Integrating Greek Philosophy into Jewish and Christian Contexts in Antiquity: The Alexandrian...

INTEGRATING GREEK PHILOSOPHY INTO JEWISHAND CHRISTIAN CONTEXTS IN ANTIQUITY:

THE ALEXANDRIAN PROJECT

Carlos Fraenkel

Introduction*

It is not obvious why Jews or Christians should be interested in philosophy.What, for instance, do they have to gain from studying logic, physics, andethics — as was the standard division of philosophy in antiquity?1 Do the

Hebrew Bible and the New Testament not provide a true account of God, nature,and humankind, and of how these interact, as well as a set of rules for life whoseobservance leads to blessedness and salvation? And conversely, why should theyhold on to their religious tradition if philosophy provides a better guide to whatthis tradition teaches? Moreover, to which of them should they adhere in case thetwo contradict each other? Or why should someone who received a philosophicaleducation become a member of a religious community in the first place? Answeringthese questions was, of course, crucial for Hellenized Jews and Christians whowanted to find a place for philosophy within their religious traditions. In thischapter I look at one prominent answer, given in ancient Alexandria by PhiloJudaeus (d. c. 50 CE) and his Christian students Clement (d. 215) and Origen (d.c. 254), who made the first sustained attempt to work out, respectively, a philo-sophy of Judaism and Christianity. The close intellectual connection between

* Throughout this chapter I have often altered existing English translations of the texts cited.1 This division can be traced back to Xenocrates (d. 314 or 313 BCE), the third head of the

Platonic Academy; see Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos, 7. 16.

10.1484/M.CURSOR-EB.1.100257

© BREPOLS PUBLISHERS THIS DOCUMENT MAY BE PRINTED FOR PRIVATE USE ONLY.

IT MAY NOT BE DISTRIBUTED WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE PUBLISHER.

Carlos Fraenkel24

these three philosophers in my view justifies speaking of a shared philosophical-religious project.2

Alexandria was the centre of the encounter between Greek culture and theJewish Diaspora in the Hellenistic period, and Philo’s work represents the intellec-tual culmination of this encounter. Philo, I contend, interpreted Judaism as whatI propose calling a philosophical religion. In this way he could make a case for whathe considered the excellence of both, Judaism and philosophy, addressing doubtsabout the value of Judaism expressed by Gentiles and assimilated Jews and doubtsabout the value of philosophy harboured by Jewish traditionalists.3 Philo’s answer

2 For the impact of Philo on Clement and Origen of Alexandria, see David T. Runia, Philo inEarly Christian Literature: A Survey (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), chaps 8–9. See also Runia’sgeneral account in Philo and the Church Fathers: A Collection of Papers (Leiden: Brill, 1995), pp.1–24. I do not, however, agree with Runia’s conclusion in this paper that despite their formativeinfluence ‘Philonism and Platonism’ ultimately did ‘not penetrate to Christianity’s heart’ which‘is to be located in the Gospel, and within it at the cross of Jesus Christ’ (p. 16). As I have arguedelsewhere, there is a direct line leading from Plato’s world of Forms to God’s Logos in Philo and toChrist in Clement and Origen. See Fraenkel, ‘On the Concept and History of PhilosophicalReligions’, in Nature and Scripture in the Abrahamic Religions: Up to 1700, ed. by Jitse M. van derMeer and Scott Mandelbrote, Brill’s Series in Church History, 36 (Leiden: Brill, 2009), pp. 35–80.In addition to Runia, see Annewies van den Hoek, Clement of Alexandria and his Use of Philo inthe ‘Stromateis’ (Leiden: Brill, 1988); Annewies van den Hoek, ‘The Catechetical School of EarlyChristian Alexandria and its Philonic Heritage’, Harvard Theological Review, 90 (1997), 59–87;Annewies van den Hoek, ‘Philo and Origen’, Studia Philonica, 12 (2000), 122–42.

3 In De specialibus legibus 3. 1–6 Philo describes how he fell from the height of philosophicalcontemplation into ‘the vast sea of civil cares’ (references to Philo are to Complete Works, Greekwith English trans. by F. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress; London: Heinemann, 1929–62)). This is often taken to be a reference to the conflictsbetween Jews and Gentiles in Alexandria in the second half of the first century CE, for which Philo’stwo historical works — In Flaccum and Legatio ad Gaium — are important testimonies. Philo, infact, was one of the leaders of the Jewish delegation to Gaius (the Roman emperor Caligula), whichwas sent to Rome to resolve the conflicts in Alexandria. Among the leaders of the Gentile delega-tion was Apion who according to Josephus ‘said many blasphemous things against the Jews’ (Anti-quitates Judaicae 18. 8; Greek text with English trans. by H. St. J. Thackeray and others(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1930–65)). Apion’s anti-Jewish polemics are docu-mented in Josephus’s Contra Apionem. If the passage in De specialibus legibus does indeed reflectthese conflicts, Philo appears to suggest a link between the historical circumstances and his philo-sophical-exegetical project, for at the end of the passage he speaks of his ‘fondness for knowledge’that led him ‘to peer into each of [the sacred interpretations of Moses] and bring to light what isunknown to the multitude’. Eusebius has preserved two fragments of a lost work by Philo whichaccording to Eusebius was written ‘in defense of the Jews against their accusers’ (Praeparatioevangelica 8. 5; Greek text with English trans. by E. H. Gifford (Oxford: Oxford University Press,



INTEGRATING GREEK PHILOSOPHY 25

to the kinds of questions outlined above in turn proved useful to Christian philos-ophers who faced a similar task: persuading philosophically educated Gentiles ofthe value of Christianity and traditionalist Christians of the value of philosophy.4

Following Philo’s lead they attempted to solve this task by interpreting Chris-tianity as a philosophical religion.5

The main thesis for which I will argue in this chapter is that the conceptualframework for interpreting Judaism and Christianity as philosophical religions isderived from Plato’s later political philosophy. The most compelling evidence forthis thesis is provided by Eusebius of Caesarea (d. 340). Intellectually, Eusebiusclearly sees himself as part of the project of the Alexandrians whose portrait hedraws in the Historia ecclesiastica,6 and whose project he defends against critics,most importantly in the Apology for Origen, on which he collaborated with Pam-philus.7 But for my purpose the main interest of Eusebius does not lie in theoriginality of his philosophical contribution to this tradition. He is, in fact, notprimarily a philosopher, but a historian. My interest in Eusebius stems from the

1903)). As for assimilated Jews, we know, for instance, of Tiberius Julius Alexander, Philo’snephew, who according to Josephus did ‘not remain true to his ancestral practices’ (Antiquitates20. 101). This is usually interpreted as describing Alexander’s apostasy. Alexander appears as Philo’sinterlocutor in De providentia 1 and 2, as well as in De animalibus. Finally, Jewish conservativesseem to be on Philo’s mind in his frequent defence of an allegorical understanding of biblical pas-sages (see e.g. De agricultura 96–97; De posteritate Caini 1. 1; Legum allegoriarum 2. 19; De opificiomundi 157). Interpreting Judaism as a philosophical religion was clearly not uncontroversial in theJewish community of Alexandria.

4 Clement’s philosophical-theological trilogy, for instance, opens with the ‘Protreptikos’, an‘Exhortation’ to Christian philosophy addressed to educated Greeks. See also Eusebius, Praeparatio1. 1 discussed below. The best-known Christian rejection of philosophy is of course Tertullian’srhetorical diatribe in De praescriptione haereticorum 7. But also Clement’s Stromateis, for example,bear witness to the awareness that his interpretation of Christianity as a philosophical religion iscontroversial.

