this subject will eventually

move into his/her +1 stage.

Two things result from this hypothesis. First, the more a subject is aware of the

limits of his/her own moral stage, the more likely he/she will move to a higher stage.

Consequently, the opportunity for role-taking becomes an important factor affecting a

person's rate of moral development. The reason is that opportunities for role-taking

provide chances for a subject to discover the limitations of his stage (Kohlberg 1981, pp.

140-141). Second, the availability of higher stages to a subject is also an important

determinant of his/her development. The factor of availability is in turn determined by

25

two factors: the cognitive ability of the subject and his exposure to moral reasoning of

higher stages.

It can easily be imagined, then, that moral development will be affected by various

factors. Related to cognitive ability we have the educational level of a person; related to

the involvement in role-taking we have his/her peer participation (Kohlberg 1981, p.

142), his/her involvement in free discussions about moral problems with others (as in

larger social institutions or just in the family) (Kohlberg 1981, pp. 141-142), and

experience in leadership." Some later studies also find that group discussions will more

effectively prompt stage development if advice from a higher-stage point of view is given

to the participants. Even social class serves as a factor of the rate of development

(Kohlberg 1981, pp. 141-142). Social class and the justice structure of a society influence

the opportunity for role-taking of its members, and hence influence their rates of

development (Kohlberg 1981, pp. 141-144).12

Section 2: Empirical tests

As a psychologist, Kohlberg's mission is not just to compare a set of forms of

moral reasoning at the conceptual level, but to have his theory empirically confirmed.

Attempts have been made to test the core assumptions of Kohlberg's theory, i.e., the

claim of universal invariant sequence, and the claim of hierarchy.

2.1. Universal invariant sequence

To be sequential, the order of the stages must represent the chronological order of

the emergence of the stages in the moral development of individual human beings. A

sequence is more than an age trend. It is not enough to show that older people tend to be

" It is supposed by some supporters of Kohlberg that leadership requires one to solve conflicts among subordinates in a way that yields more opportunity for role-taking than non-leaders typically have. 1 2 One may wonder why social class should influence opportunities for role-taking. A plausible explanation is: middle class parents are in general more educated than lower class parents, which in turn influences their ways of educating their children.1

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at higher stages. People of higher stages must have progressed through all of the lower

stages. There should be, in normal situations, no stage skippers and no regressors. Also,

let us recall that the invariant sequence does not require that everybody develops at the

same rate, nor does it require that everybody eventually reaches Stage 6. Since the

sequence is claimed to be universal, it should be applicable to all cultures.

In his "Stage and Sequence: the Cognitive-Developmental Approach to

Socialization," Kohlberg reported a study in which 50 American boys originally aged 10-

16 were studied over a 12-year period, which is a followup on his dissertation. Though

the data analysis was not yet complete when the paper was published, the result of the

research suggested that the subject's patterns of moral reasoning form a general sequence

that Kohlberg's model predicts.13 But the support of Kohlberg's theory from the research

was far from perfect. Even with the incomplete analysis of the data, exceptions to the

sequence were found. Some subjects showed stage regressions at the end of high school.

Since virtually all these subjects later on continued advancing to the higher levels,

Kohlberg believes that this anomaly can be explained by adding a transitional stage to the

sequence between Stages 4 and 5. 1 4

In the same paper, Kohlberg reports a series of cross-cultural studies conducted in

Taiwan, Great Britain, the United States, and two villages in Mexico and Turkey.15 In the

USA, Taiwan, and Mexico, use of both Stage 1 and Stage 2 reasoning dropped strikingly

with age (from 10-16). Uses of Stage 4 to Stage 6 reasoning, on the contrary, increased

with age. In the isolated villages, the cases were similar in that the use of higher-stage

reasoning increased with age, while that of lower stages decreased with age. The

difference between these isolated villages and the urban areas was that Stages 5 and 6

1 3 Lawrence Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence: the Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization." In Handbook of Socialization on Theory and Research, ed., David A. Goslin (New York: Rand McNally, 1969), 383-431. 1 4 Ibid, 388. 1 5 Strangely enough, the research data for Great Britain are not reported in his paper.

27

were virtually absent in these villages.16 Since these studies are cross-sectional instead of

longitudinal, they only show that the stages represented age trends, but not that they are in

sequence. Nevertheless, age trends can still be regarded as a weak support of the

sequential claim. Since these studies were carried out across different cultures, they

supported the claim that the sequence was universal (if the age trend is really a result of

the sequentiality of the stages).

One may question how Kohlberg can make any universal claim of moral

developmental sequence if two of the stages in the sequence were absent in some

cultures.17 Kohlberg has an easy reply: the universality claim for the sequence does not

require every single stage to be present in every culture. What is required is only that (1)

the six stages provide a comprehensive account for the forms of moral reasoning in

individuals in all cultures; and (2) in all cultures there are no stage skippers or regressors.

Kohlberg's universality claim does not exclude the possibility of having an individual or

a group stopping at any particular stage in the course of his or their moral development.

Since the two isolated villages did show an increase of use of higher stages, and a

decrease in the use of the lower stages, with the increase of age, the findings are

consistent with confirm Kohlberg's theory (see Kohlberg 1981 pp. 126-127).

Not only is the sequence of development independent of the society in which it

occurs, it is also independent of social class and religion. Kohlberg's studies showed that

middle-class children and working-class children move through the same sequences

(though middle-class children move faster), and that there is no important difference in

1 6 Ibid., 384-385, also see Kohlberg 1981, pp. 24-25. 1 7 For example see Don Locke, "A Psychologist among the Philosophers: Philosophical Aspects of Kohlberg's Theories." In Lawrence Kohlberg: Consensus and Controversy, ed. Sohan Modgil and Celia Modgil (Philadelphia, The Falmer Press, 1986), 26.

28

the development of moral thinking among Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Buddhists,

Moslems, and atheists (Kohlberg 1981, p. 25).18

2.2 The hierarchy claim

The empirical support for the hierarchical claim is also rich. For Kohlberg and his

supporters, the hierarchical claim implies that (1) people comprehend all the stages below

their own stages but not those higher then theirs (except the +1 stage), and (2) they prefer

judgments of higher stages than those of lower stages as far as they can comprehend

them. These predictions were confirmed by various studies.19

Rest (1973), for instance, conducted an experiment on people's preferences for the

stages.20 He found that people, when given various suggestions for solving moral

dilemmas, preferred suggestions from stages above their own. The higher stages are

judged better than their own stages.21

The experiment also tested the subjects on their ability to understand the

principles at different stages. The result showed that the majority of people experienced

no difficulty in understanding stages lower than their own, but had difficulty

understanding those above them. The greater the discrepancy between the tested stage and

the subject's own stage, the more difficult it was for the subject to understand it. This

1 8 Since Kohlberg does not provide us a systematic analysis of the research data, the systematicity of this research remains a question. 1 9 At first glance, (1) and (2) together imply that no one will stay in their own stage very long if they understand their +1 stage. In fact, a subject's comprehension of a higher stage does always prompt him to progress into that stage. This progression appears as a process in which the subject increases the usage of his/her +1 stage and reduces using his modal stage in his moral judgments, and finally gets rid of his/her original stage entirely. But such a process is usually quite slow. 2 0 James R. Rest, "The Hierarchical Nature of Moral Judgment: A Study of Patterns of Comprehension and Preference of Moral Stages," Journal of Personality 41 (1973): 86-109. 2 1 Ibid., 102-103. In Rest's study there is no marked difference between people's preferences for their +1 stages and +2 stages. But as we shall see in Chapter 2, with later modification of Kohlberg's model and the scoring manual, people typically prefer their +1 stages but not their +2 stages.

29

confirmed the hypothesis that the higher stages are cognitively more complex than the

22

lower stages.

Since the hierarchical claim means that the higher stages are better than the lower

stages, and this superiority is connected with the higher stability and better equilibrium of

the higher stages, the following studies that tested the stability of judgments from

different moral stages can also be regarded as confirmations of the hierarchical claim.

The first is Blatt and Kohlberg's (1975) test.23 The study was carried out in a

Reform Jewish Sunday school class. The experimenter taught a group of 30 students aged

11-12. Thirteen of these students were randomly chosen for a pre-test to determine their

moral stage. Among these 13 children, 11 were available for a post-test offered by the

experimenter right after the program, and 10 of them were available for a follow-up test a

year later. Among the 11 children in the post-test, six were boys and five were girls.

In the experiment, the experimenter organized a teaching program for the

children, which lasted for 12 weeks, involving a total of 12 hours of discussions. In these

sessions, hypothetical moral dilemmas were provided for class discussion. Free

expression of opinions was encouraged, and the experimenter helped to point out the

psychological and social dimensions of the experiences of different parties involved in

the dilemma. The result was that 63% of the experimental children moved up one stage or

slightly more, and 9% moved up half a stage. In the follow-up test, the results remained

essentially the same.24

In part 2 of the same study, which was carried out on a larger scale to assure the

reliability of the first part, 132 subjects were chosen from a suburban Chicago school

2 2 Ibid, 233. 2 3 Moshe M. Blatt & Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Effect of Classroom Moral Discussion upon Children's Level of Moral Judgment," Journal of Moral Education 4, no. 2 (1975): 129-161. 2 4 Ibid, 137.

30

system and tested in essentially the same way as part one. In this part of the study, only 7

out of 46 (15%) of the subjects in the main experimental group had moved upward by one

stage or more after the class sessions. In a second experimental group, in which

discussion was mostly leaderless, 6 out of 47 (13%) of the subjects moved upward for

one stage or more. The percentage of subjects showing upward movement was far less

than in part one. Though the upward stage movement in part 2 was less prominent than

part 1, Blatt and Kohlberg still claim that the result was all in all a replica of the first part.

They thus conclude that rational discussion is an important factor that stimulates moral

development.25

Another experiment relevant to the claim of increasing equilibrium was

Erdynast's experiment conducted in 1973.26 In the experiment, Erdynast tested 20 adult

business executives and 10 graduate students. The subjects were asked to solve two moral

dilemmas. One dilemma involved distribution of income in a new cooperative business.

Two solutions were open to the subject: a "utility" solution and an "equity" solution (as

Erdynast calls them). The other dilemma was the suicide mission dilemma (Appendix 1).

Similar to the first dilemma, the subject had to choose between a "utility" solution (to

order the demolition man to stay behind) and an "equity" solution (to go for a lottery).

After a pre-test, the subjects were asked to take the viewpoint of each party in the

situation, and were also asked to decide on a solution imagining that they did not know

which of these parties they would become in that situation. A few days later they were

tested again.

The result was that all the Stage 6 subjects in the pre-test agreed in their choice on

the equity solution in each of the dilemmas, and did not change their choice in the retest.

2 5 Ibid., 153. 2 6 A. Erdynast, "Improving the Adequacy of Moral Reasoning: An Exploratory Study with Executives and with Philosophy Students" (Ph.D. diss. Harvard University, 1973). My report of the experiment is based on Kohlberg's review in Kohlberg 1981, pp. 211-4.

31

In contrast, subjects at Stage 4 and 5 disagreed in their solutions. Some chose the utility

solution while others chose the equity solution. In the retest, after the role-taking process,

many of the subjects who initially chose the utilitarian solution changed their minds and

preferred the equity solution. By shifting to a view with a greater emphasis on equity, the

type of moral reasoning they used in solving the dilemmas had shifted to that of a higher

stage. This, Kohlberg says, demonstrated that the lower stages were less equilibrated than

the higher stages.

The experiment thus supported the idea that (1) higher moral stages are superior

since they are in better equilibrium than the lower stages; (2) such differences in

equilibrium can be defined in terms of the different degrees of reversibility — which

means "the capacity of moral principles to generate concrete judgments that do not vary

across the perspectives of the actors in the dilemma" (Kohlberg 1981, p. 279), or the

acceptability of one's own judgment when one trades off the position with the other party

in a moral situation; and (3) the awareness of the lack of reversibility of one's own moral

stage motivates stage progression because of the higher reversibility of the higher stages.

There is still another type of studies that is related to the hierarchical claim,

though perhaps less directly. Since the superiority of the higher stages is in part a

cognitive superiority, one can thereby infer that the higher cognitive dimensions of higher

moral stages is one aspect of the superiority of the higher stages. This is confirmed by the

deVries and Kohlberg (1977) test, which found that children aged five to seven who

passed a moral reasoning task at Stage 2 passed a corresponding task of logical

reciprocity or reversibility. However, many (52%) children who passed the logical task

27

did not pass the moral task.

2 7 R. deVries & Lawrence Kohlberg, "Relations Between Piaget and Psychometric Assessments of Intelligence." In Current Topics in Early Childhood Education vol. 1, ed., L. Katz (Norwood N.J.: Ablex, 1977), 119-137. Also see Kohlberg 1981, p. 138.

32

Another study supporting Kohlberg's claim about the relation between moral and

cognitive stages is the Kuhn et al. (1977) study. The study showed that all adolescents

and adults using Stage 5 or 6 reasoning were capable of formal reasoning on the Inhelder

and Piaget pendulum and correlation problems. Many adolescents and adults capable of

the latter showed no Stage 5 or 6 moral reasoning.28

Another group of studies related to the hierarchical claim concerns the relation

between moral stages and moral behavior. Kohlberg's stage model is, after all, a device to

measure moral maturity. To see how morally mature a person is, the best thing to do is

just to watch his/her behavior. I may forcefully argue for the moral maturity of higher-

stage subjects, but if they often behave poorly or more poorly than lower-stage subjects,

then one can hardly believe that higher stages indicate moral maturity at all. On the other

hand, if we see that higher-stage subjects usually behave better than lower stage ones,

then we might feel that higher-stage subjects are generally more mature, and can therefore

reasonably conjecture that there is some linkage between higher-stage moral reasoning

and moral maturity. But, of course, if we want to see whether one's behavior is moral, we

at least have to find some situations in which the morally right action can be identified

with certainty. Below are a few examples.

A study has been conducted in the so called "Milgram Situation." In 1963, Stanley

29

Milgram conducted an experiment to investigate people's obedience behavior. 40 male

subjects were recruited by newspaper advertisements and were paid to participate in a

"learning experiment." In the experiment, the subject worked in a lab with an

experimenter where they were training a learner to memorize words. The learner was

actually an accomplice. The subject was told to read words to the learner and see how

2 8 D. Kuhn, J. Langer, L. Kohlberg, & N. Haan, "The Development of Formal Operations in Logical and Moral Judgment," Genetic Psychology Monographs 95 (1977): 97-188. 2 9 Stanley Milgram, "Behavioral Study of Obedience," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 67, no. 4 (1963): 371-378.

33

well he could remember them. When the learner made mistakes, the subject was required

to administer an electrical shock (which was fake), and to increase the intensity of the

shock when mistakes repeated.

In Milgram's study, no subject stopped before the electric shock reached 300

volts, at which point the victim "kick[ed] on the wall and no longer provided answers to

the teacher's multiple-choice questions."30 Although shocks between 315 volts and 420

volts were labeled "Danger: Severe Shock," 26 of the subjects (65%) continued on up to

450 volts, i.e., 30 volts beyond the maximum of the "danger-severe shock" range. At this

point the experimenter called a halt to the session.31

Most subjects showed nervousness when they went on to the high voltage shocks,

but they failed to quit. Kohlberg supposed that the failure to quit represents a weakness in

one's moral character, and predicted that subjects of higher stages should be more ready

to quit than subjects of lower stages. He tested the subjects' moral stages before they

participated in Milgram's study in order to see whether there was correlation between

moral stage and quitting. And there was: 75% of Stage 6 subjects quit (Kohlberg does not

tell when they did so), as compared to only 13% of all the subjects at lower levels who

did so (Kohlberg 1981, pp. 44-45).

Another study conducted by Krebs in 1967 showed a similar relation between

moral behavior and moral stages. 100 sixth-grade children were given experimental

cheating tests.32 The result was that 75% of the preconventional and conventional

subjects cheated. In contrast, only 20% of the Stage 5 and Stage 6 subjects did so. A

similar study was conducted at the college level. Only 11% of the Stage 5 and Stage 6

3 0 Ibid, 375. 3 ' Ibid, 376. . 3 2 For details of the experiment please see R. L. Krebs, "Some Relationships Between Moral Judgment, Attention, and Resistance to Temptation" (Ph.D. diss. University of Chicago, 1967).

34

subjects cheated, while up to 42% of the students at the lower levels did so (Kohlberg

1981, p. 44). Honest behaviors are, therefore, predicted by stages of moral judgments.

Haan, Smith and Block conducted a survey in 1968, studying a group of students

at the University of California at Berkeley on their participation in a free speech

movement. The situation was that the Board of Regents of the university were

enforcing a rule banning the use of university grounds for political recruitment and the

distribution of political material. The students organized a sit-in to contest the rule as a

violation of civil rights. Haan, Smith, and Block administered moral judgment interviews

to over 200 of these students. Only 10 % of the Stages 3-4 subjects sat in, whereas 50 %

of the Stage 5 subjects did so. Among Stage 6 students, the issue was apparently clear-

cut: 80 % of them sat in.

To summarize, empirical studies suggest that higher stages are preferred by people

over their own stages, represent higher equilibrium and reciprocity, and to a considerable

extent predict moral behavior (assuming, of course, a common consensus concerning

morally correct behavior in the experimental situations). Therefore, there seems to be

significant empirical support for the claim that the moral stages constitute a hierarchy.

Section 3: Philosophical implications

Certain ideas of Kohlberg's are of special philosophical interest. Firstly, he claims

that what largely distinguishes the morally right from the morally wrong choice is the

"form" of moral reasoning, and not the actual content of the choice. Because of this

Kohlberg later writes that "formalism" is an assumption of his theory (Kohlberg et al.

1983, p.81). We pointed out in section 1.2 that Kohlberg's use of "formalism" is not

typical among philosophers. Of course Kohlberg is not supposed to use the word in the

3 3 N. Haan, Smith, M. B., and Block, J., "Political, Family and Personality Correlates of Adolescent Moral Judgment," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 10(\ 968): 183-201.

35

same way as philosophers do, but since we are discussing his theory from a philosophical

point of view, it is important that we distinguish the different uses of word 'form' by

Kohlberg and by philosophers. Because Stage 6 subjects typically agree on right action,

and because Stage 6 is characterized by a particular "form" of reasoning, it is reasonable

to suggest that they agree on the solution because they share the same "form" of

reasoning. If this is true, then the correct "form" of moral reasoning does determine the

correct solution. By investigating what the Stage 6 moral "form" includes we will see

what Kohlberg's normative ethical theory is like.

Secondly, his theory is a strong version of universalism. To Kohlberg, morality is

universal in that there exists a general form of reasoning which represents the highest

degree of moral maturity, without being relative to any particular cultural setting or

particular value system. This form of moral reasoning is applicable to all moral situations

and capable of determining uniquely correct solutions in all or most of them. Also, to the

extent that this form of moral reasoning does determine content, there are universal and

substantive moral values.

Thirdly, his theory is a rationalism with two manifestations. On one hand, it is

manifested in the claim that moral maturity is a matter of reasoning correctly. In this

claim he believes that his studies support a Socratic view of virtue: virtue is knowledge of

the good, and therefore "he who knows the good chooses the good" (Kohlberg, 1981, p.

189). On the other hand, his rationalism is presented as if it is a kind of principlism,

which claims that moral reasoning is basically a matter of application of principles to

cases. The principles he attempts to support by his studies are the Golden Rule, the

Categorical Imperative, and the principle of equal respect for persons. However, as I will

argue, although Kohlberg always emphasizes the importance of principles in adequate

moral reasoning, his theory is not principlism in a proper sense (Chapter 5, section 2).

36

Lastly, Kohlberg's theory is also relevant to the objectivism-subjectivism debate.

His theory is a version of constructivism, in which morality is viewed as a human

construction devised to resolve conflicts of claims. Therefore morality to him is

subjective (or better intersubjective) in the sense that it is a kind of human construct. It is,

on the other hand, objective in the sense that there exists an adequate or ideal form of

moral reasoning and, for particular cases, there exist right courses of action, which are

determined by this form of reasoning and which are to this extent independent of any

particular subject's personal values.

3.1 Universal ism

Kohlberg's objection to relativism

No defense of universalism is complete if not accompanied by a reply to

relativism. In Chapter 4 of his (1981) anthology, Kohlberg spends much effort

undermining relativistic arguments. These arguments are not attempts to falsify relativism

conclusively, but are attempts to show that relativism is less attractive as an account of

the diversity of moral beliefs in different cultures than it seems.

Kohlberg stresses that the concept of morality is not a behavioral one, but a

philosophical and ethical one. Therefore, a psychological study of morality must orient

itself towards philosophical concepts of morality. However, he also sees that empirical

study of moral development can contribute to the establishment of an ethical theory

(Kohlberg 1981, p. 102). Thus his method of assessing a moral theory, whether

psychological or philosophical, is a mixed one. For him, neither isolated empirical study

nor philosophical contemplation is a satisfactory way of providing solid ground for a

moral theory.

Before fruitful empirical psychological work on moral development can be undertaken, there must be a moral philosophic clarification and justification of the terms moral and development. Philosophy, then, must be present before starting

37

adequate empi r i ca l work i n psychology. I also c l a im , however , that mora l ph i losophy needs the work o f the empir ica l mora l psychologist . F ind ings on mora l development can support or refute in i t ia l ph i losophic assumptions about mora l development and so can help revise and correct them when they f l y i n the face o f empir ica l r e s u l t s . . . . Psychologists can, and should . . . move back and forth between ph i losoph ic and empi r i ca l f indings. (Koh lberg 1.981, x x x i )

H i s v i ew about the relat ionship between mora l psychology and mora l ph i losophy is then

comparable to Raw l s ' s methodology. Raw l s cal ls his methodology in mora l ph i losophy

"ref lect ive equ i l i b r i um , " w h i c h is achieved by means o f mutual adjustment between our

moral pr inc ip les and considered judgments o n part icular mora l p rob l ems . 3 4 W i t h

Kohlberg, ' the mutual adjustments between pr inc ip les and judgments becomes the mutual

adjustment between mora l theory and the way we classify and assess people 's mora l

reasoning. E th ica l theory provides us wi th a conceptual f ramework to classify mora l

reasoning, but h o w people 's reasoning actual ly develops also helps us to reflect on and

revise our ethical theory.

Koh lbe rg talks as i f there is a b ig difference between the study o f mora l

development and other scient i f ic research. However , I bel ieve that his research project is

not much different f rom that o f other sciences, such as phys ica l science. Before fru i t fu l

empir ica l research on phys ica l science can be done, the physic ist also needs some

theoretical assumptions wh i ch l ie beyond and in fo rm the issue he/she is wo rk i ng on.

W h e n a physic ist generalizes f rom his/her experimental results that the relative speed o f

l ight is the same for a l l observers, he/she has supposed, for example , that the universe is a

un i fo rm one, i.e., that things happening i n different places at different t imes f o l l ow the

same set o f laws. Th i s assumption is pr ior to the experiment conducted by the physic ist ,

as is the general concept ion o f mora l i ty that Koh lbe rg has i n m i n d pr ior to h is research on

mora l psycho logy . 3 5 B y saying that psychologists can and should " m o v e back and forth

between ph i losoph ic and empi r i ca l f ind ings , " Koh lbe rg evidently accepts that ethical

3 4 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press, 1972), 20f. 3 5 The parallelism between the relation ethical theory and natural science w i l l be further explored in Chapter 4.

38

theory can somehow be confirmed by empirical observations. For Kohlberg, then, an

adequate moral theory must pass two sets of tests, one philosophical and one empirical.

The Four Confusions of the Relativist

Kohlberg believes that relativism fails both kinds of tests. On the empirical side,

he asserts, relativism is incorrect in claiming that there are no universal values. On the

philosophical side, the relativist has made a fallacious inference from the factual claim

that there are no universally accepted values (which, indeed, is not even true) to the

normative statement that there are no universally valid values.

Kohlberg claims that there are, first of all, some universal categories of moral

judgments (Appendix 3; Kohlberg 1981, p. 117). He also claims that there are 25 aspects

of moral judgments which are common to all cultures.36 Kohlberg does not tell us how he

arrives at these claims, nor is the truth of these claims obvious. Nevertheless, Kohlberg

makes use of these universal aspects of moral judgments to design his research program.

From the 1950's to the 1970's, he conducted various research, some longitudinal and

some cross-sectional, in different cultures, using his MJI method. People's answers to his

hypothetical moral dilemmas were grouped into six types, with respect to these aspects of

morality.37 He finds (1) that these types form a universal sequences; and (2) that they are

structural wholes. (A person at stage 6 on the value-of-human-life aspect is also likely to

be at stage 6 on the moral-motivation aspect.) These findings made him believe that he is

entitled to call the types "stages" (Kohlberg 1981, p. 120).

Kohlberg's argument against relativism can be summarized as follows:

3 6 In The Philosophy of Moral Development, only two examples of these aspects are given, i.e., the motivation for moral action and the value of human life (Kohlberg 1981, pp. 19-20). For a complete list of the 25 basic moral aspects, please see Kohlberg's "Stage and Sequence," 378-379. The list is also presented as the table of moral aspects in Appendix 4 of this paper. 3 7 Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Development of Modes of Moral Thinking and Choice in the Years 10-16," 384-428.

39

(1) There are universal moral concepts, values and principles. There also exists a

universal sequence of moral development.

(2) The sequence is composed of hierarchical moral stages. Individual and cultural

differences in forms of moral reasoning are differences of stage or developmental status.

(3) Since these individual and cultural differences are differences in developmental status,

they are not morally neutral or arbitrary. Certain forms of moral reasoning are more

adequate or more mature compared to others, and there exists a form of moral reasoning

which is the most adequate of all.

In this way, Kohlberg can admit that people have different moral beliefs but still

maintain that there exists some universal scheme for comparing the adequacy of the

moral principles they hold (Kohlberg 1981, pp. 126-127). Below is a review of his reply

to the relativist arguments, followed by a consideration of his positive claims about

universalism.

Following Brandt, Kohlberg distinguishes between cultural relativism and ethical

relativism. According to Brandt, ethical relativism consists of three beliefs: (1) moral

principles are culturally variable in a fundamental way; (2) such divergence is logically

unavoidable since there are no rational principles and methods that can reconcile

observed divergence of moral beliefs; and (3) people ought to live according to the moral

principles they themselves hold. Brandt calls "a person who accepts the first principle a

cultural relativist," and "reserves the term ethicafrelativism for the view that both the

38 first and second principles are true" (Kohlberg 1981, pp. 106-107).

3 8 Also see R. B, Brandt, "Toward a Credible Form of Utilitarianism," Contemporary Utilitarianism, ed., M. D. Bayles (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1968), 433. People may question why Brandt should reserve the term 'ethical relativism' only for the view that accepts the first two principles but not all three. The answer is, I suggest, that the third principle is not essential to ethical relativism. Once we accept that disagreements in moral principles are incommensurable, we are ethical relativists. It does not matter whether we believe that people should thus follow their own principles. Indeed, If one does not believe people should live up to their own principles, one can be a relativist in an even more radical sense.

40

Among the above three theses of relativism, the first thesis, i.e., the thesis of

cultural relativity, is an empirical fact and there is nothing controversial about it (though

there can be disagreement over how fundamental cultural variability is). Kohlberg's

objection against relativism, therefore, is mainly concerned with the second and third

theses. Kohlberg argues that the belief in ethical relativity is based on various confusions.

The first confusion is what Kohlberg calls the "naturalistic fallacy." The term was

first introduced by G. E. Moore in his Principia Ethica to refer to the fallacy of defining

ethical concepts in terms of any complex of natural properties. The reason why this is a

fallacy is demonstrated by the so called "open question argument." "[Wjhatever

definition be offered, it may be always asked, with significance, of the complex so

defined, whether it is itself good." 3 9 Suppose one wants to define "good" in terms of

what is "pleasant." Moore points out that it is always possible to ask, "Is pleasure good?",

and we are not asking whether pleasure is pleasant. We surely do not regard the question

"Is pleasure good?" and the "Is pleasure pleasant?" as one and the same question.

However, i f "pleasant" defines "good," or if "good" just means "pleasant," then the two

questions should be identical.40

By the same token, not only is it impossible to define "good" as "pleasant," but it

is also impossible to define "good" in terms of any natural property at all. The predicate

"good," says Moore, is "simple, unanalysable, indefinable."41 Whatever property P a

thing has, we can always ask whether it is good to have the property P, and the question is

always meaningful. Likewise, Frankena applies the concept of the naturalistic fallacy to

reject any attempt at reducing ethical terms to non-ethical terms.42

3 9 G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (New York: Prometheus Books, 1988), 15. 4 0 Note, however, that Moore does not deny the possibility that the question "What is good?" can be answered, as far as the question is not one of definition, but of co-extensiveness. In other words, it is possible that we can find a property P such that all good things have P and everything having P is good. Moore's idea is only that, even if we can find such a P, "good" still does not mean P. 4 1 Ibid., 36. 4 2 William K. Frankena, Ethics, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), 81-82.

41

In general, the impossibility of exhaustively defining value terms by reference to

natural properties yields the fact-value dichotomy. According to this dictum no set of

purely descriptive statements can logically entail a normative statement. Given that

different cultures have different values, one can always ask whether it is a good thing that

a culture has the values it has. In this sense, the relativists' inference from the factual

statement "Every person/society has their own values" to the normative statement "Every

person/society ought to have their own values" is not warranted (Kohlberg 1981, p. 107).

The second confusion of the ethical relativists is the tendency to conflate the

liberal value of tolerance with ethical relativity. Kohlberg observes that many social

scientists believe in ethical relativism because they think that such relativism is necessary

if one is to be fair to other cultures and minority groups (Kohlberg 1981, pp. 107-108).

However, Kohlberg maintains, this is not true. To be fair to another culture, one need

only be tolerant of their values and deeds.43 To say that a certain value system is more

adequate than another is not to say that people living in accordance to the inferior value

system are more blameworthy, much less is it to say that one should or has the right to

punish them or treat them badly. Indeed by saying that we should be fair or tolerant to

other cultures we are advocating the non-relative value of tolerance. Therefore we cannot

jump from tolerance or fairness to ethical relativism (Kohlberg 1981, p. 110).

The third confusion is the confusion between ethical relativism and value

neutrality or scientific impartiality (Kohlberg 1981, p. 112). Kohlberg's point is that some

social scientists mistakenly think that to be value neutral one has to adopt ethical

relativism. Ethical relativism itself is not value neutral, for it states that any value system

actually held by any society is correct or cannot be rationally criticized. This is itself a

4 3 Whether we should be tolerant of every value and deed of them remains a question. Though Kohlberg does not specify, it seems possible that there is, or should be, a limit to the extent of this tolerance. In other words, there may be some practices of other cultures which we need not or should not tolerate. Cannibalism, among others, is a highly plausible example of such practices.

42

value judgment. It "prejudges" that there is no "culturally universal criteria that might aid

in defining the field of the moral" and that "variations in cultural evaluations may not

themselves be assessed as more or less adequate or moral in terms of some universal

criterion" (Kohlberg 1981, p. 112).

The fourth and last confusion is the confusion between being scientific and being

value neutral. To be scientific one must be responsive to facts and to the connections

between them. One should be careful, during research and observation, not to read one's

own values or value laden expectations into the facts. Yet this does not mean that there

are no evaluative criteria which can be used to make any judgment at all about the

observed facts. By conflating a scientific attitude with complete value neutrality, social

scientists are apt to avoid any value judgment at all. Such an attitude, together with the

confusion between value neutrality and ethical relativity, forces them to adopt ethical

relativism (Kohlberg 1981, p. 113-1.14).

In summary, according to Kohlberg, all or most arguments for relativism include

one or more of the following four confusions: (1) the confusion between the alleged fact

that there are no universally accepted values and the norm that everybody should have

their own values; (2) the confusion between ethical relativity and the liberal value of

tolerance of people of different cultures and different moral beliefs; (3) the confusion

between ethical relativism and "value neutrality or scientific impartially"; and (4) the

confusion between being scientific and being value neutral.

The Kohlbergian Claim of Universalism

The above objections serve the goal of undermining certain arguments for ethical

relativism. They are attempts to show that, even i f the cultural relativists' premises are

accepted, there is no logical necessity for us to accept ethical relativism. After this,

Kohlberg pushes further by presenting his reason for believing in universalism.

43

He starts with the claim that, despite the beliefs of many sociologists, there are

culturally universal values. He makes up a list of twelve such values: (1) life, (2)

property, (3) truth, (4) affiliation, (5) erotic love and sex, (6) authority, (7) law, (8).

contract, (9) civil rights, (10) religion, (11) conscience, and (12) punishment (Kohlberg

1981, p. 117, also see Appendix 3 of this dissertation). Unfortunately, Kohlberg explains

neither how he reaches the conclusion that all these values are universal, nor in exactly

what sense they are universal. In addition, clear definitions of these values are not

provided either.

Taking for granted that there are certain very general universal values, Kohlberg

argues that the only possible way of defending relativism is "to say that the ordering or

hierarchy of these values is relative" (Kohlberg 1981, p. 123). However, Kohlberg rejects

even this, believing in some universal ordering of these values. It might be true that

people rank these values differently, but such differences are "primarily reflections of

developmental stages in moral thought" (Kohlberg 1981, p. 123). Because different stages

of moral development are not equally adequate, the different rankings are not equally

adequate either.

As mentioned before, Kohlberg claims that there are two universal aspects of

moral phenomena. First, people in all cultures go through the same order or sequence of

stages in their moral development (Kohlberg 1981, p. 126). Second, people at the highest

level of moral development share a set of moral principles independently of their culture

(Kohlberg 1981, pp. 127-128). The philosophical implication of these two points taken

together is that there exists a form of moral reasoning (defined in terms of a set of moral

principles, according to Kohlberg) which is the most adequate without being relative to

any particular culture or value system. On the basis of this, Kohlberg claims that there

exists a single highest virtue, which he calls 'justice.' To be just is, Kohlberg says, to

respect and maintain the rights of individuals. This conception of morality as justice "[t]o

44

a large extent... coincides with a culturally universal definition of morality." In his view,

"a culturally universal definition of morality can be arrived at if morality is thought of as

the form of moral judgments instead of the content of specific moral beliefs" (Kohlberg

1981, p. 300).

3.2 Kohlberg's moral " form"

What then is this ideal form of moral reasoning? To answer the question, we have

to first find out what Kohlberg means by the word 'form.' Philosophically, moral form

means the set of characteristics that distinguishes moral from non-moral judgments. A

typical list of these characteristics include consistency (does not entail P and not P);

prescriptivity (judgments are made in a mode that is expressed by words like 'should' or

'ought'); and universality (if a moral rule is valid it is valid for everybody). Some of

Kohlberg's moral forms, such as universalizability, consistency, and prescriptivity (note

that Kohlberg's meaning of'prescriptivity' is very similar to 'unconditionality'), are very

close to these forms defined by philosophers.44 In this sense a "universal moral form" is

contrasted with the basic universal "content principles" (Kohlberg 1981, p. 126).

But more often Kohlberg's "moral form" means something very different from the

above sense. According to this second meaning, moral form is contrasted with the actual

judgment one makes about the correct solution to a moral problem. Moral form, thus

understood, refers to the reason behind one's solution to a moral problem (Kohlberg

4 4 See Kohlberg 1981, p. 191, where he introduces prescriptivity, universalizability, and primacy as the formal conditions; and Kohlberg 1981, p. 279, where he introduces universalizability, consistency and reversibility as the formal conditions. Because of Kohlberg's emphasis on disequilibrium as a factor leading to moral development, it may be desirable that we add to the list the condition of equilibrium or reversibility as weil. But whether we actually add it to the list is not important, for, as we shall see shortly, it is already included in the requirement of universality.

45

1981, p. 120). Moral form therefore includes one's principles, values, and the procedural

factors in one's moral reasoning. A l l these factors can be quite substantive (though

usually highly abstract) in the eyes of a philosopher. When Kohlberg says that moral

maturity is determined by the moral form but not content, he is talking about moral form

in this sense.

Thus Kohlberg's claim that moral form determines moral adequacy should not be

confused with ethical formalism. Formalism is the view that the correct form of moral

judgment (universalizability, consistency, and unconditionality) guarantees the

correctness of the judgment itself. Kohlberg's claim is much weaker. His claim is merely

that what is important for moral adequacy is not the action choice itself but the reason

behind it. This does not amount to ethical formalism in the typical philosophical sense.

What we can say about Kohlberg's moral principles is, then, not that they are

formal, but that they are substantive and yet highly abstract. Stage 6 moral principles do

not directly prescribe any particular actions, as the Ten Commandments do. Three

principles are central at Stage 6 moral reasoning: (1) the principle of justice, (2) the

principle of role-taking, and (3) the principle of respect for persons (Kohlberg 1981, p.

162). The principle of justice requires that we recognize "the right of every person to an

equal consideration of his claims in every situation," regardless of any particular social

convention or legal code. The principle of role-taking requires that we put ourselves in

others' situations in order to reach a solution that is acceptable to all parties provided that

they are willing to do the same. The principle of respect for persons can be represented by

46

Kant's formula: Act so as to treat each person as an end, not merely as a means (Kohlberg

1981, p. 164).

Although Kohlberg's theory is, strictly speaking, not an ethical formalism, it

resembles ethical formalism at least in one way. Like ethical formalism, it emphasizes the

importance of abstract criteria or standards in the assessment of moral adequacy, and the

possibility of deriving distinct solutions of moral problems from these criteria. For

Kohlberg, Stage 6 moral standard is sufficient for determining a correct moral decision in

solving moral dilemmas:

Not only are Stage 6 principles designed to be acceptable to all rational people, but all those who were using Stage 6 methods and principles will eventually agree on the "right" solution in concrete situations, our empirical data suggest. The people we have studied whose reasoning is at Stage 6 have agreed on the dilemmas we have presented them. In contrast, Stage 5 people all agree on certain dilemmas but not on others (Kohlberg 1981, p. 193).

To see how particular moral judgments are, with Kohlberg's theory, derived from

abstract moral standards, let us take the principle of ideal role-taking as an example.

Kohlberg describes ideal role-taking as a second-order use of the Golden Rule:

In essence, Stage 6 is a second-order conception of Golden Rule role-taking. Judgments are formed by role-taking the claim of each actor under the assumption that all the other actor's claims are also governed by the Golden Rule and accommodated accordingly. The steps involved in making a decision based on Stage 6 role-taking are (1) to imagine oneself in the position of each person in the situation and to consider all the claims that a rationally self-interested person could make in each position; (2) then to ask which claims one would uphold and which claims one would relinquish, imagining that one does not know which person in the situation one is to be; and (3) then to formulate a moral judgment in accordance with the fully reversible claims (those that one would uphold not knowing who one was to be) (Kohlberg 1981, p. 281).

If all the actors involved in a dilemma were to follow this hypothetical three-step procedure, they would necessarily give equal consideration to the claims of all before reaching a decision. Moreover, deliberating under these constraints, they

47

would almost inevitably reach agreement with one another as to what the fair resolution of the situation would be. Thus, at Stage 6, the criteria of consistency and reversibility are fully met, because one and only one resolution would be agreed on and this resolution would be accepted as fair by all concerned. At the same time, the criterion of universalizability is fully satisfied, because a role-taking procedure based on the idea that equal consideration should be given to the claim of all whose interests are at stake commends itself as a principle we would want everyone to follow in resolving moral dilemmas. This is what it means to say that Stage 6 is fully adequate moral principle (Kohlberg 1981, p. 281)

When applying the Golden Rule in this way, one asks whether one can still acknowledge

one's claim if one trades places with the other party (Kohlberg 1981, p. 203-204).

Consider Heinz's dilemma as an example (see Appendix 1). The druggist's claim to

withhold property at the expense of the other's life is irreversible in that he cannot

recognize such a claim in the wife's role. In contrast to this, the wife's claim to life can be

recognized even when she switches roles with the husband or the druggist. Therefore a

Stage 6 reasoner judges that it is right for Heinz to steal the drug for his wife (Kohlberg

1981, p. 167). The application of the Golden Rule aims at a solution to a moral dilemma

which is acceptable to all parties, and this acceptability to all parties determines what a

just solution is. Stage 6 morality is a method of moral reasoning aiming at the resolution

of conflicting claims that is acceptable to all parties involved if they are rational. As we

have seen from the example of Heinz's dilemma, by the mere requirement that a morally

right action must be one which is acceptable to all, we are able to decide what the right

course of action is when faced with particular cases.

Another example is Kohlberg's treatment of capital punishment. Kohlberg

maintains that capital punishment is, whatever the situation, unjust or morally wrong. His

argument runs like this: the ideal role-taking at Stage 6 involves a decision on what social

48

justice principle would be chosen if the decision is made by rational, self-interested

people behind Rawls's famous "veil of ignorance" (Kohlberg 1981, p. 281). Capital

punishment is irreversible in the sense that i f one turns out to be the capital offender,

he/she would be executed, an outcome which he/she surely cannot accept. One might

argue that if one turns out to be an ordinary citizen, then he/she will benefit from the

deterrent effect of capital punishment. Then he/she surely has a reason to vote for capital

punishment. Kohlberg's reply is that such a consideration still cannot justify capital

punishment for two reasons. First, imagining ourselves behind the veil, we can see that

the risk of being executed is very high if we turned out to be the capital offender.

However, "our risk of being murdered i f we turned out to be an ordinary citizen would be

much lower" (Kohlberg 1981, p. 287). Under this consideration, "it would never be

rational to prefer one's prospects under capital punishment to one's prospects under an

alternative system, no matter how great a deterrent effect the death penalty might have"

(Kohlberg 1981, p. 286).

The second reason is that "from an original position point of view, the penalty of

death would probably seem more severe than necessary to maximize deterrence." "[W]e

must consider briefly the presuppositions about the motivation of prospective criminals

that are implicit in the concept of deterrence i t se l f . . . . At least in theory, a potential

criminal acting rationally would be unlikely to decide that a particular crime was not

worth risking his/her life to commit but was worth the risk of a lesser but extremely

severe penalty such as mandatory life imprisonment without parole. Even if some people

contemplating the commission of a crime would refrain from doing so only if they feared

49

execution, the overwhelming majority of rational individuals would probably be deterred

just as effectively by a punishment less harsh than death" (Kohlberg 1981, pp. 287-288).

We have seen that Kohlberg's theory implies that there is a set of supreme moral

principles that are universally adequate. Following Paul Taylor's terminology, we may

say that Kohlberg's theory is a universalism but not an absolutism. Absolutism, according

to Taylor, comes in two forms. The first form of absolutism views that "at least some

moral norms are justifiable on the grounds that can be established by a cross-cultural

method of reasoning and that, consequently, these norms correctly apply to the conduct of

all human beings." This kind of absolutism amounts to what he calls "universalism." In

the second sense, absolutism means that there are moral norms that "have no

exceptions."45 Clearly absolutism in the first sense, i.e., universalism, makes a much

weaker claim than absolutism in the second sense. One can be an absolutist in the first

sense without being an absolutist in the second sense. For clarity and convenience, I will

use the word 'absolutism' to refer only to Taylor's absolutism in the second sense, while

referring to absolutism in his first sense as 'universalism.'

Using 'universalism' and 'absolutism' in this way, we can say that Kohlberg's

ethical theory is universalistic but not (generally) absolutistic. Kohlberg's universal

principles do not prescribe certain types of action unconditionally. Instead they provide

certain method of moral deliberation, based on some basic moral values such as equality

and fairness. Kohlberg believes that one will be able to find out the best solution in a

moral situation if one upholds the Stage 6 principles and carefully carries out the

50

procedure of ideal role-taking. We do not need any absolute rules of the type of the Ten

Commandments.

Regarding substantive values, the most notable feature of Kohlberg's theory is

that the endorsement of human rights is essential for moral maturity. Richard Shweder

presents Kohlberg's value system as one which holds out liberalism and the American

Bi l l of Rights as the ideal of morality and social justice (quoted from Kohlberg's report in

Kohlberg et al. 1983, p. 104). Whether Shweder's reading of Kohlberg is accurate

remains a question (Kohlberg et al. 1983, pp. 104 f), but he is quite right in that Kohlberg

is sympathetic to liberalism, at least in the Rawlsian form of it, and to the Bil l of Rights.

Kohlberg says that a Stage 5 conception of rights is that every person has a right

to liberty prior to society, and society has an obligation to protect it. Stage 5 subjects

believe that freedoms should be limited by society and law only when they are

incompatible with the like freedoms of others. At Stage 6, having rights means there are

universal rights of just treatment that go beyond liberties and that represent

universalizable claims of one individual on another (Kohlberg 1981, pp. 215-216). In this

sense, "[t]he procedural arrangements called constitutional democracy can make law and

society attractive to rational members because they rest on their consent, provide equal

representation for their self-interest, and include a Bi l l of Rights protecting their

individual liberties (natural rights prior to law and society)" (Kohlberg 1981, p. 154).

Looking at Kohlberg's value system from this point of view, Kohlberg's sympathy for the

Bi l l of Rights is clear.

Paul Taylor, "Ethical Relativism." In Moral Philosophy: Selected Readings, ed, George Sher (Fort

51

By reviewing Kohlberg's solutions to the hypothetical dilemmas, we can see more

about how Kohlberg ranks human values. In Heinz's dilemma we see that the value of

human life is more fundamental than property, and the value of human life is equal for all

persons (Kohlberg 1981, p. 200). In the doctor's dilemma, however, we see that the value

of autonomy is even more fundamental than the value of life, and thus the doctor ought to

let the patient die as she asks (Kohlberg 1981, p. 204).

In the life-boat dilemma, we can see how Kohlberg understands fairness and

equality. What the captain should do, according to Kohlberg, is to go for a lottery

(Kohlberg 1981, p. 208). The solution shows that, with Kohlberg, to be fair is to consider

everybody equally. Nobody can be considered more important than others. Morally

speaking, everybody weighs the same. The only qualification for being treated equally is

being a person. Therefore in the life-boat dilemma, the life of the old man should not be

valued less only because he is old and is less able to contribute to the chance of team's

survival. Therefore, a lottery should be drawn to decide who is to go overboard.

In this sense, a fair system of punishment should not be understood as giving

someone his desert. To understand punishment this way is to exercise only conventional-

level reasoning (Kohlberg 1981, pp. 257-259, 261-262). As we have seen in Kohlberg's

argument against capital punishment, the murderer and the possible victims should be

considered on a par, i.e., their claims are weighed equally.

Worth: Harcourt Brace Jovanich College Publishers, 1987), 157-158.

52

3.3 Constructivism and Rationalism

Kohlberg's theory represents the "cognitive-developmental approach" of moral

developmental psychology. Under this approach, moral development is viewed as a

process in which an active subject struggles for a better equilibrium in his interaction with

his environment. What is changed when the subject advances through the moral stages is

the cognitive structure of their conception of the self in relation to society (Kohlberg

1981, p. 134).

There are two important philosophical implications of a model like this. The first

is what we might call 'constructivism.' In this view, "moral judgments and norms are

ultimately understood as universal constructions of human actors that regulate their social

interaction, rather than as passive reflections of either external facts (including

psychological states of other humans), or of internal emotions" (Kohlberg 1981, p. 134).

