Intra-institutional politics and inter-institutional relations in the EU: towards coherent...

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Intra-institutional politics and inter-institutional relations in the EU:towards coherent governance?Thomas Christiansen

To cite this Article Christiansen, Thomas(2001) 'Intra-institutional politics and inter-institutional relations in the EU:towards coherent governance?', Journal of European Public Policy, 8: 5, 747 — 769To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/13501760110083491URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501760110083491

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Intra-institutional politics andinter-institutional relations in theEU: towards coherent governance?Thomas Christiansen

ABSTRACT While the coherence of EU governance – or the lack of it – can bestudied in a number of different arenas, this article focuses on the EU level ratherthan on relations between EU institutions and the member states. An examinationof the evolution of, � rst, the internal politics of Commission and Council Secretariatand, second, of relations between these two institutions across a range of areas ofEU governance leads to the identi� cation of an apparent paradox: while intra-institutional politics are becoming increasingly fragmented, the relative coherenceof inter-institutional relations in the EU is improving. The article offers a tentativeexplanation based on the expansion of EU institutions, the growing interconnected-ness of EU policy processes and the strengthening of a ‘supra-institutional ’ allegianceamong EU of� cials. The increasing complexity of European governance means thatpolicy-makers’ knowledge of, and identi� cation with, more speci� c policy environ-ments – and thus the management of inter-institutional relations – is becomingrelatively more important than their institutional identi� cation.

KEY WORDS Coherence of governance; Commission; Council of Ministers;external relations; inter-institutional relations; internal co-ordination; treaty reform.

INTRODUCTION

As part of the ‘post-Nice process’, a variety of issues relating to the institutionaland constitutional evolution of the European Union (EU) now receive greaterattention. One of these is the question of coherence in European governance.‘Coherent governance’, however, is not a very well-de� ned concept, anddifferent interpretations are possible. Brie� y mapping the � eld, a number ofdistinctions may be offered here: � rst, we can conceive of ‘coherence’ in termsof the systemic outputs, i.e. the way in which the substance of different policiesgenerated by the EU forms part of a coherent whole. Alternatively, we canregard ‘coherence’ in terms of the institutional process by which policies aremade, i.e. in terms of the degree to which institution(s) operate a coherent andwell-coordinated process of deliberation and decision-making. This articlefocuses on the latter which in the following is termed ‘institutional coherence’.

Journal of European Public PolicyISSN 1350–1763 print/ISSN 1466-4429 online © 2001 Taylor & Francis Ltd

http://www.tandf.co.uk/journalsDOI: 10.1080/13501760110083491

Journal of European Public Policy 8:5 October 2001: 747–769

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A further distinction can be made in terms of the pursuit of inter-level,inter-institutional and intra-institutional coherence. In other words, the issueof coherence can be examined along these three dimensions: � rst, at the inter-institutional level, in particular in terms of the coherence (or lack of coherence)of Commission and Council Secretariat activities. Second, in terms of therelations between actors on different levels, in particular with regard to thecongruity (or otherwise) of national policies and of EU policies. Finally, afurther issue of coherence arises in terms of the internal, or intra-institutional,coherence of either of these institutions, given the possibility of internalfragmentation (see Figure 1).

This article concentrates on the operation of the European Commission andthe General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers1 along two of the dimen-sions mentioned above – the relations between the two institutions as well asthe issue of the internal politics of the EU institutions.

In recent years, the EU has faced contradictory demands concerning itsinter-institutional relations. On the one hand, there is concern about the‘coherence’ or ‘consistency’ of policy-making across the various levels andpillars of European governance. On the other hand, there are demands forgreater clarity about the allocation of competence and the separation of powersin the EU. Given the frequency of treaty reform since the early 1990s – sincewhen the EU has been involved in either the preparation, negotiation orrati� cation of a treaty change at any one point – the tensions between thesecon� icting demands have gradually increased. In the course of the currentdebate about the ‘future of Europe’, meant to prepare the ground for the nextIntergovernmental Conference (IGC) in 2004, the arguments for inter-institutional coherence, on the one hand, and the allocation of tasks in linewith the principle of separation of powers, on the other, are meeting head on.

The issue of coherence has become particularly pertinent as the Secretariatof the Council of Ministers has acquired substantial executive functions in thearea of EU foreign and security policy (CFSP) and, to a lesser extent, inthe area of police and justice affairs. The emergence of an executive role of

Dimension Focus

Inter-level coherenceRelationships between EU-levelinstitutions and national authorities

Inter-institutional coherence Relations among EU institutions

Intra-institutional coherence Internal politics of EU institutions

Figure 1 Dimensions of ‘institutional coherence’ in European governance

748 Journal of European Public Policy


the Council Secretariat means that the potential for fragmentation across EUinstitutions has increased, given the European Commission’s responsibilities formanaging the Union’s external relations and aspects of internal security (Smith1994). In addition, there is increasing demand for greater co-operationbetween, and co-ordination of, the foreign policies of the member states andthe management of the EU’s external relations by Commission and CouncilSecretariat.

On the other side, among those looking for a clearer separation of powers(rather than institutional coherence), a similar, two-dimensional distinction ispossible (as indicated in Figure 2): on the one hand, there is the issue of theallocation of competences between the national and the European level – thequestion of Kompetenzabgrenzung between member states and the EU which,mainly because of German demands, constitutes one of the items on theagenda of the 2004 IGC (and therefore of the debate leading up to it). On theother hand, there is the issue of allocating tasks more clearly to the Europeaninstitutions, in particular to the Commission and the Council Secretariat.Should this allocation of tasks be governed by the constitutional principle ofthe separation of powers, as demanded by some (Sozialdemokratische ParteiDeutschlands 2001; see also Lenaerts 1991), the Commission would movefurther into the role of the EU executive – even turning into the ‘Europeangovernment’ as envisaged by its supporters (Prodi 2001). The Council ofMinisters and its Secretariat, on the other hand, would share the legislativefunction with the European Parliament (EP) – becoming more explicitly theEU legislature’s second chamber – while ceasing to share the executive functionwith the Commission, as is the case now.