5 To avoid any misunderstandings, let me stress that my intention is not to make any normativeclaims about this philosophical interpretation of Judaism and Christianity. My aim is to understandthis interpretation, not to present it as better or worse than other interpretations.

6 See in particular the account of Philo’s writings in Historia ecclesiastica 2. 18; the chapter onPantaenus ‘the philosopher’, described as the founder of the catechetical school in Alexandria andas the teacher of Clement in Historia 5. 10; the chapter on Clement of Alexandria in Historia 5. 11(cf. 6. 6), as well as the list of his writings in Historia 6. 13. Much of Historia 6 is devoted to Origen.

7 See Jerome, De viris illustribus, chaps 75 and 81. The basic study of Eusebius’s life and worksremains Timothy D. Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 1981).



Carlos Fraenkel26

fact that he makes the philosophical assumptions underlying the Alexandrianproject explicit. Although there is no lack of implicit evidence for the importantrole Plato’s political philosophy played for the Alexandrians, the most substantivesupport for my interpretation is Eusebius. Let me say on a personal note that I havebeen thinking about this interpretation for a while. I was, admittedly, somewhatworried because despite seeming very plausible to me, it had not been proposed inthe extensive scholarly literature on the authors under discussion. It was, therefore,exciting — and also a bit of a relief — to discover that in Book 12 of the Praepa-ratio evangelica, Eusebius quotes most of the passages from the Republic and theLaws on which I rely in my explication of the Alexandrian project. By adducingwhat he takes to be biblical parallels to the passages from Plato, Eusebius, of course,wants to demonstrate that Plato derived the principles of his political thoughtfrom the political science informing the Law of Moses. What he in fact shows,however, is how the Alexandrians interpreted Judaism and Christianity in light ofPlato’s political philosophy.

My argument comprises four main steps. I begin by outlining the Platonic con-ceptual framework which I contend is the basis for interpreting Judaism andChristianity as philosophical religions. Then I sketch in a schematic way how thisframework was applied by the Alexandrians to their respective religious traditions.Next I examine the evidence provided by Eusebius in support of my interpretation.Finally, I discuss how interpreting Judaism and Christianity as philosophical reli-gions was able to explain the importance of studying philosophy to Jews and Chris-tians. A more detailed examination of the works of Philo, Clement, and Origen inlight of the thesis here proposed will have to wait for another occasion.

Religion as the Handmaid of Philosophy: The Platonic Model

The interpretation of Judaism and Christianity as philosophical religions has twooutstanding characteristics: on one level it takes religion to coincide with philo-sophy; on another level it takes religion to be philosophy’s handmaid. I haveelaborated elsewhere on the first point: the Alexandrians’ view that philosophy isthe highest worship of God, that intellectual perfection is the highest human per-fection, and that the excellence of Judaism and Christianity is due to the fact thatMoses and Christ were accomplished philosophers.8 I am aware that these are con-troversial claims. But assuming that my argument holds, one would, of course, have

8 See Fraenkel, ‘On the Concept and History of Philosophical Religions’.




to ask what this religion of the philosophers has to do with the historical forms ofJudaism or Christianity — with the narratives of scripture, its pious exhortations,the religious rules of conduct, or prayers and other forms of worship. And how dothe philosophers explain that the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament teach somany things that appear to be at odds with philosophical doctrines? If the foundersof these religions were indeed accomplished philosophers, why do the religions notseem to have a clearly recognizable philosophical content? It is here that Plato’spolitical philosophy came to play a key role: it allowed integrating traditional reli-gions into a philosophical framework. The Alexandrians, I contend, are not onlyphilosophers with respect to doctrines that fall into the domain of philosophyproperly speaking — their psychology, cosmology, metaphysics, or ethics — butthey also follow a philosophical model when it comes to interpreting the contentsof their respective religious tradition. Concerning these contents they offer whatis best described as a philosophical reinterpretation. This reinterpretation, I argue,is based on the solution that Plato proposes for what he came to see as the problemof non-philosophers in the middle and late dialogues.9 Religion is conceived as themeans allowing non-philosophers to have a share in the perfection of philosophers.In this sense I suggest describing it as philosophy’s handmaid.

To substantiate my claim that Plato can be seen as the source of the concept ofreligion as philosophy’s handmaid, I will discuss two changes that occurred in hispolitical thought from the early dialogues to the middle and late dialogues. Bothchanges are motivated through developments in Plato’s conception of the soul.10

A basic assumption underlying Plato’s political philosophy from the Apology to theLaws is that a good ruler is a ruler who possesses the art of making the citizensbetter, that is, is capable of leading them to aretê (excellence or goodness).11 Sincefor Plato it is the philosopher who has knowledge of the good, as well as of the wayhow to achieve it, the philosopher is best qualified to be the ruler. In this sense,

9 Note that my claim is not that Plato accounts for all elements of this interpretation. Conceptsfrom other philosophical traditions — e.g. Stoic concepts — were integrated into the Platonicframework.

10 This development and its consequences for Plato’s ethics have been the object of a considera-ble amount of scholarship. See, for example, A. W. Price, Mental Conflict (New York: Routledge,1995); and Terence Irwin, Plato’s Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). My maininterest, however, is in the political implications.

11 For a number of characteristic passages, see Apology 25a–c; Protagoras 318c–d; Protagoras319e–320b; Gorgias 464b–465a; Gorgias 515b–521d; Republic 420b–421c; Statesman 296e–297b;Laws 630a–631d; Laws 650b.



Carlos Fraenkel28

Socrates, although he deliberately stays out of Athens’s public affairs, is praised asthe only Athenian to practice ‘the true art of politics’.12 In the early dialogues, theSocratic project of making the citizens better has the following important charac-teristics. For one thing it is intellectualistic: knowledge of the good is a necessaryand sufficient condition for doing the good. For it is the only way of motivatinggood action, and on the assumption that it would be absurd to act knowinglyagainst one’s best interest, it does so necessarily.13 It is, therefore, not surprisingthat Socrates seeks to guide all citizens to the knowledge on which their perfectiondepends: ‘I never cease to stir up each and every one of you, to persuade you andreproach you all day long and everywhere I sit down.’14 Nor is it surprising that thecharacteristic form of Socratic politics is the elenchos — the means Socrates uses tolead citizens from unexamined to examined opinions: for ‘the greatest good (tomegiston agathon) for man is to discuss virtue every day and those other thingsabout which you hear me conversing and testing myself and others’.15

In the middle and late dialogues, however, Plato partly modifies and partlyabandons the premises informing the Socratic project. At the same time there arepoints of continuity. The best life continues to be the philosophical life: it is notonly the most pleasant, but also the most divine, a form of imitatio Dei, since thephilosopher acquires knowledge of the Forms, the realm of the divine, and the soulbecomes like the objects it apprehends.16 Likewise the perfection of the city con-tinues to depend on the philosopher: as a philosopher he acquires knowledge of thedivine and becomes like it, and as a ruler he is a ‘craftsman’ of virtue; that is, heleads the citizens as close as possible to the same goal by shaping them according tothe divine as his model.17 The philosopher’s love of wisdom makes him immune tothe lures of power and wealth and thus secures that he puts into practice what heknows is best for the political community.18

12 Gorgias 521d. All English translations of Plato’s works are from Plato: Complete Works, ed.by John Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997).

