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Hydrarchy, Colonists, and Revolution in the British Atlantic WOrld
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Transcript of Hydrarchy, Colonists, and Revolution in the British Atlantic WOrld
Hydrarchy, Colonists and Revolution in the British Atlantic
World
A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Graduate School
of Millersville University of Pennsylvania
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
of Master of Arts
History
2
By Michael C. McCloskey
November 15, 2013
This Thesis for the Master of History Degree by
Michael C. McCloskey
has been approved on behalf of the
Graduate School by
Thesis Committee:
Research Advisor
3
Committee Member
Committee Member
Date
Table of Contents
Timeline—page 4
Introduction—page 6
Section I—England and Mercantilism
England and Mercantilism—page 8
The Navigation Acts—page 15
Section II—Bermuda and New England: Two Children of the Same
Mother
Bermuda—page 23
New England—page 27
Section III
4
The Role of Smuggling—36
Examples of Competition and Conflict—page 41 Revolutionary Implications—page 53
Conclusion: Evolution of an American Identity—page 59
Section IV
Bibliography—page 61
Original Sources—page 61
Secondary Sources—page 63
End Notes—67
Timeline
1584 Hakluyt writes Discourse Concerning Western Planting
1609 Wreck of the Sea Venture in Bermuda
1610 Sir George Somers dies in Bermuda in November
1615 King James I charters the Somers Islands Company, entity
from the Virginia Company
1641 Massachusetts General Court appoints September 2, as public
day of Thanksgiving
5
1648 John Cotton publishes Way of Congregational Churches Cleared
1651 Oliver Cromwell establishes the Navigation Acts
1660 Charles II returns to England to reestablish the royal
family and nullifies the parliamentary Navigation Acts and
creates his own.
1663 Charles II strengthens Navigation Acts / The second
Navigation Act
1673 Charles II strengthens Navigation Acts
1681 King Charles II issues the charter on 4th of March for the
founding of the colony of Pennsylvania
1682 Dissolution of Somers Islands Company
1686 Establishment of Governor Andros as the Governor of
the Dominion of New England
1688 Samuel Sewell of Massachusetts is sent on a diplomatic
mission to meet with Increase Mather in England, in an
attempt to reclaim their charter and manner of governance.
1696 William III strengthens Navigation Acts
6
1696 Creation of the Board of Trade
1700 Benjamin Bennett appointed Lieutenant Governor of Bermuda
1702 Death of King William
1702 War of Spanish Succession in Europe begins.
1713 War of Spanish Succession in Europe ends.
1733 The Molasses Act
1774 Petition of the Grand Continental Congress to the King
1774 Bermuda receives warning from the first Continental
Congress in July
1774 “Black Powder Affair” in Bermuda August 14
1775 The Act of Exclusion
1775 The Prohibitory Act
1776 Adam Smith writes Wealth of Nations
1776 Anglo-American Revolution
7
Introduction
Hydrarchy was a term coined by Richard Braithwaite, an upper
class-gentleman of the English Revolution, to describe the
English ruling elite. But it was brought back into the lexicon of
terms more recently by Peter Linebaugh and Markus Rediker in
their work, Many Headed Hydra (2000).1 The Hydrarchy as defined by
Richard Braithwaite consisted of the oligarchy of the British
Atlantic Colonial System. Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker use
the simplified definition of a “maritime state” as a
confederation of independent entities: a ship itself could fit
this description and its crew who “self organized from below”,
became the labor on the new water-borne factories. 2 This
approach ‘from below’ included the everyday mariner and small
merchant.
8
When approached ‘from above,’ the Hydrarchy is easily
described as the maritime trading elite, the maritime oligarchy
of the Atlantic World. These were the joint stock companies, the
governors, the merchant elites, and ultimately the seat of power
in Parliament and the King. This is the definition of Hydrarchy
used within the essay. How is it that the oligarchy of the
Atlantic World, called the Hydrarchy, came to compete against the
colonists, driving a wedge between the two which led to conflict,
and an eventual revolution? This question is what this paper will
address, essentially discussing how the competition and conflict
inherent in the Hydrarchy’s relations with the colonies led to
the development of an economic American identity.
The Hydrarchy’s methods of transportation and communication
were the Atlantic Ocean itself; these were also the means by
which their power was established and elevated. States had a hand
in all of them, and without their support the ventures assembled
could not have existed.3 Too much was needed and too much was at
stake; it was now a matter of national security. If the power
9
objective among nations in the sixteenth and seventeenth century
was to expand their wealth and power through mercantilism, then
they had to acquire colonies.
This paper will be divided into three sections discussing
this Hydrarchy and its competitive relations with colonial
elites. Section one will deal with Great Britain and the
mercantilist system itself. These two entities combined and
guided the Hydrarchy in their decision making. Section two looks
at the colonial system, focusing on the settlements of Bermuda
and New England. The ruling elites as power brokers are addressed
here. In the third section, the paper addresses the competition
and conflict of imperial and colonial elites. All of these events
contributed to the formation of an American identity over the
course of time and, for British continental America, led
ultimately to revolution.
10
Section I
Great Britain and Mercantilism
In the English world of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, the method used to achieve expansion of wealth was
colonialism, the act of creating a colony in a foreign land for
the benefit of the mother country. John McCusker and Russell
Menard call their theory of colonialism the “Staples Thesis.” It
explains the movement of labor and capital from the metropolis to
the colony. The reasons for this were the high demand of
resources in the metropolis, and the availability of resources in
the colony. The demand created a cost for the resource that
11
outweighed the risks of acquiring it, leading to the shift of
labor to the colony. These satellite colonies to the mother
country would provide raw materials and labor to be processed and
refined, ultimately to be sold back to the colonies or other
locations at as great a profit as possible.4
This complete circle of captive commerce was only one of the
methods employed in an economic philosophy better known as
mercantilism. In this manner, the accumulation of specie was
increased as much as possible, and a captive market for finished
products could be relied upon instead of counting on foreign
trade, which was always subject to disruption by wars and
protectionist tariffs. This created a positive balance of trade
where incoming specie exceeded the value of exports.5 The
driving force behind all of this, in regards to the English
aspect of the Atlantic World, was generally based in London, in a
body known as the Board of Trade and Plantations. This was the
governmental body which regulated the colonies and the joint
stock companies that ventured out, and hoped to gain a profit
12
from their efforts. In time they created something more lasting
than profits; unwittingly, they created the cultural foundations
of a new nation.
The historian Bernard Bailyn argued that the Atlantic World
was a system, and while many others have focused on the
individual parts, he saw a greater scope to those parts.
Regarding mercantilism and British colonialism, he saw the
tradition of dissent as inherent to the colonies, in that the
colonial Houses of Assembly were constantly at odds with the
royal governors. Bailyn masterfully explained this in his Origins
of American Politics (1967). Here he stated that “there was strife,
first of all, between the branches of government—between the
executives on one hand and the legislatives on the other…on
occasions to a total paralysis of government.”6 His school of
thought could be seen as having a top-down approach to the
dissent. Bailyn’s argument was that there was a conflict within
the Hydrarchy from above.
13
Marcus Rediker saw the key to the development of the
Atlantic World as class struggle. From the lowest slave, to the
sailors on the ships, all the way to the stockholders in London,
it was a contest of classes. Rediker conceived the very concept
of freedom and liberty as being developed on the waves and
planted in port cities along the coast of the Americas. 7 At this
juncture, the common people of the Americas were being influenced
by sailors’ ideas and concepts of equality and liberty. The cry
for political liberty, on reaching Boston harbor, reached a
population that had already fought trade wars against the Dutch
and Native Americans.8 They had ideological conflicts among
themselves, and they had originally left England to find a place
where they could worship in a manner that was free from
persecution. Theirs was a religion unsanctioned, and in
dissention from what the Church of England prescribed for the
faithful within that nation. Even though these settlers saw
themselves as Englishmen and women, the idea that they were equal
to people living in England was not held by the king or those in
Parliament. The colonists did not leave their views of self,
14
hidden. They told the Crown exactly what they thought. In the
Petition of the Grand Continental Congress to the King (1774) the colonists
stated, “we were born the heirs of freedom, and ever enjoyed our
rights under the auspices of your royal ancestors…” and describe
themselves as being “English freemen.”9 These men had a clearly
defined sense of who they were and the heritage from which they
came. Bailyn saw it in the fact that the colonies had a
legislature that competed in interests with the governor. Rediker
saw the resistance come from below, from the working classes.
Either way, New England was prepared to take on the mantle of
dissent, having had a long-established tradition of doing so from
the beginning. All that was required for them was time.
It seemed that England was more than willing to give the new
colonies that time, so long as England was able to pursue their
mercantilist aims. From the sixteenth century to the eighteenth,
Great Britain used that time to perfect its joint stock
companies. There was the Muscovy Company (1555 Russian trade),
the Levant Company (the Mediterranean in the region of the
15
Bosporus Straights), the Virginia Company (1609), and the Somers
Islands Company (1612/1615 Bermuda). Of these companies, the
Somers Islands Company was the only one to last beyond 1620.10 In
New England, after 1620, there were a host of colonies, each one
a type of company in its own right. There was the Massachusetts
Bay Colony (1629), the New Haven Colony (1638), New Hampshire
Colony, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, as well.11 Each behaved
similarly to the companies that were set up to extract the
resources and profits from the newly established colonies. Each
of these companies patterned their structure off of the earlier
Dutch model in an effort to minimize the risk and maximize the
profit, and remain at home. England was, of course, the
headquarters for all of these ventures, many of which have
remained, as of yet, unmentioned. But these chairmen of the
board, when it came to the New World, were from where English
policy was made, not on the high seas. The ship captains and
governors (the go-betweens) became their factors in the Americas,
and thus became the ruling class of the Hydrarchy from above.
16
England’s long history of conflict within and without its
borders prepared it well for the needs of empire building. Being
an island nation, it was realized early on the key to power and
growth was going to be naval power. This important recognition
began with Henry VII when he established the first dry dock in
England at Portsmouth in 1496.12 The inventories demonstrate a
keen sense that naval power is going to be the key to solidifying
Henry VII power at home. It also demonstrates that he was not
going to be content looking inward, but that the key to growth
was going to be to expand. Along with canvas, rope, oakum, and
masts, was also listed gunpowder. This is not necessarily
unusual, but the quantity must have been enormous. The
inventories show that seventeen British pounds, sixteen
shillings, and six pence was spent on gunpowder at six pence per
pound. Prior to going decimal there were two hundred forty pence
per pound. That makes a total inventory of gunpowder for one ship
at six hundred eighty pounds. That is a quantity demonstrating an
expansive intent. Henry VII was expecting trouble and was
preparing to meet it head on.