Since morality is a matter of equilibrium of the interaction between an active agent and

his/her environment, the environment provides for the most part opportunities for the

agent to explore his/her own moral nature, not a context for implanting values. By saying

this, Kohlberg probably has underestimated the role of internalization in human moral

development. It will be more plausible to claim, following Kohlberg's main idea, that the

moral agent is an active agent, and moral development is not totally a passive process of

adopting existing social values. A moral problem emerges when there are conflicts

between people's claims. A moral principle is, therefore, a principle which prescribes

resolutions of conflicting claims. This is the reason why Kohlberg believes that there is

53,

one and only one virtue, namely justice, for justice is by definition giving each her due in

situations where interests or claims compete.

The second implication is rationalism, which is manifested in two dimensions.

One dimension is what we might call 'principlism,' while the other concerns the relation

between knowledge and virtue. His principlism claims that there are some principles that

are central to moral reasoning. As I have mentioned, three principles are central to his

theory. They are the principle of justice, the principle of role-taking, and the principle of

respect for persons. He also refers frequently to Kant's Categorical Imperative and the

Golden Rule. By applying these principles correctly, he believes, one can derive the

correct courses of action concerning concrete moral issues.

Kohlberg's rationalism is further seen in his identification of moral virtue with

moral knowledge: "[Vjirtue is the knowledge of the good. He who knows the good

chooses the good" (Kohlberg 1981, p. 189). This is certainly an overstatement, for we see

even in Kohlberg's own tests that hot all Stage 6 reasoners quit in the Milgram study. But

a mild rationalist claim still gains support from two empirical phenomena. Firstly, it is

found that subjects have to be cognitively mature to reason morally, though cognitive

maturity does not guarantee moral maturity (Kohlberg 1981, p. 138). Secondly, it is also

found that the "amount of opportunities for role-taking" has a great effect on the

possibility of the subjects promotion in moral stages (Kohlberg 1981, pp. 141-142).

54

Section 4: Explanatory Difficulties

Though there is positive empirical support for Kohlberg's theory, counter

evidence has also been found. The most threatening finding to this early model is that

there are considerable numbers of stage skippers and regressors. Most notably, about 20%

of college youths experienced an "apparent" regression from Stage 4 to Stage 2 (Kohlberg

1981, p. 130).46 In the Blatt and Kohlberg classroom discussion experiment (1975), study

two, both stage regressors and skippers were found. Taking the two experimental groups

together, 5 of the 12 stage progressors (42%) were stage skippers, while 5 out the 97

subjects (5%) in the two experimental groups were regressors. While the percentage of

regressors was small enough to be attributed to scoring errors, the percentage of skippers

are surely too high to be neglected. Besides these, Holstein's (1974) study of the

influence of parenting styles on the moral development of children also showed that there

was a significant number of stage skippers and regressors.47 A l l these findings powerfully

challenges Kohlberg's sequential claim. Unless Kohlberg can find ways to explain away

48 these anomalies, his theory will be falsified by such counter evidence.

Support for the claim of structured-wholeness is not very strong either. As

Lawrence Walker points out, Kohlberg's (1969) study showed that "only 45% of

reasoning was scored at the modal stage and with considerable dispersion over the other

4 6 Also see Lawrence Kohlberg and R. Krammer, "Continuities and Discontinuities in Childhood and Adult Moral Development." Human Development 12 (1969): 109. 4 7 Constance B. Holstein, "Moral Judgment Change in Early Adolescence and Middle Age: A Longitudinal Study," paper presented at the biannual meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development, Philadelphia, March 1973. Also see William Kurtines and Esther B. Greif, "The Development of Moral Thought: Review and Evaluation of Kohlberg's approach," Psychological Bulletin 81, (1974): 467. 4 8 For still more counter evidence of the sequential claim, please see C. B. Holstein, "Irreversible, Stepwise Sequence in the Development of Moral Judgment: A Longitudinal Study of Males and Females," Child Development 47 (1976): 51-61; D. Kuhn, "Short-term Longitudinal Evidence for the Sequentiality of Kohlberg's Early Stages of Moral Judgment," Developmental Psychology 12 (1976): 162-166; and Kuhn et al., "The Development of Formal Operations in Logical and Moral Judgment," Genetic Psychology Monographs 95 (1977): 97-188.

55

stages (e.g., 21% of reasoning was scored at two or more stages from mode)."4y The

support of the claim of structured-wholeness from empirical data was far from

satisfactory.

Difficulties also appeared in studies of the relation between moral reasoning and

behavior. In Haan, Smith & Block's (1969) study of participation in the Free Speech

Movement (this chapter, section 2.2), as many as 60% of the Stage 2 subjects sat in, a

percentage much higher than that of conventional reasoners (10%), and indeed even

higher than that of Stage 5 reasoners (50%).

The first attempt by Kohlberg to explain these unexpected findings is to suggest

that there exists a transitional stage, between Stage 4 and Stage 5. People who apparently

regressed from Stage 4 to Stage 2 were not real regressors, because these subjects

eventually moved to Stage 5. Kohlberg thus suggests that there exist a transitional stage

between Stage 4 and Stage 5, which he calls Stage 4!/2 (Kohlberg 1981, p. 130). People at

this stage are in a stage of confusion. They have abandoned their conventional moral

ideas, but have not yet established the postconventional values, and because of this seem

to regress back to Stage 2 instrumental hedonism. After they overcome their confusion,

they will move into Stage 5 (Kohlberg 1981, pp. 45 & 130).50

Unfortunately the attempt to save the theory fails. As Kohlberg later admits, Stage

4Vi can only account for a few cases of stage regression.51 Furthermore, the existence of

4 9 Lawrence Walker, "The Development of Moral Reasoning," Annals of Child Development vol. 5 (1988): 39. 5 0 The transitional Stage 4'/2 is defined as follows (Kohlberg 1981, p. 411):

This level is postconventional but not yet principled. At Stage 4lA, choice is personal and subjective. It is based on emotions, conscience is seen as arbitrary and relative, as are ideas such as "duty" and "morally right." ... At this stage, the [social] perspective is that of an individual standing outside of his own society and considering himself as an individual making decisions without a generalized commitment or contract with society. One can pick and choose obligations, which are defined by particular societies, but one has no principles for such choice.

5 1 Anne Colby, "A Longitudinal Study of Moral Development," Monograph of the Society for Research in Child Development 48, no. 4 (1983): 5.

56

Stage 4/4 does not help to explain the existence of stage skippers at all. The upshot is that

there must be problems in Kohlberg's project, either in the stage model itself or in the

research method (particularly the scoring manual). However, it surely does not mean that

Kohlberg's theory is completely wrong. If it is completely wrong, there should be no

correspondence whatsoever between the Kohlbergian moral stages and moral behavior.

This explains why, on the one hand, Kohlberg's theory has not been totally abandoned by

developmental psychologists, and, on the other hand, why it needs revision to survive.

Section 5: Summary

To summarize, Kohlberg's theory is a mixture of moral psychology and

philosophy. On the psychological side, it is a six-stage model of moral development. At

Stage 1, people reason about moral problems in terms of avoidance of punishment and

obedience to authority. At Stage 2, they reason in terms of self-interest and exchange.

Stage 3 subjects extend their concern to others on an interpersonal base. The moral

standard is largely that of winning the approval of others, and therefore the fulfillment of

role expectations is important. At Stage 4, the moral conception is that of social

maintenance. Stage 5 moral standard transcends the societal perspective and views

individuals as prior to society. It thus relies on human rights, social contract,-and social

utility. Stage 6, the highest stage in moral development, upholds the principle of justice,

the principle of role-taking, and the principle of respect as the ultimate standard. Three

claims are especially important for these stages. First, every stage is a structural whole.

Second, they form a universally invariant sequence. Third, the stages are hierarchical.

On the philosophical side, Kohlberg's theory is a non-absolutistic version of

universalism. It proposed that the most adequate "form" of moral reasoning involves the

employment of three principles, namely the principle of justice, the principle of role-

taking, and the principle of equal respect for persons. The substantive value embraced by

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the theory is chiefly that of human rights, in which the right to liberty or autonomy is

most important. He believes in fairness, but does not believe in desert.

As a universalist, Kohlberg argues that (1) there exists a universal pattern of

development, and (2) all subjects at the highest stage share the same basic set of ethical

principles. It is important to note that, for Kohlberg, these principles determine right

actions when applied to particular cases. He also argues that the acceptance of ethical

relativism is the result of confusion. The confusion is (1) the confusion between the fact

that people do not agree in their moral judgments and the idea that no basis of argument

can be formed; (2) the confusion between the universal value of tolerance and the

relativist view that there is no universal value; (3) the confusion between ethical

relativism and scientific impartiality; or (4) the confusion between being scientific and

being value neutral.

Kohlberg claims that higher stages are better than lower stages in a cognitive and

a normative sense. They are cognitively better since they are more integrated and more

differentiated; they are normatively better since they are more prescriptive (in his sense)

and more universalizable. Four empirical findings are relevant to the normative claim that

higher stages are more adequate than lower stages. First, higher-stage reasoners

comprehend the lower stages, but lower-stage reasoners cannot comprehend the higher

stages (except that some subjects can comprehend their +1 stages). Second, people prefer

moral judgments of the highest stages which they comprehend, and this remains true even

when their highest comprehended stages are higher than their modal stages. Third,

reasoning of higher stages requires higher cognitive ability. Fourth, higher-stage

reasoning predicts better moral behavior. The first two empirical findings are regarded as

the direct consequence of Kohlberg's hierarchical claim. The last two findings, I argue,

are related to the claim that higher stages are more adequate than lower stages, although

they may not be directly related to the hierarchical claim as understood by psychologists..

58

Empirical tests of the claim of invariant sequence show mild support for the claim.

However, there is also considerable counter-evidence to it. As a result, modifications

have been made since the mid 1970's to improve the predictive power of the theory.

59

Chapter Two: Kohlberg's theory — the late model

Section 1: Modifications made in the late model

In the first chapter we reviewed Kohlberg's theory in its early form, and reported

some phenomena that the early model fails to explain. In this chapter we shall review the

recent development of the theory and see how this late model better fits empirical

findings. I will refer mainly to five of his recent publications: Moral Stages: A Current

Formulation and a Response to Critics (abbreviated as Kohlberg et al. 1983),' The

Psychology of Moral Development (abbreviated as Kohlberg 1984),2 " A Current

Statement on Some Theoretical Issues" (abbreviated as Kohlberg 1986),3 The

Measurement of Moral Judgment vols. 1&2 (co-authored with Colby and others,

abbreviated as Colby et al. 1987 vols. 1&2),4 and "The Return of Stage 6: Its Principle

and Moral Point of View" (abbreviated as Kohlberg et al. 1990).5

Although I use the term "late model" to refer to the body of the newly introduced

elements of Kohlberg's theory, this "late model" of Kohlberg's theory is not presented to

us once and for all. It has emerged bit by bit since the late 70's (i.e., before the

publication of the [1981] anthology) as Kohlberg strove to make his theory more

compatible with empirical findings. The reason for choosing the above works to represent

1 Lawrence Kohlberg, C. Levine, and A. Hewer: Moral Stages: A Current Formulation and a Response to Critcs (Basel: Karger, 1983). 2 Lawrence Kohlberg. The Psychology of Moral Development (Cambridge: Harper and Row, 1984).

3 Lawrence Kohlberg. "A Current Statement on Some Theoretical Issues." In Lawrence Kohlberg: Consensus and Controversy, ed. Sohan Modgil and Celia Modgil (Philadelphia & London: Falmer, 1986), 485-546. 4 Anne Colby and Lawrence Kohlberg. The Measurement of Moral Judgment, 2 vols. (London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

60

his late model is largely a technical one: they present us with a relatively comprehensive

picture of the recent development of the theory. The process of revising the theory is

largely settled in 1987, with the publication of The Measurement of Moral Judgment vols.

1&2. But even then he was not totally satisfied with his theory, mainly because the nature

and status of Stage 6 is not fully clarified. His (1990) paper is an attempt, perhaps a

preliminary one, to solve the problem. With the death of Kohlberg in 1987, the (1990)

paper becomes his last words on the nature of Stage 6, and his project remains unfinished.

In the late model, refinements have been made both in terms of the research

method and the theory itself. Earlier versions of the scoring manual are considered not

well-formulated, and the scorings are regarded as too subjective. These problems were

rectified by the publication of the (1987) scoring manual (Colby et al. 1987 vol. 2). Since

our main concern is the philosophical implications of his theory but not the research

method, we shall go directly to the modifications of the theoretical structure.6 Three

changes in the late model seem to be most significant: (1) modification of the "form" and

"content" distinction, (2) redefinitions of the stages, and (3) introduction of moral

orientations and the A and B Substages (or Types).

1.1 Form and content distinction

In the (1958) project, Kohlberg assessed moral stages partly in terms of decisional

content (Kohlberg et al. 1983, p. 42). In the 1970's his definitions of the moral stages

5 Lawrence Kohlberg, Dwight R. Boyd, & Charles Levine, "The Return of Stage 6." In The Moral Domain, ed. Thomas E. Wren (Cambridge MA, The MIT Press, 1990), 151-181. 6 Readers who are interested in the problems of research method can refer to William Kurtines and Esther B. Greif, "The Development of Moral Thought," Psychological Bulletin 81, no. 8 (1974): 453-470; Lawrence J. Walker, "The Development of Moral Reasoning," Annals of Child Development 5, 37-78, esp.

61

moved in the direction of a higher degree of formality, and the stages become less

dependent on the content choices. As we have seen, in the early model, Kohlberg defined

moral content as the actual judgment on what is the right thing to do, and form as the

reason behind the choice. In this way the form refers to quite a wide range of things, but

principally includes basic norms and values upheld by the subject (see Appendix 3 for

various universal values and norms people use to justify their moral judgments).

In the late model the meaning of moral form is further narrowed down, coming in

the end to contain only two elements, the social perspective and the justice structure.7 The

social perspective refers to the way one views one's relation with others on the one hand,

and with society as a whole on the other. We shall review the relation between social

perspectives and moral stages in the next section. The second element, i.e., the justice

structure, refers to the subject's understanding of equality, equity and reciprocity

(Kohlberg etal. 1983, p. 42).8

Accordingly, the values or norms of Appendix 3 no longer have direct bearing on

the moral stage of a person. For example, according to the early model, Stage 6 moral

motivation includes that of avoiding self-condemnation. Hence, if a subject judges that

Heinz should not steal the drug because otherwise he will condemn himself and will not

36-37; and Anne Colby and Lawrence Kohlberg, The Measurement of Moral Judgment, vol. 1, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 35-61. 7 The sharpening of the distinction between moral form and moral content is partly accomplished by the refinement of the scoring method. This involves further breaking down the moral judgment of a subject into each value and norm involved, and assessing how the subject reasons when these norms and. values are at stake. For details of the relation between the form-content distinction and the scoring method please see Colby etal. 1987 vol. 1, pp. 41-61, esp. 41-43. 8 See Appendix 5 for a summary of the concept of equality (including equity) and reciprocity in each of the moral stages. The reader may also find Appendix 5 useful for the understanding of the moral stages when combined with the section on the stage descriptions.

62

have l ived up to his own conscience (norm 11, see Appendix 3), this would have been

assessed as Stage 6 reasoning. However, in the late model, such a judgment does not

necessarily represent postconventional reasoning.9 Postconventional moral motivation in

the late model is either a commitment to a social contract or the promotion of the welfare

of the greatest number (Stage 5), or a commitment to some universal ethical principles

(Stage 6). Similarly, in the early model, if a subject claims that Heinz should steal the

drug because of the importance of a loving relationship, it would be ranked as a Stage 3

response because of its employment of an affiliation norm (Appendix 3, norm 4). But in

the late model it is still an open question whether this subject is applying the affiliation

norm in a manner that reflects a moral conception higher than Stage 3 (Kohlberg et al.

1983, p. 43).

1.2 The re-formulation of stage descriptions

Like the early model, the late model defines moral stages in terms of their criteria

of Tightness and their motives for doing right. But they are now complemented by a set of

social perspectives. Also, the definitions of the stages now reflect a sharper form-content

distinction, the values defining a stage are more "formal," i.e., more abstract and less

substantive than before. Below is a table of redefinitions of the stages in terms of what is

right and the motive for doing right (Kohlberg 1984, pp. 174-176).10

9 See Kohlberg 1981, p. 122. There Kohlberg lists the motive for doing the right things at different stages, followed by a note that states that the definitions of Stages 5&6 are no longer valid. Note that the book is published in 1981 while the papers anthologized in it are published in the seventies, and there is a gap between the model presented in the book and the up-to-date theory when the book is published (some of them are indeed revisions of earlier papers). 1 0 The stage definitions used in this section are quoted from the second chapter of Kohlberg's (1984) book, "Moral Stages and Moralization," which is first published in 1976. The stage definitions used by Kohlberg have virtually been kept unchanged since then. The table of stage definitions is still used in the Colby et al. (1987) book.

63

Level and Stage What is Right

Level I: Preconventional To avoid breaking rules backed by punishment, obedience for its own sake, and avoiding physical damage to persons and

Stage 1 — property. Heteronomous Morality

Reason for doing right: Avoidance of punishment, and the superior power of authorities.

Stage 2 — Individualism, Instrumental Purpose, and Exchange

Reason for doing right: To serve one's own needs or interests in a world where you haVe to recognize that other people have their interests too.

Following rules only when it is to someone's immediate interest; acting to meet one's own interests and needs and letting others do the same. Right is also what's fair, what's an equal exchange, a deal, an agreement.

Level II: Conventional Living up to what is expected by people close to you or what people generally expect of people in your role as son, brother, friend, etc. "Being good" is important and means having good motives, showing concern about others. It also means keeping mutual relationships, such as trust, loyalty, respect, and gratitude.

Reason for doing right: The need to be a good person in your own eyes and those of others. Your caring for others. Belief in the Golden Rule. Desire to maintain rules and authority which support stereotypical good behavior.

Stage 3 — Mutual Interpersonal Expectations, Relationships, and Interpersonal Conformity

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Stage 4 — Social Fulfilling the actual duties to which you have agreed. Laws System and Conscience are to be upheld except in extreme cases where they conflict

with other fixed social duties. Right is also contributing to society, the group, or institution.

Reason for doing right: To keep the institution going as a whole, to avoid the breakdown in the system " i f everyone did it," or the imperative of conscience to meet one's defined obligations. (Easily confused with Stage 3 belief in rules and authority; see text.)

Level III: Being aware that people hold a variety of values and rules are Postconventional, or relative to your group. These relative rules should usually be Principled upheld, however, in the interest of impartiality and because

they are the social contract. Some nonrelative values and Stage 5 Social rights like life and liberty, however, must be upheld in any Contract or Utility and society and regardless of majority opinion. Individual Rights.

Reason for doing right: A sense of obligation to law because of one's social contract to make and abide by laws for the welfare of all and for the protection of all people's rights. A feeling of contractual commitment, freely entered upon, to family, friendship, trust, and work obligations. Concern that laws and duties be based on rational calculation of overall utility, "the greatest good for the greatest number."

Stage 6 — Universal Following self-chosen ethical principles. Particular laws or Ethical Principles social agreements are usually valid because they rest on such

principles. When laws violate these principles, one acts in accordance with the principle. Principles are universal principles of justice: the equality of human rights and respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons.

Reason for doing right: The belief as a rational person in the validity of universal moral principle, and a sense of personal commitment to them.

The moral standards at the moral stages here are not significantly different from

the early model, they are just described in greater detail. Stage 1 is obedience to authority

and avoidance of punishment; Stage 2 is concrete exchange; Stage 3 is interpersonal

relationships; Stage 4 is social-order maintenance; Stage 5 is a mixture of utility, rights

and contract; and Stage 6 is equal respect for individuals. All these are the same as the

early model.

But if we examine the moral incentives, something more interesting is found.

Consider the Stage 3 moral incentive. According to the early model, Stage 3 subjects do

the right thing in order to please others. But in the late model, Stage 3 incentive is

extended to include the desire to be good in one's own eyes, and the desire to maintain

stereotypical values (presumably ones that one sincerely believes in). This allows a larger

degree of autonomy in Stage 3 moral character, for its incentive, thus defined,

acknowledges that the Stage 3 subject may do the right thing because he/she treasures

these values, not solely because he/she wants to please others. The same is true for the

revised Stage 4 moral incentive, which is a sense of being obliged to do one's duty as

defined by the society, and a concern for the maintenance of the social order. In contrast

to this, the early model describes the Stage 4 moral incentive as to avoid censure by

legitimate authorities, which is obviously more heteronomous than the incentive in the

late model.

The changes made to Stages 5 and 6 are also significant. In the early model, Stage

5 moral incentive is to maintain the respect of the impartial spectator, while Stage 6 moral

incentive is to avoid self condemnation. In the late model, Stage 5 and 6 incentives no

longer contain any idea of avoiding condemnation or gaining respect, whether from others

(impartial spectator) or from the self. Postconventional moral incentive is now defined

purely as the recognition that if there are any moral obligations at all one should always

66

be bound by them. Stage 5 moral incentive is thus a sense of obligation, a feeling of

commitment, and a concern for the Stage 5 values themselves. Stage 6 mOral incentive is

a rational belief in and a commitment to universal moral principles. So defined, the use of

conscience no longer guarantees a postconventional moral stage.

These changes also help to clarify the distinction between stages. In the early

model, Stage 6 moral incentive differs from Stage 3 in that the former is the avoidance of

self-condemnation, while the latter is the avoidance of others' dislike. Defining Stage 6

morality in terms of avoiding self condemnation inevitably blurs the line between Stage 6

and the lower stages. We can easily notice that self-condemnation appears quite early in

our childhood, surely earlier than the ability to comprehend the abstract postconventional

moral principles. Now, in the late model, Stage 3 incentive has included the need to be

good in one's own eyes (this is quite close to Stage 6 moral incentive in the early model),

whereas in the late model Stage 6 moral incentive becomes a sense of commitment to the

universal moral principles. This change posts a stricter standard for Stage 6, and conforms

to our experience better.

Likewise, the distinction between Stage 4 moral incentive and that of

preconventional level is sharpened. In the early model, Stage 4 moral incentive is to avoid

censure by legitimate authorities and resulting guilt. Since censure is also a kind of

punishment, the Stage 4 moral incentive thus defined is confused with Stage 1 moral

incentive, i.e., the avoidance of punishment. In the late model, Stage 4 moral incentive

becomes that of keeping the institution or society going as a whole. This change in the

definition of Stage 4 helps to separate conventional morality, which is marked by a

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concern for one's social group, from preconventional morality, whose concern is mainly

egocentric.

Kohlberg also retreats from some of his early claims about Stage 6. In the early

model, he claims that the existence of Stage 6 is empirically verified. But in his (1983)

book he withdraws from this claim, and admits that he has failed to "construct a detailed

scoring manual description which would allow reliable identification of a sixth stage"

(Kohlberg et al. 1983, p. 60). And the stage does not even appear in the (1987) standard

scoring manual (i.e., Colby et al. 1987 vol. 2). Nevertheless, Stage 6 still exists in the late

model, serving as a postulate and a device to define the nature and endpoint of moral

development (Kohlberg et al. 1983, p. 61).

In the late model, Kohlberg attaches to every moral stage a social perspective. By

'social perspective' Kohlberg means the way "[a] person sees other people, interprets

their thoughts and feelings, and sees their role or place in society." These social

perspectives are, strictly speaking, not part of the definitions of the stages. They are "very

closely related to moral stages, but are more general," and constitute a way of viewing

human interactions (Kohlberg 1984, p. 171). Since it is more general, it is easier for a

person to take up a certain social perspective than to employ its corresponding moral

stage. In this way there is very often a "horizontal development" from a certain social

perspective stage to its corresponding stage. In the "horizontal development" one attains

the social perspective that is connected to a certain moral stage first, and then solidifies

the moral conception of that stage later (Kohlberg 1984, pp. 171-172).

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The social perspective at the preconventional level is a concrete individual

perspective. The subject at this level is not yet able to comprehend the concept of society

as a collective entity, but can only comprehend individual persons. At the conventional

level, the subject starts to understand the concept of a collective entity such as a family or

a society. But with the understanding of the concept of the group the subject virtually

loses the concept of the individual in the proper sense, and thereby treats the individual

merely as a member of a group or society. At the postconventional level, the subject

regains the concept of the individual, and combines it with the idea that individuals are

members of society. The result is that persons are viewed as members of society who are

prior to society. This is why postconventional morality differs from conventional morality

by its law-making perspective, in contrast to the law-maintaining perspective at the

conventional level (Kohlberg 1984, pp. 173-180). Below is a table of the relationship

between the social perspective stages (with definitions) and moral stages (Kohlberg 1984,

pp.174-176).11

Stage Social Perspective Stage

Stage 1 Egocentric point of view. Doesn't consider the interests of others or recognize that they differ from the actor's; doesn't relate two points of view. Actions are considered physically rather than in terms of psychological interests of others. Confusion of authority's perspective with one's own.

Stage 2 Concrete individualistic perspective. Aware that everybody has his own interest to pursue and these conflict, so that right is relative (in the concrete individualistic sense).

1 1 The list was first constructed by R. L. Selman in his "The Development of Social-Cognitive Understanding: A Guide to Education and Clinical Practice." In Moral Development and Behavior: Theory, Research, and Social Issues, ed. T. Lickona (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976). Also see Kohlberg, "Moral Stage and Moralization," 33-35.

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Stage 3 Perspective of the individual in relationships with other individuals. Aware of shared feelings, agreements, and expectations which take primacy over individual interests. Relates points of view through the concrete Golden Rule, putting yourself in the other person's shoes. Does not yet consider generalized system perspective.

Stage 4 . Differentiates societal point of view from interpersonal agreement or motives. Takes the point of view of the system that defines roles and rules. Considers individual relations in terms of place in the system.

Stage 5 Prior-to-society perspective. Perspective of a rational individual aware of values and rights prior to social attachments and contracts. Integrates perspectives by formal mechanisms of agreement, contract, objective impartiality, and due process. Considers moral and legal points of view; recognizes that they sometimes conflict and finds it difficult to integrate them.

Stage 6 Perspective of a moral point of view from which social arrangements derive. Perspective is that of any rational individual recognizing the nature of morality or the fact that persons are ends in themselves and must be treated as such.

Although a social perspective stage is not identical to its corresponding moral

stage, Kohlberg says that it helps to understand the moral stage. He does not explain how,

but the following example may be useful. Consider the definition of Stage 4. We know

that the moral standards of the stage include fulfilling actual duties one has accepted,

obeying laws except when the laws are in conflict with some explicit social duties, and

contributing to one's society. But there remains the question why these standards should

be put together, and to answer it some kind of underlying spirit that unifies them is

needed. This underlying spirit is the social perspective. Since the Stage 4 subject views

the self as a member of society which is a huge system, he/she judges an action in terms

of how well it facilitates the operation of the society as a whole. And this gives rise to all

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the Stage 4 moral standards. 1 2 Therefore, the introduction of the corresponding social

perspective is a step towards clarifying and integrating the meaning of the moral stages.

1.3 The introduction of Type A and Type B moral reasoning

In section 1.3 we saw that the use of conscience no longer guarantees

postconventional reasoning in the late model. But does it not seem obvious that the use of

conscience should have some importance in determining one's moral maturity? Do we

not think that it is better for someone to do something because of a requirement of his/her

conscience rather than, say, the desire to please others? 1 3 If this is right, then we can

reasonably expect that a theory of moral development should reflect this sort of belief

about the relation between conscience and moral maturity. It is the same with content

choice. If, as Kohlberg believes, some solutions are objectively better than others (as it is

better for Heinz to steal the drug than to let his wife die), then this should be reflected in

the developmental model as well. The introduction of Substages A and B (later called

Types A and B) into the stage model is, at least in part, an attempt to cater to these

considerations. 1 4

1 2 There is a puzzle concerning how Stage 4 moral standards instantiate the social perspective at the corresponding stage. The correlation of the last two standards with Stage 4 social perspective is clear and needs no explanation. But it seems problematic when we try to explain in what sense the standard of fulfilling actual duties one has agreed to can be regarded as an instantiation of the "full-fledged member-of-society perspective" (in Kohlberg's own word, see Kohlberg 1984, p. 181). To say that one should fulfill duties one agreed to seems to suggest that one does not have to fulfill those which one has not agreed to, and the latter surely reflects a "prior-to-society" individualistic perspective, which is the characteristic of postconventional reasoning. One possible way to explain this is to claim that the fulfillment of duties to which one has agreed should be understood as something similar to promise keeping, while promise keeping is regarded by the Stage 4 subject as something necessary for maintaining a society. The moral obligation to fulfill the agreed upon duty does not come directly from the fact that one has agreed to it, but from the need for promise keeping to maintain social order. 1 3 One might ask: What if our conscience requires us to please others? It seems that even in this case it is better if one is ready to do something against others' expectations when our conscience requires us to do so. 1 4 Kohlberg presents the substages as part of his attempts to clarify the form and content distinction. See Kohlberg etal. 1983,6-7.

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For Kohlberg, the preconventional moral conception is largely heteronomous,

while the postconventional conception is largely autonomous. The conventional level is

midway between the two extremes. Therefore, it seems reasonable to subdivide

conventional moralities into two types, each leaning toward one end of this autoriomy-

heteronomy spectrum. The more autonomous type is, not surprisingly, more adequate

than the more heteronomous type. Kohlberg calls the more heteronomous type Substage

A , and the more autonomous type Substage B.

The substages are sometimes regarded also as midway between stage structure and

content choice (Kohlberg, 1983, p. 44). They are first introduced in Kohlberg's paper

"Moral Stages and Moralization," published in 1976. In the paper Kohlberg classifies

four orientations of moral reasoning: normative order, utility consequences, justice or

fairness (I will just call it the orientation of justice below), and ideal self. Substage A

focuses more on the orientations of normative order and utility consequences. The

orientation of normative order centers on moral rules, whereas the orientation of utility

consequences centers on welfare of others and/or the self. Substage B, on the other hand,

focuses on the orientations of justice and the ideal self. The orientation of justice centers

on the relations of liberty, equality, reciprocity, and contract between persons, whereas

the orientation of the ideal self centers on the consideration of what a good person should

be like, in terms of conscience, motives and virtue. Substage A makes judgments more

descriptively, in terms of something given "out there." Substage B makes judgments more

prescriptively, in terms of what ought to be, and what is internally accepted by the self.

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When compared to Substage A , Substage B is more ready to make the recognized values

universal ones (Kohlberg 1976, pp. 40-41).

In 1983, Kohlberg further clarifies the conceptions of the substages by making up

a list of criteria of Substage B in contrast to Substage A . These are composed of a set of

"Kantian" criteria and a set of "Piagetian" criteria (Kohlberg 1983, pp. 46-47). Here is a

summary of these criteria.

Five Kantian criteria are drawn up for Substage B. The first is the criterion of

choice, which requires the subject to choose the more "just" course of action or solution

to the dilemma (i.e., the choice which is empirically agreed upon by most subjects at

Stage 5). In Heinz's dilemma, the right choice is to steal the drug; in the judge's dilemma,

the right choice is for the judge to set Heinz free, or to put him on probation; and in Joe's

dilemma, the right choice is to refuse to give his father the money. The second Kantian

criterion requires that the subject's reason for action must reflect the second formulation

of the Categorical Imperative: "Treat persons never simply as means, but always at the

same time as ends." Accordingly, the subject places the right to life over the right to

property, conscience over fixed legal laws, and free agreement over authority. This is the

criterion of hierarchy. The third Kantian criterion is that the subject has to uphold the

intrinsic moral worth of persons, and show an intrinsic respect for them. Kohlberg calls

this the criterion of intrinsicalness. The fourth Kantian criterion is the criterion of

prescriptivity, the recognition of a categorical moral "ought" regardless of the inclinations

of the actor, or any other pragmatic considerations. The final Kantian criterion is the

criterion of universality or universalizability, which requires that the choice must be

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made with an acceptance that all moral agents in the same position should behave in the

same way and, in particular, an acceptance that he/she be treated in the same way by

others in comparable circumstances.

There are also four Piagetian criteria for Substage B. The first Piagetian criterion

is the criterion of autonomy. The response of the subject must reflect an understanding

that the actor in question is an autonomous moral agent. The second criterion, the

criterion of moral respect, requires the subject to consider all the other parties in the

dilemma as rational and autonomous moral agents. This seems quite similar to the

Kantian criterion of intrinsicalness. The third Piagetian criterion, the criterion of

reversibility, is closely related to the second one and to that of universalizability. It

requires that the subject must be able to consider the problem not only from the view

point of the protagonist of the story, but also from the view points of all the other parties.

The fourth criterion is the criterion of constructivism. The subject must view moral rules,

laws, and principles as a product of human communication and cooperation, and

something actively constructed by the human mind.

These criteria help clarify the sense in which the substages are intermediate

between form and content. Substage B is characterized by formal properties of moral

reasoning such as intrinsicalness, prescriptivity, universalizability, and reversibility. On

the other hand, it is also characterized by an unconditional respect for persons. Connected

to respect for persons, there are the values of human rights, among which the rights to

autonomy and to life are most basic. This constitutes the substantive side of Type B moral

reasoning.

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In the (1983) monograph, Kohlberg claims that whenever there is any change in

substage (within a single stage), it is always from A to B but not vice versa. For example,

whereas a 3 A can move either to 3B or 4A, a 3B can only move to 4A or directly into 4B,

but never to 3A. Although it is possible for a 3B to move to 4A, it happens more often

that a B subject retains his Type B thinking when he moves into a higher stage. Moreover,

it is observed that B subjects are more likely than A subjects to actually carry out what

they judge to be the "just" choice. In other words, behaviors of B subjects are more

consistent with their moral beliefs than A subjects (Kohlberg et al. 1983, pp. 45 & 61).15

These, Kohlberg believes, indicate that B subjects are morally more mature than A

subjects.

Kohlberg soon abandons the use of 'substage' to refer to these orientations of

moral reasoning because he finds that people do sometimes move from Type B moral

reasoning to Type A moral reasoning (e.g., from 3B to 3A). This violates the definition of

a substage. Instead of "substages," he finds it more appropriate to call them "types."

Nevertheless, it remains evident that (1) there is an age-development trend towards

increase usage of Type B reasoning; (2) when people change from one type to the other, it

is more likely to be a change from A to B than from B to A ; and (3) when a person

terminates stage development, it is more likely that he/she will be stabilized as a Type B

reasoner. Therefore, although Types A and B moral reasoning are no longer viewed as

two substages, they remain a useful tool to classify people's orientations of moral

1 5 Also see Lawrence Kohlberg & D. Candee, "The Relationship of Moral Judgment to Moral Action." In Morality, Moral Behavior, and Moral Development, ed. William M. Kurtines & Jacob L. Gewirtz (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1984), 41-73.

75

reasoning, and Type B moral reasoning is still claimed to be more adequate than Type A

(Colby et al. 1987 vol. 1, pp. 324-325).

Types A and B moral reasoning have shared some of the job of the moral stages.

Because Type B is better than Type A , difference in moral maturity is no longer

necessarily manifested as a difference in moral stages, but can be manifested as a

difference in moral reasoning types. Some of the judgments previously regarded as

postconventional are now assessed as Stage 3B or Stage 4B (Kohlberg et al. 1983, p. 61).

This helps to remove the anomalies in observational data such as stage regressions.

1.4 The moral domain

' Kohlberg's definition of morality in terms of justice has invited many criticisms.

Carol Gilligan, for example, argues that the definition of morality in terms of justice

involves a bias towards the male perspective. She suggests that instead of justice and

fairness, females tend to view moral problems in terms of care and responsibility, which

constitutes an equally important moral orientation. Kohlberg's model fails to include the

orientation of care and responsibility, and the moral domain thus defined is too narrow.

Kohlberg has recognized the power of Gilligan's arguments, and draws back from

the claim that morality is identical to justice (Kohlberg et al. 1983, p. 19).16 Accordingly,

he acknowledges that his moral domain needs enlargement. As a result a number of new

16Gilligan claims that she has discovered the gender difference in moral reasoning through empirical studies. Kohlberg is not convinced that the claim of gender difference is proved by Gilligan's studies. Nevertheless, in the so called ethic of care (which Gilligan thinks is characterized by females' moral reasoning), Kohlberg does find some elements that his early model fails to fully recognize.

76

principles are regarded as Stage 6 in the late model, such as the principle of Agape and

the principle of benevolence. We shall return to their debate in Chapter 3.

Section 2: Empirical support

With the modified research method and amended theoretical claims, Kohlberg's

model has received much wider support from empirical research. To see how this is so,

Walker's (1988) and Snarey's (1985, republished 1994) reviews of relevant studies are

especially useful.17

Walker's paper examines the validity of Kohlberg's stage model by reviewing a

large number of empirical studies, and estimates how well they support the model. He

wants to check the validity of Kohlberg's three major claims, the claim of invariant

sequence, the claim of structural wholeness, and the claim of hierarchical order.

Regarding the claim of invariant sequence, Walker reports the results of six

longitudinal studies and one experimental study in North America, concluding that the

studies are "strongly supportive" of the sequence assumption.18 There are "few instances

of either regression (0-17%) or stage-skipping (0-4%) in the modal stage scores."19 One

17Lawrence J. Walker, "The Development of Moral Reasoning," Annals of Child Development 5 (1988), 33-78; John R. Snarey, "Cross-cultural Universality of Social-Moral Development: A Critical Review of Kohlbergian Research," Psychological Bulletin 97, no. 2 (1985), 202-232, reprinted in New Research in Moral Development, ed. Bill Puka (New York & London: Garland Publishing, 1994) 268-298. 1 8 The studies include A. Colby et al, "A Longitudinal Study of Moral Judgment," Monograph of the Society in Child Development 48 (1-2, Serial no. 200); V. L. Erickson, "The Case Study Method in the Evaluation of Developmental Programs." In Evaluating Moral Development, ed. L. Kuhmerker et al. (Schenectady, NY: Character Research Press, 1980), 151-176; L. Walker, "The Sequentiality of Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Development," Child Development 51 (1980): 131-139; and J. M. Murphy & C. Gilligan, "Moral Development in late Adolescence and Adulthood: A Critique and Reconstruction of Kohlberg's Theory," Human Development 23 (1980): 77-104. 1 9 Walker, "The Development of Moral Reasoning," 43. For a more detailed review of the studies, refer to Lawrence Walker, "Cognitive Processes in Moral Development." In Handbook of Moral Development:

77

problem with Walker's report is that all the studies have been conducted in North

America, which, of course, is not sufficient to prove that Kohlberg's stages form a

universal invariant sequence. Yet when Snarey reviews seven cross-cultural studies, he

finds a similar result. After reviewing these longitudinal studies from the Bahamas,

Canada, Indonesia, Israel, United States, Turkey, and India, Snarey concludes that in all

these studies stage regressions are within the range of measurement error.20

The claim of structured wholeness has also received wide empirical support.

According to a paper co-authored by Colby and Kohlberg, in Kohlberg's longitudinal

study, 68-82 % of reasoning of the subjects was scored at the modal stage in late model

scoring, and 97-99% of reasoning was at two most frequent (and always adjacent)

stages.21 Walker, after reviewing the data of four studies conducted by him and his

colleagues, also finds that 66% of the reasoning of the subjects was scored at their modal

stages, while 94% of it falls in one of the two most frequent (and always adjacent)

stages.22 It therefore seems that the claim of structured-wholeness is also well supported

by empirical data.

Models, Processes, Techniques, and Research, ed. G. L. Sapp (Birmingham, AL: Religious Education Press), 109-145. 2 0 John R. Snarey, "Cross-cultural Universality of Socio-Moral Development: A critical Review of Kohlbergian Research." In New Research in Moral Development, ed. B. Puka (New York & London: Garland Publishing Inc., 1994), 215-216. 2 1 Colby et al., "A Longitudinal Study of Moral Judgment." In New Research in Moral Development, ed. Bill Puka, 1-76. 2 2 The studies he reviews include L. Walker, "Sources of Cognitive Conflict for Stage Transition in Moral Development," Developmental Psychology 19 (1983): 103-110; L. Walker, "Sex Differences in Moral Reasoning: A Critical Review," Child Development 55 (1986): 677-691; L. Walker et al., "The Hierarchical Nature of Stages of Moral Development," Developmental Psychology 20 (1984): 960-966; and Walker et al., "Moral Stages and Moral Orientations in Real-life and Hypothetical Dilemmas," Child Development 58 (1987): 842-858. See Lawrence J. Walker, "The Development of Moral Reasoning," 39.

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The third assumption, the claim of hierarchy, is a little more complicated.

According to Walker, the claim has two main empirical implications. First, it implies that

subjects have difficulty comprehending stages higher than their modal stages. They can

usually comprehend no higher than their +1 stages, i.e., the stages that are one stage

higher than their predominant stages; Second, it implies that people prefer, among the

stages they can comprehend, the higher to the lower stages. And this is true even for those

whose highest comprehended stages are higher than their predominant stages. After

reviewing a large number of studies, Walker concludes that all of them confirm these

implications.23

However, the validity of the method researchers used to test the assumption of

hierarchy is questioned by Moran & Joniak. They suggest that higher stages were usually

formulated in more sophisticated language. It was therefore the language, instead of the

form of reasoning itself, which caused the apparent preference for the higher stages.24 As

a response to Moran & Joniak's suggestion, Walker et al. conducted a test of Kohlberg's

2 3 The studies Walker uses to support the claim can be divided into two groups. The first group are tests of the claim that subjects tend to prefer the highest stage they comprehend. They include: J. L. Carrol & J. R. Rest, "Conflict, learning, and Piaget: Comments on the Development of Moral Judgment," Dissertation Abstract International 34 (1981): 2331B (University of Microfilms No. 73-28193); M. L. Divison et al., "Stage Structure in Objective Moral Judgment," Developmental Psychology 14 (1978): 137-146; C. B. Keasey, "The Influence of Opinion Agreement and Quality of Supportive Reasoning in the Evaluation of Moral Judgments," Journal of personality and Social Psychology 30 (1974): 477-480; J. R. Rest, "The Hierarchical Nature of Moral Judgment: A Study of Patterns of Comprehension and Preference of Moral Stages", Journal of Personality 41 (1973): 86-109; and J. R. Rest et al., "Level of Moral Development as a Determinant of Preference and Comprehension of Moral Judgments made by Others," Journal of Personality 37 (1969): 225-252. The second group are tests of the claim that subjects have difficulty comprehending stages higher than their modal stage. They include: Kuhn et al., "The Development of Formal Operations in Logical and Moral Judgment," Genetic Psychology Monographs 95 (1977): 97-188; R. N. Tsujimoto, "Guttman Scaling of Moral Comprehension Stages," Psychological Reports 51 (1982): 550; and the two papers by J. R. Rest just mentioned above. See Walker, "The Development of Moral Reasoning," 45. 2 4 J. J. Moran & A. J. Joniak," Effect of Language on Preference for Responses to a Moral Dilemma," Developmental Psychology 15 (1979): 337-338.

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hierarchical claim with the language controlled by (a) writing all statements representing

different moral stages as single sentences each containing the same number of words and

(b) equalizing the difficulty of the vocabulary used. The result shows that the evidence for

the hierarchical claim is still clear. Understanding of the statements at and below the

modal stage is nearly perfect (97% and 96% respectively). (The percentage drops to 67%

at the +1 stage, to 21% at the +2 stage, and 0% at the +3 stage). With regard to preference

when comparing two statements of different stages, subjects in most cases (73%) prefer

the one at the higher stage, given that they understand both.25

As I have suggested in Chapter 1, since the hierarchical claim holds that higher

stages are more adequate, showing that higher stages predict better moral behavior will

provide important confirmation of the model. With the early model and its scoring

method, a certain rough correlation was found between moral judgment stage and moral

behavior, but considerable unexpected phenomena were also observed. Under the late

model, the correlation between judgmental stage and behavior becomes much more

consistent.

In 1978, McNamee conducted an experiment to test how moral judgmental stages

were related to helpfulness. The situation of the test is described as follows:

Undergraduates who agreed to be interviewed on the standard moral dilemmas were led to a testing room. As they were entering the room they were intercepted by a student presenting himself as the next subject for the experiment. The student stated that he had just taken drugs and was having a bad time. He had come to the experiment because he thought that the experimenter, being a psychologist, could help him. The response of the experimenter was that she was a research psychologist, not a therapist. The drug-user persisted in soliciting aid, hoping that

2 5 Lawrence Walker, "The Development of Moral Reasoning," 44-47. Also see Walker et al, "The Hierarchical Nature of Stages of Moral Development."

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the experimenter could refer him to help. The experimenter replied that she had no experience with drugs and did not know what facility could help him. She told him to call to reschedule his testing session. The drug-user slowly left the room. The subject was faced with the choice of whether to remain an uninvolved bystander or whether to intervene.

The result was that helpful behavior increased with moral stages. Only 9% of the Stage 2

subjects helped the victim by offering information about other sources of assistance. The

percentage of Stage 3 subjects who intervened increases to 27%; Stage 4 subjects to 38%;

and Stage 5 subjects to 73%. Nobody at and below Stage 4 offered any personal help

(such as to take him'home or to a source of help), while 20% of the Stage 5 subjects did

so.26

As we saw in Chapter 1, according to Haan, Smith and Block, Stage 2 subjects

involved in their (1968) study generally performed even better than Stage 5 subjects.

Using the original interview records, the subjects in this study were later rescored using

the revised scoring manual. With rescoring there were no more Stage 2 subjects, nor any

Stage 5 or Stage 6 subjects (Stage 6 is not even present in the new scoring manual). The

result was that 11% of Stage 3 subjects, 31 % of Stage 3/4 subjects, 42% of Stage 4

subjects, and 71 % of Stage 4/5 subjects sat in . 2 7

Interviews of the subjects participating in the Milgram study have also been

rescored using the new scoring manual. The rescoring showed that all subjects were

conventional reasoners. 5 out of the 6 Stage 4 subjects (87%) quit the test, whereas only 1

of the 17 Stage 3/4 subjects(6%), and 2 out of the 4 Stage 3 subjects (50%) quit. The fact

2 6 See S. McNamee, "Moral Behavior, Moral Development and Motivation," Journal of Moral Education 7 (1978): 179-188; also see L. Kohlberg & D. Candee, "The Relationship of Moral Judgment to Moral

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that the percentage of Stage 3. subjects who quit (50%) is higher than that of Stage 3/4

subjects (6%) makes the result a little ambiguous. But the ambiguity can be explained by

the small number of subjects at Stage 3. Overall, there is still a mild but clear correlation

between moral judgmental stage and moral behavior.28

Section 3: Postconventional moral conception

3.1 The postconventional level

What kind of normative ethics does this new model support? To answer the

question, we have to understand the postconventional morality present in the model.

Roughly speaking, postconventional moral reasoning is marked by an awareness that

personal interests and conventions are often arbitrary, and are by themselves insufficient

for justifying moral values or norms. Thus, postconventional level reasoners look for

fundamental universal values, and try to make moral judgments based on them. At Stage

5, these universal values are defined in terms of utility, social contracts and human rights,

whereas Stage 6 further abstracts fundamental values into formal properties such as

fairness, impartiality, and reversibility (Kohlberg 1987, pp. 29-30). These are fairly

similar to the early Kohlbergian model.