13 See Plato’s argument in the last part of the Protagoras.14 Apology 30e.15 Apology 38a. But note that Socrates does not claim that the elenchos provides knowledge in

the strict sense. I cannot discuss this problem here.16 For the former, see Republic 9; for the latter, see ibid., 500b–d.17 Cf. Republic 500d–501c.18 See Republic 485d–486c; for the ‘faction-state’ in which the stronger — i.e. the governing

faction — imposes its interests on the weaker, see Republic 338d–339a and Laws 714b–715d.




Philosophical instruction in the Republic, however, constitutes the last stage ofthe educational curriculum that only very few and rigorously selected citizensreach. This gives rise to three questions: What is the function of pre-philosophicaleducation in Plato’s curriculum? Why are most citizens excluded from philosoph-ical instruction? And finally, how can they still have a share in the best life? Tobegin with, knowledge is no longer considered a sufficient condition for goodnessby Plato. He now recognizes a twofold irrational part of the soul as well as twoconditions under which it cannot be governed by reason. First, our rational facultydevelops at a relatively late stage in life, for ‘no animal to which it belongs to haveintellect (nous echein) after reaching perfection, has this faculty, or has it in thesame measure, when it is born’.19 One purpose of the pre-philosophical educationalprogramme is, therefore, to prepare the citizens for a philosophical life. This isachieved by habituating the irrational part of the soul in such a way that it acts andreacts as if it were guided by reason, so that a person ‘will welcome reason when itcomes and recognize it easily because of its kinship with himself’.20 Since, however,only very few citizens actually reach the level of philosophical instruction, prepara-tion for it cannot be the programme’s only purpose. Although for Plato all humanbeings share the basic structure of the soul, the dominating part of the soul variesfrom one to another. The rational part ‘rules in some people’s souls, while one ofthe other parts — whichever it happens to be — rules in other people’s’.21 Accord-ingly, Plato distinguishes between ‘three primary kinds of people: wisdom-loving,victory-loving, and profit-loving’.22 Thus human beings for Plato are now in animportant sense unequal, which explains why in his view most citizens will notreach the level of philosophical instruction at all: they simply are not capable bynature. In this sense Plato abandons the goal of Socratic politics of leading all citi-zens to virtue through knowledge. Pre-philosophical education has, therefore, notonly a pedagogical but also a political purpose: it functions as a replacement ofphilosophy for all those who by nature have no access to it. As either a preparationfor or a replacement of philosophy, the pedagogical-political programme thus playsan important role in the life of all citizens of the virtuous state. This explains theelaborate discussion that Plato devotes to non-philosophical devices — most prom-inently in the Laws. The programme’s main components are religious stories,persuasive speeches, laws, and religious practices. All of these are part of the code

19 Laws 672b–c.20 Republic 402a; cf. Laws 653b–c.21 Republic 581b.22 Republic 581c.



Carlos Fraenkel30

of divine nomoi set forth in the Laws. The religious stories about gods, demons, andheroes, for example, can be interpreted as imitating the forms of temperance,courage, wisdom, and justice known to the philosopher who sets up the ‘norms’(typoi) to which these stories must conform.23 Laws in turn prescribe actions thatimitate the philosopher who acts on the basis of rational insight.24 In this way thenot-yet-philosopher is prepared for the philosophical life and the non-philosopheris led as close as possible to it: to a second-degree likeness of the divine, as it were,achieved by means of an imitation of the philosopher’s first-degree likeness of thedivine. Thus Plato’s pedagogical-political programme, while not philosophicalitself, is integrated into the overall project underlying his political philosophy, thatis, the project of making the citizens better.

One last implication of the turn from Socratic politics to Plato’s later politicalthought must be noted. A non-philosopher in the best city possesses only an imita-tion of philosophical knowledge, that is, notions of temperance, courage, wisdom,and justice derived from stories about gods, demons, and heroes. He would, there-fore, neither be able to defend them in a Socratic elenchos, nor derive any benefitfrom the insight that he does not really know what he thought he knew, given hisincapacity to replace the refuted notions through knowledge. In this sense theSocratic project as presented in the Apology is not only judged inadequate given thereality of the human soul; it is also dangerous, because it potentially leads to themoral corruption of the non-philosopher who is left without philosophy’s imita-tion while being unable to reach philosophy itself. In the Republic Plato, in fact, ex-plicitly criticizes the use of the elenchos for testing the beliefs of non-philosophers:because it will cause them to lose the traditional beliefs established by ‘the lawgiver’in which they were brought up and because they lack the ability to ‘discover thetrue ones’. After having been ‘law-abiding’, therefore, they ‘become lawless’.25

Although philosophy still holds the key to the best life, Plato now thinks that itshould be practised outside the public sphere.

Applying the Platonic Model to Judaism and Christianity

How did Plato’s later political philosophy, in particular the Laws, become usefulto philosophers like Philo, Clement, and Origen for integrating their philosophical

23 Republic 379a.24 Cf. Republic 590d.25 See the entire passage, Republic 538c–539a.




and religious commitments? Let me note that in a sense the Laws itself can be seenas the first articulation of a philosophical religion. There is, in fact, a well-establishedscholarly tradition of interpreting the Laws as a religious text. Andrea Nightingale,for instance, describes it as a ‘sacred text’.26 For André Laks it is ‘le premier traitéthéologico-politique’.27

In a somewhat schematic way the application of the Platonic model to Judaismand Christianity can be described as follows. The excellence of the religious tradition,according to the Alexandrians, is due to the fact that it makes the members of thereligious community better by leading them to aretê. They adopt the fundamentaldivision of humankind into philosophers and non-philosophers that resulted fromthe development of Plato’s psychology. The founders of the religion — Moses andChrist — are portrayed as accomplished philosophers. They can, therefore, lead thephilosophically talented members of the religious community to perfection. Butthey are also prophets, lawgivers, and teachers, and as such devised a pedagogical-political programme for the guidance of non-philosophers. The literal content ofthe religious tradition is interpreted as this pedagogical-political programme, func-tioning as a preparation to philosophy for not-yet-philosophers and as a replacementof philosophy for non-philosophers. Like Plato’s programme, it consists of religiousstories, exhortations, rules of conduct, and individual and communal forms ofworship. Moreover, Plato’s view that philosophy should be kept out of the publicsphere, because it can lead to the moral corruption of non-philosophers, becomesuseful to explain the absence of philosophy from Judaism and Christianity.

A full discussion of the philosophical interpretation of Judaism and Christian-ity proposed by Philo, Clement, and Origen is not possible here. But let me sketchthe main elements of this interpretation before turning to the evidence of Euse-bius. For Philo, the pursuit of knowledge, aiming at knowledge of God, is thehighest good and Moses is the exemplar of a life devoted to achieving it.28 After acomprehensive scientific education he reaches the summit of philosophy andapprehends the Forms constituting God’s Logos, that is, the intelligible order of theworld which is the highest manifestation of God accessible to human beings.29

26 Andrea Nightingale, ‘Writing/Reading a Sacred Text: A Literary Interpretation of Plato’sLaws’, Classical Philology, 88 (1993), 279–300.

27 André Laks, Médiation et coercition: pour une lecture des ‘Lois’ de Platon (Lille: Presses Uni-versitaires de Septentroin, 2005), p. 22.