In the following, we will � rst examine the recent evolution in the internalpolitics of two of the EU’s main institutions, identifying instances of internalfragmentation and institutional coherence in the European Commission andthe Council Secretariat. Subsequently, the focus will shift to the managementof inter-institutional relations, with particular emphasis on the relationsbetween Commission and Council Secretariat across a number of areas with

Coherence of Europeangovernance

Separation of powers inEuropean governance

Inter-levelrelations

Close co-operation betweennational authorities and EUinstitutions

Inter-institutionalrelations

Close co-operation betweenCommission and CouncilSecretariat

Clear delineation between thecompetences of the nationaland the EU level

Clear delineation of tasksbetween Commission andCouncil Secretariat

Figure 2 ‘Coherence’ and ‘separation of powers’ in the EU’s constitutional debate

T. Christiansen: Towards coherent governance? 749


shared responsibilities. Such a partial study of the incidence of coherence(or otherwise) in European governance, looking in turn at the internal politicsand the inter-institutional relations of the EU institutions, does not constitutea comprehensive analysis of coherence in the Euro-polity. However, it doesprovide the basis for some tentative explanations concerning the presence orabsence of coherence in European governance, which are discussed in theconcluding section.

INTERNAL POLITICS OF THE EU INSTITUTIONS:TOWARDS INTRA-INSTITUTIONAL COHERENCE?

Commission, Council and Parliament are frequently regarded as unitary actors.However, all three institutions – and indeed other important EU institutionssuch as the European Court of Justice or the European Central Bank – facenumerous internal divisions. Depending on their seriousness, such divisionsmay translate into fragmented policy-making and thus undermine the coher-ence of EU governance.

In examining the internal fragmentation of EU institutions, a distinctioncan be drawn between generic issues applying to all EU institutions and thosewhich are speci� c to individual institutions. Looking � rst at the more genericissues, two particular challenges to intra-institutional coherence can beidenti� ed.

First, all EU institutions have over the past decade been faced withsubstantial growth, and – in terms of achieving institutional coherence – sizematters. More signi� cantly, institutional growth has been rapid and diverse.The last enlargement has brought in three new member states, with theresultant expansion of staff numbers, budgetary revenues and disbursements,and area coverage of EU policies. It has also brought in two additional of� ciallanguages, implying an exponential rise in the number of language pairs fortranslation. Growth has also been a result of the expansion of competencesacquired by the EU, resulting in the need for expertise in entirely new areasof activity such as military co-operation or justice and home affairs.

Second, partially as a result of these trends of institutional growth andpolicy expansion, the specialization of individual policy-makers has increased.The relevance of policy networks and policy communities in the EU is widelyrecognized. Policy networks, policy communities and policy coalitions implyclose links and even shared values among policy-makers from different institu-tional backgrounds with a common concern for a speci� c policy. From aninstitutional point of view, the presence of effective policy networks may, onoccasion, advance a particular institution’s aims, but in the long run is boundto be detrimental to institutional coherence. As policy-making becomes morespecialized – as it has in the EU during the 1990s – a growing number of suchnetworks makes it more dif� cult for individual institutions to manage internalco-ordination and achieve coherence.



Internal tension in the European Commission

The problem of tensions within the European Commission is not a recentphenomenon. Indeed, the very nature of the Commission – a single institutionencompassing large and relatively self-contained Directorates-General (DGs) –is a recipe for fragmentation and internal tension. Owing to the internaldivisions running through it, authors have for some time regarded it as a‘multi-organization’ in which the policy-making of different administrativeunits creates different bureaucratic and organizational logics (Cram 1994).

Beyond these sectoral or ‘horizontal’ divisions within the Commission,there has also been a ‘vertical’ divide between the Commission’s political level– the College of Commissioners – and the administrative services (Christiansen1997). Organizational logics are distinct with respect to either of these levels.The College of Commissioners operates on the basis of non-hierarchicalprinciples: despite the presence of the President and two Vice-Presidents,Commissioners have equal votes in the College, Commission decisions are, ifnecessary, voted upon, and require a simple majority of Commissioners. Oncethe College has taken a decision, all members of the Commission are boundby it, and are expected to support a common position, irrespective of theirindividual vote. The Commission President, notwithstanding recent changes tohis (or her) position (see below), is a primus inter pares who is also bound bythese rules. The Commission’s administrative services in the DGs, on the otherhand, are organized in a hierarchical manner, along the lines of publicadministration in domestic systems.

Against this background, the Commission – arguably more than any otherEU institution – has had to face the consequences of the above-mentionedtrends of institutional growth, policy expansion and policy complexity in theEU. The growing size of, and greater specialization within, the Commissionhave ampli� ed the internal divisions, and both the fall of the Santer Com-mission and the � rst years of the Prodi Commission have demonstrated theweakness of internal cohesion.

The crisis preceding the forced resignation of the Santer Commission arosefrom allegations of mismanagement and fraud which were investigated by aCommittee of Independent Experts appointed by the EP. In its � rst report, theCommittee identi� ed the lack of communication between the Commission’spolitical and administrative levels as a key problem:

9.3.4. The Committee found that the relationship between Commissionersand directors-general did not always meet this standard. The separationbetween the political responsibility of Commissioners (for policy decisions)and the administrative responsibility of the director-general and the services(for the implementation of policy) should not be stretched too far. As statedabove, it is the opinion of the Committee that Commissioners mustcontinuously seek to be informed about the acts and omissions of thedirectorates-general for which they bear responsibility and that directors-general must keep their Commissioners informed of all major decisions they



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take or become aware of. This requirement of mutual information impliesthat Commissioners must be held to know what is going on in theirservices, at least at the level of the director-general, and should bearresponsibility for it.

(Committee of Independent Experts 1999)

Apparently, the collective responsibility of the College of Commissioners didnot translate into an individual responsibility of Commissioners for theadministrative services within their respective portfolios. Indeed, in a numberof cases, Commissioners in the Santer Commission shared responsibility for aparticular DG. Such structural � aws, together with the failings of individualCommissioners to exercise proper oversight over ‘their’ services, contributed toa state of affairs which the Committee described as ‘a growing reluctanceamong the members of the hierarchy to acknowledge their responsibility. It isbecoming dif� cult to � nd anyone who has even the slightest sense of respons-ibility’ (Committee of Independent Experts 1999: para 9.4.25).