By comparing the three levels of moral development without referring to the

details of the stages, something significant about ethical theory can be seen. The

Action." In Morality, Moral Behavior, and Moral Development, ed. William M Kurtines & Jacob L. Gewirtz (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1984), 41-73, esp. 58-59. 2 7 Kohlberg & Candee, "The Relationship of Moral Judgment to Moral Action," 66-67. 2 8 Ibid., 69. For more reviews of the validity of Kohlberg's theory, see L. Kohlberg and D. Candee, "Invariant Sequence and Internal Consistency in Moral Judgment Stages." In Morality, Moral Behavior, and Moral Development, 41-51; and John R. Snarey, "Cross-cultural Universality of Socio-Moral Development: A critical Review of Kohlbergian Research." in New Research in Moral Development, ed. B. Puka (New York & London: Garland Publishing Inc., 1994), 268-298.

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preconventional level represents a largely egoistic morality. The self is the only real

concern of the subject. The conventional level is a morality of the social group. The

primary concern of the subject is the group to which he/she belongs. At the

postconventional level, moral concern is directed to the human species as a whole. The

goal of moral practice is viewed as the resolution of any possible moral conflicts between

persons, regardless of the social groups of the involved parties.

We can see, then, that the Kohlbergian model of moral development depicts a

moral agent's effort to extend his/her moral concern from the self to a particular social

group and then to the human species as a whole. Higher degrees of moral maturity require

a subject to bring a wider scope of people into his realm of moral concern. To treat others

with moral concern, one has to endeavor to act toward them in a way that is acceptable

from their points of view. This already constitutes equity or equality as a universal value,

though this value is highly abstract and formal.

The second point is that, the lower the moral developmental level of the subject,

the more the subject sticks to the values of a particular person or group. At the lowest

level, the subject simply obeys authority. At level two the subject obeys social norms of

his group, and by doing this he embraces the relativity of goodness among different

people in his own group. However, at this level, the subject still does not possess the

ability to comprehend the relativity of values among different cultures, and tends to take

the values of his own culture as absolute. At the postconventional level, the subject

embraces the contingency of social norms, and therefore bases his moral considerations

on values that can been seen as universal, such as human rights at Stage 5, and the Golden

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Rule or the principle of Agape at Stage 6. The upshot is that the more mature the subject

is, the more abstract is the moral standard the subject would likely hold.

Here we can see a seemingly paradoxical phenomenon in moral development. To

be morally mature, one has to strive for a universalistic moral view. But to develop such a

view, one has to give up concrete and absolute moral rules, and embrace more relativity

in one's moral concepts. When a Stage 6 reasoner admits that his/her cultural code is not

absolute, a natural consequence w i l l be that there can be different cultural codes that are

equally valid than his/her own, and this gives rise to certain weak form of cultural

relativism. 2 9 To view the universalism-relativism debate in light of this would inevitably

lead us to the conclusion that universalism and relativism are not totally incompatible,

though they may be opposites of each other in some sense. It seems that, i f Kohlberg's

theory is correct, the two doctrines can be reconciled in some way. Based on what we

have seen from Kohlberg's study, one may even say that a universalistic moral theory can

neither be complete nor credible without introducing some relativistic elements into the

theory. Such a universalism w i l l embrace, for instance, certain relativity in the realm of

personal good, and can perhaps admit that since no cultural code is absolute therefore

different cultural codes can sometimes be equally adequate.

3.2. Comparing Stage 5 and Stage 6

As we have mentioned, Kohlberg's early model claims that there are two

universal aspects of moral phenomena, namely a universal developmental pattern of

moral development, and a universal set of moral principles appearing at the highest stage

2 9 We shall discuss a few theories of this kind in Chapter 5.

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of moral development. In other words, universalism is true for Kohlberg in that there

exists an ideal "form" of moral reasoning which serves as the universal destination Of

moral development.

Since Stage 6, qua the universal destiny of moral development, represents a moral

ideal, examination of the stage will help understanding the implicit ethical theory in

Kohlberg's model. A straight-forward way of understanding the Stage 6 moral conception

is to look at the principles used at Stage 6. Possible Stage 6 principles include the

principles of justice, respect for human personality or dignity, utility or benevolence,

universal human care or Agape, maximum liberty compatible with the like liberty of

others, maximization of equality of life for each, and the principle of equity and fairness

(Colby etal. 1987 vol. 1, p. 31).

These principles are, however, all so abstract that they are not very useful in

guiding actions. Kohlberg repeatedly emphasizes the importance of the principle of

justice in Stage 6 moral reasoning (in the earlier model he even equates justice with the

Stage 6 moral conception). But what is justice? What does justice require us to do?

Kohlberg says that justice requires respect for human rights, but he also says that at Stage

6 human rights are no longer absolute. So it needs further elaboration to grasp the exact

meaning of the principle. Likewise, the principle of respect also needs clarification. What

must we do regarding others in the name of respect for them? There are easy cases. If I

say to a person he/she is worthy of nothing because he/she is stupid, I am surely not

expressing proper respect. But there are also many difficult cases. Consider capital

punishment. Kant claims that capital punishment is morally justifiable, because in doing

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so we recognize the offender as a moral agent who is responsible for what he has done.

What is implicit is that capital punishment is precisely what our respect for the offender

requires. Obviously Kohlberg does not agree with Kant on this point (for Kohlberg's view

see Chapter 1, section 3.3).

The formal properties of Stage 6 moral reasoning are fairness, impartiality, and

reversibility. Kohlberg suggests four ways of realizing the spirit of Stage 6 through a

process of role-taking. The first method is Rawls's original position thought experiment,

where people behind "veils of ignorance" seek agreement on a set of basic principles

guiding their behavior. The second is Kohlberg's own method, namely a second-order

application of the Golden Rule, or moral musical chairs (Kohlberg 1981, pp. 203 ff,

Kohlberg et al. 1983, pp. 101-3).30 In this second-order application of the Golden Rule,

the moral agent has to take the roles of other parties, imagining that they do the same. If

the subject can reasonably claim that all parties will then agree upon a certain solution,

then the solution is a just one. The third method is Habermas's ideal communication, "a

dialogue among free and equal persons considering and modifying their claims in light of

one another." The fourth method is a utilitarian approach (rational-preference

utilitarianism of Harsanyi), which requires one to consider people's preferences and

balance these view points. In order to do this, one has to imagine that he has an equal

probability of being any of those involved in the situation where the moral problem

arises, and thus decide what he will prefer (Colby and Kohlberg 1987 vol. 1, pp. 30-31).

3 0 Also see Lawrence Kohlberg, "A Current Statement on Some Theoretical Issues." In Lawrence Kohlberg: Consensus and Controversy, ed, Sohan Modgil and Celia Modgil (Philadelphia & London, The Falmer Press, 1986), 526.

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Viewing the Stage 6 moral conception in light of these decision-making strategies,

one may argue that Kohlberg's moral ideal is more a method or a set of methods for

decision-making than a set of principles that determines all morally correct actions.

Kohlberg obviously does not use the word 'principle' in the same way as philosophers

usually do. Philosophers seldom call something a 'principle' i f it cannot be put into a

well-defined formula. But for Kohlberg the name 'principle' can be attached to virtually

any value or procedure for the determination of values. It seems, then, the correct moral

actions that follow from Stage 6 moral reasoning are not clearly determined by the

principles themselves, such as those of Agape or justice. Rather it is the procedures of

role-taking and the like which, in particular cases, come closer to being determinative.

Stage 5 morality is sometimes understood as a utilitarian conception of morality,

whose main concern is total utility (see the stage descriptions). This is misleading, for the

concepts of human rights and social contract are equally essential for Stage 5 morality.

Kohlberg writes that, at Stage 5, moral rightness is determined by contract or agreement

made among members of a group. The legitimacy of agreements is not questioned. By

contrast, a Stage 6 reasoner proceeds to question the legitimacy of such an agreement by

asking whether it is a fair one (Colby et al. 1987 vol. 1, pp. 31-32). But even this

demarcation of Stages 5 and 6 does not work. The contractarian moral values do not

exhaust Stage 5 moral reasoning. There are also the values of human rights and social

utility. Perhaps a reasonable reading of Kohlberg's words is that there is no principle

underlying the three equally legitimate values (contract, utility, and human rights) at

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Stage 5. Bu t this renders Stage 5 subjects unable to decide in any systematic rational

manner what is right when these values are in conf l ic t .

Th is helps exp la in the different roles human rights play at Stage 5 and Stage 6. A t

Stage 5, says Koh lbe rg , the subject resorts to universal human rights in so lv ing mora l

problems. However , human rights are not as fundamental as the pr inc ip les upheld at

Stage 6. To be considered a fundamental pr inc ip le , a pr inc ip le has to be (1) general ly

relevant to a l l mora l situations, and (2) universal izable to a l l mora l agents. H u m a n rights

are universal izable to a l l mora l agents but are not general ly relevant to a l l situations. The

right to l i fe , for example, is irrelevant to the mora l issue in the Joe's d i l emma. But at

Stage 6, the subject resorts to general universal pr inc ip les such as the Go lden Ru l e and

the Pr inc ip le o f Agape . These pr inc ip les are both general and universal izable i n the sense

expla ined above (Co lby et a l . 1987 vo l . 1, p. 33). In this sense, though Stage 5 mora l i ty is

already "grounded on the operations o f equality, equity, and the l i k e , " on ly at Stage 6 do

these operations become self-conscious pr inc ip les (Co lby et a l . 1987 v o l . 1, p. 31).

It is therefore fair to say that Stage 5 and Stage 6 are essential ly s imi lar to each

other i n spirit. The standards used at Stage 5 are st i l l important at Stage 6, but they cease

to be ult imate. What is ult imate is the formal operations o f mora l dec is ion mak ing . The

concern for total ut i l i ty , human rights, and socia l contracts, and their proper ba lanc ing, is

the product o f these operation. Stage 6 mora l i ty transcends Stage 5 mora l i ty in that

ult imate mora l pr inc ip les , l ike that o f respect for persons, are more power fu l l y

implemented and integrated by abstract procedural operations. Pr inc ip les are embodied by

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cognitive operations of ideal dialogues and reciprocal role-taking leading to

universalizability (Kohlberg et al. 1990, p. 153).

Having seen how Stage 6 seeks to overcome the difficulty of Stage 5 moral

reasoning, we can understand why Kohlberg has to postulate a Stage 6 above Stage 5.

There are potential conflicts among fundamental values at Stage 5 with no hope of

systematic resolution. Kohlberg believes an end stage is needed to resolve these

conflicts.31 Although Kohlberg and his colleagues fail to verify the existence of Stage 6 as

the universal destiny of moral development with the new model and scoring method, they

keep it in the model as a postulate. They also retain universalism as part of the theory,

where universalism is defined as the view that "there is a universalistically valid form of

rational moral thought process which all persons could articulate, assuming social and

cultural conditions suitable to cognitive-moral stage development" (Kohlberg, 1983, p.

75).

3.3 The return of Stage 6

Formulating the characteristics of Stage 6 moral reasoning has been an ongoing

process since Kohlberg first started the project of establishing the cognitive-

developmental theory of moralization. He has not given up this goal despite his admission

that Stage 6 is not verified. In 1990, a paper titled "The Return of Stage 6" was published,

in which he and his colleagues attempt to reestablish the status of Stage 6 as an actually

3 1 As we have seen in Chapter 1, section 2.2, studies showed that Stage 6 reasoners typically agree on the right solution to a moral dilemma. Though Stage 6 does not appear in the (1987) scoring manual, he obviously retains his assumption that Stage 6 reasoners do agree on the solution to a moral dilemma when he says that Stage 6 resolves conflicts that Stage 5 cannot resolve. This assumption might have been given up in Kohlberg's (1990) paper, in which two subjects giving different solutions to the same moral dilemma are both ranked as Stage 6. See section 3.3 in this chapter.

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existing stage. At the same time they present their latest thoughts about the characteristics

of Stage 6 morality. Although there is nothing substantially different from the (1983) and

(1984) books, this account provides us with a more refined formulation of the formal

characteristics of Stage 6 moral reasoning. Owing to his death in 1987, this paper also

gives us Kohlberg's last words on the issue of Stage 6's existence and nature.

In "The Return of Stage 6," Kohlberg et al. report the interviews of two Stage 6

subjects, whom they call Joan and Judge D. They emphasize that the core idea of Stage 6

moral reasoning is respect for persons. In addition, they assert that there are two

components of respect for persons, both of which are equally essential. One is justice,

which is usually articulated in terms of rights, reciprocity, and equality. The other is

benevolence or "active sympathy" for others (Kohlberg et al. 1990, p. 153). The former is

best understood as the provision of protections against various action of others, while the

latter is best understood as a sense of positive responsibility for the needs and welfare of

others (Kohlberg et al., 1990, p. 156). Of course, it is impossible that potential conflicts

between justice and benevolence can be overcome simply by unifying them under the title

"respect for persons." If justice and benevolence can conflict with each other as two

principles, they can also conflict with each other as competing aspects of respect.

Therefore, whether Stage 6 can really resolve all moral conflicts remains an open

question.

Kohlberg et al. believe that there is a sense in which benevolence is logically and

psychologically prior to justice. To explain this they write:

The way of regarding the other that we are calling benevolence views the other and human interaction through the lens of intending to promote good and prevent

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harm to the other. It is an attitude that presupposes and expresses one's identification and empathic connection with others, or as Joan says, "is part of the responsibility of being a member of the human race." Thus, as a mode of interaction between self and others that manifests a Stage 6 conception of respect for persons, benevolence is logically and psychologically prior to what we are calling justice (Kohlberg et al. 1990, p. 157).

The explanation is unclear. They reach the conclusion that benevolence is somehow prior

to justice after stating the qualities required by benevolence, without considering the

qualities required by justice or comparing two sets of qualities. They also claim that

benevolence and justice constrain each other. Benevolence "constrains the momentary

concern for justice to remain consistent with the promotion of good for all ," (Kohlberg et

al. 1990, p. 157). Justice constrains benevolence by requiring us to conceive others as

individual autonomous agents when we promote the good for others (Kohlberg et al.

1990, pp. 157-8). This mutual constraints sounds plausible, but it still unclear how the

two should be balanced when they come into conflict. Ideal role-taking seems especially

important for understanding how Stage 6 resolves conflicts among Stage 5 values. It is

the process of ideal role-taking in particular context that determines it, i f anything does.

Again, it is an important question whether the ideal role-taking can really resolve all

moral conflicts. This question is closely connected with the problem of indeterminacy in

moral philosophy, and we will return to this topic in Chapter 5.

The roles of principles and dialogue

Kohlberg et al. define a moral principle as a "general prescriptive proposition that

guides individuals in making moral judgments about situations in which there are

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conflicts between otherwise acceptable rules or norms" (Kohlberg et al. 1990, p. 158).32

They believe that the two Stage 6 subjects in the paper share the same supreme moral

principle, namely the "principle of equal consideration of dignity or worth of all persons"

(Kohlberg et al. 1990, p. 158). This formulation includes vague conceptions such as

"equality" and "dignity," but the authors do not clarify them. Kohlberg et al. believe that

it was the application of the same principle that made Joan say that the doctor should help

the patient kill herself, and Judge D say that the people on the life boat should go for a

lottery. Presumably what is included in Joan's response to the doctor's dilemma is the

respect of the autonomy of the patient. What is included in Judge D's response is less

clear, but we may suppose it is that all equivalent interests should be given the same

weight. However, the principle of respect for persons remains very vague.

Besides the above principle, Kohlberg et al. also recognize the importance of

dialogue. However, they believe that Judge D has exercised more typical Stage 6

reasoning than Joan because he was more aware that dialogue can break down, and

therefore was willing to accept the lottery solution as the last resort in the lifeboat

dilemma (Kohlberg et al. 1990, pp. 162-163). We have mentioned that Kohlberg believes

Habermas is correct in emphasizing the importance of dialogue in the process of making

a moral decision. But he believes that dialogue cannot replace the application of principle,

for dialogue can break down while a valid principle cannot: principle is ultimate at least

in this sense. But since, as we have seen, what actually determines the correct solutions in

3 2 This is similar to the early model, in which he says that a moral principle is "a rule or method of choosing between legitimate alternatives." See Kohlberg 1981, 220.

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particular situations is ideal role-taking instead of the principles themselves, then we may

say that ideal role-taking is ultimate.

Formal characteristics of Stage 6 morality

Kohlberg et al. mention three main formal characteristics of Stage 6 morality:

sympathy, ideal role-taking, and universality. Sympathy here is not just a feeling or an

emotion. It requires at least two interrelated dimensions of social understanding. One

dimension is the understanding of persons as "self-determining agents who pursue objects

of interest to themselves." The other dimension is the understanding of general facts of

the human condition within which persons exist and interact (Kohlberg et al. 1990, p.

165). Thus understood, sympathy "precludes assuming the validity of one's own

conception of the actual interests of other persons a priori" (Kohlberg et al. 1990, pp.

165-6).

The second characteristic of Stage 6 moral reasoning is the employment of ideal

role-taking. The process of ideal role-taking is divided into three steps, which are

essentially what the "second order application of the Golden Rule" requires: First, the

subject takes the perspectives of others in the problematic situation in order to understand

their interests, as expressed in their claims. Second, the intent to balance interests through

ideal reciprocal role-taking involves the assumption that others are attempting to do the

same thing. Third, the subject temporarily separates the actual identities of persons from

their claims and interests in order to assess the relative merits of those claims and

interests from the point of view of any person implicated in the dilemma. Kohlberg et al.

believe that this process of role-taking can serve as a verification test for substantive

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impartiality, and by doing this one can effectively balance the interests of different parties

in a moral situation (Kohlberg et al. 1990, pp. 166-167).

The third characteristic of Stage 6 moral reasoning is universalizability, which is

most familiar to philosophers. Universalizability means two things. First, i f one judges a

certain kind of action to be right in a certain circumstance, one is committing oneself to

judge all similar actions to be right in all similar situations. A Stage 6 subject realizes

this, and therefore judges an action as a right one only when he is willing to commit

himself to the same action in all similar cases. Second, when one makes a moral

judgment, one attempts to find a solution that is acceptable to all. This explains why, in

the process of ideal reciprocal role-taking, one has to separate oneself from one's actual

identification. Therefore universalizability can be guaranteed by the process of ideal

reciprocal role-taking.

Dwight Boyd, one of the co-authors of "The Return of Stage 6," explicates the

basic spirit of Stage 6 moral conception as follows. He maintains that justice for a Stage 6

reasoner is not a mechanistic application of abstract formulas. Rather, it involves (1)

substantive ways of understanding persons and their interactions, and (2) a framework or

process for resolving conflicts in a way acceptable to all parties. It recognizes that every

person has the right to form his/her own ends, and strives to grant people as much

freedom as possible to further their ends. The "motivational heart" of this structure is the

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acknowledgment of "others as an equally unique subject of his or her own experience,

including the experience of myself and my ends."33

This "motivational heart," i.e., the recognition of individual persons as unique

subjects of their experience, is an important idea. It seems that, i f Kohlberg's emphasis on

moral knowledge has any truth in it at all, it must have to do with this idea. That every

individual is a unique subject of experience is indisputable. In Kohlberg's model, moral

development presupposes development of social perspective. It implies that an adequate

moral knowledge presupposes an adequate perspective of what a person is and how

persons are related to each other. At Stage 6, there is a deep understanding of the

subjective uniqueness of personal experience, and therefore the Stage 6 reasoner is most

able to produce reversible moral decisions that are acceptable to all parties. This is done

chiefly by ideal role-taking.

Section 4: Philosophical implications updated

In Chapter 1 we saw that the moral philosophy in Kohlberg's early model is a

universalism that upholds justice as the sole moral value. It is also a rationalism, viewing

that moral virtue is largely the ability to reason properly. In this way Kohlberg's theory is

in line with traditional ethical theory, which aims at discovering a set of highly abstract

and general principles that determines correct moral actions in particular situations. In

3 3 Dwight Boyd, "The Rawls Connection." In Moral Development, Moral Education and Kohlberg, ed. Brenda Munsey (Birmingham Alabama: Religious Education Press, 1980), 192. As we shall see later (Chapter 4, section 2.2), Kohlberg's theory is criticized as having a Western elitist bias. Boyd's explication helps us see why he invites such a criticism, for it involves the idea of maximizing individual freedom. This surely reflects the liberalist ideal. I do not mean to say that involving a liberalist ideal is itself an error. Whether it is an error depends on whether the liberalist ideal is a justified one, and we shall discuss this in Chapter 4.

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light of the above explications of its recent development, we now need to summarize the

major differences between the early and late models.

4.1 The differences between the late model and the early model

As we have mentioned, the redefinition of the moral stages involves sharpening

the distinction between form and content of moral judgments. In the original definition,

the chosen content is one of the elements determining the stage of a subject (Kohlberg,

1983, p. 42). In the late model, the stage of a person is determined by the "formal

properties" of the person's reasoning. These formal properties include the social

perspectives of a subject, the motive for doing the right thing, and the uses of justice

operations, namely equality, equity, and reciprocity (Kohlberg, 1983, p. 42). These

"formal" properties are still not moral forms in a strict philosophical sense, but at least we

can say that moral stages in the late model are defined in more abstract terms than the

early model.

Having separated the definitions of the stage from the content choices, Kohlberg

introduces two moral types, namely Type A and Type B, that are more closely linked to

moral content. Type B differs from Type A in that it is more autonomous than the latter.

The criteria of Type B include a set of "Kantian" and a set of "Piagetian" criteria, both of

which have been reviewed earlier in this chapter.

Kohlberg observes that when a change occurs in moral types, it is most likely a

change from A to B. He finds that in Type B the justice reasoning occurs in an explicit

way, while in Type A it occurs in an implicit way (Kohlberg et al. 1983, p. 45). In other

words, Type B is better than Type A because, in part at least, Type B subjects are more

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aware of the principles they employ than Type A reasoners. Although the stages

themselves do not entail certain courses of action, there is a tendency for particular stages

to be connected to certain action types. The same is also true for the moral types.34

In the late model, Kohlberg retreats from the claim that morality is equivalent to

justice. Instead of saying that morality covers only the realm of justice, he now recognizes

that realms such as care and special obligations should also be covered (Kohlberg et al.

1983, pp. 19-21). He retreats from the claim that deontological justice is better than

utilitarian morality.35 Rather, utilitarian morality, with careful refinement, can be

incorporated into the Stage 6 morality as a possible formulation of ideal role-taking

(Colby et al. 1987 vol. 1, p. 31). The principle of utility was considered a part of Stage 5

in the early model, but is now regarded as belonging to Stage 6 when properly interpreted

(Kohlberg et al. 1983, p. 63). On the other hand, he also admits that there are aspects of

morality which his stage model does not cover. For instance, in The Measurement of

Moral Judgment, he and Colby divide moral judgment into three types: deontic judgment,

aretaic judgment, and judgment about ideals of the good life. They claim that the major

concern of the Kohlbergian stages is deontic judgments (Colby et al. 1987 vol. 1, pp. 23-

24).

3 4 This is problematic because, as we have seen, a subject's moral reasoning type is partially determined by his/her content choices for the dilemmas. So certainly there will be a connection between the type and the action chosen. Therefore this "tendency" for a type to be connected to a certain action is not very informative. 3 5 See Kohlberg, "A Current Statement on Some Theoretical Issues." In Lawrence Kohlberg: Consensus and Controversy, ed. S. Modgil and C. Modgil (Philadelphia & London: The Falmer Press, 1986), 521.

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4.2 Claims that remains unchanged in the late model

Though having abandoned several earlier claims, two central claims of Kohlberg's

theory remain unchanged: that the stages represent a universal sequence of development,

and that the sequence marks a growth of moral maturity. If Kohlberg is correct at these

two points, then one can conclude that comparison of (at least some) moral standards in

terms of adequacy is possible, and we can accordingly dismiss some kinds of ethical

relativism.

The other unchanged idea is that Kohlberg's ethics is universal (non-relative) but

largely non-absolutist (Colby et al. 1987, vol . 1, p. 35). Moral rules are not absolute, with

a few exceptions such as that there should be no capital punishment. This means that

most substantive values are relative to context. What distinguishes a higher moral stage

from a lower stage is that the higher stage entails the recognition of the relativity of the

lower-stage values. A t the preconventional level authority is an absolute moral standard,

but at the conventional level it is not. At the conventional level societal values are

absolute, but at the postconventional level they are not. On the other hand, it is also

obvious that, in the process of moral development, people strive to maintain a unified

vision of morality by subsuming all the recognized relativity of moral standards or

concerns under a more general and abstract moral principle or standard. A t the

postconventional level, the subject becomes well aware of the fact that these highly

abstract principles or standards can hardly define every single right action for him. A t

Stage 5, only a few basic values such as human rights are retained, but it is not clear

whether a Stage 5 reasoner necessarily views human rights as absolute. At Stage 6, it is

certain that even human rights cease to be absolute. What remains at Stage 6 is but a set

of formal operations for moral decisions that are formulated under the postulate that all

human beings have equal moral status, and are deserving of equal respect and dignity.

In the previous chapter I pointed out that, though Kohlberg emphasizes that the

moral adequacy is determined by "moral form," his theory does not amount to ethical

formalism, for his "moral form" is different from the moral form as understood by

philosophers. However, I also pointed out that his theory resembles ethical formalism,

and indeed the entire traditional moral philosophy, in one way: it holds that there exist a

set of highest moral principles that are most adequate and is able to determine correct

moral actions in particular situations. This determinateness of Stage 6 moral principles

are less explicit in the late model. Nevertheless, Kohlberg is still certain about what are

the correct solutions to his hypothetical dilemmas. Heinz should steal the drug; people on

the life boat should go for a lottery; and Joe should not give the money to his father. A l l

these are still crystal clear, not a bit blurred by the redefinition of the Stage 6. This

suggests that Stage 6 in the late model morality is as determinative as it has been in the

new model.

The relation between "form" (moral reason) and content (choice) is weakened in

the late model. In "Stage and Sequence" both the stage definitions and the scoring system

presupposed some direct connection between the form of moral reasoning and the content

of the choice. The moral stage of a person can be assessed by the content of his choice

(Kohlberg 1983, p. 42). But now the form of moral reasoning is more sharply

distinguished from the content. The formal properties of moral reasoning are, as we can

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see from the table of definitions of the moral stages, confined to the social perspective,

moral motive, the justice operations (equality, equity, and reciprocity), and the procedures

like role-taking which support them (Kohlberg 1983, p. 42).

Nevertheless, there is still some correlation between content choice and moral

maturity. They are still related in the sense that (1) the higher the moral stage, the more

likely that subjects will agree on a particular content choice in a moral dilemma; and (2)

moral maturity is not only reflected in one's moral stage but also by its correlated type of

reasoning which is defined partly in terms of the content of the choice.

Kohlberg also retains what he calls the "cognitivist" claim in his late model,

though perhaps in a weaker sense. Similar to the early model, higher stages are more

mature partly in the sense that they are cognitively better. The hierarchy claim is

supported in part by Walker's experiment, which finds that lower-stage subjects have

difficulty in comprehending the higher stages. The Socratic claim that one who knows the

good chooses the good, however, has quite surely been abandoned (compare Chapter 1,

section 3, or Kohlberg 1981, p. 189).36

The final claim which Kohlberg appears to retain in the late model is his

principlism, i.e., the claim that the most adequate form of moral reasoning is a principled

one. Stage 6 moral principles include the principle of justice or respect for human dignity

and the principle of utility or benevolence. But the principle of benevolence involves the

3 6 Kohlberg does not make any assertion about this explicitly. However, he once mentions that there is a "horizontal sequence" from logical capacity to social perspective, and then to moral judgment, and finally to moral action (see Kohlberg 1984, pp. 171-172). This surely implies that it is possible that one can have attained the capacity of, say, postconventional moral reasoning, but not yet have the will power to carry out what she thinks to be right.

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"attitude of universal human care and agape" (Colby et al. 1987 vol. 1, p. 31, my italics).

Likewise, the inclusion of Agape in the realm of principles also loosens the notion of

principle, and is hardly equivalent to what philosophers usually understand by the same

term. The Categorical Imperative, however vague it is, is a formula that aims at defining

what a right action (or at least a morally permissible one) is. It commands us not to do

any action which cannot be universalized. Unlike the Categorical Imperative, what the so

called 'Principle of Agape' commands is generalized love of others. No concept of action

is directly involved in the command. What the command involves is rather more an

attitude than a condition that tells the right action from the wrong. Therefore, though

Kohlberg may have no complaint about being named a "principlist," it is quite unlikely

that he is really proposing a principlism in any strict philosophical sense, insofar as Stage

6 represents for him the supreme destiny of moral development. As I have repeatedly

pointed out, what is really represented by Stage 6 morality is not only a set of very

abstract principles, some of which are more properly thought of as attitudes, but also a set

of rational procedures in the service of universalizability and justice. Therefore,

Kohlberg's theory is at most a pseudo-principlism instead of a real one. By real

principlism I mean the view that adequate moral reasoning is, ultimately, the application

of the right principles. It is in this sense I say Kohlberg's theory is not a real principlism.

There is, however, a weaker sense in which Kohlberg's theory can be regarded as a

principlism, namely the view that there exists a set of general, abstract principles which

jointly determined the moral truth and which are adequate, by means of procedures of

application, to guide moral practice. But even so Kohlberg still owes us a complete list of

these principles and their proper formulations.

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As I have pointed out in the first chapter, Kohlberg's idea about the methodology

of moral psychology and philosophy is one of reflective equilibrium between ethical

theory and the empirical study, classification and assessment of people's moral reasoning.

Confronted with anomalies in his empirical findings, Kohlberg makes a number of

modifications to his theory. He sharpens the form-content distinction by redefining the

moral incentives of the stages. He clarifies the meaning of moral stages by attaching to

each of them a social perspective. He retreats from the claim that the existence of Stage 6

is verified, and introduces Type A and Type B moral reasoning into his model so that

subjects ranked as Stage 6 in the early model are now ranked as Stage 3B, Stage 4B or

Stage 5. He enlarges the moral domain to include care as well as justice, and redefines

Stage 6 in terms of active sympathy, ideal role-taking, and universalizability. In spite of

these changes, his theory remains a universalism holding abstract principles and values

and a weak rationalism. He also retains the claim that Stage 6 reasoning is a principlism,

but his understanding of principle is so broad and ambiguous as to rob this claim of much

substance.

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Chapter Three: Criticisms of Kohlberg's Theory

Since one main theme of this dissertation is to examine the extent to which

Kohlberg's theory supports ethical universalism, it is important that we examine the

credibility of his theory. If his theory is itself incredible, then all attempts to support

ethical universalism based on the theory will fail. Here, then, we shall examine the most

systematically developed objections to the theory, and see how well the theory can

survive these objections.

In the last chapter, we have seen that Kohlberg's new model has gained support

from various studies. However, this does not mean that Kohlberg's theory is flawless.

Today, many psychologists, including some of Kohlberg's main co-workers, believe

some aspects of the theory to be mistaken or unsatisfactory. In this chapter I will take

Carol Gilligan and Owen Flanagan as representative of Kohlberg's critics. I choose

Gilligan because she is the most widely recognized opponent of Kohlberg's theory

among psychologists. Flanagan is chosen because he has formulated the most systematic

philosophical arguments against Kohlberg. Of course, Gilligan and Flanagan are not the

only critics of Kohlberg's theory. I will refer to certain opinions of other critics when

needed. But by discussing the Kohlberg's debates with Gilligan and Flanagan, we shall

gain a fairly good idea about the merits and demerits of Kohlberg's theory.

Section 1: Gilligan and the ethic of care

Gilligan is perhaps Kohlberg's most famous critic. She was first a student and

then a colleague of Kohlberg, and has co-authored a paper with him on his stage theory.

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However, as she went deeper into the issue of human moral development, she came to

believe that the Kohlbergian model was not satisfactory.

Gilligan's main criticism of Kohlberg's theory is that it is gender biased. This can

also be interpreted as a charge of incompleteness. In her book In a Different Voice

(abbreviated below as Gilligan 1982), Gilligan complains that for many years studies in

moral psychology have been concentrated on male subjects.1 Theories have been

developed based on these studies, and are presented as if they are applicable to all human

beings. The problem with this approach is, she believes, that it fails to reflect the

distinctive moral psychology of females, and for this reason the theories thus developed

fail to apply universally. She then goes on to argue that Kohlberg's theory shares in this

bias because the basic structure of his theory has been established on the basis of his

original (1958) study, in which only male subjects were interviewed (Gilligan 1982, p.

18; Kohlberg et al. 1983, p. 122).

Gilligan argues that the result of only male representation in Kohlberg's research

is an unjustifiable concentration on the "orientation of justice or fairness" in moral

reasoning, which Gilligan believes is largely a masculine one. She claims that what is

thereby left out is the equally important orientation of care or responsibility, which is

typically a feminine orientation in moral reasoning. By ignoring this feminine orientation,

females are inevitably ranked as morally less developed in general when measured by

Kohlberg's scale:

Although Kohlberg claims universality for his stage sequence, those groups not included in his original sample rarely reach his higher stages. Prominent among those who thus appear to be deficient in moral development when measured by

' Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1982).

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Kohlberg's scale are women, whose judgments seem to exemplify the third stage of his six-stage sequence (Gilligan 1982, p. 18).

Gilligan adopts David McClelland's idea that the sex role is "one of the most

important determinants of human behavior." With this idea in mind, she believes that

psychologists who develop their theories based solely on the studies of males inevitably

"regard male behavior as the norm and female behavior as some kind of deviation from

that norm" (Gilligan 1982, p. 14). For this reason Kohlberg's theory is gender biased and

ignores the fact that there exists a distinct moral language usually spoken by women, and

consequently fails to estimate the moral maturity of women fairly. Gilligan suggests that,

in order to remove the gender bias, one has to observe carefully how women make their

moral decisions and how their decision-making processes differ from those of males.

1.1 The concept of indiv idual person

According to Gilligan's observations, the word 'morality' tends to mean different

things for males and females. A twenty-five-year-old male subject in Kohlberg's study

said that for him morality essentially meant "recognizing the right of the individual." The

individual rights thus recognized included, firstly, the "right to existence," and secondly,

the "right to do as [one] pleases" (Gilligan 1982, p. 19). To put it simply, these are the

right to life and the right to liberty, which are essential for postconventional moral

concepts in the Kohlbergian model (Gilligan 1982, pp. 19-20).

Comparing this subject's moral conception to that of a twenty-five year old

female, the difference between genders becomes apparent. Like the above young man,

the female subject rejected a strict relativistic view of morality, but with a different

reason. Her reason was that "a person's life is enriched by cooperating with everybody

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else, and to that end, there are right and wrong, there are things that promote that end and

that move away from it." Even when an action affects nobody except the actor himself,

she believed that it can still be wrong "to the extent it doesn't cohere with what [she]

know[s] about human nature" (Gilligan 1982, p. 20). This is sharply different from the

viewpoint of the male subject, who defined morality in terms of rights and non­

interference. For a female, responsibility "signifies response, an extension rather than a

limitation of action" (Gilligan 1982, p. 38).

When the female subject was asked what made her take up such a moral view,

and what she thought about herself in relation to it, she replied:

Just seeing more of life, just recognizing that there are an awful lot of things that are common among people. There are certain things that you come to learn promote a better life and better relationship and more personal fulfillment than other things that in general tend to do the opposite, and the things that promote these things, you would call morally right.

[I value] having other people that I am tied to, and also having people that I am responsible to. I have a very strong sense of being responsible to the world, that I can't just live for my enjoyment, but just the fact of being in the world gives me an obligation to do what I can to make the world a better place to live in, no matter how small a scale that may be on. (Gilligan 1982, p. 21)

Gilligan emphasizes that this woman did not commit herself to such a moral

conviction in any simple or direct manner. The subject had once been a relativist,

believing that she should never pass any moral judgment on others. Her moral conviction

was therefore a personal reconstruction of morality as a result of questions and doubts,

just like all the male subjects at the higher stages in Kohlberg's studies. If this woman's

case is typical of females in their moral conception, then there would be remarkable

differences between the male and the female general conceptions of morality.

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As we have already seen, the postconventional level in Kohlberg's model is

marked by a conception of fairness. It seeks to resolve moral dilemmas by arriving at a

choice which all rational persons could agree on. In the above example, the female

subject obviously showed a concern for the responsibility she had for other individuals

and the whole world. Morality existed because she cared for these people and because

she cared for the world. Gilligan sees a moral orientation like this as significantly

different from Kohlberg's ethic of fairness.

Consider Heinz's dilemma for example. The orthodox interpretation of the

dilemma is that it instantiates a conflict between the right to life and the right to property.

According to Gilligan, while this interpretation is typical among males, females tend to

interpret the case differently. Gilligan reports the response of Amy, an eleven-year-old

girl, to the dilemma: " i f somebody has something that would keep somebody alive, then

it's not right not to give it to them." Obviously, for Amy, the dilemma arose "not from

the druggist's assertion of rights but from his failure of response" (Gilligan 1982, p. 28).

Amy's solution to the dilemma was that Heinz should not steal the drug, but should talk it

out with the druggist until they reach some compromise that avoids stealing (Gilligan

1982, pp. 28-29). Jake, an eleven-year-old boy, by contrast, gave a straightforward

answer: Heinz should steal the drug, because "life is worth more than money" (Gilligan

1982, p. 26). Gilligan's interpretation of these answers is:

Both children thus recognize the need for agreement but see it as mediated in different ways — he impersonally through systems of logic and law, she personally through communication in relationship. Just as he relies on the conventions to be shared, so she relies on a process of communication, assuming connection and believing that her voice will be heard (Gilligan 1982, p. 29, my italics).

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Therefore, with this "different voice," a female's moral perspective is

characterized by her view of the world as a world of relationships. It shows the subject's

awareness of the connection between people, which in turn gives rise to a recognition of

responsibility for others and a need for response. Since the subject views persons as

basically connected to each other, the subject tends to resolve moral dilemmas by

communication and contextual reasoning instead of applying abstract principles or by the

ranking of values. Gilligan calls such a moral view the "ethics of care" (Gilligan 1982,

pp. 30-32).

By contrast, Kohlberg's ethic of justice defines morality in terms of fairness.

Gilligan points out that Kohlberg's model "equate[s] moral development with the

refinement of the idea of justice from its initial confusion with obedience to authority,

through its equation with conformity to social roles and rules, to the recognition of its

ideal form in the logic of equality and reciprocity. . . . In Kohlberg's system, the rational

individual standing alone is the ideal moral agent" (my italics).

This difference between the moral conceptions of males and females can therefore

be explained by the different imageries of human relationships between the sexes. We

may say that the morality of justice is a morality of separation. Males tend to view

persons (including themselves) as isolated entities. When asked to describe himself, Jake

answered by presenting his abilities, beliefs, and physical appearance. Gilligan believes

that his answer showed the tendency of males to understand themselves in terms of their

own qualities apart from the world. This supports the notion that the idea of self for males

2 Carol Gilligan, "Do the Social Sciences Have an Adequate Theory of Moral Development?" In Social Science as Moral Inquiry, ed. Norman Haan et al. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983) 38-39.

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is an isolated person. Females, on the other hand, tend to view persons as part of a larger

entity. Unlike Jake, Amy described herself in terms of her interactions with others: "I

want to help people." Gilligan believes that this is an example showing how females view

themselves, i.e., they tend to view themselves through their positions in the world and

their relations with others (Gilligan 1982, p. 34).

If this contrast between males' and females' moral conceptions is correct, we can

perhaps say that the male conception of morality is a negative or passive one. Assuming

separation, they develop morally by establishing a conception of obedience to rules and

laws so that individuals can be protected when they pursue their own goals. This notion

of acting in accordance with rules inevitably gives rise to the categorical conception of

morality. The disengagement of the self from his social world, on the other hand, gives

rise to the idea of autonomy (Gilligan 1982, p. 46). The function of moral rules is mainly

to limit interference and restrain aggression to minimize hurt, secure social contract, and

protect autonomy (Gilligan 1982, pp. 37-38). In other words morality is only for the

prevention of evils from happening. In contrast, starting with a view that persons are

connected to each other, the moral conception of females is more positive: morality

includes "doing what others are counting on her to do regardless of what she herself

wants" (Gilligan 1982, p. 38).

1.2 Contextual reasoning and communication

A second but related difference between the moral reasoning of males and

females is that males tend to adopt and apply general principles, while females tend to

reason contextually. When Jake was asked how one should make his decision when his

own interests and his responsibilities to others conflicted, Jake answered, "You go about

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one-fourth to the others and three-fourths to yourself (Gilligan 1982, p. 35). Gilligan's

comment is that "Jake constructs the dilemma as a mathematical equation, deriving a

formula that guides the solution" (Gilligan 1982, p. 37). In contrast to Jake's formula,

Amy's answer was "it depends," and she rejected any general guide as the solution of the

problem (Gilligan 1982, p. 38).

In addition, Gilligan claims that females tend to resort to communication more

than males do. We can see this tendency in the emphasis on the importance of

communication in Amy's response to the Heinz dilemma: Heinz should not steal the drug

but talk it out with the druggist. This emphasis on communication is perhaps related,

firstly, to the contextualist conception behind females' moral reasoning. For without

communication we cannot identify the particular needs of individuals in particular

situations. Secondly, it is also related to females' tendency to view individuals as related

to, not isolated from, each other (Gilligan 1982, p. 29).

To summarize, Gilligan attempts to demarcate two gender related orientations of

moral reasoning, namely the orientation of justice and the orientation of care. The

orientation of justice is typically exemplified in males' reasoning in terms of rights,

fairness, and justice. The orientation of care is typically exemplified in females'

reasoning in terms of responsibility and care (as contrasted with selfishness and hurt) as

its core concepts (Gilligan, 1982, p. 73). The orientation of justice is characterized by

applying abstract principles and rules in a categorical way, while the orientation of care is

characterized by a contextual and narrative mode of thinking with an emphasis on

communication in the resolution of moral dilemmas (Gilligan, 1982, p. 19).

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1.3 Development of care reasoning

In her (1982) volume, Gilligan does not suggest that we should abandon

Kohlberg's stage model of moral development as a whole.3 Instead she wants to

complement his theory by introducing another component of moral operation, namely

care and responsibility. By interviewing pregnant women on how they decided whether

they should abort or continue their pregnancy, she develops a three level model of

development regarding the care orientation of moral reasoning.

At the first level in Gilligan's model, the conception of care is centered on the self

alone. The self is the sole object of caring and the goal is ensuring the survival of the self.

At the second level, morality is represented by responsibility, which is understood within

the framework of maternal morality. Being good is identified with care for others and

self-sacrifice. At this level, caring for self is criticized as being selfish. At the third level,

however, the self is recognized again to be a legitimate object of one's care. The tension

between one's own need and others' are reconciled in the awareness that the self and

others are interdependent. Morality at this level becomes a self-chosen morality of non­

violence, interpreted as a universal responsibility to exercise care and avoid harm (for

both the self and others). This pattern of development in terms of care reasoning

represents a "progressively more adequate understanding of the psychology of human

relationships" (Gilligan 1982, p. 74).4

3 She later does propose that we should abandon the concept of developmental stages in the Kohlbergian sense. She suggests that development is a complicated process. It is "fraught with vulnerabilities", and "it entails both loss and gains." Therefore organizing human growth into stages and calling some of them higher than others does not make good sense of human development. Carol Gilligan, Annie Rogers, & Lyn Mikel Brown, "Soundings into Development." In Making Connections, ed., Carol Gilligan, Nona P. Lyons, & Trudy J. Hanmer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 314-334, esp. 319-320. 4 This claim of the increasing adequacy is important for Gilligan. It is important for two reasons. First, it seems obvious that some forms of care are better than others. It is hard to see, for example, how care at

I l l

1.4 The relation between care and justice reasoning

Several questions can be asked about the two orientations. How are they related to

each other? Are they utterly different or incompatible? What are the relative statuses of

these orientations when compared to each other? Is one of them in any sense better than

the other? Or are the different orientations each better in solving some particular kinds of

moral problems?

Figure 1 (Joseph Jastrow, 1900)

Gilligan sometimes uses the exan pie of ambiguous figures, such as a drawing

that can be seen as a duck or a rabbit (Fig ure 1), to illustrate the nature of the contrast

between the two orientations. Since it is impossible for one to see the figure

simultaneously as a duck and a rabbit, the use of such analysis suggests that Gilligan

thinks of the two orientations as in some sense incompatible, and indeed, she sometimes

writes in this way:

level three in her (1982) model can fail to be better than at level 1. Second, she needs such a claim to make her theory a proper foundation for criticism of Kohlberg. For without a claim about the adequacy of different forms of care reasoning, there would be no problem for Kohlberg in leaving out the care orientation, for it would not make a person less mature to be uncaring. Therefore, even though she wants to abandon the concept of developmental stages in her (1990) paper (see the previous note), she still retains the claim that the pattern of development described in the (1982) book is a progression (p. 317). Whether it makes any sense to speak of progression while abandoning the concept of developmental stage (among which some are higher than the others) remains a question.

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Within each perspective, the key terms of social understanding take on different meanings, reflecting a change in the imagery of relationship and signifying a shift in orientation. A s the illustration of the ambiguous figure is perceived alternately as vase or faces, so there appear to be two ways of perceiving the self in relation to others, both grounded in reality but each imposing on that reality a different organization. But, as with the perception of the ambiguous figure, when one configuration emerges, the other temporarily vanishes (my italics). 5

However, we have good reason to believe that Gill igan has overstated the

incompatibility of the two moral orientations within her own theory. In the same paper, a

subject says that she and her friend "depend on each other in a way [they] are both

independent."6 What she means by such a paradoxical expression is that she and her

friend are to a large extent independent, but neither can be completely so. Each needs the

help and support of the other to survive. Such a view about interpersonal relationship

suggests a possibility of synthesizing the two moral perspectives, i.e., we can view a

person as an individual who is connected with others. To the extent that they are

individuals they are independent, but to the extent that they are connected with others

they depend on others. This may explain why Gil l igan softens her tone in a later paper

when she talks about the tension between the two orientations:

The analogy to ambiguous figure is useful here in several ways. First, it suggests that people can see a situation in more than one way, and even alternate ways of seeing, combining them without reducing them — like designating the rabbit-duck figure both rabbit and duck. Second, the analogy argues against the tendency to construe justice and care as opposites or mirror-images and also against the implication that these two perspectives are readily integrated or fused. 7

5 Carol Gilligan, "Remapping the Moral Domain: New Images of the Self in Relationship." In Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality, and the Self in Western Thought, ed. Thomas C. Heller (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), 242. 6 Ibid., 249. 7 Carol Gilligan, "Moral Orientation and Moral Development." In Women and Moral Theory, ed. Eva Feder Kitty & Diane T. Mayers (Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987), 30.

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Though not utterly incompatible, the two moral conceptions do, for Gilligan,

sometimes give rise to different solutions to the same moral dilemma. She gives an

example: A boy and a girl were playing together. The boy wanted to play as pirates, but

the girl wanted to play as next door neighbors. The solution the girl came up with was

that the boy "be the pirate that live[d] next door." Gilligan calls this an "inclusive

solution," which she contrasts with the typical "fair solution" of taking turns and playing

each game for an equal period. The fair solution "leaves the identity of each game intact,"

but in the inclusive solution each child is invited to "enter the other's imaginative world"

and "transform that world by his or her presence." This is the difference between the

justice conception of morality and the care conception of morality.8

In this sense there is a real difference between the two orientations. They are not

just two formulations of the same moral conception, and neither of them can be reduced

to the other. They seem to be equally valid in general, but in solving a particular moral

problem one of them may be better than the other. Both orientations have their

disadvantages. For Gilligan, the problem with justice reasoning is that it is apt to

"confuse one's perspective with an objective standpoint or truth," and "define others in

one's own terms by putting oneself in their place."9 Gilligan does not explain why this

happens, but her point is not hard to imagine. In Kohlberg's model, moral problems are

solved by "ideal role-taking," which means that one has to imagine what he/she would

have chosen if he/she were in the places of the other parties involved in the situation.

