Jagannātha's definition of poetry: An analysis of the introductory verses of rasagangādhara and...

NORMAN SJOMAN

JAGANNATHA’S DEFINITION OF POETRY: AN

ANALYSIS OF THE INTRODUCTORY VERSES OF

RASAGANGADHARA AND THE DEFINITION OF POETRY

PREFACE

The svdrthcinurnka is a form of perception; the panirthdnurmina is a thought structure used in order to convince another of something. It is, in essence, a structure meant to bring someone else to the point of perceiving a particular object. In the same way, a logical argument should be considered only as a curtain which, when opened, reveals the thing to be perceived. It should result in a perception and not a thought construction. The commentary and notes presented here are written with that in view.

In many places this commentary is merely a translation, a plagiarism of one commentary or another without acknowledgment. This is standard practice in commentatorial writing - acknowledgments would exceed the text. Such blatant plagiarism does not constitute grounds for criticism (this commentary may be criticized but not for that - so little of anything is one’s own). For the concept of plagiarism is involved in what is termed ‘creativity’ in our language, and in what is known as vyutpatti or ‘detailed knowledge’ in another tradition. ‘Detailed knowledge’ entails memorizing passages both before and after comprehending them. Hence ‘creativity’ in the Sanskrit intellectual tradition comes to mean the ability to move freely and efficiently from one topic to another, along with the capacity to expand any topic or indicate the correct path through a particular topic’s complexities. Thus the ‘creative’ capacity would overlap with the emotion- ally-charged notion of plagiarism, which we have been taught to regard as repugnant.

I have read the text with Chandrasekhara Pattankar Sastri, Dharmadhikari to the Mysore palace and Vishveshvara Dikshita of the Maharaja’s Maha- pathasala, Mysore. I have consulted with B. Rajashekharaiah, Maharaja’s Mahapathasala, Mysore, H. V. Nagaraja Rao, and N. S. Venkatanathacharya (both of the Mysore Oriental Research Institute), and K. S. Varadachariar on various points.

D. Gitomer has absorbed the information and organized it both in terms

Journal oflndian Philosophy 9 (1981) 359-402.0022-1791/81/0094-0359$04.40. Copyright 0 1981 by D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, U.S.A.

360 NORMAN SJOMAN

of form and content. The creative act as described by Jagannatha (see also my note 20) is split between the Maui and the sahydaya. Work of this nature is essentially oral, so it requires a division into transmitter and receiver.

Mysore, May, 1980 N. SJOMAN

PI Merely remembered, it destroys the burgeoning sun’s fierce heat through compassion for mankind. Encircled by hundreds of lightning flashes of undwindling brilliance, resorting to divine trees on the banks of Kalinda Mountain’s Joy - May this in- effable tier of [black] clouds caress my mind.

1.1. SOURCES OF THE VERSE

The verse is found in JagannBtha’s [hereafter J] own Bhtiminivihisa [hereafter Bhv] 4.3. Acyuta Raya Modak introduces the verse as a request to the unmanifest divine one, following an appeal to the deity in manifest form in the previous verse. According to one legend recounted in a commentary (see Ramaswami Sastri [hereafter R] , p. 40), J was a devotee of Krsna and spent his last days on the bank of the Yamuni.

1.2. AESTHETIC STRUCTURE OF THE VERSE AS A WHOLE

The entire verse reveals r bhakti (for Krsna), which is a form of the bh&a rati. The three-fold qualification of the ktidambini (literally ‘line’ of clouds) contributes to the vyatireka,2 a figure which also comprises the entire verse, producing the understanding that something more than a line of clouds, namely Krsna, is being referred to here.

1.3. DISCUSSION OF THE MAbGAL.4

The verse is a marigala (see &ivyrida& [hereafter KAD] 1.14) of the hinuida

JAGANNATHA’S DEFINITION OF POETRY 361

form of lo; in the sense of pr@&zati by P@ini [hereafter P] 3.3.162. NSgeb Bhatta [hereafter N] states that the verse is samucitasve~?adevat@vastunirde& nipam. The ‘Madhumati’ commentary on Ktivyaprak& [hereafter KP] states: dvividhd hi devatl - scidhlrani as&dh@ani ca. Gane&-dib s@dhlfrani. Yatra ydadhikaroti sd as&dhrfra@ Iyameva ca samucitapadenlitrrfbhidhiyate (p. 8). N means that Krsna is J’s i$adevata. He is also the samucitadevat@ as the cilambana in the verse for Sycg&ra, the foremost rasa in poetry. Moreover, since Rasagaligcidhara [hereafter RG] is a text about poetry, and since the finest poetry is that in which rasa is predominant, the verse therefore, as well as the title of the work, are vastunirdeSa, indicative of the subjective matter.

1.4. ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL WORDS

Ktipi (‘indescribable’) indicates that the clouds are more than ordinary ones, thereby contributing to the vyatireka. 2 The clouds of the kddambini are black and bring relief from the ritapa, the heat - figuratively, the pain of existence: both are qualities common to Krsna. By the kaimutikany@ya,3 the word api (‘merely’, in smytQi) also includes seeing and hearing. The idea is that if the line of clouds (or Krsy) accomplishes the action merely by our remembering it (or him), what need be said about seeing or hearing? Haranti (‘eliminates’) uses Sap (P 3.2 .124) to indicate that Krsna is doing this in the present - not in the future, not in the past. N states that kanqza is mentioned to show that it is because of compassion alone that he removes pain (heat), and not merely ‘somehow’. Nr@rn is expressed in the plural to indicate that it is for all men.

Vidyutlrm (‘lightning flashes’), through adhyavatina (‘willing suspension of disbelief’),4 are taken as the countless gopis surrounding Kysna. In the accompanying compound viiepw, the Gzndrika commentary [hereafter C] glosses tanu as vapus (‘form’ or ‘body’). If the word is first understood in this meaning, when the viSe!ya (i.e., vidyutdm) is reached there will be a semblance of virodha, since the adjectival sense ‘slender’ (not translated above) seems to fit better. This virodha is conducive to the comprehension of the vyatireka. Otherwise, tanu may simply be understood as meaning svatipa by ttitpcuya. Moreover, even outside the context of the poem, lightning flashes are understood as women by poetic convention. C states that the basis of this is their both being capala, ephemeral - which in the context

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of women has the wellestablished sense of ‘fickle’. But even though the lightning disappears instantly its brilliance remains.

The nandini (‘joy’) of the Kalinda mountain is its daughter, the Yamuna River, the banks of which were the place of Krsga’s bliss. Of the suradrutih (‘divine trees’) on those banks, C says that they are the five trees that come from heaven, mandtira and the others. Amara’s entry is paficaite devataravo manddmh par@itaka+ / san t&ah kalpavyk@ca puthsi vd han’candanam . N glosses them as nfp@ and offers a quote to show that their significance is that they are beloved by Krsna: ‘ma@dvipe, nipopavanavati, cint&na@g?-he’. Amara’s entry for nip@ supports this.

1.5. ANALYSIS OF THE FIGURES

Since there is absorption of the upameya in the upamdna (the misery of the world in the word dtapa, the gopis in the word vidyut, and Krsna in the word ktidambini) and, through adhyavtina (‘willing suspension of disbelief’), there is consideration of identity where there is really difference, the figure is atitiyokti. 5 Note that this figure, like the others in the verse, is subordinate to the bh&va.

It is known that a cloud with lightning flashes that disappear instantly is capable of removing heat only for those near it, who either see it or feel the touch of its rain. Krsna, however, though having the same capacity as the cloud for removing heat (pain), is surrounded by a brilliance that is imperishable, unlike ordinary lightning which is momentary. The plural of &air indicates difference from the usual one or two lightning flashes. (N notes that if Satair is interpreted according to P 2.3.2 1, as qualification, the lightning flashes become identical with Krsna, the implication being of his all-inclusiveness.) The word valayita indicates that the connection between the row of clouds and the lightning flashes is not temporary, as in satiyoga. The &IP affix in haranti, indicating present time, suggests the urgent immediacy - sprha#yatamatvam (‘great desirableness’), according to C - of Krsna’s action. Finally, as was stated previously in the analysis of the words, Krsna removes the pain of existence not just for some, but for all men, and through the specific motivation of compassion. In this way, while the upameya exhibits similarity to the uparmina, it also exhibits difference in that it exceeds or surpasses (vi-ati-Jric) the upanuina. This constitutes the figure


vyatireka, which stands as a subordinate contributor to the ati@okti. Their union is thus termed sa&~a. 6

On the side of the atiiayokti itself, it may be observed that the absorption of the bodies of the gopis into the lightning suggests their absolute beauty. Another important element of suggestion in the verse concerns the expression maticumbini. Since mati (‘thought’ or ‘mind’) is a formless entity, cumbana in its primary meaning of ‘kissing’ is impossible. The meaning must then be understood, according to C, as “a connection (sambandha) which is the invariable relationship between content (the mind) and the holder of that”.

The assumption of the meanings ‘seen’ and ‘heard’ from the use of the word api in sm$i’pi constitutes the figure arthapattil 7 In the third pada the words ta[asuradntma in the compound kalindaetc. can be analyzed in two ways. The dissolution as translated above is a saptami-tatpun+ meaning ‘the heavenly trees on the bank’. It may also be dissolved as a karmadhlfraya: the bank itself is the heavenly tree because it fulfills desires, specifically here the desires of mankind. In this dissolution of the compound the figure will be nipaka. * The arthripatti and nipaka here operate independently of each other, their junction therefore is termed sanisygi. 9

The identity of Krsna with the line of clouds suggests his readiness to give immediate aid as well as his superb beauty. Since the figure operating in this verse is atiifzyokti, there can be no objection to the use of a feminine noun (kadambini) to stand for Krspa who, as upumeya, is (in the language of the alanik@aGstra) -swallowed’. Such a b@dha would only have force in nipaka, where Krsna as upameya would be directly mentioned.

Both commentators show how the verses can be taken as referring to R&&a or Kali also, Kali because she is the local deity and R2dha on the basis of viparitaluksami r” of the color. This is meant to show the comprehensive . . nature of the verse and not to be a convincing alternate interpretation.

1.6. THE METER IS PRTHVI

PI He who learned from the illustrious JrXnendrabhiksu the whole world of B&ma-knowledge, who learned from Mahendra the profound words of Kanada and Aksapada and the instruction of Jaimini from god-like Khandadeva in the city where Hara is remembered, and who obtained from him whose name is Mesa

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131

[Viresvaraparrdita] the pure teaching of Mesa [Patafijali] - he who holds all knowledge -- By whose playful whim nectar flows from even a stone - I bow down to him called Perubhatta, the beloved of Laksmi, the Mahaguru .

2-3.1. THE MAiVGALA

This ma&ala is in the form of guru-namaskdra. it is customary to open a work with an invocation to the divine power and then to one’s guru. Yasya deue par& ~hakti~ath~ deve tathggurau, &et&vatara Upani~d 6.23.

2-3.2. INDIVIDUAL WORDS

Perubhatta was J’s teacher as well as his father; therefore guru is doubly appropriate. Moreover, the person from whom J could learn all these vidyas must be mahd. The mention of his father’s illustrious teachers certifies J’s authority in this work. Jfianedrabhiksu is popularly taken as referring to VijiianabhQzu. The New Catalogus Catalogontm [hereafter NCC] states that he is the preceptor of Perubhattasuri and the grandfather of J. Mesa is an upamima of Vire’svara according to N. Deva refers to Khandadeva by vrlrttikti 3298 under P 5.3.83.