This diagnosis is testimony to the fundamental problems that the Com-mission has had in seeking to achieve internal coherence, not only with regardto the horizontal co-ordination of its policies, but also, and in particular, interms of the vertical relationship between political and administrative sphereswithin the Commission. It also implied that the cabinets, who, in addition toadvising Commissioners, have played a central role in co-ordinating policieshorizontally and managing communications between Commissioners and theirrespective DGs (Donnelly and Ritchie 1994), were overburdened with thesetasks.

Against the background of the Committee’s criticisms, a number of reformsof the Commission since the appointment of Romano Prodi have sought toremedy these problems. In particular, three aspects of Commission reform canbe examined in terms of their impact on institutional coherence: certainorganizational changes made by President Prodi soon after his appointment,the ongoing reforms supervised by Reform Commissioner Neil Kinnock, andthe changes to the of� ce of the President resulting from the Nice Treaty.

First, one of Prodi’s responses to the ‘vertical divide’ between the politicaland the administrative level of the Commission was a seemingly simple one:Commissioners had to ‘move in’ with their services. Under Santer (as underDelors) Commissioners shared a single building, together with their cabinetsand with key parts of the Secretariat-General. This arrangement facilitated theexchange between the various cabinets in the co-ordination of policies gen-erally, and in preparation for the weekly meetings of the College, the chefs decabinet and the deputy chefs.

However, the � ipside of this coin was the physical distance betweenCommissioners and cabinets, on the one hand, and the DGs, on the other.Commissioners residing collectively in the Berlaymont, and later the Breydel,while services have been scattered across a multitude of different locationsacross Brussels, added – practically as well as symbolically – to the perceived



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distance between political and administrative spheres of the Commission. Themove of Commissioners from the Breydel headquarters to the separate build-ings of their respective DGs has demonstrated the dilemma faced by aninstitution that has to manage tension along two dimensions: just as com-munication between Commissioners and services may have become easier(though, for reasons discussed below, it may not), communication amongCommissioners and, crucially, among cabinets has become signi� cantly moredif� cult. Previously, meetings and informal conversations among members ofdifferent cabinets were a common part of the daily work routine as they couldeasily be arranged along the same corridor. Now, given that of� ces may be atthe other end of town, meetings need to be organized in advance, and informalconversations have all but ceased. Consequently, horizontal co-ordination –not only crucial in terms of the coherence of the Commission’s policy output,but also essential for ensuring the functioning of collegiate responsibility – hasbecome more dif� cult and time-consuming. As it happens, the relocation ofCommissioners coincided with another Prodi reform: the reduction of cabinetstaff to a maximum of six per Commissioner. Together, these changes addsubstantially to the workload of individual cabinet members and limits thetime and care which can be spent on policy co-ordination. In other words,what has been gained in terms of coherence on one side (‘vertically’) has beenpaid for on the other side (‘horizontally’).

A second response to deal with the underlying problems leading to the crisisof the Santer Commission has been the launch of a broader, more long-termset of internal reforms overseen by Vice-President Kinnock. This reformprogramme is underpinned by an administrative structure comprising the newof� ce of a Reform Commission, a ‘Group of Reform Commissioners’ and aReform Task Force. Its aims are, broadly speaking, to make the Commissionmore accountable, effective and cost-ef� cient (Metcalfe 2001). The emphasishere is on matching staff resources with policy priorities, revising � nancialregulations in order to make decisions about payments more accountable andtransparent (Spence 2000). In the course of the process, administrative reformin the Commission has become a major ‘policy’ in itself, and for the durationof the ‘transition period’ – the time it takes to agree the details of thesereforms, to relocate staff and change internal procedures – it has a distinctlydestabilizing effect on Commission staff.

The Kinnock reforms aim squarely at the issue of ‘responsibility’ (Cini2001) identi� ed as a major failing by the independent experts. However, thereforms do not properly address the problem of the vertical divide betweenCommissioners and DGs. The reform programme addresses essentially thefunctioning of the administrative services rather than the relationship betweenCollege and administrative service, or the functioning of the College itself. Thereforms therefore do not address key issues which contributed to the downfallof the Santer Commission. Indeed, by some of the staff in the administrativeservices they are regarded as an exercise in ‘scapegoating’ – identifying the



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administration rather than the Commissioners as a liability for responsible andaccountable public service in Europe.

The Commission’s staff unions have been critical of the Kinnock proposals,and the threat of a strike among Commission of� cials in the spring of 2001could only be averted through a renegotiation of the reform package. Generally,relations between Commissioners and senior of� cials have, if not worsened,certainly not improved, with frequent reports of friction between Com-missioners or Commission President, on one side, and Directors-General, onthe other (European Voice 2001a, 2001b, 2001c).

The preliminary observation at this point is therefore that over the past fewyears the internal tensions in the Commission have increased, both with regardto vertical and to horizontal relations. Consequently, we have to conclude thatthe foundations for the achievement of enhanced internal coherence haveworsened in the aftermath of the Santer crisis. At the very least, the reformslaunched by Prodi and Kinnock have not substantially improved the oppor-tunities for more coherent internal management of the Commission. Part ofthe problem here is that, as yet, no �nal point for these reforms can beidenti� ed – which is why it is impossible to make judgements about theultimate effects (and ‘success’) of these reforms. However, this state of affairsin itself – the nature of limited internal reform turning into a seeminglypermanent programme of reform (and turmoil and uncertainty) – is destabiliz-ing for staff morale and detracts from internal coherence.

There has been, however, a third level of reform which deserves a fewcomments. At the level of treaty change, Commission reform had been on theagenda at Amsterdam and again at Nice. At Nice, a number of changes to theoperation of the Commission were agreed. The more important ones hereconcern the role of the President whose hands are to be strengthened vis-a-visthe individual Commissioners: in what was essentially a recognition of thestate of affairs which Prodi and the EP had already established de facto at thetime of the current Commission’s investiture, according to the new Art. 217the President will be able to request that a Commissioner shall resign. He (orshe) will also have the explicit power to decide on the internal organization ofthe Commission and to allocate the responsibilities of the Commissioners,both at the time of appointment and throughout the term of the Commission.