However, when deciding what one would have chosen if one was in the place of the

other, there is a distinct tendency for one to choose according to his/her own values and

8 Carol Gilligan, "Remapping the Moral Domain," 242-243.

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his/her own preferences rather than adopting the values of the other. It might happen that

the other party involved in the issue has different but equally reasonable values and

preferences, leading to a different choice than the subject's, while the subject is unable to

appreciate that. On the other hand, the potential error in care reasoning lies in the fact that

it is easy for the subject to forget his/her own values and needs. By admiring the value of

selflessness one is apt to "define oneself in other's terms."10

But the danger involved in role-taking has been overstated. When one defines

others in one's own terms, he/she does not put himself/herself 'in others' places; he/she

puts others in his/her own place. There is certainly a risk of projecting one's own values

onto others when one takes others' roles, but when one does so one's role-taking is by no

means ideal. By attaching a set of social perspectives to the stage definitions, Kohlberg

makes clear that higher stages are characterized by higher ability to appreciate the

individuality of every person. Also, by adding active sympathy to Stage 6, he also makes

clear that projecting one's values onto others in role-taking is itself a kind of injustice.

The two orientations are not defined in terms of gender but in terms of theme. Of

course, for Gilligan, the two orientations are associated with gender, but the association is

not absolute. Gilligan and her colleagues observe that (1) both justice and response (or

care) orientations are employed by both sexes, though (2) most females (75%) use

response orientation predominantly, while most males (79%) use justice orientation

predominantly." Therefore, it is a mistake to think that care orientation is unique to

9 Carol Gilligan, "Moral Orientation and Moral Development," 31. 1 0 Ibid., 31. 1 1 See Kohlberg et al. 1983, vol. 1, p. 123. Original data is from Carol Gilligan, S. Langdale, N. Lyons, & J. M. Murphy, "Contribution of Women's thinking to Developmental Theory: The Elimination of Sex Bias in Moral Development Theory and Research," Final Report to National Institute of Education, 1982.

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women and justice orientation is unique to men (Gilligan 1982, p. 2). Moreover,

empirical data also show that gender is not the only factor affecting the moral orientation

employed. The choice of orientation depends in part on the type of problem posed. In

general, stories that highlight inequality and attachment result in higher rates of justice

and care responses, respectively, for both men and women. But whatever the kind of

moral question the story highlights, the proportion of females who choose care

orientation remains higher than that of males.

If each sex is capable of both kinds of moral reasoning, and if both forms of

reasoning have their own limitations, then it seems the best answer to the question of

superiority will be that neither is better than the other. Since different moral problems

tend to generate moral reasoning utilizing different orientations, it seems that the best

moral reasoning should integrate both orientations, perhaps with some kind of

psychological division of labor. The idea that we should strive for a cooperation of the

two moral orientations is very likely what Gilligan suggests.14 Unfortunately, no

systematic proposal for integration has been formulated.15

1 2 Also see the section "Reply by Carol Gilligan" in Linda K. Kerber, Catherine G. Greeno & Eleanor E. Maccoby, Zella Luria, Carol B Stack, and Carol Gilligan, "On In a Different Voice: An Interdisciplinary Forum," Journal of Women in Culture and Society 11, no. 2 (1986), 327. 1 3 Carol Gilligan and Grant Wiggins, "The origins of Morality in Early Childhood Relationships." In The Emergence of Morality in Young Children, ed. Jerome Kagan & Sharon Lamb (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 283-286. Also see Owen Flanagan, Varieties of Moral Personality (Cambridge MA & London England: Harvard University Press, 1991), 214. 1 4 Carol Gilligan, "Moral Orientation and Moral Development," 30. 1 5 Ibid., 27.

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Section 2: Reply from Kohlberg and his school:

2.1 Incomplete?

As I mentioned in Chapter 2, Kohlberg agrees with Gilligan that an ethic of care

usefully enlarges the moral domain, and thereby in the late model Stage 6 principles

include not only the principle of justice, but also the principle of benevolence and Agape.

In this sense, Kohlberg admits that his model, at least in its early formulation, is

incomplete. However, as Gilligan points out, Kohlberg's attitude towards the relation

between morality, justice, and Kohlberg's stages.remains ambivalent. In Kohlberg et al.'s

(1983) book, Kohlberg and his colleagues respond to Gilligan's criticism by saying that

they "now need to emphasize the nomenclature 'justice reasoning', since Kohlberg's

stages have more typically been called stages of moral development" (Kohlberg et al.

1983, p. 17). This suggests that morality and justice are different, and his stages capture

the development of justice reasoning but not moral reasoning. In other places, however,

Kohlberg still calls his stages moral stages and his theory moral developmental theory.

2.2 Gender biased?

Kohlberg admits that the charge of gender bias is "partially true of the original

Kohlberg [1958] method," in which care orientation in moral reasoning tended to be

scored Stage 3 (Kohlberg et al. 1983, p. 125). He even admits that "the 'principle' of

altruism, care, or responsible love has not been adequately represented" in his work

(Kohlberg et al. 1983, p. 20). However, Kohlberg insists, with the modified scoring

method, his model is not gender biased.

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In several of his publications, Kohlberg does suggest that females are usually

morally less developed than males.16 But for him this difference between the sexes is

comparable to the difference between working class males and middle class males. Both

are results of the difference in social roles. Since women are traditionally provided with

less chance of social participation, particularly regarding the exercise of power, they have

less opportunity for role-taking and hence their moral development is hindered (Kohlberg

1983, p. 122).

Two questions are relevant to consider whether Kohlberg's model is gender

biased. The first question is whether there are mean differences between males and

females on the scores in Kohlberg's moral judgment tests. The second question is

whether women's responses to the dilemmas can be scored in terms of the Kohlbergian

stages so as to yield the same results of invariant sequence and structured wholeness as

are found in the development of males (Kohlberg et al. 1983, p. 127).17

To answer the first question, Kohlberg draws upon Walker's (1982) review of 54

studies using Kohlberg's moral judgment interview and 24 studies using Rest's (1979)

Defining Issue Test.18 According to this review, the only studies showing fairly frequent

gender related differences are studies of adults among whom most female subjects are

1 6 Lawrence Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence: the Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization." In Handbook of Socialization on Theory and Research, ed., David A. Goslin (New York: Rand McNally, 1969); Lawrence Kohlberg and R. Kramer, "Continuities and Discontinuities in Childhood and Adult Moral Development," Human Development 12 (1969), 93-120. 1 7 For Colby et al.'s study see Anne Colby, Lawrence Kohlberg, John Gibbs, and Marcus Lieberman, "A Longitudinal Study of Moral Judgment." In New Research in Moral Development, ed. Bill Puka (New York and London: Garland Publishing , 1994), 1-124. 1 8 Lawrence J. Walker, "Sex Differences in the Development of Moral Reasoning: A Critical Review of the Literature," Paper presented in Can. Psychol. Ass., Montreal 1982. A more elaborated version of the paper is published as "Sex Differences in the Development of Moral Reasoning: A Critical Review," Child Development 55, 1984, 677-691. For Rest's Defining Issue Test see James Rest, Development in Judging Moral Issues (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979).

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housewives. It is thus very likely that the differences are a result of the differences

between education and job status of male subjects and female subjects in the sample.

Indeed, Speicher-Dubin (1982) and Powers (1982) report that sex differences disappear

when the variables of higher education level and job status are statistically controlled

(Kohlberg et al. 1983, p. 129).19 In a more egalitarian social context, like that of the

kibbutz, no differences are found between the sexes. Weisborth's (1970) study also found

that, with the education and occupational status under control, there were no gender

difference in the scores.20 Therefore, Kohlberg concludes that, the apparent gender

difference is really a product of education and job opportunity (Kohlberg et al. 1983, pp.

129-130).

Responding to the second question, Kohlberg claims that his moral judgment test

and standard scoring system produce invariant sequence and structured wholeness for

females just as it does for males. For example, the Snarey et al. (1982) longitudinal study

found that both the development of males and females formed invariant sequences and

also structural wholes.21 Another piece of evidence is Erikson's (1980) study, which

showed that females' development as measured by Kohlberg's method was always

upward and there was no stage skipping.

1 9 B. Speicher-Dubin, "Parent Moral Judgment, Child Moral Judgment and Family Interaction: A Correlation Study" (Ph.D. diss. Harvard University, 1982). S. Powers, " Family Interaction and Parental Moral Judgment as a Context for Adolescent Moral Development: A Study of Patient and Non-Patient Adolescents" (Ph.D. diss. Harvard University, 1982). 2 0 S. P. Weisborth, "Moral Judgment, Sex and Parental Identification of adults," Developmental Psychology 2 (1970), 396-402. 2 1 A. Higgins, C. Power, L. Kohlberg, "The Relationships of Moral Atmosphere to Judgments of Responsibility." In Morality, Moral Behavior and Moral Development: Basic Issues in Theory and Research, ed. William M. Kurtines & Jacob L. Gewirtz (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1984), 74-106. 2 2 V. L. Erickson, " The Case Study Method in the Evaluation of Developmental Programs." In Evaluating Moral Development, ed. Kuhmerker, Mentkowski, and Erickson (New York: Character Research Press, 1980).

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For Kohlberg, it is untrue that males and females tend to solve moral dilemmas in

terms of justice and care respectively. Higgins et al.'s (1983) study, for example, showed

that the major differences among students in using the two orientations were mainly

determined by two factors. First, it depends on the type of dilemma to be solved. "The

dilemma about helping another student elicited caring considerations, while a dilemma

about theft elicited justice concerns." On the other hand, it is determined by the socio-

moral atmosphere of the school situation. The more familial or communitarian the socio-

moral atmosphere, the greater the tendency to use the care orientation.

2.3 Lacking contextual sensitivity?

Another charge against Kohlberg's theory is that his moral ideal ignores the

importance of contextual considerations concerning special responsibilities and

relationships in moral reasoning. In response, Kohlberg insists that even in situations

which involve special relationships (such as family, friends, and groups of which the

subject is a member), a "universalistic justice ethic of respect" is enough to solve moral

problems, though he also admits that a "morality of particularistic relations" is also

suitable for handling those situations (Kohlberg et al. 1983, p. 20).

This claim of Kohlberg's may not itself be very convincing. But I think the

crucial point is that emphasizing the importance of universal moral principles for an

adequate understanding of morality does not imply that context is unimportant. He quotes

the following statement from Nunner-Winkler to explain this idea:

2 3 Higgins et al, "The Relationships of Moral Atmosphere to Judgments of Responsibility." Also see Kohlberg etal. 1983, p. 132.

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Therefore one cannot very well hold context orientations to be a feature to constitute contrasting approaches to morality. Context orientation is a prerequisite for all actual moral judgments (Kohlberg et al. 1983, p. 140).

Nunner-Winkler's opinion is that Gilligan's ethic of care does not differ from Kohlberg's

ethic of justice by its contextual sensitivity. The difference is in emphases: whereas care

emphasizes the positive duty to help, justice emphasizes the negative duty of non­

interference (Kohlberg et al. 1983, p. 139).

When Kohlberg talks about the differences between A and B types of moral

reasoning, he points out that Type B moral reasoning is not only more autonomous but

also more "flexible in regard to rules and persons" (Kohlberg et al. 1983, p. 18). Since

Type B moral reasoning is held to be more adequate than Type A , this further confirms

the view that contextual sensitivity is a requirement of moral adequacy in Kohlberg's

theory.

2.4 Two separate moralities?

It is clear, then, that Kohlberg acknowledges the difference in the emphases

between the ethic of care and the ethic of justice. Does he also admit that the two moral

orientations are, as Gilligan puts, two separate moralities? The answer is a definite "no."

Consider Heinz's dilemma. To solve the dilemma, the subject does not choose between

care and justice. On the contrary, concern for the wife and the recognition of the wife's

right to life are interwoven. The more Heinz cares for his wife, the stronger he feels that

he has an obligation to protect her right to life. The same holds true even when the person

who needs help is a stranger. One postconventional subject, for instance, said that in a

significant sense all human beings are related to each other: "He felt human and that was

enough of a bond" (Kohlberg et al. 1983, p. 135). It is thus obvious that one need not give

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up the care orientation to reach a high Kohlbergian stage. On the contrary, "at the

postconventional stages there is typically an effort to integrate concerns of benevolence

and care on the one hand with justice concern on the other." After all, the principle of

persons as ends in themselves is "common to both the ethic of care and the ethic of

justice" (Kohlberg et al. 1983, p. 137).

It is tempting to understanding the difference between justice and care, as Gilligan

seemingly does, in terms of the difference between non-violation of rights and promotion

of welfare.24 But this understanding is not perfectly accurate. Kohlberg himself is

responsible for this construal of his justice, for he says that morality is based on

individual rights, and moral wrongness is understood in terms of the violation of these

rights (Kohlberg 1981, p. 300). But looking at the definition of Stage 6, we see no reason

to understand morality in this way. The most important element in Stage 6 morality is

equal respect for persons, and the non-violation of rights is only part of it. (And since

Stage 6 morality is universalistic but not absolutistic, we should not even suppose that

non-violation of rights always has priority to the promotion of human well being.) In his

(1981) anthology, Kohlberg presents an imaginary case in which a person is drowning in

the river. He argues that a passerby should jump in to save the drowning person if the

chance of success is great enough to compensate the risk of both drowning to death

(Kohlberg 1981, p. 204). This means that Stage 6 morality also requires us to be

responsive to others' needs. Similarly, when he argues that Heinz should steal the drug

2 4 The non-violation of rights is sometimes referred to as 'justice,' and the promotion of welfare as 'benevolence.' However, as I will show immediately, Kohlberg's ethic of justice is by no means limited to the non-violation of rights. Therefore I will avoid using 'justice' and 'benevolence' to refer to these two orientations in moral reasoning.

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for his wife, he is talking not just about a negative obligation of not taking lives, but a

positive duty to save lives.

Therefore the ethic of justice and the ethic of care do not represent two "separate

general moralities." But Kohlberg still emphasizes the importance of justice in morality,

since without some orientation to justice one cannot even properly recognize most moral

dilemmas. His reason is that moral dilemmas appear where there are conflicting claims

among people, "all of whom should be cared about" (Kohlberg, 1983, pp. 21-22). The

ethic of care is a distinct orientation from the ethic of justice only in that "special

obligations of care presuppose but go beyond the general duties of justice" and hence

"elicit care responses which supplement and deepen the sense of generalized obligations

of justice" (Kohlberg, 1983, p. 21).

Section 3: Reflections on the Kohlberg-Gilligan debate

3.1 Gender bias

In my interpretation, incompleteness and gender bias are Gilligan's main

criticisms of Kohlberg's theory. Kohlberg insists that there is no gender bias in his

theory. He is right in this respect. A necessary condition for Gilligan's claim of gender

bias is that Kohlberg's model inaccurately down-scores females' moral reasoning. If

neither gender has general superiority over the other in their moral maturity, then the

existence of sex bias will mean that females are on average ranked lower than males

according to Kohlberg's scheme. After reviewing a wide range of studies, Walker finds

that there is little evidence for the claim that females are underscored by Kohlberg's

method:

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Walker (1984, 1986) reported a review of the literature that included all studies using Kohlberg's measure in which sex differences in the development of moral reasoning were, or could be, examined. My review included 80 studies with 152 samples, and involved a total of 10,637 subjects. Of the 152 samples, a nonsignificant difference was reported for the vast majority, 130 (85.5 percent). Females had higher scores in 9 samples (5.9 percent), whereas males had higher scores in 13 samples (8.6 percent).... It is interesting that in every case where researchers controlled in some manner for education and/or occupation, sex difference disappeared. This is not an attempt to "explain away" these findings, but to illustrate Kohlberg's claim that such experiences are influential in stimulating moral development.

The above is the result of the vote-counting, which involves simply counting the

number of studies favoring or disfavoring a certain theoretical claim. Walker also reports

the result of another analysis, which supposedly assesses a theoretical claim in a more

accurate way by analyzing the results of various studies collectively, namely meta­

analysis. The analysis also showed that Gilligan's claim is not true:

Walker (1984, 1986) also reported a meta-analysis of the studies included in his review and found that the probability level for the overall pattern of findings did not reach significance. In subsidiary analysis the effect size was found to be extremely small: Sex explained only 1/20 of 1 percent of the variability in moral reasoning development. 6

3.2 Incompleteness

However, i f we concentrate too much on the problem of sex bias in Kohlberg's

theory, we will miss the most interesting point in Gilligan's criticism. Gilligan claims that

the two moral orientations (justice and care) are not defined by gender but by themes. A

major reason why Kohlberg's theory is interesting is that it claims to be universally

applicable. If there exists a moral orientation that is not reflected in Kohlberg's stage

2 5 Lawrence Walker, "Sexism in Kohlberg's Moral Psychology?" In Moral Development: An Introduction, ed, William M. Kurtines & Jacob L. Gewirtz (Boston & London: Allyn and Bacon, 1995), 100.

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model, and if this orientation is no less adequate than the justice orientation, then

Kohlberg's model would be insufficient for explaining human moral phenomena. As we

have seen, Kohlberg admits that Gilligan's care orientation usefully enlarges the moral

domain. This is in effect to admit that his early model is incomplete. In his late model, he

extends Stage 6 morality so that it embraces principles other than justice. He seems to

agree with Gilligan that justice and care are not merely two different formulations of the

same morality. But for him the two orientations are not separate either.

One of Kohlberg's most powerful arguments concerning interconnections

between justice and care is that the more one cares the harder one will try to protect the

rights of others. To care is to help others and to avoid harm to them, while to be just

involves, chiefly, protecting the rights of others. But protecting rights is surely one way

of avoiding harm. Moreover, rights can either be positive or negative. Negative rights are

those which prohibit certain types of actions against others. For instance, the right to

property is negative in the sense that it prohibits any person's taking over another's

property by force. Positive rights prescribe certain positive actions regarding others.

When we say people have a right to education, we do not mean only that a society should

not interfere with the educational activities of its people, but also that society has a

positive duty to provide education for its people. In this sense, positive rights are parallel

to helping those in need, and negative right is parallel to avoidance of harm.

According to Gilligan, Kohlberg's morality is largely one of non-interference.

This would mean that Kohlberg gives primary place to negative rights over positive

rights. However, it is difficult to decide whether Gilligan is correct. We can see that, in

the Stage 5 moral conception, Kohlberg does emphasize the rights to life and liberty, both

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being negative rights. But at Stage 6 morality, we find the Golden Rule, the principle of

equal respect for all persons (treat every person as an end but not as means), and a

procedural method of decision making (ideal role-taking). None of these suggests that

non-interference is being emphasized to the point of relative exclusion of positive

concern. So far, then, it would seem that Kohlberg's theory does not, as Gilligan argues,

leave out the ethic of care. The problem is, however, that Stage 6 is not formulated in the

new model in any empirically testable fashion. But Stage 5, the highest verifiable stage,

does emphasize negative rights, and thus more definitive connection with the morality of

non-interference. And if we remember that, for Kohlberg, the Stage 5 reasoner tends to

agree on the same solutions that as the Stage 6 reasoner, it seems that the connection

between morality of non-interference and Stage 6 is apparent.

I think we can probably say this about Kohlberg's theory: as far as the stage

definitions are concerned, there is no obvious sign of ignoring the care orientation in

moral reasoning. But when it comes to more substantive matters, Kohlberg does

deemphasize the care orientation. This is evident when we look at the scoring manual. In

the Heinz dilemma, not a single Stage 5 "criterion judgment" (i.e., sample judgment

illustrating how moral judgments or justifications should be ranked) has anything to do

with commitment, special responsibility, or compassion.27

The ethic of care is also supposed to be more innovative. Consider Gilligan's

game example, in which a boy and a girl wanted to play two different games. Gilligan

presupposes that using the justice orientation, the solution would be that the children take

turns playing different games, while using the care orientation the solution would be

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playing a new game that combines the two. But what principle of justice prescribes that

the children should not play a game that combines the two games? Certainly, Gilligan

does not mean that the justice orientation must forbid the solution reached by the care

orientation. For her, the demarcation between justice and care by no means entails that

justice is uncaring and care is unjust.28 But they are still two different approaches to

solving moral problems. When compared to the justice orientation, the care orientation

has "a greater tolerance, a greater tendency toward innovation in solving conflicts, a

greater willingness to make exceptions to rules, and a lesser concern with legal

elaboration." When confronting a situation, the justice orientation will ask the question

T A

"What is just?", while the care orientation will ask "How to respond?" Presumably,

when a person asks this "how" question he is prepared to be more innovative in the

deciding the right action.

But is this true? Why cannot a just person ask instead "How to make a just

decision?", and why cannot a caring person ask "What to do?" Distinguishing the two

orientations in terms of "what" and "how" questions simply does not help. To begin a

question with different words does not necessarily make two different questions. It is also

a mistake to suppose that the difference in flexibility and innovativeness is intrinsic to the

justice-care distinction. We can be just and flexible, just and inflexible, unjust and

flexible, or unjust and inflexible (being just and inflexible is perhaps the least possible

among the four). The same applies to the relation between justice and innovativeness,

care and flexibility, and care and innovativeness. Consider an example quoted by Gilligan

2 7 Colby et al. 1987 vol. 2, pp. 11 -12, 63-64. 2 8 Carol Gilligan, "Moral Orientation and Moral Development," 22.

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herself. She describes the woman who "comes before Solomon and verifies her

motherhood by relinquishing truth in order to save the life of her child" as an example of

care (Gilligan 1982, p. 104-105). She does not mention Solomon. He does not relinquish

the truth, but is he not innovative when he invents an ingenious method to discern the real

mother and then does her justice?

Why then has Kohlberg invited the criticism of being inflexible? I think the

answer is twofold. First, it is due to the setting of the moral judgment interviews. For

example, in Heinz's dilemma, the subject is forced to choose between letting the wife die

or to steal the drug. When the subject raises other options, the interviewer will tell

him/her that Heinz has tried that already, but it does not work. The setting forces the

subject to choose between competing values so that scorers can see how (or according to

what standards) he/she weighs different values. In this setting, not surprisingly, only

those reasoning processes used to choose between readily available options will be

elicited. Various possibilities for flexibility and innovativeness in one's reasoning remain

undetected.

The second reason Kohlberg has invited such criticism is his single-minded

commitment to certain solutions for the dilemmas. Unfortunately, not all of his solutions

make good senses to his readers. For instance, in the life boat dilemma, Kohlberg insists

that the just solution is to go for a lottery. This is, of course, highly problematic. As

31

Carter has asked, why cannot the people on the life boat just join hands and sing?

Kohlberg's solution does not seem to follow from his ideal role-taking. Indeed, we can

3 0 Ibid., 23. 3 1 Robert E. Carter, "What is Lawrence Kohlberg Doing?" Journal of Moral Education 9, no. 2 (1990), 99.

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quite forcefully argue against his solution from the Stage 6 principle of respect for

individual persons. The principle requires us never to treat others merely as a means but

always as an end. If forcing the old man to go overboard is to treat him as a means, then

to determine who should go overboard by forced lottery equals determining who should

be treated as a means by the lottery. Of course it is better if the three people have already

agreed to use the lottery method. But then it is the agreement that makes it right, not the

lottery itself. Therefore the just solution is to do whatever the three can agree on, not

simply to go for the lottery.

Taking the Stage 6 morality as one that emphasizes agreement seeking,

everything Gilligan says about the care orientation gets in. To arrive at an agreement,

there has to be communication. To arrive at a list of (good) options, there needs to be

some innovative and flexible thinking. Gilligan contrasts the real mother in Solomon's

story with Abraham (Abraham being taken as an example of someone using the justice

orientation), who "prepared to sacrifice the life of his son in order to demonstrate the

integrity and supremacy of his faith" (Gilligan 1982, p. 104-105). But as I have pointed

out, Solomon is a just man, and he is no less flexible than the woman. And it is simply a

mistake to say that Abraham is just, for what he tries to do is terribly unfair to his own

son.

When we look more closely at Gilligan's moral developmental model defined in

terms of care, the correlation between the orientations of care and justice becomes even

more evident. From the first level to the third level, the meaning of care does not change.

Care always means to help the one who is in need and to avoid harm. What changes is the

object of care. At the first level, the subject concern is only for herself. At the second

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level, she cares for others but not the self, and therefore views self-sacrifice as the major

value. At the highest level, the objects of care include both the self and others.

The similarity between this scheme and Kohlberg's is remarkable. The first level

corresponds to Kohlberg's preconventional level, in which right and wrong are defined in

terms of self-interest. The second level also parallels Kohlberg's level 2, though the

parallelism is less straight forward. By viewing self-sacrifice as the major moral value,

the female adopts a particular role assigned by the society to her (i.e., as a nurturer). This

perfectly instantiates Kohlberg's conventional morality, in which moral actions are

defined in terms of social norms or societal expectations. At the highest level, the subject

recognizes that she deserves her own care as much as others do. This is obviously an

awakening to the call of equality: everybody is equal, and nobody should be assumed to

have an obligation of self-sacrifice. At level 1 the subject is unfair to others; at level 2

unfair to herself; but at level 3 she tries to be fair to everybody. This level 3 is exactly

what the postconventional level is all about.32

Therefore, Kohlberg can quite reasonably claim that care and justice are two

aspects of his model. These aspects cannot be reduced to each other, and are not different

formulations of the same thing (which would mean that the two orientations are

identical), but they are still not two separate moralities. They may not be in perfect

3 2 Even Gilligan herself would most likely agree with me on this point. In her (1990) paper she writes: Women's concerns about their own survival in the face of what they perceive to be abandonment by others, and their concerns about their appearance or "goodness" in the eyes of others, and their concern about truth — specifically truths about relationship and violence — suggested a pattern of increasingly sophisticated thinking about the nature of relationships between people. This pattern more or less conformed to the progression from an egocentric, through a normative or conventional, to an autonomous or reflective or critical position; the progression that most developmental psychologists have traced. '

See Gilligan, Rogers, & Brown, "Soundings into Development," 317.

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harmony, but they sometimes do reinforce each other, as Heinz's dilemma shows. We

may also say that the difference between two orientations is one in emphasis. Taking care

for granted, we shall see justice as the prominent feature of morality; taking justice for

granted we shall see care as prominent.

3.3 Contextual sensitivity and abstract principles

What about the problems of contextual sensitivity? Again I find Kohlberg's reply

quite satisfactory. Kohlberg says that "[cjontext orientation is a prerequisite for all actual

moral judgments" (Kohlberg et al. 1982, p. 140). Instead of upholding absolutist moral

rules like "Never lie" or "Never break a promise," he upholds highly formal principles.

Moral musical chairs also guarantees that adequate moral reasoning must be contextual.

In ideal role-taking, the one imagines oneself in the position of others and attempts to

decide on a solution that is acceptable to all the involved parties. The particular positions

of all other parties involved is in turn determined by the particular situation in which the

moral dilemma arises. Therefore it is a mistake to say that Kohlberg's theory lacks

contextual sensitivity.

Like the problem of care and justice, I think the problem of universality and

contextual particularity is a matter of emphasis. Kohlberg's aim is to look for some

universal destiny of human moral development that underlies the appearance of cultural

and contextual relativity. What inevitably follows is that he can capture only those

elements that are common to all adequate moral perspectives, and particular

considerations cannot be included in his theory. However, it can still be a commonplace

of all adequate moral decisions that they must be made after all relevant particular factors

in the situation have been taken into consideration. We have to notice that Kohlberg does

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not in general accept simple absolute moral rules. Principled morality "is not dictated by

'absolutes' or by rigid or exceptionless rules" (Kohlberg et al. 1983, p. 86). In other

words, moral rules that are applicable regardless of situation are extremely rare or

nonexistent. Thus, it might be correct to say that contextual relativity is not emphasized

in Kohlberg's theory, but it is incorrect to say that Kohlberg's moral ideal is insensitive to

contextual particularity.

3.4 Communication

According to Gilligan, Kohlberg's model of moral psychology leaves out the

importance of communication in solving moral problems. To a certain degree this is true.

Though Kohlberg acknowledges in his (1983) anthology that communication is important

for solving moral problems, he does not spend much effort explicating the role of

communication in solving moral problems.

When Kohlberg does talk about communication at greater length in his (1990)

paper, he gives his readers an impression that he has not taken the importance of

communication very seriously. In the paper, although both of the two subjects

interviewed (Judge D and Joan) are ranked at Stage 6, he still cannot resist the temptation

to say that Judge D's moral judgment is more adequate than Joan's. Joan's judgment is

said to be less adequate because she believes that the three people on the life-boat should

keep communicating until they agree on a solution. She said she had difficulty imagining

that they could never come to an agreement, and thus she found the lottery solution

unsatisfactory. Compared to Judge D, who chose the lottery solution, her reasoning was

less adequate because she failed to acknowledge that communication could breakdown

(Kohlberg et al. 1990, pp. 161-162). But surely this criterion of judging the adequacy of

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moral reasoning is ad hoc. It has nothing to do with the formal characteristics of

equilibrated moral judgments.

Kohlberg's comment signals a slight reservation about the importance of

communication in solving moral dilemmas. Judge D said nothing about continuing the

dialogue, and Kohlberg does not view this as a deficiency. But when Joan failed to

acknowledge the lottery solution, her answer is said to be a less typical exemplification of

Stage 6 reasoning. Surely his undermining the importance of dialogue is not intrinsic to

his theory. Rather, I think by doing so he is somewhat inconsistent with his own claim

that at Stage 6 there is an "attitude of recognizing the necessity of entering into dialogue"

(Kohlberg et al. 1990, p. 160).

Section 4: Flanagan and pluralism

The other critic I will discuss is Owen Flanagan. He is a philosopher who looks

deeply into the research in moral psychology when reflecting on problems of moral

philosophy. Few philosophers have paid as much attention to moral psychology as he

has.

In his book Varieties of Moral Personality (1991) (abbreviated as Flanagan 1991

below), Flanagan argues against Kohlberg's model, rejecting his principled approach. He

agrees with Gilligan that principled thinking is not the only mode of moral thought. He

then pushes further, arguing that morality is so variegated and multipurposed that it can

hardly be analyzed in terms of one or two simple schemes. Even with justice and care

blended together, it will not be enough to exhaust what we call moral personality

(Flanagan 1991, p. 233). Below is a brief review of his arguments.

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Argument 1. Objection to the cognitive criteria

In an early paper, Flanagan raises three arguments against Kohlberg's claim that

the higher stages are more adequate.33 The first argument is concerned with Kohlberg's

"cognitive criteria," i.e., the greater differentiation and integration of the higher stages.

As Flanagan understands it, greater integration of the higher stages means merely that the

moral stages "fit into a neat logical hierarchy," while greater differentiation means that at

higher stages "more subtle conceptual discriminations" are made. Flanagan argues that

integration and differentiation in this sense can hardly guarantee adequacy. The statement

"my brother and sister are wicked" is more integrated and differentiated than the

statement "my sister is wicked." But if neither my sister nor my brother is wicked, the

former statement will be less adequate than the latter because it is doubly false. Thereby,

Flanagan concludes that "the mere logical facts of integration and differentiation are not

sufficient to establish increasing adequacy."34

Argument 2. Objection to stage-preferences

The second argument concerns the empirical evidence Kohlberg aduces. Kohlberg

believes that the increasing adequacy of the stages is partly supported by the fact that

people prefer the highest stage they comprehend. However, Flanagan says, since people

cannot comprehend stages higher than their own, the preference for the highest

comprehended stage is equivalent to the preference for one's own stage. This "says

nothing about adequacy, only about tenancy."

3 3 Owen Flanagan, "Virtue, Sex, and Gender: Some Philosophical Reflections on the Moral Psychology Debate," Ethics 92 (1982): 481-517. 3 4 Ibid., 506.

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Argument 3. Object ion to the normative cr iter ia

The th i rd argument deals w i th Koh lbe rg ' s normative cr i ter ia, w h i c h inc lude,

ch ief ly , revers ib i l i ty , uncondit ional i ty , and universa l izabi l i ty . These cr i ter ia obv ious l y

echo the Kan t i an tradit ion, w h i c h stipulates that mora l i ty is deontologica l and that a

mora l pr inc ip le must be universal izable. The process o f ideal role-taking also reflects the

Raw l s i an methodology o f mora l del iberat ion, w h i c h is usual ly understood as part o f the

Kant i an tradit ion. A s K o h l b e r g h imse l f recognizes, his normative cr i ter ia are " a l l i ed to

the formal ist ic tradit ion i n ethics f rom Kan t to R a w l s . " 3 6 But since this Kant ian-Rawls ian

tradit ion i tse l f is ph i losoph ica l l y questionable, K o h l b e r g owes us an explanat ion why we

have to f o l l o w it. W h y , asks F lanagan, do we not f o l l o w other tradit ions l ike those o f

N o z i c k , Qu ine , Singer, Hare , or Habe rmas ? 3 7 Un less we can prove that the Kant ian-

Raw ls i an tradit ion is the on ly tradit ion wor th f o l l ow ing , Koh lbe rg ' s formal cr iter ia

remain h igh ly problemat ic .

F lanagan agrees w i t h G i l l i g a n that just ice is not the on ly fundamental constituent

o f moral i ty . H e also agrees that care is an important element i n human mora l psycho logy .

However , he st i l l f inds G i l l i g a n ' s theory unsatisfactory i n that it attempts to reduce mora l

del iberat ion into two and on ly two orientations, i.e., just ice and care. F lanagan bel ieves

that mora l i ty is too mult i far ious to be reduced to on ly two orientations. He is sympathetic

to the Ar is tote l ian tradit ion w h i c h v iews mora l l i fe as one i n w h i c h people endeavor to

real ize var ious virtues that are good for human beings qua human beings. H e does not ask

" W h y not A r i s to t l e ? " , but the question may best express his attitude.

3 6 Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Claim to Moral Adequacy of Highest Stage of Moral Judgment," Journal of Philosophy 70(1973): 633.

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Argument 4. The H e i n z ' s max ims argument

In another paper co-authored w i th Jonathan E . Ad l e r , F lanagan argues that

Koh lbe rg ' s theory faces (as do al l formal mora l theories) the d i f f i cu l ty o f spec i fy ing f rom

whence a formal universal l aw gets its substantive content . 3 8 Take the pr inc ip le o f respect

for persons as an example : " [OJn what bas is , " asks F lanagan, " d o we make a judgment o f

what counts as treating someone l ike a means as opposed to an end? " Cons ider H e i n z ' s

d i l emma. There are ways o f deal ing w i th the d i l emma w h i c h are obv ious ly inadequate

but nevertheless con fo rm to Stage 6 moral requirements perfectly. One possible way is to

universal ize a m a x i m about act ing for the interests o f one 's w i fe . O r one can universal ize

a m a x i m by p lac ing the r ight to property and the right to l i fe at the same leve l , say, by

conce iv ing o f a person's property as mora l l y indist inguishable f rom his body. A third

example is to universal ize a m a x i m that no one should disobey the law.

F lanagan admits that there are grounds to oppose these max ims . However ,

F lanagan argues, whatever reasons we use to reject these max ims , we have to br ing

substantive background knowledge and values unto the evaluations. Fo r K o h l b e r g , the

d i l emma is best so lved by recogn iz ing the right to l i fe as something more valuable than

the right to property. Bu t this invo lves the assignment o f different values to different

things. Therefore, even i n Koh lbe rg ' s own reasoning, the d i l emma is not solved merely

by abstract pr inciples l i ke the Go lden Ru le and the Categor ica l Imperative, but is so lved

at least i n part by the rank ing o f part icular values or virtues associated w i th them. The

3 7 Owen Flanagan, "Virtue, Sex, and Gender," 506-507. 3 8 Owen Flanagan & Jonathan. Adler, "Impartiality and Particularity," Social Research 50, no. 3 (1983): 576-596. 3 9 Ibid., 581.

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upshot is that Koh lbe rg ' s v i ew about mora l reasoning is incorrect. K o h l b e r g bel ieves that

the correct way o f so l v ing mora l problems is to apply a certain set o f mora l pr inc ip les ,

not to real ize a "bag o f v i r tues. " But n o w it seems that "[t]he very bag o f virtues he

c la ims we ought not teach is necessary to give more abstract pr inc ip les their con ten t . " 4 0

Argument 5. The depressed fr iend argument

In st i l l another paper co-authored w i th Ka th r yn Jackson, F lanagan makes his

Ar is tote l ian appeal e x p l i c i t 4 1 F o l l o w i n g Anscombe , he suggests that "the Ar is tote l ian

tradit ion was the best place to look for a r icher and less shadowy concept ion o f mora l

agency than either ut i l i tar ianism or Kant i an i sm had p r o v i d e d . " 4 2 In this paper, F lanagan

cr i t ic izes Koh lbe rg on his c la ims that (1) a l l mora l judgments have the formal features o f

prescr ipt iv i ty and universa l izabi l i ty , and (2) the central funct ion o f mora l judgments and

pr inc ip les is to resolve conf l icts o f c la ims.

T o argue against the c l a im that mora l judgments and pr inc ip les must be

prescriptive and universa l izable , F lanagan raises the example o f he lp ing a depressed

fr iend. T o determine what is the best way to help the f r iend, one has to consider many

factors wh i ch are pecul iar to the situation, such as his o w n personalit ies and the that o f

his fr iend. He then proceeds to say that "where fr iendship or love truly exists, th ink ing

about what one is obl igated to do can, as Bernard W i l l i a m s has put i n a related context,

invo lve 'one thought too m a n y . ' " 4 3

4 0 Ibid., 582-583. 4 1 Owen Flanagan & Kathryn Jackson, "Justice, Care, and Gender: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Debate Revisited," Ethics 97 (1987): 622-637. 4 2 Ibid., 622. 4 3 Ibid, 632

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Argument 6: The argument f rom other d imens ions in mora l l i fe

F lanagan goes on to argue that it is just not obvious that mora l i ty has the central

funct ion o f reso lv ing " conf l i c t s o f c la ims or r ights . " H e admits that reso lv ing conf l ic ts o f

c la ims is an important funct ion o f mora l i ty , but there are other d imens ions o f human

mora l i ty as we l l . F lanagan names three plausible d imensions o f mora l i ty other than

revo lv ing conf l ic ts o f c la ims : (1) self-improvement and the ref inement o f character; (2)

respectful interactions w i th loved ones, fr iends, and strangers; and (3) supererogation. A l l

these dimensions are exc luded by K o h l b e r g f rom his mora l doma in without

jus t i f i ca t ion . 4 4 '

Argument 7. Object ion to the narrow range o f hypothet ical d i lemmas

Fu l ler d iscuss ion o f Koh lbe rg ' s mora l theory by F lanagan can be found in his

book Varieties of Moral Personality (abbreviated be low as F lanagan 1991). Here he

argues that Koh lbe rg has a narrow concept ion o f mora l good that projects a telos o f

human mora l development. Th is telos, unfortunately, is suspic ious ly oriented towards a

ph i losophica l l y contentious normative ideal associated w i th l ibera l i sm (Flanagan 1991, p.

162). F i ve general objections are highl ighted by F lanagan i n his book, and these

objections ca l l into quest ion some o f the basic assumptions o f Koh lbe rg ' s theory.

The first object ion is that the range o f Koh lbe rg ' s imaginary hypothet ical mora l

problems is too narrow, and that his studies were conducted in an art i f ic ia l way. T w o

things then fo l low . F i rst , it is unreasonable to s imp ly extrapolate the observed results o f

the tests so as to draw conclus ions concerning a much wider range o f mora l problems

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encountered by the subject. Second, since the studies were conducted i n an art i f ic ia l way ,

the response o f the subjects may not even reflect real psycho log ica l activit ies i n their

actual l ives (F lanagan 1991, p. 186).

A rgument 8. The argument f rom weak empir ica l support

F lanagan also argues that Koh lbe rg ' s experimental results do not adequately

support his theory. F i rst o f a l l , F lanagan reports, no subject 's answers cou ld a l l be scored

as be longing to one single stage. M o s t subjects have on ly two thirds o f their responses

fa l l ing under their predominant stages. A l s o , postconventional subjects were too rare, and

indeed no Stage 6 subject was detected by the M J I method us ing the revised m a n u a l . 4 5 So

it is implaus ib le that the mora l reasoning o f human beings can be f itted neatly into

Koh lbe rg ' s scheme (F lanagan 1991, pp. 186-7).

Argument 9. The object ion to the use o f hypothetical d i lemmas

F lanagan 's third object ion is that Koh lbe rg too readi ly assumes (1) that his

standard tests should accurately predict h o w indiv idua ls wou ld respond to cases o f other

k inds , and (2) that such tests are suitable for assessing people 's levels o f mora l maturity

(F lanagan 1991, p. 187). H e argues, on the contrary, that Koh lbe rg ' s hypothet ical

d i lemmas are not a very sensitive counterfactual instrument for testing people 's mora l

tendencies. The imaginary cases are about a third party and therefore " d o not obv ious ly

4 5 As we have seen, Kohlberg claims to have found two Stage 6 subjects in his 1990 paper, but Flanagan might not have had access to the paper when he wrote the book. Besides, Kohlberg also identifies a number of public figures such as Gandhi and Martin Luther King as Stage 6 reasoners. Even so, it remains true that Stage 6 reasoners are extremely rare.

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draw subjects into th ink ing about what they themselves w o u l d do i f they were faced w i th

certain counterfactual s i tuat ions" (F lanagan 1991, p. 188).

Moreover , F lanagan argues, the assumption that mora l personal i ty must fo rm a

structural who le is by no means obvious. It is also dubious that a unified rationalization is

necessary for mora l maturation. However , this is exactly what Koh lbe rg has presupposed

when he argues for the greater adequacy o f the higher stages by po in t ing to their greater

degree o f integration. A l s o , he argues that what constitutes a unitary foundat ion for mora l

reasoning is cul tura l ly relative. "Wha t looks l ike an incoherent hodgepodge f rom the

outside may, f r om an ins ider 's point o f v i ew , have s igni f icant ly greater coherence"

(Flanagan 1991, p. 191).

Argument 10. The object ion to the hierarchical c l a im

Flanagan maintains that even i f the Koh lbe rg i an stages real ly f o rm an invariant

sequence, it does not f o l l o w that they fo rm an order w i th increasing adequacy. Th i s

object ion stands even when the so ca l led log ica l order o f stages is taken into

considerat ion. He argues:

• [E]ven i f one th inks that each stage provides a coherent enough typo logy o f a k i nd o f cognit ive-moral style w i th a clear enough developmental order to warrant the c l a im o f stage h o l i s m , one is under no log ica l compu ls ion also to think that the proper qualitat ive order ing o f these stages corresponds to the order in w h i c h they empir i ca l l y unfo ld . Resistance to any straight forward inference f rom the empir ica l order to the normative order is possible even i f there is a clear sense i n w h i c h attaining the competencies required at stage n-1 is necessary for reaching stage n. (F lanagan 1991, p. 191)

F lanagan illustrates his point by the example o f a race car driver. It is certain that be ing

able to drive is a necessary prerequisite for be ing a race car d r i ven Bu t it does not f o l l o w

that it is better to be a race car dr iver than to be an ordinary driver. S im i l a r l y , that lower

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stages are the prerequisites for higher stages does not entail that higher stages are better

than lower ones.

Argument 11. The object ion f rom the heterogeneity o f mora l i ty

T o argue for the supreme adequacy o f the highest stage, K o h l b e r g has to re ly o n

some particular k i nd o f normative concept ion. However , F lanagan argues, the normative

standard K o h l b e r g uses is h igh ly problemat ic , as expl icated i n arguments 1-4. Koh lbe rg ' s

standard highl ights just ice and fairness at the price o f underestimating many goods that

are also very important i n our mora l l ives. " T h e heterogeneity o f the mora l is a deep and

signif icant fact , " says F lanagan. " O n c e we pay attention to the mult i far ious content o f

mora l issues and think o f the var ious cognit ive and affective disposit ions required to meet

them, it seems s imp ly unbel ievable that there cou ld be a single ideal mora l competence

and a universal and irreversible sequence o f stages according to w h i c h mora l maturity

can be unequivoca l ly p lo t ted " (F lanagan 1991, p. 195).

Section 5: Kohlberg's reply

Koh lbe rg ' s on ly direct reply to F lanagan 's c r i t i c i sm appears i n his " A Rep l y to

O w e n F lanagan and Some Comments on the Puka-Goodpaster E x c h a n g e . " 4 6 The paper is

a response to F lanagan 's arguments in his (1982) paper, wh i ch cr i t ic ize Koh lbe rg ' s

cr iter ia o f the superiority o f the higher stages, and the empi r i ca l evidence o f the c l a i m o f

hierarchy (Arguments 1-3 i n the previous section).

4 6 Lawrence Kohlberg, "A Reply to Owen Flanagan and Some Comment on the Puka-Goodpaster Exchange," Ethics 92 (1982): 513-528.

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Koh lbe rg agrees w i th F lanagan that integration and dif ferent iat ion themselves

on ly make the higher stages more sophisticated, not necessari ly better (Argument 1.

Object ion to the cogni t ive criteria). H e then makes it clear that what he real ly bel ieves is

that such cogni t ive sophist icat ion is on ly a necessary cond i t ion for mora l adequacy, not a

suff icient one . 4 7 A s for F lanagan 's c l a im about people 's judgment preferences at different

stages, Koh lbe rg points out that F lanagan is s imply wrong. Preference for the highest

stage one comprehends does not, as Flanagan says, equal a preference for one's o w n

stage (Argument 2. Object ion to stage preferences). V e r y often people can comprehend

mora l judgments one stage higher than their own . Therefore, F lanagan 's c l a im that

empir ica l evidence on ly supports tenancy is a mistake.

In response to F lanagan 's c r i t i c i sm that he presupposes too readi ly the adequacy

o f Raw l s ' s ethical theory (Argument 3. Object ion to the normative criteria), K o h l b e r g

replies that what he has taken up f rom Raw l s is only the formal structure o f mora l

reasoning, not the substance o f it. Th is formal structure requires impart ia l i ty and

recommends that the subject put h imse l f into the place o f each person invo lved i n the

situation. Koh lbe rg bel ieves that this formal requirement o f mora l reasoning has gained

wide support. It is not on ly supported by Kant ians or Rawls ians , but is "supportable w i th

a number o f normative theories o f mora l pr inc ip les , whether deontologica l or

te leo log ica l . " In essence Koh lbe rg stresses that what he has adopted f rom Raw l s are

features o f a "mora l point o f v i e w , " w h i c h includes impart ia l i ty , universal i ty ,

reversibi l i ty , and "p resc r ip t i v i t y " (or uncondit ional i ty ) . " B o t h ut i l i tar ian and

Ibid, 522. Ibid, 523.