28 De decalogo 81; De specialibus legibus 1. 41–50.29 De vita Mosis 1. 21–24; De opificio mundi 8; De vita Mosis 1. 158.



Carlos Fraenkel32

Moses, however, is not only a philosopher, but also a lawgiver, and Philo, in fact,explicitly describes him in terms of Plato’s philosopher-king in the Republic.30 Asa lawgiver, Moses establishes a pedagogical-political programme that aims atleading all members of the Jewish community to aretê: by preparing not-yet-philosophers for the philosophical life and by making the intellectual and practicalcontents of philosophy accessible to non-philosophers.31 In De decalogo and Despecialibus legibus Philo explains in detail how the nomoi of Moses ‘prepare andexhort us to wisdom and justice and piety and the rest of the chorus of virtues(aretai)’.32 As a whole this pedagogical-political programme relates to the objectsof the philosopher’s knowledge as a shadow relates to a real thing.33 Philo thusapplies Plato’s ontological dualism to the Law of Moses: its literal content can bedescribed as an imitation of the doctrines established in philosophy. Whereas thephilosopher knows, for instance, what justice is, the narratives of the Mosaic Lawimitate that knowledge by describing the behaviour of exemplary just individuals.34

Plato’s view that philosophy, although inherently good, can prove destructive fornon-philosophers is developed by Philo into a general ontological principle: as Godmust restrict the goodness bestowed on his creatures because of their ontologicallimitations, Moses must teach an imitation of philosophy to the religious com-munity because of the intellectual limitations of most of its members.35

Clement and Origen did not introduce major changes into the philosophicalframework adopted by Philo, but simply identified its foundation with Christ:whereas Moses and Plato strove to apprehend the Forms constituting God’s Logos,Christ is God’s Logos; whereas Moses and Plato were lovers of wisdom, Christ iswisdom.36 The portrait of Christianity as the source of Greek philosophy andJudaism and as superior to both is thus compatible for Clement and Origen withtheir commitment to the project of philosophy as the pursuit of knowledge aimingat knowledge of God.

30 De vita Mosis 2. 2.31 See, for example, Quod Deus sit immutabilis 51–69.32 De specialibus legibus 4. 134.33 See De confusione linguarum 190; cf. De vita contemplativa 78.34 See, for instance, the description of the Patriarchs as ‘living laws’ in De Abrahamo 2–6.35 See De opificio mundi 23 with De posteritate Caini 143–45.36 See e.g. Origen’s Peri archôn 2. 6, 1, where Christ is identified with Verbum, Ratio, and

Sapientia to which Origen adds Veritas.




What most sets the Christian philosophers apart from Philo is how they con-nect the distinction between philosophers and non-philosophers and betweenphilosophy and philosophy’s imitation with a notion of progress built into a con-cept of universal history. For Origen all rational souls were equally united with theLogos in an initial state of perfection. Turning away from the Logos — thus Origeninterprets the biblical ‘fall’ — leads to the embodiment of the souls. In successiveembodiments they gradually move further away from or back up to the Logosdepending on how rational a life they lead. Christianity’s mission is to turn human-kind as a whole back to the Logos by directing all human beings to aretê. Thismeans bringing them as close as the current state of their souls allows to intellectualperfection which is attained through the apprehension of the Logos: philosophersby means of philosophy and non-philosophers by means of philosophy’s imita-tion.37 In the course of successive embodiments, however, also non-philosophers —once turned into the right direction — will be able to gradually replace philosophy’simitation through philosophy itself. In this sense the advent of Christianity is seenas a turning point in the history of humankind: it initiates the restoration of thesouls to the state of intellectual perfection which they had lost through the ‘fall’.38

There seems, however, to be an important point on which Plato’s pedagogical-political programme differs from that proposed by the Alexandrians. In the Repub-lic, Plato is highly critical of traditional ‘stories’ (mythoi), most importantly thepoetry of Homer and Hesiod.39 He discards nearly all they wrote because in hisview it is pedagogically unsuited for the citizens of the best polis. Instead of philo-sophically reconstructing existing Greek mythoi through interpretation, he pro-vides philosophical ‘guidelines’ (typoi) for composing new ones.40 In this respectPhilo, Clement, and Origen clearly do not follow Plato: they integrate the founda-tional texts of their religious traditions into the pedagogical-political programmeby interpreting their literal content as useful for guiding the members of the reli-gious community to aretê and by attributing to them an allegorical content whichreconciles them with the doctrines established in philosophy.41 Let me stress,

37 For the education of non-philosophers through the Logos, see Contra Celsum 4. 71–72.38 This paragraph summarizes what I take to be the main line of argument of Peri archôn

1. 4–3. 6. See in particular 3. 6 where Origen stresses the circular character of the development ofthe rational souls.

39 See Books 2, 3, and 10; for Plato’s attitude to mythoi, see Luc Brisson, Platon, les mots et lesmythes (Paris: Maspero, 1982).

40 Republic 379a.41 See Philo, De posteritate Caini 1. 1; De agricultura 96–97. Origen, Peri archôn, Book 4.



Carlos Fraenkel34

however, that this does not point to different systematic commitments. After all,pagan Platonists are engaged in a very similar project when they portray Homer asan accomplished sage whose wisdom — conveyed in parables and metaphors —can be recovered through allegorical interpretation.42 The claim that the allegoricalcontent of the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament coincides with the doctrinesestablished in philosophy is of course indispensable to the Alexandrians for secur-ing the truth of their religious tradition besides its pedagogical-political usefulness.

Eusebius of Caesarea’s Praeparatio evangelica as a Key to the AlexandrianProject

As I suggested above, the most compelling evidence for my claim that Philo,Clement, and Origen relied on a Platonic model for interpreting Judaism andChristianity as philosophical religions is provided by Eusebius of Caesarea. Euse-bius’s use of Plato and its intellectual setting have been documented in detail byEdouard des Places.43 More recently, Dominic O’Meara has pointed out the impor-tance of the Neoplatonic reception of Plato’s political philosophy for under-standing Eusebius’s portrait of the Christian emperor Constantine as the truephilosopher-king.44 But this portrait of the founder of the Christian politeia shouldsurely be seen in conjunction with the detailed discussion in the Praeparatio ofhow Plato’s political philosophy in turn is derived from his knowledge of thepoliteia of the Jews. In this context it is important to note that Eusebius stressedthe continuity between the Jewish theocracy and the Christian politeia, the pur-pose of the latter being to expand the rule of God from Israel to the entire world.45

This God, as we will see below, is for Eusebius the same as ‘the Nous who rules allthings’, in Plato’s Laws.

42 The standard account for the later Platonic exegesis of Homer is Robert Lamberton, Homerthe Theologian (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).

43 Edouard des Places, Eusèbe de Cesarée, Commentateur: Platonisme et écriture sainte (Paris:Beauchesne, 1982).

44 Dominic J. O’Meara, Platonopolis: Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 145–51.

45 See the Commentary on Isaiah for Eusebius’s view on this development. Cf. the study byMichael J. Hollerich, Eusebius of Caesarea’s ‘Commentary on Isaiah’ (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1999), in particular chaps 4–6. But note that the difference between the Jewish theocracyand the Christian politeia is not only one in scope; I will discuss below what sets Christianity apartfrom Judaism according to Eusebius.




