Peter A. Kiss

ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM

AND

POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN EUROPE

Összefoglaló: A tömeges muszlim bevándorlás Európába, valamint a fundamentalista iszlám

térhódítása a bevándorlók között jelent s biztonsági kockázathoz vezetett a nyugati világban.

A kockázat csökkentéséhez szükség lenne a mérsékelt muszlimok együttm ködésére, de

ennek semmi jele sem Európában, sem másutt. A muszlim bevándorlók és a helyi nem-

muszlim lakosság együttélésének feltétele a befogadó társadalom értékeihez, hagyományaihoz

és törvényeihez igazítani az iszlám doktrínáit. A muszlimok erre nem hajlandóak és

ellenállásukkal muszlim-ellenes er szakhullámot kockáztatnak.

Summary: Mass immigration to Europe by Muslims, and the spread of fundamentalist Islam

among the immigrants have led to a significant security risk in the Western world.

Cooperation of moderate Muslims would be key to reducing the risk

but there is no sign of

such cooperation, either in Europe or elsewhere. The long-term coexistence of Muslim

immigrants and non-Muslim natives requires the adjustment of Islam's tenets to the host

society's values, traditions and laws. The Muslims are not willing to do this

and their

reluctance raises the risk of anti-Muslim violence.

Kulcsszavak: iszlám, terrorizmus, politikai er szak, felkelés

Key words: Islam, terrorism, political violence, insurgency

A szerz az Egyesült Államok fegyveres er inek nyugállományú tiszthelyettese, jelenleg a

ZMNE doktorandusz hallgatója.

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Political Violence in Europe

In the western world (which includes Australia, New Zeeland and Israel)1 fundamental

freedoms and democratic processes offer many opportunities to express and advocate the

most variegated political views and to discuss them without resorting to violence; to weigh

and evaluate political intentions; to identify and rectify grievances. Other cultures (e.g. the

Hindu or the Latin American) also offer fora for the public evaluation of opinions and

intentions. But not even the most perfect democracy will resolve every individual or

community grievance even less will it guarantee the realization of every political goal. For

example the principle of state sovereignty and that of self determination of national minorities

or, at the very least, they are terribly difficult to reconcile them. Corsica is either

independent, or part of France, and it is difficult to find a compromise that will satisfy the

adherents of both positions.

The adherents of some views do not accept defeat even if that is the result of perfectly clean

and fair parliamentary processes, and they are ready to resort to more direct, Clausewitzian

methods to realize their goals. Others feel excluded from the political processes, and through

violence they attempt to attract the attention of society to themselves and their problems. Still

others see violence as a shortcut through the slow and convoluted political processes. Thus, in

spite of constitutional guarantees and smoothly functioning democratic institutions, political

violence is not an unusual occurrence in Europe. Undoubtedly, its most obvious and most

frightening form is terrorism but this is not its only form, not its most common form, and

perhaps not even its most dangerous form.2 Street riots; open defiance of public order

authorities; no-go zones for certain ethnic/religious/class groups; violent suppression of

certain political/cultural views; vandalization of media that publish other opinions and

violence against those holding such opinions these are also tools of political violence. Their

common characteristic is that (unlike terrorism) they are marginally legal forms of political

1 According to Samuel P. Huntington the world is divided into eight civilizations: Western, Slavic-Orthodox, Islamic, Hindu, Confucian, Japanese, Latin American and African. We may or may not agree with Huntington's theory of the "clash of civilizations," this division is a useful analytical tool. Huntington, Samuel P.: "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs, 1993. summer.

2 The excessive importance attributed to terrorism diverts society's attention from the real, and far more dangerous problem (broad violent challenge to the power and authority of the state) to one of its symptoms. It also forces the security forces to allocate most of their human and material resources to treating the symptom. But far more dangerous than this misallocation of resources is that the steps necessary for handling an emergency situation are not taken: society is not mobilized; the necessary political, legal and administrative mechanisms do not get triggered. Kiss, Álmos Péter: "A terrorizmusról másképpen," Új Honvédségi Szemle, Budapest, 2007. Sep, and Kiss, Álmos Péter: "Átvihet k-e az aszimmetrikus hadviselés tapasztalatai?" Hadtudomány, Budapest, 2009.1-2 on-line edition. http://mhtt.eu/hadtudomany/2009_e_8.pdf

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behavior, or not particularly grave misdemeanors and or minor crimes; therefore they are very

difficult to deal with through preventive action. A further common feature is that they can

always be justified by reference to the "righteous indignation" of the participants/perpetrators

as proximate cause.3

Political violence has many sources: German, Italian, Belgian, French, Greek, anarchist and

far-left groups; Irish, Corsican, Basque, Chechen, Kosovo independence movements; Serbian

nationalists; Italian fascists; neo-Nazi racists. These sources have mostly dried up in the past

three decades. The insurgency in Northern Ireland has come to an end, the clash of Catholic

and Protestant, or Loyalist and Republican interests continues in a parliamentary setting. The

French, Italian, German extremist political organizations have been destroyed in battles with

the police, or dissolved due to lack of new members. The Basque and Corsican nationalist

independence organizations still exist; the anarchists can still mobilize aggressive, young

crowds for street demonstrations, but since the success of the Iranian Islamic revolution,

Muslims have become the primary initiators of violence in Europe.

About 15 to 25 million Muslims live in the European Union,4 most of them immigrants, or

first or second generation offspring of immigrants. Their integration into the host societies

(aside from the numerous individual exceptions) has been a comprehensive failure throughout

Europe.5 They enjoy the freedoms and services of the host society, but firmly and their

European-born offspring even more firmly reject its values, morals, traditions and laws.

They insist on the customs and traditions of their homelands and the divine laws laid down by

the Koran even if these clash with the most fundamental laws of their new homelands (e.g.

polygamy, honor-killing, forced marriage, female genital mutilation).6 Instead of integration,

3 For example a street demonstration which is a perfectly legal event in most European countries can turn into a riot with unbridled violence. Whether it happens in accordance with, or contrary to, the intention of the organizers (e.g. through the interference of outsiders), it is easy to deny intentional incitement. See for example the Budapest riots in September-October 2006, or the demonstrations against the Danish Mohamed cartoons.

4 About the same number live in countries that are not EU members (Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, Bosnia and Herzegovina, etc). There are no hard data available. In many European countries the law prohibits data collection on the religious and ethnic affiliation of the population, and there are only very inaccurate estimates on the millions of illegal immigrants.

5 Leiken, Robert S.:"Bearers of Global Jihad? Immigration and National Security after 9/11" The Nixon Center, Washington, DC, Mar. 2004. http://www.nixoncenter.org/ There are very large numbers of non/Muslim immigrants in Europe also (Vietnamese, Chinese, Latin-Americans, Indians). Their integration into the host societies has not been without its problems but these do not come close to the problems experienced with the Muslims.

6 Ye'or, Bat (2004): Eurabia The Euro-Arab Axis, Farleigh Dickinson University Press, Teaneck, NJ and Madison, WI, 384 p. ISBN 0-8386-4077-X; Fallaci, Oriana (2002): La rabbia e l orgoglio, RCS Libri SpA,

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they have created mini-Pakistans, mini-Algerias, mini-Moroccos on the periphery of large

cities (where all the social and economic problems of Pakistan, Algeria, etc. are added to the

local, European social and economic problems). One result of this self-imposed segregation is

that education is far inferior and (partly as a consequence of this) unemployment is far higher,

than in the host society.

This situation did not happen by itself, by accident. Reconstruction after WWII, then the

economic boom of the 1950's and 1960's demanded not particularly well trained, but

undemanding and cheap manpower. The employers found this on the periphery of Europe

(Yugoslavia, Portugal, Turkey) and in the former colonies (primarily West Asia and North

Africa). If the governments of the most affected states of the period (France, Britain,

Germany) had any coherent vision, it was just short term: the "guest workers" should work for

a few years, then they should return home with their savings, and there create a better life for

themselves and their families. This model worked for only a very short time, and only in the

case of European migrant workers. The jobs requiring low levels of training have gradually

disappeared, but those who lost their positions did not return home (where employment

opportunities were even worse), but joined the crowd of unemployed on welfare (along with

their wives and children who arrived meanwhile as a result of "family unification"

programs).7

The integration of "temporary" immigrants was not an issue at first. The primary reason for

this is that the doctrines that were developed to de-legitimize negative attitudes towards the

immigrants (political correctness, tolerance, multi-culturalism) consider it desirable for the

immigrants to retain their cultural identity even if it leads to social tensions and friction. But

Europe's paternalist racism has also played a role: Arabs, Turks, Pakistanis should form

picturesque patches of color in Europe's big cities; they should operate exotic shops and good

Milano, 163 p. ISBN 88-17-86983-X, and Fallaci, Oriana (2004), La forza della ragione, Rizzoli International Publications, Inc, New York, 279 p. ISBN 88-17-00296-8.