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deontologica l normative theorists come to s imi lar fo rma l characterizations o f mora l

j u d g m e n t s . " 4 9

Koh lbe rg disagrees w i th F lanagan 's c l a im that his emphasis on universal

pr inc ip les in so l v ing mora l problems impl ies ignorance o f contextual relat iv ity. M o r a l

pr inc ip les , argues K o h l b e r g , can be "contextua l ly re la t ive" in that they can be sensit ive to

features o f part icular situations. H e fo l lows Hare i n d is t inguishing mora l rules and

pr inc iples. A mora l rule is a proscr ipt ion or prescr ipt ion o f a certain class o f actions, such

as " D o not k i l l , " " D o not steal , " and " L o v e your ne ighbo r . " 5 0 A mora l pr inc ip le , on the

other hand, is a method o f mak ing a choice, a way o f perce iv ing and selecting mora l

components o f a situation, and a speci f icat ion o f the mora l point o f v iew. Examples are

Kan t ' s Categor ica l Imperative, the G o l d e n Ru le , and Raw l s ' s or ig ina l pos i t ion . Whereas

the rule " D o not s tea l " prohibits H e i n z f rom stealing the drug regardless o f the situation

(even i f his intention i n stealing the drug is to save a l i fe ) , the pr inc ip les mentioned above

surely a l l ow (or even require) h i m to take a l l the particularit ies o f his situation into

considerat ion when he makes a mora l dec i s i on . 5 1

Section 6: Flanagan's counter-arguments

A s a counter-argument to Koh lbe rg ' s c l a im that subjects' preference for the

highest stage they comprehend does not equal a preference for their o w n stage, F lanagan

says:

4 9 Ibid., 523-524. 501 think Kohlberg has made a mistake here. "Love your neighbor" by no means prescribes any action at all. It prescribes an attitude. 5 1 Lawrence Kohlberg, "A Reply to Owen Flanagan and Some Comment on the Puka-Goodpaster Exchange," 520.

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Koh lbe rg objects to this by say ing that "bo th the theory and Rest 's empir ica l f ind ing say that people often comprehend and prefer the stage one stage above their stage o f predominant use . " I ronical ly , it turns out that Rest 's data, to w h i c h Koh lbe rg refers, show that fewer than 50 percent o f his subjects' responses cou ld be scored in any one predominant stage, and that subjects often make responses w h i c h can be scored i n as many as three or four different stages. Rest 's response data w o u l d seem to indicate that people comprehend several different stages and prefer different ones at different t imes. Where an ind iv idua l has some overr id ing preference for some mora l concept ion that is not his predominant one it is invar iably one he at least sometimes deploys. Rest 's data about preferences, therefore, are entirely consistent w i th an account in terms o f ego identity and establish noth ing about adequacy ... (F lanagan 1982, p. 531).

In response to Koh lbe rg ' s c l a im that the formal features o f the mora l point o f

v i ew are shared by var ious ethical theories, F lanagan argues that K o h l b e r g ' s defense is

st i l l an argument f r om authority. Instead o f re ly ing on Raw l s alone, K o h l b e r g n o w relies

on the consensus among Hare , Ba ier , Frankena, Raw l s and others. Moreover , i f K o h l b e r g

is right i n saying that the formal features he presupposes receive support f rom both

uti l i tar ian and non-util itarian mora l phi losophies, then "the moral-phi losophica l meat on

the bone o f Koh lbe rg ' s stages is t h i n " (F lanagan 1982, pp. 531-532).

Section 7: Reflections on the Kohlberg-Flanagan debate

It seems that F lanagan's most important c r i t i c i sm o f K o h l b e r g is that his c l a im o f

hierarchy for the stages is unsupportable. H e argues against both Koh lbe rg ' s cognit ive

and normative criteria. H e also argues that studies regarding stage preferences indicate

on ly ego identity, not the superiority o f the higher stages. W e shal l discuss these

arguments one by one.

F lanagan 's c r i t i c i sm o f Koh lbe rg ' s cognit ive cr iter ia is on ly partly correct. He is

correct i n that the integration o f the higher stages impl ies that the mora l stages f i t into a

rather neat log ica l hierarchy, and greater differentiat ion impl ies more subtle conceptual

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discr iminat ions (F lanagan 1982, p. 506). Nei ther o f these factors seems to have any

signif icant normative impl i ca t ion . However , F lanagan has obv ious ly overs imp l i f i ed

Koh lbe rg ' s concept ion o f differentiat ion. H a v i n g the abi l i ty to make subtle conceptual

d iscr iminat ions means hav ing the abi l i ty to discover relevant s imi lar i t ies and difference

between different mora l situations, and this abi l i ty is certainly relevant to consistency i n

moral judgments. S ince consistency is an important cr i ter ion o f adequate mora l

judgment, there is every reason to say that differentiat ion is relevant to mora l maturity.

A l s o , greater integration and differentiat ion entails greater abi l i ty to handle complex

problems. I f we bel ieve that the ab i l i ty to handle situational comp lex i t y is required by

mora l maturity, we have further reason to bel ieve that Koh lbe rg ' s higher stages are more

adequate than the lower ones.

F lanagan charges that Koh lbe rg ' s normative cr iter ia too readi ly presuppose the

correctness o f Raw l s ' s ethical theory. F irst he charges that Koh lbe rg ' s rel iance on

universal pr inciples lacks sensit iv ity to contextual particulars. Then K o h l b e r g responds

that his pr inc ip les are suff ic ient ly abstract and methodolg ica l to accomodate contextual

complexi t ies . F lanagan says that, i n that case, the higher stages must lack substance. But

s imp ly say ing this does not make it so, and F lanagan does not carry out the task o f

showing that it is so.

W e n o w turn to the object ion to stage-preferences, wh i ch centers on the empir ica l

data that K o h l b e r g uses to support the hierarchical c l a im . Unfortunately , F lanagan's

c r i t i c i sm starts w i th a false c l a im , that a subject's preference for the highest avai lable

stage equals a preference for his o w n stage. A f t e r K o h l b e r g has reminded h i m that the

highest avai lable stage is quite often a stage higher than one 's predominant stage,

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F lanagan fo l lows up by saying that, since the subjects who comprehend the +1 stage at

least deploy that stage occas ional ly , this observation is st i l l compat ib le w i th his c l a i m that

the preference is just a k i n d o f ego identity, rather than any s ign o f superiority.

But even in the amended fo rm F lanagan 's argument is st i l l not conv inc ing . G i v e n

that people overwhe lming ly prefer stages higher than their o w n predominant stages (as

far as they can comprehend them), the question becomes why people do not s imp ly prefer

their o w n predominant stages. If, as F lanagan says, the preference o f + 1 stage is

consistent w i th ego identity because the subject does deploy them, then it should be

equal ly possible that they prefer -1 stage or the predominant stage itself. However , this is

not what psychologists have observed. W h y should this be so? Obv ious l y F lanagan's

v i ew cannot exp la in this. Therefore Koh lbe rg ' s theory, wh i ch presupposes that the stages

are hierarchical , remains a better explanat ion than F lanagan's .

Moreover , the cred ib i l i ty o f the hierarchical c l a im does not mere ly depend on

people 's preferences for different types o f mora l judgment. A s I have argued in Chapter

1, it also depends on the extent to w h i c h higher stages predict moral behavior. I think this

is the most important evidence for the hierarchy c l a im . Just look at h o w people at

different mora l stages behaved in the M i l g r a m situation. One can hardly resist the

impress ion that postconvent ional mora l i ty must i n some sense be better than lower levels,

unless one bel ieves that people who quit the experiment were no better than those who

appl ied electric shocks w e l l above the dangerous level . F r o m the nervousness shown by

people who carried on to h igh voltage electric shocks (Chapter 1, sect ion 2.2), it seems

apparent that even those who carried on knowed , however d im l y , that it was wrong for

them to do so. The difference between convent ional reasoners and postconvent ional

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reasoners was clear cut. Postconvent ional reasoners were more l i ke l y to disobey when

they found that what they were ordered to do was clear ly wrong . E ven F lanagan h imse l f

has to admit that the result o f this experiment is important:

Koh lbe rg c la ims that higher-stage reasoners are most l i ke l y to resist M i lg ram- l i ke coerc ion and to engage i n samaritanism. The overal l adequacy o f Koh lbe rg ' s stage theory to one side, this is an important c l a im i f true (F lanagan 1991, pp. 313-314).

It seems that F lanagan st i l l has reservations, as he on ly says the c l a im is important if true.

But I cannot f ind any reason to doubt this c l a im . It is a c l a im about recorded empir ica l

observations. Where is the point i n doubt ing such a statement unless accompanied w i th a

be l i e f that those who have reported the results are l y i ng or are under an i l lus ion? A l s o ,

F lanagan resists assessing the relevance o f such empir ica l f indings to Koh lbe rg ' s stage

theory. I f he had done so, I cannot imagine h o w he cou ld avo id d raw ing the same

conc lus ion I have just drawn. Koh lbe rg ' s theory might be, as G i l l i g a n bel ieves,

incomplete or biased. But even i f this is so, the theory must at least be correct to the

extent that postconvent ional reasoning is in general more adequate than the lower levels.

W e have n o w discussed F lanagan 's first three arguments. Koh lbe rg has not

responded to the rest o f F lanagan 's arguments. But we can st i l l try to reply to these

arguments f rom a Koh lbe rg ian point o f v i ew. B y do ing so, we can estimate how power fu l

F lanagan 's arguments are, and have a more thorough understanding o f the merits and

demerits o f Koh lbe rg ' s theory. B e l o w I discuss F lanagan's Arguments 4-11 one by one

(except for arguments 8 and 10, wh i ch need lengthy replies and w i l l be left to the next

chapter).

A rgument 4. The H e i n z ' s max ims argument

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Th i s argument states that to reason adequately one does not s imp ly apply h igh ly

abstract mora l pr inc ip les , such as the pr inc ip le o f universa l izabi l i ty . H e i n z can easi ly

formulate var ious max ims that are certainly mora l l y bad, but wh i ch can be universa l ized

without contradict ion. T o avo id this, one has to return to virtues or values that are more

part icularist ic and diverse than the ult imate pr inc ip le . Abou t this I th ink F lanagan is

correct. Bu t this need not entai l that Koh lbe rg is wrong i n emphas iz ing general ethical

pr inc ip les i n differentiat ing developmental stages, a l though he has seemingly exaggerated

their power i n determining the adequacy o f mora l reasoning.

F lanagan's argument focuses on the importance o f the knowledge o f substantive

values i n the actual der ivat ion o f acceptable mora l decis ions f rom Stage 6 mora l

pr inc iples. However , I th ink his argument works at lower stages as we l l . Fo r example , let

us compare the f o l l ow ing judgments :

S I : H e i n z should steal the drug because people must be w i l l i n g to save others i f

society is to survive (Cr i ter ion judgment 24, C o l b y et a l . 1987 vo l . 2, p. 9).

S2 : H e i n z should steal the drug because the right to l i fe supersedes the right to

property (Cr i ter ion judgment 36, C o l b y et a l . 1987 v o l . 2, p. 11).

S I is a Stage 4 judgment because it just i f ies H e i n z ' s stealing the drug i n terms o f the

maintenance o f social order. S2, on the other hand, is Stage 5, since it just i f ies the

behavior i n terms o f human rights. Psycho log ica l studies show that people who

comprehend both statements prefer S2 to S1 .

But let us consider the f o l l o w i n g statements, wh i ch argue against H e i n z ' s steal ing

the drug:

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S3 : H e i n z should not steal the drug because a l though some laws may not be

complete ly fair or are unfair in some cases, they are st i l l set up by society to

promote socia l welfare or the c o m m o n good, or to prov ide benefits and protection

to a l l members o f society (Cr i ter ion judgment 26, C o l b y et a l . 1987 v o l . 2, p. 62).

S4 : H e i n z should not steal the drug because the right to property supersedes the

right to l i fe (my fabr icat ion, not found in the scor ing manual) .

S3 is , l ike S I , a Stage 4 judgment because it is based oh the socia l order. S4 is a judgment

w i th exact ly the same structure as S2 , except that it ranks the right to property over the

right to l i fe . S ince the mora l stages are def ined i n terms o f f o rm instead o f content, S4

should be a Stage 5 judgment as we l l . I wonder whether people who comprehend both S3

and S4 w o u l d st i l l prefer S4.

It is easy to see w h y S4 cannot be a Stage 5 judgment , for Stage 5 shares w i th

Stage 6 most o f their substantive values. G i v e n that respect for persons is a central value

at Stage 6, it is pract ical ly imposs ib le for the Stage 5 reasoner to bel ieve that the right to

property should overr ide the r ight to l i fe . Bu t then it means that, when K o h l b e r g says the

concept o f human rights is one o f the core concepts o f Stage 5 mora l i ty , he already has i n

m i n d something substantive about what human rights are, and h o w they should be

ranked. But this st i l l means that an adequate understanding o f mora l i ty does not merely

inc lude the understanding o f the fo rm o f mora l reasoning, but o f various substantive

values as we l l . W i thout some agreement o n basic substantive values (such as the value o f

l i fe over property i n general), the higher adequacy o f the higher stages cannot be

established.

A rgument 5. The depressed fr iend argument

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In this argument, F lanagan argues that i n some mora l behavior, l ike he lp ing a

depressed f r iend, the Stage 6 formal characteristics not on ly do not seem to p lay any

signif icant role but i f appealed to can, in fact, seem to undermine appropriate mora l

disposit ions. W h e n fr iendship or love truly exists, to think about ob l igat ion can

sometimes be to think too much . Th i s is correct. Suppose m y w i fe is i n danger and needs

m y help. It is not very nice for me to hesitate and consider where m y ob l igat ion l ies by

consider ing whether he lp ing her w i l l do more good in this c ircumstance than he lp ing

others who are nearby and in s imi la r d i f f icu l t ies . Bu t i f a l l four people i n need are

strangers such considerations w i l l be fine.

The above example shows that pr inc ip les or fixed mora l concept ions do not he lp

m u c h in mora l del iberations i f they are insensit ive to context. Va lues such as fairness and

impart ia l i ty must be f lex ib le enough to handle var ious personal relat ionships and the

special obl igat ions invo lved , or otherwise they cou ld not poss ib ly represent an adequate

mora l standard. I f Koh lbe rg ' s theory were a p r inc ip l i sm in the sense that adequate mora l

reasoning is merely a matter o f app ly ing the set o f va l id mora l pr inc ip les into a mora l

situation, it w o u l d face the k i n d o f d i f f i cu l ty that a l l p r inc ip led ethics share: the d i f f i cu l ty

in exp la in ing h o w h igh ly abstract pr inc ip les can derive a l l the moral solut ions we need in

different situations.

But it seems that Koh lbe rg ' s theory is not an ethical p r i n c ip l i sm i n this sense.

Stage 6 pr inc ip les inc lude the pr inc ip le o f Agape , w h i c h is actual ly more an attitude than

a pr inc ip le . There is also the pr inc ip le o f role-taking, w h i c h is a procedural method o f

dec is ion mak ing and does not s imp ly upho ld a single mora l value that determines a l l

mora l actions. Role-taking is important in the resolut ion o f a l l mora l problems in that it

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a l lows us to capture, to the finest details, the particularit ies o f the mora l situation. To

decide h o w to help a depressed f r iend, it surely is useful to put onesel f into the f r iend 's

situation and imagine what one w o u l d need most i n the f r iend 's situation. O n the other

hand, Agape also a l lows for the recognit ion that, i n some situations, love , i n order to be

love, excludes calculat ions i n terms o f fairness i n the fo rm o f strict impart ia l i ty .

A rgument 6: The argument f rom other dimensions in mora l l i fe

A rgument 6 states that reso lv ing conf l ic ts is not the on ly d imens ion o f mora l i ty .

There are other d imens ions such as (1) self-improvement and the ref inement o f character;

(2) respectful interactions w i th loved ones, friends, and strangers; and (3) supererogation.

(2) and (3) obv ious ly paral le l G i l l i g a n ' s ethic o f care. I f m y arguments in section 3 are

sound, then Koh lbe rg ' s expans ion o f the mora l doma in w i l l be enough to cover these

dimensions. E ven so, (1) remains a blank i n Koh lbe rg ' s theory. The f o l l ow ing quotation

f rom Robert Carter can help us see more c lear ly the insight in F lanagan 's argument:

K ie rkegaard may serve as one example o f someone who assumed that mora l reasoning (the E th ica l stage) is intr ins ica l ly infer ior to the Re l ig ious stage o f Fai th, at w h i c h , and on ly at w h i c h , matter can be resolved properly . Or , i f Chr is t ian agape is invoked , a l l the reasoning i n the wo r l d , without love , is next to nothing, and agape, even w i t h modest systematic reasoning, y ie lds a l l . O r consider the Z e n master who becomes mora l by meditat ion whereby he discerns the state o f inner harmony, integration and peace, and endeavors to express this d i l igent ly in the countless situations o f l i fe. W e may retrospectively c l a im that these people are reasoning mora l l y , and even that they display just ice reasoning. However , they have either transcended such reasoning (Kierkegaard) , or have by ­passed it by learning to love , or to be harmonious ly receptive i n ident i fy ing w i th another person i n his or her unique situation. It may be a just act, but an interv iew need not reveal that the state o f mora l i ty was arr ived at through mora l reasoning at a l l . 5 2

5 2 Robert Carter, "Does Kohlberg Avoid Relativism?" In Lawrence Kohlberg, Consensus and Controversy, 15-16.

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Though self-perfection remains a blank in Koh lbe rg ' s theory, the idea is not

strictly incompat ib le w i th Koh lbe rg ' s theory. Koh lbe rg has admitted i n the late mode l

that just ice does not exhaust the mora l domain . Nevertheless, I th ink, just ice can st i l l be

regarded as the central core o f mora l judgments. Self-improvement and ref inement o f

character presuppose that what I aspire to becomes acceptable f rom an impart ia l point o f

v i ew. Otherwise it is not refinement at a l l . In this way, just ice is central to mora l i t y i n that

it set l imi ts to what is mora l l y permiss ib le and admirable regarding ideals o f se l f

improvement or self-realization.

A rgument 7. Object ion to the narrow range o f hypothet ical d i lemmas

Argument 7 addresses the va l id i ty o f extrapolat ing f rom interviews concerning a

narrow range o f imaginary situations to the mult i far ious real ity o f everyday mora l l i fe .

The argument has a certain power. Surely a theory gains more support i f it is tested i n

different and various settings. S ince the range o f hypothetical d i lemmas used by

Koh lbe rg is not especial ly w ide , one can throw doubts on the power o f the empir ica l

support for the theory. Nevertheless, there are two points we can make on beha l f o f

Koh lbe rg . F irst , a l l sc ient i f ic theories invo lve extrapolat ion. Phys ics tells us that the

vo lume o f a gas or a mixture o f gases is proport ional to its absolute temperature when the

pressure is kept constant. It is imposs ib le for physic ists to test the theory for every

combinat ion o f different gases, i n a l l possible proportions o f them, at a l l possible

temperatures and under a l l possible pressures. A n d in general, the range o f settings i n

wh i ch experiments can be carried out is doomed to be narrow when compared to the

mul t ip l i c i t y o f condit ions the theory is supposed to cover. However , we st i l l think we

have good reason to bel ieve that many theories, l ike that concerning the behavior o f

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gases, are true. Secondly , the power o f the object ion f rom the narrow range o f

hypothet ical d i lemmas is l imi ted i n any case. The reason is twofo ld . O n the one hand,

there is no standard method to judge whether the range o f settings is narrow. A s already

indicated, a l l exper imental proofs o f scient i f ic theories invo lve extrapolat ing the

observations i n a relat ively narrow range o f settings to a m u c h (and usual ly inf in i te ly )

larger range o f condit ions wh i ch the theory is intended to cover. O n the other hand, even

i f we a l l agree that a range o f settings is too narrow, the f indings i n these settings do not

thereby cease to support the theory. A l l we can conclude is that the empi r i ca l evidence is

not as strong as we w o u l d l ike .

B e yond a l l these, there is posi t ive support for the general appl icab i l i t y o f

Koh lbe rg ' s theory. Recent research indicates that people 's mora l stages, estimated in

relation to real l i fe d i lemmas, matches quite c losely their mora l stages estimated by

hypothetical d i l emmas . 5 3 Th i s suggests that Koh lbe rg ' s theory is appl icable to people 's

everyday mora l l i fe .

A rgument 9. The object ion to the use o f hypothet ical d i lemmas

Argument 9 throws doubts on the legi t imacy o f the presupposit ion that the way

people reason about hypothet ical d i lemmas reflects h o w they reason about their personal

mora l d i lemmas i n real l i fe . In response to Argument 7,1 have pointed out that people 's

responses to real l i fe mora l d i l emmas c lose ly match their responses to hypothet ical

d i lemmas. So, again, this suggests that the use o f hypothet ical d i lemmas i n mora l

5 3 Lawrence J. Walker & John H. Taylor, "Stage Transitions in Moral Reasoning: A Longitudinal Study of Developmental Process," Developmental Psychology 27, no. 2 (1991): 230-337.

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judgment interviews is legit imate and is quite rel iable i n e l i c i t ing the subject 's pattern o f

mora l reasoning i n general.

F lanagan argues that the assumption o f structural wholeness for mora l reasoning

is by no means obv ious . It is true, o f course, to the extent that the assumption is not

obvious i n itself. The real question here is , however, not whether the assumption is

obv ious i n itself, but whether it has gained substantial support f rom empi r i ca l research.

A s we have seen i n Chapter 2, w i th the modi f icat ions made in the late mode l , the

assumption o f structured wholeness is we l l conf i rmed by empir ica l data. F lanagan is not

conv inced that the recent data support the assumption because most subjects do not

present mora l judgments at a single mora l stage. But his requirement is unreasonable, for

we should at least a l l ow people to be between stages as they are progress ing f rom one

stage to another. Thus , for the assumption o f structural wholeness to be true, the

reasonable expectation is that peoples ' response should be w i th in one stage or w i th in two

adjacent stages and this is conf i rmed by empir ica l data (Chapter 2, sect ion 2).

F lanagan 's f ina l point is that unity o f rat ional izat ion is cul tura l ly relative.

Unfortunately , he is begg ing the quest ion when he says this, for the quest ion K o h l b e r g

wants to answer is precisely whether there are any universal typologies each o f w h i c h can

be regarded as a un i f ied foundat ion o f mora l rat ional izat ion. Koh lbe rg ' s answer is that

there are s ix such typologies, and he shows us his empir ica l evidence. F lanagan s imp ly

does not respond to Koh lbe rg ' s evidence at a l l , and insists instead that since unity is

relative K o h l b e r g must be wrong . Bu t this is mere assertion.

A rgument 11. The object ion f rom the heterogeneity o f mora l i ty

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It may be mis lead ing for me to ca l l this an argument. The object ion starts w i th the

c l a im that the heterogeneity o f mora l i ty is a deep and signif icant fact, and then jumps

direct ly to the conc lus ion that the stage mode l can hardly be correct. A g a i n , this is more

assertion than argument. A n d , i n general , whether things can be grouped into a f inite

number o f sets depends most ly on h o w the sets are designed, not h o w heterogeneous

these things are. L i v i n g creatures are extremely heterogeneous, but they can be quite

neatly grouped under two categories: plants and animals. There is no reason i n pr inc ip le

why basic mora l conceptions cannot be grouped into a f inite number o f types.

Section 8: Summary

In this chapter we rev iewed G i l l i g a n ' s and F lanagan 's cr i t i c isms o f Koh lbe rg ' s

theory. G i l l i g a n argues that (1) there is a gender bias i n Koh lbe rg ' s theory; (2)

Koh lbe rg ' s account o f the forms o f mora l reasoning is incomplete ; (3) Koh lbe rg ' s mora l

theory ignores the importance o f contextual considerations i n adequate mora l reasoning;

and (4) he ignores the importance o f communica t ion in mora l dec is ion. F lanagan, on the

other hand, challenges K o h l b e r g regarding his research method, his presupposit ions, and

various theoretical c la ims , such as the c l a im o f hierarchy o f the mora l stages, the

def in i t ion o f mora l i ty as a device for reso lv ing conf l ic ts , and the c l a im that mora l

adequacy is determined by the fo rm o f mora l reasoning. Re f lec t ing on the debates

between these two important cr it ics and Koh lbe rg , I argue that most o f their arguments

are not sound, but w i th the f o l l ow ing important exceptions:

1. G i l l i g a n is correct i n c l a im ing that just ice does not exhaust the mora l domain . B y

adding the orientat ion o f care to the picture o f mora l i ty we can understand the nature o f

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mora l i ty better. F lanagan pushes a step further and c la ims that just ice and care are st i l l

not enough. Euda imon iac mora l ideals, for instance, are left out.

2. A s G i l l i g an argues, K o h l b e r g has not done just ice to the importance o f communica t ion

i n the process o f mora l dec is ion. Though Koh lbe rg later verbal ly acknowledges that

communica t ion is what Stage 6 reasoning requires, he nevertheless part ly undermines this

concession by say ing so l itt le about communica t ion i n his d iscuss ion o f particular mora l

d i lemmas.

3. F lanagan is right that K o h l b e r g overestimates the power o f mora l f o rm to determine

right actions i n particular situations. Substantive values and contextual considerations are

a lways important i n adequate mora l reasoning.

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Chapter Four: From Moral Psychology to Moral Philosophy

W e have n o w rev iewed many o f the most important cr i t ic isms o f Koh lbe rg ' s

theory. I argued that most o f the c la ims against the theory do not ser iously threaten it, at

least not seriously enough to make us abandon the theory as a whole . The next question is

whether Koh lbe rg ' s theory is relevant to mora l ph i losophy at a l l . K o h l b e r g certainly

thinks it is and I bel ieve he is correct. In this chapter we shal l see h o w and why . M o r e

part icular ly, we shal l see h o w one can just i fy the c l a im o f increasing adequacy o f the

Koh lbe rg ian stages, re ly ing part ia l ly on the empi r i ca l f indings. Then we shal l discuss the

c l a im for universal i ty o f Stage 6.

Section 1: The relevance of psychology to moral philosophy 1

1.1 The "is-ought" gap

Some phi losophers think that empir ica l research i n psycho logy has litt le relevance

for mora l phi losophy. Th i s v i e w has its basis i n H u m e ' s demarcat ion between " i s " and

"ought , " and M o o r e ' s idea o f the naturalistic fal lacy. H u m e asserts that no combinat ion

o f " i s " statements can log ica l l y imp l y an " ough t " statement. The same basic idea is

further elaborated by M o o r e i n his d iscuss ion o f the "natural ist ic f a l l acy , " where in M o o r e

c la ims that it is a fa l lacy to attempt to define the word " g o o d , " or any other normative

expression, i n purely descript ive terms (Chapter 1, section 3.1). 2 O n the basis o f this

log ica l d i v i s i on between descr ipt ion and evaluat ion, S iegel c la ims that K o h l b e r g ' s p roo f

o f the greater adequacy o f the higher stages is inva l id :

1 By psychology here I mean the empirical study of human behavior and human thought. In this sense, Kohlberg's theory is not purely psychological, but is a mixture of psychological theory and normative theory. " G. E. Moore, PrincipiaEthica, 12-17.

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I f higher stages are indeed more mora l l y adequate than lower stages, then they w o u l d be so even i f the facts o f mora l development were different than K o h l b e r g c la ims they are. Suppose people developed dif ferent ly than Koh lbe rg ' s research indicates — suppose, that is , they developed through a random sequence o f stages, or that they developed sequential ly f rom Stage 6 through Stage 1, or that development was not universal so that people had different sequences o f development f rom one another — i f the c l a im to mora l adequacy cou ld be jus t i f i ed , we w o u l d st i l l have to say that Stage 6 was mora l l y superior to Stage 5, Stage 5 to Stage 4, and so o n . 3

But even i f there is a log ica l gap between facts and values and, therefore, even i f this

point o f Se igel 's is correct, does it f o l l o w that Koh lbe rg ' s developmental theory is

irrelevant to mora l ph i losophy? N o . The gap between values and facts is a log ica l one.

N o set o f factual statements log ica l l y entails any value statement, but it does not f o l l o w

that no set o f factual statements supports or just i f ies any value statement. The fact that a l l

birds we have observed are warm-blooded does not entail that a l l b irds are warm-blooded

either. Nevertheless, the fact that a l l birds observed before are w a r m b looded st i l l i n some

way supports the general statement about the warm-bloodedness o f a l l birds i n general.

To exp la in h o w the former supports the latter is the ma in task o f ph i losophy o f science,

w h i c h I w i l l not discuss i n detail here. What I want to point out is on ly that, entai lment

and support are two different matters. Enta i lment is suff ic ient, but not necessary, for a

support.

1.2 The second step: moral psychology and moral philosophy

Is mora l psycho logy relevant to mora l ph i losophy? It w o u l d certainly seem so. A s

M a r k Johnson argues, when we study mora l ph i losophy, we are studying human

moral i ty . Such a mora l i ty must be " a mora l i ty directed to human concerns, real izable by

3 Harvey Seigel, "On Using Psychology to Justify Judgments of Moral Adequacy." In Lawrence Kohlberg: Consensus and Controversy, ed. Sohan Modgil and Celia Modgil (Philadelphia and London: The Felmer Press, 1986), 71.

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human creatures l ike ourselves, and appl icable to the k inds o f problemat ic situations we

encounter i n our l i ves . " W e s imp ly cannot k n o w what is the best th ing to do i f we k n o w

nothing about the human m i n d , inc lud ing human emotions. Fo r h i m , the relevant

questions o f mora l psycho logy focus on personal identity, human ends and mot iva t ion ,

mora l development, conceptual izat ion, reasoning, and affect. 4

What interests me most is Johnson's emphatic reminder that what we are

discussing i n ethics is human mora l i ty . S ince an adequate mora l standard must be a

reasonable one, it fo l l ows that what is adequate must be something reasonable for human

beings. But what is reasonable for human beings depends on what human reason or

rational ity is l i k e . 5 A n d this last question about the features o f human rat ional i ty is at

least partly a psycho log ica l quest ion, and thus part ly an empi r i ca l one.

F lanagan argues for the relevance o f psycho log ica l studies to mora l ph i losophy

for a s imi lar reason, a l though he stands strongly against Koh lbe rg ' s theory. H i s reason is

s imple : for a mora l ideal to be va l i d , it should at least be possible that human beings can

achieve such an ideal (however d i f f i cu l t it is ) ; but d iscover ing what is possible for human

beings to achieve is part o f the j o b o f psycho logy (F lanagan 1991, p. 26). F lanagan is

ta lk ing about a p la in truth: " o u g h t " impl ies " c a n . " I f a person is utterly unable to do X ,

then it does not make sense to say he/she ought to do X . I f a schizophrenic person cannot

4Mark Johnson, "How Moral Psychology Changes Moral Theory." In Mind and Morals, ed. Larry May and others (Cambridge, MA & London, England: MIT Press, 1995), 49-50. 5 The term 'reasonable' is ambiguous here. On one hand, it can mean that it is reasonable for the individual to do the morally right thing. On the other hand, it can mean that it is reasonable for the human species to have a certain moral practice. My own view is that these two meanings are connected to each other: what is reasonable for the human species to value is reasonable for me to value. But this is not the question I am discussing here. The most important thing here is only that, whatever 'reasonable' means, a reasonable moral standard must be reasonable for human beings, and therefore must be responsive to the psychological make-up of human beings.

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help sco ld ing people around him/her, it does not make sense to say he/she should not do

so. L i k ew i se , i f it is imposs ib le for people to be perfect ly impart ia l , then it does not make

sense to say they should be so. Whether it is possible for schizophrenic persons o f var ious

types to control their behavior, or for persons i n general to be perfect ly impart ia l , can

certainly be ver i f ied by psycho log ica l studies. A n adequate understanding o f human

mora l i ty requires an adequate understanding o f h o w the human mora l psyche actual ly

works . I f I propose some mora l ideal that the human conscience can never approve, then

such an ideal is obv ious ly unsuitable for human beings.

Therefore, mora l psycho logy is relevant to mora l ph i losophy i n at least two ways.

First, what is mora l l y reasonable is reasonable for human beings. Second, what is

regarded as mora l l y obl igatory must be possible for human beings to achieve.

Consequent ly , K o h l b e r g is certainly correct i n be l iev ing that empir ica l studies in mora l

psycho logy can offer something o f general relevance to mora l ph i losophy . H e also has

his o w n more part icular v iews about h o w mora l psycho logy is relevant, to mora l

phi losophy. W e shal l n o w examine these.

1.3 A third step: moral development and moral philosophy

What is Koh lbe rg ' s more part icular answer to the question about the relevance o f

mora l psycho logy to mora l ph i losophy? W e are not concerned w i th " b r i d g i n g " the " i s-

ought " gap ( in the log ica l sense) but w i th d iscover ing certain posi t ive evidentia l relations

between Koh lbe rg ' s empir ica l f indings and his c la ims concerning the superiority o f

certain developmental stages. K o h l b e r g explains as fo l lows :

To begin w i th , there are two forms o f the naturalistic fa l lacy I am not commit t ing . The first is that o f der iv ing mora l judgments f rom psycho log ica l , cognit ive-predict ive judgments or pleasure-pain statements, as is done by naturalistic

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notions o f mora l judgment. M y analysis o f mora l judgment does not assume that mora l judgments are real ly something else, but insists that they are prescriptive and sui generis. The second naturalistic fa l lacy I am not commi t t ing is that o f assuming that mora l i ty or mora l maturity is part o f b io log ica l human nature or that the b io log i ca l l y older is the better. The th i rd fo rm o f the natural ist ic fa l lacy , wh i ch I am commit t ing , is that o f asserting that any concept ion o f what mora l judgment ought to be must rest on an adequate concept ion o f what it is'. The fact that m y concept ion o f the mora l " w o r k s " empi r i ca l l y is important for its ph i losoph ic adequacy. B y this I mean first that any concept ion o f what adequate or ideal mora l judgment should be rests on an adequate def in i t ion o f what mora l judgment is i n the minds o f people (Koh lbe rg 1981, pp. 177-178).

A s Dw igh t B o y d points out, it is clear that Koh lbe rg ' s v i e w is not a reduct ion ism

o f mora l va lues . 6 Th i s is evident f rom the above quotat ion, i n w h i c h Koh lbe rg says that

mora l judgment is not reductive and is sui generis. The same point is also seen when

Koh lbe rg c la ims that "the concept o f mora l i ty is i tse l f a ph i losoph ica l (ethical) rather

than a behavioral concept " (Koh lbe rg 1981, p. 102). I th ink B o y d is right. K o h l b e r g is not

unfami l iar w i th the ph i losoph ica l p rob lem about the " i s-ought " gap. Indeed, as we have

seen i n Chapter 1, K o h l b e r g used the naturalistic fa l lacy to reject the arguments for

ethical re lat iv ism raised by some soc ia l scientists. O n the other hand, B o y d also argues

that Koh lbe rg ' s theory is not " a naive move f rom ' i s ' to ' ought . ' " B y this he means that

Koh lbe rg is not t ry ing to derive the conc lus ion that higher stages are superior f rom the

mere fact that people do move upward i n the stage sequence. 7 A s we can see i n the

quotation above, Koh lbe rg ' s theory does not assume that "the b io log i ca l l y older is the

better," so why w o u l d he think the b io log ica l l y later is better for the reason that it is later?

W h i l e the first k i n d o f "natural ist ic f a l l a cy " K o h l b e r g talks about is doubtless a

fa l lac ious fo rm o f argument, why the second fo rm o f "natural ist ic f a l l a c y " is indeed

6 Dwight R. Boyd, "The Ought of Is: Kohlberg at the Interface between Moral Philosophy and Developmental Psychology." In Lawrence Kohlberg: Consensus and Controversy, 45 &51.

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fa l lac ious requires some explanat ion. In Principia Ethica, M o o r e exp l i c i t l y a l lows that

there may be some universal relations between certain facts and certain values. In other

words , he admits it could be, that a l l good things, and on ly good things, are i n fact X ,

where X is some natural property. S imi l a r l y , it may be that a l l mora l stages that emerge

later are better than their predecessor stages. But even i f this is the case, "better stage"

does not mean " later stage," any more than their be ing " g o o d " means be ing " X , " and

therefore be ing a later stage provides i n i tse l f no reason to bel ieve that such a stage is a

better one. So to attempt to derive value s imp ly f r om the chrono log ica l order o f the

emergence o f the stages is to commi t the naturalistic fa l lacy.

It is a litt le strange for K o h l b e r g to say that there is a th i rd fo rm o f natural ist ic

fa l lacy that he is commit t ing . T o commi t a fa l lacy, there must be some fault i n one 's

argument or reasoning, but this is surely not what Koh lbe rg means. In this sense,

Koh lbe rg surely does not bel ieve the "natural f a l l a cy " he commits is a fa l lacy at a l l . What

he means by commit t ing a fo rm o f natural fa l lacy is s imp ly that he is t ry ing to use studies

o f psycho log ica l development to support a c l a im o f superiority for a certain general f o rm

o f mora l reasoning. Apparent ly , Koh lbe rg is reacting to what he takes to be a general

d ispos i t ion i n ph i losophy to s imp ly reject or d ismiss psycho log ica l studies as hav ing no

relevance for ethics, w h i c h general d ispos i t ion he regards as a legacy o f M o o r e .

To see h o w psycho logy is related to ph i losophy i n Koh lbe rg ' s v i ew , let us see

what Koh lbe rg says about it:

What I am c l a im ing about the relat ion o f " i s " to " o u g h t " i n mora l development comes to this:

7 Ibid, 52.

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1. The scient i f ic facts are that there is a universal mora l f o rm successively emerging i n development and centering on pr inc ip les o f just ice.

2. Th i s Kant ian mora l fo rm is one that assumes the fact-value d is t inct ion; that is , mora l people assume that their mora l judgment is based on conformity to an ideal no rm, not on conformi ty to fact.

3. Sc ience, then, can test whether a phi losopher 's concept ion o f mora l i ty phenomenolog ica l l y fits the psycho log ica l facts. Science cannot go on to just i fy that concept ion o f mora l i ty as what mora l i ty ought to be.... M o r a l autonomy is k i ng , and values are different f rom facts for mora l discourse. Sc ience cannot prove or jus t i f y a mora l i ty , because the rules o f sc ient i f ic discourse are not the rules o f mora l discourse.

4. L o g i c or normative ethical analysis can, however , point out that a certain type o f mora l ph i losophy — for example, Stage 4 — does not handle or resolve certain problems that it acknowledges to be problems that it ought to handle, whereas another type o f mora l i ty (for example , Stage 5) can do so. Here , factual invest igat ion o f people 's beliefs must support internal log ica l analysis o f why the deve lopmenta l ly h igher ph i losophy can handle problems not handled by the lower ones. Sc ience, then, can contribute to a mora l discourse as to why one mora l theory is better than another.

5. The scient i f ic theory as to why people factual ly do move upward f rom stage to stage, and why they factual ly do prefer a higher stage to a lower, is broadly the same as a mora l theory as to w h y people should prefer a higher stage to a l o w e r . . . . (Koh lbe rg 1981, pp. 178-179)

W e can see that statement (1) is about the psycho log ica l phenomena K o h l b e r g

c la ims to have discovered through his studies. Statement (2) is about the discrepancy

between facts and values as perceived by normal people, and this discrepancy is largely

the same as what many (or most) mora l phi losophers have i n m ind . In spite o f such a

discrepancy, Koh lbe rg nevertheless suggests i n (3) that i n some way mora l psycho logy is

relevant to mora l ph i losophy . The statement echoes what I reported a f ew paragraphs

ago, that the concept ion o f what an adequate mora l judgment should be must comport

w i th what such judgments are or can be i n people 's minds. That is , (3) provides us w i th

an interpretation o f h o w conceptions o f ideal mora l judgment must rest on capacities o f

actual judgments. Th is is an example o f what Habermas cal ls the 'complementar i ty

thesis' o f the relat ion between psycho logy and phi losophy, w h i c h c la ims that

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psycho log ica l studies " func t ion as a check on the normative va l id i ty o f hypothet ica l ly

reconstructed mora l in tu i t ions . " 8

(3) states that psycho logy can on ly funct ion as a check on a certain mora l

concept ion, but cannot prove its adequacy. Nevertheless, (4) states that science can

"contribute to a mora l discourse as to why one mora l theory is better than another." Th i s

suggests that (a) psycho logy can support certain aspects o f mora l theory; and (b) this

support is weaker than a proof . (4) and (5) together prov ide us w i th an explanat ion o f

h o w this support is possible. (4) states that, i n mora l development, a subject gives up a

certain mora l concept ion and takes up another because the previous concept ion cannot

handle certain problems that need to be handled. The person thus replaces one mora l

concept ion w i th another w h i c h is more adequate to the problems mora l i ty deals w i th .

Th i s is the psycho log ica l explanat ion o f why people do move f r om one stage to another.

A t the same t ime, (5) states that the reason why people do move upward and do prefer

higher stages is broadly the same as the reason why they should prefer them. That is, the

funct ional superiority o f the higher stages explains the fact that people prefer them and

move upward as they are able to. That is , we can diagnose the d i f f icu l t ies w i th the lower

stages and describe the advantages o f the higher. A s we shal l see short ly, these

advantages are connected essential ly w i th consistency and comprehensiveness. A

phys ica l l aw explains a phys ica l phenomenon, and the observed phenomena in turn

support the law. S imi l a r l y , i f the pattern o f human mora l development through

Koh lbe rg ian stages is expla ined by the funct ional superiority o f higher stages then,

8 Jiirgen Habermas, "Interpretive Social Science vs. Hermeneutics." In Social Science as Moral Inquiry, ed. N. Haan et al. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 266.

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obv ious ly , to this extent the higher stages are better, and people 's preferences for them,

based on these f ind ings, supports the c l a im o f superiority.

Seen in this l ight, (5) is a plausible c l a im . B o y d w o u l d most l i ke l y agree. He

argues that one o f the tasks o f developmental psycho logy is to exp la in why people 's

mora l conceptions change systematical ly i n a part icular direct ion. T o exp la in the pattern

o f these changes one should not treat them as mere phenomena, for do ing so over looks

the fact that the subjects are themselves constructive mora l agents. 9 B o y d even c la ims

that "what the matur ing mora l subject does and what the mora l phi losopher does are

essential ly the same cognit ive act iv i ty , the same orientation toward the construct ion o f

mora l meaning and determination o f mora l truth, carr ied on at different levels o f

abs t rac t ion . " 1 0

I am sympathetic to B o y d ' s idea about the s imi lar i ty between the cognit ive

activit ies o f the phi losopher and the layperson in their ref lections and cognit ive

constructions i n mora l reasoning. Laypeop le surely do ph i losoph ize about mora l

problems too. Otherwise h o w cou ld non-philosophers ever become phi losophers? W e

need not suppose that everybody is equal ly sophisticated about mora l problems

(Koh lberg does not suppose this either), but it is a mistake to suppose that the way the

layperson strives to construct his own mora l meaning is irrelevant to what mora l

reasoning should be.

9 Dwight Boyd , "The Ought o f Is," 60. 1 0 Ibid., 55.

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1.4 The "empirical" implications of statements of value

Koh lbe rg suggests that psycho logy supports a mora l theory by testing its

consequences, and an adequate mora l theory must fit the psycho log ica l facts about

human beings. Bu t h o w do we judge whether a theory fits these psycho log ica l facts or

not? A n d what k inds o f the consequences are o f concern here? I f there is a mora l theory

w h i c h c la ims that some general f o rm o f mora l reasoning is better, what should we expect

to observe?

Suppose there are two things, A and B, and A is object ively better than B. What

do we expect? D o we expect, for example, that everybody prefers A to B ? N o . I f this

were a reasonable expectation then we should expect everyone to prefer Beethoven to

Madonna . ( M y point is s imp ly that even those who bel ieve that Beethoven is better than

M a d o n n a do not expect everybody share this v iew.) Shou ld we appeal to the preference

o f the majority? Shou ld we expect that most people w i l l prefer A to B i f A is object ively

better than B ? A g a i n , no. W e a l l k n o w that people make mistakes, part icular ind iv idua ls

do, and so do the majority.

A more plausible answer concerning expectation and the assumption o f objective

goodness is this: the object ively better is something that a fu l l y rational agent prefers,

prov ided he has a l l the relevant knowledge. B y ' f u l l y rat ional ' I mean fu l l y consistent

and coherent i n one 's reasoning. Moreover , we should expect a convergence o f

preferences among people to the extent that they are rational and fu l l y in formed. In other

words, the more complete ly rational and fu l l y in formed are a set o f people, the greater the

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tendency for agreement over values that are object ive . 1 1 Let us ca l l this the C R P

(convergence o f rat ional preferences) cr i ter ion o f object iv i ty o f values.

No te that by say ing al l this I am mak ing no c l a im about h o w objective values

exist. Perhaps they exist as P latonic forms independent o f human existence and human

psycho logy , or perhaps they exist precisely as a construct ion f rom the intersubjective,

rational convergence itself. In either case the C R P criter ion works . The reason it works

for the case where value is a human construct ion is clear: i f values do not exist

independently but on ly as a human project ion, then the convergence o f rational

preference under fu l l knowledge defines these values. That objective values are those on

wh i ch rational preferences converge (as far as people are fu l l y informed) becomes a k i n d

o f conceptual truth, for this is a l l they can be. Bu t i f values exist independently o f the

human m i n d , then it might seem that there is no reason why in formed rat ional people

should necessari ly prefer them. (If their existence does not depend on our existence, w h y

should there be any connect ion between them and our preferences?) Bu t this prob lem is

i l lusory. What we are discuss ing are human values, things that are valuable for us. Bu t i f

there are things that are object ively good for us, i n this mind-independent way , this

goodness w i l l be inexpl icab le i f fu l l y in formed, rational people do not recognize these

values. Fo r what cou ld poss ib ly exp la in this bel ieve? So i f people are fu l l y in formed

(about their o w n true interests and everything else, inc lud ing metaphysica l or re l ig ious

truths i f you l ike) and rat ional , their preference should converge on these objective

(human) values.

1 1 I owe this idea to Earl Winkler, who suggested this to me in a personal discussion.

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The C R P cr i ter ion is not purely empir i ca l . T o see what is object ive ly good, we do

not on ly observe what people actual ly prefer, we also examine h o w rational they are and

h o w much they k n o w o f a l l the things relevant to a g iven judgment. Bu t cr iter ia o f

rational ity and knowledge are at least partly normative, for there are normative standards

that we use to judge w h o is rational and who has proper knowledge. F o r instance, to be

rational one has to be consistent and coherent in one's reasoning. However , to be

consistent i n one 's reasoning one has to f o l l o w var ious norms o f log ica l analysis, such as

"It is wrong to commi t the fa l lacy o f a f f i rming the consequent" and "It is correct to infer

that Q f rom ' I f P then Q and P.'" S imi l a r l y , to establish proper knowledge we have to

f o l l o w norms l ike " I f a theory predicts P and we observe P, then we have some reason to

bel ieve that the theory is true." Bu t the cr i ter ion o f rational convergence is not purely

normative either. It does predict some empir ica l phenomena. T o see h o w it does so, let us

imagine the f o l l ow ing scenario.

1.5 The "Adobe Photoshop" Analogy.

Imagine you want to buy a computer program for photo manipulat ion. So you

want to k n o w w h i c h program is the best in the market. N o w you learn that a l l the most

knowledgeable buyers who want a fu l l range o f manipulat ion capabi l i ty buy A d o b e

Photoshop. What does this phenomenon suggest? Does it suggest that the A d o b e

Photoshop is the best program c i rculat ing in the market?