To provide the context of Eusebius’s discussion of Plato’s political philosophylet me briefly sketch the project of the Praeparatio evangelica which, together withthe Demonstratio evangelica, forms a two-part exposition and defence of Eusebius’sunderstanding of the Judaeo-Christian tradition.46 In the Praeparatio, Eusebiusaddresses educated readers in antiquity who ‘do not know what Christianity is’(1. 1).47 From the outset he adopts a philosophical approach: rational deliberation,Eusebius argues, necessarily leads to the choice of Christianity.48 The first step toproving this claim consists in examining and refuting alternative traditions — forexample the religions of the Phoenicians, the Egyptians, and the Greeks — with theaim to convince the readers that they have good reasons to prefer Christianity.Most of Books 1 through 6 is devoted to this destructive project, focusing inparticular on the rejection of polytheism and the doctrine of fate. Book 7 marks thebeginning of the project’s constructive part. After exposing what he takes to be theerrors and corruption of the pagan traditions, Eusebius now argues for the correct-ness of the tradition of the Hebrews. His portrait of Hebrew wisdom is firmlyrooted in the philosophical-religious project of the Alexandrians: he gives anaccount of ancient Hebrew metaphysics, cosmology, psychology, and ethics, as wellas of the Mosaic politeia based on quotations from Jewish and Christian authorsin Alexandria, most importantly Philo, but also Aristobulus, Josephus, Origen, andothers (Books 7–8). In order to prevent this account from being dismissed asapologetic, Eusebius seeks to provide support for the views of the Alexandriansthrough a collection of testimonies from Greek writers ranging from Theophrastusto Porphyry (Book 9). Book 10 elaborately argues for the dependency thesis:Nothing in Greek culture is authentic; everything was appropriated through pla-giarizing ‘barbarian’ sources. At first view this seems to introduce the argument’snext step: Eusebius’s claim that everything of value in Greek science is equallycontained in the Hebrew tradition. But Eusebius does not make the additional

46 For a comprehensive study of Eusebius’s apologetic project, see Arieh Kofsky, Eusebius ofCaesarea against Paganism (Leiden: Brill, 2002).

47 See Eusebius’s own summary of the argument and its connection to the Demonstratio in15. 1.

48 The portrait of the choice of Christianity as a philosophical choice, as if Christianity werethe best among competing philosophical schools, is not uncommon among early Christian intel-lectuals. See, for example, Justin Martyr’s account of his conversion in Dialogue with Trypho 3–8.The title ‘Protreptikos’ that Clement gave to the first volume of his philosophical-theological trilogyreflects the same idea: it is an ‘Exhortation’ to the best philosophy, which Clement takes to beChristianity.



Carlos Fraenkel36

claim that Greek science is derived from studying the Bible. Valuable in Greekscience, according to Eusebius, is first and foremost the philosophy of Plato — orrather, his understanding of Plato’s philosophy which is shaped by various pagan,Jewish, and Christian interpretations. Plato in his view surpassed all other philo-sophers (see Book 11, Preface), a view also prominent in the two outlines of Plato’sphilosophy by Atticus (second century CE) and by Aristocles (late first century CE)which he quotes in Book 11. 2. I will try to explain below why Eusebius is hesitantto accuse Plato of plagiarism. For my present purpose it is important to note thathis intellectual commitment to Plato seems unqualified at first: Eusebius not onlytries to demonstrate that Plato’s physics, ethics, and logic — following the standarddivision of philosophy in antiquity that I mentioned above — are in complete‘concord’ (symphônia) with the ‘oracles of the Hebrews’ (Hebraiôn logia) (11,Preface). He also makes considerable effort to provide evidence that Plato helddoctrines that look suspiciously non-Platonic, in particular eschatological doctrinessuch as the resurrection of the dead (see 11. 33–38). But in Book 13 Eusebiusseems to have become aware of the following objection set forth by the Greekreaders whom he addresses in the Praeparatio: ‘If Moses and Plato have philoso-phized in agreement, why should we not follow the teachings of Plato, but thoseof Moses? We ought to do the opposite since in addition to the doctrines being thesame (isa dogmata), the Greek [philosopher] would be closer to us Greeks than thebarbarian’ (13, Preface). The argument for complete symphônia thus raises thequestion why a Greek intellectual should embrace Judaeo-Christianity at all. Thisproblem seems to have motivated a series of minor criticisms of Plato at the end ofBook 13 (14–21). Ultimately the philosophy of Moses thus comes out as superiorto the philosophy of Plato, if only by an insignificant margin. In the last two booksEusebius returns to the destructive project, this time examining and rejectingdoctrines set forth by philosophical traditions from the Presocratics to the Helle-nistic schools which he takes to disagree with the philosophy of Moses and Plato.For this purpose, Eusebius considerably exploits ancient philosophical debates anddisagreements.

In conclusion we can say that in the Praeparatio Eusebius’s aim is to establishthe superiority of the Hebrew tradition over other traditions through philosoph-ical argument. For my purpose the most important step in the argument is hisattempt to show the complete concord between Plato’s philosophy and the wis-dom tradition of the Hebrews. But how is this an argument for becoming a Chris-tian? After all, if Eusebius has made a successful case for the superiority of theHebrew wisdom tradition, why should one convert to Christianity rather than toJudaism? This question is addressed in the Demonstratio evangelica in which




Eusebius explains how in his view Christianity is related to Judaism and why thenew covenant superseded the old one. Below I will show that Eusebius’s argumentfor supersession is based on an interpretation of Plato’s pedagogical-political pro-gramme as a process unfolding in history — similar to the interpretation of Origenthat I outlined above.

In what follows, I will briefly recall the central points in Plato’s political philosophywhich I take to constitute the conceptual framework underlying the Alexandrianinterpretation of Judaism and Christianity as philosophical religions. I will thenshow how these points recur in Eusebius’s attempt to establish the ‘concord’between the political principles informing Plato’s best politeia and the politicalprinciples on which Moses based the politeia of the Jews.

We saw that the overall goal of Plato’s philosophical-political project is to makethe citizens better by leading them to aretê. In the Laws the criterion to determinewhether nomoi are divine or not is their ability to lead the citizens to ‘the highestaretê’. For Eusebius the nomoi of Moses clearly fulfil this criterion. He agrees withPhilo and other Hellenistic-Jewish authors that they lead the members of the reli-gious community to aretê. In Praeparatio 12. 16 Eusebius quotes two long passagesfrom the Laws (631a8–632a3 and 632c3–d6) in which Plato argues that nomoi canonly lay claim to be divine if they impart to the citizens all the ‘goods’ required toattain perfection: human goods (health, beauty, strength, and wealth) and divinegoods — the four cardinal aretai established in the Republic, the former being goodonly as a means for attaining the latter. The highest good towards which the fouraretai are directed is ‘Reason (Nous) who rules all things’. The following is the cru-cial passage in which Eusebius identifies the project of the Laws, as laid out in thetwo passages just discussed, with the project of Moses:

Moses had made his entire legislation (nomothesia) and the politeia established by himdependent on the religion (eusebeia) of the God of the universe. He had made thedemiurge of all things the starting point of the legislation. Then he taught that from thedivine goods the human goods proceed and referred the divine goods to Reason who rulesall things (ho pantôn hêgemôn nous), i.e. to the God of the universe himself. Consider howthe philosopher [i.e. Plato], walking on the same path, criticizes the legislators of the Cre-tans and the Lacedaemonians, and teaches (ekdidaskei) the Law dear (areskonta) to Moses.(Praeparatio 12. 16)

The ‘religion of the God of the Universe’ is thus one that guides its membersby means of the nomothesia and politeia established by Moses to complete aretê,culminating in God, that is, the ‘Reason who rules all things’, which Eusebius takesto be the highest perfection. Although Eusebius points out what in his view are a



Carlos Fraenkel38

number of parallels between the nomoi of Moses and the nomoi established in theLaws, it is highly unlikely that he takes the latter to be a copy of the former. Whathe likely means by his claim that Plato ‘teaches the Law dear to Moses’ is that Platoapplied the political principles that inform the nomoi of Moses to the geographicand cultural circumstances of fourth-century Greece.49