7 Undeniably, this immigration was very advantageous for Europe, and it is also undeniable, that current demographic trends indicate the need for further immigration. But Europe does not need any more unskilled and undemanding manpower. It needs manpower that is at home in information technology, economics and the cutting edge sciences, and speaks foreign languages. This manpower is not available in the Middle East and North Africa. Nevertheless, mass immigration is continuing, because its ideological foundations (tolerance, multiculturalism, political correctness) prevent slowing down the process (and never mind halting or reversing it). Anyone, who argues for limiting immigration is, ipso facto, a racist full of hate, and can count on moral and existential sanctions (Enoch Powell London, 1968), criminal charges (Brigitte Bardot Paris, on at least five occasions between 1997 and 2008), deadly threats (Oriana Fallaci New York, from 2002 until her death), or violent retribution (Pym Fortuyn Hilversum, 2002 and Theo van Gogh Amsterdam, 2004).

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ethnic restaurants, but they should not aspire to become Dutch, Norwegian, German; they

should not expect the host society to accept them as equals and grant them citizenship rights.8

The activists of fundamentalist Islam exploited the vacuum left by the political elites and

bureaucrats of the host societies, and today they are the ones who govern Europe's mini-Asias

and mini-Africas. They control the mosques, aid organizations and charity institutions; they

edit the newspapers and internet web-sites and dominate the TV-channels.9 Their goal is not

to assist the immigrants to integrate into the host society and become its citizens quite the

contrary: they do everything to prevent the integration of immigrants, and use them as a mass

base for the creation of Islamic republics. Their message is foreign to the European ear:10 the

Muslims must identify themselves by their religion, and not by their ethnic origin, or their

homeland, and least of all by their new homeland. They must segregate themselves from the

kufr (unbeliever) majority society, must not maintain friendly relationships with unbelievers.

They must follow the prescriptions of the sharia (the divine law derived from the Koran)

instead of the lay laws of their new homelands. Their children should attend schools run by

Muslims, or if that is nor possible they must screen the government schools' curriculum in

accordance with the sharia and the values of Islam.11 In some large cities of Europe this self-

imposed segregation has become a reality not only in a political and cultural sense, but in a

physical, geographical sense also. Using tactics that straddle the margins of political activism,

crime and armed conflict violence, harassment, intimidation, intolerable behavior, unbridles

street violence forced out non-muslims and created de-facto cultural, personal, religious and

territorial autonomy.

Thus several sources (the host society, the labor market, the radical activists) send signals

encouraging segregation to young Muslims, and many prove to be receptive to the message of

fundamentalist Islam. Under the influence of friends, relatives, teachers, imams frequently

without the knowledge of their immediate family they are radicalized in a very short time

often only a matter of weeks. In the name of Islam they are prepared to fight in Iraq,

8 Bawer, Bruce (2006): While Europe Slept How Radical Islam is Destroying the West from Within, Broadway Books, New York, 262 p. ISBN 978-0-7679-2005-6, pp. 54, 56-57, 67, 164, 199, 206.

9 The generous support Saudi Arabia offers to the organizations that follow salafist doctrines have played a determining role in their success. More moderate doctrines cannot compete with the Saudi resources. Many western universities have Islamic studies departments funded by Saudi sources which inevitably contributes to the growth of fundamentalist influence.

10Feiler, Michael: "Die grösste Gefahr für die innere Sicherheit Deutschlands Islamischer Extremismus," .SIAK Journal, Vienna, 2006.4. pp. 14-22

11Bawer, Bruce: While Europe Slept, pp. 209.

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Afghanistan and Somalia or at home, in their own environment, and they are ready to carry

out the most ruthless terrorist actions and self-immolating12 bombings.13

Is every Muslim a Terrorist?

Following a series of terrorist operations, the Arab journalist Abdel Rahman al-Rashed wrote

in a desperate-sounding article, that "it is a certain fact that not all Muslims are terrorists, but

it is equally certain, and exceptionally painful, that almost all terrorists are Muslims."14 This

was a surprising statement form a Muslim journalist. It duly raised some dust, which soon

settled, only to be raised again two years later, when Dan Gillerman, Israel's ambassador to

the UN at the time, said something similar: "while it may be true - and probably is - that not

all Muslims are terrorists, it also happens to be true that nearly all terrorists are Muslim."15 It

would be easy to dismiss Gillerman as biased against enemies of Israel, but al-Rashhed is a

distinguished Arab journalist, the general manager of the al-Arabia news channel

broadcasting from Dubai, and one of the shapers of Arab public opinion.

Al-Rashed's article and Gillerman's remarks highlight a number of important questions

questions that are not politically correct, but must be asked nevertheless, and must be

answered. What is the relationship between religion and violence, especially between Islam

and terrorism? Is a violence an act defense or of aggression? Is it a tool for establishing

Islam's hegemony or that of national resistance? Does Islam allow suicidal attacks and

intentional targeting of non-combatants? Is it possible, that incidents labeled as "Islamic

terrorism" (or at least some of them) are in fact motivated by foreign occupation, nationalism,

a desire for national autonomy or independence, and the religion of the perpetrator is only

incidental? What is the true extent of the terrorists' popular support in the Muslim world?

What is its extent in the European Muslim communities? What motivates many young men

(and an increasing number of young women) to join terrorist organizations and target

12Islam forbids suicide as a result of desperation or loss of hope, just as the Christian faiths do. However, to die in battle against the unbelievers, "in the way of Allah" is not suicide (intihar), but martyrdom (istishad). Glazov, Jamie: "Suicide Bombings and Islam" FrontPageMagazine.com 2009.01.19. http://www.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=33756

13Sageman, Marc (2008): Leaderless Jihad, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 200 p. ISBN 10-0-8122- 4065-0, pp. 71-88.

14Al-Rashed, Abdel Rahman: "Innocent religion is now a message of hate" Telegraph, London, 4 Sep 2004. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/1471043/Innocent-religion-is-now-a-message-of-hate.html. The article was originally published in the pan-Arab Al-Sharq Al-Awsat paper in London.

15The remark was made on 7 March 2006. during a meeting of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) lobby-group.

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defenseless civilians with medieval barbarity? Is the expression "Islamic terrorism," so

common in Europe and the United States, justified at all?

Political violence is not a new phenomenon: political murder was practiced in biblical times,

and there were organizations that would be labeled as "terrorist." Ehud committed the first

political murder of the Judeo-Christian tradition: he concealed a short sword beneath his

clothes, gained the confidence of the Moabite king Eglon, at an opportune moment stabbed

the king to death and thereby freed the Jews from a foreign tyranny.16 Also in biblical times,

but in the New Testament period (in the middle of the 1st century AD), we can recognize the

tactics of modern terrorists in the activities of one of the Jewish organizations rebelling

against Rome. During religious and lay ceremonies the sicarii mingled in the crowds, stabbed

their victims, then again tried to mingle in the crowd to avoid detection. Most of their victims

were not the Roman occupiers, but Jewish collaborators who profited from the occupation

(members of the religious hierarchy, merchants, land owners). They took hostages to free

their captured comrades, and used violence to force the people to support their revolt.17

A thousand years later an Ismaili branch of Shi'a Islam, the assassins terrorized the Middle

East.18 They created a virtual state consisting of an archipelago of impregnable fortresses in

the threatening sea of Shi'a and Sunni Islam. Since their numbers were too small to create a

real army (however small) either for conquest or defense, so they developed an early form of

asymmetric warfare. One of its pillars, the patient, thorough and slow persuasion was the

instrument for expansion and consolidation. Its other pillar, the carefully planned selective

political murders, defended the sect's interests. Their fighters (fedayeen) disguised themselves

as merchants, pilgrims, Christian monks, or other harmless individuals, in order to get close to

their intended victim but in many cases they had already infiltrated the victim's environment

as "sleeper agents." They created the tradition of the self-sacrificing attacker, who carryies out

his mission at the cost of his own life: in order to create a greater psychological impact and

16Kings, 3:12-30 17Their name comes from the Latin word for the short dagger (sica) they concealed in their robes and used to kill

their victims. In the Italian and Latin American press and vernacular sicario means murderer, killer, hitman. 18Contemporaries called the sect "esoterics" (batini), Ismailis or Nizaris. According to the travel diaries of Marco

Polo, leaders of the sect regularly administered drugs to the members to accustom them to unquestioning obedience, hence their later (and current) name: assassins

hashisheen in its original form hashish eaters. (If the instrument of control over the members was indeed a drug, it could not have been hashish: it is not strong enough to cause sufficiently deep coma or high enough euphoria for suggestibility, and does not cause sufficiently strong and compelling dependence.) The sect still exists, its leader is the Agha Khan.