B-apaffca is beautifully chosen here, as it contains the ideas of prolixity, copiousness and variety, as well as the literal meaning of ‘world’. N says that prapatica qualified by nikhihz indicates that J learned completely, without missing anything. SakaZavidy@ (-dhara) may refer specifically to the fourteen vidyris. Pum-~ny~ami~-~sadhamza~str~~garni~~t~~ ved@ sth&Gni vidy&am dharmasya ca caturdab, Y@iavalkya Smrti 1.3, and elsewhere.

Piytigm (‘nectar’) also means poetry here. By saying that Perubhatta could make nectar flow from a stone, J shows his own humility: through the samcisokti,” he himself is the stone and the nectar running from it is his poetry. Lihzyti (‘by whim’) indicates that, like the gods who create effortlessly and unconcernedly, Perubhatta had divine powers and was thus worthy of reverence. Since J’s mother’s name was Laksmi, LaksrnrkiTnta can mean either Perubhatta or Visrm himself.


2-3.3. FIGURES

In the earlier verse the figure is kfiyalitiga l2 mixed with yamuka l3 and anuprbz. l4 In the latter verse there is satisokti ‘l supported by arthrfpatti7 and k2vyaliriga. l2

2-3.4. THE METERS ARE SRAGDHARA- AND ANUSTUBH

[41 By me who was sunk with difficulties in the depths of the ocean of thought, this lovely gem, the Rasagatigddhara, has been brought into the world. Dispelling the inner darkness when set in the hearts of good men, may this jewel break the pride of all other ornaments.

4.1. THE MANGALA

This &rvrida verse is also vastunirdeb, since we understand through the samlfsokti ” that Rasagarig#dhara is a work on alanik&a.

4.2. ANUBANDHACATUSTA YA

This introduction of the subject coincides with the introduction of the anubandhacatu$ayu - the stating of the subject matter, the motive or result of the study, the prerequisites for it, and the relation between the subject matter and what is contained in the particular text under consideration. The anubandhacatusfaya is generally stated at the beginning of every Gastric text, an explanation of it is found in the beginning of Vetintasdra.

In this verse, 3 states the vigya, or subject matter, as well as the prayojana, which means both the result of the study and the motive for the study of this particular text. J wants to inform us that he had not obtained any decisive knowledge about poetics from previous texts and that therefore, after careful consideration of the subject, he has produced definitive knowledge in an area where there was none before. In the next verse he will clarify and proudly emphasize the value of his contribution. Here, however, he focuses on the spiritual aspect of the creative act and its product by suggesting a comparison with bringing treasures from the ocean.

366 NORMAN SJOMAN

4.3. MANANA

Connected with this creative act is its source - manana-jaludhi. Mamma means ‘thought’ in general but is always explained as specificahy referring to logical argumentation or dialectics, and it is this which is the source of J’s strength for some and the cause of criticism for others. Bhattacharya (“Rasagarig&dhara and its Contribution to Poetics”, in Studies in Indian Poetics [hereafter Bh] ) says, “ . . . Panditaraja . . . applied his unclouded vision (vi&a or manana) . . . not merely in its creative but also in its critical aspect (pp. 4 and 6). ” “So far as originality in Jagannatha is concerned, we have to trace it to his method of discrimination (victlra) (p. I,).” J’s consistent application of the navya-ny@ya method of dialectics produced new knowledge and should not be discounted by unconsidered generalities. He is aware of the method and its result in this verse. Yogasatra [hereafter YS] 1.4 1 com- pares the mind in which the dross has been removed by samddhi (that is samprajii&tasarruidhi, which corresponds to manana) to a jewel in its hardness or firmness, and its clarity.

4.4. INDIVIDUAL WORDS

The word antar, used twice in the verse, has a special force. Both commentators take antardhvdntam with respect to alanikdra texts as referring to the absence of knowledge about poetics. The meaning can be extended to refer to the ajfidna which covers the soul and which is temporarily dispelled through the aesthetic experience.

4.5. FIGURES

Although the expressed meaning of the verse refers to a jewel, by P 2.1.72 we understand the compound lalitarasagatigddhararnqi as a nipaka8 referring to the work itself. This tipaka in turn forms the basis of a sarruisokti l1 figure whose suggested meaning is, “May this work which has been produced by me after careful consideration surpass all other works on alatikara.”

4.6. THE METER IS $IKHARIyj

is1 Let some bulls among aestheticians go on embellishing the

JAGANNdTHA’S DEFINITION OF POETRY 367

substance [of poetics] ; still, the pains I have taken will in no way be meaningless. The big fish may agitate the ocean once again. Does that make the toil of Mandara Mountain fruitless?

5.1. CONNECTION1S WITH THE PREVIOUS VERSE

In the previous verse (according to N), J suggested that he had found no satisfaction in the works of his predecessors in alatiklra-tistra. Here he implies that he is also dissatisfied with the contemporary schools, and that his work is superior to theirs. The image of the churning of the ocean, which was suggested but not expressly stated in the previous verse, has been skilfully and pointedly maintained. Here, though the image is directly expressed, our attention is made to shift to a different aspect of it. In the last verse J referred to his endeavor as the bringing of a jewel from the ocean. In this verse he refers to his work as a product of the mythological churning of the ocean, not directly, but as a presupposed image in a general statement that defends the meaningfulness of his work against critics.


Both N and C gloss sahydayadhuri@ as ‘best among the wise’ or ‘foremost of learned critics’. It is also conventional to employ words denoting ‘bull’ in the sense of “best among” as the final member of a compound. The yaugika meaning incorporates the idea of bearing the yoke like a beast of burden, thereby adding a touch of sarcasam.

Bhavita (‘will be’) indicates that it is not only the contemporary schools that are deficient, but also any ones that may arise in the future; hence his book will remain definitive. C states that this is based on the use of lu?, P 3.3.15, referring to the remote future instead of the general future.

5.3. FIGURES

The figure here is prativastipanui. l6 Though it appears to be arthbztaranyba. *’ there is no relationship of general-and-particular which is the basis for the operation of arth&tarany&.

5.4. THE METER IS ~IKHARIJ~

368 NORMANSJOMAN

[61 As I have composed a new ~&WI [whose verses are] suitable for examples, nothing of anyone else’s work has been inserted here. Does the deer who possesses the power to produce musk resort to the scent of flowers, even by thought?

6.1. CONNECTION

This verse expands the pmyojana mentioned earlier, stressing the creative aspect of the work as part of its unique nature. Other alari?k&ikas have used their own works as examples in such works as EkSvali, Pratcfparudriya, Naiijarcij~ya$obh@aqa, Raghuncithabhtipaliya, and Alarhk&amafij@a. J’s poetic compositions are of a consistently high standard throughout.

6.2. SOURCES OF THE EXAMPLES

‘A new ktivya’: C and N say this refers to Bhaminivil&a. Bh (p. 12) states: “He utilized the choicest verses of his, from the Bh vi1 largely, and from his other k&vyas, the five laharis, the Galigalahari, the Amrtalahari (on the Yamuti), the Sudh&zhari (on Stirya), the Kan@ahari (on V&u), and the Laksmiluhari (on Laksmi) . . . and the three royal panegyrics @m&tis), the JagadcibharaF (a eulogy on his patron emperor Shah Jahan and his son Dara Shikoh . . . ), the Pr@ibhara~ (in praise of the fedual chief Prananarayana of JGmanipa . . . ) and the &zji&isa (in honor of Asaf Khan a benevolent patron of his . . . through whose introduction the poet received the title of Pa@tar@a from the emperor Shah Jahan.”

According to Bh, there are about 900 illustrations in the work; about 700 illustrate titras and about 200 form part of the critique. About 100 of the first group are from his known ktiyas, 300 are from his body of independent verses, and a number are adaptations from other poetical pieces in Sanskrit and Prakrit . Of the remaining ones, some probably came from a prose tivya (see Bh for details) and some from a R&nak@vya. The second group consists of course of examples from other poetics texts.

R (p. 65) states that the Bhv, which N says is the work referred to here, was not composed independently before RG but is a collection of individual verses written for use in RG (durvytt~ jlsrajanmana?z . . . ), but which we were unable to trace. Paranjpe has argued otherwise in his edition of Bhv, published in 1895.



The expression k&Wik@mana&zktibh~ta is a specific reference to J’s creative capacities. The choice of the word tikti is deliberate: J claims that pratibhd or &zkti alone is the cause of poetry.

6.4. THE FIGURE HERE IS PRATIVASTuPAM/i16

6.5. THE METER IS VASANTATILAKA

[71 That king of pandits, Jagannatha, who has crossed the ocean of knowledge in the boat of deliberation, effortlessly makes this investigation of poetry called Rasagatigddhara.

7.1. CONNECTION

C states that this verse contains the prayojana of the study which was mentioned under the discussion of verse [4] : since the book (whose uisaya is k&yam im&sa, ‘* the investigation of poetry) was composed by someone who is extremely learned it is therefore worthy of attention.


Kutukena (‘spontaneously’, literally, ‘out of curiosity’) in this context really means ‘with ease’, in the same way that God’s creation is said to be mere Iila (‘play’). Kutukena therefore suggests J’s superiority, since he required no effort to compose the work. Manana (“deliberation”) can indicate formal reasoning (logic) as well as thought in general. See the discussion under verse [4] .

7.3. THE FIGURES ARE ROPAKA a AND ANUPRASA l4

7.4. THE METER IS iRY/i

PI May this composition called Rasagarigcidhara long remain triumphant [over other alanik&atistra works because of its superiority] . And may it gladden those generations of poets who are possessed of natural refinement.

370 NORMAN SJOMAN

8.1. CONNECTION

This verse is J’s prayer for the success of his own work.

8.2. ANALYSIS OF THE TITLE

C analyzes the name rasagarigtidhara here. Rasa evLwidyatvena gafigd tasyd dharah refers to the receptacle of the gahg& which is rasa itself. Since there is an identity between the two, it cannot be the earthly gatigti which is referred to. The work then is the ‘holder’ of that celestial gafigti by teaching rasa or bringing it into being. The second analysis is rashim pratipddanena garigddharah Satikara iva: the work is like Siva who received the garigti on his head when it descended to earth because it teaches about rasa, which Siva also did through the N@v&stra. Sahrdayas should be able to decide the better analysis on the basis of cam&k&a.


Sandarbha is taken by both commentators as referring to the five-fold vrfkya, which is further clarified by C as the adhikara@ structure from Mimtitisa, i.e., topic, doubt, preliminary argument, reply, and conclusion. However, in the context of the work as a whole this has no propriety. Therefore it would be better to take the usual, more general meaning of ‘collection’ or ‘compilation’. Bh (p .4) says, interestingly, that sandarbha means San t&a here, and translates it as ‘intellectual offspring’. In this he follows BhLskaraya’s gloss in the Vrttacandrodaya, santtino Lam ciram . . . etc., which in turn is based on a citation from fol. b in AS. MSS. collection III.C.94: ta?ika dhananiksepye bnihmace sthUpanarh matah/ Siv&laya+ prabandhkca sat . . sant@na~ prakirtitafz. Nyayakob [hereafter NK] under the entry sandarbha gives: (1) kathanati , (2) vakQTatparyavfie& , (3) racati, (4) grathanafi , (5) prabandhafz.