A politeia of this nature can only be established, according to Plato, if politicalscience and political power come together. Plato’s position in the Republic is thatphilosopher-rulers are able to achieve this because as philosophers they have notonly the knowledge of what is best for the polis, but also the moral integrity to im-plement it when they take office as rulers. In an important passage of the Republic(500c–501c) Plato describes how a philosopher-ruler consorts ‘with what is divineand well ordered’, and thus becomes ‘himself as divine and well ordered as a humanbeing can be’. Then he turns into a ‘craftsman’ of aretê and a ‘painter of politeiai’who shapes the polis according to the same divine model. Eusebius quotes theentire passage from the Republic and applies it to Moses in 12. 19. To this end heuses Exodus 25. 40 and the interpretation of this verse in the pseudo-PaulineEpistle to the Hebrews. In the Exodus passage, God instructs Moses to make allthings pertaining to the tabernacle ‘according to the model (kata ton typon) whichwas shown to you on the mountain’. In Hebrews 8. 5 this is taken to mean thatMoses ought to make ‘an imitation and shadow (hypodeigma kai skia) of heavenlythings’. Disregarding the original context of the two passages in which they referto the construction of the tabernacle, Eusebius interprets them as meaning that the‘symbols’ (symbola) of Moses ‘contained images (eikona) of the more divine reali-ties in the intelligible realm (en noêtois)’. As the quotation from the Republic makesclear, these ‘symbols’ for Eusebius are the content of the nomoi of Moses. LikePlato’s philosopher-ruler, Moses thus becomes the ‘painter’ of the Jewish politeiawhich imitates the objects ‘in the intelligible realm’ apprehended by the philoso-pher Moses. Already in Praeparatio 12. 6, moreover, Eusebius had inferred Moses’smoral integrity — which secures that he uses his political power to put what heknows to be best into practice — from the fact that Moses pleads with God to ap-point someone else to be the political leader of the Jews (see Exodus 4. 13). BecauseMoses does not want political power he also cannot be corrupted by it. Eusebiusrelates this claim to the passage in Book 1 of the Republic in which Socrates argues

49 On contextualism in Plato and in the Platonic tradition, see my ‘Divine Law in the PlatonicTradition: One or Many?’, in Universality of Reason: Plurality of Philosophies in the Middle Ages.Proceedings of the 12th International Congress of the SIEPM in Palermo 2007 (forthcoming).




against Thrasymachus that the art of ruling consists in promoting the good of theentire polis and not the special interests of the rulers (see 345e).

But why does Moses guide the members of the community to aretê through‘symbols’ that imitate the objects ‘in the intelligible realm’ instead of exposingthem to these objects directly? We saw that Plato divides humankind into philoso-phers and non-philosophers. Eusebius adopts this division and takes the literal con-tent of the Mosaic Law to be a pedagogical-political programme designed for theguidance of non-philosophers. In Plato this programme fulfils a twofold function:it prepares not-yet-philosophers for the philosophical life, and it replaces philoso-phy for citizens who are not philosophers by nature. The same twofold function,according to Eusebius, is fulfilled by the Law of Moses. In 12. 18, for example, hequotes Laws 643d6–644b4, a passage in which Plato describes the purpose of‘education’ (paideia) as ‘the initial acquisition of aretê by the child, when the feel-ings of pleasure and love, pain and hatred, that well up in his soul are channelledin the right courses before he can grasp the rational ground (logon lambanein).Then when he does grasp it, [these feelings] agree with his reason through havingbeen properly trained by means of appropriate habits’. Many passages of theHebrew Bible, Eusebius argues, bear witness to the fact that this conception ofpaideia was anticipated by Moses. In general he takes the stories contained inscripture to conform to the ‘guidelines’ for pedagogically suitable mythoi that Platoestablished in Books 2 and 3 of the Republic. Parents and nurses, Eusebius assertsin 12. 5, recited these stories to children ‘in order to prepare them (proparaskeuêsheneka) for the religion (theosebeia) appropriate to adulthood’. Throughout chap-ters 1–6 in Book 12, the term ‘faith’ (pistis) can be understood as designating thispreparatory stage of religion. That pistis precedes theoria is a view that Eusebiusexplicitly attributes to scripture in 12. 1. But preparing for a life guided by reasonis not the only purpose of Moses’s pedagogical-political programme. Eusebius takesmost members of the community to be non-philosophers by nature who retainchildish souls throughout their adult life. Quoting a passage from the pseudo-Platonic Second Letter (314a1–10), Eusebius explains that one should not ‘reveal(ekpherein) to everyone the holy doctrines of the truth’, a view he finds confirmedin Matthew’s prohibition to ‘give that which is holy to the dogs’ and to ‘throwpearls before swine’ (7. 6). Although Plato’s physics — comprising both the scienceof the natural word and the science of the intelligible world — is for Eusebius obvi-ously part of the wisdom of the Hebrews, Moses did not think it fit to be taught to‘the multitude’ (hoi polloi) and to ‘the common people’ (to dêmôdes plêthos), exceptfor those doctrines that are required for leading a ‘devote and moderate life’ (11. 7).We saw that Plato’s pedagogical-political programme is made up of different



Carlos Fraenkel40

components, the most important of which can be characterized as religious stories,laws, persuasive speeches, and various forms of worship. Throughout Book 12Eusebius describes the components of Moses’s pedagogical-political programme,quoting a wide range of passages from both the Republic and the Laws and pointingout what he takes to be parallels in the Law of Moses to the pedagogical-politicaldevices discussed by Plato.

Eusebius, then, takes Moses and Plato to be in agreement on that philosophyshould not be taught in public. Recall that Plato explicitly criticizes the use of theelenchos for testing the beliefs of non-philosophers, because it will cause them tolose the traditional beliefs in which they were brought up and because they lack theability to ‘discover the true ones’. After having been ‘law-abiding’, therefore, they‘become lawless’.50 The implication of this argument for the Mosaic Law is that itdoes not teach philosophical doctrines, since it is a pedagogical-political pro-gramme designed for the guidance of non-philosophers. As a consequence it is alsonot possible to learn philosophical doctrines by studying the Mosaic Law. Al-though I have found no explicit statement of Eusebius to this purpose, a good casecan be made for his being aware of this implication from how he describes Plato’srelationship to Moses. As I mentioned in my sketch of the argument of the Praepa-ratio, Eusebius claims in Book 10 that Greek culture in general is the outcome ofthe plagiarism of barbarian sources. He does not, however, contend that Platoderived his philosophical doctrines from studying the Law of Moses. While thismay seem surprising at first, it should now be clear why Eusebius cannot make sucha contention: if the Mosaic Law does not contain philosophical doctrines, but‘symbols’ that imitate them for non-philosophers, Plato cannot have gained hisphilosophical insights from studying it. Eusebius does suggest, on the other hand,the existence of an esoteric tradition of Hebrew wisdom which was transmittedorally by Hebrew philosophers from generation to generation. He leaves it open,however, whether Plato derived his doctrines from this oral tradition. Eusebiustakes this to be possible because of Plato’s alleged visit to Egypt where he couldhave come into contact with Jewish exiles. But he may as well have ‘discoveredthem by himself (par’ heautou)’ or, Eusebius adds, in ‘whatever manner he mayhave been considered worthy of this knowledge by God’ (11. 8). Note that Euse-bius takes for granted that Plato was familiar with the Law of Moses. But it is withrespect to the pedagogical-political programme, not with respect to philosophicaldoctrines, that he claims Plato to be dependent on Moses. As we saw above, he