This is not a departure from the principle of collegiality – indeed theCollege has to approve the President’s request for the resignation of Commis-sioners (Art. 217 (4)) – but it should strengthen the President’s hand vis-a-visindividual Commissioners and in principle allows him to run the Commissionwith greater authority. The anticipated effect of these changes is a Commissionin which individual Commissioners take greater responsibility for their respec-tive portfolios and, should they fail to perform, can be sanctioned by thePresident. Thus it can be seen as a further attempt to improve the account-ability of Commissioners and their responsibility in overseeing their services.However, at the time of writing the Nice Treaty is not yet rati� ed – indeed itwas rejected in the Irish referendum in June 2001 – and even if and when it



is, it may take time for these treaty changes to translate into actual authorityfor the President. For the time being, the difference in the leadership qualitiesof Delors, on the one hand, and of both Santer and Prodi, on the other, servesas a stark reminder that the formal rules are only part of the story, and thatthe authority of the of� ce of President also depends on the individualoccupying it (Drake 1995; Peterson 1999, 2000).

Internal tension in the Council Secretariat

The creation of the pillar structure at Maastricht, removing the Commission’smonopoly of initiative in important new areas of EU competence has em-powered the Council Secretariat. Before and after Maastricht, a determinedcampaign by some member states as well as by the Council Secretariat itself hasbeen to keep the institutionalization of CFSP out of the hands of theCommission. It has been a campaign that has had demonstrable success in thatinitially the European political co-operation (EPC) Secretariat was createdoutside the existing institutional structure rather than being added to theportfolio of the Commission. At Maastricht, this Secretariat was then mergedwith the Council Secretariat and at Amsterdam the new post of High Rep-resentative was created as an adjunct to the responsibilities of the CouncilSecretariat Secretary-General. Beyond the appointment of Javier Solana to thisnew post, an expansion of staff at the Council Secretariat was the result ofthese changes. A number of EU Special Envoys to certain crisis regions acrossthe globe are also based at the Council Secretariat. In a nutshell, the CouncilSecretariat has become the core of the evolving EU foreign policy machinery.

While it is possible at each instance of institutional reform to point to acertain alignment of member state positions on the institutionalization ofCFSP, it is nevertheless striking how this process has enhanced the institutionalstanding of the Council Secretariat. Assuming that Council Secretariat of� cialsare involved in matters of treaty reform with inter alia the interests of theirown institution at heart – an assumption not too radical to make in the lightof what we know about bureaucratic politics – it is dif� cult not to concludethat their objective has been achieved.

In addition to the changes resulting from the Amsterdam Treaty, there havebeen further developments since the decisions at the 1999 Cologne andHelsinki Summits (Presidency 1999) to provide the Union with a militarydimension in order to acquire a capability for humanitarian intervention – theso-called Petersberg tasks. The organizational changes required to develop thiscapability include the creation of new working groups in the Council – thePolitical and Security Committee and the EU Military Committee – and thebuilding up of a military staff component in the Council Secretariat. Thisprocess has been aided by the appointment of Solana as Secretary-General ofthe Western European Union and the partial transfer of tasks and resourcesfrom that organization to the Council Secretariat (Presidency 2000). Thiswhole process is continuing and is somewhat open-ended since the precise



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nature of arrangements with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)– the sharing of assets and the degree of autonomy of EU structures fromNATO – remains subject to debate.

The Council Secretariat’s acquisition of an operational role in the manage-ment of CFSP and European security and defence policy (ESDP) is a majordeparture from its traditional role in the EU’s institutional architecture. Whatneeds to be emphasized at this point is that what at one level appears to havebeen a jewel in the crown of policy-making, which has been snatched awayfrom the Commission, has also proved to be a somewhat poisoned chalice.Gaining a role in CFSP has created certain tensions for the Council Secretariatwhich are not too unfamiliar to students of the European Commission.Indeed, the occurrence of certain institutional pathologies is strikingly similarto problems which we have seen in the Commission for some time, and on alarger scale. The problems arising from these changes can be summarized asfollows: greater internal fragmentation, greater scarcity of resources, the co-existence of con� icting institutional cultures and logics within the sameinstitution and greater demands on internal co-ordination.

As is implicit from what has been said so far, the ‘old’ Council Secretariathas drawn its political in�uence from working behind the scenes, away fromthe public limelight. Much of its in� uence is being executed indirectly, via thePresidency. Its organizational culture has been based on legalism – a compre-hensive knowledge of EU law at all levels, its application and interpretation.The arrival of a substantial number of of� cials working on foreign policymatters has added a contrasting dimension to this. Activity, if not activism, inforeign policy has heightened the pro� le of the Council Secretariat and turnedthe public spotlight on some of its activities – an unfamiliar and perhapsunwelcome development for the established bureaucracy. The increasingpresence of military of� cers seconded from national forces to make up the newEU military staff has added further unease, given that it brings with it verydifferent working methods. The internal tensions resulting from these changesaffect key aspects of the institutional life of the Council Secretariat. These aresummarized in Figure 3.

Given that the Council Secretariat has, in the past, been a comparativelysmall and cohesive institution, the presence of such different organizationallogics within the institution is bound to create tensions. To name just oneexample: what may have been regarded, at � rst sight, as a minor disagreementabout the degree of administrative transparency has already erupted as a majorissue about the EU’s military effort to maintain secure communications whichwill ultimately require the move of military units to a designated security HQof the EU. This development constitutes a � rst physical split for the institutionand further demonstrates the fragmentation – or incomplete integration – ofthe institution. This echoes the experience of the Commission where thelocation of DGs in separate buildings has reinforced intra-institutional bound-aries. At the same time, the issue has raised the opposite concerns elsewhere,



i.e. that the Council Secretariat is moving backwards on the issue of transpar-ency, despite assurances to the contrary (General Secretariat 2000).

Indeed, what we seem to be witnessing in the case of the Council Secretariatis the construction of two separate administrative structures which are onlyvery loosely integrated at the top. One, the ‘new’ Council Secretariat, is headedby the Secretary-General/High Representative for CFSP and consists of thepolicy unit and the military staff. This part of the Council Secretariat is inrapid expansion and, given the uncertainties about the future direction of EUforeign, security and defence policy, in search of a clear role and identity. The‘old’ Council Secretariat, on the other hand, headed by the Deputy Secretary-General, consists of the legal services and the sectoral DGs assisting thePresidency, the various Councils and working groups in � rst pillar matters.There is a fairly clear dividing line between the two, even though they areformally part of the same administration.