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avoid "collateral damage," they killed their victims in public, using a dagger, even if they

knew that they would be immediately captured and would die a slow and very painful death.

The assassins disappeared at the end of the 13th century, during the Mongol conquests of

Western Asia, and terrorisms disappeared with them for six centuries19 (although other forms

of political violence continued to exist). Terrorism reappeared in the second half of the 19th

century. Its first wave was the anarchists, who were followed by the national liberation

movements, then the left and right radicals,20 and finally (since the 1980's) the movements

motivated by religion.

As the motivating ideology changed, the restraint that characterized the operations of the early

movements gradually disappeared. The anarchists were serious about punishing only the

guilty they did not want to distort the propaganda of the deed with the death of innocent

civilians and other "collateral damage." Their operations were "targeted kills," and were

frequently postponed, if others beside the intended victim were put in danger. Innocent

victims gradually became acceptable (albeit "regrettable") in operations carried out in the

name of national or class interests. Terrorists motivated by religion reject the very idea that

there are innocent bystanders

in their view the large number of innocent victims is the very

essence of the propaganda of the deed.21 Religious motivation creates a perfect closed system,

because it provides reason, right and motivation to commit violent, inhumane acts; it provides

absolution for atrocities and all breaches of secular laws, customs and morals: one has to

account only to God (or the gods) for one's actions.

The most consistent and most dangerous practitioners of political violence are the adherents

of Islamic fundamentalism. The cumulative result of their mass base, their inexhaustible

financial resources, their intercontinental strike capability, their spectacularly bloody terror-

attacks, their control over entire city districts and their ability to mobilize huge crowds of

enraged demonstrators is a national security risk for some nations, and literally an existential

threat for others.

19Laqueur, Walter (1999): The New Terrorism Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction, Oxford University Press, New York, 312 p. ISBN 0-19-514064-8.

20Fascists, national socialists and communists have seldom committed terrorist acts. Although they have no objection to violence on the contrary, violence plays a central role in their blueprint for seizing and exercising power and they do not reject terrorism in principle, but they trust in collective, rather than individual terror. Laqueur, p. 22.

21In the phraseology of the apologists of terrorism, "it is a desperate cry for help by oppressed and hopeless people, who have no other way to call society's attention to their problems."

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Their goal is to introduce the sharia all over the world, and establish the hegemony of Islam.

The reject the secular nation state and its man-made laws, and consider Islam as the only true

and correct political ideology, which is suitable to create and organize a society that can gain

God's approval, since it follows His guidance. In order to realize this goal, they are willing to

use any means indiscriminately, resort to violence without hesitation, and do not recognize

any limit, rule or law that does not originate from the Koran.22

Spectacular and inhumane brutality and humiliation of the victim play a very important role in

their operations. For example the murder of hostages in Western Asia and North Africa is

consistently described by the press as "beheading." The word suggests execution by axe,

sword or machine a gruesome, but relatively quick, and above all dignified way to die.

Reality is entirely different: the fettered victim is wrestled to the ground, and his carotid

arteries, esophagus and windpipe are cut with a knife (at least three of the four), and he is bled

to death, while the executioners chant "Bismillah, Allahu akhbar! (In the name of God, God

is great!). His head is removed only after death. This may also be a quick way to die (it is over

in 10-20 seconds, if the executioner is skilled), but there is nothing dignified in it. On the

contrary, it is deliberately humiliating, because is symbolically strips away the victim's

humanity: this is the zibah-e-ikhtiyari procedure this is the way the goats and sheep are

killed to make them halal (ritually pure and suitable for consumption, according to the

sharia).23

Attacks are primarily directed against defenseless civilian targets, their goal is to cause the

greatest possible devastation among civilians, to create the bloodiest and most shocking clips

on the TV-screens of the world.24 Not even the weakest and most vulnerable members of

society are spared women, children, seriously handicapped and elderly people are

22Rajaram, N.S. "Terrorism: Eastern and Western Views" Sword of Truth internet magazine. No. 45. 1999.11.06. http://www.swordoftruth.com/swordoftruth/archives/byauthor/navaratnarajaram/teawv.html, http://www.ci-ce-ct.com/article/showquestion.asp?faq=3&fldAuto=1628; Camus, Jean-Yves "Islam in France" 10 May 2004. International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Herzliya, Israel http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/543/Default.aspx; Laqueur: The New Terrorism, pp 127-155. and Feiler: "Die Grösstre Gefahr "

23Bostom, Andrew G. "The Sacred Muslim Practice of Beheading 2004.05.13. FrontPageMagazine.com internet magazine, USA http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=13371

24Bolgár Judit, Hajdú István, Szternák György (2008): "A terrorizmus elleni harc, mint a katonai m veletek egyik formája" in A katonai m veletek háttere, megvívásuk jellemz i napjainkban, Zrinyi Miklos National Defense University, Budapest, textbook, 175 p. ISBN 978-963-7060, pp. 28-30

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considered legitimate targets. 25 When the Achille Lauro cruise ship was hijacked (7 Oct.

1985.), a wheel-chair bound pensioner (Leon Klinghofer) was executed. In Baghdad the

terrorists exploited the child-like trust and naiveté of Down-syndrome patients at least twice

(in 2005. and 2008.): they were outfitted with suicide vests, sent into the crowd and detonated.

Palestinian guerrillas store their equipment in facilities that are particularly protected by the

rules and customs of war; they routinely launch their attacks from the vicinity of schools and

hospitals, and when the Israelis launch a retaliatory strike they seek cover among women and

children. The Chechens who occupied the school in Beslan immediately executed al men on

the premises, denied all comfort to the hostages, raped 12-14 year-old girls Russian and

international sources agree, that their attitude towards their prisoners was characterized by

unrestrained barbarity and brutality.

Attacks are not postponed even if there are Muslims in the target area: Muslim victims will

automatically become martyrs, and in the afterlife they will receive rewards appropriate for

martyrdom. According to the takfiri who are extremists even among the extremists the

world has returned to a state of jahiliya (the ignorant and dark age of paganism and idolatry

before the appearance of Islam). And since everyone is takfiri (apostate), there is no obstacle

to any attack anywhere, anytime. The Muslim victims, if they do not belong to the group,

cannot be "true" Muslims.26

Islam a religion of peace, or the ideology of hegemony?

Public opinion, the press and the political elite have naturally noticed the changes in the

nature of political violence. The result has been a flood of public opinion surveys that attempt

to discover, summarize and explain the thinking of the umma (the Muslim community). So far

these surveys have pointed in two diametrically opposite directions. The vast majority of the

Muslims either condemns political violence and the targeting of civilians, or considers them

acceptable and justified, if they serve the defense of Islam and the umma. They either reject

the terrorists and do not consider them true Muslims, or regard them as the true heroes of

Islam. They either want to realize Islam's basic tenets and introduce the sharia only through a

25Terrorist organizations are non-state actors, therefore they have no "standing" in international law, cannot conclude treaties, and are not parties to international agreements limiting the instruments and behavior of belligerents. But the generally accepted customs and rules of war are much older than the Hague and Geneva Conventions: 2,500 years ago both the Greek city states and the princes of India fought among each other according to customs and laws very similar to today's customs. According to the current position of the United Nations, non-state actors have the same obligation to observe these customs and laws as do sovereign states.

26Sageman: Leaderless Jihad, p. 39.

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peaceful political process as a result of convincing propaganda and attractive example, or

want to see it happen immediately, and through violence, if that proves necessary.

The inevitable conclusion is that most such surveys are unreliable

or worse, deliberately

misleading. A public opinion survey can yield distorted or outright false results if it is not

controlled for influencing factors (phrasing, number and sequence of questions; sampling

process; size of sample; coverage of target population; characteristics of respondents and

those who refuse to participate). Deliberate manipulation of these factors (e.g. suggestive

phrasing of questions; pre-selection of respondents) can yield any desired result. Further

serious doubt is cast on the reliability of surveys when political decision classifies unexpected

or unwelcome results.27

Islamic culture and religion themselves are full of distorting factors. The doctrine of taqiya

allows and obliges the faithful not only to conceal the truth behind a veil of half-truths and

unrevealed facts, but also to resort to lies and active deception. This doctrine exists both in

Shi'a and Sunni Islam (although it gets more emphasis in the Shi'a).28 Originally it was a

doctrine for survival and defense in the face of religious persecution. It has become such a

common feature of everyday life, that most Muslims practice it without being aware of it.

