Knowing Thy Self: The Importance ofReligious Social Location in

Comparative Theology

Kathleen MrozBoston College

Engaging Particularities ConferenceMarch 20, 2014

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IntroductionComparative theology is a relatively new academic field,

though its importance continues to grow as religious pluralism

becomes an increasingly prevalent reality, especially within

college classrooms. Francis Clooney, SJ, one of the developers of

the field of comparative theology, insists that “no community,

wherever it is and however it is configured, will casually

abandon its traditional commitments and practices in the face of

religious diversity.”1 Therefore, we must be enabled to learn

from one another across religious boundaries, in such ways that

allow us to appreciate another tradition while retaining devotion

to our own.

Accepting difference as inevitable, we must also see that

diversity exists not only among various traditions, but among the

persons who are members of one tradition. My interest in

comparative theology began as a masters student at Harvard

Divinity School. I found comparative theology to be an incredibly

rewarding and interesting discipline, and one that I knew I

wanted to incorporate into my work as a doctoral student in

1 Francis X. Clooney, SJ, Comparative Theology: Deep Learning Across ReligiousBorders (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 3.

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Systematic Theology. Nevertheless, I was troubled by the fact

that there appears to be far less women in the field than men.

This is not something we can ignore, as our religious identity is

shaped by our other identities. For example, in my tradition,

Roman Catholicism, the perspective of someone in a position of

authority (i.e. a priest or a bishop) may differ drastically from

that of someone on the margins of the tradition, a woman or a

member of the LGBT community. Yet, listening to both perspectives

is crucial, since both are Catholic. Whom we are talking to

matters. However, many students arrive at college ill-prepared

for open discussion and acknowledgment of their religious beliefs

and their social location for fear of being “politically

incorrect.” Thus, I propose that feminist theology provides

resources for both encouraging students to develop an interest in

comparative theology and for paying attention to other types of

diversity which shape our religious views.

Why Knowing Your Own Religion Matters: The Definition of

Comparative Theology

Francis Clooney, SJ states that comparative theology “marks

acts of faith seeking understanding which are rooted in a

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particular faith tradition but which, from that foundation,

venture into learning from one or more other faith traditions.”2

The key words in this definition are “rooted in a particular

faith tradition.” Comparative theology always retains both a

confessional and autobiographical dimension. This is distinct

from the pluralist approach taken by, for example, John Hick, who

advocates that all religions must give up absolutist claims of

unique superiority in order for interfaith relationships of

mutuality and respect to flourish. Coming from a Christian

standpoint, he proposes a form of Christianity that “reveres

Jesus as its supreme teacher and inspirer but does not regard him

as literally God incarnate.”3 What Christianity should look like

in a pluralistic world is a religion in which divine incarnation

is not longer defined solely by Christ, but is seen as “taking

place wherever and whenever God’s will is done.” Worship is also

directed to God rather than Jesus.4

For Clooney, this vision is neither practical nor necessary

as applied to Christianity or any other religion. He asserts that

2 Clooney, 10. 3 John Hick, A Christian Theology of Religions (Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 1995), 126. 4 Ibid, 136.

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“scholars who are Christian believers can, for instance, still

assert that Christ founded the one universal religion and that

Jesus is the universal savior.” In much the same way, scholars of

other traditions will make similar universal claims.5 The goal of

comparative theology is not to completely understand the other or

inhabit the other’s world view, as this is neither possible nor

desirable for the devout believer. Rather, through comparative

theology “we see the other in light of our own, and our own in

light of the other.”6 Encountering another tradition can help

provide us with a fresh understanding of our own faith or of the

divine.

Of course, with this understanding of comparative theology,

bias is inevitable. Clooney insists that we need to know our

history, as “we come to any of our new reading projects with

literacy in our own tradition, and what we have read affects how

we read and make sense of what we read in another tradition.”7 A

major theme of Clooney’s work is that “we learn best when we

learn in detail, in small options and choices we make in the face

5 Clooney, 12-13. 6 Ibid, 11. 7 Ibid, 60.

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of the vast possibilities of our religiously diverse world. We

ourselves are part of the details that need to be noticed.”8

Since comparative theology is autobiographically grounded,

our own religious tradition, personal beliefs, age, upbringing,

ethnicity, geographical location, travel experiences, etc. all

matter, and we need to be upfront about them when we engage in

comparative work. Clooney also states that believers must remain

in constant conversation with their own communities. They need to

write and speak in ways that make sense to the members of that

community. This demands that one be able to locate one’s

community and be knowledgeable of its language prior to taking on

comparative work.