Nisaqasarhyafici (‘possessed of natural refinement’) is purposely vague. Nisarga simply means ‘by nature’. Saniyatici (from samyak) means ‘correct’, ‘proper’ or ‘pleasant.‘, ‘agreeable’. As an adjective referring to kuhini, C glosses satiyafici as “impeccable (correct) because of their devotion to discrimination in poetry”. N, on the other hand, takes the meaning of the compound to be

- - . svabh&a-ramavryam, ‘who are naturally delightful’, which in the context of


the original word, safi~~~r?ci, must be interpreted as “possessed of natural refinement’. N further clarifies that the use of the expression nisargasatiyaiici is to eliminate the possibility of including those who are affected, those whose refinement in not inherent (etena krtrimarama~iyaninisa). From one point of view (see verse 25 af Vakroktijivita [hereafter VJ] 1.9 and commentary), the use of satiyafici could be considered a defect. However, because ramqziyatti itself is an irreducible, uncontrivable entity, the use of a word which, though general and undefmed, denotes ‘precision’ - satiyafici - generates a particular camatkura. The consideration of it as a defect must therefore be overridden.

Ku&i can mean either vati~~ (‘family lineage’) or VP& (‘multitude’). N gives both meanings. C states that the meaning van& is not strictly justifiable here because the passing on of poetic capacity through a lineage is not known. In the translation above, ‘generations’ is used in the broader English sense.

8.4. THE FIGURE HERE IS YAMAKA l3

8.5. THE METER IS AR Y/i

9.1. THE GENERAL DEFINITION OF POETRY

9.1.1. Introduction: Text and Translation

Tatra kirtipara~-hhidagunMjadevatripra~-d~dyanekaprayo- janakasya k@vyasya vyutpatteh kavisahydayayonivaiyakataya gug-latiklnidibhir niriipa$ye tasmin viSe;yat& ‘vacchedakati taditarabhedabuddhau sddhanati ca tallakgzpni t&annitipyate

Because of the necessity for both poets and sahldayas to have an exact knowledge of Poetry - among the many results of which are fame, supreme bliss, and the favor of gurus, kings, and divinities - a definition of Poetry will now be delineated which comprises both (a) the unique determining factor of that which is in the subject to be described [i.e., Poetry] , along with [its properties such as] gu@s, akzniktiras, etc., and (b) that which causes the knowledge of its difference from other things.

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9.1.2. Definition: Text and Translation

Ramaniydrthapmtiprtdakab bbdah kdvyam. Poetry is Word which conveys beautiful Sense.r9

9.1.3. Connection between Introduction and Definition

The purpose of the introduction to the definition is to give again the prayojana for the study of the text. Knowledge which contains the delimiting factor of Poetry, tatprak&akaj&inasya (NJ), amounting to an exact determination of what is Poetry and what is not Poetry, will induce us to study the text. Previously, in the introductory verses, J has suggested this authoritativeness, but under the guise of drambhakatvaprayojana through the mention of his father’s teachers and his own superior knowledge of the subject. In other words, he has invoked tibdapramdq

According to the oral precept lakgqapramc-%-bhytiti Scsstram pravartate, the subject should be introduced and then the definition given, following which there should be a discussion of the validity of the definition.

9.1.4. Discussion of the Introduction

Here the definition of ktivya is the subject under consideration. Since something completely unknown could not be examined, and since there would be no point in examining what is already known, J shows that although Poetry is known in a general way through its effects (such as fame for the poet and supreme bliss for the sahydaya), still its specific causal nature is not known. An exact definition of Poetry, together with all its properties, is necessary for both poets and sahldayas, since both are intimately connected with the creative act.*O The definition of Poetry is usually given as a viie@akga. J here gives a comprehensive general definition (tim&zyalak~~) within which the viiesaqs may be included (as he states).

9.1.5. Analysis of the Words in the Introduction

Before dealing with these various vi$eqas, or adjuncts, the general definition of Poetry itself, the viiesya, should be stated in order to determine the essential property which is found in all Poetry. Just as the perception of a


da@ is not possible without prior perception of a da@a, so the correct perception of the uiSe!ya to be determined is dependent upon perception of the viSesoF. To be specific: Even though a da@ may be qualified by many other adventitious factors, such as ‘possessing a begging bowl’, ‘wearing saffron garments’, ‘having a trident’, and so on, the unique factor that definitely marks him as a da?& (a particular class of ascetics) is his da@a. Therefore when the general definition which comprehends all da@s is to be given, it is given on the basis of the property which uniquely determines a da?&.

The viSesyat&vacchedaka, then, is the unique determining factor which resides there (in Poetry, kbya) alone. (That the viiesyafti is what invariably resides in the viSe;ya, kdvya, is emphasized by.J’s use of tasmin.) In the uddeiya (subject) of the definition this would be k&vyat@; in the vidheya (predicate) of the definition it is Sabdahta. Thus the vi&yat@vacchedaka is the unique (atidhdray) property which resides in the object itself, and is the basis for our knowledge of its distinction (vy@vvytti) from other things. The statement of unique property and difference from other things is the twin function of a definition, and forms the basis of our language usage. See Tarkasanigraha [hereafter TS] , Dipikn, under dravya.

With regard to the prayojanas of kbya and the implications of cidi in J’s list, see KP 1.2 : k&yam yaiase ‘rthakyte vyavahdravide CvetarakSataye/ sadya paranitvrtaye kanttisammitatayopadetiyuje. Vyutpatti (exact knowledge) is glossed by C as particular knowledge (knowledge of particulars) relating to a particular subject. This means it is direct knowledge of the thing rather than knowledge ‘about’ it.

9.1.6. Analysis of the Structure of the Definition

The vijesya part of the definition consists of Sabda only. Ramapiycirtha- pratip&dakatve sati will be the form the rest of the definition takes as vi&ap, qualifying the viSe!ya without entering into its substance, except to prevent over- and under-application of the definition.

9.1.7. Logical Necessity of the Individual Words of the Definition

The dala-prayojana is a standard procedure in which each element of the definition is justified. Without the word iabda the definition could apply to

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such things as coquettish glances. Pratiptiaka is used instead of vticaka so that the definition will include vya&Mrtha as well as v&y&ha. If the word artha were omitted the definition could refer to grammar, in which Sabda produces the word ‘ramqiya’. Ramqiya is used to prevent application of the definition to such ordinary statements as ‘bring the pot’.

9.1.8. Reference to Tradition

For our oldest extant source of iabda (‘Word’) as k@vya, see Dan&n, KAD 1 .lO: Sariram tlSvadis?@rthavyavacchinna pad@vali, and Tarunavacaspati’s (commentary on KAD) explanation of taih in the previous p&ia: laksana- vidbhih ptirv&Qyai~ k&y@rUti svansparlca alani karajca datiit@; tayaiva d&i vayamapi darSay&ma ity&a - tairiti, which shows that it is an established tradition preceding Dandin.

RamaniyaM is for all intents and purposes camatk&a; cf., RG under upamd: saundaryarizca camatkytyddtiyakatvam (saundavam is of course rama~iyat$j Gzmatk&acandrika’s [hereafter C’q vrigarthau sacamatkdrau etc. may also be compared, as well as Sarasvati Mohan’s statement in the introduction to her edition of the work (p. 53): ‘It is only in Jagannatha, who stresses this camatkara in his definition of the kdvya, that we have a later echo of VibveSvara’s concept.” She later (p. 176) quotes the definition of camatk&a given by Visvelvara: camatkarastu vidu~.imtinandapativ&ak?/ g+arh rititi rasarh vyttiti prikani sayydmalanikytini/ saptaitrSni camatk&ak&aFm bruvata budh@z/, and states: “When it is applied to all these it would really amount to giving a comprehensive definition itself, a definition which would take into it even parts or specimens of k#vya which are not always rasapradh&a. Thus it leads directly to the definition of poetry given by Jagannatha in his Rasagarigcidhara .”

It is clear, therefore, that to this line of aestheticians the definition must stress that it is Word, or how something is said, that distinguishes Poetry from other forms of language. Moreover the incorporation of the idea of rama$yatd, or “the beautiful,” establishes the definition as an idealistic one.

9.2. cAvQiDAsA: THE S.XSTRIC SOURCE FOR J's THEORY OF iABDA ALONE AS KA-VYA

The following is from Candidba’s commentary on the KP, in which he

JAGANNiiTHA’S DEFINITION OF POETRY 375

explains the definition given by Mammata (KP 1.4) in such a way as to state that sabda alone is Poetry. In so doing he is in the same tradition as Dan&r. Candid&a was the younger brother of the grandfather of Visvanitha, the author of Sihityadarpana. He is quoted in the Pradipa on KP, in the Kuvakiyanandakhandana, and in the SD. Since he is a predecessor of J, and since the particular theory of asvrfdodbhodaka taken up by J for refutation is found here and in only a few other places, the relevant portion of his rather difficult-to-obtain commentary is given here in Sanskrit and then translated with notes. As the only edition is full of corruptions, corrections have been made here according to the meaning, None of them is critical to the essence of the theory.

9.2.1. Sanskrit Text

5

10

15

20

sabddrthaviti Sabdasya ptirvanipatenabhyarhitataratvani dyo tayan viSesyatvam&iskaro ti, Se.sasya tu paranipatentf- pnidhanyrid viseqratvam. Evamca sabdadharma eva kavyatvam, tasya car-the visistavibhavadivy@priyamanasyaivayamatisaya in’ dhvanantirthamarthasya tulyakaksataya nirdesah. Ye tu dvayorapi kavyatvamicchantititthamanuyojyrih - kavyatvamubhaya- dharmatay&igikriyam@ani samyogadivadvyasajyavrtti va? Gotvri- divatpratyekasamdpyavrttivrfnnddyah, scimanyasya tatha bhavangi- kaninnetarah, pratyekam kavyatriprasarigat. Kinica kavikanna- visesa eva kavyamucyate. Tacca visistarthapratyayartha- saniyojyamdnam padakadambamevetyuddesya evartho, na tu kavi- vyaparagocarah. Sagu~~viti laksanam pradyotanaparam, vaksya- miinarityd gu~-n~~-~~dasva~-pavi~e.~~~e~iva paryavasrinat tatpradhanasyaiva ca vrikyasya kavyatvarigikrteh, itarasya- bhtisataniyamat. Etaduktambhavati asvadajivamh padasandarbhah ktivyam. Tatra yatnikznikaravise.s@ sambhavanti tatra pariposa- visesabhave tu tesani tatkrtapusn’hinatvam, dosataratamyaiica- svadabhavatciratamyani, na tu kavyahanih, te.scini sarvatra vyripa- katvat, gu@vasridasarirantargata eva, na tu sabdtirtharacana- dharmd iti.

9.2.2. Emendations to the Printed Text

line 7. After vyasajyavrtti v@ add pratyekaparisamriptim va.

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line 9. Read tathclbh&@narigik&in. Netarah. . . etc. line 10. For pratyq&tha read pralyayaa. line 19. For gu@v&da read gund~c&uidQ . . . etc.

9.2.3. Translation of Lines l-5

In [the compound] &bd&thau [in the KP] the greater importance of [the word] Sabda is shown by its prior position in the compound [by the vtirttik&] QbhyQrhitQtica [under P 2.2.341; it is thereby shown to be the predominant member of the compound, the member that is qualified. The remaining portion is a qualifier only, since what is in the latter position is not predominant. Therefore Poetry is of the nature of Word only. And for the sake of suggesting that the excellence in Word lies also in its being employed [to bring out] the various vibhtitidis, Sense is given an equal place [in the compound] .