Broad (virtually uniform) social acceptance of taqiya raises the question of just how reliability

does an opinion survey reflect the respondents' true views.

The most important distorting factor is disunity within Islam, perhaps since the death of the

Prophet. Within the two main branches (Shi'a and Sunni) there are many smaller branches that

interpret the basic tenets of the religion differently, often accuse each other of heresy, and

sometimes resort to violent confrontations. The institution of nation states (but especially the

division of the umma by artificial geographical boundaries) does not sit well with Islam's

doctrine of universality. Nevertheless, in addition to doctrinal divisions, the ethnic, tribal and

clan divisions are also significant. Somalia is probably the best example: ethnically and

linguistically it is practically homogenous, and nearly 100 percent Islamic, yet as a result of

the revival of tribal conflict (1988), then the growing influence of radical Islam the country

27 For example an EU study analyzing anti-Semitism led to unexpected results, and highly placed EU officials tried to archive it without publishing its results. Bergmann, Werner and Julianne Wetzel (2003): Manifestations of Anti-Semitism in the European Union, Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), and Barton, Omer: "Hitler Is Dead, Hitlerism Lives," The New Republic, Washington DC, 2004.02.02. "EU Survey Dogged by Controversy," Quintana, http://www.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-476/_nr-45/i.html

28http://www.al-Islam.org/encyclopedia/chapter6b/1.html

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has been torn into three parts and does not exist today as a functioning state. Europe's Muslim

communities reflect these divisions within Islam. Berlin and Frankfurt Turks and Berlin and

Frankfurt Lebanese (or even Hamburg Turks) may give entirely different questions to

particular questions.

Nevertheless, the world of Islam is not nearly as mosaic-like as the above would suggest: the

boundaries are not sharp at all; they are not impenetrable, and not at all rigid. The fact that

(partly as a result of generous Saudi financial support) Salafism has become the dominant

doctrine of much of the Muslim world's attests to the ideological and theological flexibility of

the Muslim communities.29

According to the Austrian Islam-specialist Alexander Schahbasi the most important factor

for Europe is not this division but the ideological and religious commitment of Muslims.

From this point of view, Europe's Muslims can be divided into seven categories: secular

considers himself a Muslim, but does not practice the daily religious rituals; liberal

practicing Muslim, but critical towards conservative doctrines, open to other faiths;

traditional-conservative practicing Muslim (Friday prayers, Ramadan fast), the foundation

of his conservatism is traditional upbringing and environment, rather than dogma; religious-

conservative strongly religious, interprets the Koran and the Sunna in a conservative (often

literal) sense; Islamist considers Islam an all-encompassing political system, which covers

all areas of public and private life; considers the caliphate the ideal state organization; radical

Islamist, who considers coercion acceptable to realize his ideology; terrorist ready to

resort to violence and terrorism, in order to realize Islamist/radical goals. The most important

question in this approach is the ratios among the categories which is very difficult to

estimate for an outsider.30

The changes in political violence have also caught the attention of scholars studying Islam.

Although their publications cover a very broad range of views based on sound scientific

analysis, they have tended to cluster around two strongly defined positions at the two ends of

29 Corn, Tony: "World War IV As Fourth-Generation Warfare," Policy Review, Washington DC, 2006.01. 30 Schahbasi, Alexander: Wahrnehmung un Eischaetzung der Radikalisierung von Muslimen in Europa," .SIAK

Journal, Vienna, 2006.1. pp. 52-60. Significantly, the Singaporean professor Kumar Ramakrishna has come to very similar conclusions in his analysis of Southeast Asia's Muslim societies: nominal Muslims, liberal Muslims, Salafist Muslims, Islamists, national jihadists, global jihadists. Neutralizing Radical Islamism in the Southeast Asia Theatre, in Anne Aldis and Graeme Herd, eds: The Ideological War on Terror: Worldwide Strategies for Counter-Terrorism, Routledge, London, 2006, pp. 128-142 http://www.comw.org/tct/fulltext/0509ramakrishna.pdf

12

the opinion-spectrum. We could call them the "moderate Islam" and "aggressive Islam"

schools of thought.

Muslim theologians and lay scholars, as well as many non-Muslim western (and eastern, for

example Indian) Islam scholars are unanimous in their opinion, that the behavior describe in

the paragraphs above are contrary to Islam's basic tenets, to the Koran, the Sunna and the

1,400 years of Islamic jurisprudence. The vast majority of the world's 1.3 billion Muslims31

believes in a moderate interpretation of Islam, does not consider the terrorists true Muslims

and condemns their methods.32 Terrorists cannot be Muslims at all; they can only exploit

Islam's tenets for self-justification and to deceive ignorant people. The very term "Islamic

terrorism" is incorrect and deceptive: it stigmatizes 1.3 billion people, stigmatizes their

culture, their faith, their history, all on the basis of the behavior of a few hundred - but at most

a few thousand - misguided, pathologically violent (very often emotionally traumatized or

mentally deranged) individuals. The root causes of terrorism are not to found in the religion of

its perpetrators, but in the political, social, economic conditions (foreign occupation, foreign

economic, political, military and cultural hegemony, exclusion, underdevelopment,

desperation, polarization between rich and poor, globalization). Once a political solution is

found for these, terrorism will automatically disappear if not, negotiations can identify the

compromises that will lead to its disappearance. Those who find a political program in Islam,

find inspiration for the program's violent implementation in Islam, find justification for the

violence and find dehumanization of the victims are better described as Islamists, rather than

Muslims. Kumar Ramakrishna summarized the difference between the two: "Islam, like all

31There are no reliable data on the world's Muslim population. The most affected 60 or 70 nations rely on fundamentally different census and statistical procedures. In some states the very concept of "personal identification" is unknown, therefore there are no identity documents. In some cases there are substantial doubts about the reliability of records and documentation for example, in Iraq this author examined numerous identity documents that had the pictures of 5-6-year old infants. In some cases the government's authority does not cover substantial areas of the state, and population data can only be estimated (e.g. Pakistan). Illegal immigrants (several million in both Europe and the United States) actively avoid being surveyed. In some states ethnicity and religion are a matter of self-declaration, in others collecting data on religious affiliation is forbidden by law. Unlike Christianity and Judaism, Islam is based on self-identification

thus, it is not always clear who should be categorized as a Muslim (e.g. Druze, Baha'i). And as every other population-group that seeks special dispensation and unique privileges, the Muslims also see strength in numbers: it is in their interest to inflate their own numbers as much as possible. As an example, during the 2001. census in Hungary 3,200 respondents claimed to be Muslims (http://www.nepszamlalas.hu/eng/volumes/26/tables/load4_1_1.html), but according to the yearbook of the National Security Office the Muslims themselves estimate their own numbers to be 15,000 (http://www.nbh.gov.hu/evk2005/05-0041.htm). The result is, that there can be anywhere between 1 and 2 billion Muslims in the world it depends on what the person using the numbers intends to prove.

32Masmoudi, Radwan: "The Silenced Majority" Journal of Democracy, Washington DC, 2003, Vol. 14, No. 2

13

great faiths, seeks to transform the individual. Islamism, like all political ideologies/Stories,

seeks the capture of state power as the prelude to transforming entire societies."33

A much smaller group of Islam-scholars (mostly non-Muslims)34 represent a diametrically

opposite view. In their opinion, Islam is a great deal more than what we call "religion" in the

west today. Yes, it is a religion a religion that seeks hegemony particularly aggressively

but in addition it is a set of regulations for state administration, political and social ideology,

legal theory and military doctrine. Therefore, the distinction between "Muslim" and "Islamist"

is deceiving: the Muslim terrorists are not Islam's aberrant outgrowths, but its pioneers; there

is no such thing as "moderate Islam," and in reality the 1.3 billion Muslims of the world do

not reject and condemn the methods of the terrorists. Social and economic inequality,

exclusion, lack of development, etc. are common phenomena all over the world, yet the most

dangerous terrorist organizations are not rooted in the poorest, most oppressed, most excluded

societies. Sociological surveys have shown that the Muslim terrorists themselves are not

subject to the alleged root causes: generally they middle-class people with a trade or

profession; many have degrees from some institution of higher learning, and they come from

ordinary, well-adjusted families.35 If we are seeking the root causes of terrorism, we must

identify those circumstances that characterize the societies that provide protection and support

to terrorist movements, and not general conditions that are common to most parts of the

world.36 The most important factor is the existence and general acceptance of a messianistic

ideology that does not admit error and seeks the cause of failure in external factors,

dehumanizes the enemy in the name of a universal truth, discounts the value of his life, allows

attacks on the weak and the defenseless, and dictates a violent response to every real or

imagined grievance or injury.