17
The first two ships constructed in England were the Regent
and the Sovereign. These ships carried 225 and 141 guns
respectively and were a demonstration of English resolve.13 It
was not these two ships that are so singular to Henry VII but
rather the infrastructure he laid down. Understanding that his
kingdom was going to require a navy, he actively constructed the
support structure a naval power would require. He determined
capital was better spent on storehouses and the establishment of
in-country dry docks than construction of vessels. The maritime
tradition of the English and the hiring out of Dutch ships meant
Henry VII did not need to build many of his own, which allowed
him to spread his resources elsewhere. In fact Sean Cunningham
states that from 1497 until 1509, England did not have to engage
in heavy military spending owing to a relatively peaceful twelve-
year span, beginning with peace with Scotland. Henry VIII would
reap the benefits of this by having a substantial war chest to
work from.
18
It took four more monarchs and the Spanish to demonstrate to
England that the New World is going to be where conflicts in
Europe will be settled. Massive amounts of treasure from the
Americas made Spain a superpower and the rest of Europe took
notice. Queen Elizabeth I was convinced by Richard Hakluyt that
the answer to much of England’s trouble lied in the west.
Elizabeth, seeing an opportunity for expansion of English sea
power, unleashed her Sea Dogs upon the Spanish with a goal
(unofficially of course) of raiding and capturing a portion of
the wealth on its return trip from the Americas. Men such as
Humphrey Gilbert, Sir Frances Drake, and Sir Walter Raleigh laid
the ground work of English exploration in the New World, albeit
on plunder. In fact, Sir Walter Raleigh established the first
English colony in the New World, Virginia in 1584.14 This gave
the English a point from which they launched sorties after the
Spanish fleet. From Jamestown, England eventually established a
foothold and fledgling colony of their own. Little did they
realize at the time how important Raleigh’s outpost became.
19
Sir Walter Raleigh did something at this juncture that had a
long standing effect for the future of the Atlantic World and
English legacy. He sought support and backing from the Crown of
England. This ensured the power of the state could be called upon
when private entities would just not be enough to maintain the
colonies. It also ensured that an English presence or some
representative of the Crown was going to be present wherever
English ships landed. What eventually developed out of this was a
private/public partnership where much of the risk was taken by
Raleigh and the investors but supported with men and material
from the Crown.15 This ensured that if things went wrong on a
raid of Spanish ships, the monarch was left without tarnish and
was still able to benefit from successes.
In 1603 James I took the throne of England and became a
critical monarch in establishing an English, and eventually
American, New World. There were obvious reasons why he would want
to expand the English reach to America and they were diverse.
Here we will focus on two: the economic and the political. The
20
economic incentive was simple. The revenue generated from the
resources in the Americas was staggering. Wood, pitch, hemp for
rope and fabric, tobacco (though James I abhorred it), fishing
waters, and the fur trade were just a few. These enterprises
1 Peter Linebaugh, and Marcus Rediker, The Many Headed Hydra (Boston, Beacon Press: 2000), pp, 143, 14.
2 Ibid, p. 144.3 Jonathan Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade (New York, Clarendon Press: 1989), p. 67.4 John McCusker and Russell Menard, The Economy of British America: 1607-1789 (Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press: 1985), pp, 19-235 McCusker and Menard, The Economy of British America, pp. 11, 36, 376 Bernard Bailyn, The Origins of American Politics, (New York, Vintage Books: 1967), p. 64.7 Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The Many Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic, (Boston, Beacon Press: 2000), pp. 162,163.8John Ferling, “Struggle for a Continent: The Wars of Early America”, The Early American Series, (Arlington Heights, Il. Harlan Davidson, Inc: 1993), pp. 41, 42.9 Continental Congress, The Petition of the Grand Continental Congress to the King, (Boston, S. Curwen (printer): 1774), pp. 4,5.10 Robert Brenner, Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflicts, and London’s Overseas Traders, (New York, Verso Press: 2003), pp. 4,11,13, 92n, 93.11 Francis J. Bremer, John Winthrop: America’s Forgotten Founding Father, (New York, OxfordUniversity Press: 2003), pp. 153, 302, 303.12 M.Oppenheim, ed., Naval Accounts and Inventories of the Reign of Henry VII: 1485-5 and 1495-7, Vol. 8, (London, Navy Records Society: 1896), pp. xxxiv.
13 Sean Cunningham, Henry VII, (New York, Routledge: 2007), pp. 261, 262.14 Kenneth R. Andrews, Trade, Plunder, and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire: 1480-1630, (New York, Cambridge University Press: 1984), p. 200.
21
needed labor and there was plenty to be found in England, some of
them more troubling than others to the Crown, namely the
Puritans. This is part of the political side. This group of
people wanted to purify the English church by following a
Calvinistic approach to Protestantism. It wanted to eliminate the
hierarchical structure of the Bishops and replace it with a more
democratic form of governance, congregationalism. This is where
each congregation chose the manner of worship and prayer
according to its needs. There was no overarching structure with
enforcement authority, so long as the congregations kept within
the doctrinal bounds. In John Cotton’s Way of Congregational Churches
Cleared, he addressed this issue to his detractors’ in1648,
demonstrating the debate was far from over by then. “Yet some
ordinances of Christ may be found and administered in a church of
believers, without officers”.16 It is easy to see how this view
of faith would have an adverse effect on monarchical rule. James 15 Andrews, Trade, Plunder, and Settlement, pp. 202, 205.16 John Cotton, Way of Congregational Churches Cleared, The Second Part (being Doctrinal, and Controversial) Concern9ing Congregational Churches and their Government, (Cornhill,Matthew Simmons at the sign of the three Golden-Lions: 1648), Part 2, p. 10, this is a reprint of the original by Kessinger Publishing’s Rare Mystical Reprints.
22
I had had enough of the church telling him what to do in Scotland
and he was not interested in repeating the situation. As a result
he allowed the first group of Puritans to sail to the Americas
where they eventually landed at Plymouth in what would become the
colony of Massachusetts Bay.
Looking at a map of the American colonies from the 1620s to
the 1640s, the two English colonies of Jamestown and Plymouth can
be seen as bookends preventing Spanish advancement from the south
and French advancement form the North. The Dutch in New Amsterdam
(New York) were dealt with in the Anglo-Dutch war of 1664. The
eastern seaboard of continental America was now open for English
settlement. In addition, emigration to the Americas under the
reign of James I was lax compared to the Spanish, the more
successful colonizing power up to this point.17 This
comparatively relaxed emigration policy eventually ensured the
English hegemony of the region in a political sense. There were
going to be regional differences but up until the opening of the
17 J.H Elliot, Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America 1492-1830, (New Haven, Yale University Press: 2006), p. 51.
23
Revolution, the English colonies on the mainland of North America
considered themselves English. The tool that was used to keep the
revenue generated by the colonies in English elite hands was
created by a Puritan revolutionary, Oliver Cromwell. His tenure
and most notably the Navigation Acts will have far reaching
implications for the New World well beyond the intention of
keeping revenue from leaving the realm.
The Navigation Acts
One of the primary means by which the Hydrarchy in England
ran its trade in the Atlantic World during this period, as
previously stated, was through the Navigation Acts. The
importance of these Acts cannot be overstated. They were the
benchmark by which all trade within the English context would be
done (post-1651), much to the consternation of the colonists. The
first round of the Navigation Acts was instituted by Oliver
Cromwell during his period of power.18 When Charles II came to 18 Mark Kishlansky, A Monarchy Transformed: Britain 1603-1714, (New York, Allen Lane ThePenguin Press: 1996), p. 201.
24
the throne he eliminated the original statutes, and replaced them
with his own version. Though he would not want much to do with
the policies of a perpetrator of regicide, Charles II kept this
one.
What was it about these Navigation Acts that appealed to
Charles II? It was the control of trade and the factors involved
in it. It would ensure (with proper application) an increased
traffic in the use of English shipping. The legislation itself
had nineteen parts to it, each addressing different points of the
law: it may have been long, but the essentials were fairly
simple. For any of the English colonies in the world, any trade
which was to be done with them, in English goods were to “be
carried by English ships, with an English captain and at least ¾
of the crew was to be English.”19 This was to ensure the
employment of the merchant marine, and all the trades pertaining
to the maintenance of English fleets. It was also aimed at the
19 John Raithby, ed., Statutes of the Realm: volume 5: 1628-80, An Act for the Encouraging and Increasing of Shipping and Navigation, 1660, (London, History of Parliament trust: 1819), p. 246 URL: http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=47266&strquery=Navigation,Date Accessed 14 November, 2012.
25
Dutch and the trade competition with which England constantly
found itself entangled. What this legislation did, in addition to
its intended purpose, is what we are more concerned with. It
meant that the colonies were only allowed to trade with England.
Only English ships were to perform all the transport for all the
goods coming into and out of England and the colonies, or ships
belonging to English dominions. Specific commodities were only
allowed to be transported on English ships, such as “sugar,
tobacco, indigo, rice, cacoa, molasses and naval stores”.20 The
latter involved “Masts Timber or Boards…Salt Pitch Tar Rozin Hemp
and Flax…” only to be carried on English ships, excluding all
other nations. The idea that only England and its agents could
trade with “Asia, Africa, America and England” did more than turn
a few heads. It made prospective merchants within the colonies
strike out on their own creating illicit trade. 21 In regards to
English seamen, the ports they looked to were the western ports
20 Marcus Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates, and the Anglo-American Maritime World 1700-1750, (New York, Cambridge University Press: 1987),pp. 19, 20.21 Raithby (editor), Navigation Acts 1660, pp. 2, 6, URL: http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=47266&strquery=Navigation,
26
of “Bristol, Liverpool, and Glasgow”. These ports expanded in
importance due to the illicit trade taking place and their
relative distance from London, the seat of power.22 This was much
the same reason that west end trade in Bermuda was primarily acts
of smuggling. It allowed a distance from the prying eyes of the
Crown. The eighteenth-century Bermudian merchant and Planter
Henry Tucker, knew this and established his home, called “The
Grove,” on the west end of the island, far from the colonial
capital at the East end.23 Free trade was not a practice
sanctioned by the Crown, though many were in the act of
practicing free trade anyway. The growth of west end ports in
Bermuda is just one indicator of this.
The second Navigation Act was passed in 1663, and was
motivated by politics. In an effort to check French influence in
the New World, England granted Portugal the ability to trade with
British America, duty free. The focus was on the highly
22 Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea, p. 40.
23 Philip Hamilton, The Making and Unmaking of a Revolutionary Family: The Tuckers of Virginia 1752-1830, (Charlottesville, University of Virginia Press: 2003), p. 11.
27
desirable commodity of Madeira wine.24 Historian Louis Cullen
assembled the numbers to demonstrate that the Navigation Acts
were working, at least in the eyes of England and their goals.