It seems that it does suggest so. A n d this is comparable to Koh lbe rg ' s f indings

about people 's preferences for higher mora l stages. There are four important observations

that support the superiority o f higher stages: (1) higher-stage mora l reasoning requires

greater cognit ive ab i l i ty ; (2) stage development is irreversible; (3) people prefer the

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highest stage they can comprehend; and (4) higher stages predict mora l behavior. Taken

together, (1) and (3) come pretty close to the fact that people w i th proper knowledge

prefer the A d o b e Photoshop ih our analogy. No te that i n the A d o b e Photoshop case it is

not the major i ty 's preference i tse l f that suggests that A d o b e Photoshop is the best

program. It is rather the fact that knowledgeable buyers prefer it that suggests it is the

best. Therefore, that h igher stages require greater cogni t ive ab i l i ty does seem to support

the hierarchical c l a im .

B y examin ing what explains stage progression we can prov ide even more so l id

foundat ion for accepting Koh lbe rg ' s hierarchical c l a im. Cons ider cogni t ive abi l i ty . I f

there is any mora l reasoning at a l l , then mora l maturity must, to some extent, be

connected w i th cognit ive maturity. Therefore, a mora l l y mature person should show a

stronger abi l i ty to deal w i th the complex i t ies o f mora l situations. He should also be able

to dist inguish between value concepts in a systematic way. These are what Koh lbe rg cal ls

the cognit ive cr i ter ia (see Chapter 1, section 1.3 for details). Therefore, that higher stages

require greater cogni t ive abi l i ty , i.e., (1), is a natural consequence o f the hierarchical

c l a im . Since (1) is empi r i ca l l y conf i rmed by empi r i ca l studies, these studies prov ide

indirect support for the hierarchical c l a im .

O f course, g iven a l l this, the support for the hierarchical c l a im remains weak. T o

be a professional k i l l e r requires greater cognit ive abi l i ty than to be an average gangster,

but this does not mean that being a professional k i l l e r is object ively better than being a

gangster. (3) is therefore especia l ly important. O n one hand, (3) is relevant to the

hierarchical c l a im in that the person who understands on ly Stages 1 -4 is cogni t ive ly

infer ior to the person who understands also Stage 5, at least as far as their abi l i t ies to

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comprehend different mora l conceptions is concerned. Therefore, (3) supports the

objective superiority o f the higher stages i n a way s imi lar to (1). M o r e important ly , (3)

also supports the superior i ty o f the higher stages i n an important way i n w h i c h (1) does

not. Th is has to do w i th the fact that when we assess the relevance o f people 's

preferences to the object iv i ty o f values, considerations o f epistemic adequacy come into

p lay as we l l . S ince it appears that no one w h o articulates a preference for a lower stage

over a higher stage understands the higher stage correct ly, there is real ly nobody who

prefers a lower stage to a higher stage. Consequent ly , there is real ly no disagreement on

whether a higher stage is better than a lower stage. A l l the preferences people have are

preferences for higher stages to lower ones.

Though we do not c l a im that the objective superiority o f A over B empi r i ca l l y

impl ies a general agreement on people 's preference for A to B, the existence o f

agreement does undermine re lat iv ism in an indirect way. Re l a t i v i sm seems to predict that

there are different and conf l i c t ing mora l standards among people, and that there is no way

to resolve these. Bu t this is not what we f i nd by observat ion on the question o f the

preferabi l i ty o f higher to lower Koh lbe rg i an stages. What we f i nd is rather that there is

l itt le real disagreement at a l l i n preferences for mora l standards as represented by these

stages. A t least here, then, re la t iv ism is less plausible than it appears, and the less credible

re lat iv ism is , the more credible is object iv ism or universa l ism.

The relat ion between (2) and the objective superiority o f higher stages is s imi lar .

The i rreversibi l i ty o f stage development means that nobody who has adopted the mora l

concept ion o f a higher stage w i l l ever, under normal c ircumstances, give it up and replace

it by a lower stage. Presumably , a person who has adopted a certain mora l concept ion

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understands it suff ic ient ly to be able to apply it i n mak ing mora l judgments .

Irreversibi l i ty therefore amounts to a k i nd o f performative agreement among people to

the effect that, relative to the stages they can employ , a higher stage is a lways better than

a lower one. Th i s again undermines the relativist c l a im that different mora l standards are

equal ly adequate.

Las t ly we have to see h o w (4) is relevant to the objective superiority o f the higher

stages. S ince we expect that mora l maturity predicts mora l behavior , the mora l l y mature

person should have a greater tendency to do the right th ing i n a mora l situation. Thus , i f

i n situation S the mora l l y r ight th ing to do is X , the mora l l y mature person should have a

greater tendency to do X i n situation S than the immature person, other things equal. Th is

cr i ter ion is ph i losoph ica l l y even more conv inc ing than the above two, for what we do i n

emp loy ing this cr i ter ion is not to infer an "oughf '-statement f rom an "is"-statement.

Quite the contrary, we are inferr ing an "oughf '-statement f rom an "ought"-statement. The

inference is l ike this: since Stage 5 subjects are more l i ke l y to do what they ought to do

than Stage 4 subjects, Stage 5 reasoning is most l i ke l y better than Stage 4.

A question arises concern ing this l ine o f argument. The argument starts w i th the

assumption that there are things that are obv ious ly r ight, such as quit t ing the experiment

i n the M i l g r a m situation. Bu t i f this course is real ly so obv ious , then even the less mature

should f ind it wrong to continue just as the more mature do. It w o u l d thus seem un l ike l y

that the less mature w o u l d d i f fer much i n their tendency to quit f r om the more mature.

Bu t since they do di f fer , the idea that " to quit is r ight " must not be as obv ious as it seems,

at least not to the less mature.

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It is true that, for the less mature, to quit is less obv ious ly the right th ing to do.

Bu t this has nothing to do w i th whether it is right to quit. Indeed, when I argue for the

superiority o f higher stages o n the basis o f the difference between subjects at different

stages i n the M i l gram situation I assume that the reader already agrees w i th me that it is

right to quit. The quest ion I want to ask is not whether it is right to quit but, rather, since

it is right to quit , and since most higher-stage subjects quit wh i l e most lower-stage

subjects do not, whether it is reasonable to suppose that higher-stage subjects are indeed

mora l l y more mature. Moreove r , the fact that what is r ight i n the situat ion is less obv ious

to the lower-stage subjects i tse l f suggests that these subjects are less mature, for what is

obv ious ly r ight is less obv ious ly right for them.

O n the other hand, that quit t ing is less obv ious l y right for lower-stage subjects

does not mean that they do not bel ieve or have some strong sense that it is r ight to quit.

M o s t o f the subjects who cont inued showed strong signs o f anxiety, and they cont inued

to apply the shocks on l y when forced by the experimenter to do so. There are two points

we can draw f rom these facts. F irst , there is no reason to doubt the presupposit ion that it

is obv ious ly right to quit the M i l g r a m experiment. Second, a l though almost a l l

participants feel that it is w rong to continue, higher-stage subjects are more inc l ined to

quit than lower-stage subjects, suggesting that higher-stage reasoning provides stronger

mot ivat ion or conf idence for a subject to do what he/she knows to be right. Di f ferent

forms o f mora l reasoning appear therefore to have different mot ivat ing powers , w i th

higher Koh lbe rg i an stages p rov id ing stronger mot ivat ion for mora l act ion. A s suggested

above, such a correlat ion between moral stage and mora l behavior may also be related to

self-confidence. I f you understand your o w n reasons w e l l y o u do not defer so m u c h to

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authority. Therefore we can conclude that the higher stages are better on the basis that

they prov ide stronger or more secure mot ivat ion for a person to do the r ight t h i n g . 1 2

The above d iscuss ion can be regarded as a reply to F lanagan 's A rgument 10

against Koh lbe rg ' s hierarchical c l a im . F lanagan's point is that invariant sequence does

not imp l y hierarchy, and he is def ini te ly correct. That is , the sequential ity o f the stages

i tse l f does not suggest much . However , when tak ing other empi r i ca l f ind ings into

considerat ion, the hierarchical nature o f these stages gains s ignif icant support.

1.6 The CRP criterion revisited

N o w let us return to the C R P cr i ter ion. What does m y interpretation o f Koh lbe rg ' s

theory have to do w i th the C R P criterion? The C R P cr i ter ion states that the object ively

better th ing is one on w h i c h fu l l y rational agents' preferences converge, prov ided that

they have fu l l knowledge about the things they are compar ing , and regardless o f whether

our conceptions o f object iv i ty for human values is realist or constructivist.

I have pointed out that the C R P cr i ter ion has some empi r i ca l content that is o f

relevance in assessing Koh lbe rg ' s theory. Th is content comes f r om the fact that we

human beings are rational beings. Though not everybody is equal ly rat ional , we strive to

be as rational as we can when we reflect on any k i nd o f prob lem. S ince most o f us, or a l l

o f us, do reflect on things, it is most l i ke l y that our abi l i ty to solve problems rat ional ly

w i l l sharpen through t ime. It is absurd to suppose that there is no trend whatsoever i n the

cognit ive development as people grow up. S imi l a r l y , it is extremely implaus ib le to

121 do not pretend that this is a logically conclusive argument. Nevertheless, I find it compelling, and all the premises in the argument are either true or highly plausible.

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suppose that people 's mora l maturity does not g row and deve lop at a l l . O f course some

people may s imp ly become better able to rat ional ize and cogni t ive ly distort the matters

they encounter. But it seems that they w i l l more l i ke l y be exceptions than norms.

Otherwise experience and reflections w i l l be entirely or almost entirely irrelevant to

growth, wh i ch is h igh ly implaus ib le . Therefore the general pattern one f inds i n human

mora l development cannot be ph i losoph ica l l y ins ignif icant . There also remains the

poss ib i l i ty that the chronolog ica l order o f the emergence o f mora l stages can be expla ined

by other reasons else. Therefore F lanagan and Seigel are correct i n c l a im ing that

sequential ity does not i m p l y hierarchy. But they cannot prov ide us w i th any other

plausible explanat ion either. In this absence, increasing adequacy remains the on ly and

best explanat ion, especial ly when buttressed w i th analyses o f increased adequacy in

terms o f greater consistency and comprehensiveness.

Chrono log ica l order is not the on ly " e v idence " we have. W e also observe that the

employment o f mora l stages is related to cogni t ive and rational abi l i ty . The C R P cr i ter ion

requires that evaluators have fu l l knowledge about the things they compare i n order to

judge w h i c h is better. K o h l b e r g discovers that a l l disagreements about the compar ison o f

two stages are accompanied by an epistemic asymmetry. A l m o s t a l l who understand two

stages prefer the higher stage, and almost a l l who "p re fe r " a lower stage to a higher

misunderstand the nature o f the higher stage. Th is strongly suggests that higher stages are

object ively better than lower stages according to the C R P cr i ter ion. The same l ine o f

argument can also be appl ied to the i rrevers ibi l i ty o f development as we l l .

The effect o f free discussions on stage development is even more supportive o f

our conc lus ion. A c c o r d i n g to the C R P cr i ter ion, objective value is necessari ly connected

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to convergence o f rational preference, either quite direct ly on a construct iv ist account o f

object iv i ty, or more indirect ly on a realist account. W h e n we are engaged in free

discussions about values and the determination o f mora l rightness the very condit ions o f

d iscuss ion impose constraints w h i c h force us to avo id arbitrariness in preferr ing some

people 's interests over others. The abstract tendency o f these constraints is such as to lead

everyone towards a recogni t ion o f the equal basic mora l status and d ign i ty o f a l l persons.

Therefore, i n this more substantive way also, the more rational we are the more l i ke l y we

shal l agree on mora l standards o f the sort represented by the higher Koh lbe rg i an stages.

These considerations — wh i ch , again, invo lve a substantive matter connected w i th

equality and just ice — prov ide addit ional support for the c l a im that higher stages are

better than the lower ones.

W h e n def in ing rat ional i ty, we say that be ing rational means being consistent and

coherent in one 's reasoning. A s emphasized throughout this d iscuss ion, these cr iter ia are

prominent ly reflected in Koh lbe rg ' s developmental mode l . The related concept is that o f

d isequ i l ib r ium. A stage is better than its previous stage because, w i th its greater

reversibi l i ty , it is less l i ke l y to lead to d i sequ i l ib r ium (Chapter 1, section 1.4). A n d , o f

course, this is a major reason people move to a higher leve l . A s they discover that their

mora l concept ion leads to irreversible solutions to mora l d i lemmas they become less and

less comfortable w i th their o w n mora l standard, and they try to revise their mora l

concept ion to make it more equi l ibrated. Espec ia l l y under the pressures o f mora l

discourse among people o f d i f fer ing race, background, gender, soc ia l pos i t ion , etc., they

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try to extend their realms o f mora l concern, to understand better the ind i v idua l situation

o f every person, and to treat different persons as equal ly as poss ib l e . 1 3

1.7 A clarification of Kohlberg ' s hierarchical c laim

There is an important point to note so that we do not misunderstand Koh lbe rg ' s

hierarchical c l a im . What Koh lbe rg endeavors to show is that higher-stage reasoning is in

general more adequate than that o f lower-stages. He is not t ry ing to show that higher

forms o f reasoning always g ive rise to better mora l decis ions. In H e i n z ' s d i l emma, a

Stage 4 reasoner may decide that H e i n z should not steal the drug so that the legal system

is protected; wh i l e a Stage 2 reasoner may decide to steal the drug because his w i fe w i l l

then do h i m a favor i n return. Th i s does not make the choice o f refra in ing f rom stealing

better than stealing. Fo r K o h l b e r g , it is clear that stealing the drug is the right choice.

S imi l a r l y , that two persons are at the same stage does not necessari ly mean that

they have equal ly adequate mora l bel iefs. Therefore we can reply to objections such as

the one raised by Laurence Thomas . " I f Koh lbe rg is to be taken l i teral ly , then people who

at Stage 4 came to embrace N a z i anti-Semitic ideology were exh ib i t ing as m u c h proper

mora l development as contemporary Canadians who at Stage 4 come to embrace the

egalitarian ideo logy o f Canad ian soc i e t y . " 1 4 The key to puzz les l i ke this l ies i n the

dist inct ion between the adequacy o f the " f o r m " o f mora l reasoning and the h igh ly

substantive values held by a subject. The fact that both the N a z i and the egalitarian are i n

Stage 4 may suggest their forms o f mora l reasoning are equal ly adequate. However , by

1 3 The hypothesis that disequilibrium stimulates stage progression is also tested empirically (Chapter 1, section 2.2). 1 4 Laurence Thomas, "Morality and Psychological Development." In A Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter Singer (Oxford, Blackwell, 1993), 471.

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no means does it i m p l y that a value system dr i v ing people to massacre and persecute

others must be as good as one requir ing them to l i ve peaceful ly w i th others. K o h l b e r g

does not c l a im that a better f o rm o f mora l reasoning a lways guarantees a better mora l

dec is ion . Th i s is exact ly the reason he dist inguishes mora l " f o r m " and mora l content. One

may have chosen a mora l l y " cor rec t " act ion by luck, so to speak, as has the egalitarian i n

Canada. I say that he has chosen the correct mora l content by " l u c k " because, prov ided

that he has chosen it because he wants to mainta in the socia l order b y f o l l o w i n g

convent ional norms, he/she w o u l d have chosen the N a z i norm had he/she l i ved i n N a z i

Germany. A n d , o f course, one can also reason in a fa i r ly adequate way but st i l l make a

wrong dec is ion (perhaps except Stage 6 reasoners). Therefore, it is not surpr is ing for a

N a z i whose mora l reasoning is fo rmal l y as adequate as the Canadian egal itar ian's to

make mora l choices that are worse, and indeed far worse, than the Canadian 's .

Moreover , it is wrong to suppose that a l l reasoners at the same stage display

equal ly adequate mora l reasoning. A s we have seen in Chapter 2, K o h l b e r g does not

measure mora l maturity i n terms o f mora l stages on ly , but also i n terms o f mora l types

(Chapter 2, section 1.3). A Stage 4 N a z i w o u l d almost certainly be a Type A reasoner, for

he/she fai ls to recognize the value o f conscience over f i xed laws (assuming that

conscience prohibits massacre), and therefore his/her reasoning violates the criterion of

hierarchy. L i kew i se , he/she cou ld not l i ke l y satisfy the cr i ter ion o f autonomy, wh i ch

requires him/her to recognize that he/she is an autonomous mora l agent. I f one had such

recogni t ion, one cou ld hardly avo id f o l l ow ing one's o w n conscience instead o f obey ing

the government. He/she cou ld not satisfy the criterion of intrinsicalness, wh i ch requires

him/her to show an " in t r ins ic respect for persons; " and he/she w o u l d have fa i led to satisfy

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the criterion of moral respect, w h i c h requires him/her to recognize that the other parties

as autonomous mora l agents too. He/she cou ld not poss ib ly satisfy the criterion of

constructivism, w h i c h requires him/her to consider the v i e w points o f a l l the.other parties.

Therefore, the Stage 4 N a z i cou ld on l y be a Stage 4 A reasoner, but the Canad ian

egalitarian w o u l d quite l i ke l y fa l l under Stage 4 B . In this sense, there is st i l l a s ignif icant

difference i n the adequacy o f their mora l reasoning or values (for the cr i ter ia o f type B

mora l reasoning refer to Chapter 2, sect ion 1.3).

Furthermore, it is extremely problemat ic whether any Stage 4 reasoner can truly

bel ieve in N a z i s m . W h e n I say this I do not mean that Stage 4 reasoning and N a z i

ideology are log ica l l y incompat ib le w i th each other. I am say ing that as a matter o f fact it

is extremely un l ike ly for a Stage 4 reasoner to embrace such a value at a l l . The Stage 4

mora l concept ion is not one o f obedience to authority or government. A l s o , norms for a

Stage 4 reasoner serve to "promote cooperat ion or socia l contr ibut ion and act as

regulations designed to avo id disagreement and d isorder " (Koh lbe rg 1984, p. 632). Does

genocide avo id disagreement and disorder? Does it promote cooperat ion? A Stage 4

reasoner may think it does, but this is possible only i f he/she seriously misjudges the

socia l situation. Indeed by 1930's most Germans had l i ved w i t h the Jews for a long t ime

and had good reasons to bel ieve that the Jews were part o f their society. E ven i f they d i d

not think so, they might we l l th ink that the best way o f mainta in ing their society was to

l ive w i th outsiders peaceful ly . S ince the core mora l concept ion o f Stage 4 is that o f

maintenance o f the societal system as a whole , it is not to be expected that a Stage 4

reasoner w o u l d endorse every single norm enforced by their society. Y e s , there might

st i l l be a f ew extreme cases i n wh i ch a Stage 4 reasoner w o u l d embrace the anti-Semitic

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ideology, but this s t i l l does not damage Koh lbe rg ' s theory because Stage 4 fo rma l

reasoning does not guarantee correct mora l decis ions, and K o h l b e r g has never c la imed

that it does.

In this sect ion I argued that Koh lbe rg ' s studies prov ide s ignif icant support for the

normative c l a im that Stage 6 is object ively better than the lower stages. Th i s defense o f

Koh lbe rg ' s h ierarchica l c l a im has integrated var ious considerations related to the

developmental patterns o f Koh lbe rg i an mora l psycho logy , inc lud ing (1) h igher mora l

stages require greater cogni t ive abi l i ty ; (2) the stages fo rm a universal invariant sequence;

(3) subjects o f lower stages typ ica l l y cannot comprehend higher stages; (4) free

discussions tend to stimulate stage progressions; and (5) h igher stages predict better

mora l behavior.

Fo r us this is an important conc lus ion. One o f our ma in purposes is to explore the

relat ion between Koh lbe rg ' s theory and ethical un iversa l ism. A l t hough up to this point

we have not examined precisely what k i nd o f universa l ism his theory supports, we can

already refute an extreme fo rm o f re lat iv ism. Th is extreme re la t iv ism c la ims that

different mora l standards cannot be compared. N o mora l standard can be said to be

object ively better than others. I f the arguments above are sound, then surely some mora l

standards are object ively better than others, independently o f any part icular culture or

value system. Th i s is an important step towards establ ishing a credible universa l ism.

Section 2: Supremacy and universality of Stage 6

W e have just seen how empir ica l studies o f mora l development combined w i th

norms o f rat ional ity provides support for the normative c l a im that the Koh lbe rg i an stages

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are increasingly adequate. W e n o w turn to the question o f whether Koh lbe rg ' s mode l

represents a credible vers ion o f universal ist ethics. U l t imate l y I w o u l d l ike to suggest that

there can be different versions o f universa l ism. But first let me define a strong and

perhaps typ ica l f o rm o f it, what I w i l l ca l l 'paradigm un iversa l i sm. ' A c c o r d i n g to

paradigm universa l ism there exists a set o f pr inc ip les that are absolute and al l embrac ing,

but yet perfectly determinate when appl ied in particular situations. Koh lbe rg ' s theory

tends to suggest a un iversa l i sm in this paradigm sense. I w i l l examine Koh lbe rg ' s

universal ist c la ims i n this section.

In section 1 I argued that empi r i ca l f ind ings, together w i th norms o f rat ional i ty,

favor the hierarchical c l a im in Koh lbe rg ' s theory. However , the h ierarchica l c l a i m alone

says nothing about whether Stage 6 is real ly the best when compared to all possible

forms o f mora l reasoning. Sect ion 1 on ly offers a general schema for understanding h o w

a theory o f mora l development l ike Koh lbe rg ' s can be relevant to mora l ph i losophy and a

defense o f Koh lbe rg ' s hierarchical c l a im relative to the Koh lbe rg ian stages. W e do not

k n o w i f rat ional people w o u l d find some other possible fo rm o f mora l reasoning even

more attractive than Stage 6. E v e n granted that Koh lbe rg ' s mora l stages are o f increasing

adequacy, we cannot therefore c l a im that Stage 6 mora l reasoning is the best f o rm o f

mora l reasoning possib le . Therefore, to further evaluate Koh lbe rg ' s theory, we need to

discuss his c l a im that Stage 6 mora l reasoning is not on ly object ively superior to a l l other

stages but is also the goal or destiny o f mature mora l development.

2.1 The rarity of postconventional reasoners

Koh lbe rg ' s c l a im that the Stage 6 mora l concept ion is object ively more adequate

than al l other stages o f his mode l is related to universa l ism in that the superiority o f Stage

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6 is independent o f any part icular culture or value system. B e y o n d this, K o h l b e r g also

bel ieves Stage 6 to be the supreme goal o f mora l development. Ye t , as we have seen i n

Chapter 2, w i th the remova l o f Stage 6 f rom the (1987) scor ing manua l , K o h l b e r g and his

col leagues can no longer prove the existence o f Stage 6 reasoners. D o we , then, st i l l have

any reason to bel ieve that Stage 6 is real ly the destiny o f mora l development? Th i s

question is , i n effect, what F lanagan 's argument 8 is a l l about.

Before I reply to this quest ion about the real ity o f Stage 6, something needs to be

said on beha l f o f Koh lbe rg . M o r a l developmental psycho logy is , after a l l , a young

d isc ip l ine . The first major wo rk i n the f i e ld was Piaget 's Moral Judgment of the Child, .

publ ished i n 1932. Moreover , research i n mora l development was v i r tua l ly d iscont inued

after this, and d id not resume unt i l K o h l b e r g single-handedly rev ived the entire d isc ip l ine

i n the 1960's . Therefore it is fair to say that the d isc ip l ine is less than 40 years o ld .

Natura l science, w h i c h is general ly regarded as the paradigm for scient i f ic enterprises,

has taken several centuries to develop into the integrated fo rm it has today. It w o u l d be

unrealist ic to expect K o h l b e r g to achieve anything comparable to this integration al l by

h imse l f and w i th in such a short per iod.

Indeed, K o h l b e r g has never pretended that his establishment o f a developmental

mode l o f mora l i ty is a f in ished project. H i s last (1990) paper is not intended to be the

launching o f his theory about the highest stage i n mora l development. Rather, it is an

attempt to reintroduce Stage 6 into his mode l after hav ing retreated f rom c l a im ing its

actual occurrence for a decade. Bu t even in the m i d 80s, when he admits that there is no

evidence for the actual occurrence o f Stage 6 subjects, he keeps mainta in ing that we need

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to postulate Stage 6 as the end point o f mora l development and as a dev ice to define the

mora l domain . B e l o w we shal l deal w i th this c l a im .

In section 1,1 argued that K o h l b e r g is jus t i f ied i n us ing empir ica l data as

indicators o f the objective adequacy o f different forms o f mora l reasoning. The ma in

question then is whether the empir ica l data avai lable so far lead us to Koh lbe rg ' s

conc lus ion about the supreme adequacy o f Stage 6. Str ict ly speaking, the answer is no.

Fo r we have to note that Koh lbe rg ' s argument is based on empir ica l observat ion: I f a

certain fo rm o f mora l reasoning X is object ively better than another fo rm Y , then we

should observe that people 's reasoning moves f rom Y to X but not v ice versa, etc. W i t h

the recent re-development o f the mode l and the research method, the existence o f Stage 6

reasoning is no longer c l a imed to be ver i f ied by such observat ion, and it is not even

inc luded in the (1987) scor ing manual . U p to 1990 on ly two Stage 6 subjects have been

interv iewed, and this is an insuff ic ient foundat ion for any general c l a im about Stage 6

reasoning. D o a l l Stage 6 reasoners develop through a l l the lower stages? W i l l Stage 6

reasoners give up Stage 6 later? D o al l subjects who can understand Stage 6 prefer it to

Stage 5? D o Stage 6 reasoners behave better than Stage 5 reasoners in situations i n w h i c h

we k n o w the right th ing to do? S ince the (1987) scor ing manual has e l iminated Stage 6,

we do not even have a protocol for detecting Stage 6 mora l reasoning, and none o f the

above questions can be answered on the basis o f Koh lbe rg ' s later empir ica l research.

Nevertheless one may part ia l ly defend Koh lbe rg ' s c l a im about Stage 6 as fo l lows .

It is not surpr is ing that Stage 6 reasoners are so rare. A f t e r a l l , i f Koh lbe rg ' s theory is

correct, Stage 6 reasoners are real experts i n mora l reasoning. U n l i k e experts i n other

f ie lds l ike computer p rogramming , we do not have any systematic tra ining for mora l

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reason ing . 1 5 One w i l l be surprised to f ind a programmer who can design a software as

sophisticated as W i n d o w s 95 w i th no fo rma l t ra in ing behind h i m at a l l . A c c o r d i n g to

Koh lbe rg ' s theory, cogni t ive abi l i ty and sensit iv ity to d i f fer ing ind iv idua l and soc ia l

perspectives are two prerequisites o f mora l development. It is on ly to be expected then

that Stage 6 subjects w i l l be quite rare. Consequent ly , the smal l number o f Stage 6

subjects found does not necessari ly mean that there is any serious p rob lem in Koh lbe rg ' s

theory.

Moreover , as a result o f rev is ing the scor ing manual , there occurred a downward

shift o f the scores for the higher stages. In particular, reasoning w h i c h was earlier

categorized as Stage 6 was most ly categorized as Stage 5 in the (1987) scor ing manua l .

However , l ook ing back to the earl ier studies, s ignif icant ( dif ferences between the

performance o f Stage 5 subjects and Stage 6 subjects can be noted. Stage 6 subjects

showed clear superiority i n their mora l behavior i n the M i l g r a m situation and the Free

Speech Movemen t study. Th i s is a good reason to conjecture that K o h l b e r g had done

more than he needed when he col lapsed Stage 6 into Stage 5 in the late mode l . Perhaps

there were ways by w h i c h K o h l b e r g cou ld have kept Stage 6 in the scor ing manual wh i le

overcoming the anomal ies he encountered.

In the above discuss ion I attempted to exp la in the rarity o f postconvent ional

reasoners i n terms o f cogni t ive demands and the absence o f tra ining i n soc ia l

understanding through a postconvent ional perspective. I have also suggested that the

rarity o f Stage 6 subjects may be exaggerated by the fact that Stage 6 appears to be

1 5 It is interesting to note that, according to the early writings of Kohlberg, all philosophers he has interviewed are postconventional reasoners.

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col lapsed unnecessari ly into Stage 5 i n the (1987) scor ing manual . Researchers i n mora l

psycho logy have recently proposed other h igh ly plausible explanations. A n example is

R i chard Shweder, who suggests that, i n Koh lbe rg ' s mora l judgment interv iews, subjects

are required to "generate arguments, verbal ly represent complex concepts, and talk l i ke a

mora l ph i losopher . " S ince "knowledge o f concepts often precedes their self-reflective

representation i n speech, " such a research method tends to underscore the reasoning o f

the subjects. 1 6

Moreover , when we look c lose ly at Koh lbe rg ' s (1987) scor ing manua l , we cannot

help suspecting that the manual is not an accurate representation o f his def ini t ions o f the

mora l stages. Fo r example , i n response to H e i n z ' s d i l emma, a subject is scored as a Stage

4 reasoner i f he/she says H e i n z should steal the drug because human life is more

important than property r ights, or because human l i fe has intr insic value (Co lby et a l .

1987 vo l . 2, p. 9). However , one is ranked as Stage 5 i f one answers that the right to l i fe

transcends the r ight to property (Co lby et a l . 1987 v o l . 2, p. 11). The difference i n these

two answers is surely arbitrary, as it turns mere ly on the fact that the latter uses the term

'r ight to l i fe , ' wh i l e the former uses instead the term 'value o f l i fe . ' Examples o f this k i n d

tend to show that Shweder is r ight i n say ing that Koh lbe rg has required the subjects to

talk l ike phi losophers. I w o u l d even say that Koh lbe rg has required his subjects to talk

l ike phi losophers who share his terminology. I f a phi losopher does not th ink there is

m u c h difference, i n the relevant context, between say ing "the value o f l i f e " and "the r ight

16Richard A. Shweder et al, "Culture and Moral Development." In The Emergence of Morality in Young Children, ed. Jerome Kagan and Sharon Lamb (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 16.

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to l i f e , " he/she may be scored as Stage 4 because he chooses to use the former

expression.

The imp l i ca t ion is that the (1987) scor ing manual may have downscored some

postconvent ional subjects. I f this is true, then what is partly responsible for the rarity o f

postconvent ional subjects is the scor ing manual instead o f the concepts o f the stages

themselves. One possible way to ver i fy this c l a im is to develop mod i f i ed versions o f the

scor ing manua l , and test whether there is any vers ion w h i c h (1) fa i thfu l ly reflects the

mora l concept ion o f each stage and, (2) produces the same pattern o f empi r i ca l data,

except (3) it detects more cases o f postconvent ional subjects. I f these results were

obtained under one or more mod i f i ed vers ion o f the scor ing manua l , then the

responsibi l i ty for the present appearance o f scarcity o f Stage 6 w o u l d go to the (1987)

manual . Otherwise, one w i l l have reason to bel ieve that there are some intr ins ic problems

w i th the mora l stage mode l or that Stage 6 is a k i n d o f ideal f o rm o f reasoning that is

rarely achieved i n practice. Sort ing a l l this out is a task that needs further effort o f

professional psychologists .

2.2 A philosophical argument in favor of Kohlberg's supremacy claim

What we n o w need, however , is posi t ive support for the c l a i m o f the supreme

adequacy for Stage 6. In his latest formulat ion, Koh lbe rg defines Stage 6 reasoning i n

terms o f active sympathy for others, ideal role-taking, and universa l izab i l i ty (Koh lbe rg et

a l . 1990, p. 153). These fo rma l properties are intui t ive ly attractive as the characteristics

o f correct mora l reasoning.

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Moreover , the point o f postulat ing Stage 6, Koh lbe rg says, is that the fo rma l

characteristics i n Stage 6 are the formal characteristics that make each stage better than

its previous one (Koh lbe rg et a l . 1990, p. 152). Le t us first consider universa l izabi l i ty .

F r o m Stage 1 to Stage 5, there is an obv ious expansion o f the rea lm o f mora l concern. A t

the preconvent ional leve l , the se l f is very m u c h the on ly mora l concern o f the subject. A t

the convent ional leve l , concern is ma in l y directed to people i n the agent's o w n group.

The convent ional subject can care about people outside his/her group, but he/she is

unable to consider mora l problems in terms o f values that transcend his/her o w n socia l

setting, and therefore the universa l izabi l i ty o f his/her mora l reasoning is st i l l l im i ted . A t

the postconvent ional leve l , the subject f ina l ly acquires the abi l i ty to reason i n terms o f

values independent of, and therefore not l imi ted by, the socia l setting and the socia l

values o f his/her o w n group. Un ive rsa l i zab i l i t y at the postconvent ional leve l is thus at its

ful lest manifestat ion.

It is the same w i th the " p r i n c i p l e s " o f sympathy and ideal role-taking. Stages

dominated by socia l perspectives show clear ly that development through the Koh lbe rg i an

stages involves the growth o f the abi l i ty to understand others' perspectives and to take

them into considerat ion. Preconvent ional subjects have very l imi ted abi l i ty to sympathize

w i th others. Convent iona l subjects' abi l i ty o f sympathetic understanding is more or less

l im i ted to people o f their o w n group (people who are s imi lar to themselves).

Postconvent ional subjects, by contrast, show a m u c h stronger capacity to sympathize

w i th everybody (however different these people are f rom themselves).

Overa l l , when one develops a long the stages, there is an increasing wi l l ingness to

seek agreement based on values that are c o m m o n among different parties. A t Stage 1

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there is on ly conformi ty but no agreement. A t Stage 2, cooperat ion is possible because

every person has his/her o w n interest and often needs to cooperate w i th others to achieve

his/her goals. (Note that this cooperat ion appears i n a very crude f o rm , i.e., i n the fo rm o f

exchange o f favors: " y o u scratch m y back and I ' l l scratch yours. " ) A t Stages 3 and 4,

agreement is possible because people share a society, and by mainta in ing the socia l

norms (Stage 3), or the socia l order i n general (Stage 4), cooperat ion is enhanced. A t

Stage 5, the subject sees that agreements should be based on the fact we are a l l human

beings o f equal wor th and dignity . W e can see, then, that one o f the ma in determinants o f

the adequacy o f each fo rm o f mora l reasoning concerns a fundamental attitude o f open-

mindedness, respect for others and a desire for agreement.

V i e w i n g Stage 6 in this l ight, one may f ind it appropriate to suppose that Stage 6

is not a separate stage f r om Stages 1-5. It can be considered a weto-stage, i.e., a product

o f ref lect ion on the previous s tages . 1 7 It is riot a separate stage, as it does not pose new

values that replace the values recognized i n its preceding stage (i.e., Stage 5 values such

as human rights, soc ia l contract, and ut i l i ty ) . Rather, it employs a formal operation (ideal

role-taking) to uni fy these values. Bes ides, this formal operation is not new either. It has

already existed at the lower stages. One can even say that every stage (starting at Stage 2)

is actually a truncated Stage 6, a distorted and l imi ted one. The higher the stage, the less

the distort ion. Therefore it is reasonable to postulate that the end point o f mora l

development is the point where such distort ion and l imi ta t ion disappears.

1 7 By saying this, 1 do not mean that this is part of Kohlberg's own theory. Rather, I am elaborating some ideas in his theory which may amount to a significant modification of Kohlberg's theory. However, Kohlberg can surely agree with me. See Colby et al. 1987 vol. 1, p. 35.

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Someth ing very important then fo l lows . I f Stage 6 is def ined i n terms o f the

fullest real izat ion o f precisely those formal characteristics whose advancement

demarcates every stage f rom its predecessors, then its supreme adequacy is proved by the

increasing adequacy o f Stages 1-5. Stage 6 thus represents the fu l l embodiment o f the

features whose instantiation at each stage is proport ional to the normative adequacy o f

that stage. Thus , to prove the supremacy o f Stage 6 over Stage 5, we do not need the k ind

o f empir ica l evidence we have for the superiority o f Stage 5 over Stage 4, or Stage 4 over

Stage 3, etc. Insofar as the " f o r m a l " features o f Stage 6 are d imensions that make every

stage different f r om and better than its preceding one, we have good reason to bel ieve

that these formal features, i n their fu l l embodiment , are basic cr i ter ia o f the best mora l

reasoning.

Th i s , I bel ieve, is the best defense that can be g iven o f Koh lbe rg ' s general c l a im

that Stage 6 reasoning is the ult imate goal or destiny o f mora l development. It does not,

however, rule out as a logical poss ib i l i ty that there might be some u n k n o w n fo rm o f

mora l reasoning w h i c h f u l l y rat ional and in formed people w o u l d prefer even to Stage 6.

What it does is to accept that the empi r i ca l evidence indicates that mora l development for

humans as we k n o w them fo l lows a progression o f stages w h i c h is h ierarchica l , and that

Stage 6 defines a m a x i m a l real izat ion o f the very characteristics w h i c h exp la in this

hierarchical order. In this sense, then, Stage 6 constitutes a k i n d o f ideal end stage o f

mora l development as we encounter it i n l i v i ng human beings.

2.3 Cultural diversity and universality of Stage 6

Another important question related to our defense o f Koh lbe rg ' s theory is whether

his mode l reflects a Western elit ist bias. Cr i t i cs such as Snarey and Shweder bel ieve it

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does. I f Koh lbe rg ' s theory real ly reflects such a bias, the c l a im for the universal i ty o f

Stage 6 w i l l be undermined.

Snarey suggests that wo rk i ng class people may have a different value system that

is equal ly p r inc ip led but is undetectable by the Koh lbe rg ian method. He also bel ieves that

Koh lbe rg ' s mode l favors Westernized societies. W h i l e the differences between

Westernized and non-Westernized societies are not as obv ious as Snarey may think, the

differences between upper and midd le class chi ldren and lower class ch i ldren is

remarkable. " U p p e r middle- and middle- class subjects a lways showed a faster rate o f

development than work ing- or lower-class subjects w i th in the same soc i e t y . " 1 9

Be l i e v ing that K o h l b e r g has such a bias, Shweder proposes a theory o f diverse

rationalit ies, w h i c h c la ims that there exists more than one rat ional ly defensible mora l

code. A m o n g these defensible mora l codes there are some "mandato ry " concepts, wh i ch

are cruc ia l for their rat ional appeal, and the rest are "d iscre t ionary , " w h i c h can change

f rom system to sys t em. 2 0 A r g u i n g on a s imi lar track, Snarey suggests that the fo rm o f

pr inc ip led mora l th ink ing i n Koh lbe rg ' s mode l is just one o f var ious possible forms o f

pr inc ip led mora l th ink ing , namely the indiv idual ist ic-l iberal fo rm. There exists at least

one other alternative, w h i c h embodies a more communi tar ian style o f mora l reasoning.

1 8 Snarey claims that Kohlberg's model is biased toward Western ideology because he discovers that no postconventional subjects were found in any non-Westernized societies at all. However, all these societies were also non-urbanized societies. Indeed, even in the non-urbanized Western societies there was no postconventional subjects. See John R. Snarey, "Cross-cultural Moral Development," in New Research in Moral Development, ed. Bill Puka (New York & London: Garland Publishing, 1994), 283. 19John Snarey, "In a Communitarian Voice: The Sociological Expansion of Kohlbergian Theory, Research, and Practice." In Moral Development: An Introduction, ed. William M. Kurtines & Jacob L. Gewirts (Boston and London: Allyn and Bacon, 1995), 118-119, 127. Also see Richard A. Shweder, "Culture and Moral Development," 14. 2 0 Richard A. Shweder, "Culture and Moral Development," 18.

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I th ink both Shweder and Snarey have pointed out some important shortcomings

o f Koh lbe rg ' s mode l . Nevertheless, several points have to be c lar i f ied as we l l . F irst ,

neither o f these cr i t ics has denied Koh lbe rg ' s basic d i rect ion i n d i v i d ing mora l

conceptions into three general levels , the highest o f w h i c h is postconvent ional and

pr inc ip led. Second, it is clear that they are sympathetic at least to the idea that human

mora l development can be d i v ided into the three Koh lbe rg i an levels. Otherwise they

w o u l d not have ta lked about a type o f communi tar ian postconventional or pr inc ip led

moral i ty . Th i rd , as far as the most mature type o f mora l concept ion is concerned, even the

alternative systems suggested by these cr i t ics share some basic values o f the Koh lbe rg i an

Stage 6 mora l concept ion.

The third point here is especia l ly important and deserves further elaboration.

W h e n we compare Koh lbe rg ' s mode l to Snarey 's proposal i n his " In a Communi ta r i an

V o i c e " we f ind that even Snarey 's o w n communi tar ian concept ion o f mora l i ty can be

assessed i n terms o f Koh lbe rg ' s o w n concept ion o f postconvent ional mora l standards. In

the communi tar ian mora l concept ion, the ind iv idua l is not def ined independent o f one 's

role i n the communi ty as the indiv idual ist ic- l ibera l tradit ion a l legedly does. Rather, " ro le

relationships are part o f the fabric o f b e i n g " o f ind iv idua l persons. Nevertheless, i n a

postconventional construct ion o f the concept ion o f role relat ionships, "the roles do not

derive fundamental ly f r om societal a s s i g n m e n t s . . . . W h e n an ind i v idua l ' s role does not

correspond w i t h the person's be ing, or an ind iv idua l does not l i ve up to the responsibi l i ty

o f a g iven role, normative role relat ionships are subject to m o d i f i c a t i o n . " 2 1 In other

words, i n a postconvent ional concept ion o f communi tar ian mora l i ty , what roles society

2 1 John Snarey, "In a Communitarian Voice," 121.

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assigns to the ind iv idua l are weaker than they are for convent ional (and most l i ke l y also

the preconventional) subject, wh i l e the part icular ity and dist inctiveness o f the ind iv idua l

gains more respect.

Snarey 's ma in idea is that there are forms o f postconvent ional mora l reasoning

wh i ch Koh lbe rg ' s scor ing manual fa i ls to reflect. Snarey quotes some responses f rom his

study o f k ibbu tz im subjects that are unscorable accord ing to Koh lbe rg ' s manua l , but

wh i ch nevertheless seem to be pr inc ip led (i.e., postconventional) in some signif icant

sense. Fo r example , one subject said that M o s h e should steal the drug to save his w i f e ' s

l i fe (the name o f the character i n H e i n z ' s d i l emma is changed to fit the culture o f the

subject). She jus t i f i ed her judgment f rom a Utopian point o f v i ew , say ing that i n a Utopian

society people w o u l d have agreed on values that supported her choice. She went on to

describe her Utopian society as one i n w h i c h everybody was equal and one wh i ch

recognized the right o f every member to se l f growth and happiness. Th is conception o f a

right to se l f growth and happiness does not appear i n Koh lbe rg ' s scor ing manual at a l l .

Nevertheless, this subject 's mora l concept ion shares Koh lbe rg ' s idea o f respect for every

ind iv idua l as an equal entity.

Another example was a subject in Ta iwan . Though suggesting that Joe should .

give his father the money based on a reason we might ca l l f i l i a l piety, the subject also

c la imed that the father should have respected his son's right. The subject d id not

understand f i l i a l p iety as b l i nd obedience to authority or parents, but a l lowed the ch i l d to

"stand up on his o w n pos i t ion i f he truly believe[d] he [was] r ight . " The prob lem was that

2 2 John Snarey, "Cross-Cultural Moral Development." In New Research in Moral Development, ed. Bill Puka (New York & London: Garland Publishing, 1994), 288.

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camping was not important enough for h i m to cause such a conf l ic t between his father

and himsel f . W h e n asked what was the most important th ing a son should be concerned

about i n his relat ionship to his father, the subject said that it was understanding his

parents' intent. F r o m this we can also see, though the answer is hardly scorable by

Koh lbe rg ' s manua l , that the subject shares the same basic mora l concept ion o f

23

Koh lbe rg ' s pr inc ip led leve l , i.e., mutual understanding and mutual respect.

S imi la r phenomena have also been observed by other psychologists . The study by

Wa lke r and M o r a n on the mora l reasoning i n Commun i s t C h i n a found that many people

(particularly leaders and intellectuals) were extremely reluctant to general ize mora l

decis ions beyond the particulars o f the d i l emma. Wa lke r and M o r a n think that this is a

mora l theme that is not we l l understood by Koh lbe rg ' s approach . 2 4 The Tiet jen and

Wa lke r (1985) study i n Papua N e w Gu inea also found that some mora l conceptions

people employed were d i f f i cu l t to score according to Koh lbe rg ' s scor ing manual . These

conceptions inc luded marawa wawe, wh i ch roughly means "ha rmony w i th others;" vina,

w h i c h means the " repayment o f fo rma l ob l iga t ion ; " and sorcery, wh i ch was pract iced as a

means o f socia l contro l . Nevertheless, Tiet jen and Wa lke r point out that these concepts

can be used at different levels , " just as the concept o f ' just ice, ' on wh i ch Koh lbe rg ' s

25

system is based, can be used at different leve ls . "

2 jIbid, 290-291. 2 4 Lawrence J. Walker and Thomas J. Moran, "Moral reasoning in a Communist Chinese Society," Journal of Moral Education 20, no. 2 (1991), 139-155, esp, 153. The "moral theme" expressed in their reluctance to generalized moral decisions is clearly a contextualist one. This theme is closely related to the problem of determinacy of postconventional moral reasoning, and I will deal with this question shortly. 2 5 Anne Marie Tietjen and Lawrence J. Walker, "Moral reasoning and Leadership among Men in a Papua New Guinea Society," Developmental Psychology 2\, no. 6 (1985), 982-992, esp, 990-991.

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The reason why these responses are hard to score is clear: they emp loy concepts

w h i c h do not appear i n the scor ing manual , such as self-growth, f i l i a l p iety, and harmony,

etc. But does it mean that Koh lbe rg ' s theory is total ly wrong? N o t necessari ly. It may

mean on ly that, though the Koh lbe rg ian stages correctly capture h o w people 's mora l

reasoning develops, the scor ing manual fai ls to inc lude al l the possible responses w h i c h

instantiate these stages (wh ich is by no means surprising). Moreove r , it is also plausib le

that in different cultures these stages tend to manifest themselves i n different ways.

In order to exp la in the existence o f unscorable data f rom non-Western cultures,

Snarey proposes that there exists a communi tar ian mora l concept ion, w h i c h is to be

contrasted w i th Koh lbe rg ' s ind iv idua l is t ic one. In such a mora l concept ion, s ix basic

values are upheld. The first is the pr inc ip le o f happiness. Happiness is understood here as

the fu l f i l lment o f potentials inherent i n the ind iv idua l and the socia l context. A

postconventional construct ion o f such an idea recognizes that the happiness o f the

ind iv idua l is a value that functions as a pr inc ip le for evaluat ing a g iven societal

construct ion or a mora l dec is ion.

The second value is tradit ion. The role o f tradit ion is comparable to that o f the

legal system in the ind iv idua l is t i c mora l concept ion. In a postconvent ional construct ion

o f tradit ion, tradit ion "represents an approximat ion o f the nature o f b e i n g " o f people. Bu t

since it is on ly an approximation, it is also recognized i n a postconvent ional construct ion

that tradit ional values are not ult imate, and that the true values o f things l ie beyond

tradit ion.

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The th i rd is understanding. Mu tua l understanding, accord ing to such a mora l

concept ion, is an intr insic value o f a society. In a postconvent ional formulat ion , mutual

understanding derives its force f rom a pos i t ion outside or above the societal system.

The fourth is rec iproc i ty , by w h i c h Snarey means co-operation and mutual a id.