33 Ramakrishna, Kumar: "It s the Story, Stupid ..." 34"Non-Muslim" does not mean "ignorant. The names speak for themselves: Bat Ye'or, Robert Spencer, Daniel

Pipes, Bernard Lewis, Raymond Ibrahim, Ajay Sahni, Praveen Swami, Ibn Warraq, Magdi Allam, Peter Hammond.

35This is particularly true of terrorists active in the west. Sageman: Leaderless Jihad; Hudson, Rex A. (1999): The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why? Library of Congress, Washington, DC USA 186 p. www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/Soc_Psych_of_Terrorism.pdf; "Background of jihad recruits in the Netherlands," Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD), The Hauge, 10 Mar 2004. https://www.aivd.nl/actueel/andere-publicaties/andere-publicaties/background-of-jihad.

36The "root causes" theory surrenders the moral high-ground to the terrorists, because it legitimizes political violence. It implies that only violence can resolve grievances stemming from inequality, exclusion, etc, and violence is justified as long as a single unresolved grievance exists.

14

The representatives of both positions (and also those of the intermediate position not analyzed

here) find plenty of documentation to support their opinion. On can find justification and

absolution for just about anything or its opposite in the scriptures, traditions and scholarly

authorities of every religion. In this respect the Koran is no different from the Bible, the Book

of Mormon or the Hindu and Sikh holy book; Islam's jurisprudence and the works of its

scholars are no different from similar sources in other religions. The moderate Islam school

cites those verses of the Koran that forbid forced conversion and instruct the faithful to avoid

excesses and treat humanely the Jews and Christians in their power. It also cites historical

examples which show that "true Islam" is far more tolerant towards other religions than

Christianity. Its position is also supported by the large number of Muslim immigrants, who

successfully integrated into European societies. According to the aggressive Islam school the

rare episodes of Islamic tolerance in the past37 are not characteristic at all of the 1,400 history

of Islam or the Islamic world, from Morocco to the Philippines. They cite the sermons of

today's fundamentalist imams, and the "sword verses" of the Koran, which call the faithful to

fight against the unbelievers "in the way of Allah" which, according to the doctrine of

supersession, overwrite the earlier, more moderate verses. The behavior of Europe's Muslims

also support this view: in a fast growing number of ordinary western customs and generally

accepter behavior they discover harmful intent against Islam or the Muslim community, and

respond to every grievance (whether real or imagined) and unconfirmed rumor with unbridled

individual or mass violence, whose result may be a few burned out cars, or a number of dead

victims.

But whatever the holy book have to say, whatever the scholars and imams have to say, in the

final analysis it is the conviction of the faithful that determines the essence, the message

and the guidance of their religion. This is particularly true about Islam, which does not

recognize any intermediary between God and the faithful; the Sunni branch (nearly 90 percent

of the Islamic world) does not even have a clerical hierarchy. Thus, there is no definitive,

authoritative source for religious dogma and theses as the Vatican for the Roman Catholics. In

doctrinal conflict there is no authority comparable to the pope, there is no infallibility as final

37The religious tolerance of Al-Andalus is more legend than historical fact. The "golden age" of the Cordoba caliphate lasted less than 100 years, covered only a small area of Spain, and there were anti-Christian and anti-Jewish pogroms before, during and after it. The tolerance of the Ottoman Empire is also a mixed record: not only political changes in Istanbul, but often changes in the local political scene could cause fundamental change from one day to the next in the relationship of Muslims and unbelievers. Ye'or, Bat (2002): Islam and Dhimmitude Where civilizations Collide,Farleigh Dickinson University Press, Lancaster, UK, 528 p. ISBN 0-8386-3943-7 and Fernández-Morera, Darío: "The Myth of the Andalusian Paradise," The Intercollegiate Review, Wilmington, 2006, fall, pp. 23-31. http://www.mmisi.org/ir/41_02/fernandez-morera.pdf

15

arbitrator and there is no excommunication, as final disciplinary tool. Perhaps the charge of

takfir (apostasy) comes closest but for the truly radical Islamists it is not much of a

deterrent: already in the 1960's their example and inspiration, Sayyid Qutb condemned 1400

years of Islamic theology and jurisprudence as invalid, and declared that the only true

Muslims are those who follow his guidance. Everyone else, the whole world is in a state of

jahiliya38 which is but one step away from takfir.

Muslim Insurgency

The collision, comparison and evaluation of views on the relationship between religion and

political violence are important not only for reasons of science, but also for practical reasons:

they serve as the foundation of social and political decisions. But much of this is irrelevant for

the professional who is responsible for the security of state and society. It is not his office to

decide which Islam-scholar's analysis of the relationship between religion and violence is

correct. He does not evaluate the nobility or baseness of intent behind an attack. He does not

examine whether a grievance that led to violence was real or imagined. He analyses motive,

grievance, root causes only in the interest of more effective prevention, or (if prevention

failed) for quick apprehension of the perpetrators. His task is to protect the state and society

from violent, destabilizing, subversive attacks, from political violence regardless of the

perpetrator's motivation.

In this task neither the opinion surveys, not the "moderate Islam/aggressive Islam" polemics

offer reliable foothold: in spite of the many surveys and scientific analyses there is still no

answer to the question of how much real support do the fundamentalist Muslim agitators

enjoy among the faithful, and how closely do they represent the views of the Muslim

community. In this uncertainty the national security professional has one single reliable

source of information: the observable, recordable behavior of the Muslim communities. And

this leads to disturbing and politically highly incorrect conclusions.

Europe's Muslim communities gradually turn into ghettoes, and the ghettoes turn into

parts of dar al-Islam: they are forbidden zones not only for non-Muslims, but often also for

the local police and emergency services. They are bases for raids into the kufr (unbeliever)

38Qutb, Sayyid (1964): Milestones, Maktabah Booksellers And Publishers, Birmingham, 2006. pp.25,34, 93-95. http://www.scribd.com/doc/3295871/Milestones-Special-Edition-Sayyid-Qutb, Kepel, Gilles (2007): Dzsihád, Európa Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 858 p. ISBN 978-963-07-8235-7 pp. 53-65, and Eikmeier, Dale C.: "Qutbism: An Ideology of Islamic-Fascism," Parameters, 2007. spring, pp. 85-98. http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/07spring/eikmeier.pdf

16

world.39 The customs, traditions and laws of the Islamic world dominate among their walls.

The state institutions, schools, community centers, clinics, libraries (all potential stepping

stones in the path to integration into the host society) have been vandalized. The public

offices representing the power and authority of the state, and the civil servants that operated

them have been chased out, their places have been taken by alternative power centers, which

demand the loyalty and support of the ghetto's residents (and obtain it by force, if necessary).

At the same time they loudly demand the government subsidies and services.40

With the growth of Europe's Muslim population, there have been concerted efforts to extend

Islam's doctrines to the non-Muslim host population primarily the enforcement of rules

of the sharia by violence, if necessary. The process has started slowly and imperceptibly,

but it has intensified in recent years. Confusing networks of Muslim organizations, funded

generously from obscure sources, lobby, declaim, explain, demand, demonstrate and

increasingly threaten, if their demands are not met. They demand veto over the contents of

schoolbooks, and demand the teaching if Islam's tenets in schools. They expect the employers

to construct washrooms suitable for ritual washing before prayers (otherwise they spoil and

ruin the ordinary restrooms); expect them to observe Islam's rules (e.g. the prohibitions on

alcohol and pork) when they assign tasks to their Muslim employees, and expect their work to

be scheduled around the Islamic calendar and daily routine.41 The demand segregation of

genders in public education, sports, medical services, swimming pools, and demand

suppression of every western custom, tradition or behavior that may offend the Muslims'

39This phenomenon has developed to the furthest in the 700 or so "sensitive urban areas" (zones urbaines sensibles) of France, but the Muslim districts of Brussels, London, Malmö and many other large European city are not far behind. For the establishment of the French zones see Décret n° 96-1156 du 26 décembre 1996 fixant la liste des zones urbaines sensibles (http://www.admi.net/jo/AVIV9604443D.html). For their detailed maps see http://i.ville.gouv.fr/divbib/doc/chercherZUS.htm. Current information is not available: the French government has not updated the data since 2002.