In this sense, bias, rather being seen as a stumbling block

and cause of discord, can be viewed in a more positive light, as

giving us direction. Clooney holds that “if we see our biases and

watch them in operation, we can become freer, more vulnerable in

our reading.”9 “Admitting a kind of elitism,” writes Clooney,

“confessing what we have and have not chose, is the best way to

keep open wider possibilities that stretch beyond our books and

8 Ibid, 16. 9 Ibid, 64..

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writing.”10 Of course, this project is not without risk. Clooney

remarks that “we should certainly consider ourselves continually

accountable as we read, and we should welcome criticisms of our

presuppositions, methods, and conclusions.”11 We must accept

vulnerability without letting “even deeply held truths become an

obstacle to learning.” Clooney acknowledges that sometimes

research may complicate the case for one’s faith. However, this

complication can be healthy and fruitful, as “faith need not

suffer from the fact that comparative study does not quickly

confirm dearly held beliefs or smoothly undercut what others

believe.”12 Comparative theology requires that we sometimes feel

uncomfortable. Discussions are not always simple and easy.

At A Loss for Words: Young Adults and the Inability to Speak

About Religion

Based on Clooney’s definition, doing comparative theology

requires being able to identify one’s own tradition and discuss

one’s beliefs with those who are outside the tradition.

Unfortunately, statistics show that many young adults are unable

10 Ibid, 68. 11 Ibid, 64. 12 Ibid, 13.

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to speak about their religion. In 2005, Christian Smith published

Soul Searching: The Religious and Spiritual Lives of American

Teenagers, compiling data from in-depth interviews, surveys, and

research conducted by the National Study of Youth and Religion.13

Overall, his research concludes that “the vast majority of

[teenagers] tend to be incredibly inarticulate about their faith,

their religious beliefs and practices, and its meaning or place

in their lives.”14 The majority of them would “badly fail a

hypothetical short-answer or essay test on the basic beliefs of

their religion.”15 Smith’s impression is that this is because

teenagers have not been effectively educated in and provided

opportunities to practice talking about their faith.16 As teens

are increasingly spending time in “secular” environments,

religion appears to have faded into the background. Today, fewer

than fifteen percent of Catholic teens in the United States

13 For the purpose of the study, respondents were placed into the following categories: Conservative Protestant, Mainline Protestant, Black Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, Mormon, and Not Religious. Smith admits the limitations of his study, calling for a more dedicated study of Muslim, Hindu,and Buddhist teens in the United States14 Christian Smith, Soul Searching: The Religious and Spiritual Lives of American Teenagers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 131. 15 Smith, 137. 16 Ibid, 133.

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attend a Catholic school.17 The majority of US teenagers do not

attend a religious youth group or religion classes.18

Smith notices that teens appear to be greatly concerned with

political correctness. Most of those interviewed reported that

“their school teachers avoid discussing religion like the plague

and that their school friends largely act as if religion is not

part of anybody’s life.”19 For the vast majority, expressions of

religious faith at school are kept to a minimum.20 Therefore, few

teens talk about religious matters with their friends or family,

and even fewer get into arguments when these matters do come up

in conversation.21 Many simply accept religion as a taken for

granted aspect in the background of their lives. Smith asserts

that this can be partly be attributed to society’s message to

youth that they are immature. Religion is defined by many

teenagers as a “mostly adult affair” which makes religion

automatically feel distant to them.22 Yet, eighteen is the

average age of a college freshman, meaning many students,

17 Ibid, 214. 18 Ibid, 53. 19 Ibid, 161. 20 Ibid, 59. 21 Ibid, 124. 22 Ibid, 185.

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especially those who did not grow up attending a religious

school, enter university without the skills necessary to express

their religious beliefs. Complicating matters further is that

teenagers have likely been influenced by religion in more ways

than they realize. More than three-fourths of teens consider

their own religious beliefs to be somewhat or very similar to

their parents, tending to be more similar to their mother than

their father.23 Only 2.8% affiliate with more than one different

faith.24 Contrary to popular stereotypes, Smith asserts that the

character of teenage religiosity in the United States is

extraordinarily conventional. This appears to suggest that

upbringing plays an important role in constructing one’s

religious views and how one chooses to identify him/herself.