9.2.4. Notes on Lines l-5

In a dvandva compound, strictly speaking, the two members enjoy the same status, both being predominant. Yet Candid&a says that on the basis of the vlrttika mentioned, iabda must be considered as ‘more worthy’ because it is placed first in the compound. He states that the greater worthiness can only be explained by the fact that iabda is viiesya and artha its qualifier. Then he has the problem of explaining how both members have equal prominence in the dvandva: he claims that even though artha is a qualifier of iabda, because of its great importance owing to the fact that rasa comes from artha, it is given equal status, that is, predominance along with iabda - hence the dvandva.

9.2.5. Translation of Line 5-9

Those who claim that Poetry refers to both [&zbda and artha] should be questioned thus: Accepting that Poetry refers to both attributes, is it a case of (a) vy&zjyav~tti, such as satiyoga (‘conjunction’), or (b) the reference’s resting complete in each? As with [the Universal (#ti)] ‘cowness’, the reference rests complete in each; hence it cannot be the first case because a Universal is not accepted as being such. Nor can it be the second case because

JAGANNziTHAS DEFINITION OF POETRY 377

there would then be the contingency of Poetry’s referring to each [to Word and Sense each separately].

9.2.6. Notes on Line S-9

Satiyogu is the vy&zjyq-tti par excellence. S&yoga (“conjunction”) does not reside in either one of the two things it joins but in both of them. In the same way, Poetry must be in both Word and Sense together and not in either one individually. But Poetry, k&~atvam, is a Universal, and a Universal is complete or evident in each single individual, as ‘cowness’ is in each individual cow. (In fact, according to some schools, before we can know the vyakti (individual) we must know its @ti (Universal).) Therefore, in view of the nature of Universals, it would be absurd to hold the first position - that the term kti~~7 refers to both Sable and artha by vyhzjyavytti. Nor can the second position be supported because of the undesired contingency of reference to two ‘poems’ in each instance of poetry, one being the sense and the other being the words.

9.2.7. Translation of Lines 9-12

But Poetry is said to be the particular activity of poets. And that [Poetry] is an assemblage of words being joined together for the conveying of a particular Sense. Sense, then, is only that which is being referred to [in Poetry ] , but does not come under the scope of the activity of poets.

9.2.8. Notes on Lines 9-12

Candidr%a has had to formulate the above in response to KP’s first definition of Poetry, given in the urtti under 1.2. He elaborates:

92.9. Translation of Lines 12-15

The definition sagu~u etc. [KP 1.41 is for indicating [something particular, namely that kavya is not merely a padakadamba but a padakadamba qualified by some particular artha] , because gunas can ultimately qualify only that which is @sv@dutipa [i.e., rusa] (which will be stated later), because it is accepted that [the Universal] Poetry (ktiyatva) resides only in such utterances

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where [risv&&z, i.e ., rasa] is predominant, and because of the restriction that in others [i.e., in utterances where risu&z is not predominant] there is only the mere semblance of Poetry.

9.2.10. Notes on Lines 12-15

Candid& states that Mammata’s second definition (sugr+zu etc.) specifies the particular sense in which the earlier definition (kuvikarmatva) is to be taken. Artha comes to be involved because it is the medium through which rusa is experienced.

Gunas are qualities belonging to the soul and not to the body; courage, for example, is properly considered a quality of the soul rather than the body. Hence the inclusion of gugs in the definition indicates that it refers to the soul (tirrrrci) of Poetry, i.e., rosa. &v&z of the gups then becomes a qualifier of Poetry. Candid&a supports his analysis by reference to the widely-accepted (KP and elsewhere) dictum that Poetry in which rusa is predominant is the best and other poetry is merely a semblance of Poetry. Note that it is this notion which is subjected to special criticism when J sums up his refutation of other theories. Candid&a now gives his definition:

9.2.11. Translation of Lines IS-20

This then is to be stated: A poem is [not any collection of words but] a collection of words which is endowed with life through aesthetic enjoyment. It exists where particular alarizkriras are present. But where there is the absence of this particular nourishing [of aesthetic enjoyment by alatikbzs] there is diminution of’the nourishing effected by them. [The text here is probably corrupt but the general context is clear.] The increase in dogs (‘poetic faults’) is proportionately correlated to the increase in the absence of aesthetic experience. But there can be no diminution of [the Universal] Poetry (k@Uy&uQ), because these [ah&k&as and dops] are everywhere pervasive of it. Gu+, then, are included in the realm of aesthetic enjoyment but cannot be said to be attributes in an actual construction of Word and Sense [i.e., in the product of the poet’s activity].

9.2.12. Notes on Lines 15-20 and Final Summary

Candid&a gives the definition and explains the relation of guyas, ah&c&as


and dops. To sum up, Ca#d&a has taken the first definition given in the vrtti of KP that refers to the activity of the poet - which must be with words. Then he has shown how to interpret the stitra definition at Kp 1.4 so that it also refers to Word, but Word as qualified by rasa via artha. This amounts in substance to J’s definition in which &&da is qualified by ramaniydrtha.

Thus Candid&a’s final definition states that k#vya is hbda only, but hbda which is qualified as productive of aesthetic experience. This is supported by the viiesanas sagu~u etc. (in KP) which are not qualities of bbda or artha . . but of the aesthetic experience itself, the dm of k#vya. Mammata’s SabaSirthau etc. comes to mean that Poetry is Word which is invariably qualified by Sense which contributes directly to the aesthetic experience, which aesthetic experience may or may not be qualified by gupzs, alanik&as, and so on.

9.3. DISCUSSION OF THE DEFINITION WITH REFINEMENT TO ITS

FINISHED FORM

9.3.1. Translation of Text

The essence of the pleasurable experience (ramqiyatti, ‘Beauty’, ‘the Beautiful’) is the state of being the content of knowledge which produces transcendent delight. Transcendentness (Zokottaratva) [is a quality which] resides in delight (#h&da); it is synonymous with cam&k&a&a; it is directly experienced, and it is a particular Universal (j&i, ‘irreducible entity’).

The cause of camatk&atva is a particular bh&vand (“reflective mental state”) on what is delimited 2’ by that [lokottaratva=camatk&-atva, or the poem which produces it] which [mental state, bh&ati] is of the nature of returning to that [tivycirtha] again and again.22

Of the delight which is produced from the understanding of the meaning of such sentences as ‘A son has been born to you’ and ‘I will give you money’ there is no lokottamtva. Therefore there is no undesirable contingency of [the definition of Poetry] referring to such statements.

Thus the definition of Poetry (k6vyatva) results in [the following three definitions] : (1) [Kcivyatva is] Word which conveys Sense which is the content of the reflection which produces camatk&a, or (2) [Kayatva is] that whose nature is the reflection which has as its content Sense produced by

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that [Word, ~bdafva which is &yatva] , which is also the delimitor of the producer of camatkaru, or (3) [Kavyatva is] the state of possession of the nature of camatkara only by the relation of the conveying of Sense which is the delimitor of the capacity to produce what is qualified by itself ]camafk&afva] .23

9.3.2. Analysis of the Individual Words

Ramaniyufa, the essence of the pleasurable experience, is here defined as what constitutes the class of things that are the content of the knowledge which produces transcendent pleasure. Note that the idea of ‘beautiful Sense (ramaniyartha)’ in the original formulation is redefined subsequently in experiential terms. Patwardhan and Masson (in ‘The Rasagungadhara on the Definition and Source of Poetry’, by V. Patwardhan and J. L. Masson in YlTre Journal of the Oriental Institute, Baroda, June, 1970, Vol. XIX, No. 4, pp. 4 166427 [hereafter PM] ) note that this is based on the Dhuanyalokalocana [hereafter DHK L. ] , p. 1: sarasvafyas tattvam kavisahrdayakhyam vijayafe. The -M affix enjoined by P 5 .l .119 suggests that there is a basis for con- sidering it to be a Universal. The basis is the ‘consistently perceived feature (anugafadharma)’ in various places when there is otherwise no objection to its being considered a Universal, a Universal being that which cannot be further reduced. Instances of pleasure can be consistently identified in our ordinary worldly experience but not in their aspect as Universals, i.e., as ‘pleasureness’. For this reason J defines it thus at the outset.

It then becomes necessary to define the term lokottaratvam (‘transcendentness’). If it can refer to any kind of transcendence, that is, to any instance of transcendence, then again there will be no consistent perception which would allow us to consider it an irreducible Universal. Furthermore, if by lokottaratva its absolute form is being referred to, then it will mean the bliss of brahma. Therefore, the exact sense of lokottaratva must be determined. J says first that it is ahhidagafa (“residing in ahluda”). On camatkrlra, which J posits as synonymous with lokottaratva, see Raghavan, Studies in Some Concepts of Alamkaru &ish-a [hereafter SSCAS] , p. 293. C further glosses it as a particular dharma of the vrtti (mental state) whose nature is the expansion of the mind characterized by vismaya (Lwonder’). Anubhavatiksika (“directly experienced”) is stated in order to exclude other means of knowledge (including the ordinary perception of the sense organs) as a mode of access to the transcendent aesthetic

JAGANNbTHA’S DEFINITION OF POETRY 381

pleasure. For the Naiyayikas the experience of sukha (a quality of the 2&z&) comes under the scope of this means of knowledge. In Vedanta it is extended to include the means of perceiving the dhatmf (i.e., the titi) itself rather than the dharma. It would be the Vedantic sense of tik$i which is intended in the aesthetic procedure here. Accordingly C glosses it as being the perception of a sahrdaya which is characterized by carvap and is considered to be tik;ipram@a. (Compare AZhityadarpa~ [hereafter SD] ,3-4: sacetasimanubhavab pram&am tatra kevalam.) This means that it is a revelation of the &zanda which is the &md itself. In the statement of the cause, the words puna~punaranusandh&za are added to distinguish J’s bhlvand from the concept as it is defined in Nyaya; cf., TS 34 and DipikrS, satisk&am@trajanyani jE&ati sm@z. bhtianrikhyab sanisk&ah. tadbhinnam jricinamanubhava~. PM discuss “A son has been born to you” with reference to its occurrence in DHKL., pp. 79,80,83 (Chowkhamba edition, 1940).

9.3.3. Discussion of the Three Definitions

The three definitions are not different in substance from the original, but are simply rearrangements of it with slightly different emphases. The first of the three is given with a ka@ikg on Mammata and those who define poetry as word-and-meaning. The second is given with Vifvanatha and his definition of poetry as rasa in mind. The third of course is the final version of J’s own definition.

The first definition drops the word jfi&za used in the explication of ramaciyatci and substitutes for it bh@vami. This is to prevent overapplication of the definition to the case in which the jr%inu which produces pleasure is mixed with a jr%ina which does not produce pleasure as a single knowledge (samuhdambana). The definition would apply in such a situation, and instances which are not ksvyatva would have to be called so. Therefore J introduces the term bhdvand which denotes a particular kind of ‘memory’ as stated by J in the cause of Poetry and which is inapplicable to the cases of samuh~lambanajii&na mentioned above.