The way in which new structures have been added in a gradual manner, andthe speed with which the institution has expanded, have raised demands fora reform which would deal with current or anticipated problems and in-ef� ciencies of the Council’s structure and working practices. As a matter of factthese problems result not only from the addition of new responsibilities to theCouncil Secretariat but also from the fact that up till now – much like theCommission – the Council Secretariat had never undergone any fundamentalreform since its inception. And enlargement is bound to add further pressuresand tensions to the Council’s and the Council Secretariat’s procedures andworking practices. Arguably, enlargement will be a greater challenge to theCouncil than to any other of the EU institutions.

‘Old’ Secretariat ‘New’ Secretariat

Administrativefunction

Legislative drafting/policy advice

Substance ofpolicy-making

‘Bureaucratic’: activitiesconcern legalistic andrule-centred environment

Operational/policy management

‘Diplomatic’: activitiesconcern relativelyunregulated environment

Degree of hierarchyin internal

proceedings

Relatively low: importantrole of informal networks

Degree oftransparency in

internal proceedings

Traditionally low, but needto demonstrate greateropenness

Relatively high: need forformal command structures

Very low, with preparationsto achieve greater secrecy

Figure 3 Administrative dif ferences between ‘old’ and ‘new’ parts of the CouncilSecretariat



A � rst attempt to encourage the reform of the Council was made with thedrafting of the so-called Trumpf-Piris report in 1999 which acknowledgessome of the problems of the Council’s working methods, and the need forreform (Secretary-General 1999). It did follow in the footsteps of demands forreform made outside the institution, but most of its recommendations werenot followed up by positive responses from member states. A second report onCouncil reform will be presented by Secretary-General Solana to the EuropeanCouncil in the course of 2001. Beyond that, even more far-reaching reformsare set to be proposed at the Laeken European Council in December 2001 andimplemented during the Spanish Presidency in 2002.

Intra-institutional politics: towards coherent governance?

Both Commission and Council face serious issues of internal fragmentation. Inthe case of the Commission, internal fragmentation, a long-standing and latentproblem, has more recently become an issue of institutional survival. Lack ofcoherence was a major contributing factor in the Santer Commission’s crisis.Subsequent and ongoing reforms have demonstrated the continuing challengeof achieving greater coherence in the Commission. The thrust of a range ofinternal reforms has been to achieve greater vertical integration of Commissionactivities, and while in due course these changes may take effect in terms ofa more coherent institution, they have served, in the short run, to amplify theproblem.

The Council Secretariat, more recently, is in a period of fundamentalchange, facing a series of serious challenges and far-reaching reforms. Havingmade effective use of its resources in the past, the Council Secretariat has seena period of rapid expansion and increasing political weight as a result. Yetexpansion has come at a price as internal fragmentation has increased: theCouncil Secretariat needs to � nd ways of reconciling differing organizationalcultures and adapting to the spotlight of wider public attention that comeswith involvement in the politically highly sensitive areas of CFSP and ESDP.

The challenges and problems which the Council Secretariat has been facingare not altogether different from those which have confronted the Commissionfor some time. Institutional growth and expansion of competences, generallyconsidered as signs of success, have left their mark on the institution and nowthreaten the maintenance of coherence, just as they have done in the Com-mission. The Council Secretariat may not have gone through the kind of crisiswhich the Commission has been facing since 1999, but it is nevertheless in thegrip of a need to reform and adapt to the changing circumstances of the timewhich is quite as serious as that of the Commission.

Over the 1990s, as the pace of European integration picked up, the size ofthe Union increased and its range of policies expanded, the individual institu-tions have suffered the consequences of success. They have become larger andmore unwieldy, while at the same time being assigned an ever-increasing rangeof tasks and responsibilities. As a consequence, greater efforts have been



necessary to achieve or maintain internal coherence, and in a number ofinstances, most notably in the case of the European Commission, the ‘cost’ ofreduced coherence has become evident. However, as noted at the outset, thequestion of coherent governance of the EU implies the examination of inter-institutional relations as well as internal politics, before broader conclusionscan be drawn.

RELATIONS BETWEEN COMMISSION AND COUNCILSECRETARIAT: INTER-INSTITUTIONAL COHERENCE?

The analysis of the Commission–Council Secretariat relationship will proceedin two steps: � rst, we will examine a number of contexts in which the twoinstitutions ‘meet’ and which therefore provide arenas for interaction andthereby opportunities for the generation of either con� ict or co-operation.Second, we will seek to conceptualize this relationship in a way that moves ourunderstanding beyond traditional images of institutional rivalry, on the onehand, and the need for fusion in order to achieve coherence, on the other.

Commission–Council Secretariat relations in the EU policyprocess

Commission and Council Secretariat co-operate on a regular basis in routine� rst pillar policy-making in the preparation and the running of the multitudeof meetings within the Council structure. Both institutions share an interest inthe smooth running of the policy process. An effective management of EUaffairs can be expected to heighten the problem-solving capacity of theEuropean level and will therefore assist the legitimacy of EU institutions. BothCommission and Council Secretariat have therefore much to gain from thesuccessful passage of a directive, and much to lose from a failure. Clearly, noagreement in the Council is a guarantee of effective policy-making, but on thewhole a perception of purposeful action is seen to be more desirable than oneof inactivity.

In terms of the substance of policy proposals, Commission and CouncilSecretariat may, on occasion, have different interests, but beyond such differ-ences both will be united by a common desire to in� uence dynamics in themeetings of Council working groups to achieve the required consensus ormajority, as the case may be. The search for compromise in the Councilrequires efforts at mediation which involve both the Commission and theCouncil Secretariat in different ways (Fouilleux et al. 2001). Both institutionshave representatives in any meeting held under the Council’s rules of procedure,i.e. from working groups and the Committee of Permanent Representatives(COREPER) to the actual meetings of ministers. This, in itself, establishes acontinuous presence of Commission of� cials in the proceedings of the Counciland thereby ensures regular interaction with Council Secretariat staff.