Political theories that seek to limit the role of religion

in the public realm seem to exacerbate the problem. In his famous

book Justice As Fairness, John Rawls argues for the formation of

an overlapping consensus to avoid one comprehensive doctrine

being endorsed over another. Rawls proposes that deliberations

must be made from the “original position.” In the original

23 Ibid, 34. 24 Ibid, 31.

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position, all parties are under a “veil of ignorance” in which

they are “not allowed to know the social positions or the

particular comprehensive doctrines of the persons they represent.

They also do not know peoples’ race and ethnic group, sex, or

various native endowments such as strength and intelligence, all

within the normal range.”25 Notre Dame philosopher Robert Audi

calls for a “principle of secular justifications,” which states

that all laws or public policies must be backed by adequate

secular reasons, since these are the only reasons that count in

the liberal state. He demands that “secular reasons must be

strong enough to direct the citizen’s own behavior, for example

when voting in elections, quite independently of the concomitant

religious motivations.”26 Jurgen Habermas softens this position a

bit by acknowledging that we cannot expect all citizens to be

able to easily separate their political view from their personal

faith. Nevertheless, in the legislative process, “only secular

reasons count.”27 Religious citizens can express their opinions

publicly in a religious language, but must subject these reasons 25 John Rawls, Justice As Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001). 26 Jurgen Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion (Malden, MA: Polity Press,2008), 126. 27 Habermas, 130.

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to “the institutional translation proviso” in the legislative

process.28

So, one may ask, what is the problem? Much of Smith’s data

can be interpreted as positive for fostering interfaith dialogue.

Sixty percent of US teens indicated that they believe “many

religions may be true,” with only 29% saying “only one religion

is true.”29 Yet, simply adopting a tone of civility and

inclusiveness, while it may prevent public discord, does not

promote true learning across religious differences, nor does it

promote appreciation for the religious other as other. Adopting

the proposals of the political philosophers is more complicated

in real life than on paper. Many may wish for a secular state,

but even the “secular” is not neutral, and according to Talal

Asad, the purely secular state is a myth. He quotes Carl Schmitt,

who asserted that “all significant concepts of the modern theory

of the state are secularized theological concepts.”30 Secularism

tends to be domination of one religion to the degree that it

becomes the norm against which all others are judged. In the

28 Habermas, 136. 29 Smith, 74. 30 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 189.

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United States, as Saba Mahmood insists, secularism is

overwhelmingly Christians, with many persons unconsciously aware

of Christian biases that operate in the political sphere.31 Too

often, persons are encouraged to try to bracket their religious

faith when interacting in a pluralist environment, rendering

opportunities for publicly expressing one’s faith scarce. Yet,

this type expression is needed in the classroom.

In order to learn across differences, one must be able to

articulate his or her religious understandings, whatever those

may be. While some may find talking about their faith to be a

smooth and uncomplicated process, others may need to engage in

some serious self-reflection before being able to put their

beliefs and presuppositions into words. Furthermore, I propose

that religion is not the only aspect of identity that is

significant for comparative theology. We are not just Christians,

Muslims, Jews, Hindus, Buddhists, etc. but particular Christians,

Muslims, Jews, Hindus, Buddhists. We also belong to other

31 Saba Mahmood, “Can Secularism Be Other-Wise?” in Varieties of Secularism ina Secular Age, ed. Juergensmeyer, VanAntwerpen, and Calhoun (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 285

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identity groups based on gender, race, socioeconomic status,

profession, geographical location, etc.