But another overapplication arises which compels J to offer his second definition. Even though, by the previous definition, bhrivand is that cognition which produces pleasure only, still if it is considered as a case of an unbroken stream of the same cognition, each individual cognition (bhtiati) cannot be said to produce pleasure - yet the definition applies there. The second

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definition avoids this contingency by statingyat - that by which the btivami arises - is correlated with that which produces the pleasure.

The third definition is given out of regard for Zlghava, (‘economy’). The definition is more brief because it actually consists of camatk&ztvavattva alone. The viiegp of relationship is only for the prevention of over- and under-application of the definition. On the principle that what is elicited by sarhsargamarycida need not appear in the definition, the word hbda is obtained. The relational qualification itself is made possible by the vattva of camatkaravattva, which shows the presence of an &dh&idheya relationship.

By framing his definitions in this manner J has shown that it is possible to include the other primary views about poetry in his own definition, implying that the inconsistencies in the other definitions are not really irreparable. But his own definition is superior not only because of its avoiding these inconsistencies but also by virtue of its economy and precision.

9.3.4. Connection with the Succeeding

The next topic will be a consideration of the faults in others’ definitions of poetry.

9.4. PROOF THAT WORD ALONE IS POETRY AND REFUTATION

OF OTHER DEFINITIONS

9.4.1. Criticism of Definition of KP: Translation of Text

But what the older alatitirikas say is this: “Poetry is Word-and-Sense that are free of faults, endowed with [the poetic] excellences and endowed with figures (adopu sagupu s&ztik@rau iabdrlrthau k&yam).” This view is examined here. The pair hbd@rtha (word-and-sense) is not what is indicated by the term kzivya, because there is no m&a (‘proof’, ‘authority’) for that. Rather, since there is a common verbal usage (vyavah&a) [of these terms] which is known to everyone in such expressions as, ‘The poem is read aloud’, ‘The meaning was understood from the poem’, and ‘The poem was heard, but the meaning was not understood’, what is meant by the term Poetry is a particular kind of Word alone.


9.4.1.1. The older alarhkcitikas. The text of Mammata’s definition actually reads: tadadoq Sabd@rthau alatikrti pur@ kv@pi, KP 1 A. PM (p. 423, fn. 10) note that J is making a reference to Bh%maha, Rudrata, Vamana and others as well.

9.4.1.2. ExpAmation of the vyavahcira examples. The first example is intended to show the impossibility of a vyavahara such as ‘The meaning was read aloud’; therefore the term Poetry can refer to Word only. The second example means “From hearing the poem the meaning was understood”. Again, since it is words which are heard and not meaning, ‘Poetry’ in such a vyavahcira conveys Word only. The last example is self-evident.

9.4.1.3. Explanation of individual words. Viie.u (‘particular’) means Word- as-qualified-by-Sense, etc. But the use of the word eva (‘alone’) indicates the defmite exclusion of Sense from the substance of the definition of Poetry. N states that pratipatti (‘understanding’, ‘conveying’) here means ‘ascertainment’, or by extension ‘proof’. The basis for the suffix tasil in vyavahaatah is P 5.4.44, Wttikd 3 339.

9.4.1.4. J’s use of vyavahcira as proof: All kistras accept the validity of vyavahara because it is based on our experience (anubhava) which is irrefutable. It is therefore essentially knowledge grounded in ‘the way things are’. In this sense it does not then come under the scope of &bda pram@a, the validity of which is determined by the conditions stipulated in each individual philosophic system, but is directed towards pmtyakg, the fundamental pram&a. The principle involved is that the vyavah&ra is based on an actual situation which we accept directly; otherwise such common verbal usage would never have occurred in the first place.

See Raghavan, Bhoja’s &Fig&a-PrakGa [hereafter BSP] , p. 83: “But in the ordinary speech in the world one adopts a fictitious analysis of a single whole into its parts.” See also YS 1.9. And see also PM, p. 423, fn. 11 for criticism on the basis of vyavahcfra. Actually the traditional division in the case of the Ved%ntins into pararmirthika-vyavahtika, the Naiyayikas into parik$ka- laukika, and even the Buddhists into paranzirtha-samvyti reflects doubt on the proof based on vyavahrira as such.

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9.4.2. Objection that the Term Poetry Cannot Refer to Word Alone, and Refutation: Translation of Text

Objection: The vyavahlira [that kaYya has reference in Sabda alone] can be shown to be by lakp@ [i.e., the vyavah@ra that k@vya is tibdam.&ra is an indirect rather than direct reference] .

Refitation: This would be so if there were any stronger proof that the denotative power (&zkti) of the term k&ya were in [i.e., referred directly to] the pair word-and-sense, which is what the meaning of the term Poetry is in the opinion of others. But we do not see that [stronger proof]. And, further, statements about which there are diverse opinions are not to be trusted. Therefore when proof that the term Poetry directly denotes the pair word-and-sense is non-existent, who indeed is able to reject that it directly denotes a particular kind of Word which, as has already been stated, is established on the basis of common verbal usage? By this [argument] the opinion that the denotative power (iakti) of the term k&vya is to both [the pair word-and-sense] is refuted, because of the absence of a decisive argument (vinigamana) in favor of it.

9.4.2.1. Argument of the pCvapak@. The Sakti (‘denotative power’, ‘direct denotation’) of the term k&ya is to word-and-sense. In order for it to refer to Word alone, lakq@ - ‘indirect reference’, which in this case is a reference to the part by the whole - must be resorted to. This is the ptirvapakg.

9.4.2.2. J’s refutation: Validity of pmm@a. J simply states that there is no stronger proof than what he has already given (the argument vyavahrlratah) which would support the opponent’s contention. C says that the argument of no stronger proof is not really solid as the statements of the older alanikxitikas constitute jab&-pram&u, which is certainly a valid authority. It is for this reason that J counters vimatavdkyarh tvairaddheyameva (“statements about which there are diverse opinions are not to be trusted”). Acceptance of them would result in “option” or a contradiction of validity.

The status and nature of kbda-pram@a is different in each tistra. The Naiyayikas, for example, say that its scope is things as they are, i.e., correct knowledge. The Yogis say that it must refer to the word of someone who is trustworthy and who has actually seen the thing under consideration. jab&- pram@a can be an authority for the knowledge of things about which there

JAGANNiTHA’S DEFINITION OF POETRY 385

is no contention or contrary evidence; but when such contrary evidence exists iabda-pram&Q loses its authoritative status. (This is even accepted by the Mimamsakas in establishing the validity of the Veda on the basis of the suatahsiddhatva of knowledge.) It is for this reason that J can begin his next statement “when proof . . . is nonexistent . . . ” The implication is asati bidhake - “When no objections can be made to my statement (i.e., there exists no proof of yours), then the question is settled by the formal procedures of logic.”

The proof thus rests on vyavahtira. In this context C quotes the following verse to establish the traditional validity of vyavah&a as a basis for iakti:

iiaktigrahani vy~~rQ~opamcinako~~ptav~~~d vyavah&rataica vikyasya Se@d Viv~tervQdQn ti SQnnidhyQtUb siddhapadasya vyddh@

9.4.3. Establishment of the Meaning of the Individual Terms in the Definition in the Context of the Procedure of the Argument: Translation of Text

When it has been thus [by the foregoing proof] siddha (‘established’, ‘proved’) that the meaning of the term k&vya is a particular kind of tibda alone, then it is proper to state the definition of it [Poetry], but not of an idea of some “poetry” which one has fabricated oneself. And this is also the only procedure in [establishing] definitions of Veda, Purana, etc. Otherwise [i.e., if one were to accept the pair Sabdtirtha in defining vedatva etc.] the same difficulty [contradiction of vyavahrira] would arise there as well.

9.4.3.1. J’s connection. J must state the saligati (‘connection’, ‘context’) of the argument because the examination of the &zkti of a word is actually extraneous to the definition. J’s intention is to emphasize its necessity as a presupposition to the establishment of the definition. The other alatik@rikas have not examined this factor carefully; that is, they have given definitions in which the full implications of the meanings of the terms have not been considered.

9.4.3.2. Significance of reference to vyavah&.ra about Vedu Veda@ SabdQra<i& veda uccai@ pathyate are examples of vyawhriras which support J’s contention. Of course drawing a parallel with the Veda also establishes the sanctity of his position over that of the other alarhk&ikQs.

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9.4.4. Refutation of the Theory that Poetry is Aesthetic Experience: Translation of Text

And what others say - that the essence of Poetry is &widodbodhakatva (“awakening or arousing aesthetic appreciation or enjoyment”) of it, and that it is the same in Word and in Sense - that is not so, because there will be the contingency of including the ragas of music, etc. in the definition, since they also awaken aesthetic enjoyment - something which has been agreed upon by all the alanYc&ikas beginning with the Dhvanikba. why say more? All the subsidiaries of drama [costumes, etc.] , since they come under the same contingency [i.e., they are risvtldodbodhaka] will also have to be considered likewise [as poetry] .

9.4.5. Allied Refutation of the Theory that Poetry is the Capacity to Arouse Rasa: Translation of Text

By this [same argument] the theory that [poetry] is rasodbodhasamartha (“that which has the capacity to awaken rasa) is also eliminated.

9.4.6. Discussion of the Two Theories Refuted

It would seem that two distinct theories are being referred to here, the first having to do with the aesthetic experience itself and the second with the capacity to produce that experience. Since J has refuted one theory and then added ‘by this . . . ‘, that is, by the refutation of the first theory the second theory also stands refuted, we would expect the clear statement of two theories. However, it is not entirely certain what J was referring to. One possibility is that the first theory, which mentions risvcida, is in accordance with the tradition initiated by &ndavardhana, since that term occurs with the expression rasabh&ata&bhl etc. The second theory, which mentions rasa alone, could then be a reference to ViSvanatha’s definition. The fault of both definitions is of course ativycipti. (For the faults of a definition see TS Dipikd under dravya.)

The distinction between the two definitions should perhaps be understood as a logical rather than historical one, as was suggested above. One way of defining poetry is in terms of the elusive category of experience. .&v&da is a term which is usually applied to the aesthetic experience or enjoyment of


rasa, but it could be taken here as referring to aesthetic experience or enjoyment in general and therefore could even apply to alanikdras, etc. The second definition or theory is limited to the specific case of the enjoyment of rasa alone, i.e., to the heart of the aesthetic experience. It is, in other words, an idealistic definition.

There is however what may be considered a historical reference to the &w@da theory of poetry (mentioned by J as being distinct from the raw, i.e., the rasodbodhaka theory) in the statement of Candid& (cf. 9.2). The expression &vrfdajiv&‘uh, which is a synonym for &widodbodhaka, is found in Candid&a and again in the commentary Sgrabodhini (in edition of KP edited by Dr. Goparaju Ramu and Dr. Jagannatha Pathak, Ganganath Jha Kendriya Samskrita Vidyalaya, Allahabad, 1976) on KP by his @ya Srivatsala&hanabhatfa (p. 10): tasm@d &v@dajivcituh padasanidarbhah 6widodbodhakatvameva k@vyatvaprayojakam (The passage is translated in context at 9.4.8 5). This indicates that he equates @sv&dajiv~m+ and &Mdodbodhakatva. In the same passage Srivatsahiiichana mentions rasodbodhakatva. There is no further explanation of the theory in Candid&a, but he refers the reader for particulars to an independent work of his called Dhvanisiddhrlntasatigraha, which does not seem to have been recovered yet.