50 Republic 538c–539a.




suggests that the Law of Moses was the model that Plato had in mind when hedescribed the nature of divine nomoi in Book 1 of the Laws. But most interestingin this context is that Eusebius takes Plato to have copied the story about the fallof Adam and Eve in his account of the birth of Eros in the Symposium (Praeparatio12. 11). He contends, moreover, that the Symposium’s account of human beingswho were originally hermaphrodites of spherical shape and later cut into two halvesis based on a misunderstanding of the biblical account of the creation of Eve fromAdam (12. 12). In other words, not Plato the philosopher, but Plato the ‘mythmaker’ is, according to Eusebius, dependent on the Mosaic Law!51 This implies thatfor Eusebius Plato, like Moses, sometimes uses the prophetic mode of discourse.He, in fact, explicitly says that when Plato describes the birth of Eros ‘he is also [i.e.like Moses] speaking allegorically (kai autos allêgorôn)’ (12. 11). The same view isexpressed by pagan Platonists: Plotinus, for instance, takes the account of the birthof Eros to be an allegory and explains it accordingly. Proclus contrasts Plato’smythoi which he takes to be suitable for pedagogical purposes with the mythoi ofHomer which he takes to be suitable for initiates alone.52 To see the relationshipbetween philosophy and scripture clearly is crucial for determining the place ofphilosophy in Jewish and Christian intellectual contexts in late antiquity: philo-sophers like Philo, Clement, and Origen had an excellent justification for the studyof philosophical texts since on their view of scripture studying philosophy wasindispensable for gaining access to scripture’s allegorical content.

This brings me to the next point. Taken literally the Law of Moses consists of‘symbols’ which imitate philosophical doctrines with the aim to guide non-philosophers to aretê. In another respect, however, Eusebius takes philosophicaldoctrines to be present in it. As an imitation of philosophical doctrines scripture isnot, strictly speaking, true. In this sense, Eusebius can identify the literal content ofscripture’s stories with the ‘noble falsehoods’ as Plato describes the mythoi that oughtto be employed for pedagogical purposes. According to Republic 376e12–377a8,quoted by Eusebius in 12. 4, children ‘must at first be educated in falsehoods (entois pseudesin)’. But once the stories are understood as representations of philo-sophical doctrines, they can be translated, as it were, into these doctrines by meansof allegorical interpretation. While Plato takes mythoi to be ‘false on the whole’, he

51 I am borrowing the phrase from the title of the English translation of Brisson, Platon, lesmots et les mythes (Plato the Myth Maker, trans. by Gerard Naddaf (Chicago: University of ChicagoPress, 1998)).

52 In Platonis Rem publicam commentarii 1. 76–77, 1. 79. Cf. Lamberton, Homer the Theolo-gian, pp. 180–97.



Carlos Fraenkel42

also contends that ‘they have some truth in them’ (Republic 377a). Literally, for ex-ample, the description of the soul as a chariot with a charioteer and two horses inthe Phaedrus is false, but if read as a figurative representation of Plato’s philoso-phical psychology it would be true — assuming of course the truth of Plato’spsychology. Plato himself did not systematically develop a programme of allegoricalexegesis. But Eusebius clearly thinks that such a programme is implied in Plato’stheory of pedagogically suitable mythoi. He sums up the Hebrew approach to‘noble falsehoods’ as follows:

And among the Hebrews also it is the custom to teach the narratives (historiai) of theinspired scripture to those of childish souls (hoi nêpioi tas psychas) in a very simple way justlike any mythoi, but to teach those of a trained [intellectual] habit the deeper and doctrinalconcepts of the words (hai tôn logôn bathuterai kai dogmatikai theôriai) by means of theso-called ‘second level interpretation (deuterôsis)’ and explanation of the intelligible con-tents (noêmata) that are hidden from the multitude. (Praeparatio 12. 4)

While it is not possible to derive philosophical doctrines from scripture, it is thuspossible to exegetically locate them in it.

Let me finally address the question of how Eusebius describes the relationshipbetween Judaism and Christianity, the old and the new covenant. After all, thepedagogical-political programme that constitutes the Law of Moses was notadopted by Christians: they accept as canonical the scripture of the Jews, but donot follow their way of life.53 Thus after having made such a strong case for theexcellence of the Law of Moses, Eusebius now must explain why Christians dismissit. Whether the reason he gives in the Demonstratio for its dismissal is consistentwith the case he made for its excellence in the Praeparatio is doubtful in my view,but I cannot pursue this question further. More interesting for my present purposeis how Eusebius creatively interprets the concept of religion as a pedagogical-political programme as a process unfolding in history. Christianity, he claims, is nota new religion, but restores the religion practiced by the ‘saints’ before Moses —from Enoch to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.54 The Law of Moses is not an integralpart of this religion, but a pedagogical device conceived by Moses to re-establish itafter the exodus from Egypt:

[The Law of Moses] was like a nurse and governess of childish and imperfect souls. It waslike a doctor to heal the whole Jewish race, worn away by the terrible disease of Egypt. Assuch it offered a lower and less perfect way of life to the children of Abraham, who were tooweak to follow in the steps of their forefathers. For through their long sojourn in Egypt,

53 See Demonstratio 1. 4.54 Demonstratio 1. 2.




after the death of their godly forefathers, they adopted Egyptian customs, and […] fell intoidolatrous superstition. (Demonstratio 1. 6)

According to the standard Platonic view the childishness which requires guidancethrough a pedagogical-political programme is either childhood in the literal senseor childhood as the condition of the soul of non-philosophers. To this Eusebiusadds a third form: temporary childhood caused by detrimental historical circum-stances.

Why Jews and Christians Should Study Philosophy

It is important to stress at the outset that the Alexandrians do not simply equatephilosophy with Greek philosophy. Philo, for instance, refers respectfully to the‘most holy Plato’,55 but takes Moses to be superior to Plato. Clement and Origenalso hold Plato in high esteem, but hold Moses in higher esteem than Plato andChrist in turn in higher esteem than Moses. This superiority, however, is conceivedas philosophical superiority. Given the way a philosophical religion is construed ithas no implications for the philosophical commitments of a Jew or a Christian. Forthe extant works of Moses and Christ derive from their role as lawgivers, teachers,or prophets and thus constitute what I described above as the handmaid of philo-sophy. Although the allegorical content of these works is taken to coincide with thedoctrines established in philosophy, it cannot be learned by studying the textsthemselves. Only someone who studied philosophy can locate them in these textsby means of allegorical interpretation. In the portrait Philo draws of his own edu-cation he first studies the preliminary sciences and then pursues philosophy.56 Onlyafter being forced to abandon the contemplative life by ‘the worst of evils, envy,hater of the good’ which dragged him ‘into the vast sea of civil cares’ does he turnto the interpretation of the Law of Moses bringing ‘to light what is unknown to themultitude’.57 To the best of my knowledge, Philo nowhere claims to have derivedscientific knowledge from the Mosaic Law, although he locates its objects in itthrough allegorical exegesis. Perhaps the clearest evidence for my contention is thedetailed account of the curriculum in Origen’s school, provided by Gregory Thau-maturgus in his Panegyric on Origen. For Gregory Origen is a model philosopher,entirely devoted to the pursuit of truth and virtue. He describes how he was first

55 Probus 13.56 Congressu 74–76.57 De specialibus legibus 3. 1–6.



Carlos Fraenkel44

trained by Origen in logic, then introduced to physics and cosmology which inturn was followed by mathematics, in particular geometry and astronomy. Nextcame ethics in conjunction with philosophical psychology, both theory and prac-tice, in order to achieve a virtuous character, in particular Plato’s four cardinal vir-tues. The goal of his efforts is described by Gregory as follows: ‘By the pure intellectmake yourself like to God that you may draw near to Him and abide in him.’58

Ethics in turn is followed by metaphysics and theology. Gregory stresses that Ori-gen directed him to study the works of all philosophical schools and to assent onlyto what he clearly recognized as true. Only after this comprehensive philosophicaltraining encompassing both theory and practice does Gregory turn to reading theBible under the guidance of Origen.