The signi� cance of Commission intervention at the decision-making stagein the policy process, when proposals have formally left the Commission andare under deliberation in Council and EP, depends both on the policy area andthe decision-making mechanism applicable in any given case. If decisions areto be taken by the co-decision procedure, for example, the Commission’sleverage is enhanced by its opportunity to change the proposal in the courseof proceedings, in order to adapt it to the emergence of a relevant majority in theCouncil. Further co-operation between Commission and Council Secretariat(as well as Presidency and EP) is called for in the context of the trialogue – thegetting together of the three institutions in order to search for compromiseonce legislation has reached the conciliation phase of the co-decision pro-cedure. In different circumstances, however, the role of the Commission maywell be less prominent.

In any case, the in�uence that the Commission can have in this process inmediating among different member state positions can be ampli� ed by theCouncil Secretariat. The Council Secretariat, as explained above, has a role toplay here too, but this will depend to a large extent on the readiness of thePresidency to rely on the services and the advice of the Council Secretariat.Different Presidencies handle this relationship in different ways. It is commonpractice, however, for a working relationship between all three parties –Presidency, Commission and Council Secretariat – to develop. This workingrelationship can extend to the detailed preparation of meetings, including theexchange of information regarding different national positions in the items onthe agenda and the agreement on strategies to overcome opposition from oneor the other member state delegation.

As far as the Commission and Council Secretariat are concerned, the co-operation in such situations can amount to a division of labour. The Com-mission’s contribution is of a more high-pro� le nature, in a more formal searchfor common ground among member states, with the result of the exercise� nding its way into the formal proposal. Once proposals have reached theCouncil, the Commission’s room for manoeuvre is limited, in part because itwill feel bound by the fact that it has adopted its own institutional positionon the issue in the College of Commissioners. At this stage, Council Secretariatstaff (as well as the Presidency) can take over mediation efforts in a more subtleway, via the running of the meetings, the drafting of minutes and positionpapers, and the provision of legal advice. To the extent to which such strategieshave been agreed in advance of any meeting, such a ‘division of labour’between Commission and Council Secretariat can be highly effective, playingto the strengths of either institution.

As is evident, such a modus operandi relies only to a very minimal degree onformal rules of procedure or on treaty provisions. It really depends on personalcontacts between the relevant DGs in Commission and Council Secretariat,and the extent to which the personalities on either side are willing and able towork together. As has been argued, institutional dynamics point towards co-operation between of� cials from Commission and Council Secretariat, and



only in rare cases will there be formal impediments to such co-operation. Yetwhether it actually takes place depends on the speci� c actors concerned, andit is here that individual of� cials can make a difference for the better as wellas for the worse. In any case, the emphasis in the co-operation betweenCommission and Council Secretariat in routine policy process is on informalcontacts and, in a wider sense, the presence of networks which cross theinstitutional divide.

Commission–Council Secretariat relations in the treaty reformprocess

The EU’s treaty reform process is, of course, distinct from routine, day-to-daypolicy-making. Yet there are also a number of parallels, and these extend to theco-operation between the Commission, Council Secretariat and Presidency inthe search for consensus among member state positions in the course of anIGC. In fact, to mention these supranational institutions in the context of anIntergovernmental Conference may strike some as odd, but the participation ofsupranational institutions in the process of treaty reform is becoming increas-ingly recognized, thanks also to contributions from the actual participantsin the proceedings (Dinan 2000; Petite 2000; Gray and Stubb, forthcom-ing; Christiansen and Jørgensen 1998; Gray, forthcoming; Christiansen,forthcoming).

Obviously, the Commission is in a fundamentally altered position here,given that it does not possess the monopoly of initiative familiar from routinepolicy-making. Indeed, its participation in meetings is less of a right and moreof an established practice. The Council Secretariat, on the other hand, is moreempowered here than it may be in normal decision-making given that its staff,the legal service in particular, are closely familiar with the subject matter underdiscussion. Subject to the arrangement found with the Presidency, the CouncilSecretariat – acting as the Conference Secretariat – may have an in� uentialrole in the drafting of the treaty (Gray and Stubb, forthcoming; Stubb,forthcoming).

There is a greater propensity for issues under discussion in an IGC to havea divisive effect on Commission–Council Secretariat relations, since treatychanges are more likely than secondary legislation to affect the institutionalbalance. While this may constitute a barrier to co-operation, but there are stillareas which constitute positive-sum games for the two institutions, and whereboth can bene� t from the exchange of information about the likelihood ofagreement being reached among member states, and the way of securing suchagreement.

In terms of the dynamics of IGCs, two aspects deserve speci� c emphasishere. First, the constitutional nature of the subject matter places legal advicein an even more privileged position than it is in routine policy-making. Giventhe rotation among countries holding the Presidency, the permanency of theCouncil Secretariat’s occupies a rather central position in the proceedings of an



IGC. Second, the Commission, while not possessing a vote – and therefore noveto over any � nal outcome of the IGC – is nevertheless more than just abystander. The Commission’s opinion may have an integrative effect on thecourse of negotiations. In particular, the Presidency, in searching for a com-promise solution, will be keen to have the Commission on its side. APresidency proposal which has support from the Commission has greaterlegitimacy, and therefore chances of success, than one opposed by theCommission.

Despite the very different legal and political circumstances, the dynamichere may therefore be quite similar to the need for extensive, informal co-operation between Presidency, Commission and Council Secretariat in routinepolicy-making. The main proviso here is that there are exceptions to this inareas where the institutional interests of Commission and Council Secretariatcome into con� ict. One such example – the institutionalization of CFSP – willbe discussed in a little more detail below.

Commission–Council Secretariat relations in the management ofthe EU’s external relations

Whereas in the legislative process and in the treaty reform process Commissionand Council Secretariat have distinct responsibilities which lend themselves toinformal co-operation and division of labour arrangements, the situation israther different in the area of external relations. Here there is much greaterpropensity for the two institutions to develop a competitive approach given theoverlap in responsibilities. Given the institutional dynamics involved in thisarea, the achievement of the treaty demand for coherence or consistency hasbeen a growing concern (Tietje 1997; Duke 1999).

The treaty provides no clear division of competences, and there has beenmuch debate about the potential for rivalry and con� ict between the twoinstitutions – and the two individuals, Patten and Solana. Certainly, sensitiv-ities and suspicions are detectable on either side. In the Council Secretariat,there is a perception that the Commission is defensive about the potential lossof in� uence in external relations as the Council Secretariat builds up itsinstitutional strength in this respect. On the Commission’s side, concerns arebeing voiced about the dangers of duplication of tasks and expertise.