They looked at the total departures listed by William Bolton, a
factor in the Madeira wine export trade, and found forty-eight
percent of the 545 ships listed that sailed went to the British
West Indies. Fully seventy-four percent of the totals went to
British ports in the New World.25 England was realizing that
trade was diplomacy by another name, and could be used to
advantage in the Atlantic World. To go against this
protectionist view was treason in the eyes of the King.
The reason the English saw this as treasonous was that the
budding free trade that was happening in the Caribbean and the
North American colonies was lending assistance to other nations’
colonies with whom England was in conflict. It also meant the
revenues from taxes and duties were not coming into government
24Louis M. Cullen, “Irish Businessman and French Courtier: The Career of Thomas Sutton, comte de Clonard 1722-1782”, The Early Modern Atlantic Economy, John J.McCusker and Kenneth Morgan, editors, (New York, The Cambridge University Press: 2000), p. 111.25 Cullen, Irish Businessman and French Courtier, pp. 111, 112.
28
coffers but were in turn going into private merchants’ pockets.
In essence, these merchants were embezzling the government out of
the funds it needed. This duty was at 6d per pound on tobacco,
and in the early seventeenth century (specifically the 1620s)
tobacco was king and was the savior of the colonies as a
financial venture. Sugar took its place after a major depression
hit the tobacco market. The problem was that everyone else could
see this as well, and wanted to get into the act. This had the
impact of depressing the values of tobacco. Another aspect to
this involving the staple crop of tobacco was that large
quantities were being imported to England from Spain. This
Spanish tobacco was much cheaper and of generally a better
quality than the English imports.26 Eventually, it became less
expensive to import tobacco in its leaf form at 4d per pound, but
even still, well over 80,000 pounds of Spanish tobacco made it
into London to compete against the tobacco from Bermuda and other
colonies.27 This is an example of how the governing body, in the
26 Henry C. Wilkinson, The Adventurers of Bermuda: A History of the Island from its Discovery untilis Dissolution of the Somers Islands Company in 1684, (London, Oxford University Press: 1958), p. 163.
29
interests of state revenue, allowed a competition of another
power (Spain) to enter into the country against that of the
companies. It is a fine example of Adam Smith’s theories (yet to
be developed) in action and in opposition to the Navigation Acts.
Not all contemporaries were in agreement with the Navigation
Acts, nor were they in approval of the views their fellow
Englishmen were holding of the colonists. Robert Dodsley
recognized the importance of the colonies to the economic well-
being of England. He felt a pang of fear at the thought of what
colonists might do if they had a sense of the contempt that
“people of a better figure” had of them. After all, the
colonists provided the influx of wealth to England for their
finished product.28 The attitude that developed out of this view
of the colonists as existing to serve the mother country was a
we/they mentality. In England, the we component continued to reap
the benefits of colonial labor. By 1774, that we shifted to the
27 Wilkinson, The Adventurers of Bermuda, p. 166.28 Breen, Marketplace of Revolution, pp. 90, 91.
30
other side of the Atlantic, and a new identity emerged from an
economy built on Atlantic trade and commerce.
From the perspective of the leadership in London, they had
been given very powerful tools in maintaining a mercantilist
machine that had been developed over the course of the preceding
fifty-one years. In 1660, Charles II returned to England to
reestablish the royal family and the House of Stuart on the
throne. What he found in place when he got there was a
strengthened navy, ordinances passed to man the navy through
impressments, and a system designed to exclude competition and
enrich the pockets of the state (and by extension, the king). All
this was done under the watch of Cromwell, beginning in 1651,
with the Navigation Acts. In 1660, Charles II nullified the
parliamentary Navigation Acts and created his own. In fact, he
liked them so much that he strengthened the initial act with two
more in 1663 and 1673; William III would add to it again in
1696.29 These Acts were designed to strengthen the navy and to
maximize the profits of monopoly companies, such as the East
31
India Company –which they did. It also had the effect of creating
disconnectedness between the colonies and the leadership in
London, though not as strong as the ones established in the
eighteenth century, specifically post-1764.
Just the year before, in 1763, the Seven Years War finally
came to a close. In America it was known as the French and Indian
War and the British were victorious only through spending a great
deal of treasure and blood to that end. In an effort to recoup
those losses, a new policy was adopted regarding the Navigation
Acts which the colonists would look upon with great derision,
with major consequences for the future of the colonies. Historian
Oliver M. Dickerson tells us that prior to 1764 there seems to be
little evidence for unrest regarding the Navigation Acts in
America—“the system worked”—but after that date policies were
enacted for the sake of “revenue and political exploitation”. 30
The Sugar Act of 1764 and 1766 raised the tariff on processed 29 John Raithby (editor), An Act for the Encouraging and Increasing of Shipping and Navigation, Statutes of the realm: volume 5: 1628-1680, 1819, p. 246, British History Online, URL: http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=47266&strquery=Navigation, Date Accessed, November 14, 2012; David C. Douglas (editor), American Historical Documents, Volume 9, (New York, Oxford University Press: 1964), pp.356-365.
32
sugar across the board while molasses and raw sugar remained the
same. All wine imported to the Americas was heavily taxed, “Seven
pounds sterling per ton”.31 New rules to commerce that could lead
to confiscation of cargo without the proper paper work were put
in place, hidden in the legislation itself. To give an idea of
the impact of the Sugar Act, the total amount collected for the
year 1772 was 30,000 pounds sterling. But it was levied on five
ports of call in all the colonies: New York, Boston, Charleston,
Philadelphia, and Quebec.32 This had massive implications on the
trade and consumption of goods in the region. Understand that the
revenue from the Sugar Act went directly to a separate account
specifically for the treasury. No part of this new series of
taxes was being used to pay for salaries or infrastructure,
another point of evidence leading to the view the Sugar Act was
nothing more than a cash grab.33 The Stamp Act (1765) proved so
unpopular that it was repealed after only four and a half months,
and the Quartering Act (1765) required governments to provide for
the housing of soldiers while in the colonies rather than England
providing it. This was found in section VII of the law. It
33
required “fire, candles, vinegar, and salt, bedding, utensils,
for dressing their victuals, and small beer or cider, not
exceeding five pints, or half a pint of rum mixed with half a
pint of water, to each man, without paying anything for the
same”.34 Then there came the Townsend Acts of 1767 which added
further duties and added an administration to the American ports
to oversee the collection of the said duties. Customs
Racketeering and entrapment became common and sailors could no
longer sell their own cargo outside of the customs, a long-held
right.35 None of these acts were passed with any input from those
governed.
The Navigation Acts were the beginning of the end for the
western colonies ties to England as a mercantilist outpost. The
irony of the situation was that the king, in securing his
authority over the colonies, managed to sow the seeds of their
rebellion. In fact, up until 1774, colonists were still
expressing their allegiance to the Crown, but now they were
interspersing language such as “American Rights and Liberties” in
34
place of “Rights of Englishmen” though that was expressed as
well.36 The point of the Navigation Act of 1660 was to maximize
the profit through transporting English goods, whether acquired
in the colonies or from England, in English ships with English
crews. It dictated the ports of call that could be accessed and
served as a mechanism to closed and managed trade. This meant
that free trade, a concept that had been developing in the
Americas for some time since the establishment of the colonies,
was officially coming to a close. Parliament had chosen to
attack the foundation of the colonial economic system and the
heart of the colonists’ prosperity; in the colonists’ eyes, the
Crown was attacking their livelihoods, their liberties, and by
extension, their lives.
30 Oliver M. Dickerson, The Navigation Acts and the American Revolution, (New York, A.S. Barnes & Company: 1951), p. xiii, xiv .
31 Dickerson, Navigation Acts, pp. 172-175.
32 Ibid, 178-184.
33 Ibid, 186.34 Merrell Jensen, ed., English Historical Documents: American Colonial Documents to 1776, (New York, Oxford University Press: 1964), pp. 657, 658.35 Dickerson, pp. 208, 211, 214
35
The historian Stephen Saunders Webb correctly asserted that
the English Civil War had caused “the development of autonomous
colonial elites and institutions, and provided a republican
ideology…”.37 England had been warned of growing independence
bred out of distance from the mother country and ambition. What
was born out of this conflict in England was a new Hydrarchy from
above in America. It was a new set of maritime elites with their
own interests, and yet, they still had ties to England.
Why was this so? It had its roots in the very entreaties to
colonization in the first place. Beginning with Richard Hakluyt
in the late sixteenth century, England began to consider
expanding westward. Hakluyt wrote a book called Discourse Concerning
Western Planting (1584) that was all about the possibilities and
advantages that western colonies held for England. It was the
same argument heard later in the expansion westward. “They will
36 U.S. Continental Congress, Extracts from the Votes and Proceedings of the American Continental Congress held on the 5th of September 1774 Containing The Bill of Rights, a List of Grievances,Occasional Resolves, the Association, an Address to the People of Great Britain, and a Memorial to the Inhabitants of the British American Colonies, (Boston, Edes and Gill (printer): 1774), pp.4, 11, Early American Imprints, Accessed November 14, 2012.
37 Ibid, p. 441
36
provide markets for English manufacturers. They will provide a
nursery for English seamen. They will be an outlet for idle
soldiers and sailors as well as an outlet for the poor and
unemployed of England”.38 Who was it that Hakluyt was
recommending to be sent west? It was the masses that were
discontent and would cause trouble for the powers that be in
England.39 This situation was very similar to those who would
settle in Virginia at Jamestown, or the Puritans in
Massachusetts. All of these people had reasons to leave England,
and it was not because they were getting along well with the
authorities.
The issue of relatively autonomous colonial trade with the
rest of the world, outside of the Navigation Acts, was not a new
one to England. It was recognized as far back as the origins of
the acts themselves, during the English Civil War. Oliver
Cromwell rightly saw that England’s merchant marine and Navy
needed to be bolstered against outside competition, which was the
38 Douglas, ed. English Historical Documents, p. 10239 Linebaugh and Rediker, pp. 16, 20.
37
whole reason for the development of the Navigation Acts in the
first place. However, he had more pressing issues closer to home
that required his attention and as a result, the colonies were,
more or less, left to their devices for the time being. It was
status quo for the New World.