40"Separate laws for Muslims' idea slammed" The Local, Stockholm, 28 Apr. 2006. http://www.thelocal.se/article.php?ID=3674&date=20060428&PHPSESSID=d268bd3504742c3d788355992e85c1ea; "Towards Greater Understanding Meeting the Needs of Muslim Pupils in State Schools" Muslim Council of Britain, 20 Feb. 2007. http://www.mcb.org.uk/downloads/Schoolinfoguidancev2.pdf; Spengler: "Europe in the house of war" Asia Times, Hong kong, 12 Feb. 2008. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Front_Page/JB12Aa02.html; Fallaci: La forza della ragione, p. 79.

41The five daily prayers do not seem to be a big deal at first (a normal workday would include maybe three of them) but they do add up to 30 to 45 minutes of down-time. The time of the dawn and sundown prayers is very precisely set (and different for every day) this makes the employment of Muslims difficult in positions that are subject to very precise scheduling (e.g. public transport) or require immediate availability (e.g. emergency services)

17

religious sensitivity or sense of morals.42 They demand unconditional respect for Islam, and

the suppression of all criticism.43 To this end they try to force host societies to limit freedoms

that were achieved in long, hard and costly struggles: there can be no secularism and equality

of genders; democracy, constitution, freedom of opinion, of thought, of scientific inquiry can

extend only as far as the sharia allows. In the United Kingdom sharia courts decide those

civil cases within the Muslim community that are brought to them voluntarily by the

litigants.44 No telling when they demand equal status to Crown courts, when they will demand

the exclusive right to decide criminal cases involving Muslims, and when they will decide the

first case involving non-Muslims.

From Nigeria to the Philippines Muslims initiate the religiously motivated raids, riots

and pogroms against non-Muslims and against takfiri Muslims. There are some

exceptions (for example the Gujarat riots in India in 2002.), but it is hardly disputable that the

primary source of political violence is the umma. Its most common motivations are "righteous

outrage" over some real or imagined insult to Islam (Mohamed cartoons, a teddy bear named

Mohamed,45 a Koran that is allegedly torn, trampled, or treated with disrespect in some other

manner), or the intention to defend the umma from some harmful influence (e.g. Christian

missionaries on the streets of Birmingham46). The result may be a few burnt out cars and

smashed shop windows or it may be several hundred corpses.

In the martyr-videos the terrorists identify themselves as militant, true Muslims, soldiers

of the jihad and hopeful future martyrs; the primary motivating factor for their actions is a

desire to protect Islam and the umma. The investigation of terror-attacks nearly always

discover the religious background, which can be a clandestine prayer room operating in a

42"Fatwa for 'gay Jesus' writer" BBC News, London, 29 Oct. 1999. 29. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/493436.stm; Gammell, Caroline: "Muslims call for 'no-go' CoE bishop to resign" Daily Telegraph, London, 7 Jan. 2008. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2008/01/07/nmuslim107.xml

43The Dutch film director Theo van Gogh was murdered. Ettore Capriolo and William Nygaard (the Italian and Norwegian translators of Salman Rushdie) were seriously injured. Salman Rushdie, Robert Radeker, Fleming Rose, Ayan Hirsi Ali, Geert Wilders, Magdi Allam and many other public figures require constant protection, because they excited the anger of the Muslims.

44Hogg, Clare Dwyer and Wynne-Jones, Jonathan: "We want to offer sharia law to Britain" The Telegraph, London, 19 Jan. 2008. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml;jsessionid=IE2H35B2OOCFBQFIQMGCFGGAVCBQUIV0?xml=/news/2008/01/20/nsharia_120.xml&page=2

45"Mohamed teddy bear teacher, Gillian Gibbons, is spared lash but gets 15 days in jail," The Times, London, 30 Nov. 2007. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/article2971369.ece

46Webb, Al: "Missionaries accused of 'hate crime' in Muslim neighborhood," The Pew Forum, Washington DC, USA, 2 Jun. 2008. http://pewforum.org/news/display.php?NewsID=15747

18

basement or garage, with an unqualified imam but quite often it is something far more

substantial. For example the Finsbury Park Mosque47 is one of the largest mosques in London,

and an exceptionally important center of local religious life. Yet its basement served as

classroom for weapons familiarization training; many prominent terrorists (Richard Reid,

Zacharias Moussaoui, Kamel Rabat Bouralha, Yacine Benalia) attended its services, and

dozens of volunteers made their way to training camps in Afghanistan with the mosque's

assistance.

The assertion that terrorists "acting in the name of Islam" or "referring to Islam" represent an

infinitesimally small fraction a few thousandths, but at most one or two percent of the

Islamic world is incorrect. The terrorists themselves may be small in number, but they are

not lone wolves: there is a huge international support network behind them, without

which they would be unable to function. The network provides information, documents,

funds, safe houses, connections, training, weapons and equipment, doctrine, ideological,

tactical and operational guidance. And the terrorists are the elite commandos of political

violence but political violence is effective only if it covers a wider spectrum than just bombs

and assassinations. In addition to the elite troops, plenty of foot-soldiers are required:

"spontaneous" street riots over a torn Koran, smashing a liquor store, slapping around Jewish

high-school students in Paris require numbers, rather than high standards of training or death-

defying resolution and the record shows, that the numbers are available.

The "infinitesimally small fraction a few thousandths, but at most one or two percent"

estimate has so far not been defined with any accuracy. The numbers range from one

thousandth48 to 10-15 percent.49 The difference between the low and high estimate is three

orders of magnitude

we are looking at guesswork, not at estimate. The 28 Islamist

organizations in Germany have about 32,000 members. This is about one percent of all

Muslims living in Germany but from this single datum we cannot conclude, that Islamism is

an isolated phenomenon among Germany's Muslims. Family ties are usually very important

for Muslims, so it is reasonable to take them into consideration in this instance also.50 But we

should also know how readily do Germany's 3.2 million Muslims join other, non-Islamist and

47In 2005. the mosques was renamend North London Central Mosque. 48 Kis-Benedek, József: "A nemzetközi terrorizmus jelenlegi tendenciái Európában," Felderít Szemle, Vol. 5.

Special Issue, Jan 2006. pp. 12.. 49 Daniel Pipes, Global Sunday, Global TV (Canada) 28 Sep. 2003. http://www.danielpipes.org/article/1270. 50 Feiler: "Die Grösstre Gefahr "

19

non-Muslim organizations. And we should know the demography of the members of the

Islamist organizations their age, gender, education, economic situation, because these are

the most important factors determining a person's influence within the family. And we should

carry out this analysis for every European state, because the picture thus formed about

Germany's Muslims (mostly Turks) does not tell us much about France's (mostly Algerian),

Spain's (mostly Moroccan) or the UK's (mostly Pakistani and Bangladeshi) Muslim

communities.

Even if the apostles of political violence "acting in the name of Islam" or "referring to Islam"

represent an infinitesimally small fraction of the Islamic world, we must not ignore the

historical record of the success of small, well organized, well financed movements that are

informed by a combination of a messianistic ideology and a cult of violence. Through a

skillful combination of moral pressure and focused violence a radical movement can

overcome and absorb its numerical superior, but less cohesive and less combative opponents.

The formula is simple, effective and foolproof.51

As a first step, active opponents must be destroyed and neutral bystanders must be silenced.

This creates the impression that the movement has neither opposition, nor alternative. This

lends it tremendous strength, because the moderates are isolated and the press especially the

foreign press, which is usually ignorant of the local situation

casts the movement as the

choice of the people. Next the bystanders and passive opponents are terrorized into

cooperation. Finally passive, silent and reluctant cooperation is no enough: voluntary and

wholehearted support and passionate enthusiasm for the cause are the conditions for the price

of their security and survival. In the end the movement appears to have only loyal followers

and active supporters, and nobody dares raise his voice against it.52 In the Muslim societies

and especially in the Muslim communities of Europe this intimidating and radicalizing

process seems to have already been completed: the adherents of moderate Islam do not

raise their voice; they do not try to restrain or oppose the Islamists.

The violent incidents spectacularly bloody terrorist attacks against the civilians, unbridled

street riots (French intifada, 2005), violent anti-Semitism (attacks on synagogues and other

51 Just, Bob: "Silencing Muslim moderates," World Net Daily, 25 Sep. 2001 52Europe especially Central Europe has experienced this process several times: black, brown and red

socialism triumphed through these methods in the 20th century. Tolerance, multiculturalism and political correctness became the dominant ideologies through these methods (although with far less violence). Today the partisans of global warming/sustainable development/global governance use these methods.