How Adopting a Feminist Perspective Can Foster Learning Across

Borders

Francis Clooney’s description of comparative theology shows

us that it is crucial for young scholars to be aware of their

religious social location. Yet, many teenagers who come to fill

college classrooms are not used to talking about themselves in

such a way. Finding a solution to this problem is not going to

happen overnight. Also, it is not a difficulty that can be

ameliorated by college theology classrooms alone. Getting people

more engaged with their faith communities and their own personal

beliefs will require work on the part of ministers, clergy,

parents, and others who are influential in teenagers’ lives.

Nevertheless, theology classrooms can help students gain the

confidence and language conducive for expressing their beliefs.

Also, students may hold convictions that affect their daily

lives, but of which they are not aware of without personal

examination. Biases may not be obvious, but that does not mean

they are non-existent. The work of two feminist scholars,

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Jeannine Hill Fletcher and Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza provide

us with resources that can be helpful for teachers and scholars.

Jeannine Hill Fletcher stresses the importance of seeing all

persons as “hybrids.” Given our hybrid-identity, it is impossible

to isolate a slice of identity that informs a given experience.

For Christians, the answer to the question “what does it mean to

be a Christian?” is conditioned by other identity categories,

such as gender, race, sexual orientation, socioeconomic status,

family structure, and personal experience.32 Our other identities

shape how we read the Christian story. Religious identity is

neither singular nor static.

This reality is witnessed when we read the Gospels. Hill

Fletcher tells us, “the gospel writers rewove the story of

Judaism with the new experience of Jesus of Nazareth; so too did

they weave themselves and their context into this story.” Each

gospel was responding to particular theological concerns, which

shaped its interpretation of the Christian story. For example,

Matthew’s gospel was written to Jewish-Christians trying to

understand their continued relationship to Judaism after the fall

32 Jeannine Hill Fletcher, Monopoly on Salvation: A Feminist Approach to Religious Pluralism. New York: Continuum, 2005.

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of the Temple. From the perspective of Matthew, Jesus is seen as

the new Temple, the continuation of Israel. Luke retells the

story of Jesus attentive to the concerns of non-Jews, emphasizing

the dimensions of Jesus’ ministry that might appeal to a Gentile

audience.33

In comparative theology, one’s personal perspective must

encompass a lot more than just announcing that one is Roman

Catholic or Muslim. Also, while some aspects of identity are

obvious, others are less so. For example, I am very mindful of

the fact that I am a twenty-four year old woman who is Roman

Catholic. I am often repeating this knowledge on a day-to-day

basis. However, less obvious knowledge, like the family dynamics

in which I grew up, my relationship status, where I went to

school, the teachers with whom I studied, my health, and the

political and religious views of those around me, were likely not

any less influential in contributing to my own biases. Knowing

our own biases requires work on our part, and this is why I

suggest that young theologians be introduced to aspects of the

33 Ibid, 124.

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radical democratic pedagogy used by Harvard Divinity School

professor and New Testament scholar Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza.

Schussler Fiorenza critiques what she refers to as the

“malestream” pedagogy and contends that we must transform what

she calls “the Didactic Triangle.” The standard didactic triangle

consists of three components: 1) knowledge; 2) teacher; and 3)

learners, or students. The didactic triangle proceeds as follows:

“teachers teach knowledge, which students learn and give back to

teachers in their exams in order for teachers to evaluate and

assess whether learning has taken place.” She takes issue with

this model because it presupposes a finite amount of knowledge.

By “casting knowledge as abstract power that is not contingent

upon its practitioners and socio-political contexts, the

epistemology of the didactic triangle is not able to critically

articulate the ideological functions of knowledge.”34

A radical democratic pedagogy insists that “reflection on

experience is an essential starting point for learning.”35

Participants must recognize that everyone’s perspective and

34 Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza, Democratizing Biblical Studies: Toward an Emancipatory Educational Space (Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 2009), 129. 35 Ibid, 140.