9.4.7. Formal Argument That the Term Poeby Cannot Refer to Both Word and Sense: Translation of Text

Is the pravytti-nimitta (‘basis for the usage’, ‘reason for the use of a term in the particular significations it bears’) for the term Evya a single entity connected with both Sabda and artha [together as a pair] , or does it refer separately to each one? It cannot be the first case, for then there would be the undesirable consequence of such [untrue and nonexistent] vyavahaas as ‘Verses are not poetry’, which is of the same format as the [true and existing] vyavah&a ‘One entity is not two’. Nor can it be the second case, for then there would be the undesirable contingency of the vyavahrira ‘two poems’ in a single poem. Therefore, the definition of k&vya can properly refer to $abda alone, as is the case with the definitions of Veda, Lastra, purQra, etc.

9.4.7.1. Summary of J’s refutation: [email protected] concepts involved. The above constitutes a further refutation of the view that poetry can refer to both

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word and sense. Here the refutation is by demonstration of the logical impossibility of holding such a view. There are two possible alternatives, that the term k3vya refers to &zbda and artha together, or that it refers to each separately.

Pravytti-nitnitta, the basis for the usage of a word, is the padahkyatti- vacchedaka, as ghatatva is the pravrttinimitta for the word ghata. The pravrttinimitta of a word can be its @ti (as in the example of ghata), a guv, kriyd, or yadycchciya. See Mahabhti;ya [hereafter MBH] on P 4.1.44. Vy&zkta means resorting to vydsajyavytti, which is defined as svasam&idhi- Azra~bhedapratiyogMvacchedaka. It refers to situations in which a single entity (here a word) is invariably connected with two things, as for example the word ‘both’.

9.4.7.2. J’s use of pravrttinimitta. By examining the pravrttinimitta of the word klvya, J is determining precisely the basis for vyavahdra, our common verbal usage, which was earlier used to prove that Word alone is Poetry. There the issue was considered from a non-technical (/auk&z) point of view and the contradictions were shown. Here he examines the vyavah&a of these terms from a technical (tistric) point of view. The pravrttinimitta is the property of an entity in our knowledge which determines our use of that word (to the exclusion of others): Without knowing ‘potness’, that is, the nature of pots in general, it would not be possible to determine that an individual entity was a pot. When there is knowledge of ‘potness’, it is possible to know the entity ‘pot’ and to use the word that refers to it.

9.4.7.3. J’s use of vycisajyavrtti. Eko na dvau (‘one entity is not two’) is a valid usgae. A parallel example is ‘a pot is not a pot and a cloth’. And in the present context, if Poetry is Word and Sense, then one of those - Word alone - will not be Poetry. Further, if the term Poetry refers to both Word and Sense, then in a vyavah&a that refers to verses which are heard or seen (in written form) but not understood, the word Poetry could not be used because both elements (Word and Sense) which together form its pnzvrttinimitta (‘basis for usage’) are not present. (See Vakroktijivifa [hereafter VJ’j K. Krishnamoorthy, 1977, commentary on 1.7, dvavekamiti vicitraivokti+, and Siddh&tamuktcivali [hereafter SM] under 49, ubhayariz naikam ityasya sarvajanasiddhatvdt.) In J’s second case, if the term Poetry refers separately


to Word and Sense there will be the contingency of two poems in one - one poem of the words and another of the meaning.

9.4.8. Objections to J’s Definition of Poem by Various &istris

9.4.8.1. Objection of Gokulamitha cited by C: Partial translation and resume of argument. “Even if artha is not the actual activity of the poet, still the thing that is seen first is what is referred to by that activity.” In this statement Gokulanatha has reference to a definition of Poetry given in the vrtti to KP 1.2: lokottamva+nanipu~kavikarma - “the activity of a poet who is skilled in heightened (i.e., special, non-prosaic) description.” This activity can only mean the construction of words. Sense as such cannot be arranged; it is with words that the activity is involved. But what the term Poetry really signifies is not words, but that thing which is illuminated first, i.e., the thought in the poet’s mind. It is this thought, which is prior to the words and which is distinguished by beauty, etc., that is what is really meant by kavikarma (‘the activity of the poet’) - not Sense, which is precluded by its very essence, and not Words either. “If we were to say that it was bbda which was referred to then all those who regard &bda as eternal (MM, vrirttikd 1; Jaimini’s Minuitisadatina [hereafter JAI] , 1 l.5) could not engage in poetic activity, because of the impossibility of eternal things being produced. Therefore, since there is no decisive proof here [this is contrary to J] , the predominance of both hbda-as-qualified-byurtha as well as artha- as-qualified-by-Sabda indicates that k#vya, which is the manifestor of transcendent delight, refers to both of them. As for the vyavahdra in statements such as ‘he hears the poem’, they can be explained as referring to artha also, in that the act of hearing means hearing the Sense which is conveyed by the understanding of the words, as is the case with such iruti statements as &mdSrotavya (Byhadtiracyaku Upanigd [hereafter BAU] , 2.4.5,4.5.6), which does not mean that one should hear the word dtnui, but the meaning, i.e. the knowledge of that.”

9.4.8.2. Objection ofN: Resumt and partial translation. Nage’sa Bhatta first remarks that his objection given here constitutes a general objection to all three of J’s definitions, for in both the &v&da and rasa theories the idea of Sense must be included. He states:

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The prav~ttinimittu (‘basis for usage’) of the term Poetry is both [Word and Sense] - by vyhujyuvytti - (a) because the experience of rusu (in that best kind of poetry) is found without distinction in both [Word and Sense] , (b) because the unique property (lak~yat&zcchedaka) which is stated in the definition in KP, which definition refers to the possession of the unique property found in all contents of knowledge which produce the cognition of aesthetic delight, and which definition is not a trivial one - that property is found in both [Word and Sense], and (c) because there are vyavah&zs, such as ‘the poem was read’, ‘the poem was heard’, and ‘the poem was understood’ which also refer to both. Accordingly Lord Patafijali’s commentary on tudadhite (P 4.2.59), which indicates that the word Veda (and other similar words) refers to both [Word and Sense], concurs with what we are saying. Also because there could be reference by lak,uw in one or the other [i.e. an indirect reference to the one of the pair which is not directly referred to] , there will be no contingency [of a vyuvuhrfra such as ‘a verse is not a poem’] of the sort found in ‘one is not two’. Therefore the non-trivial definition of k&vyu in the K@vyupruk& stands without fault. Similarly in the case of the definitions referring to &&&I and so on [i.e., definitions referring to rusu] , because they include this particularity [of involving both &bda and urthu] , both stand without fault.

9.4.8.3. Objection of Gutig~dhuru@tri cited by C: Resumt. The activity of the poet is not directed to Word alone since the activity of one who is describing something transcendent (lokotturavurqmanipqakavikarmatti) is without distinction in terms of Word and Sense. Even if the act of reciting the poem is directed to Word alone, still the experience of the rusa is directed to Sense. Therefore the term Sense (urthu) refers to the directly stated, the indirectly stated, and the suggested (Mcyu-Zaksyu-vyuhgvu). (The definition of urthu is expanded to exclude overapplication of the definition of k@vyu and has not been fully reproduced here .)

9.4.8.4. Other objections offered by C. If Word alone is Poetry then the description [in uZurhk&atistru] of faults, figures, etc. should apply to Word alone. Then those connected with urthu would be irrelevant to the considera- tions of poetics, and if not irrelevant then only secondary. This is one of the undesirable consequences in accepting J’s definition.

Further, if it is said that faults, figures, etc. are described [in uZatik&utistru]


because they bear in a general way on the experience of rasa, but at the same time it is also maintained that they are arigas (‘subsidiaries’) of ktivya [as J has done in his introduction to the definition of Poetry (9.1 .I)] [and not arigas of rasa] , then there will be no point in describing them.

Even the definition of ViSvanitha (SD), vrlkyani ras&nakani klvyam, which is introduced as referring to Word only, is later modified by Vibvanatha himself when he states driya.+avyavibhedena pun& k@vyam dvidhd matam.

9.4.8.5. Objection of &ivatsalHchana, disciple of Ca@id@sa. $rivatsalafichana, mentioned earlier (9.4.6) in connection with the &xidodbodhaka theory, interestingly enough refutes his own guru’s theory in his commentary SBabodhini on KP (p. 10). The paragraph below is a translation of the relevant portion, followed by explanatory notes.

Translation: Following the etymological statement that Poetry is the activity of a poet, it was stated that poetry is in Sabda only and not in artha, because [poetry] cannot be produced by effort with respect to that [artha]. Therefore it was stated that Poetry is a collection of words which are productive of &v@da (cisv&la~3Gtuh). They say this is the definition of Poetry. But it is not so. Indeed the capacity for evoking &uida (rlsvtiodbodhakatva) is given as the nature of the causal factor of Poetry. And that [capacity] is found in both Sabda and artha without distinction. And since it is accepted that there is rasodbodhakatva there [in artha] there must then be ktivyatd in artha also [because the causal factor of k#vyat& resides there] , as it is found in drama (dTiyak@vya, literally ‘seen poetry’) [in which the total assemblage of words, meaning, gesture, costume, etc. evokes rasa] . But vyavahciras which refer to the activity of the poet in respect of artha are indirect (bhfikta, i.e., by lakyqa) because it [artha] is revealed by that [tibda] alone. And for those who hold that tibda is eternal, since ktivya is also in the form of tibda [and therefore cannot be involved in creation] , vyavahliras referring to the activity of the poet [which is in respect of Jabda] must be indirect (bhrikta). Thus even though it has been established [by us] that kdvyatti is in artha, vyavahriras such as ‘he reads a poem’, he composes [literally ‘arranges’] a poem”, and ‘he hears a poem’ do occur when the term kuvya refers to Sabda alone.

Notes: The ‘etymological statement’ refers to the urtti under KP 1.2 mentioned earlier @at kavyani lokottarava~ananipu~kavikanna). “Because poetry cannot be produced by effort with respect to artha” means that the

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activity, i.e., the act of composition is expended on words. ‘They say’ refers to Candid&. Note that rlsvcidodbodhaka was the term used by J. ‘Causal factor (prayujaka)’ means a cause which is a basic part of the causal complex which is not direct but is also not external, that is, not anyath&iddha. Thus it must be considered a legitimate cause of poetry. SrivatsalzYiIchana’s point is that this causal factor, namely ~sv&&dbodhnka, occurs indiscriminately in both bbda and artha. Rasodbodhaka here appears to be the same as tisnidodbodhaku, but in J (see 9.4.4 and 9.4.5) seems to be another theory separately mentioned and summarily refuted together with the lrsvlrda theory. Interestingly, it is here related to drama. “For those who hold that &rbda is eternal” refers to the Mimarhsakas. Srivatsallfichana is saying that since they must resort to lakgz@ in order to explain vyauahtiras concerning Word (because an eternal Word cannot be involved in the production of anything), there iS certainly no fault in my resorting to hzkpr@ to explain vyuvah&zs concerning Sense. The last point is this: When it has already been established by a proof based on cause-andeffect that k&ya refers to both hbda and artha, those VyQVahiiras which would seem to support the notion of hbda alone are explicable by a kind of luk+m@ which allows the term k&yQ to refer to the bbda-portion alone, since there is blrdha of the expressed sense which refers to both. Therefore these vyavah&zs do not contradict the fact that Poetry refers to both Word and Sense.