20

Jewish institutions, beating up isolated Jews when the opportunity presents itself) on the

streets of French, German, Belgian, UK cities, the epidemic of robbery and rape in

Scandinavia, the zones of dar al-Islam around the metropolises of Europe (forbidden zones

for unbelievers) serve one purpose: to intimidate non-Muslims. More or less legal political

activities parallel the intimidation campaign: lobbying, litigation, demand for special legal

status but also demonstrative charity, and support for public figures that can be bought or

persuaded. All these "good cop/bad cop" activities point in one direction: Muslims are not

subject to the laws of unbelievers, they are obliged to obey only the sharia; their rights and

interests are superior to those of the unbelievers, and they can exercise them any time, using

any means. If the unbelievers do not want to adjust to these facts, sooner or later they will be

crushed by the triumphal march of Islam. What we are seeing is actually a Europe-wide

Muslim insurgency, whose mass base, recruiting area and logistical support is a significant

part of the European umma.53

What is to be Done?

According to Gijs de Vries, the first anti-terrorist coordinator of the European Union, what we

are seeing in the western world is a peripherical effect of an ideological struggle within Islam,

rather than a Muslim offensive against the west:

"Within the past few years there has been a huge conflict within the world of Islam about

the interpretation of Islam, with a number of radicals trying to hijack Islam for terrorist

purposes, trying to give themselves the right to decide who is a true believer and who is an

53According to United States joint doctrine, an insurgency is an "organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict." (JP 1-02, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 2009. US Government Printing Office, Washington DC. 780 p.) British doctrine offers a more detailed definition: "Insurgency is ... the actions of a minority group who are intent on forcing political change by means of a mixture of subversion, propaganda and military pressure, aiming to persuade or intimidate the broad mass of people (normally within a state) to accept such a change. It is an organized armed political struggle, the goals of which may be many and diverse." (Army Code 71749

Counter Insurgency Operations (Strategic and Operational Guidelines), 2007. Army Field Manual, Volume 1 Combined Arms Operations, HM Printing Office, London 216 p). Recent experience suggests, that modern insurgency

especially in the Middle East can no longer be describes a very "organized." Autonomous groups and leaderless, self-organizing decentralized networks compete fro resources, recruits and mass support, but occasionally form temporary alliances against the common enemy (the state), in order to achieve very fuzzily determined common goals. And there are an increasing number of insurgent organizations, whose goal is not to take over the state, only to weaken it, reduce its effectiveness and create alternative power centers. These organizations (or more correctly, networks) see the shadow of a weak, but still somewhat functional state structure as the best opportunity to advance their interests or realize their ideological goals. Kiss, Álmos Péter: "Generációk a hadviselésben a negyedik generáció" Hadtudományi Szemle, Budapest 2009-2. and North, Chris: "Redefining Insurgency" Military Review, Leaveworth, KS, USA, Jan-Feb. 2008. pp. 117-118 http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JanFeb08/NorthINSIGHTSJanFeb08.pdf

21

apostate. The majority of the world s Muslims reject that: they do not believe that

terrorism is a legitimate strategy or that Islam is incompatible with democracy. There

are different traditions within Islam. Islam is not a monolith. It is a pluriform religious

community just as much as Christianity and Judaism. The key to tackling Islamist

fundamentalism and terrorism from the Islamist community is in the hands of moderate

Muslims."54

De Vries may be mistaken, or he may be correct concerning the civil war within Islam (in any

case, a number of distinguished scholars share his opinion: Boaz Ganor, Gilles Kepel55 and

Reza Aslan56). But we must agree with him on one thing: the key to the resolution of Islam's

internal problems is in the hand of the Muslims themselves. Europe's non-Muslim politicians,

social scientists, civil servants and security professionals can speculate, analyze, conclude and

explain but they will not be able to solve the internal problems of the Islamic world.57

If they try, they will only pour oil onto the fire, because one of the key drivers of radical Islam

is the feeling of being threatened; its constantly repeated narrative is the war of the Crusader-

Jewish alliance against Islam, and the intention of the unbelievers to destroy Islam and the

Muslims. A most convincing proof of this narrative would be interference in the affairs of the

umma by non-Muslim politicians, bureaucrats, police officers, university professors. They

could cause incalculable damage if they started to determine who is a "true Muslim" and who

is not, and on that basis grant or withhold visas, decide who may and who may not serve as

imam to a community, instruct the community whose donations it may accept and whose must

it reject, where it may send its charity and where it may not.

At the same time, there is no sign that moderate Muslims are willing (or able) to do anything

in order to rein in fundamentalist Islam. It is probably true, that the overwhelming majority of

the 15 to 25 million Muslims in the European Union prefer the moderate branches of Islam. It

is indisputable that there is a western Muslim business, political and intellectual elite, which is

54"Gijs de Vries on terrorism, Islam and democracy" EurActiv internet news site, 4 Mar. 2005. http://www.euractiv.com/en/justice/gijs-vries-terrorism-Islam-democracy/article-136245

55Hoebink, Michel: "The civil war at the heart of Islam," Radio Nederland Wereldomroep, Hilversum, 26 May 2005. http://static.rnw.nl/migratie/www.radionetherlands.nl/currentaffairs/region/internationalorganisations/isl050926-redirected

56Grimes, William: "The Jihad Is a Civil War, the West Only a Bystander," The New York Times, NY, 4 May 2005. http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/04/books/04grim.html?_r=1

57The internal problems of the Christian churches or Judaism are also not solved by bureaucrats, politicians, lawyers and police officers, but by the community of the faithful and the clerical hierarchy.

22

just as active as the non-Muslim business, public figures and intellectuals: they are present in

the economy, in public administration, in international, national and local political life; they

give interviews, publish books and articles, teach in institutions of higher learning.

Theoretically they are ideally placed to influence the opinion of the moderate majority, but in

reality their voice finds no echo in the Muslim communities.

Obviously, many Muslims are afraid of retributions and passively accept the increasing

influence of the radicals. Others follow Islam's solidarity doctrine and will not side with non-

Muslims against Muslims, even if the latter are on the wrong path. Whatever the reason, there

is always an excuse, an explanation, a righteous motive for the latest violent incident. There

are no fatwas against terrorists. There are no Muslim demonstrations against political violence

committed "in the name of Islam."58 The Muslim communities deny that Islam, the umma, or

individual members of the community have anything to do with the problem. They refuse all

cooperation with the authorities,59 and they are more likely to reject and exclude the moderate

Muslims who advocate reform, than the violent extremists.60 They shelter the men who try to

destroy the freedoms, values and stability of the host societies, provide them with information

to prepare their operations, and perhaps most important keep silent.

This raises an important question that the majority of Europe's intellectual and political elites

would rather ignore, while a smaller but steadily growing minority sees as political

capital: how should the majority society handle minorities (Muslims or not) which refuse to

integrate? In the case of the Muslims we can identify three benchmarks:61

Open hostility. Consistently suppress every attempt to gain special status for Muslims or

to increase Islam's influence in the slightest measure. Hindus resisted the Muslim

conquest for centuries; they sustained huge losses in men, treasure and territory, but their

58 Bawer, Bruce: While Europe Slept, pp. 179-180, 197-200 59Emerson, Steven: "Threatened by the Jihad," FrontPageMagazine.com, 14 Mar 2007.

http://www.steveemerson.com/4282/threatened-by-the-jihad; "Call to Muslims over police help," BBC, London, 2006.06.07. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/5054600.stm; "German authorities report lack of Muslim cooperation in antiterrorism fight," Trading Markets.com, 2007.09.15. http://www.hvk.org/articles/0907/68.html; Amon, Michael: "Peter King standing by Muslim comments," Newsday, New York, 2009.04.19. http://peteking.com/PeterKingstandingbyMuslimcomments/tabid/80/Default.aspx.

60Tibi, Bassam (1999): Keresztes háború és dzsihád Az iszlám és a keresztény világ, Corvina, Budapest, 268 p. ISBN 963-13-5238-2, pp. 160-162.

61Srinivasan, Rajeev: "How to avoid future 9/11s & Beslans" rediff.com, Mumbai, India, 2004.09. 30. http://www.rediff.com/news/2004/sep/30rajeev.htm

23

efforts saved India from the fate of Byzantium, Egypt or Persia, whose ancient cultures

have been confined to museums since they came under Islam's influence. In earlier

centuries Europe beat back Islam's assaults in a series of Crusades: in 732 the "first jihad"

was stopped at Tours; in 1683 the "second jihad" was stopped under the walls of Vienna,

and the Ottoman Empire was forced back into the Balkan Peninsula. The Russians have

chosen this route. As a result the Russian state and Russian society are subject to massive

attacks by Muslims.