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knowledge is limited by their religious social location, thus the

classroom experience must foster examination of our own

presuppositions.36 Like Francis Clooney, this method does not

expect one to give up cherished beliefs or traditions, nor does

it seek to establish consensus on every topic. Rather, it seeks

to “use disagreement and conflict creatively,” particularly in

challenging structures of oppression and exclusion, and uplifting

the voices of those who have been marginalized.37 Now, one may

question whether comparative theology has such liberationist

aims. After all, Clooney does not envision comparative theology

as leading to the formation of judgments or conclusions regarding

particular religious doctrines or communities, nor does he see it

as a tool for conversion. Nevertheless, comparative theology for

its own sake can be interpreted as a liberating endeavor. Clooney

affirms that comparative theology may “play a corrective role in

the theological conversation.” Even a simple comparison of

theologies, he says, “should help believers unburden themselves

of misconceptions they have about what other traditions believe

36 Ibid, 150. 37 Ibid, 151.

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or about the uniqueness of their own tradition’s claims.”38 It

can be rewarding just to get to know another, even without clear-

cut goals.

Schussler Fiorenza structures her seminars using the concept

of Theme-Centered Interaction (TCI) which was developed by Ruth

Cohn, a humanistic psychoanalyst and Jewish emigre, as a pedagogy

which could “oppose the Nazi mind-set” and “compel people to

become engaged in politics.”39 According to Cohn, every learning

situation consists of four factors. The first is the “I” or

“individual.” Second, is the “we” or the “group.” Third is the

“it” which is the topic, theme, or subject for which the group

has come together. Last, is the “globe,” the organizational

environment of the training and the wider context of the

participants. It is vital that all four factors be held in

creative tension and to notice on which level the discussion

moves.40 One may object that comparative theology does not have

an “it.” However, the “it” can be what Clooney defines as the

purpose of comparison, “fresh theological insights that are

38 Clooney, 133. 39 Schussler Fiorenza, 153. 40 Ibid, 154-155

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indebted to the newly encountered tradition/s as well as the home

tradition.”41

The discussion rules put forth by Cohn can be helpful for

scholars engaging with texts, traditions, or rituals of another

tradition for the first time. First, one should speak in the “I-

form” and not as “we” or “one.” In this way, one avoids speaking

for everyone, letting each person take responsibility for

themselves. Cohn tells each person to “articulate and make

transparent the motivation and background of your own reactions,

questions, and feelings, and refrain from interpreting other’s

statements.” She also insists keep our statements personal

impressions, rather than judgments. Cohn also cautions against

generalizations. We should always say “I think” instead of

“everybody says.”42

In Schussler Fiorenza’s classroom, all are considered equal

but different. She insists on a mutual rather than hierarchical

relationship between the teacher and the students, regardless of

level of study. Rather than merely absorbing the professor’s

words or techniques, all “bring their different capabilities and

41 Clooney, 10. 42 Schussler Fiorenza, 156.

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knowledges to the task of creating new knowledge in a way that is

critically interactive with the body of knowledge and scholarship

already available.”43

Before proceeding, I want to be clear that I do not envision

comparative theology classrooms fully adopting Elisabeth

Schussler Fiorenza’s method of pedagogy. The radical-democratic

pedagogy has some serious limitations. Schussler Fiorenza places

such emphasis on the radical equality of teacher and student,

that students are not evaluated in the typical manner. Grades are

given on the basis of a contract, where students sign up for the

grade they wish to receive at the start of the semester and are

rewarded with that grade provided that they submit all work on

time. Most of the syllabus is left blank so that it can be filled

in by seminar participants as the semester moves along. Much of

the semester is spent reading the work of seminar participants,

rather than outside scholars. Paper feedback is given by the

entire class, rather than just the professor. Such practices are

probably not desirable nor practical for the comparative theology

classroom. Students will need to read the sacred texts and

43 Ibid, 153.

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literature of other traditions more so than one another’s papers.

While the professor should admit his or her own biases and never

be seen as an absolute authority on the subject, deference should

be given to the professor for their greater number of years in

the field. Furthermore, a professor may need to make certain

authoritative decisions for the sake of saving time. In this type

of environment, long debates can take place over the structure of

the syllabus or method all should adopt when reading each other’s

papers, that take away from time that could be spent engaging

subject material.