9.4.9. &.istric Support for J’s Word-only Position

Despite the abundance of arguments against J’s definition and in favor of the standard Sabdarthau pakp, we do find supportive statements such as the one in the Madhumati commentary on KP (p. 30). After a rather complex argument the author, Ravi Bhatticarya, states: ‘The term kdvya’ is used to refer to both [iabda and artha] in that they are [both] the &zya (‘substratum’) of kdvya. Here again tibdu is directly the subject of the activity of the poet (s&k@ kaviuytip&Qvi$ayQ~), and artha is [the subject of the activity of the poet] only through being a delimitor [of Sabdu] . This is because the activity of the poet, which consists of joining [words together], can only be of a collection of words delimited by the desired meaning and having that particular sequence [the sequence which had been the subject of the activity of the poet, i.e., the sequence of the words as they sprang to his mind during the activity of composition, which is the same arrangement


of words as they are found in the poem]. (The original of this sentence is trid~~nup&vike#irthavyavacchinnapadakadambasyaiva yojan&tmakakavivy& pliratvlt. As the meaning of ttid$inupzirvika was unclear to us, we sought the assistance of Sri N.S. Venkatanathacharya, the second editor of the Mysore O.R.I. KlvyaprakGa, which contains the Madhumati.) In conclusion the author cites Dan@ KAD 1 .lO as support: The body [of poetry] is a garland of words delimited by the desired meaning.

9.5. J’S CRITICISM OF THE QUALIFIERS IN MAMMATA’S

DEFINITION

9.5.1. Translation of Text

The inclusion of [the qualifiers] gup, alatikEra and the others in the definition [of Mammata in KP] is not proper. For there will be the contingency of avyrSpti (‘non-pervasion’, i.e., exclusion) [of the term Poetry] in such poems as uditam man&zlafi vidhob (‘the orb of the moon has risen’) which, if spoken by a dtiti (‘messenger’, ‘go-between’) can be advice for the n&yik@ to go and meet her lover, if spoken by one about to meet her lover (abhis&ikd) can be a prohibition against going [now that the moon is full and she will be seen] , or if spoken by one separated from her lover (virahipi) can mean that death is near. The same is the case with the poem gato’ stamarkab (“the sun has set”) and other such poems.

9.5.1.1. Connection and resumt. J here begins a criticism of the qualifiers in the definitions of Mammata and others; that is, having criticized the viSe!ya part of the definition, he now turns to the vi@aFs. In the verses cited there are noguys, alarizk&as, etc. They would therefore have to be excluded by the definition from being klvya. Yet they are extremely rich in suggestion and thus worthy of inclusion.

9.5.1.2. The examplesgiven. PM note that J’s second example is from Bh%maha 2.87:

gato ‘stamarko bhdtindurydn ti v&iiya paksipah ityevamddi kiti kdvyam v@rttdmeruim pracaksate

The sun has set, the moon is shining, the birds are going to their nests - What kind of poetry is this? This is merely narrative.

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But in Jayamangala on Bhaftikavya 10.46 the reading of the second line is different, giving a different meaning:

ityevarmidikani k&yam varttrim etam pracaksate

PM further note that the various suggestions in the line are clearly explained by Jhalakikar in Bcflabodhini on KP 5.47, p. 240.

9.5.1.3. Discussion of the status of the visegas by other commentators. In this regard C quotes the Radipa commentary on KP which states that there is no Poetry only when there is absence of rasa or when there is absence of sphutalanikara (obvious figures). Both of these are causes of Poetry and the presence of either is sufficient to effect poetic status. The definition in KP is thus modified. Others say that the presence of guys and alamktiras is a necessity in poetry, for in their absence the poem does not contain that particular striking quality (vicchittiviSesa@dhanat) which produces poetic delight, and the designation kavyata becomes difficult to apply. If this necessity of guqs and alar&k&as is not accepted then citrakavya (‘sound poetry, or tour-de-force pictorial poetry, generally considered the lowest form of versifying), mere description, and narrative will also come under the classification Poetry.

9.5.2. Elimination of Other Possible Interpretations of the Status of the Visesanas: Translation of Text . .

Nor is it possible to say that this [example, uditam mandalam vidhoh, and others like it] is not Poetry. For then it would be possible [for anyone] to say likewise [‘this is not Poetry’] about that which others consider to be Poetry, And we do find [in this example] the aesthetic delight which is the essence of Poetry (kavyajivitam camatkaritvam). Moreover there is no consistent opinion about the status of guys, alamkaras, etc. [among the alamkarikas of the various schools old and new]. Finally, there can be no application of the element of the definition [namely adosau, ‘free from poetic faults’] without contradicting the vyavahha, ‘this poem is faulty’.

9.5.2.1. Connection. The thrust of the argument against Mammata is, “If you fail to consider these examples as Poetry because they do not possess guws and so on, then we can apply the same criterion to some of the

JAGANNATHA’S DEFINITION OF POETRY 39.5

examples that you have given as Poetry and find them equally lacking.” From one point of view, J’s argument seems unfounded since Mammafa has qualified his definition with kvacit. However J has not included kvacit in his version of Mammata’s definition so his argument can stand as a general refutation of that school.

9.5.2.2. First point of refitation: Camatk&a as common criterion. Kivyajivitati camatk@itvam is given here to show that there is a common criterion among the rival schools which must be accepted in order to prevent the undesired exclusion of such examples as uditam man&lam vidhoh. The following statement concerning the lack of consistent opinion about the status ofguys, alatikrfras, etc. also supports this. (Note that J uses the word camatkuritva here in reference to aesthetic pleasure in its pure generalized form, and not to the delight which comes from figures, etc.) If an objector should then say that gu~s contribute directly to the rasa (it is commonly accepted that they are dharmas of the &ma of Poetry) and that alarhkdras contribute indirectly to the rasa and therefore there is really no fault in including them in the definition, J then introduces his second point of criticism of the qualifiers in Mammafa’s definition.

9.5.2.3. Second point of refutation: Ado.uu. If k@vya is that which is adu#a (‘unfaulty’) then to say ‘this poem is faulty’ is impossible, because the definition is so constructed that the term ‘faulty’ alone means absence of poetry. Mammata’s definition thus results in the contradiction ‘poetry is not poetry’.

9.5.3. Further Elimination of Possible Interpretations of the Status of the Viie;aps: Translation of Text

Nor should it be said that ‘faulty’ (dusta) means lacking in faults in one place, as in “the tree which is possessed of the absence of conjunction has conjunction” (saniyogtibh&uzv@n vrk& sarhyogitivat), and that therefore there is no contradiction with the vyavah&a [‘this poem is faulty’]. For if, like the cognition “this tree has the conjunction of a bird as its base but does not [have the conjunction of a bird] on its branch,” [there were the cognition], ‘this verse is a poem’ in its first half [because of the absence of doFs] but is not a poem in its second half [because of the presence of

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dosas] , then it would be proper to accept adosau in terms of avytipyavrtti (‘non-pervasive connection’)] but there is the lack of [such a cognition as a] natural experience on the part of anyone, and thus there is also no propriety in accepting the term adosau as uvyapytzvrtti. Moreover, there is no proof for including in the body [of krfvya] the gunas., which are properties of the rfcnxi, like courage [which is a property of the soul] , and the alurizkrlras, which are decorations [of the body and not the body itself], like a necklace [and other such bodily decorations].

9.5.3.1. J’s use of avytipyavrtti. Except for the substitution of a bird for the more usual monkey in Nyaya, the above is the classic example of avyapyavrtti, defined in TS, Dipikci as sv~tyanttibh~vastim&uidhikaranatva (27, under samyoga). Avyapym+ti means simply a connection which does not pervade completely the thing connected, but resides in one part of it, so that the entire entity (a tree) is both connected (because there is a monkey in the top of the tree, which is a part of the tree) as well as not connected (because there is absence of a monkey at the bottom of the tree). J finds avy@pyavrtti unacceptable as an interpretation of the nature of adosau in Mammata’s definition for again it leads to the contradiction “this poem is not a poem (in one of its parts).”

9.5.3.2. Individual words. N glosses svarasav#hinah, the qualifier of anubhavasya, as svarasikasya (‘natural’, ‘self-evident’, hence ‘acceptance’). The force of api (“thus there is also no propriety in accepting the term adosac as avydpyavrtti”) is to indicate that this is an additional, culminating criticism of the use of adosau in Mammata’s definition begun in 9.5.2.

9.5.3.3. Criticism of J’s argument against Mammafa. I’M (note 17, p. 425) state:

At VIII, 66 of the KtivyaprakGa (p. 462), Mammafa defines the gu+s as properties belonging to raw and contributing to its heightening:

ye rasasya arigmo dharm@t burytidaya ivatm@nah utkarsahetczvaste syuracalusthitayo gun@

Now this is the same view as the one expressed by Jagannatha on p. 18 of RG: Saurylsdivad &mrfdharm@uim gqimim. It would seem therefore that Jagannatha is being unfair to Mammata here. Mammata has never said that


the guys are the constituent elements of the body of poetry (iariraghataka). Cf. KP VIII. 67 (p. 465, where Mammata says that alatikrfras help rasa through Sabda and artha). At VIII. 71 (p. 477) Mammata says that in spite of the gups being the properties belonging to the soul of poetry, the gups are spoken of as properties belonging to Sabda and artha (for example in Mammata’s definition of poetry tadado.mu Sabd&thau sagqau) it is only a secondary image (i.e., a loose way of speaking):

gqavrttyd punas te@y vrttih Sabddrthayor mat@

N, commenting on J’s statement gu~tv@latik&iderananugamdcca, explains that guvs can be a property of k@vya and alarhktiras can also, so J’s objection is unfounded. But the word ddi in the above statement must include adosa - indeed adosa is the next point J takes up - and such inclusion of adosa in a (general) definition of Poetry is insupportable. For if it means the general absence of dosas there would be very little left which could be called Poetry. Thus N is in essence acknowledging PM’s point that gups and alarizkaras can be construed as properties of kdvya, but the definition as a whole, because it includes adosa, is not proper. Moreover, even if there were no fault in including these viieqas in a particular definition (vi~e~a@ak~a~, that is, a definition of particulars) of Poetry, it is not fit to do so in a general definition (s&m&zyalak;ap - which is what is under discussion here), because the restrictions imposed by the qualifiers cannot apply to all instances of Poetry.

9.6. REFUTATION OF VISVANziTHA’S DEFINITION OF POETRY IN

SA-HITYADARPAYA

9.61. Translation of Text

And that which has been ascertained [as the definition of Poetry] in Sihityadarpa~, namely rasavadeva k&yam (“Poetry is that alone which is endowed with rasa”), is also not acceptable, for then there will be the contingency of lack of k&vyatU in those klvyas in which vastu (‘narrative information’) or alan?k&a are predominant [i.e., such poems could not be called Poetry]. And this is not a desired consequence [as might be supposed, since it excludes “lesser” forms of poetry ] , for it results in the received tradition of the mah&wis being thrown into confusion. Indeed the rushing

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flow of water, its descent over falls, its upward spray, and its meanderings have been described by poets, as well as the playful movements of monkeys, children, and others. Nor should it be said that even there [in such descriptions] there is, somehow, indirectly, a touch of rusa, for then the contingency will arise of such a touch of Msu being in such statements as ‘the cow walks’, and ‘the deer runs’ [or in any other utterance in which one seeking MSU cares to find it] , and that is fruitless [for determining precisely what is Poetry] . Our point is [that finding rusu in such utterances] means indiscriminately calling any urthu a vibh&vu, unubhtiu, or vyubhicrin’bh&u.