38
Section II
Bermuda and New England: Two Different Children of the Same
Mother
Bermuda
Bermuda, a small but pivotally important island six hundred
miles east of South Carolina, is the key to understanding what
was going on in the Atlantic World in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. It was the very salvation of the Jamestown
settlement in 1610,40 and it was also the beginning of the
undoing of England’s permanent presence in the New World by the
years approaching the Anglo-American Revolution with the
Bermudian Gun Powder Plot of 1775. Known as Las Islas de los Diablos
for years before the Sea Venture wreck of 1609, Bermuda was
considered to be the bane of mariners. Due to the flow of the
Gulf Stream, just about every sailing ship had to come within
striking distance of the island.41 The shoals that surround up to
39
three miles of the island gave rise to the reputation, along with
the cahow bird and its loud call, terrifying to those unlucky
enough to have marooned there.42 There is evidence that
Portuguese or Spanish survivors of a wreck had been on the
island, and upon their rescue, enhanced its reputation.43 But in
1609, something happened that changed English fates in the
Atlantic. A flotilla leaving England on a relief voyage to
Jamestown got caught in a hurricane and scattered. Most made it
to Virginia, but the Sea Venture, the flagship of the flotilla, was
separated from the fleet. On board were the new Governor of
Jamestown, Sir Thomas Gates; the Captain of the vessel, Captain
Christopher Newport; and Admiral Sir George Somers, for whom the
company would later be named.44
40 Lorri Glover and Daniel Blake Smith, The Shipwreck that Saved Jamestown: The Sea Venture Castaways and the Fate of America, (New York, Henry Holt and Company: 2009), pp. 169, 236.41 Glover and Smith, p. 169.42 Linebaugh and Rediker, Many Headed Hydra, pp. 9, 10.43 Henry C. Wilkinson, The Adventurers of Bermuda: A History of that Island from its Discovery Until the Dissolution of the Somers Islands Company in 1684, (New York, Oxford University Press: 1958), pp. 20, 21.44 Michael Jarvis, In the Eye of All Trade: Bermuda Bermudians and the Maritime Atlantic World 1680-1783, (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press: 2010), pp. 12,13 ; Linebaugh and Rediker, Many Headed Hydra, p. 9.
40
By a matter of chance both the admiral of the fleet, Sir
George Somers, and the new Governor of Virginia, Sir Thomas
Gates, both found themselves on the same vessel.45 This led to a
clash of personalities; the two men agreed that while upon the
seas, Admiral Somers would be in command. When on land, Sir
Thomas Gates would carry precedence. When the Sea Venture wrecked
off the coast of Bermuda, the agreement of who was in charge, and
even if the expedition was still even under way, was brought into
question. Conflict among the leadership, or at least a visible
dislike of one another leading to a healthy competition, was at
the core of Bermuda’s discovery by the English, and it would
remain that way for centuries to come.46
Bermuda was considered to be a location to avoid in the
middle of the Atlantic in the early seventeenth-century even
though it came to eventually hold a primary position in the
Atlantic World, both geographically and economically. It was luck
or fate that led the Sea Venture to accidently find one of only 45 Lorri Glover and Daniel Blake Smith, The Shipwreck that Saved Jamestown, p. 72.46 Virginia Bernhard, A Tale of Two Colonies, p. 69; Lori Glover and Daniel Blake Smith, The Shipwreck that Saved Jamestown, p. 132
41
two safe passages through the shoals in 1609, when a hurricane
scattered their English fleet and marooned them on the island for
ten months.47 One of these survivors, Silvester Jourdain,
recounted that the waters “afforded nothing but gusts, storms,
and foul weather,” continuing the undeserved reputation.48 It was
an unwitting moment of good fortune. The timing kept the early
settlers from reaching Jamestown during the “Starving Time” and
has been credited by some historians, such as Virginia Bernhard,
in her book A Tale of Two Colonies (2011), and Lorri Glover with Daniel
Blake Smith, in their book The Shipwreck that Saved Jamestown (2008), as
being a key ingredient in the success of Jamestown. In so doing,
it was also a key ingredient in the maintenance of an English
presence in North America.
Admiral Sir George Somers had a keen eye for islands and a
possible means by which to profit by his efforts. Some
historians, such as Lorri Glover and Daniel Blake Smith, make the
47 Michael Jarvis, In the Eye of All Trade: Bermuda, Bermudians, and the Maritime Atlantic World, 1680-1783, (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press: 2010), pp. 12, 1348 Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, the Many Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic, (Boston, Beacon Press: 2000), p. 9
42
argument that the castaways who remained on Bermuda while the
remainder of the wrecked settlers left for Jamestown, were
instructed to do so by the command of the Admiral.49 There was
much they could do in the way of exploration and mapping. They
could have been experimenting and searching for navigable
entryways to the island. They could experiment in different
crops and seek out and identify the many types of animal life
present on the island at the time. It is quite possible they
were taking inventory and awaiting the return of their commander.
Had he lived longer (he died on the islands in November of 1610),
he might have lived to see his wealth prosper through his efforts
of mapping and experimenting of the agricultural possibilities
Bermuda held.50 Few doubt he would have been the island’s first
colonial Governor. History would prove Admiral Somers’ foresight
correct, in many ways.
What is important for our purposes in this essay is not that
Sir George Somers landed on the island of Bermuda, or that he saw
49 Glover and Smith, pp. 167, 168, 21450 Ibid, p. 215
43
value in the islands and their location in relation to the new
colony of Jamestown (only ten days’ sail), but rather that the
competition and conflict so readily displayed itself from the
very beginning. Factions developed among the voyagers, which set
a precedent which was followed by Bermudians much later. Mutinies
were threatened, and at one point the workers finishing the
Patience and Deliverance, ceased construction and lived in the forest
to demonstrate their displeasure at leaving Bermuda, the land of
plenty, for Jamestown, the land of want and suffering.51 This was
an early example of the conflict between Crown and colonist.
Chartered in 1615 by King James I, the Somers Islands
Company came into existence, taking its name from the bold
Admiral who died on the Island of Bermuda. Initially the Somers
Island Company was an extension of the Virginia Company. In short
order however, it took over as the dominant entity from the
latter, which had dominion over the islands up to this point. The
enticements that brought investors into this new venture included
51 Lori Glover and Daniel Blake Smith, The Shipwreck that Saved Jamestown: The Sea Venture Castaways and the Fate of America, (New York, Holt Paperbacks: 2009), pp. 166, 167
44
“freedom from all taxes for seven years, state aid in case of
aggression, and near absolute authority in governing life in the
colony.”52 This gave Bermuda a unique perspective in being able
to govern as the locals saw fit, according to their needs.
What kind of rule would early settlers expect from the new
company since the separation from the Virginia Company? Not much
different from the previous experience in Jamestown; out of “117
initial investors, only ten were not investors in the Virginia
Company.”53 This gave the Virginia Company de facto rule in
Bermuda, and was one way investors could help to recoup losses
from their Virginia venture. The implication being, that the
focus of the company on the island would be on monopoly and
profit. Maritime trade, on the other hand, took it in a different
direction.
52 Jarvis, In the Eye of All Trade, p. 1953 Jarvis, p. 19
45
New England
New England was going to be very different in its cultural
composition when compared to the Bermuda and Virginia
settlements. Not only was there a difference in the people who
were settling in those regions (New England being primarily
Puritan dissenters) but in contrast to the Massachusetts Bay, the
investors were very different as well. Only four of the original
investors from the Levant Company took part: “Francis Flyer,
Matthew Craddock, Samuel Vassall, and Nathan Wright”.54 This in
itself demonstrates a difference in the nature of each of the
respective colonies, an important difference that had major
consequences later on. Bermuda was much more strongly influenced
by mainstream, conservative, English culture, reflective of the
company’s leadership. 54 Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, p. 273
46
In 1620, a new presence was injected on the shores of what
became New England. This was a different type of settler than
England had been sending previously, with unforeseen consequences
which led to a cultural defiance against the crown and mother
country. The Puritans coming to the New World did so as a result
of religious persecution in the wake of the consolidation of
power by James I. In June of 1616, James I approached his judges
in the Court of Star Chamber to make clear to them what his
expectations were, and to give warning that he intended to extend
his authority. He began;
I understand the inheritance of the King and subjects in this land must be determined by commonlaw…[But] there is another law, of all laws free and supreme, which is God’s law, and by this all common and municipal laws must be governed, and except they have dependence on this law, they are unjust and unlawful…that law in this kingdom hath been too much neglected, and churchmen too much had in contempt.55
His Majesty gave two limitations to his Star Chamber Court. First
“encroach not upon the authority of the Crown;” secondly he
55 J. P. Kenyon ed., The Stuart Constitution, 1603-1688: Documents and Commentary, Second Edition, (New York, Cambridge University Press: 1986), pp. 84
47
stated to “keep yourselves within your own benches, not to invade
other jurisdictions”.56 This was an announcement in the direction
of absolutist authority; dissenters had been put on notice.
Two years later James I gave fresh instructions to his
Justices of the Peace. These men were charged with enforcement of
the King’s edicts and maintaining law and order. Of the list of
twenty instructions, number one was “to levy the 12d [fine] upon
absentees from Church according to the statutes of Elizabeth c.2
and 3 James [c. 4]”. The third instruction was to take “the names
of all recusants within their several parishes, with the names of
their children above nine years old and the names of their
servants…”57 While the statute could have been directed at the
Catholic presence in London, it was just as surely aimed at the
Puritan influence, as well. These royal instructions demonstrate
a monarch who was becoming more unwilling to bend in the face of
dissension. In 1620, the Puritan migration west to New England
began.
56 Kenyon, The Stuart Constitution, p. 8557 Kenyon, Stuart Constitution, p. 450
48
The coming of the puritans marked the arrival of a new sort
of colonists in the Americas. They were made up of entire
families, and they brought with them trades, farmers, and all the
things needed to transplant a society from one shore to another.
This is a stark contrast to what had come to the New World in
Virginia. The vast majority of Virginian settlers were young
males without families, “laborers…out of work soldiers and self
important gentlemen” looking for a better life from that which
they left in England.58 The initial settlers of New England by
Puritan dissenters were looking for a better life as well.
However, there was a defining cultural difference between the two
regions. The Jamestown region was run like a small fiefdom. It
had a concept of governance and culture much more in tune with
the established power structure in England at the time. The
Massachusetts Bay colony was made up of religious dissenters
(Puritans), who were members of a protestant sect who felt the
Church of England was losing its way and falling back into papist
49
traditions.59 They believed that the teaching contained in the
Bible, and only the teaching contained in the Bible, was the
foundation upon which the Church should be built. Furthermore, a
main tenet of Puritanism was that all were equally worthless
before God, and that it was only by God’s grace and election that
salvation was achieved. Francis Bremer pointed out this unity by
addressing a portion of the Modell of Christian Charity speech before
the pilgrims left for the New World.