It is clear, therefore, that for Jewish and Christian proponents of a philosoph-ical religion the claim that Moses and Christ were superior to Greek philosophers,or that their religious tradition is absolutely true, has no immediate doctrinalimplications. For the authority of the religious sources in matters of truth dependson the objects of knowledge that constitute their allegorical content. These, how-ever, are accessible by means of philosophy alone. Hence the religious sources donot set limits to the study of philosophy, but on the contrary encourage it. Theassumption that the founder of a religious tradition was the most accomplishedphilosopher (or in the case of Christ, wisdom itself) and that the allegorical con-tent of that religious tradition is absolutely true translates into the establishmentof an intellectual curriculum for the pursuit of knowledge which is at the same timethe ideal of philosophy and the ideal of religion.

This brings me to a final point. Scholars often contend that the Alexandrians,in order to justify their study of philosophy, argued that Greek philosophers de-rived their philosophy from the Bible.59 Such a claim would be highly implausibleif I am right that according to the Alexandrian concept of a philosophical religion,philosophical doctrines cannot be learned from the Bible, but only exegeticallylocated in it by someone who completed a comprehensive philosophical curricu-lum. The ‘dependency’ claim appears to lead straight into a logical circle. For thenbeing a philosopher would be both a condition for finding true doctrines in the

58 Panegyric 12. 149; English translation by Michael Slusser in St. Gregory Thaumaturgus: Lifeand Works (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1998).

59 See, for example, Daniel Ridings, The Attic Moses: The Dependency Theme in Some EarlyChristian Writers (Gothenburg: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 1995); G. R. Boys-Stones,Post-Hellenistic Philosophy: A Study of its Development from the Stoics to Origen (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2001).




Bible and the result of studying the Bible. It is also not clear to me what shouldmotivate such a view. For even if Moses and Christ were the greatest philosophersof all times, why should the fact that Plato was a decent philosopher too depend onhis being a disciple of Moses? The agreement of Moses and Plato on some doctrinalissue does not require ‘dependency’ as an explanation. They may just have indepen-dently reached the same conclusion. Confronted with Celsus’s claim that the rejec-tion of idolatry is not a Christian innovation, but was anticipated by Heraclitus,Origen does not say that Heraclitus in turn derived it from the Bible. Instead heexplains that ‘ideas were implanted in the minds of men […] from which not onlyHeraclitus, but any other Greek or barbarian, might by reflection have inferred thesame conclusion’.60 There is scarce evidence for counting either Philo or Origenamong the proponents of the dependency claim. Philo for one cannot have consid-ered Moses the sole source of knowledge, because he describes Moses himself asbeing trained by Egyptian, Chaldean, and Greek teachers.61 To the best of myknowledge Philo nowhere explicitly claims that Plato derived any of his philosoph-ical doctrines from Moses.62 In the entire De opificio mundi there is only oneindirect reference to Plato as ‘one of the ancients’, despite the paramount influenceof the Timaeus on Philo’s exposition of the creation account.63 If Philo wished tojustify his use of Plato through the dependency claim, it would be difficult toexplain why he fails mentioning it in this treatise. Although in De providentia 1. 22he does contend that Moses anticipated Plato by teaching that there was water,darkness, and chaos before the world came into being, he does not say that Platodepends on Moses concerning these doctrines. The assumption of independentdiscovery also explains Philo’s, at first view surprising, statement that the StoicsBoethus of Sidon and Panaetius abandoned a cosmological theory, which disagreedwith Moses’s cosmology, due to ‘divine possession’ (theoleptoi).64 Philo evidentlythought it possible for a philosopher to adopt a doctrine in agreement with Moses’s

60 Contra Celsum 1. 5.61 De vita Mosis 1. 21–24.62 Cf. Paul Wendland, ‘Die Therapeuten und die philonische Schrift vom beschaulichen

Leben’, Jahrbücher für classische Philologie, Supplementband, 22 (1896), 693–772 (p. 770).63 De opificio mundi 21. On Philo’s use of the Timaeus, see David T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria

and the Timaeus of Plato (Leiden: Brill, 1987). For the context of the indirect reference to Plato,see On the Creation of the Cosmos according to Moses, intro., trans., and comm. by David T. Runia(Leiden: Brill, 2001), p. 144.

64 De aeternitate mundi 76.



Carlos Fraenkel46

teachings because the pursuit of philosophy had brought him into contact withGod and thus with the truth and not because he derived it from the Law of Moses.

Upon closer examination the ‘dependency’ claim does, in fact, not seem tojustify the study of Greek philosophy at all. For if Plato was able to derive his philo-sophy from the Bible, there is no good reason why one should study Plato. Whybother with the works of the disciple if the works of the teacher are available aswell? Why would Origen make Gregory work through a comprehensive curricu-lum of philosophical disciplines if these consisted in nothing but plagiarisms fromthe Bible? Why did Philo not study the Bible instead of first learning the propae-deutic sciences and then continuing with philosophy?

We have already seen that Eusebius too, although in many respects a championof the dependency thesis, does not claim that Plato’s philosophy is derived from theBible. There, are, however, thinkers who do extend the dependency thesis to philo-sophy. One of them is Clement of Alexandria. Examining the case of Clement andother proponents of the dependency thesis with respect to Greek philosophywould go beyond what I can accomplish in this chapter. It should be clear,however, that the stance adopted by Philo, Origen, and Eusebius is much moreplausible given their conception of Judaism and Christianity.

Conclusion

If my sketch of the interpretation of Judaism and Christianity as philosophicalreligions is correct, its proponents would argue that the questions set out at thebeginning of this chapter are based on a false dichotomy between philosophy andreligion. For Philo, Clement, and Origen Jews and Christians must study philo-sophy — to the extent they have the required capacity — because philosophy leadsto the greatest perfection. The doctrines established in philosophy in turn are notdistinct from Judaism and Christianity: they are their allegorical content whichtheir literal content imitates in the form of a pedagogical-political programmedesigned for non-philosophers — either as a preparation to or a replacement ofphilosophy. While these doctrines can be exegetically located in scripture, theycannot be derived from it. Consequently the study of scripture cannot be a substi-tute for the study of philosophy, whereas the study of philosophy is indispensablefor accessing the true content of scripture. Contradictions exist only betweenphilosophy and scripture’s literal sense and can be resolved through allegoricalinterpretation. Educated Gentiles should convert to Christianity, because Chris-tianity is superior to Greek philosophy, but this superiority is conceived as thesuperiority of one philosophical school over another. Being equally committed to




philosophy on the one hand and Judaism and Christianity on the other, it is clearwhy philosophers like Philo, Clement, and Origen would find the Platonic modelof a philosophical religion attractive: it allowed them to integrate both philosophyinto a Jewish and Christian framework and Judaism and Christianity into a philo-sophical framework. Finally, in a creative adaptation of the standard model, itprovided Christians with an explanation for their view that a new covenant hadsuperseded the old one.

Departments of Jewish Studies and Philosophy, McGill University



Integrating Greek Philosophy into Jewish and Christian Contexts in Antiquity: The Alexandrian...

Documents

Transcript of Integrating Greek Philosophy into Jewish and Christian Contexts in Antiquity: The Alexandrian...