The appointment of Javier Solana and the changes in the Council Secretariatthat went with it have ruf� ed feathers in the Council Secretariat as well as inthe Commission. However, with Nice having come and gone without anychange in these arrangements, there is a greater sense of acceptance of the newstructures and a willingness to make them work. Initial inter-institutionalfriction related to the � nancing of second pillar operations (Monar 1997) hasbeen largely overcome. A co-operative attitude has prevailed, both at thepolitical level where Patten and Solana have struck up a collegial workingrelationship and at the of� cial level where consultation and co-operation acrossinstitutional boundaries have become commonplace.



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Commission–Council Secretariat co-operation here has some formal aspects,but is on the whole a question of informal contacts and ad hoc meetings toaddress speci� c issues. Given the nature of the policy area, co-operation is toa large extent problem-driven rather than process-driven, and has been mostintensive in cases of crises, in particular with respect to EU policy on theBalkans. Either side professes a recognition of mutual dependence betweenthe institutions. The Commission acknowledges the formal competence of theCouncil Secretariat and the value of its direct links to member states’ foreignministries – a link that is strengthened by the fact that a signi� cant proportionof Council Secretariat of� cials in the CFSP area are seconded national diplo-mats. The Commission also appears to have given in to demands from theCouncil Secretariat that Solana be accorded a more senior status in thediplomatic protocol to Commissioner Patten, even though this breaks withpast inter-service convention.

The Council Secretariat, on the other hand, clearly accepts the expertise andthe resources that the Commission possesses in the area of external relations.The Commission controls the key instruments in gathering information andprojecting EU in� uence abroad. The network of delegations across the globe,providing the Commission with direct information about the conditions ‘onthe ground’ (Bruter 1999), is recognized as valuable by the Council Secretariat– as is the Commission’s co-operation in making these available to the CouncilSecretariat: an agreement among member states, Council Secretariat andCommission to provide the policy unit with regular despatches from nationalembassies or, in the case of the Commission, from its delegations has been fullyimplemented only by the Commission. Most importantly, there is a recog-nition in the Council Secretariat of its own lack of resources and the Com-mission’s relative wealth of them. Effective external action of the Unionrequires the use of instruments such as � nancial or technical assistance,humanitarian aid or economic sanctions; the Commission’s role in the controlof access to them leads to a recognition in the Council Secretariat of thedesirability of involving the Commission in the planning and deliberation ofintegrated crisis management responses in the future.

Among the formal mechanisms of Commission–Council Secretariat co-operation is the membership of representatives from both institutions in thenew troika created by the Amsterdam Treaty (and consisting also of a Presidencyrepresentative). The troika is an instrument of external representation – it con-stitutes a joint EU delegation abroad and is, as such, not intended to providea forum for internal EU co-operation. However, the troika provides a regularmeeting place for Commission and Council Secretariat and the preparation ofany foreign mission of the troika will therefore offer opportunities for policyco-ordination between the two institutions.

The second and arguably more regular and comprehensive contact betweenCommission and Council Secretariat is the Commission’s membership inCouncil working groups, much like in the � rst pillar. This includes thePolitical Committee and the new Political and Security Committee. The



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Commission’s role here will be different from that in the � rst pillar workinggroups as it lacks the monopoly of initiative in this context. But the Com-mission’s participation still allows for a two-way exchange of information andas such assists the co-operation between the two institutions.

A sensitive point here seems to have been the extension of such co-operationinto the military � eld, in particular given the opposition of some memberstates to the inclusion of the Commission in meetings of the new EU militarycommittee. Because of these tensions the Commission has not, as yet, partici-pated in any meeting of the military committee, but it reserves the right to doso if its participation is called for in view of the speci� c agenda for anindividual meeting. But this seems more of a transitional problem as newmilitary structures are being created. There is no doubt on either side that, inthe medium to long term, the Commission’s participation in EU crisisresponse planning and execution is not only desirable but essential.

Finally, among the formal mechanisms of co-operation is the mutualsecondment of of� cials between the Commission’s DG EX and the Council’sPolicy Unit. This affects only a limited number of of� cials and is regarded withsome scepticism on either side, given the detrimental impact that secondmenthas on the prospects for promotion and compliance with staff regulation.Nevertheless, to the extent to which it is practised, secondment adds a valuablechannel of communication between the two institutions.

This observation leads to the recognition of informal networks stretchingacross the institutional divide. Just as in other policy areas, these are prominentin this area, and of� cials working in a speci� c area of CFSP will be in dailytelephone and e-mail contact with their counterparts in the Commission.Again, such contacts may suffer from personality clashes, or may bene� t fromthe chemistry among the of� cials involved. In general, though, they tend to bean effective means of overcoming the formal distance between the institutions,and the dif� cult hierarchies involved on either side.

By way of conclusion to this section we can say that the Commission–Council Secretariat relationship has not been without its problems, somethingthat was to be expected given the radical nature of the changes introduced byAmsterdam. On the whole, though, institutions and of� cials have copedcomparatively well with the tensions built into the formal arrangements. Anumber of channels of communication have been opened up on differentlevels, and they provide scope for the regular exchange of information and thepreparation of joint actions. But personal contacts rather than formal struc-tures constitute the backbone of inter-institutional co-operation, particularlywhen Commission and Council Secretariat are required to react collectivelyand quickly to a crisis in the area of foreign policy.

Given the joint responsibility for external relations, it is remarkable howlimited the formal structures of policy co-ordination between Commission andCouncil Secretariat are, placing high demands on of� cials to network inform-ally. At the highest level, this state of affairs has turned the spotlight on thepersonal relationship between Patten and Solana, highlighting the fact that the



two are very different personalities who have, despite differences in politicalbeliefs and in style, developed a professional and collegial relationship that hasnot witnessed any major crisis that would have spelt ‘incoherent EU foreignpolicy’ to the outside world. In any case, on the basis of the informationdiscussed here, the relationship between Patten and Solana, as the one betweenthe Commission and the Council Secretariat in general, does not seem soproblematic as to warrant the call from Commission President Prodi to mergethe two jobs by creating a Commission Vice-President for foreign affairs – ademand that not only seems utopian in the context of current institutionaldevelopments, but may also have been counterproductive provoking a hostilereaction from the Council Secretariat (as well as from the member states).