Here John Winthrop stated:
…the meanest as well as the richest, the wealthiest as well as the strongest, the lowest aswell as the highest, they all have the same Spirit, the same Jesus, the same faith; they are all fellow-members, fellow-travellers, fellow-soldiers, fellow-citizens, fellow-heirs, and therefore they must be loved with a sincere and cordial love.60
58 Glover and Smith, p. 35, 8059 Ralph Walton Perry, Puritanism and Democracy, (New York, Harper Torchbooks: 1944), p. 71, 7260? Francis J. Bremer, Congregational Communion: Clerical Friendship in the Anglo-American Puritan Community: 1619-1692, (Boston, Northeastern University Press: 1994), pp. 7,8, 9
50
In this statement, the rich and poor, the strong and weak, the
laborer and gentleman are lumped together in one category. Ralph
Barton Perry called puritans the “left wing of Protestantism”. 61
This is a concept of equality that was dangerous to a power
structure in England that relied on class distinction to maintain
order. The Puritan society was still a hierarchical one, but on a
much smaller scale. The equality found was one of a spiritual
equality and was strongly held by the Puritan faithful.
Once the colony became established - with some difficulty -
the stockholders of the Massachusetts Bay Company petitioned for
a charter. In 1628 a final charter was completed. In this there
was a very important omission that established the location of
the annual meeting of stockholders. This meant that the
Massachusetts Bay colony did not have to convene in London near
the seats of power.62 It could meet in the New World where it had
much more freedom to pass legislation favorable to the Puritan
mindset.
61 Ralph Walton Perry, Puritanism and Democracy, p. 6762 Francis J Bremer, John Winthrop: America’s Forgotten Founding Father, (New York, OxfordUniversity Press: 2003), p. 359
51
The New England colonies began to trade with other nations’
colonies apart from those of England. By the second half of the
seventeenth century this situation was an affront to the
Navigation Acts, and viewed as treason by members of the Board of
Trade. Timber, pitch, furs, and various surpluses upon which
England had been relying, were now being diverted to other
colonies, providing a larger profit and an easier transport run
than the trans-Atlantic trade. Trade with the various colonies
throughout the New World became a necessity, especially for those
receiving foodstuffs from the continent. This was a direct
competition to the mercantile system designed to benefit the
mother country.
This region became very important for maritime international
trade, and made fortunes for merchants willing to try their luck.
To add to what has already been mentioned, there was sugar,
tobacco, dye woods, tar, Bermuda cedar, and other products from
other nations, such as: “livestock, poultry, preserved meat and
fish, butter, whale oil, Indian corn, cabbages, pails and tubs,
52
staves, furniture, and other wooden wares, woven Palmetto hats
and mats, beeswax and honey, candles, rosewater, hides and
saddles, rope” and eventually trade in tea, Delftware, and china
flatware. 63 The economic implications to both Great Britain and
the colonies could not be ignored.
There is another dimension to insert at this point. It is
the cultural foundation of dissention which the Puritan settlers
brought with them to their new home. James I thought that by
allowing the puritans to leave and worship as they chose, in a
land across the ocean, he was removing a political irritation,
which to him, seemed seditious. Here was a group of people
telling the King that he was wrong in his persecutions. For this
monarch, the need for the freedom to exert rule by divine right
was overwhelming. James I would not be told what to do, nor would
he be told that he was wrong.
He allowed the puritans to leave, and in New England they
established colonies based on the puritan work ethic with an
63 Jarvis, pp. 78,79, 89
53
emphasis on learning and literacy. This allowed the Puritan
tradition of dissension to take root in the New World where it
found an environment in which to flourish.64 This is not to say
removal of dissension is the primary reason for the allowance of
the puritans to sail west to the New World. There were also large
economic reasons as well. The Navigation Acts being employed at
the time would have required the new community to trade directly
with the mother country and their allies only. This ensured that
the flow of revenues and resources stayed within the English
system, while getting individuals to voluntarily make a dangerous
and expensive journey all for the benefit of England and the
King.
To the colonists, the realities of life were very harsh.
These realities had to be contended with before they could
establish the beginnings of a government 2,500 miles from their
previous home in England. Indian attacks could come at any time. 64 For additional reading on the development of print in the colonies see David D. Hall Cultures in Print. He explores the cultural differences of print within the context of how it relates to the societies in which it is established, when it is established, and who has control of the presses. For amore focused look at Revolutionary Print, see Thomas Larkin’s Thomas Paine and the Literature of Revolution (2005).
54
Disease was ever-present, as was conflict between various
European powers to see who could gain control of as much
territory as possible in the New World. The resources available
seemed limitless. These competing powers were attracted by giant
timbers, beaver fur pelts, and of course, tobacco. There were
food stuffs grown at the various farms, and rum distilled from
molasses, the byproduct of the sugar grown in the Caribbean. With
all of these goods, and much of it in a surplus, the American
colonists began supplying the many colonies of various nations in
the Caribbean and other ports of call. This would fly in the face
of the Navigation Acts, and was a tenet of their free-trade
philosophy.
There is another aspect to the tradition of independence
that was inherent in New England at the time. While they still
saw themselves as Englishmen and believed they were entitled to
all the rights thereof, the Massachusetts Bay colonists had an
advantage that all the other colonists lacked. Each joint-stock
company and each colony had to have some representative in
55
London, prepared to appear before the Board of Trade or
Parliament when called. Massachusetts had no such clause within
their initial charter.65 This gave the colony a buffer period in
regards to answering inquiries into their activities, and whether
or not they were following the edicts of the Crown. It also
allowed for greater time to prepare or cover up extra-legal
trading activities when they occurred. This action was
premeditated, and was taken with the concern that some of the
activities in Massachusetts might not be to the liking of the
authorities in London, whether it regarded religion, trade, or
taxation. John Winthrop knew that there would be forces in London
interested in the failure of his colony. During the English Civil
War, he had personal friends and family fighting for the
Parliamentary cause. In a letter dated February, 1649, he stated,
“the Army hath prospered beyond all expectations, in Wales, in
Kent, at Colchester, and especially against the Scots”.66 His
allegiance during the English Civil War, not to mention his
65 Bremer, John Winthrop, p. 35966 Bremer, 374
56
religious convictions and affiliation, would have made him
powerful enemies across the Atlantic.
Beginning in 1641 with the rumblings of the English Civil
War on the horizon, the Massachusetts General Court appointed
September 2, 1641 as “public day of Thanksgiving ‘for the good
success of Parliament in England’” harkening back to the
intensity of gratitude felt in the first Thanksgiving. This act
of thanks was in response to the Triennial Act which forced the
King, then Charles I, to call Parliament every three years. This
was a severe limitation to the king’s power.67 Siding with
Parliament in such a way demonstrated one’s loyalty, and it was
not being shown to the monarchy. Not long after the Triennial
Act, Parliament “banned taxation without its consent,
specifically ship money and forced loans, as well as
unparliamentarily taxes on trade”.68 This view of a struggle
between Parliament and the Crown was seen as having been outside
forces working against the opposing poles in London. Robert 67 Ibid, p. 33468 Robert Brenner, Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London’s Overseas Traders: 1550-1653, (New York, Verso Publishing: 2003) p. 691
57
Brenner in his Merchants and Revolution presents this view as having
been “not the ends but the means to adopt in order to secure
broadly held principles”. 69 The actions of the court in
Massachusetts in support of Parliament, as opposed to the Crown,
could be viewed as seditious, if not treasonous. If this official
court sanction was not viewed as seditious, then the efforts of
some of the clergy in Massachusetts Bay certainly were. William
Hooke of the Plymouth colony asked his congregation to “let us
pray against them, and sing against them, and live against them.”
He continued by saying that “the role of the colonists was to lie
in wait in the wilderness, to come upon the backs of God’s
enemies with deadly fasting and prayer, murderers that will kill
point blank from one end of the world to the other”.70
John Winthrop, as Governor of the Colony of Massachusetts
Bay, was responsible for the actions and well-being of the
colonists. His view was sought in all sorts of various matters
both personal and legal. It is highly unlikely that the
69 Brenner, pp. 691, 692, 69370 Bremer, John Winthrop, p. 334
58
Massachusetts General Court would make such a bold and sweeping
statement of alliance as they did in their declaration of
Thanksgiving without at least the tacit approval of their
governor. We now see a competition, engaged in by the leadership
of both Massachusetts and London, which eventually leads to
conflict. This made Governor Winthrop just as guilty in his
sedition as the courts and clergy.
Eight years after King William III ascended to the throne,
he decided to attempt to make this nearly unmanageable core of
colony administration somewhat less complicated by the creation
of the Board of Trade. It was established in 1696 by the King,
which, in theory, gave him greater control over the legal actions
of the colonies and placed him in a better position to handle
disputes. In reality, it became another bureaucratic piece to the
colonial system after 1704.71
The New England coast was not alone in its subversion
against Crown authority. During the period of 1682-1782, a
71 Edward J. Cashin, Governor Henry Ellis and the Transformation of British North America, (Athens, University of Georgia Press: 1994), pp. 47, 48
59
combination developed involving a free-trade loving people along
the coastline of the mainland American colonies, an island colony
in Bermuda that was basically ignored by the mother country, and
a people who were willing to trade with just about anyone so long
as the goods do not go through the customs house. Lastly came the
leadership in London. To those colonists in the New World, London
seemed a world away—remote, and out of touch with the realities
of colonial life. One example of this is cited by Michael Jarvis,
where tobacco was smuggled into Bermuda, by way of the west end
of the island chain. The period was the 1680s, and tobacco had
begun to boom on the island. There was to be imposed a “penny a
pound tax” on the crop when it was exported. The colonies of the
Caribbean and the Americas were ripe markets, which paid a
premium for certain commodities, and that made the Bermuda
merchants much more willing to engage in smuggling, bypassing the
customs house and freight charge on the British magazine ship.72
Here, for the British subject at Bermuda, the opportunity for
heightened profits superseded his English duty to follow the
72 Jarvis, pp. 78, 501
60
official mercantilist agenda. He went into competition with the
mother country and the company that represented it. This
emulsion of differing perspectives led to a competition and
conflict among the Hydrarchy, which eventually brought about a
revolution that would change the world.
England was the epicenter of westward expansion to the North
American continent in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
It was the financial hub around which successful colonialism
sprang. But in creating its own success in the Atlantic World, it
spread the seeds for its New World empire’s eventual demise. The
Commissioners for Trade and Plantations were gathered as a
governing body to keep colonialism running smoothly; it rarely
did, though, since political factions and religious differences
constantly came into play. It also had to deal with international
trade disputes, mostly among the colonies that it governed. On
any given page within the Journal of the Commissioners of Trade and
Plantations Preserved in the Public Records Office, one can find references to
New York, Virginia, Barbados, Jamaica, Nevis, and Bermuda.
61
Addressed as the Board of Trade, these men became a part of the
Hydrarchy in London and the governing body through which the
Crown exerted influence in the Atlantic World.