Nevertheless, I think students who wish to study comparative

theology should undergo a thorough self-examination to uncover

their own biases. Crossing religious borders can be a difficult

and frightening process. Students should make it a habit to

indicate their social location when writing papers or speaking in

public. Adopting Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza’s method of

requiring students to answer questions about their social-

location at the beginning of the semester is a great place to

start. This reflection takes place in two parts. First, a silent

meditation upon one’s story in which the student writes down

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relevant aspects about their life, and how they were primarily

taught or encouraged to view religion. Next, the student

dialogues with the student next to them. In narrating one’s own

story, one can become aware of aspects of their social identity

that they had never before deemed relevant. One can suddenly see

how he or she may have unconsciously exercised privileged or

experienced oppression. Most of the time, persons will find that

they belong to both groups that are privileged and groups that

are marginalized, which means we all need to wrestle with the

question of how to be more inclusive toward others and how to

gain a voice in situations where we are silenced.

Following parts of the Theme Centered Interaction, like

avoiding generalizations, speaking as an “I,” and clearly

articulating one’s context and motivation, can help prevent

insulting remarks or contentious fights, ensuring that one person

does not have a monopoly on the conversation. Saying how one

feels about a particular text or religious practice will likely

be more welcomed by the religious other than a judgment. “I felt

this could be a problematic statement for women” is much better

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than “that text is oppressive.” It does not feel like an attack,

but rather an opening for dialogue.

When discussion is taking place, it is crucial to constantly

remember, as Jeannine Hill Fletcher tells us, that religious

identity is always a hybrid identity. Fletcher claims, “although

persons may not view the world through the same religious story,

the many facets of identities suggests that they can find a

common language in one of the other stories that shapes them.”44

If space is given to encounter the other, Fletcher insists that

“it is hard to imagine that some points of contact would not be

found.”45 This would be true in the classroom, as at the very

least, students would all share the fact that they are academics

attending the same university. Partial identification can foster

collaborative efforts across religious boundaries. For example,

when I was a student at Harvard Divinity School, I was a leader

of WomenCircle, a group of women from all different faith

backgrounds who would get together for prayer and fellowship.

Within our different traditions, we converged in our common

experience of subordination and discrimination in our

44 Hill Fletcher, 110. 45 Ibid, 94.

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communities. We found a common purpose in wanting to create a

safe space for women’s voices to be heard. We wanted to remind

women that their bodies can image the divine and mediate the

sacred.

At times, we may find that we have more in common with

someone of another tradition than someone of our own. This also

serves to prevent stereotyping individuals, since we see that not

all persons from one tradition are exactly the same. A

Christians’ encounter with one Muslim, for example, will be

different, than their encounter with another Muslim.

All of this stress on points of convergence is in no way

meant to imply that difference is bad. By recognizing the

multifaceted nature of identities, we allow the other to be

other. This means, according to Fletcher, that Christians cannot

say in advance what Christian thought says about the other.

Rather, with each meeting, we “relinquish the possibility of

controlling knowledge.”46 Where our encounters and exchanges will

lead us is a mystery. Multifaceted identities are also dynamic.

Encounters with other people and places may shift the way in

46 Ibid, 95.

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which we practice or articulate our faith, even as we still

continue to hold on to long-held faith convictions. A Catholic

may refuse to abandon the notion that Jesus is the absolute and

universal Savior, but he can still maintain that knowledge is not

finite, and that there is always more he can learn to enrich his

faith. Also in describing his faith to others, he may develop a

greater appreciation for his tradition, remembering why it is

that he loves Jesus. As a Catholic, one of the most memorable

masses I ever attended was when I took one of my non-Catholic

friends to church with me because she had to attend a Catholic

mass as part of a class assignment. In explaining the parts of

the mass to her, while watching and listening to her reaction, I

was reminded of why I go to Church on Sunday. The same words and

rituals that I have recited and practiced for years were no

longer ordinary and boring, but unique and filled with rich

meaning.

Feminist thought provides us with a way to strike a balance

between too much focus on otherness, on the one hand, and too

much focus on sameness on the other. When too much emphasis is

placed on sameness, the other is not recognized for who they are.