"Rec ip roc i t y is expected to be mutual , equitable, and non-exploitat ive; it is assumed that

a l l persons deserve mutual respect, equal transactions, and fair dea ls . " Snarey does not

tel l us what its postconvent ional construct ion is l ike . But the expectations ment ioned

above (mutuality, equity, respect, fairness, etc.) are a l l s imi lar to Koh lbe rg ' s formal

properties at the postconvent ional leve l . So what Snarey means is poss ib ly that in the

postconventional construct ion these expectations are better and more comprehensive ly

fu l f i l l ed than i n the convent ional and preconvent ional constructions.

The f i f th value is role relat ionship and sol idarity. It means that role relat ionships

are considered part o f the fabric o f be ing. In a postconventional construct ion o f this

concept, roles do not derive mere ly f rom societal assignments. " W h e n an ind iv idua l ' s

role does not correspond w i th the person's be ing, or an ind iv idua l does not l i ve up to the

responsibi l i t ies o f a g iven role, normative relationships are subject to mod i f i c a t i on . "

The s ixth and final value is the unity o f a l l l i fe . Th i s value presupposes a wor ld

v i ew in wh i ch there exists a "un i ty o f a l l be ing . " Snarey suggests that i n a

postconvent ional construct ion o f this value, " i t wou ld be argued that a l l l i fe is

fundamental ly connected. " Unfortunate ly this speci f icat ion does not dist inguish the

postconventional construct ion f rom the convent ional or the preconvent ional . What he

says about the postconvent ional construct ion appears to be just the same as his general

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def in i t ion o f the value i t s e l f — for what is the real difference between al l l i fe be ing

" connec ted " and there be ing a "un i t y o f a l l b e i n g " ? 2 6

What can be taken f rom Snarey 's proposal is that Koh lbe rg ' s ma in ideas on

postconventional mora l i ty can be expanded to inc lude a wider range o f ideologies.

Snarey h imse l f does not regard his ideas as any sort o f refutation o f Koh lbe rg ' s theory,

but rather as an expans ion o f it. Koh lbe rg ' s theory itself, as we can observe f r om his

scor ing manual , is bounded somewhat to an indiv idual ist ic- l iberal ideo logy , but Snarey

bel ieves that its basic spirit can be recast i n other forms w i th different emphases. Leav ing

aside the d i f f i cu l ty i n understanding the value o f the uni ty o f a l l l i fe , Snarey 's

formulat ion o f a communi tar ian mora l concept ion instantiates Koh lbe rg ' s

postconventional mora l concept ion in a way that emphasizes communi tar ian aspects o f

respect for ( indiv idual ) persons together w i th equality. But as far as their

postconventional formulat ions are concerned, a l l o f Snarey 's communi tar ian mora l ideals

recognize the ind iv idua l i ty o f persons, and seek to grant every ind iv idua l the greatest

possible respect. Indeed, some o f the ideas i n Snarey 's postconvent ional communi ta r ian

mora l i ty are v i r tua l ly ident ical w i th the formal characteristics o f K o h l b e r g ' s Stage 6

moral i ty . Fo r instance, mutual understanding is just the value wh i ch K o h l b e r g tries to

real ize through rec iprocal role-taking. Rec iproc i ty , wh i ch means " a l l persons deserve

mutual respect, equal transactions, and fair dea ls , " also reflects perfect ly Koh lbe rg ' s

basic idea o f the egal itarian nature o f mora l i ty . The ma in difference between Snarey 's

communi tar ian mora l concept ion and Koh lbe rg ' s mora l concept ion is that Snarey accepts

26Snarey, "In a Communitarian Voice: The Sociological Expansion of Kohlbergian Theory, Research and Practice." In Moral Development: An Introduction, ed. William M. Kurtines & Jacob L. Gewirtz (Boston & London: Allyn and Bacon, 1995), 120-121.

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a " t h i cke r " concept ion o f persons i n that the identity o f ind iv idua ls is int r ins ica l ly bound

up w i th relat ionships.

S imi la r l y , Shweder also acknowledges the basic spirit o f the Stage 6 mora l

concept ion. He suggests that there are three mandatory features i n Koh lbe rg ' s idea o f

Stage 6 moral i ty . F irst , there is the idea o f natural law. The idea o f natural l a w is that o f

an "object ive ob l iga t ion , " w h i c h means that there are things that are r ight or w rong

independent o f the agent's personal interest and the external norms exis t ing i n a society.

Second, there is the pr inc ip le o f harm. It states that " a legit imate ground for l im i t i ng

someone's l iberty to do as they want is a determination that harm is be ing done to

s o m e o n e . . . . Eve ry rat ional ly appeal ing mora l code defines what consequences are

permiss ible and just i f ies the regulat ion o f certain actions by reference to their harmfu l

effects, however those are conce i ved . " Th i rd , there is the abstract pr inc ip le o f just ice. It

states that " l i k e cases must be treated a l ike and different cases must be treated

d i f f e ren t l y . " 2 7

W e can easi ly see h o w these features are connected to Koh lbe rg ' s idea o f Stage 6

moral i ty . The idea o f natural l aw is exact ly what Koh lbe rg means by postconvent ional

moral i ty . Preconvent ional mora l values are dependent on personal interests, and

convent ional mora l values are dependent on socia l norms (either direct ly or indirect ly ) .

The postconvent ional leve l is the on ly level where mora l i ty is v i ewed as independent o f

a l l these factors. The pr inc ip le o f harm can be seen as direct ly related to the idea o f

human rights — rights to l i fe and l iberty, f reedom f rom harm, etc. The pr inc ip le o f just ice

also fits Koh lbe rg ' s idea o f universa l izabi l i ty perfectly.

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There are several important c o m m o n points between Snarey 's and Shweder 's

proposals. First, though both o f them are desperate to avo id any Western-liberal bias,

they nevertheless acknowledge that an adequate mora l code must seek to protect

ind iv idua l persons f rom unreasonable interference (whether or not we accompl i sh this in

the name o f the protect ion o f human rights). Second, both admit that the fo rma l

characteristics o f Stage 6 are object ively va l i d , though it is possible for them to be

incarnated i n ways other than that o f the Western-liberal tradit ion.

2.4 Kohlberg's cultural bias and other matters of controversy

Shweder and Snarey both bel ieve that Koh lbe rg ' s theory is a defense o f

l ibera l i sm, w h i c h as I see it, takes a Raw l s i an form. But whether grounded in a Raw l s i an

contractarianism or not, K o h l b e r g bel ieves i n the existence o f a set o f universa l human

rights that underl ie a l l va l id mora l rules. In Chapter 1, we have seen that K o h l b e r g

upholds the supreme value o f persons, o f autonomy o f persons and equal ity. Another

important value is the value o f l i fe , but when it conf l ic ts w i th the value o f autonomy, the

value o f autonomy prevai ls . In the late mode l o f his theory, just ice is st i l l c l a imed to be

pr imary among mora l considerations (Koh lbe rg et al . 1983, p. 91 f f ) . A s Weinre ich-

Haste has pointed out, a l though K o h l b e r g is not total ly content w i th l ibera l i sm in its

contemporary fo rm, he does bel ieve that the remedy is inside the l ibera l tradit ion itself,

w i th Raw l s as the representative o f such a hope . 2 8 Thus construed, mora l pr inc ip les o f

just ice are central to l ibera l i sm, wh i l e " just ice is def ined i n terms o f ind iv idua l r ights, a l l

o f w h i c h revolve around l ibe r ty " (Koh lbe rg 1981, p. 232). In this sense, Koh lbe rg ' s

2 7 Shweder et al, "Culture and Moral Development," 19. 28See Helen Weinreich-Haste, "Weinreich-Haste Replies to Broughton." In Lawrence Kohlberg: Consensus and Controversy, 386-388. Also see Kohlberg 1981, p. 228 & 233.

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mora l theory highl ights the importance o f human rights among w h i c h the r ight to l iberty

(or autonomy) is the core value.

F lanagan is right in compla in ing that the range o f mora l problems covered by the

hypothetical d i lemmas is too narrow. Indeed, by altering the settings o f the hypothet ical

d i lemmas a l itt le, we may have quite different opin ions about what should be done.

Cons ider the Doc to r ' s d i l emma ( D i l e m m a IV ) . Suppose n o w the patient is not suffer ing

f rom cancer but instead she is suffer ing f rom a non-life threatening strange disease that

brings her a lot o f pa in . She is quite weak, but is s t i l l able to work . One day she asks the

doctor whether there is any drug she can use to k i l l hersel f without pa in . What should the

doctor say? Shou ld he tel l her what to use? I am quite sure, i n this case, even the mora l l y

mature w o u l d be d is inc l ined to say that the doctor should tel l her h o w to k i l l herself. The

upshot is that the way K o h l b e r g estimates h o w different values are ranked is not rel iable.

The setting i n the Doc to r ' s d i l emma is in favor o f the right to autonomy, but i n other

cases it can be the other way round. I f m y son is hanging around w i th gangsters, I w i l l

surely care more about h o w to get r id o f his gangster fr iends than whether it is h is choice

to stay w i th them. A n d I do not see h o w I can be wrong th ink ing this way.

The same holds true for H e i n z ' s d i l emma. Koh lbe rg conf ident ly c la ims that the

right to l i fe is a lways pr ior to the right to property, since almost a l l subjects at the

pr inc ip led leve l judge that H e i n z should steal the drug for his w i fe . Bu t let us suppose

that the druggist asks a reasonable pr ice for the drug, and that this drug is the on ly means

for h i m to save his business. M a n y have already come to h i m to ask for the drug at a

lower price ( lower than his cost to make the drug), and he has g iven the drug to a l l these

people at the prices they offered, on ly n o w he cannot do so any longer or he w i l l go

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bankrupt. Just at this t ime H e i n z comes to h i m and asks for the drug at a lower pr ice

(again lower than the cost he incurs to make the drug). A r e we not more hesitant i n

saying he should give H e i n z the drug?

A l l these examples indicate that Koh lbe rg ' s hypothet ica l d i l emmas are insuf ic ient

to reveal relations between different mora l values. Koh lbe rg ' s solut ions to his d i lemmas

and his scor ing manual strongly suggest that autonomy is the highest value. Bu t f rom the

example o f hav ing a son hanging around w i th gangsters, it is evident i n some cases we do

think that autonomy is not the trump considerat ion. Koh lbe rg ' s research method has

fa i led to recognize this.

Furthermore, some o f Koh lbe rg ' s solut ions to h is o w n d i lemmas are also

questionable. A s we have argued, it is problemat ic that the on ly just so lut ion to the l i fe

boat d i l emma is to go for a lottery. W h y is it unacceptable for the people i n the l i fe boat

to just j o i n hands and sing? O r consider Joe's d i l emma. W h y cannot Joe g ive his father

the money because he cares for his father or because he is w i l l i n g to sacrif ice h imsel f ?

T w o points then fo l l ow . F irst , because o f Koh lbe rg ' s unreasonable presumpt ion about the

right solut ion i n certain hypothet ical d i l emmas, his mora l judgment interviews have

fa i led to detect some o f the Stage 6 mora l reasoning (al l Stage 6 reasoners agree on the

" r i g h t " mora l choice) . Second, Koh lbe rg ' s c la ims about substantive values become

problematic. Fo r example , his understanding o f fairness or equity may be quite s impl is t i c

as we have seen i n the d iscuss ion o f the l i fe boat d i l emma. A s I have argued, this

problemat ic understanding also extends into his v iews about the death penalty.

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Nevertheless, Koh lbe rg ' s research does have some bear ing on the issue o f human

rights. H u m a n rights are, after a l l , one o f the core conceptions o f postconvent ional

moral i ty . Therefore to reason in terms o f human rights is more adequate than to reason i n

terms o f maintenance o f soc ia l order (Stage 4) or i n terms o f role expectations (Stage 3).

W e can reasonably suppose that human rights for K o h l b e r g inc lude those rights speci f ied

i n the B i l l o f R ights , such as var ious l iberties o f ind iv idua ls and o f groups, r ight to be free

f rom coerc ion (part icularly f rom the state), and legal just ice.

A s already ment ioned, the fo rm o f l ibera l i sm K o h l b e r g embraces is very m u c h a

Raw ls i an one. He shares w i th Raw l s the idea that the contractor beh ind the ve i l o f

ignorance cares about nothing but his/her personal interest. The contractor does not, for

instance, care about his/her o w n mora l character. Thus i n the l i fe boat d i l emma and the

capital punishment case he/her cares about nothing except his chance o f surv iva l . Fo r

him/her, it does not matter whether he/she becomes a murderer, and he/she does not think

about what he/she deserves i f he/she becomes one. In this sense, G i l l i g a n ' s c r i t i c i sm on

the incompleteness o f Koh lbe rg ' s theory is a sound one as Koh lbe rg ' s theory presupposes

on ly a part o f human nature that is relevant to human mora l l i fe . A credible contract

theory has to presuppose that the agents invo lved i n the contract process must be at least

partly altruistic. Bu t i f the agents are to any interesting degree altruist ic, Koh lbe rg ' s

normative c la ims become questionable. Fo r instance, the c l a im that capital punishment

w o u l d never be acceptable, however great the deterrent effect, becomes h igh ly

problematic.

29 The Concise Columbia Encyclopedia (second edition) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 190-191.

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In Koh lbe rg ' s theory, there is no need to earn one 's d igni ty ( i f y o u think one

needs to earn it you are at no higher than Stage 3). It sounds very l i ke l y that, for

Koh lbe rg , no matter h o w w i cked a person is , he/she has essential ly the same d igni ty as

others do. But i f we do not presuppose that people i n the or ig ina l situation are pure ly self-

interested, then one might suggest that the qual i f icat ion for entering the contract i tse l f

requires one to make a certain mora l commitment to the entire human communi t y , such

as concern for human welfare in general. Th i s point is st i l l related to G i l l i g a n ' s c r i t i c i sm

against Koh lbe rg .

However , we do not want to throw out the baby w i th the bath water. F lanagan 's

c l a im that Koh lbe rg ' s theory is not taken seriously by psychologists is def ini te ly false.

Some aspects o f Koh lbe rg ' s theory have gained w ide support f rom empi r i ca l studies.

These include the c la ims o f hierarchy, universal invariant sequence, and structural

wholeness. The most problemat ic c l a im o f Koh lbe rg is that just ice is the on ly mora l

virtue, wh i ch he h imse l f has g i ven up i n his later (1983, 1984, & 1990) publ icat ions.

Therefore, there must be some important truth about human mora l psycho logy i n his

theory. I f we admit that mora l psycho logy is not total ly irrelevant to mora l ph i losophy ,

we have to thereby admit that K o h l b e r g has captured some important truth about mora l

ph i losophy as we l l .

2.5 The mora l domain

Another controversial feature o f Koh lbe rg ' s theory is its def in i t ion o f the mora l

domain . A n important question is whether his def in i t ion o f the mora l doma in is

suff ic ient ly comprehensive. Koh lbe rg ' s theory in i t ia l ly presupposes that the pr inc ipa l

funct ion o f mora l i ty is to resolve conf l ic ts o f c la ims, and therefore just ice is the on ly

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mora l virtue. Though he later retreats f r om this c l a im , his emphasis on just ice is st i l l

obv ious. A p rob lem concerning Koh lbe rg ' s idea o f just ice is that the concept o f " con f l i c t

o f c l a i m s " is ambiguous. What exact ly is a c l a im? Is it ident ical to a reasonable demand?

What is a reasonable demand? Does every true need constitute a reasonable demand?

Suppose a person is wa i t ing by a pay phone to make a ca l l , but does not have a quarter.

H e has a two dol lar b i l l , and asks me to give h i m change when I pass by. Does he have a

claim to the change? Does he have a r ight? What is the relat ion between a c l a im and a

duty? D o I have a duty or an obligation to give the man the change? I f I have such a duty,

is it because it is unfair for me not to do so?

Th i s example illustrates h o w the debates between K o h l b e r g , G i l l i g a n , and

F lanagan arise. M o s t people, I expect, w o u l d say that I should g ive h i m the change, but I

doubt whether they w o u l d say that fa i l ing to do so is unfair to h i m . It seems more l i ke l y

that people w o u l d say that to give h i m the change is to show some m i n i m a l care and

concern for another, w h i c h everybody w i th normal conscience does. Or , people may say

that I should be kind enough to do such an easy favor. To say that I should show this

m in ima l care towards a stranger presupposes a certain G i l l i gan i an v i e w about mora l i ty ;

wh i le ta lk ing about kindness reflects some more o f virtue ethics w i th w h i c h F lanagan is

very sympathetic. A c c o r d i n g l y , G i l l i g a n and F lanagan blame K o h l b e r g for mak ing the

mora l doma in too narrow by mak ing fairness the central concept o f mora l i ty , and leave

out care and concern and virtue.

Leav ing aside Koh lbe rg ' s early characterization o f the mora l doma in i n terms o f

resolv ing conf l icts i n a fa ir way , it is clear that i f we apply the strategy o f "mora l mus ica l

cha i rs " to solve the p rob lem o f whether I should give the stranger the quarter, we w i l l

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decide that I should. I lose nothing by g i v ing h i m the change, but it is a considerable

inconvenience i f he does not get it. So i f the p rob lem o f g i v ing h i m the change is not a

prob lem o f just ice or fairness, then the Stage 6 mora l concept ion is not bui l t around mere

just ice and fairness either. That Stage 6 mora l i ty concerns m u c h more than fairness is

apparent f rom Koh lbe rg ' s (1990) paper, i n w h i c h active sympathy is inc luded in the

formal characteristics o f Stage 6 mora l reasoning. Bu t even without us ing the term

"act ive sympathy , " the strategy o f " m o r a l mus ica l cha i rs " or ideal role-taking is already

enough to der ive some mora l decis ions that we usual ly understand as instances o f care.

So it w i l l be a mistake to understand Koh lbe rg ' s theory as s imp ly based on what people

usual ly understand by the term " fa i rness " or " jus t i ce . " B y inc lud ing the pr inc ip le o f

Agape and that o f active sympathy K o h l b e r g has, i n effect, expanded his concept ion o f

the mora l doma in is a way that adequately accommodates other central d imensions o f

moral i ty beyond that o f just ice and rights, such as an ethic o f care.

Section 3: Chapter Summary

. In this chapter I argued that psycho log ica l studies on mora l development have an

important bearing on mora l ph i losophy. I compared it w i th the re lat ion that observations

o f particular phenomena have to scient i f ic theories. The relat ion between facts about

mora l development and an ethical theory is not as direct as that between part icular

phys ica l phenomena and phys ica l science. Nevertheless, the former resembles the latter

i n that, to the extent that a theory about the structure o f ethical reasoning explains the

facts about mora l development, the phenomena support the theory. It is unfortunate that

Stage 6 has not been inc luded in the (1987) scor ing manual , and therefore the supreme

adequacy o f Stage 6 among the Koh lbe rg ian stages has not been empi r i ca l l y tested. But

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we can st i l l argue for the supreme adequacy o f Stage 6 based on the fact that Stage 6 is

def ined i n terms o f fo rma l characteristics o f mora l reasoning w h i c h are is increasingly

real ized f rom Stage 1 through Stage 5.

I also argued that an adequate concept ion o f mora l i ty must inc lude more

dimensions than mere just ice, such as care and self-perfection as we l l . Th is idea was

adopted by K o h l b e r g i n his late mode l , though perhaps was not fu l l y developed. But we

can also be certain that K o h l b e r g is correct i n emphas iz ing the importance o f just ice.

W h e n we care about others we want to be fair to them, and when we strive for self-

perfect ion we want to be a just person, though we may also want to be more than fair and

just.

F ina l l y , I also argued that Koh lbe rg ' s theory has a cultural bias towards the

Western ind iv idua l is t i c tradit ion. Bu t I suggest that this cultural bias is expressed more in

the formulat ions o f the scor ing manual than i n the stage conceptions themselves. Th i s

suggestion is supported by Snarey and Shweder 's arguments that there are universal

elements o f the Stage 6 mora l concept ion and w h i c h can receive expression i n terms o f

communi tar ian mora l concepts. I return to the topic o f ethical un iversa l i sm in the final

chapter.

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Chapter Five: A Reflection on the Universalism-Relativism Debate

This f ina l chapter is a ref lect ion on the universal ism-relat iv ism in l ight o f

Kohlberg 's theory. It is meant to be exploratory and suggestive rather than thorough or

def ini t ive. Fo r our purpose it is essential to d ist inguish between two c la ims that are both

typ ica l ly universal ist but different f rom each other. The first is the c l a im that there exist

some universal mora l pr inc ip les or values, wh i ch I w i l l ca l l the 'existence thesis. ' The

second c l a im is that these pr inc ip les or values are suff ic ient ly comprehensive and

informative to be appl icable to a l l mora l situations and to determine the correct solutions

i n them. Th i s I w i l l ca l l the 'determinacy thesis. "

In the foregoing chapters we have seen that Koh lbe rg c la ims that his research

supports the universal va l id i ty o f some basic values, attitudes, and procedural methods o f

dec is ion mak ing . Th i s is paral le l to the existence thesis. O n the other hand, he also c la ims

that a l l Stage 6 reasoners agree on the solutions to particular mora l d i lemmas. B y mak ing

this second c l a im he takes up the determinacy thesis. B y ho ld ing true both the existence

thesis and the determinate thesis Koh lbe rg has commit ted h imse l f to a strong and very

much tradit ional vers ion o f universa l ism. Th i s strong universa l i sm is i n many ways

comparable to what W i n k l e r cal ls the 'parad igm theory ' i n bioethics, and for this reason I

w i l l ca l l it 'parad igm universa l i sm. '

In his " M o r a l Ph i losophy and B ioe th ics : Contextua l i sm versus the Parad igm Theory , "

W i n k l e r defines a "pa rad igm theory" in bioethics, w h i c h he contrasts w i th contextual ism.

Th i s paradigm theory c la ims that there exists a set o f ethical pr inc ip les for bioethics that

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are (1) universa l ly va l i d , (2) comprehensive, and (3) informat ive. A c c o r d i n g l y , mora l

just i f i cat ion is held to be a matter o f deductive appl icat ion o f rules and pr inc ip les : one

just i f ies a mora l judgment by showing that it is the log ica l consequence o f a mora l rule,

and just i f ies a mora l rule (ult imately) by showing that it is the log ica l consequence o f

some set o f fundamental and a l l embrac ing mora l pr inc ip les . 1 Th i s paradigm theory i n

bioethics is comparable to the paradigm just described i n that it instantiates the latter.

A c co rd i ng l y , W ink le r s c r i t i c i sm o f the parad igm theory bioethics w i l l be appl icable to

paradigm universal as we l l . F o l l o w i n g W ink l e r , I w i l l argue that, w i th a l l the d i f f icu l t ies

that faces the determinacy thesis, paradigm universa l i sm is too strong to be acceptable. I

w i l l also argue that the determinacy thesis is too strong for K o h l b e r g to support.

However , i n spite o f a l l the d i f f icu l t ies o f paradigm universa l i sm, I w i l l formulate a

weaker fo rm o f un iversa l i sm that does receive suff ic ient support f r om K o h l b e r g ' s

research. Then I w i l l examine h o w this f o rm o f unv iersa l ism sheds l ight on the

universal ism-relat iv ism debate.

Section 1: A reflection on Kohlberg's universalist claims

1.1 The problem of indeterminacy

There are at least two reasons why paradigm universa l i sm is indefensible. F i rst ,

though I have argued i n Chapter 3, section 2.4, that respect and care are not two separate

moral i t ies, there are two basic direct ions i n mora l reasoning that are potent ia l ly

conf l i c t ing . One o f these is the non-violat ion o f basic human r ights, and the other the

promot ion o f human goods i n general. There is no reason why either o f these

' Earl Winkler, "Moral Philosophy and Bioethics: Contextualism versus the Paradigm Theory." ln Philosophical Perspectives on Bioethics, ed. L. W. Sumner & Joseph Boyle (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 50-78, esp, 51.

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considerations should a lways have pr ior i ty over the other when they conf l ic t . It seems

absurd, on the one hand, to ho ld that a doctor is ob l iged to k i l l a patient i f do ing so can

make avai lable healthy organs w h i c h w i l l save four other l ives without p rovok ing

counterva i l ing disut i l i t ies. It is equal ly absurd, on the other hand, to ho ld that it is

impermiss ib le to violate even the most t r iv ia l right o f a single person in order to save

several l ives. A n overarch ing pr inc ip le , namely the pr inc ip le o f equal respect for persons,

is g iven by K o h l b e r g (his "respect for persons" is not on ly a pr inc ip le o f non-violat ion o f

rights), but such a pr inc ip le does not i n i tse l f contain any fo rmu la for resolut ion when

there is real conf l ic t between the promot ion o f ut i l i ty and the non-violat ion o f rights. It is

therefore inevitable that there w i l l be cases i n wh i ch the concern for ut i l i ty and the

concern for human rights w i l l dr ive the rational and impart ia l reasoner i n two mora l

directions. A n d across a certain range o f such conf l icts it may be the case that there

s imp ly is no object ive, rat ional ly determinate resolut ion. Yet , f rom the point o f v i ew o f

the ind iv idua l mora l agent, neither is it therefore a matter o f mora l indifference w h i c h

choice one takes, as i f f l i pp ing a co in w o u l d be as good a dec is ion procedure as any.

Cons ider the c lassic example o f the young man who came to Sartre seeking

advice as to whether he should j o i n the Free French or stay w i th his mother:

H i s father was quarre l l ing w i th his mother and was also inc l ined to be a " co l l abora tor " ; his elder brother had been k i l l ed i n the German offensive o f 1940 and this young man, w i th a sentiment somewhat pr imi t i ve but generous, burned to avenge h i m . H i s mother was l i v i ng alone w i th h i m , deeply af f l ic ted by the semi-treason o f his father and by the death o f her eldest son, and her one consolat ion was i n this young man. Bu t he, at this moment, had the choice between go ing to Eng land to j o i n the Free French Forces or o f staying near his mother and he lp ing her l i ve . H e fu l l y real ised that this or perhaps his dea th—wou ld plunge her into despair. He also real ised that, concretely and in fact, every act ion he performed on his mother 's beha l f w o u l d be sure o f effect i n the sense o f a id ing her to l i ve , where as anything he d id i n order to go and f ight w o u l d be an ambiguous act ion w h i c h might van ish l ike water into sand and serve no purpose. Fo r instance, to set

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out for Eng land he w o u l d have to wait indef in i te ly i n a Spanish camp on the way through Spa in ; or, on arr iv ing i n Eng land or i n A lg i e r s he might be put into an off ice to f i l l up forms. Consequent ly , he found h imse l f confronted by two very different modes o f act ion; the one concrete, immediate, but directed towards on ly one i nd i v idua l ; and the other an act ion addressed to an end inf in i te ly greater, a national co l lect iv i ty , but for that very reason amb iguous—and it might be frustrated on the way. A t the same t ime, he was hesitating between two k inds o f mora l i ty ; on the one side the mora l i ty o f sympathy, o f personal devot ion and, on the other side, a mora l i ty o f w ider scope but o f more debatable va l id i t y . 2

So what should this young man do? L i k e Sartre, I bel ieve that there is no poss ib i l i t y o f an

object ively determinate answer. A f t e r a l l due considerat ion, what the young man had to

do was just to choose between the opt ions, and commi t h imse l f to his choice. The be l i e f

that one can derive a dist inct correct solut ion for every possible mOral situation f rom

some ult imate mora l pr inc ip les or values is excess ive ly opt imist ic . In many cases there

may not be a single best solut ion wh i l e , at the same t ime, we cannot induce i n ourselves a

state o f mora l indif ference between avai lable options. A n d the reason that f l i pp ing a co in

is unacceptable is that such situations as Sartre describes take on the character o f choices

as to what sort o f person one is to be or become, where either self-defining opt ion is

permiss ib le , even just i f iable .

A second basic considerat ion against paradigm universa l i sm has to do w i th

interpretation. It is imposs ib le to decide what is right without understanding h o w a

pr inc ip le is to be interpreted and understood for the part icular k i n d o f situation at hand.

Genera l pr inc ip les purchase their generality by abstraction f rom part iculars; and it is

precisely the abstractness that makes the need for interpretation inescapable, especial ly

regarding nove l and d i f f i cu l t cases. Hence W i n k l e r argues for the pr ior i ty o f

interpretation over appl icat ion i n actual mora l reasoning. He insists that pr inc ip les dp not

2 Jean Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, trans. Philip Meiret (London: Methuen, 1948), 35-36.

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interpret themselves and because o f this the deductive mode l o f un iversa l i sm is

indefensible. Fo r the fact is that " w i t h i n the complex realities o f pract ice, it is dominant ly

the interpretation o f cases that in forms our understanding o f pr inc ip le rather than

pr inc ip le gu id ing the resolut ion o f d i f f i cu l t cases."

To il lustrate the pr ior i ty o f interpretation over appl icat ion, W i n k l e r considers an

example o f a man w i th mul t ip le sclerosis admitted to the hospita l for treatment o f spinal

meningi t is w i th a bacterial or ig in . The pr inc ip le i n question is that o f autonomy.

H i s past history indicates a very satisfactory adjustment to M S . H e has taken an active part i n f ami l y l i fe , he has had var ious interests, hobbies, and so forth. Despite a l l o f this, and despite the fact that his M S has not worsened, the man refuses antibiot ic therapy to treat his meningi t is , saying on l y that he wants to be left alone and a l lowed to die w i th dignity . Suppose consultat ion w i th the f ami l y reveals that the patient has been very w i thdrawn and depressed lately. It is also learned that the patient has been depr ived for some t ime o f the usual attentions and support o f other f ami l y members because o f a pro longed cr is is elsewhere i n the fami ly . M o r e evidence o f the same k i n d makes it fa i r ly probable that the patient's dec is ion is a product o f a sense o f self-pity and worthlessness accompany ing feel ings o f iso lat ion and depression. Phys ic ians exp la in to the patient what they th ink is happening w i th h i m , they i n fo rm h i m dec is ive ly that they intend to give h i m antibiot ics to save his l i fe and that f ami l y counse l ing w i l l be prov ided in due course. The patient is silent. An t ib io t i c s are administered, the man recovers complete ly , counsel ing reveals to the f am i l y the importance o f this patients' be ing in formed and invo lved i n fami l y affairs, and everything turns out fine4

W e may think that the physic ians have made a correct dec is ion. Ye t it certainly appears

that what they have done violates the pr inc ip le o f autonomy, a pr inc ip le o f central

importance in bioethics w h i c h is norma l l y understood to require that phys ic ians act in

accord w i th what the patient wants for himself/herself. A c t i n g accord ing to this standard

interpretation o f the pr inc ip le o f autonomy w o u l d thus require the phys ic ians to w i thdraw

the treatment i n the above situation, as this patient is fu l l y competent. A l ternat ive ly ,

3 Ibid, 355.

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however, we can argue that this case shows that the pr inc ip le o f autonomy needs more

subtle interpretation, as it currently rests too heavi ly on considerations o f competence

only . It may also be important to consider whether or not the patient 's choice is authentic,

i n terms o f whether or not it is consistent w i th the patient's o w n most characteristic and

stable values. S ince the patient 's o w n dec is ion i n this case seems more a product o f

depression than o f settled values, and since the consequences o f inact ion are so grave, we

may conclude that cases o f this k i n d just i fy the interpretive elaborat ion o f the pr inc ip le in

terms o f an authenticity cr i ter ion.

In l ight o f examples l ike this it becomes clear why pr inc ip les cannot be

determinate. Pr inc ip les can on ly determine correct mora l judgments when interpreted

proper ly , but they are a lways l iable to reinterpretation i n confrontat ion w i th unexpected

cases. A n d the capacity o f the wo r l d to present us w i th novel cases a lways outruns our

capacities o f ant ic ipat ion. In short, considered judgment arr ived at by case analysis and

case compar ison is at least as important i n determining wo rk i ng interpretations o f

pr inc ip le as pr inc ip le ever is i n determining the mora l i ty o f cases. A n d , obv ious ly , this

complete ly undermines any fo rm o f tradit ional or paradigm universa l i sm accord ing to

wh i ch conformi ty or non-conformity w i th pr inc ip le is what makes actions right or wrong .

O f course, it does not f o l l o w that no fo rm o f mora l un iversa l i sm is defensible or

that mora l pr inc ip les are utterly useless. M o r a l pr inc ip les can be seen to serve at least two

funct ions, one intel lectual and the other pract ical . F i rst , pr inc ip les serve to organize and

systemize our understanding o f the complex doma in o f mora l i ty , by their use we gain

4 Ibid., 358.

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something o f an ordered comprehension o f the who le o f the mora l l i fe . Second, i n spite

o f the prob lem o f indeterminacy, we need not deny that mora l pr inc ip les have some

normative force at the pract ical leve l . A f t e r a l l , as W i n k l e r h imse l f points out, sometimes

we are able v i r tua l ly to " read f rom a g iven situation the mora l l y most reasonable th ing to

d o , " for i n these cases "certa in well-established values or pr inc ip les can be seen evidently

to app l y . " 5 E v e n in d i f f i cu l t cases " i t w i l l s t i l l be the tensional structure o f values and

pr inc ip les that shapes the nature o f the prob lem i tse l f . " 6 It remains, however , that the

basic d i f f i cu l ty regarding parad igm universa l i sm is that there is a tension between the

intel lectual and the pract ical funct ions o f mora l theory. In order to comprehens ive ly

systemize our overa l l understanding o f mora l i ty we have to employ levels o f abstraction

i n formulat ing pr inc ip les w h i c h severely l imi ts their usefulness i n actual ly gu id ing

practice by means o f direct appl icat ion.

1.2 Indeterminacy and Kohlberg

A s we know , K o h l b e r g c la ims that there exist some universal ethical pr inc ip les as

we l l as universal dec is ion-making procedures. W h e n these pr inc ip les and procedures

work together K o h l b e r g expects there w i l l be agreement on the solut ions o f part icular

mora l d i lemmas. Th i s is h o w we get those h igh ly speci f ic mora l rules or judgments, such

as the one concerning steal ing i n H e i n z ' s situation. But are Koh lbe rg ' s pr inc ip les and

procedures real ly suff ic ient for guaranteeing agreement? Suppose two persons both

accept the Go lden Ru le and apply it i n the way Koh lbe rg prescribes. W i l l they

5 Earl Winkler, "Moral Philosophy and Bioethics: Contextualism versus the Paradigm Theory," 75. 6 Ibid.

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necessari ly solve a mora l p rob lem i n the same way? I f they w i l l a lways agree, then

paradigm universa l i sm might be saved despite the arguments about indeterminacy.

Unfortunately , it is hard to see what w o u l d guarantee such agreement. Cons ider

the p rob lem o f capital punishment. W h e n Koh lbe rg agues against capital punishment, he

imagines, as does Raw l s , that the contractor behind the ve i l o f ignorance is noth ing but a

seeker o f self-interest. The contracter cares about nothing except pr imary goods l ike

property, l iberty, and l i fe . M o r a l considerations concerning, for instance, desert or

equality do not come into p lay except as consequences o f del iberations about h o w to

design basic institutions so as to max im ize the chances for personal we l lbe ing . Based on

these presupposit ions, K o h l b e r g concludes that capital punishment is absolutely

impermiss ib le , whatever the situation is. The or ig ina l pos i t ion compels each person to

consider whether he/she w o u l d want capital punishment rea l iz ing that it cou ld turn out

that he/she is a capital offender.

But why cannot one reason, even behind the ve i l , that the chances are smal l that

he/she w i l l be such an offender and bel ieve also that the socia l ut i l i ty o f capital

punishment w o u l d be suff ic ient ly great as to just i fy it? Cannot people behind the ve i l be

rational gamblers o f this sort? W h y not? A l ternat ive ly , cannot someone behind the ve i l

bel ieve in free w i l l and therefore bel ieve that competent people are responsible for what

they do? In this case, those who deliberately and know ing l y commi t homic ide may be

thought to deserve capital punishment . 7 Therefore, i f the p rob lem o f j ud i c i a l mistakes can

7 A hard determinist will say that this is impossible. But since the issue is controversial, understanding human nature as we know it from when behind the veil of ignorance will not rule out being a libertarian on the issue of free will.

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be dealt w i th , both ut i l i tar ian and deontologica l out looks may reasonably be thought to

favor capital punishment f rom behind the ve i l o f ignorance.

I have also argued (Chapter 3, sect ion 3; Chapter 4, sect ion 2.4) that K o h l b e r g is

too s ingle-mindedly commit ted to some part icular solut ions o f var ious d i lemmas. Fo r

example, the lottery solut ion is hardly the best solut ion for the l i fe boat d i l emma, unless

everybody on the l i fe boat agrees to go for it. L o o k i n g at the disagreement between Joan

and Judge D (the Stage 6 subjects reported i n Koh lbe rg ' s [1990] paper), Koh lbe rg ' s

c l a im that a l l Stage 6 reasoners agree i n their solut ions o f mora l d i l emmas is surely

unwarranted.

Section 2: Minimal universalism

2.1 Moral universals

Koh lbe rg ' s ma in contr ibut ion concerning ethical un iversa l i sm is that his research

provides good grounds for the v i e w that certain basic values do exist universal ly . Despite

the problems w i th tradit ional ethical un iversa l i sm his research appears to support the

f o l l ow ing aspects o f a weaker ethical un iversa l i sm:

(1) that the adequacy o f mora l reasoning is increased through the expansion o f an

agent's concern f rom the self, or the s e l f s o w n group, toward a l l human beings;

(2) that there are certain procedures or formal operations that help to accompl i sh

this expansion, namely , ideal role-taking and universa l izat ion;

(3) that there are certain attitudes w h i c h are fundamental to a l l adequate mora l

reasoning, such as a w i l l ingness to compromise , a desire to reach agreement,

open-mindedness, active sympathy, and above a l l , respect for others; and

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(4) that, accord ingly , there are certain universal mora l pr inc ip les , most notably the

Categor ica l Imperative and the Go lden Ru le .

The existence o f universal values can be expla ined. To s imp l i f y the case, let me

speak as i f the benevolence d imens ion and the just ice d imens ion exhaust human mora l

concern. Then the way one judges whether an act ion is right i n a certain situation is , i n

effect, to ask whether it is acceptable i n the eyes o f a benevolent and just person.

Conceptual considerations surrounding the concepts o f "benevo lence " and " jus t i ce " must

alone ensure that he/she w i l l f i nd that some things can never pass his/her justice-

benevolence tests. It is easy, for example , to formulate certain spec i f ic , universal mora l

rules. A l l one has to do is formulate an undeniably harmfu l act ion and attach to it a t r iv ia l

reason, l ike in f l i c t ing serious harm for personal pleasure. Such actions w i l l a lways be

wrong . What makes this possib le , o f course, is that human beings do share some ideas

about what constitutes harm, about the connections between harm and benevolence, and

also about what constitutes a good reason for in f l i c t ing harm. I f un iversa l i sm in a l l

possible forms were utter fantasy, such c o m m o n grounds cou ld not be found.

To the extent that such commona l i t y i n values does exist, or w o u l d exist under

condit ions o f fu l l knowledge and rational ity, there is ground for be l i ev ing i n

universa l ism. Th i s f o rm o f un iversa l i sm about values need not imp l y that there is a set o f

perfect ly universal , comprehensive and determinate mora l pr inc ip les or dec is ion-making

procedures. G i v e n the complex i t y o f the mora l l i fe it may even be the case that these

general, universal human values w i l l not carry us very far i n confrontat ion w i th real

mora l problems. But at the same t ime this k i n d o f m in ima l un iversa l i sm does set

important theoretical l imi ts to ethical re la t iv ism.

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2.2 M o r a l absolutes

It is noteworthy that, though people tend to th ink that un iversa l i sm and absolut ism

are c lose ly connected i f not ident ica l , K o h l b e r g exp l i c i t l y declares that he is not an

absolutist. B y this he means that, as shown in Chapter 3, mora l rules are se ldom absolute.

Th i s seems to be a wise move , for , g iven the complex i t y o f mora l l i fe , absolute mora l

rules w i l l hardly be possible. A s we have seen, we can easi ly formulate some absolute

mora l rules, such as "It is w rong to inf l ic t unnecessary h a r m . " Bu t a rule o f this k i n d is

tautological . For , g iven the very nature o f the mora l point o f v i ew , the "wrongness " is

insured by the lack o f "necess i ty . " .

It w i l l be m u c h more d i f f i cu l t to formulate absolute mora l rules i f they are to be

substantive. K o h l b e r g bel ieves that capital punishment is a lways w rong , whatever the

condi t ion , and however great the deterrent effect. Bu t as we have argued, his argument is

unsuccessful . W e have seen that i f the deterrent effect is great enough and the p rob lem o f

ju r id i ca l mistake can be so lved, then capital punishment may be mora l l y acceptable.

Perhaps we can weaken his c l a i m and say that w i th our l imitat ions o f knowledge we

cannot ensure that ju r id i ca l mistakes can be avoided, and thus capital punishment is

a lways wrong for any human society. But this becomes a matter o f ba lanc ing the l i ab i l i t y

o f mistake against the benefits o f deterrence, and nothing i n the human condi t ion as we

k n o w it rules out the poss ib i l i t y that circumstances cou ld t ip this balance i n favor o f

capital punishment.

Thus absolute rules o f mora l i ty w h i c h are also substantive and general are go ing

to be either non-existent or extremely scarce. O n the other hand, we can c l a im , l ike Hare,

that there are h igh l y speci f ic universa l "oughf '-statements. Hare ' s idea is roughly that,

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general rules l ike " N e v e r te l l l i e s " cannot be absolute; we can have absolute rules on ly i n

h igh ly qual i f ied forms l ike " N e v e r tel l l ies except when it is necessary i n order to save an

innocent l i fe , and when no counterva i l ing bad consequences w i l l occur . " I f one adds

enough prov is ions to the rule, the rule w i l l f ina l l y become except ionless. 8 Bu t the rule

w i l l also be too specif ic to be o f m u c h use i n pract ical mora l i ty , i n connect ion w i th n iora l

education for example , for the l ist o f prov is ions w i l l be too long to be readi ly

comprehended.

These considerations point toward a m i n i m a l un iversa l ism. M i n i m a l un iversa l i sm

c la ims that there are values, virtues, and procedures o f mora l reasoning w h i c h are good

for everybody i n every culture. It does not make a c l a i m for absoluteness, for it admits

that absolute pr inc ip les w i l l be either too abstract or tautologica l , or too r idd led w i th

qual i f icat ions, usual ly completed i n vagueness, to be useful . Koh lbe rg ' s research, on the

other hand, provides good grounds for accepting certain elements o f a universal mora l i ty :

respect for persons as a universal value, fairness as a universal v irtue, and ideal role-

takirig and ideal communica t ion as universal dec is ion mak ing procedures.

Section 3: From minimal universalism to limited relativism

3.1 Radical cultural relativism

A natural consequence o f un iversa l i sm is that it rules out some extreme forms o f

re la t iv ism or sets l imi ts to a l l forms o f them. Howeve r abstract and indeterminate,

Koh lbe rg ' s ethical pr inc ip les and values have the f o l l ow ing important impl ica t ions :

(1) M o r a l discourse is possible and is necessary for the resolut ion o f mora l

8 R. M. Hare, "Universal Prescription." In A Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter Singer (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993) 451-463, esp. 457.

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problems;

(2) The most important th ing i n discourse is not what people f ina l l y agree upon,

but rather the attitude: no participant i n the discourse should ho ld any fo rm o f

egoism or ethnocentr ism; ,

. (3) Eve rybody should 'acknowledge that he/she is not the f ina l authority on what

is good for human beings. There is relat iv i ty i n personal goods. One therefore has

to imagine onese l f i n the situations o f the other parties to judge what their best

interests are, and balance these interests by ask ing onese l f what people w o u l d

agree upon i f they take the roles o f a l l parties;

(4) A l l the above i m p l y or presuppose that to solve conf l ic ts peacefully is a central

funct ion o f moral i ty . Whatever value system fai ls i n this is t o that extent a bad

one.

Before I proceed to discuss h o w this vers ion o f un iversa l i sm sets l imi ts to

re lat iv ism the latter concept must be c lar i f ied. Pau l Tay lo r dist inguishes three k inds o f

re la t iv ism: descript ive, normat ive, and metaethica l . 9 Descr ipt ive re la t iv ism is an

empir ica l theory. It holds that, as a matter o f fact, " no mora l standard or rule o f conduct

has been universa l ly recognized to be the basis o f mora l ob l igat ion. A c c o r d i n g to the

descriptive relativist there are no mora l norms c o m m o n to a l l cu l tu res . " 1 0 Normat i ve

re lat iv ism pushes a step further, c l a im ing that since societies have different mora l norms,

" [w]hat is right i n one society may be wrong i n another . " 1 1 Metaeth ica l re la t iv ism is

again different and includes two subcategories. Conceptual re la t iv ism holds that " m o r a l

9 Paul Taylor, "Ethical Relativism." In Moral Philosophy, ed, George Sher (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace Joanovich College Publishers, 1987), 146-160. 1 0 Ibid, 147. . • • •

. 217

concepts vary f rom culture to culture and therefore the mora l judgments o f one society

are meaningless or uninte l l ig ib le to the members o f another . " 1 2 Me thodo log i ca l

re lat iv ism c la ims that i n different cultures the methods o f mora l reasoning are different. It

fo l l ows , then, that we have no reasonable way to judge that a certain mora l i ty is more

adequate than another. " F o r to choose between any two methods, a neutral th i rd method

must be used . . . . Bu t any such th i rd way w i l l i tse l f mere ly postulate its o w n " v a l i d "

13 reasons, and we w o u l d then have to just i fy our o w n choice o f these cr i ter ia . "

Bo th normative and metaethical re lat iv ism presuppose descript ive re la t iv ism.

Were there not d ivers i f ied mora l codes i n different cultures, and instead people f rom a l l

cultures agreed upon what is r ight and what is wrong , then there w o u l d be no point i n

saying that what is r ight for one society may be wrong for another. S im i l a r l y , i f a l l

cultures shared the same code, everybody w o u l d reason in terms o f the same set o f rules,

and there w o u l d not arise the question o f h o w to compare the adequacy o f different

methods o f mora l reasoning.

Aga ins t these def in i t ions we can see that Koh lbe rg ' s theory and research sets

s ignif icant l imi ts to re la t iv ism. Cu l tura l diversity w i th regard to mora l values or norms is

an established and indisputable fact. G i v e n such diversity it is d i f f i cu l t to deny normative

re la t iv ism, that certain things may be right i n one culture and wrong in another. A more

tenable universal ist pos i t ion w o u l d be to admit cultural and normative relat iv i ty, but

nevertheless mainta in that there are panhuman mora l phenomena and that there are l imi ts

w i th in w h i c h adequate cultural codes may vary. Indeed this is what anthropologists are

1 1 Ibid., 151. 1 2 Ibid., 155.