Section III: Competition, Conflict, and Revolution
The Role of Smuggling
Almost as early as the Somers Islands Company began, and
tried to enforce its monopoly, the people of the island began to
find ways to circumvent that monopoly. Here is part of that
competition of the Hydrarchy. Smuggling by Bermudians, while seen
as a crime by the mother country, was a part of daily life in the
maritime trades of Bermuda. Marcus Rediker estimates a “threefold
increase in profits through trading by stealth”.73 There was far
too much money to be made by trading with ports that otherwise
73 Marcus Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea, p. 42
62
were disallowed to be visited by English ships. During periods of
conflict, and warfare especially, privateering (the act of
sanctioned piracy by a state) and illegal trade abounded.
Merchants like the Tuckers, a very wealthy and influential
maritime family in Bermuda and the Americas, found themselves
with “more tonnage than they had possessed previously, because
their privateering campaigns normally produced overall gains”.74
This excess equipage was commonly the reason for the eventual
downturn in shipping fortunes. In times of peace the demand for
goods was just not there.
The reason for taking up smuggling was quite plain. The
duties and taxes imposed on products sometimes doubled the
cost.75 The cycle of high import duties and smuggling led to
increasing taxes and a redoubled effort to bypass the taxes.
Eventually the “tax burden was twice the level of their French
counterparts”.76 In turn, colonists looked to illicit trade even
74 Rediker, Devil and the Deep Blue Sea, pp. 34, 35
63
more. The American shippers, having already been accustomed to
trading with various ports of call outside of English ports,
adopted the mentality of free trade which had rapidly become a
marker for a new economic identity that began developing in North
America around the 1720s.
The situation in the Caribbean from the 1680s through the
close of the American Revolution was such that many of the other
nations were not providing all that was needed for their
existence. The Bermudians, with their sloops and armed with a
knowledge of the reefs and coves of the islands, were able to
commonly circumvent the efforts to cease the illicit trade, even
when the authorities were well aware a ship had been engaged in
such an endeavor.77 The new commodities that were in vogue were
“tobacco, sugar coffee, tea, chocolate, and printed cottons”.78
75 Carol Shammas, The Revolutionary Impact of European Demand for Tropical Goods, The Early Modern Atlantic Economy, John J. McCusker and Kenneth Morgan (editors), (New York, The Cambridge University Press: 2000) , p. 18076 Carol Shammas, The Revolutionary Impact of European Demand for Tropical Goods,, p. 18177 Jarvis, p. 17278 Shammas, p. 169
64
These commodities were what the Navigation Acts targeted, having
seen the sudden growth in their demand.
All goods, however, were required to be transported
according to the laws of England. That meant, according to the
Navigation Acts, that English goods had to be imported and
exported on English ships with English crews, this included
colonists. The New England mariner and merchant, along with his
compatriots in Philadelphia were notorious for ignoring this
particular piece of legislation, which was designed to enhance
profits and act as a protection for English trade. One of the
reasons for this was the great distance from the “customs control
of London”.79 One example of this was Newport, Rhode Island. This
New England seaport community was so filled with illicit trade
that the customs agents “dared not exercise their office for fear
of the fury and unruliness of a threatening mob”.80 What the
Navigations Acts and the disregard for them actually did, was
begin to drive a wedge between the Old World and the New. This 79 Markus Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea, (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 42, 6080 Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea, p. 66
65
was one of the many signs of competition and conflict that arose
in world of the trading elites. The question on both sides was
very similar: how to best increase profits and reduce
expenditures. This is no different from today’s businesses - but
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the stakes seemed
much higher to the colonists than to today’s businessman. The
colonies had debtor’s prison.
European conflicts were another reason for the expansion of
smuggling in the New World. One of the major conflicts going on
at the time was the War of Spanish Succession (1702-1713) in
Europe. And as in all conflicts involving European powers, these
conflicts spilled over into the Colonies. The French were once
again the enemies of England, and trade with any of their
settlements in the colonies was forbidden under the Navigation
Acts.81 New England and the trade thereof, was largely reliant on
a great deal of inter-colonial trade, in addition to the
mercantile system which tied New England to England itself.
81 Allen Taylor, American Colonies: The Setting of North America, (New York, Penguin Books:2001), pp. 292, 293
66
Remembering the independent spirit of New Englanders, it was only
a matter of time before someone would have to be made an example
of.
One example of the punishments for trade with the enemy can
be gleaned through minutes relating to a party in New England who
traded with the French in a period they were considered enemies.
Five men - John Borland, Samuel Vetch, Roger Lawson, William
Rouse, and Ebenezer Coffin - were the objects of the Board’s ire.
On April 7, 1707 the company, in defense of itself, had sent a
complaint to the Board of Trade that they had “already suffered
imprisonment and loss of ship and goods &c….”.82 Though the line
is small, it is telling. These were men of some means, as they
owned a vessel, or else they would not have mentioned the loss of
the ship in the seizure. Imprisonment was no small affair
either. If there was no one to care for the prisoner during
their time in the gaol, chances were good they would starve. The
difference in connection to the halls of power is evident in the
frequency of the mention of the Jones case, which will be 82 Board of Trade, p. 342
67
discussed later, in comparison to that of Vetch and company. In
the case of the latter, there are only five mentions about the
case in the minutes before they are condemned by the
Massachusetts colony.83
Other examples of the massive amounts of smuggling were
going on right under the noses of officials in the colonies. One
of the primary cash crops of was sugar and the most prized of the
byproducts of the process of refining sugar was molasses.
Distilleries abounded all over New England and the drink of
choice in these maritime communities was rum, which was made from
molasses. In the colony of Massachusetts alone, for the years of
1754-1755, Bernard Bailyn tells us that “384 hogsheads of
molasses were officially entered into Boston Harbor”. While this
may seem like a substantial amount of molasses, it took “40,000
hogsheads to keep the sixty-three distilleries going”.84 This is
such a massive scale of smuggling, and it being only one colony
83 Ibid, p. 34584 Bailyn, Bernard, Atlantic History: Concept and Contours, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press: 2005), p. 90
68
that the impunity with which the smugglers operated led to a
belief that their actions were right and proper. What is meant by
this was that through having ignored the Molasses Act and
smuggling becoming so large scale it was considered the norm.
This eventually evolved into a concept of free trade. This had
been going on for the past twenty years or more. Even in 1743,
ten years into the Molasses Act, William Bollan sent a letter to
the Board of Trade informing them of the gross amounts of
smuggling taking place. He told the Board that Holland was
sending, “yarn, spun hemp, paper, gunpowder, iron, and goods of
all kinds used in men’s and women’s clothing”.85 Also included in
the report was a mention of the French and how they were
encroaching on the English market with broadcloth, a commodity
with which England liked to provide the colonies. Looking ahead
to Bailyn’s period of 1755, nothing has changed, and the
colonists have had twenty years to refine their trade. It is
through this constant trade that the elites made their fortunes,
85 Douglas, David C, English Historical Documents, p. 373
69
and competition and conflict will become a matter of daily
expectation in everyday life.
How else did this competition and conflict play out? In the
early years of New England’s settlement, it was a matter of
necessity that trade with other regions in the New World took
place. The Massachusetts Bay Colony was having challenges that
warrented the leadership to outside its borders for support.
In1639 the realization that trade was going to be the means that
would allow the “City on a Hill” to be successful led John
Winthrop, the colonies’ governor, to send out his son in search
of avenues for trade. One of these ports of call was Bermuda,
where sugar, tobacco, and indigo were purchased.86 Robert Rich,
the Earl of Warwick, was an influential puritan who was heavily
involved in the early colonization of Bermuda. It was through
these dissenting ties that Winthrop felt sending his son to
Bermuda was a worthy risk. He expected his son to be well
received. Thus began a relationship with Bermuda and New England
86 Francis Bremer, Jonathan Winthrop: America’s Forgotten Founding Father, (New York, Oxford University Press: 2003), pp. 331, 332
70
that continued for more than one hundred and fifty years, and
this relationship will have very profound effects in the future.
From this point on, New England maintained ties with the whole of
the West Indies to strengthen its position and trade became its
foundation whether through legal trade or smuggling.
Examples of Competition and Conflict
Two powerful reflections of competition and conflict
occurred in Bermuda, the first occurred between the Board of
Trade and the Clerk of Courts, Francis Jones. Colonel Francis
Jones immigrated to Bermuda in December of 1671 on the ship
Hopewell. His job was as a Customs Officer called a “searcher,”
and it was his responsibility to go onboard vessels to ensure
they were following the laws of trade and paying the appropriate
71
duties to the Crown.87 At that time, the Somers Islands Company
was in control of the Bermuda Islands, and any form of trade that
was done that was not through their official channels was
considered to be smuggling, and could be tried as such.
This was a very lucrative and powerful position on the
island. Over the term of his career he was able to amass a total
of 250 acres of land on an island chain that covered only twenty-
three square miles. Twenty-five of those acres were on Ireland
Island, on the extreme southwest tip of the chain. 88 Ireland
Island became central to the defense strategy of the Islands. The
primary defenses against Bermuda’s closest military threat in the
Caribbean after the American Revolution (the United States) were
eventually posted there. While there were fortifications in
various locations around Bermuda, Ireland Island’s guns looked
west, to America. The area was easily defensible and next to
impossible to be approached without being seen. The strategic
87 Bermudian National Trust, Bermuda’s Architectural Heritage: Paget, V. 6, (Hamilton, Bermuda, The Bermuda National Trust: 2010), pp. 5, 8
88 Paget, p. 8
72
importance of the island was clear. The western end of the island
was also used for other purposes, including smuggling, in which
it was very important to keep a good distance between operations
and the Governor. The record would show that Colonel Jones and
the governor would want as little contact with one another as
possible.