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Pluralism can quickly turn into marginalization, as one tradition

often becomes the norm against which other traditions are

measured.47 However, if we over-emphasize otherness, then we do

not adequately seek resources for bridging differences. We also

falsely assume that all members who identify with a specific

tradition hold the same exact views and behave in the same exact

ways. Hybrid identity means that we will have points of

similarity and points of difference with every single person with

whom we come into contact. Difference need not be feared.

Disagreement need not be avoided at all costs, especially if it

requires one person to give up his or her long-cherished beliefs.

Debate and argument can be conducted in a manner that does not

lead to violence and hatred. If consensus is not the ideal, there

is not pressure to conform. Two people can see the world very

differently and still call each other “friend” and “colleague.”

Conclusion

As Clooney informs us, comparative theology is not supposed

to be simple and comfortable. Not only must be open to having our

cherished beliefs challenged, but we also must challenge our own

47 Ibid, 65.

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biases. This means acknowledging our privilege, and the ways in

which we have directly or indirectly contributed to the silencing

of those who are different from us, both inside and outside of

our religious community. One example is that we can no longer be

satisfied with comparative theology as a predominantly male

discipline. While dialogue between two religious leaders or

clergy is useful, getting to the heart of a tradition means

listening to many voices within that tradition, including those

not given access to positions of religious authority. A feminist

approach to pedagogy, while not a cure-all, can certainly help

make comparative theology a more inclusive and diverse field by

fostering deeper interfaith learning in theology classrooms. It

can also help students feel more prepared to do comparative work

by assisting them in developing ways to better understand and

articulate what they believe and why.

While comparative theology is distinct from feminist

theology or liberation theology, I think comparative theology can

and should play a key role in these disciplines. For example, as

a woman whose area of interest is Muslim-Christian dialogue, I

see that while I am not of the same tradition as Muslim women, I

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share a story with many of them, in that we are women in

traditions that do not include women in positions of leadership,

and are often interpreted in ways that are misogynistic. We share

the story of being women who see our respective traditions as

giving us comfort and motivation, as containing resources for the

liberation of women. Most liberation theologies have been

criticized for being exclusive in one way or another, for

uplifting some while neglecting others. Feminism would fail to be

a liberation movement if it neglected to take into account the

variety of religions to which women belong, and focused solely on

a Catholic solution to the problems facing all women. Comparative

theology can foster interfaith collaboration in addressing issues

like sexism, racism, and homophobia.

I believe diversifying comparative theology is especially

important in Catholic schools at a time when Catholicism has been

given a lot of negative attention in the media. Many tend to

associate Catholicism solely with the teachings of the

Magisterium, or the actions of the Pope and certain bishops. Some

may simply choose to label Catholicism as anti-gay or

misogynistic. The same has been done with Hinduism and Islam.

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Yet, listening to a variety of voices enables us to see that our

perception of a religion cannot be reduced to one interview on

the news, one passage from a sacred text, or one encounter with

another person. Comparative study can be a source of healing, for

people can come to realize, through intense study of a tradition

and dialogue with many of its members, that another religion is

not their enemy and is not to be feared. Comparative theology,

done with careful attention to our hybrid identities, can direct

our anger toward violence and oppression done in the name of

religion, rather than toward particular religions as a whole.

Asad, Talal. Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003.

Clooney, Francis X. Comparative Theology: Deep Learning Across Religious Borders. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.

Habermas, Jurgen. Between Naturalism and Religion. Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2008.

Hick, John. A Christian Theology of Religions. Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 1995.

Hill Fletcher, Jeannine. Monopoly on Salvation: A Feminist Approach to Religious Pluralism. New York: Continuum, 2005.

Mahmood, Saba. “Can Secularism Be Other-Wise?” in Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age, ed. Juergensmeyer, VanAntwerpen, andCalhoun. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010.

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Rawls, John. Justice As Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001.

Schussler Fiorenza, Elisabeth. Democratizing Biblical Studies: Toward an Emancipatory Educational Space. Lousville, KY: John Knox Press, 2009.

Smith, Christian. Soul Searching: The Religious and Spiritual Lives of American Teenagers. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

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