9.6.2. Connection and Resumi of Argument

Here J concludes his refutations of the definitions of others. His strategy here is to cite examples from the accepted poetic tradition (‘indeed the rushing flow of water. . . ‘) and thereby demonstrate that a definition based only on the possession of rusu suffers from not covering all the instances required: the fault is avyrlpti. He further argues against the position that there is rusu in whatever utterance a sahrduyu can find it, because of the consequence of such a position for the system of poetics.

9.6.2.1. Support in Dhvunyrlloka for the position refited by J. Definitions such as Vitvanatha’s and others based on rasu can be supported by maintaining that rusu is involved in the prosaic statements above, or in any description. Since rasa engages the bhtius of the suhyduyu, it can be assumed that the capacity to arouse aesthetic pleasure in one sensitive to it is actually in such statements or descriptions. This is in fact what handavardhana says in DHV’ when he discusses the superimposition of sentience on insentient things in order to make them fit to support an aesthetic experience. PM (fn. 19, p. 425) refer to DHV II, pp. 200--204, where it is stated that descriptions of natural objects, etc. are really accessories to the arising of emotions. The perceiver takes the natural objects as symbols or signs, thereby injecting them with his own emotions.

9.6.2.2. J’s counter-refutation. The last part of the above text (arthunuitrasyu vibhcfvlfnubhrSvavyubhicu~unyutamutv~diti dik) contains in rather compressed form J’s criticism of kandavardhana’s position as a confounding of the precision employed in ulunikriia&istru to analyze rusa. If the Dhavanikara’s


argument is accepted, definitions of k@~a based on rasa will apply to any prosaic utterance as well as legitimate Poetry because there will be no differentiating factors by which to establish what the causes are for the arousal of aesthetic pleasure - since any meaning could be indiscriminately considered as a uibhdua, anubhdva, etc. This is a clear contradiction of the tradition of poetics and implies a meaninglessness of that tradition’s accepted views on the arousal of aesthetic pleasure.

9.6.3. Conclusion and Connection with the Following Topic

J has now discussed the sdmdnyabzksana of kdvya and refuted the views of others. Before discussing the viSesalak;anas he turns his attention to the cause of Poetry. But examining the definitions J has ascertained the nature (svatipa) of kdvya; once the nature of the effect is established, the cause and causal factors must be known. The cause-effect relationship and its determinants constitute basic subject matter in ‘sastric argument.

NOTES

1 Vyafijana and cognates are translated as ‘reveal’ or ‘suggest’ according to context. This does not mean that other words, e.g., praLz&z and cognates, have not also been occasionally translated as ‘reveal’. As this exposition is meant to be a tool for studying RG, it intended that the reader should constantly refer to the original text with its two commentaries C and N while using it. Where the language of the original has a particular technical or suggestive sense difficult to render in English, or where the original is not easily available the Sanskrit has been included here. z Upamtinadupameyasya gunavisesavattvenotkarsa vyatirekah, RG. Definitions of alamkcrms, etc. taken from RG may be easily located as all editions contain tables of contents and indexes. The same is true for definitions from other ‘tistric works. 3 Kirica taduta ca, sam&h&o va kimuta tasya bhavah. kaimutyam kaimutiko va, kavyarthapattirasya namrintaram. The example is sa jitastvanmukhenenduh ka varta sarasiruh&m? It is also commonly expressed as kimuvaktavyam. Explanations of nytiyas may be found (as this one was) in such compendia as Bhuvanesalaukikanyayas6hasri. 4 Aprthannirdiste visaye visayyabhedah adhyavas&mm, RG, p. 186. Note that the English expression ‘&Ring suspension of disbelief’ denotes a general principle while adhyavaMta occurs in a specific environment as defined. The translation therefore is not strictly accurate. 5 Visayina visayasya n~aranamatisayah tasyoktth, RG. 6 Niraksiranytiyen&sphufabhed&mkaramelane sarikarah, Kuvahzyananda [hereafter

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KIWI. Since J left the RG an incomplete work, we have had to give some definitions supplied by other alaritkan’kas. 7 Kenaci&rthena tulyanyayatvcidarthtintarasyapattirarthapattih, RG. f~ Upameyatavacchedakapurasktirenopameye kb&Cuu~ciyamcfnnm upamcinatadatmyam riipakam. Tadevopaskarakatva vi&am alarftkarah. RC. 9 Tilatandulanytiyena sphu@agamyabhe&Zanikaramelane sams@t, KUV. lo Sa ca prakaranddina . . . btidhitassan viparitam laksayati, Jhalakikar on KP example 4.24 (upakrtam bahu tatra etc.). Or Saniketa on the same example (but numbered 4.25), mukhy&thalMdhah vaiparityanica sambandhah. SD, again on the same example, includes viparitalaksana under laksa$aksa~-, a form of jahatsvcirthalaksamf I1 Yatra prastu tadharmiko vyavaharah sadhtiranavisesarunn&ropasthap~taprastutad- harmikavyavahtinibhedena bhtisate sa &ru%oktih, RG. l2 G&&+ig&ah pmkrtarthopapcidakatvena vivaksito ‘rthah krivyalirigam, RG. 1 3 Arthe satyarthabhinn&uMi varn&uim Sa punahsrutih yamakam, KP, I4 VarnasdmyamanupnBah, KP. . 1s Sarigatih - ekavtlkyattipannatve sati anantartibhidh&aprayojakaj~tiasajanakajtianavisayo ‘rthah, Nyayakosa [hereafter NK] . Saprasarigc upoddhcfto hetu tavasarastatha nirwihakaikyak&yaikye sodha sangatirisyate, R&narudri. I6 Vastuprativastubhdv@annasadharanadharmakavaky&thayor arthaupamyam pra tivasttipama, R G. I7 Simanyena visesasya visesena s&rUnyasya vd yatsamartharaarit tadarthantaranytisah, . . RG. la A standard explanation of the term mimdmsa in its general sense would be TTU~ vicare, svrfrthe san, meaning victiraptirvakatathnirnaya, or ttidrsatattvanirrtayapratipadako gran thavisesah. tg PM (see 9.3.2. for reference) translate this passage as follows:

Because detailed knowledge (vyutpattii about poetry, which is the source of many (benefits) such as fame, pure bliss, favour of one’s teacher, a king, or a god etc., is absolutely necessary for both the practising poet and the discriminating reader, I will fist of all give a scientific defmition of poetry, which, while setting forth (in positive terms) its most essential nature (or traits), will also serve to distinguish it from everything else.

The term poetry is used of words that convey a striking or charming sense (p. 416).

2o The close association of the poetic act with the appreciation of it by an audience should be stressed here. When poetry was spontaneously appreciated in the court (which was considered to be an ideal situation), the participation of the audience was of course a crucial factor. In this way the actual situation of poetry was similar to that of music to&y. When music is improvisational the audience is responsible to a certain extent for enabling the artist to perform to his utmost capacity. The translation of sahrdnya as “connoisseur” is inadequate because it fails to convey the sense of relationship between artist and audience. Our rather drab technology-derived term ‘feedback’ is closer to the desired idea, but is also inadequate because it has to do with an appreciation afterwards rather than being intimately connected with the creative act at the moment it is happening. ‘Feedback’, then, connotes a detached objective response rather than a communion of souls. 21 PM (p. 422) state: “It is well-known that JagannLtha uses terms from Navyanyaya. It must be pointed out that, at least in the case of Jaganniitha, little is gamed. To use the


term avacchbma instead of vi&a seems to us no major gain in clarity. More often than not the complex terminology simply conceals a rather prosaic idea.”

The term vi@a means that the thing referred to is qualified by its viiefly(s), which may be of any number and which can also be the v5epFs of other things. Avacchinna means qualified by a particular kind of viieFv, i.e. an avacchedaka, which is found only in the thing referred to and thus confines the reference to that entity alone which possesses the unique feature. (‘Qualified’ and ‘delimited’ are therefore reasonable transla- tions of vi@a and avacchinna respective.) In the case in question, the avacchedakxdharma confines the object of reflection to that which is delimited (avacchinna) by iokottaratva (the Universal of the quality ‘transcendent pleasure’) and thus excludes reflection on any of the adventitious accompanying factors in a complex psychological process. Surely precise expression excludes rather than conceals prosaic ideas. ** PM (p. 416) give the following translation for the above passage:

Transcendence is a generic characteristic that belongs to (a certain kind of) joy and for which the term “aesthetic rapture” (cam&k&a) is a synonym. It is known through direct experience (only). It is caused by a particular (form of) being absorbed in thought (bhcvamii (about a poem that is) characterized (avacchinna) by that (ability to give transcendent delight).

23 PM (p. 416) give:

Poetry is words conveying a meaning which, when it becomes the object of profound reflection (bhdvan@ gives rise to aesthetic rapture. (Or, 2:) Poetry consists in words, deep reflection on whose meaning is capable of giving rise to (janakatdvacchednko, i.e. jam&r) aesthetic rapture. Or, (finally) we can say that poetry is whatever evokes aesthetic rapture (in the sensitive reader) because of the relation (sutisurga, i.e., sambandha) of the signifying words with the signified sense, which (through profound reflection) produces that aesthetic rapture (svavGi@ajanakatd ‘vacchedakdrthapratipd&kat&anisarge~a).~

And PM’s note [9] is as follows:

This compound is difficult. We should dissolve it as follows: svena (i.e., camattiratva- vattvenn, i.e. camatkZtvena) vi@f yd janakaf (i.e., bhcivanrSn~~~~anyaca~t~-raja~- data?, tasydfi janakattiy@ avacche&ka+ yah arthab (i.e., tivyclrthafi), tena arthena saha (krivyagata~abaZ~-m) ya+ pmtip&iakat&a&rgah (i.e., prati~~dyapratipd&zt~sam- bandhuh), tena satisarge@ camatkdratvavattvam ‘(i.e., camatk&ak&itvam) eva k$yatvam.

PM maintain that there is no significant difference between the three definitions. They note that Ramaswami Sastri “seems” to find a difference between them.

In note 1, p. 41, Ramaswami Sastri states:

The final explanation of the definition of ktivya runs thus - camatkdrajanakab~vancf- vi~y~rthapratipd&ka&zb&ivam . . . This form of definition introduces bhdvati instead of jff&ru as given in the original defmition. The utility of it is explained thus: samuh&mbanaj&ina comprising two coordinate thoughts, of which one may be ramqiya and the other aramapiya, can be taken as camatkrllajanakaji&a; and the statement like k&o ratati expressing an arama+y&tha may be called a tivya when it becomes the object of the cognitive jumble - samuh&rmbanajr7ifna, along with a rama~iy@rfha - a beautiful idea. So to exclude cases like kaXo ratati, bhdvami is inserted in the place of jr%ina. Bhlfwmi is a chain of cognitions (punah punar anusandhdnam). It

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is possible to say that the first is samtduiimbana; but the succeeding cognitions cannot be so in that they, under special circumstances, present only beautiful objects. Hence there is no ntivy@ri.

Two more amended forms of this definition are also given by Jagannatha - (1) yatpratipciditlirtha . . and (2) svaviki@a . . . . Of these the first is better than the definition already notes above in that it obviates the ativy&pti on a btivati, the succeeding cognitions of which present under different circumstances are both ramaciytirtha and aramaniygrtha while the second explains practically the same in a simpler and more convenient form by adopting the onugumu method.

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