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t ry ing to establish nowadays. Robert Red f i e ld , for example, argues that people in

different cultures are not as different as they seem. " A b o u t whatever pr imi t i ve or ancient

people you may read, y o u w i l l f ind something already fami l ia r to y o u — mothers

cher ishing their ch i ldren, or men proud o f their ach ievements . " 1 4 Unfortunate ly

Redf ie ld ' s universals do not carry us very far, for immediate ly f o l l ow ing this he writes:

The ch i ldren cherished may later be k i l l ed as offer ings to supernaturals, and the proud man may be proud o f the number o f heads he has taken; but it is st i l l mother love about w h i c h y o u have read, and it is st i l l a pride i n one's achievement that is characteristic o f a l l human i t y . 1 5

U n l i k e Redf ie ld , I am not content w i th the existence o f a universal mother ly love w h i c h ,

i n some situations, drives a mother to sacrif ice her ch i l d to supernaturals. Be l i e v i ng that

one should sacrif ice one 's be loved ch i l d must inc lude some mistake, whether it be a

mistake in one 's attitude or i n factual belief. N o r am I content w i th the pursuit for

achievement wh i ch i n some cultural contexts means an effort to take as many human

heads as one can. To establish a more meaningfu l un iversa l i sm, one needs more

constraints on the correct ways o f expressing love or str iv ing for achievement. I prefer a

theory that, for example, recognizes tak ing heads as an intr insic ev i l .

N o fo rm o f cultural re lat iv ism w i l l manage to establish such a theory. F o l l o w i n g

Sumner, a dist inguished relativist socio logist , I mean by 'cu l tura l re la t i v i sm ' the v i ew

that the mores o f a society are the f ina l judge o f the rightness and wrongness o f its

member ' s deeds . 1 6 " The not ion o f r ight is i n the f o l kways , " says Sumner. "It is not

outside o f them, o f independent o r ig in , and brought to them to test them. In the fo lkways ,

1 3 Ibid., 157. 1 4 Robert Redfield, "The Universally Human and the Culturally Variable." In Ethical Relativism, ed, John Ladd (Lanham: University Press of America, 1985), 129-143, esp. 130-131. 1 5 Ibid, 131.

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whatever is , is r ight. . . . W h e n we come to the fo lkways we are at the end o f our

ana l y s i s . " 1 7 What fo l lows is that, i f head hunt ing is right accord ing to the norms o f the

hunter 's society, it is right, per iod.

Koh lbe rg ' s theory provides reason to say that such an extreme re la t i v i sm is

wrong. One central c l a im o f Koh lbe rg ' s theory is that whenever there is a conf l ic t i n

c la ims there is a mora l p rob lem, and an adequate mora l i ty must help to solve these

conf l icts peaceful ly . N o w since the rule that encourages head hunt ing is more l i ke l y to

cause conf l ic ts than to solve them, and in any case does not solve conf l ic ts peacefully, it

can hardly be considered as an adequate moral i ty .

Thus we do have something accord ing to w h i c h different value systems or ways

o f mora l reasoning can be compared i n terms o f adequacy. One major p rob lem fac ing the

effort to establish a standard for trans-cultural value judgments is the charge o f

ethnocentrism. Herskov i ts , for example, declares that "[f]he pr imary mechan ism that

directs the evaluat ion o f culture is e thnocent r i sm. " 1 8 Th i s is exact ly what the charge o f

cultural bias against K o h l b e r g is a l l about. W h e n judg ing the adequacy o f the mora l

standards o f a different culture accord ing to a putative absolute or universal mora l

standard there is a lways the danger o f project ing our o w n cultural values on others. W e

do not k n o w whether these " un i v e r s a l " truths about mora l values ( inc lud ing the

conv ic t ion that they are universal) are, as a relativist w o u l d say, mere ly what we learn

1 6 William Graham Sumner, "Folkways." In Ethical Relativism, ed., John Ladd (Lanham: University Press of America, 1985), 23-39. 1 7 Ibid., 31. 1 8 Melville J. Herskovits, "Cultural Relativism and Cultural Values." In Ethical Relativism, ed., John Ladd (Lanham: University Press of America, 1985), 66.

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f rom our cu l tu re . 1 9 Indeed it is implaus ib le that anyone can reason about values i n purely

objective terms, without the effect o f inf luence by his/her o w n culture. Th i s explains

why , w i th Koh lbe rg ' s endeavor to identify universal patterns o f mora l development,

traces o f cultural bias are st i l l found in his theory. Fo r some relativists, this avoidance o f

ethnocentrism is real ly the m a i n spirit o f cultural re lat iv ism. Herskov i ts , for example ,

describes cultural re la t iv ism l ike this:

The very core o f cultural re la t iv ism is the socia l d isc ip l ine that comes o f respect for differences — o f mutual respec t . . . Such emphasis seeks to understand and harmonize goals, not to judge and destroy those that do not dovetai l w i th our

20 own .

Th i s , however, is i tse l f an expression o f a universal mora l value and should not

prohibi t us f rom searching for universal mora l standards that w i l l overcome basic

conf l icts . A s we have seen, a l l forms o f re lat iv ism are dependent on the truth o f

descriptive re la t iv ism. Though cultural divers i ty is unarguable, it remains an open

question h o w fundamental these cultural differences are. Koh lbe rg ' s answer is that mora l

codes do vary to a large degree, but many disagreements can be expla ined i n terms o f

developmental stages. W h i l e stages and thus the corresponding ways o f mora l reasoning

vary, the pattern o f development through these stages appears to be constant. F r o m this

sequence we can in fo rma l l y derive some properties w h i c h adequate mora l reasoning

should have. Moreover , some o f these properties are accepted by socia l scientists l ike

Snarey and Shweder, a l though they st i l l bel ieve that Koh lbe rg ' s overa l l theory is

cultural ly biased. These properties that define the Koh lbe rg i an higher stages are the most

l i ke l y to present themselves as constituents o f a truly universal mora l out look.

1 9 Paul Taylor, "Ethical Relativism," 149. 2 0 Melville J. Herskovits, "Cultural Relativism and Cultural Values," 76.

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Moreover , one central c l a im o f Koh lbe rg ' s theory is precisely that ethnocentrism

is an inadequate fo rm o f mora l reasoning. T o assume superiority for one 's o w n group is

in effect to reason in a Stage 3 or Stage 4 manner. A t the postconvent ional leve l , people

suppose that every person is equal and avo id project ing their o w n values on others. Seen

in this l ight Koh lbe rg is an a l ly o f Herskov i ts . The major difference between K o h l b e r g

and cultural relativists l i ke Herskov i ts is that Koh lbe rg real izes that i f mutual respect is

essential for harmonious coexistence between groups then the value o f mutual respect

must be va l id independently o f ind iv idua l cultural codes. In this sense K o h l b e r g is correct

i n saying that cultural relativists have confused cultural relat iv ity and the universal value

o f tolerance.

W e should also be careful not to equate tolerance w i th respect. John L a d d raises

the k i nd o f question w h i c h has dr iven many people to reject the cruder forms o f

re lat iv ism such as Sumner 's . Shou ld we tolerate other moral i t ies " even i f tolerance

requires us to condone practices, such as human sacr i f ice, genocide, or rac ism, wh i ch we

feel to be mora l l y repugnant " ? 2 1 Cu l tura l re lat iv ism w o u l d require such tolerance. But

f rom the point o f v i ew o f universal respect for persons we can cr i t i c ize such practices.

In spite o f terminolog ica l disagreements, relativists and universal ists are m o v i n g

closer to each other i n their posit ions. E v e n Herkov i ts urges his readers to d ist inguish

between absolutes and universals. He admits that there can be mora l universals, by w h i c h

he means those " c o m m o n denominators to be extracted f rom the range o f var iat ion that

2 1 John Ladd, Introduction to Ethical Relativism, ed, John Ladd (Lanham: University Press of America, 1985), 1-11, esp. 1-2.

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a l l phenomena o f the natural or cultural wo r l d manifest . " Th is pos i t ion is just one step

away f r om m y m i n i m a l un iversa l i sm, d i f fer ing on ly i n that it does not c l a i m that these

mora l universals can serve as a measure for cross-cultural mora l judgments . It seems to

me, however, that once one accepts that there are ethical universals one can hardly resist

accepting the leg i t imacy o f such judgments.

Some phi losophers have proposed weaker forms o f re la t iv ism. A c c o r d i n g to them,

re lat iv ism can be true i n spite o f the existence o f ethical universals. The i r central idea is

that such ethical universals as exist are not suff ic ient for e l iminat ing mora l relat iv i ty

entirely. Th is idea provides a way o f reconc i l ing un iversa l i sm and re la t iv ism and, as I

w i l l argue, K o h l b e r g can agree w i th it to large extent. B e l o w I shal l discuss a few

examples. . . :

3.2 Relativism as it is defended by moral philosophers

Cons ider R i cha rd Brandt, the famous rule ut i l i tar ian. Brandt is important for our

d iscuss ion because he is a universal ist who bel ieves i n l im i ted mora l relat iv ity. H e

defines re lat iv ism as the v i e w that some conf l i c t ing mora l c la ims can be equal ly va l i d . A s

an example o f conf l i c t ing c la ims he writes:

Let us l ook at the matter o f causing suffer ing o f animals. W e are in formed that very often, i n La t i n A m e r i c a , a ch i cken is plucked alive, w i t h the thought that it w i l l be more succulent on the table. The reader is inv i ted to ask h imse l f whether he w o u l d consider it jus t i f ied to p luck a ch icken a l ive, for this purpose. O r again, take some " g a m e " p layed by Indians o f the Southwest (but learned f rom the Spaniards, apparently), ca l led the " ch i c ken p u l l . " In this " game , " a ch i cken is bur ied i n the sand, up to its neck. The contestants ride by on horseback, t ry ing to grab the ch i cken by the neck and yank it f rom the sand. W h e n someone succeeds i n this, the idea is then for the other contestants to take away f rom h i m as m u c h o f the ch i cken as they can. The " w i n n e r " is the one who ends up w i t h the most ch icken. The reader is inv i ted to ask h imse l f whether he approves o f this sport.

Melville J. Herskovits, "Cultural Relativism and Cultural Values," 74.

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The writer had the dec ided impress ion that the H o p i d isapproval o f causing pa in to animals is m u c h mi lder than he w o u l d suppose typ ica l i n suburban Ph i l ade lph ia—cer ta in ly m u c h mi lder than he w o u l d feel h imsel f . Fo r instance, ch i ldren often catch birds and make "pe t s " o f them. A string is t ied to their legs, and they are then " p l a y e d " w i th . The birds se ldom survive this " p l a y " for long : their legs are broken, their w ings pu l led off , and so on. One informant put it: " Somet imes they get t ired and die. N o b o d y objects to th i s . " W o u l d the reader approve o f this, or permit his ch i ldren to do this sort o f t h i ng ? 2 3

I f you , l ike me, f i nd these behaviors disagreeable, y o u w o u l d probably make an

ethical c l a im that conf l icts w i th those o f the La t i n Amer i cans reported above. W e bel ieve

it wrong to p luck a ch icken a l ive s imp ly to increase gustatory pleasure but they think it

alright. C a n conf l i c t ing bel iefs o f this k i n d both be equal ly va l id? Brandt bel ieves that

they can. It is important to note that the La t i n Amer i cans do not do this because they

bel ieve that animals have no consciousness and feel no pa in . The difference between their

behavior and ours is thus not a consequence o f different factual bel iefs, but the

consequence o f different ethical op in ions. Brandt suggests that a disagreement o f this

k i nd may be "u l t ima te " and there is no objective way to judge that one v i e w is more va l id

than the other.

A c c o r d i n g to Brandt 's v i e w we and the La t in Amer i cans di f fer i n terms o f the

strength and scope o f our d ispos i t ion or attitudes o f d isapproval concern ing the in f l i c t ion

o f pa in on animals, and there is no objective means o f ove rcoming the conf l ic t . Thus

certain behaviors may be such that approval or disapproval may be equal ly rational or

just i f iable . Th i s represents a plausible fo rm o f ethical re la t iv ism that deserves serious

considerat ion.

Richard Brandt, Ethical Theories (Englewood Hill: Prentice-Hall, 1959), 102-103.

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A most important feature o f Brandt ' s def in i t ion o f re la t iv ism is that it does not,

l ike Sumner 's def in i t ions, define re la t iv ism negatively i n terms o f the non-existence o f

universal mora l standards or values. Rather, he defines re la t iv ism i n terms o f the

existence o f relative mora l judgments , w h i c h certainly does not exc lude the poss ib i l i t y

that there are also universal d imensions to moral i ty . Indeed, as a ut i l i tar ian, Brandt is

commi ted to the be l i e f that there are universal mora l values:

First, it has come to be agreed that certain features o f a culture system are essential for the maintenance o f l i fe , and that a system o f values that permits and sanctions these forms is inevitable i n society. Fo r instance, every society must provide for mat ing and for the rearing o f of fspr ing. A g a i n , it must prov ide for the education o f the of fspr ing in the performance o f those tasks that are necessary for surv iva l . Moreover , i n a complex society there must be dif ferent iat ion o f jobs , assignment o f ind iv idua ls to these jobs and the means for t ra in ing them for adequate performance, and prov i s ion o f mot iva t ion to do the jobs . Suff ic ient security must be prov ided to prevent serious disrupt ion o f act iv it ies, for example, security against v io lent attack. 2 4

The list o f ethical universals has not been completed. Other examples inc lude the

disapproval o f rape, the ideal for marriage as l i f e long un ion between spouses, the demand

for loyal ty to one 's o w n socia l group, the attachment o f h igh value to rec iproci ty and to

fair deal ing, the expectat ion that parents should educate their ch i ldren, and that ch i ldren

should be obedient and should render care in the o ld age o f their parents. Know ledge is

also universal ly v a l ued . 2 5

L im i t ed re lat iv ism o f the k i nd Brandt a l lows for appears plausible . Cer ta in other

relativists such as Ph i l i ppa Foot define re lat iv ism in s imi lar ways, c l a im ing that there are

objective l imi ts to w h i c h adequate mora l codes can vary, but a l l ow ing also that w i th in

Ibid., 286. Ibid.

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such l imi ts mora l relat iv i ty exists. In her " M o r a l i t y and A r t , " 2 6 Foot argues that re la t iv ism

is false "as a theory o f a l l mora l j u d g m e n t . " 2 7 The reason why re la t iv ism cannot be true

as a theory o f a l l mora l judgments is that (adequate) mora l systems are necessari ly

connected w i th " r emov ing part icular dangers and securing benef i ts . " N o t everything can

be counted as mora l reasons for (or against) do ing someth ing . 2 8 I f the code o f a group

requires its members to behave i n a certain way under certain condi t ions, and i f these

condit ions do not qual i fy as mora l reasons for behaving this way , then the code s imply

fai ls to be a mora l code at a l l . W i t h this i n m i n d we can see why she c la ims i n " M o r a l

R e l a t i v i s m " that there cannot be moral systems that radica l ly d i f fer f r om each other. N o t

a l l cultural codes can proper ly be ca l led mora l codes, i n spite o f the fact that

anthropologists may be w i l l i n g to ca l l them s o . 2 9 Foot bel ieves that there are important

s imi lar i t ies between a l l human beings. " A l l need affect ion, the cooperat ion o f others, a

place in a communi ty , and help i n t r oub l e . " 3 0 G i v e n the universal i ty o f such general

needs, and g iven that mora l i ty must, conceptual ly speaking, be responsive to human

needs, there w i l l be some universal mora l values. A c co rd i ng l y , she argues, " i t is c lear ly

an objective mora l fact that the N a z i treatment o f the Jews was mora l l y inde fens ib le . " 3 1

Foot also argues, however , that even w i th the existence o f objective mora l facts it

is st i l l possible that "object ive mora l systems can go on ly a little way, and w i l l come to

an end before a l l the radica l disagreements are reso lved . " I f this is so then mora l relat iv i ty

2 6 Philippa Foot, "Morality and Art." ln Philosophy as It Is, ed., Ted Honderich and Myles Burnyeat (Penguin, 1979), 12-26. 2 7 Ibid, 17. 2 8 Ibid, 13. 2 9 Philippa Foot, "Moral Relativism." In Relativism: Cognitive and Moral, ed, Michael Krauz and Jack W. Meiland (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982), 152-166. 3 0 Ibid, 164. 3 1 Ibid, 163. ,

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w i l l be left "substant ively i n tac t . " 3 2 In " M o r a l i t y and A r t , " she suggests that the prob lem

o f abort ion may fa l l under the category where no object ive ly best so lut ion can be found.

T o her, whether a fetus should be considered as hav ing rights is something to be chosen,

not something to be d i scovered . 3 3 Such genuine choice between compet ing options also

appear when there is conf l ic t between deontologica l and ut i l i tar ian mora l considerations.

It is extremely d i f f i cu l t to f ind a clear and obvious pr inc ip le when we start l ook ing into the problems, e.g., o f med ica l ethics. W e ourselves have a strong object ion to the idea o f us ing one person for the benefit o f others, and it probably guides our intuit ions i n many cases. It does not seem clear, however , that one cou ld rule out o f court the pr inc ip les o f a strict ut i l i tar ian who w o u l d , at least i f he were consistent, a l l ow things that we w i l l not a l l ow in the interests o f cancer research. A n d so it may be that at some points we real ly do f i nd the k i nd o f ult imate breakdown in mora l argument that has been suggested as a quite general poss ib i l i t y by those who refuse to admit def in i t ional cr i ter ia o f r ight and w r o n g . 3 4

Foot ' s first example is controvers ia l , for conservatives w i l l not agree that whether

to treat fetuses as persons is a genuine choice. Fo r them, fetuses are persons, per iod. To

avo id controversy let us concentrate on Foot ' s second example, w h i c h I bel ieve to be

more power fu l . W e often find it d i f f i cu l t to decide what to do when the negative duty o f

non-violat ion o f rights conf l ic ts w i th the posit ive duty to promote ut i l i ty , as I have argued

in section 1.1. What most p laus ib ly fo l lows is that neither non-violat ion o f rights nor

promot ion o f ut i l i ty is an ult imate mora l pr inc ip le or value. It w o u l d be more convenient

theoretical ly i f there were an overarching pr inc ip le by wh i ch we cou ld resolve a l l

conf l icts between these pr inc ip les , but no such pr inc ip le has been found. Therefore, i n

some cases at least, we m a y find it equal ly just i f iab le to act for the non-violat ion o f r ights

or for the promot ion o f ut i l i ty .

Ibid., 166. Philippa Foot, "Morality and Art," 14. Ibid., 15.

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Another dist inguished relativist, D a v i d W o n g , makes the difference between

universa l ism and re la t iv ism even more clear ly a matter o f degree. In Moral Relativity,35

he holds that there are s ix objectivist c la ims (he does not d ist inguish between object iv ism

and universal ism), not a l l o f w h i c h are necessari ly connected w i th each other:

(1) M o r a l statements have truth values;

(2) There are good and bad arguments for the mora l posi t ions people take;

(3) N o n m o r a l facts are relevant to the assessment o f the truth value o f mora l

statements;

(4) There are mora l facts;

(5) W h e n two mora l statements conf l i c t as recommendat ions to act ion, on ly one

statement can be true;

(6) There is a single true moral i ty .

In relat ion to this l ist there can be many versions o f ob ject iv ism, each formed as a subset

o f c la ims chosen f r om it. B y the same token, re lat iv ism can vary i n terms o f different

combinat ions o f these c la ims that it rejects. Consequent ly , l ike Brandt, W o n g bel ieves

that re lat iv ism can be true o f some value judgments i n spite o f the existence o f some

universal mora l truths.

A central idea i n W o n g ' s re la t iv ism is that human nature is so f l ex ib le that there

can be different moral i t ies that are equal ly adequate. W o n g suggests that we analyze

" ough t " statements as fo l l ows :

David Wong, Moral Relativity (Berkley: University of California Press, 1984).

228

" A ought to do X under actual condi t ion C " means " B y not do ing X under actual

condit ions C , A w i l l be breaking a rule o f an adequate mora l system apply ing to

h i m or h e r . " 3 6

Since " A ought to do X under actual condi t ion C " is true on ly when it f o l l ows f r om an

adequate mora l system hav ing appl icat ion for the agent, one cannot jus t i f y A ' s do ing X

under cond i t ion C by referr ing to whatever value system he l ikes. O n the other hand,

however, for some X and some C , there may be equal ly adequate mora l systems that

attach different values to A ' s do ing X , and hence " A ought to do X under the actual

condi t ion C " w i l l have different truth values.

To il lustrate h o w di f fer ing mora l systems can be equal ly va l id , W o n g compares

the Ar is tote l ian tradit ion, w h i c h centers on the theoria, w i th Con fuc i an i sm , w h i c h centers

on the virtue o f sophia. F o r Ar i s to t le , the highest virtue is a l i fe o f contemplat ion, a l i fe o f

intel lectual act ivity. Con fuc ius , however, places ren (usual ly translated as humanness or

benevolence) on the top o f a l l virtues. Though acknowledg ing w i s d o m as an important

virtue, Confuc ius shows no s ign o f regarding pure intel lectual activit ies as essential for

human perfect ion, but instead takes w i s d o m as the abi l i ty to discern the most suitable

behaviors on different occasions.

A f te r invest igat ing the basic idea o f what a good l i fe is l ike accord ing to these

tradit ions, W o n g suggests that there is genuine var iat ion in the truth condi t ion o f value

statements between Ar is to te l ian and Con fuc i an mora l i ty :

E ach culture sets out an ideal o f the best person and the best activit ies. Th i s is a way o f reso lv ing the internal conf l icts i n requirements between needs, desires,

Ibid., 40.

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and goals that is one o f the funct ions o f moral i ty . There seems to be, however , at least two ways o f reso lv ing those conf l ic ts that seem equal ly va l id .

L i k e Foot, then, W o n g bel ieves that there are compet ing but equal ly v a l i d value

judgments, and between them there is room for genuine choices.

W o n g makes clear that the relativist need not reject a l l object iv ist c la ims about

mora l statements. H e h imse l f is w i l l i n g to accept statements (1) through (4) o f the above

objectivist c l a i m s . 3 8 He declares h imse l f to be a relativist on ly because he does not

bel ieve i n any single true mora l i ty , and maintains that "there is no feature or set o f

features (about human nature) that el iminates a l l but one (moral) ideal as v a l i d . " 3 9 Seen in

this l ight W o n g ' s relativist c l a i m is fa i r ly moderate. E v e n W o n g h imse l f admits that his

re lat iv ism "m igh t not fit the stereotype o f r e l a t i v i s m " 4 0 i n that, un l ike Sumner 's theory, it

does not exclude the poss ib i l i ty o f compar ing different convent ions, say ing that some are

better than others.

W o n g ' s moderate re la t iv ism adopts a c l a im that is more typ ica l l y universal ist than

relativist, namely that there are universal mora l values and object ive mora l facts. M u t u a l

respect is considered to be the foundat ion o f a l l adequate mora l systems, and indeed he

regards cultural re la t iv ism as a theory o f tolerance o f cultural differences, and this gains

support f rom the pr inc ip le o f equal worth o f a l l human be ings . 4 1 H e also admits that there

3 7 Ibid., 158. 3 8 Ibid., 63-64. 3 9 Ibid., 158. 40David Wong, "Relativism." In A Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter Singer (Cambridge MA: Blackwell, 1993), 447.

4 1 David Wong, Moral Relativity, 199-201.

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are substantive mora l bel iefs that we cannot conceive to be false. A person's sk in co lor ,

for example, is ( in and o f itself) irrelevant to h o w we ought to treat h im/her . 4 2

3.3 Reconciling universalism and relativism

A l l three phi losophers discussed above share two central c la ims. F irst , there are

objective mora l facts, and there are universal mora l values. Second, w i th in the l imi ts set

by objective mora l facts, however , there can be a variety o f mora l systems that present

compet ing mora l conc lus ions, a l l o f w h i c h may be equal ly jus t i f i ed . T o the extent that

there are compet ing mora l systems that are equal ly va l i d , re la t iv ism can be said to be a

correct theory about moral i ty . Le t us ca l l this m i l d vers ion o f re la t iv ism " l i m i t e d

re la t i v i sm. " Koh lbe rg suggests that Stage 6 mora l pr inc ip les are determinate i n that a l l

Stage 6 reasoners w i l l agree on the same solutions for any mora l d i lemmas. Seen in this

l ight his theory is incompat ib le w i th l imi ted re lat iv ism as def ined above. If, i n some cases

at least, there are compet ing solutions to mora l d i lemmas that are equal ly jus t i f i ed , there

can be no guarantee that mature mora l reasoners w i l l agree on their solut ions for a l l

mora l problems.

I argued in sect ion 1 that the determinacy thesis is hardly defensible, but the c l a im

for determinacy is , perhaps, not a central thesis o f Koh lbe rg ' s theory. The most important

contr ibut ion o f the theory to mora l ph i losophy , as I see it, is that it goes a long way

toward showing that there are some universal mora l values that are fundamental to a l l

adequate mora l systems. These fundamental values have much to do w i t h equal respect

for persons, w h i c h is most typ ica l l y embodied i n our mora l reasoning through a

Ibid., 59.

231

procedure l ike ideal role tak ing. Th i s c l a im is , un l ike the c l a im o f determinacy, perfect ly

compat ible w i th l im i ted re la t iv ism. Indeed one can say that l im i ted re lat iv ism is a natural

extension o f Koh lbe rg ' s c l a im for universal values and decis ion-making procedures.

A l t h o u g h K o h l b e r g always cal ls Stage 6 mora l i ty a " p r i n c i p l e d " mora l i ty , Stage 6

mora l i ty actual ly has m u c h to do w i th attitudes. It is for this reason that I ca l l Koh lbe rg ' s

p r inc ip l i sm "pseudo . " In so far as there is no s imple fo rmu la that equates the attitude o f

respect w i th s imple types o f behaviors (such as k i l l i n g , steal ing, or l y i ng , etc.), respect as

a fundamental mora l value w i l l not be as determinate as the word ' p r i n c i p l i s m ' impl ies .

Respect, as a proper attitude, however , does set l imi ts to what is mora l l y permiss ib le , and

therefore to the degree to w h i c h adequate mora l systems can vary. Foot ' s idea that the

N a z i ' s treatment o f Jews is object ively indefensible, and W o n g ' s idea that sk in co lor in

and by i tse l f constitutes no mora l reason, can be easi ly expla ined by the requirements o f

respect. Fo r respect, whatever it means, at least impl ies that one should treat persons as

subjects, not as objects, and therefore their wor th cannot be determined by their phys ica l

appearances or l ineage.

Section 4: The study of human good

I argue that un iversa l i sm and re la t iv ism are both true to some extent. The quest ion

for me is not w h i c h o f these theories is true, but h o w they can be combined . In l ight o f

Koh lbe rg ' s theory, it can be said that mora l universals exist as certain fundamental mora l

Values, and as operations that embody these values. However , regarding the

determination o f objective human good , K o h l b e r g does not successful ly defend his v iew.

The truth o f un iversa l i sm, it seems, is proport ional to the number o f ex is t ing forms o f

universal human good, as w e l l as to the degree that the weights o f these goods can be

232

compared i n universal terms. B o t h Brandt and Foot c l a im that there are universal human

goods, inc lud ing knowledge , enjoyments, affect ion, help and support, and communi ty .

They do not go on to c lar i fy the ethical impl icat ions o f their c la ims , or h o w the

recognit ion o f these goods helps to enr ich the out look o f an adequate mora l system. N o r

do they prov ide so l id empi r i ca l data to support their c la ims.

Perhaps psycho logy can help develop a more complete understanding o f universal

mora l values through the study o f the w e l l be ing o f human k ind . Recent ly , developmental

psychologists such as P h i l i p and Barbara N e w m a n suggest that human wel l-being is a

r i ch concept ion, w h i c h combines safety, love , creativity, the sense o f involvement in

one 's role or one 's act iv it ies, autonomy, power , and perhaps other e lements . 4 3 I f theories

o f this k i nd can be tested i n a w ide range o f cultures, and their values examined i n terms

o f their relations to one another, and i f methods are developed to observe h o w they are

most effect ively we ighed i n everyday l ives, a more comprehensive theory o f human good

may be established. In these ways our understanding o f human good and hence o f mora l

values may be enriched.

Koh lbe rg ' s idea o f personhood and the good l i fe (or personal good) was rather

thin. W i t h a r icher account o f personhood and a fu l ler account o f what types o f human

good there are, a better br idge can be bui l t between the formal pr inc ip les and operations

i n mora l reasoning and speci f ic mora l rules. Th is is , I th ink, a way i n w h i c h

psycho log ica l research can be o f further help i n developing a r icher mora l ph i losophy.

W i t h the help o f psycho log ica l research, we can better understand what elements

constitute psycho log ica l health and enhance human fu l f i l lment , and perhaps many other

233

things as we l l . The more knowledge we have i n these areas, the more we k n o w h o w to

make the wo r l d a better place. K n o w i n g better h o w to do this is o f the first importance for

moral i ty .

Philip Newman & Barbra Newman, Development through Life (Homewood, 111.: Dorsey Press, 1984).

234

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94. Wa lker , Lawrence. "Cogn i t i v e Processes i n M o r a l Deve lopment . " In Handbook of Moral Development: Models, Processes, Techniques, and Research, edited by G . L. Sapp, 109-145. B i rm ingham, A L : Re l ig ious Educat ion Press, 1986.

95. Wa lker , Lawrence. "Sources o f Cogn i t i ve Con f l i c t for Stage Trans i t ion i n M o r a l Deve lopment . " Developmental Psychology 19 (1983): 103-110.

96. Wa lker , Lawrence. " S e x Dif ferences i n M o r a l Reasoning: A Cr i t i ca l R e v i e w . " Child Development 55 (1986): 677-691.

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104. W ink l e r , Ea r l . " M o r a l Ph i losophy and B ioeth ics : Contextua l i sm versus the Parad igm Theory . " In Philosophical Perspectives on Bioethics, edited by L. W . Sumner and Joseph Boy le , 50-78. Toronto: Un ivers i ty o f Toronto Press, 1996.

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242

Appendix 1: Moral Judgment Interview

1. Dilemmas included in the [1987] Standard Issue Scoring Manual:

D i l e m m a I (Joe's d i l emma) :

Joe is a 14-year o ld boy who wanted to go to camp very much . H i s father promised h i m

he cou ld go i f he saved up the money for it h imself . Sp Joe worked hard at h is paper route

and saved up the $40 it costs to the camp and a little more besides. Bu t just before camp

was go ing to start, his father changed his m i n d . Some o f his fr iends decided to go on a

special f i sh ing tr ip, and Joe 's father was short o f money it w o u l d cost. So he to ld Joe to

give h i m the money he had saved f rom the paper route. Joe d idn ' t want to give up going

to camp, so he thought o f refusing to give his father the money. — Shou ld Joe refuse to

g ive h is father the money or should he g ive it to h im? W h y or why not?

D i l e m m a II (Louise 's d i lemma) :

Judy was a 12-year-old g i r l . He r mother promised her that she cou ld go to a special rock

concert coming to their town i f she saved up f rom baby-sitting and lunch money so she

w o u l d have enough money to buy the ticket to the concert. She managed to save up the

$15 it costs plus another $5. But then her mother changed her m i n d and to ld Judy that she

had to spend the money on new clothes for school . Judy was disappointed and decided to

go to the concert anyway. She bought a ticket and to ld her mother that she was spending

the day w i th a fr iend. A week passed without her mother f ind ing out. Judy then to ld her

sister, Lou ise , that she had gone to the performance and had l ied to her mother about it.

Lou ise wonder whether to tel l her mother what Judy d id . — Shou ld Lou ise , the older

243

sister, tell their mother that Judy had l ied about the money or should she keep quiet? W h y

or why not?

D i l e m m a III (He inz ' s D i l emma ) :

In Europe, a w o m a n was near death f rom a special k i n d o f cancer. There was one drug

that the doctors thought might save her. It was a fo rm o f rad ium that a druggist i n the

same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist

was charging ten t imes what the drug costs h i m to make. H e pa id $400 for the rad ium and

charged $4,000 for a smal l dose o f the drug. The sick woman ' s husband, H e i n z , went to

everyone he knew to bor row the money, but he cou ld only get together about $2,000,

wh i ch is ha l f o f what it cost. H e to ld the druggist that his w i fe was dy ing and asked h i m

to sel l it cheaper or let h i m pay later. The druggist said, " N o , I d iscovered the drug and

I 'm going to make the money f rom i t . " So H e i n z got desperate and broke into the man 's

store to steal the drug for his w i fe . — Shou ld the husband have done that? W h y or why

not?

D i l e m m a III A (the doctor 's d i l emma) :

The doctor f ina l l y got some o f the rad ium drug for H e i n z ' s w i fe , but it d idn ' t work , and

there was no other treatment k n o w n to medic ine wh i ch cou ld save her. The doctor knew

that she had on ly about s ix months to l ive . She was i n terrible pa in , but she was so weak

that a good dose o f a pa ink i l l e r l ike ether or morphine w o u l d make her die sooner. She

was del i r ious and almost crazy w i th pa in , and in her ca lm periods she w o u l d ask the

doctor to give her enough ether to k i l l her. She said she cou ldn ' t stand the pa in and she

244

was going to die i n a few months anyway. — Shou ld the doctor do what she asks and

make her die to put her out o f her terrible pain? W h y ?

D i l e m m a IIP:

W h i l e a l l this was happening, H e i n z was i n j a i l for breaking ih and try ing to steal the

medic ine. H e had been sentenced for ten years. But after a couple o f years he escaped

f rom the pr ison and went to l i ve i n another part o f the country under a new name ; H e

saved money and s low ly bui l t up a b ig factory. He gave his workers the highest wages

and used most o f his profits to bui l t a hospital for work i n cur ing cancer. Twenty years

had passed when a ta i lor recognized the factory owner as be ing H e i n z the escaped conv ic t

w h o m the po l i ce had been l ook ing for back i n his home town. — Shou ld the tai lor report

H e i n z to the po l ice? W h y ?

D i l e m m a III' (the judge 's d i lemma) :

H e i n z d id break into the store. H e stole the drug and g ive it to h is w i fe . H e i n z was

arrested and brought to court. A ju ry was selected. The ju ry ' s j o b is to f ind whether a

person is innocent or gui l ty o f commit t ing a cr ime. The ju ry f inds H e i z gui l ty. It is up to

the judge to determine the sentence . : — Shou ld the judge give H e i n z some sentence, or

should he suspend the sentence and let H e i n z go free? W h y is that best?

D i l e m m a IV :

There was a woman who had very bad cancer, and there was no treatment k n o w n to

medic ine that w o u l d save her. Her doctor, D r . Jefferson, knew that she had only about s ix

245

months to l ive . She was i n terrible pa in , but she was so weak that a good dose o f a

pa ink i l l e r l ike either or morphine w o u l d make her die sooner. She was del i r ious and

almost crazy w i th pa in , and in her ca lm periods she w o u l d ask Dr . Jefferson to give her

enough ether to k i l l her. She said she cou ldn ' t stand the pa in and she was go ing to die i n a

few months anyway. A l t hough he knows that mercy k i l l i n g is against the law, the doctor

thinks about granting her request. — Should the doctor do what she asks and make her

die to put her out o f her terrible pain? W h y or why not?

D i l e m m a IV :

D r Jefferson d id per form the mercy k i l l i n g by g i v ing the w o m a n the drug. Passing by at

this t ime was another doctor, D r . Rogers, who knew the situation Dr . Jefferson was i n .

Dr . Rogers thought o f try ing to stop Dr . Jefferson, but the drug was already administered.

Dr . Roger wonders whether he should report D r . Jefferson. — Shou ld Dr . Rogers report

D r . Jefferson? W h y or why not?

D i l e m m a I V :

D r . Jefferson d i d per form the mercy k i l l i n g by g i v ing the w o m a n the drug. However ,

another doctor saw Jefferson give the woman the drug and reported h i m . Dr . Jefferson is

brought to court and a ju ry is selected. The ju ry ' s j ob is to f ind whether a person is

innocent or gui l ty o f commit t ing a cr ime. The jury f inds Jefferson gui l ty. It is up to the

judge to determine the sentence. — Shou ld the judge give D r . Jefferson some sentence, or

should he suspend the sentence and let Dr . Jefferson go free?

246

D i l e m m a V (Suic ide M i s s i o n D i l emma ) :

In Ko rea , a company o f Mar ines was greatly outnumbered and was retreating before the

enemy. The company had crossed a bridge over a r iver, but the enemy were st i l l most ly

on the other side. I f someone went back to the bridge and b lew it up as the enemy soldiers

were com ing over it, it w o u l d weaken the enemy. W i t h the head start the rest o f the men

in the company w o u l d have they cou ld probably then escape. But the man who stayed

back to b l o w up the bridge w o u l d probably not be able to escape a l i ve ; there w o u l d be

about 4 to 1 chance that he w o u l d be k i l l ed . The captain o f the company as to decide who

should go back and do the j ob . The captain h imse l f is the man who knows best h o w to

lead the retreat. He asks for volunteers, but no one w i l l volunteer. — Shou ld the captain

order a man to stay behind, or stay behind himsel f , or leave nobody behind? W h y ?

D i l e m m a VI I :

T w o young men, brothers, had gotten into serious trouble. They were secretly leav ing

town in a hurry and needed money. K a r l , the o lder one, broke into a store and stole

$1000. Bob , the younger one, went to a man who was k n o w n to help people i n town. B o b

to ld the man that he was very s ick and needed $1000 to pay for h is operation. B o b asked

the o ld man to lend h i m the money and promised he w o u l d pay h i m back when he

recovered. Rea l l y B o b wasn ' t s ick at a l l and he had no intention o f pay ing the man back.

A l t hough the man d idn ' t k n o w B o b very we l l , he lent h i m the money. So K a r l and B o b

skipped town, each w i th $1000. — W h i c h w o u l d be worse, stealing l ike K a r l or cheating

l ike B o b ? W h y ?

247

D i l e m m a VII I :

In a country i n Europe, a poor man named Va l j ean cou ld f i nd no work , nor cou ld his

sister and brother. Wi thout money, he stole food and medic ine that they need. He was

captured and sentenced to pr ison for s ix years. A f te r a couple o f years, he escaped f rom

the pr i son and went to l i ve i n another part o f the country under a new name. H e saved

money and s low ly bui l t up a b ig factory. H e gave his workers the highest wages and used

most o f his profits to bu i ld a hospital for people who cou ldn ' t afford good medica l care.

Twenty years had passed when a tai lor recognized the factory owner as be ing Va l j ean , the

escaped convict w h o m the po l i ce had been look ing for back i n his hometown. — Shou ld

the tai lor report Va l j ean to the pol ice? W h y or why not?

2. D i l emmas not inc luded i n the [1987] Standard Issue Scor ing M a n u a l 1

2.1. D i l e m m a I A (Bob ' s d i lemma) :

Joe l ied and said he only made $10 and went to camp w i th the other $40 he made. Joe had

an older brother Bob . Before Joe went to camp, he to ld B o b about the money and about

l y ing to their father. — Shou ld B o b tel l their father? W h y ?

2.2., D i l e m m a V A :

The captain f ina l ly decided to order one o f the men to stay behind. One o f the men he

thought o f had a lot o f strength and courage but he was a bad trouble maker. He was

" Dilemmas 2.1-2.3: Ronald Duska and Mariellen Whelan, Moral Development: A Guide to Piaget and Kohlberg (New York and Paramus, Paulist Press, 1975), pp. 121-123; Dilemma 2.4: Kohlberg 1981, pp. 205-206; Dliemma 2.5, Kohlberg 1981, p. 209.

248

always steal ing things f rom other men, beating them up and refusing to do his work . The

second men he thought o f had gotten a bad disease i n K o r e a and was l i ke l y to die i n a

short t ime anyway, though he was strong enough to do the j ob . — If the captain was

go ing to send one o f the two men , should he send the trouble maker or the s ick man?

W h y ?

2.3. D ies ing ' s D i l e m m a

Du r i ng the war i n Europe, a c i ty was often heav i ly bombed. A l l the men in the c i ty were

assigned to different f ire-fighting and rescue stations a l l over the city. A man named

D ies ing was in charge o f one fire engine station near where he worked . One day after an

especial ly heavy bomb ing , D i es ing left the shelter to go to his station. Bu t on the way,

decided that he had to see whether his fami ly was safe. H i s home was quite far away, but

he went there first. — Was it right or wrong for h i m to leave the station to protect his

fami l y ?

2.4. The L i f e boat d i l emma:

A charter plane crashed in the South Pac i f i c . Three people surv ived, the p i lo t and two

passengers. One o f the passengers was an o ld man who had a broken shoulder. The other

was a young man, strong and healthy. There was some chance that the raft cou ld make it

to the safety o f the nearest is land i f two men rowed cont inuously for three weeks.

However , there was almost no chance i f a l l three o f the men stayed on the raft. First o f

a l l , the food supply was meager. There was barely enough to keep two men al ive for

three-week per iod. Second, a storm was approaching, and the raft wou ld almost certainly

249

capsize unless one man went overboard. Th is man cou ld not c l i ng to the raft and in a l l

l i ke l i hood w o u l d drown. A dec is ion had to be made qu ick ly . The captain was strong and

the on ly one who cou ld navigate. I f he went over, there was almost no chance the other

two w o u l d make it to safety. If the o ld man w i th the broken shoulder went, there was a

very good probabi l i ty , about 80 percent, that the other two cou ld make it. I f the young

man went overboard and the o ld man and the captain stayed, chances were a l itt le less

than 50:50. N o one w o u l d volunteer to go overboard. What should the captain do? Shou ld

he (1) order the o ld man overboard, (2) should they draw straws (Note: the captain has the

opt ion o f inc lud ing h imse l f in the draw or not), or (3) let a l l three o f them stay? W h y ?

2.5. Char lene 's d i l emma:

Joanne is try ing out for the school play. A f te r her audi t ion, she rushes to her f r iend,

Char lene, to thank for her mora l support and to ask her for her op in ion o f her

performance. Char lene assures Joanne that she was very good, but Joanne worr ies that a

newcomer to the schoo l , who is try ing out for the same role, w i l l get the part. The new

g i r l , T i na , comes over to congratulate Joanne on her performance and asks i f she can j o i n

the two gir ls . She says that she's t ry ing hard to make friends. Char lene asks her to j o i n

them for a snack. Joanne is more reserved. W h e n T ine leaves, Joanne has a prob lem she 'd

l ike Char lene to help her solve. However , later that day, T i n a cal ls Char lene and asks her

to go to Wash ington to see a p lay on Saturday. Char lene is faced w i th a d i l emma: she

wanted to go w i th T i n a but has already made plans to see Joanne. Joanne might

understand and be happy that Char lene has the chance to go, or she might feel she's

los ing her best f r iend. What should Char lene do? (Koh lberg 1981, p. 209)

250

Appendix 2: The value of life in different stages (Koh lberg , 1981, pp. 19-20)

Stage Views of value of human life

Stage 1 The value o f human l i fe is confused w i th the value o f phys ica l objects and is based on the socia l status or phys ica l attributes o f the possessor.

Stage 2 The value o f human l i fe is seen as instrumental to the satisfaction o f the needs o f its possessor or o f the other people.

Stage 3 The value o f human l i fe is based on the empathy and affect ion o f f ami l y members and others toward its possessor.

Stage 4 L i f e is conce ived as sacred i n terms o f its place i n a categorical mora l or re l ig ious order o f rights and duties.

Stage 5 L i f e is va lued both in terms o f its relat ion to communi ty welfare and i n terms o f l i fe be ing a universal human right.

Stage 6 H u m a n l i fe is sacred — a universal human value o f respect for the ind iv idua l .

251

Appendix 3

Table o f Un ive rsa l Categories o f M o r a l Judgment (Koh lberg 1981, p. 117)

- E L E M E N T S - '

M o d a l E lements

1. Obey ing (consult ing) persons or deity. Shou ld obey, get consent (should

consult , persuade).

2. B l a m i n g (approving). Shou ld be b lamed for, d isapproved (should be approved).

3 T Retr ibut ing (exonerating). Shou ld retribute against (should exonerate).

4. H a v i n g a right (having no right).

5. H a v i n g a duty (having no duty).

Va lue. E lements

1. Ego is t i c consequences:

a. G o o d reputation (bad reputation)

b. Seeking reward (avoid ing punishment)

2. Ut i l i t a r ian consequences:

a. G o o d ind i v idua l consequences (bad; ind iv idua l consequences)

b. G o o d group consequences (bad group consequences)

3. Ideal or harmony-serving consequences

a. Upho ld i ng character

b. U p h o l d i n g self-respect ,

c. Serv ing socia l ideal or harmony

d. Serv ing human.digni ty and autonomy

4. Fairness

a. Ba lanc ing perspectives or role tak ing

b. Rec iproc i ty or posi t ive desert

c. Ma in ta in ing socia l contract or freely agreeing

N O R M S

1. L i f e

a. Preservat ion

b. Qual i ty and quantity

2. Property

3. Truth

4. A f f i l i a t i o n

5. E rot i c love and sex

6. Author i ty

7. L a w

8. Contract

9. C i v i l r ight

10. R e l i g i o n

11. Consc ience

12. Punishment

253

Appendix 4

Table o f Coded Aspects o f Deve lop ing M o r a l Judgment (Koh lberg 1969, pp. 378-379)

I. Va lue Locus o f value — modes o f 1. Cons ider ing mot ives in j udg ing

attributing (moral) value to acts, act ion.

persons, or events. M o d e s o f 2. Cons ider ing consequences in

assessing value consequences i n a j udg ing act ion,

situation. 3. Subject iv i ty vs. object iv ity o f

values assessed.

4. Re la t ion o f ob l igat ion to w ish .

5. Identif icat ion w i th actor or

v i c t ims in j udg ing the act ion.

6. Status o f actor and changing the

mora l wor th o f actions.

II. Cho i ce Mechan i sms o f reso lv ing or 7. L i m i t i n g actor 's responsibi l i ty

denying awareness o f conf l icts for consequences by shi f t ing

responsibi l i ty onto others.

8. Re l iance on discuss ion and

compromise , ma in ly

unreal ist ical ly .

9. D is tor t ing situation so that

con forming behavior is seen as

always m a x i m i z i n g the interest o f

254

III. Sanctions The dominant mot ives and

and Mot i ves sanctions for mora l or deviant

act ion

IV . Ru les The ways i n w h i c h rules are

conceptual ized, appl ied, and

general ized. The basis o f the

va l id i ty o f a rule.

V . R ights and Bas is and l imi ts o f control over

Author i ty persons and property.

the actor or others invo lved .

10. Punishment or negative

reactions.

11. D is t r ibut ion o f an interpersonal

relat ionship.

12. A concern by actor for welfare,

for posi t ive state o f the other.

13. Self-condemnation.

14. De f in i t i on o f an act as deviant.

(Def in i t ion o f mora l rules and

norms.)

15. General i ty and consistency o f

rules.

16. W a i v i n g rules for personal

relations (part icular l ism).

17. Non-mot ivat iona l attributes

ascribed to authority (knowledge,

etc.). (Mot iva t iona l attributes

considered under III above.)

18: Extent or scope o f authority 's

rights. R ights o f l iberty.

19. R ights o f possession or

255

property.

V I . Posi t ive Rec iproc i ty and equality. 20. Exchange and reciprocity as a

Justice mot ive for role conformity .

21 . Rec iproc i ty as a mot ive to .

deviate (e.g., revenge).

22. D is t r ibut ive just ice. Equa l i t y

and impart ia l i ty .

23 . Concepts o f mainta in ing

partner's expectations as a mot ive

for conformity . Contract and trust.

Puni t ive Standards and functions o f 24. Puni t ive tendencies or

Justice punishment. expectations, (a) No t ions o f

equating punishment and cr ime.

25. Funct ions or purpose o f

punishment.

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