Inter-institutional relations: towards coherent governance?

So far, the story has been one of a structurally determined tension between twoinstitutions which appears to be managed rather well, by the policy-makersinvolved. Of� cials have been developing collegial approaches to their work inareas of shared responsibility, and have overcome the lack of formal structuresof co-operation and co-ordination by resorting to informal networking.

Three explanations can be advanced here which, taken together, amount tothe argument that an ideational structure facilitates the co-operation betweenCommission and Council Secretariat: � rst, a shared allegiance as civil servantsof the EU; second, experience of working within a common bureaucraticculture; and, third, the presence of an epistemic community of experts in thehighly technical matter of EU policy-making.

The recognition of a shared allegiance concerns of� cials working in Brusselswho identify themselves primarily as EU of� cials rather than Commission orCouncil Secretariat of� cials. In other words, a common allegiance to the EUmay override more narrow institutional identities which may separate them.The development of such a shared allegiance among Commission and CouncilSecretariat staff lies in their participation in very similar daily routines and thepresence of technical and legal expertise on important matters of EU politicsin both institutions. The former, which could be termed the ‘Brusselsization’of EU of� cials, refers to the common experience of working in the multi-lingual, multinational environment of an international institution. At a morepractical level, EU of� cials have to pass similar entry requirements and concoursand are governed by the same staff regulations.

This observation is complemented by the recognition of the expertise whichCommission and Council Secretariat staff share with respect to certain EUmatters. This may not apply to all areas of their work, but to some which –it can be argued – are important to their institutional self-perception (andtherefore to the generation of a sense of shared allegiance). This concerns, inparticular, the knowledge of the rules and procedures of EU decision-making,ranging from policy-making in the � rst pillar to the modalities of treaty reformin IGCs. In contrast to the substantive issues involved – on which the expertise



of other actors in the policy process is probably greater – both Commissionand Council Secretariat, as managers of the process, have unrivalled knowledgenot only of the technicalities of the process of decision-making, but also of theorigins of the rules governing this process.

Finally, the effects of this ‘Brusselsization’ – the exposure to similar work(and life) routines – and membership in such an epistemic communitycontribute to the generation of an allegiance to the EU and to the integrationproject. This shared allegiance, and the resultant promotion of a commonidentity as EU of� cials – in opposition to the partisan identities of Com-mission and Council Secretariat – provide the environment in which co-operative action by individual actors can take place.

CONCLUSIONS

The present examination of internal politics in, and relations between, Com-mission and Council Secretariat has demonstrated the nature of the challengeof achieving institutional coherence in the EU. Given that this is only a partialperspective on the wider issue of coherence in the Euro-polity, only limitedconclusions can be drawn at this stage. The internal fragmentation of theCommission and the Council Secretariat (as that of other EU institutions) hasincreased. The growing size and expanded range of policy competences haveaffected both to some extent. And while in the Commission the dividebetween administrative services and political level has been a problem whichongoing reforms seek to bridge, the Council Secretariat is having to accom-modate the internal changes resulting from the rapid expansion of its com-petences in the � eld of foreign and security policy. The problem here is, as ithas been in the Commission, that the differing organizational logics of distinctadministrative tasks constitute internal tensions which then require substantiveinstitutional resources for their resolution.

With respect to inter-institutional relations, the situation is different.Against a background of reduced expectations, Commission and CouncilSecretariat manage to co-operate well in areas of shared responsibility. Policy-makers here rely on informal relations in order to help bridge the inter-institutional divide, and such relations build on the broad foundation of ashared allegiance to the European project and a more speci� c commitment to,and knowledge of, the details of speci� c policies under deliberation. Conse-quently, the coherence of inter-institutional relations – at least among thesetwo institutions – is not as elusive as the formal institutional arrangementwould lead us to expect.

One tentative conclusion which can be drawn from these observationsconcerns the EU’s response to institutional size: the analysis here suggests that,while there are increasing problems to internal coherence, inter-institutionalrelations have been managed comparatively well, at least without the funda-mental threats to coherence that may have been expected. If this is the case ona broader scale, the EU may be better served by a greater number of smaller,



more self-contained institutions which are likely to operate more coherentlythan the established institutions suffering from increasing problems withinternal fragmentation. This means in practice that, for example, a splitting offof the CFSP/ESDP aspects of the Council Secretariat and the creation of aseparate foreign policy body of the EU may be a legitimate consideration. Asfar as the Commission is concerned, these observations about institutionalcoherence may engender similar thoughts about the issue of ‘unbundling’ ofCommission tasks – devolving speci� c tasks currently carried out by theCommission to separate institutions or assigning new tests to Europeanagencies. As has been argued before, this may help, rather than hinder, furtherintegration (Kreher, 1997).

Given the manifold divisions, cleavages and tensions running through theEuro-polity and its institutions, there are clearly persistent and inherentchallenges to the achievement of coherent governance. At the same time,however, there are established and strong, albeit informal, links which help tobridge such divisions and which assist the search for coherence. The ongoinginstitutional reforms which have been discussed above will have an impact onthis situation, both in terms of their intended effects and their unintendedside-effects. More signi� cantly, the prospect of enlargement, implying thefurther growth of institutions and their internal diversity, will further muddythese waters. Even in the limited perspective offered here, the coherence ofgovernance is a complex issue exhibiting unexpected features. A more compre-hensive perspective will need to conduct more detailed research along bothdimensions examined here, as well as the coherence of governance across thedifferent levels of the Euro-polity.

Address for correspondence: Thomas Christiansen, Jean Monnet Centre forEuropean Studies, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, Ceredigion SY23 3DA,UK. Fax: +44 1970 622709. email: [email protected]

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Research for this article was greatly assisted by the willingness of of� cials in theEuropean Commission, the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers and thepermanent representations of member states to provide valuable advice andinformation. A previous version of this article was presented as a paper at theECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Grenoble, 2001. I am indebted to theworkshop participants for their useful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.

NOTE

1 The Secretariat of the Council of Ministers is not formally recognized as an‘institution’ of the EU in the Treaty. Instead, it is categorized as an organ of theCouncil, which is the actual institution. Nevertheless, the Secretariat is hereregarded as an institution for the purposes of analysis since it does possess therequired criteria.



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