Satisfy every Muslim demand, from religious education, through swimming pools

segregated by gender, to special legal status. The initial Muslim response to this dhimmi62

behavior is understanding and tolerant cooperation. But as the number of Muslims grows,

cooperation is gradually replaced by restrictions, violent intolerance and forced

conversions. We can see the result is stagnating Maronite, Copt, Assyrian, Druze,

Zoroastrian, Animist and Buddhist communities of Muslim-majority states. Jawaharlal

Nehru chose this route, and today the Indian state and Indian society are subject to

massive attacks. The United Kingdom has also chosen this route, and today the state and

society are subject to massive attacks by Muslims.63

Ignore the internal problems of the western Muslim communities, as well as the problems

that arise from tensions and friction between Muslims and the host society. France (and

much of Europe) has chosen this route. The result of some decades of well-intentioned

multiculturalism is that the Muslims live in ghettoes, where even the police are reluctant

62Dhimma in Arabic means contract, agreement, which a Muslim conqueror would conclude with the Christian and Jewish populations of the occupied lands. In return for accepting some restrictions and paying a poll-tax (jizya) he offered them protection and the right to practice their religion and live according to their own rules and customs.

63The British success in the integration of Muslims has proven to be an illusion, which the bombing attacks on London's transport system (7 Jul. 2005.) and the failed attempts two weeks later have begun to dispel. (Vidino, Lorenzo (2006): Al Qaeda in Europe The New Battleground of International Jihad, Prometheus Books, Amherst, 403 p. ISBN 1-59102-433-1 and Gallis, Paul; Kristin Archick, Francis Miko, Steven Woehrel: "Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries," Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC 47 p.2005.11. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33166.pdf).

Since then many events have shown that the British model has (also) failed. Only a few randomly selected examples: Bradford city council has cancelled the Saint George Day parade, because it was afraid that the sensibilities of local Muslims would be offended by the sight of the many crosses, and they would disrupt the event by violence. (21 Apr. 2008.) Lord Nazir Ahmed forced the British government to deport Geert Wilders, who had been invited by the House of Lords. (10 Feb 2009.) According to surveys the isolation of Muslims from the host society is increasing (Snow, Jon: "Muslim integration has come to a halt," The Sunday Times, London, 6 Aug. 2006. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/article601094.ece), and MacEoin, Denis and Dominic Whiteman (2009): Music, Chess and other Sins: Segregation, Integration, and Muslim Schools in Britain, Civitas: Institute for the Study of Civil Society, London, 154 p. ISBN 978-1-906837-06-8).

24

to enter. They have been radicalized, view the state and the non-Muslim citizens as

enemies, and prey on young non-Muslim women. They enjoy the services of the welfare

state, yet feel victimized by it. The host nations and host societies are subject to massive

attacks by Muslims.

So all three models have been failures to a certain extent, but the historical record shows that

open hostility has the best chance of success. The other two alternatives have not worked in

the long run but often not even in the short run.

But complex social phenomena seldom exist in the pristine form suggested by the above

threefold division. Usually a state of equilibrium somewhere within the triangle staked out by

the above benchmarks characterizes the co-habitation of Muslims and non-Muslims. Conflicts

arise only when the equilibrium is disturbed. So, there is at least the possibility for Muslims

and non-Muslims to live in an undivided society. The question is whether the equilibrium

point could be found without significant changes in the host society's values, freedoms,

traditions, way of life and social achievements and whether it can be maintained for a long

time, in spite of demographic changes.

For the peaceful coexistence of the non-Muslim majority and the Muslim minority obviously

requires some tolerance and some behavioral changes in the host society64 - but even greater

behavioral changes are requires from the Muslims. A modern, democratic western society

obviously cannot tolerate religious, ethnic (or any other) discrimination against a minority.

But neither can it tolerate special status and privileges reserved for the minority based on

religion, ethnicity (or for any other reason). And it cannot tolerate discrimination within the

minority, even if its members accept them voluntarily, as part of their cultural heritage. It

cannot tolerate segregation of the minority but neither can it tolerate self-imposed

segregation. It cannot accept cultural heritage and traditions as mitigating circumstances in

murder, rapes, family violence or female genital mutilation. And it cannot tolerate because it

is contrary to the very foundation of the modern sovereign state the creation of states within

the state, which obey only their own laws and set conditions for their loyalty.

64This requirement immediately raises some questions that are far from trivial. To start with, which branch of Islam should the host society adjust to? What should be the basis of this decision? The number of the faithful? The similarities between the cultures of the host society and the selected branch? What is to be done if the branches left out violently demand that the host society should adjust to them also?

25

Long-term coexistence is possible only if the Muslims integrate into western culture and

modify their doctrines in accordance with its laws, values and traditions, and do not expect

western culture to adjust to Islam's laws and values. If Islam withdraws from the state and

politics. If the Muslims practice their religion within the mosque, but do not try to force its

tenets on the host society. If they accept that no religions has supremacy over the others. If

they reject the fanatics and reject violence committed in the name of religion; if their

communities expel the terrorists from themselves.65 If the Muslims accept and respect the

values, traditions, laws, rights and freedoms of the host society, even if they disagree with

them. If the accept without complaint, that some elements of western culture (alcohol- and

pork-consumption, dogs everywhere, uncovers breasts on the beach) clash with the Muslims'

morals and the rules of Islam.

For this to work, Islam's modernization or "Europeanization" is essential. There is a need for

an Islamic renaissance, an Islamic enlightenment.66 For over 100 years there have been many

attempts at such modernization from Abdülhamid sultan, through Nasser, to Pahlavi and all

of them have ended in failure. And the increasing popularity (or at least acceptance) of

radical, Salafist Islam indicates, that the vast majority of Muslims does not want any changes

in their religion, does not want to adjust to the challenges of a changing world. This rigid

rejection is particularly regrettable, because it may lead to unpredictable consequences for

Europe's Muslim communities.

There is an increasingly common view throughout Europe, that the European nations have

accepted immigrants (Muslims and non-Muslims alike) in large numbers from Africa, Asia

and the Caribbean, gave them opportunities to seek a better life, and (in spite of the mistakes

and failures) made significant sacrifices to ensure their welfare. The response of the

immigrants (particularly that of the Muslims) has been contemptuous isolation, violence and

never-ending demands for special status and privileges. Also, throughout Europe there have

always existed intolerant attitudes towards immigrants (especially non-European ones):

"Hungary belongs to the Hungarians," "British jobs for British workers," "Ausländer raus,"

"you don't have to live here if you don't like the rules of the game, pack up and go home."

These views have coalesced into a body of opinion that the source of all Europe's ills, from

public security problems, through social tensions and unemployment, to the welfare system

65Bolgár Judit et al.: "A terrorizmus elleni harc " pp. 36-40 66Tibi, Bassam (1999): Keresztes háború és dzsihád Az iszlám és a keresztény világ, Corvina, Budapest, 268 p.

ISBN 963-13-5238-2, pp. 203-205.

26

that has been bleeding from multiple wounds, is the presence of Muslims. According to this

body of opinions the solution in is not slowing down or halting the immigration of Muslims,

but their wholesale expulsion.67

So far this program has found supporters only among xenophobic fringe groups, but their

number is increasing, their representatives already quite influential in national parliaments

have also won seats in the UE parliament. For the time being the program is not generally

acceptable, and it faces significant political and moral hurdles but there are no technical or

organizational obstacles to its implementation. Because Gijs de Vries may be correct when he

says that only the Muslims can solve Islam's internal problems. But he is certainly wrong,

when he says that the moderate Muslims are indispensable to solving Europe's problems that

stem from the behavior of Muslim radicals. Europe's security forces are effective and

powerful; they do not have to worry about external threats; their numbers, equipment and

training is sufficient to "clean house" in a short time, even without the cooperation of

moderate (or any other) Muslims.

If the European nations adopt this solution, that would destroy not only Europe's Muslim

communities. The required methods and procedures (mass-mobilization propaganda;

recording, separating, detaining, deporting parts of the population based on ethnicity and

religious affiliation; police-state methods to identify and punish the disobedient and the non-

cooperative) would signal a return to totalitarianism and the abandonment of some of the most

important values and achievements of European culture.

67 Such a "Final Solution" is not a new phenomenon at all: expelling or destroying the troublesome part of the population has a very long tradition in Europe, from expulsion of the Jews in the Middle Ages to Hitler's "Endlösung" to population exchanges in Eastern Europe following World War II.

27

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"Towards Greater Understanding

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