Understanding the position of Colonel Jones and his son,
Captain Francis Jones, Jr., is central to understanding the
conflict that was about to take place. The year was 1707 and the
Joneses were at the height of their power on the island. King
William III had recently passed away, and a new monarch sat on
the throne: Queen Anne. It appeared that some on the island of
Bermuda had decided that they have had enough of Colonel Jones in
his position, and sought to remove him from his standing in the
community by having reported him to the Board of Trade. The
issue at hand was whether or not “Mr. Jones had a patent from Her
Majesty for the places of Secretary and Provost Marshal of the
said islands, or no.” 89
73
What began to unfold was an interesting web of charge and
counter-charge which put the island of Bermuda into a virtual
standstill, judicially speaking, and left a question as to who
the official Clerk of Courts actually was. This was thought to
have been settled in favor of the Jones camp after the death of
King William, by the new Queen herself. In order to maintain the
continuity of the government and to keep the wheels of the
bureaucracy moving, Queen Anne made a proclamation that all those
who had served in an official capacity with a patent from the
King would continue to do so until Her Majesty the Queen had
chosen otherwise. There was even an act of Parliament that aided
in the insurance of the continuity of government, “Explaining a
clause in the Act of the seventh of King William for the better Security of his Majesty’s
Royal person and Government”. 90 This act was to allow all those with
patents to keep their positions for a period of six months,
“after the six months, all officers ought to renew their
patents.” The Jones camp believed that they had nothing to worry89 Board of Trade, Journal of the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations (London, His Majesty’s Stationary Office:1920), reprint University of MichiganPress 2012, p. 37590 Board of Trade, p. 375
74
about in regards to the primary accusation. They saw the Queen’s
proclamation as an extension of the patent, and they believed
that they would not need to file for a new one.91 However, that
challenge to Jones’ authority remained, which would need to be
addressed before any further business could be done, and before
he could return to his post. This feud demonstrated how the
elites of trade, though they were supposed to be working towards
the same ends, worked against each other in a competition and
conflict which eventually caused a complete disruption to the
judicial system of Bermuda, at least in regards to what the
Official Records of the Board of Trade had to say.
What began to unfold was an interesting web of charge and
counter-charge which put the island of Bermuda into a virtual
standstill, judicially speaking, and left a question as to who
the official Clerk of Courts actually was. This was thought to
have been settled by the Jones camp after the death of King
William, by the new Queen herself. In order to maintain the
continuity of the government and to keep the wheels of the 91 Ibid, p. 375, 379
75
bureaucracy moving, Queen Anne made a proclamation that all those
who had served in an official capacity with a patent from the
King would continue to do so until Her Majesty the Queen had
chosen otherwise. There was even an act of Parliament that aided
in the insurance of the continuity of government, “Explaining a
clause in the Act of the seventh of King William for the better Security of his Majesty’s
Royal person and Government”. 92 This act was to allow all those with
patents to keep their positions for a period of six months,
“after the six months, all officers ought to renew their
patents.” The Jones camp believed that they had nothing to worry
about in regards to the primary accusation. They saw the Queen’s
proclamation as an extension of the patent, and they believed
that they would not need to file for a new one.93 However, that
challenge to Jones’ authority remained, which would have needed
to be addressed before any further business could be done, and
before he could return to his post. This feud demonstrated how
the elites of trade, though they were supposed to be working
92 Board of Trade, p. 37593 Ibid, p. 375, 379
76
towards the same ends, worked against each other in a competition
and conflict which eventually caused a complete disruption to the
judicial system of Bermuda, at least in regards to what the
Official Records of the Board of Trade had to say.
A powerful customs agent, Jones had managed to amass a large
amount of property on the island and established his family as
one that was going to have to be dealt with if any shipping is
going to take place there. After all, he was the primary customs
official on the island and arguably second in power only to the
Governor.94 These twenty-five acres may have been the impetus
for the whole issue at hand. Further research in Bermudian
archives may eventually determine that. It was in the west end
that smuggling was at its height in Bermuda.95 During this
period, the Governor’s mansion and official port of call on the
island were on St. George’s Island, on the east end, perhaps as
far away from Jones’ land on Ireland Island as you can get and
94 The Bermuda National Trust, Paget, Volume 6, Historic Buildings Book Project,(Bermuda: The Bermuda National Trust, 2010), p. 895 Hamilton, The Making and Unmaking of a Revolutionary Family, p. 11
77
still be on Bermuda. The suspicion is that there was “unofficial”
trade which took place at the property, and that this began to
gain the ire of others who could either not take part, because
they were unable to acquire the land necessary, or they really
held the conviction that their oath to the crown was being
mocked. Bear in mind also that some historians, such as Michael
Jarvis, regard the Bennett tenure on Bermuda as being very lax on
smuggling, due to a break in the close ties to England when
tobacco prices plummeted. Benjamin Bennett was the governor of
Bermuda during this period. As a result, smuggling increased, and
apparently even the Governor took part.96 This is not
unsurprising. In the first half of the 1700s, it seemed that so
many respected merchantmen and betters were involved with illicit
trade that in 1726 Daniel Defoe was able to defend himself
against acts of smuggling by accusing his accusers of the same
thing.97 Perhaps this issue was more about two large fish in one
small pond.96 Jarvis, pp. 167, 168
97 Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea, p. 51
78
Two other key components to this turn of fortune for Francis
Jones, were the installation of Benjamin Bennett as Lieutenant
Governor in 1700 and the death of King William in 1702.98 This
left a question as to whether the patents held by Francis Jones
were valid, or if there was grounds for revoking the charter
giving Jones authority on the island of Bermuda. The loss of the
joint monarchs whom issued the initial patents was seen by Jones’
opponents as effectively having stripped Francis Jones of his
authority. His aspirations for the family would then have come
to very little. As it was, the Joneses were going to be tough
family with which to keep up.
Prior to all of the official complaints, letters to and from
the Board of Trade to Captain Jones and Col. Bennet concerning
Capt. Jones, all addressed him as “secretary and provost marshal”
of the island. Even during the investigation his titles were used
to address him. This implies that the official response to the
complaints may not have been what was desired by the governor.
98 Stephen Saunders Webb, The Governors-General: The English Army and the Definition of the Empire, 1569-1681, (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press: 1979), p. 473
79
Yet the proceedings continued anyway. The official reinstatement
occurred in April, 1704, much to the distaste of Governor
Bennett, and the situation was still not resolved by the end of
1707. Looking though the Official Records, we find entreaties
being sent to the Board of Trade, asking for a resolution to be
brought regarding the matter as late as December of that year.
The fight for authority between Governor Bennett and Francis
Jones was a long, drawn-out affair. 99 Either there were much more
pressing issues that were occupying the Board of Trade at the
time or Francis Jones had some very powerful friends on the Board
or influencing it.
By April of 1708 a resolution to the feud seemed to have
been in place. Captain Jones was demanding his rents (payments
for services rendered and property used) through the Board of
Trade to Governor Bennett.100 This demonstrated that things had
begun to run as usual on the island again. An uneasy truce was
put into place. Each side seemed to allow the other to go about
99 Ibid, pp. 1, 3, 375100 Webb, The Governors General, p. 484
80
their business as long they stayed out of each other’s way. Then,
in the June 8, 1708 entry of the minutes of the Board of Trade,
Governor Bennett fired the first salvo of a renewed antagonism
against Mr. Jones. He sent affidavits pertaining to Daniel
Greatbeach and Colonel Peniston, declaring that they never did
pen anything in favor of Captain Francis Jones, when in fact they
had. This gave the impression the previous recommendations were
forgeries. A new fight in the old rivalry was on. For the next
six months, Bennett continued to communicate with the Board of
Trade in his efforts to remove Captain Jones from his posts as
secretary and provost marshal of Bermuda. In December of 1708,
Francis Jones fought back with a letter detailing “87 articles of
complaint” against Governor Bennett. Though Jones was silent in
the minutes, he was not idle.101
The last entry pertaining to the Bennett/Jones dispute is
dated January 27, 1709. At this juncture we are left with a
cliffhanger. Both parties in the complaints agreed to await
decision on the issue until February, the minutes for which are 101 Board of Trade, p. 553
81
not in the volumes available at this time. It could not have gone
too poorly for Jones, however, considering that his son, Francis
Jones III, eventually went on to become president of Bermuda
later in his life.102 This whole affair seems to be a clash of
personalities of two powerful men, both of whom were charged with
exercising the affairs of the Crown.
Here are two members of the Hydrarchy who, by all rights,
should have worked in unison toward the greater execution of
maritime trade and improving the influence of the English Crown
within the region. The reality expressed above was much more
representative of the Legislature and Governor relationship in
North America as related by Bernard Bailyn in his Origins of American
Politics (1968). In his top down approach to the political situation
in North America (part of the English Hydrarchy), the competition
and conflict between these powerful bodies had their roots in the
English legal systems and tradition of the rights of Englishmen.
The difference came into play with the new recognition of the
colonies not having complied with the Navigation Acts, and the 102 Ibid, p. 582
82
Throne now having the time and opportunity to begin to address
the issue.
Another example of the competition and conflict is from New
England, with repercussions for that region’s very existence as
they knew it. By 1686, Governor Andros had been put in place to
run the Dominion of New England as a first step towards bringing
the colonists there under the heel of the Crown. His selection
as the Governor of the Dominion of New England was no accident.
Andros had served in the Irish Guards, and while in Ireland, he
had learned the authoritarian techniques of “forceful
colonization,” in which a methodical subjugation of the native
people was to take place. The expectation was that Andros would
employ the lessons learned in Ireland in New England when he took
over.103 Samuel Sewell, a contemporary diarist in the inner
circles of Massachusetts government prior to the new Dominion,
“prayed that God would pardon each Magistrate and Deputies
Sin”.104 It appears from Sewell’s diary that he was expecting hard
83
days ahead. Even during the Sabbath meeting on May 16, Sewell
recorded that “Mr. Willard prayed not for the Governor or
Government as formerly; but spake as implied it to be changed…” –
an overt act of protest to the sudden change of fortunes to New
England.105 Even more so, there were three men mentioned in the
diary who refused to take the oath of allegiance. They were
Captain Hutchinson of the local militia, William Johnson, Esq.,
and one of the Lieutenants under the command of one Captain
Lidget. As a result, the entire company of men refused to take
the oath of allegiance as well.106 Many New Englanders bristled
under the thought of the loss of their so long enjoyed
independence. The Dominion of New England was in place, and a
Royal Governor sat at its head. No legislative assembly was to
exist. Representation was a thing of the past, “taxes were
imposed without representation,” something the puritan
Congregational tradition would not allow on its own, and, even
worse, the “third Church of Boston was forced to share its
meetinghouse with an Anglican Congregation”.107 The situation was
beginning to look bleak for the Massachusetts Colony. It was
84
reported by Edward Randolph, agent for the King, that “not one
Minister op’ned his lipps to pray for the King, hoping the tyme
of their deliverance from monarchy & popery was at hand”. 108If
you want to know the temperament of the New England population in
the late seventeenth century, listen to its preachers. Those
elected to high office will also follow in their wake. Any
relief from the Andros regime placed over them, would be
welcomed.
As a consequence, Samuel Sewell of Massachusetts was sent
on a diplomatic mission in 1688 to meet with Increase Mather in
England, in an attempt to reclaim their charter and manner of
governance.109 While making the crossing, the ship, America, that
103 Webb, pp. 39, 49
104 Samuel Sewell, The Diary of Samuel Sewell: 1674-1708, Vol. 1, M. Halsey Thomas, ed. (New York, Farrar, Straus, and Giroux: 1973), p. 114.
105 Sewell, The Diary of Samuel Sewell, Vol. 1, p. 113.
106Sewell, pp. 116-118.
107 Francis Bremer, Congregational Communion, (Boston, Northeastern University Press: 1994), pp. 245, 246.
108 Bremer, Congregational Communion, p. 246.
109 Sewell, , p. 184.
85
Mr. Sewall was traveling in, had met with a ship in transit on
Sunday, December 30th, 1688, and learned of the Glorious
Revolution, while on the way to defend his colony against King
James II, who then was no longer in power.110 He recalled a dream
after hearing the news of the fall of King James II. In it he
stated that he, “dreamed of Military matters, arms and Captains,
and of a suddain, Major Gookin very well clad from head to
foot….his coat and breeches of blood-red silk…” (Major Gookin was
a good friend of Sewell’s back in Massachusetts). Sewell was
girding himself mentally for the possibility of a greater
conflict that never came.111 His relief must have been immense,
for both the Parliamentary cause and his home colony, when he
discovered the changed situation in England.
Sewell’s travels in England saw a great deal of visitations
to schools and universities, as well as a great deal of shopping
for family back home, but his primary purpose was still
unfulfilled. That purpose, now that James II was no longer on the
110 Ibid, p. 187.111 Ibid, p. 187.
86
throne, was to secure the patent, or at least to be able to bring
economic stability and credit, back to the New England property
owners, both of which had been greatly reduced under the Andros
regime and the loss of the Charter. The point about credit was
key to the elite of New England. Without it, their ability to
continue in the trades they had been engaged in previously would
have been greatly curtailed, and their power reduced
considerably. His apprehension was still evident in his title of
the letter sent and recorded in his diary on April 26th; “Hat in
Hand &c.”112 His deference, however, was more for show than deeply
felt out of fear. In his company and lobbying for the return of
the Charter was Edward Harley, who was Governor of Dunkirk, and
Philip Wharton, “fourth baron,” who was an important and
prominent puritan with connection in court who “introduced Nathan
Mather (brother to the New England divine, Increase Mather) to
both James II and William III.”113 In so doing, Samuel Sewell was
connected to parties working against James II prior to the
112 Ibid, pp. 212, 213.
113 Sewall, notes, p. 212.
87
Glorious Revolution of 1688 and placed his allegiance with the
Convention Parliament and William III. The conflict in England
and the connections tying the anti-Stuart factions to New England
would lead to a greater conflict which began in Boston on April
18th, 1689. It was the revolution against the Andros Government
and the Dominion of New England. Governor Andros’ days in power
were numbered. The last week in June, Sewell received a letter
which informed him of the essentially bloodless revolution that
had taken place. In his entry dated June 28, 1689, Sewell
recorded the event, “We were surpris’d with joy”.114 The chances
that the Charter would be returned became even greater indeed and
New Englanders demonstrated a willingness to take up arms in
conflict, regardless of station, when necessary to achieve their
ends.
Some might find the New England deposition of Governor
Andros to be in opposition to the Crown and thus in opposition to
William and Mary, the new monarchs. What the New Englanders saw
114 Ibid, p. 222.
88
was a representative of King James II still in power, who owed
his allegiance to the Catholic King. Protestant New England
wanted to do whatever it could to remove what it saw as
oppressive policies and to demonstrate their loyalty to the new
King and Queen. By removing Governor Andros they were in effect
removing whatever authority James II might have had remaining by
eliminated his authority in the New World. It also helped that
King William III was also known as William of Orange from the
Netherlands, a very Protestant country. New England Protestants
would have seen them as a spiritual ally in the continuous
struggle for true religion.
The news in the letter Sewall received was that the Prince
of Orange had taken England, and the new war with France, meant
that New England was going to be far from the new monarch’s mind,
while he needed to consolidate his power in England. Bear in
mind also that in this transition, the two most powerful
Hydrarchies in the world bordered on war, and one lost his throne
to the original Atlantic Hydrarchy, the Dutch. What did this
89
mean? This meant that New England could go about governing
themselves as they had in the past since in 1692; the Charter was
once again returned to New England.115 The second example of the
competition and conflict is from Bermuda and carried with it,
revolutionary implications, the Bermudian-American Gunpowder Plot
of 1774. It is an example that will be repeated at varying levels
through the Anglo-American Revolution of 1776.
115 Ibid, p. 291.
90
Revolutionary Implications
The more Revolutionary reflection of this conflict occurred
in the so-called Bermuda Gunpowder Plot. Tensions were building
on the mainland colonies of North America, and another conflict
was about to take place in Bermuda with serious implications for
the Americans. It mirrored, somewhat, the disagreement between
the Americans and British on an individual scale, one a merchant
and businessmen and the other, a Royal governor the
representative of Royal authority on the island. The antagonists
were a rather intrepid business man and adventurer, Colonel Henry
91
Tucker and the local Governor, George James Bruere. The former
served as a delegate to the Continental Congress and as a
representative in London. His connections were strong, as well.
Bermuda received a fair warning from the first Continental
Congress in July 1774, warning them that they were going to cease
trade with Great Britain and the colonies one year from “the
first day of December next (1775)” if the political differences
then brewing did not get resolved.116 In a word, Bermuda was on
notice that war was coming. The effect that the Navigation Acts
had on the island’s economy and subsistence would have been
immense. Michael Jarvis relates that “famine and potential civil
unrest” was likely to be the result of American resolve not to
trade with Great Britain. This was a view that was shared very
strongly by the son of Henry Tucker, St. George Tucker.
Businesses would be ruined. Bermudians moved into action, but on
an unofficial level.117
116 Continental Congress, Extracts from the votes and Proceedings of the American Continental Congress, (Boston, Edes and Gill: 1774), p.22.117 Jarvis, In the Eye of All Trade, p. 386.
92
Henry Tucker and an “extralegal” delegation were sent to
Philadelphia to petition Continental Congress to exempt the
island from what they saw would be a crippling trade embargo,
which it would indeed have been. The island did not have the
capacity to sustain itself. Congress saw a means to acquiring
something they desperately needed to fight a revolution,
gunpowder. Congress “resolved to grant entry to any vessel
carrying gunpowder, saltpeter, muskets, cannon, or other war
material…” and many knew about the poorly guarded magazine
located at St. Georges in Bermuda. Tucker made the decision to
let the powder go in exchange for the ability to continue to
trade needed provisions for the island.118 This flew in the face
of Governor Bruere, who has been trying to maintain England’s
interests as best he could. Henry Tucker, Bermuda’s Chief
Justice’s own son-in-law, was engaging in treason.
On August 14, 1774, Bermudians and Americans “broke into the
magazine and rolled over one hundred barrels of gunpowder half a
mile to boats waiting at Tobacco Bay…”119 The governor was not 118 Jarvis, pp. 385-387.
93
made aware until the next day, and even then the majority of the
population did their best to obstruct news of the theft going to
England. The next morning Bruere responded and issued a reward
for the apprehension of “any person who can make a proper
discovery before the Magistrates”.120 None came forward. It was
this very gunpowder theft that allowed the colonists to take the
engagement with England to the next level. Bermuda became the
launching pad for the Anglo-American Revolution.
Two weeks later, at the August 31 meeting, Governor Bruere
made an appeal to the Council that demonstrated the challenges he
was up against. The Bermudians, or at least a large part of them,
were well aware of what would happen if they could not gain
access to American produce. The governor himself went to hire a
sloop to go to Boston and attempt to locate the powder and those
responsible for its theft. He continued: “But to my surprise and
astonishment some persons have intimidated the Man (captain of
119 Ibid, 389.120 J. C. Arnell, ed., Minutes of His Majesty’s Council: Bermuda-August 15, 1775, Bermuda Journal of Archaeology and Maritime History, Volume 11, (Canada, Bermuda Maritime Association: 1999), pp. 186, 187.
94
the Sloop) by having the impudence & Assurance to tell the Man
that they would take away the Sloop’s rudder and secure his sails
if he offered to fit her”. The Council, in the same minutes,
called this occurrence, “A Sloop very much out of repair that had
neither Master nor Men”.121 On October 2, the Continental Congress
allowed for Bermuda to trade all but “British manufactured
goods,” providing the ability for the island to maintain its
sustainability. England, however, was not so generous as to
allow this free trade to continue, especially in the face of open
rebellion. In December 1775, Parliament banned trade with
American “rebellious colonies”. In the effort to keep Bermuda
fed, the mariner and merchant could lose everything.122
Why did Parliament find the colonies in rebellion at this
point? In large part it was the concept of Virtual
Representation. This was the idea that members of Parliament not
only represented the constituency from which they were elected,
but also that of the entire empire. The colonists saw this as a
121 Arnell, pp. 186, 187.122 Jarvis, p. 392.
95
farce. How could someone who was almost three thousand miles away
have any insight as to the needs of the colonists on a day to day
basis? With the line in the sand thus drawn, Parliament issued
the Act of Exclusion.123
The Act of Exclusion treated the Americans as foreigners in
the eyes of the Navigation Acts, and seems to have terrified St.
George Tucker. In a letter dated March 31, 1776, he voiced his
anger and fear of both parties to the Honorable John Page. He
called the American Revolutionary leadership men with “misguided
zeal or ruthless ambition” and described the English leadership
as having “blindness prevailing among a set of men who seem to
have resigned the important interest of the British nation, to
the calls of ambition and the considerations of conquest”. He
continued to paint a picture of war on the continent and famine
in the islands. Of the impending hunger, St. George stated, “What
are the horrors of death in the martial field,…compared with the
slow of deliberate, but not less certain, attacks of famine”? 124
123 Thomas Ladenburg, “Digital History”, The Stamp Act and Virtual Representation, 2007. http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/teachers/lesson_plans/pdfs/unit1_7.pdf, accessed November 15, 2013
96
Since the islands had been growing cash crops, rather than
produce for consumption, his point was a valid concern, to a
degree. He stated that they had “no internal resources, and our
external supplies are cut off by the most unjust and cruel act
that ever Tyrant could devise”. More to the point was the fear of
disrupted trade and loss of business to his shipping company, and
the inability for his contacts in England to provide for credit
and goods to be sold and traded. Remembering that he was writing
from a British colony loyal to the Crown (Bermuda) he injected
descriptions of his locale as being “this wretched spot” and that
he would “rather fall in the field or perish at the stake, than
be doomed to a miserable exit…”.125 What seemed more believable
was that he was attempting to lay the groundwork for his return
to Virginia and did not want to have his extended stay in Bermuda
affect his standing back home.
The Tuckers were one of the wealthiest families on the
island and it is highly unlikely they were going to starve given
their connections. What was more likely to have been the concern
97
of St. George was the arrival of the “act of parliament
prohibiting all trade and intercourse with the United Colonies,
and subjecting all vessels to forfeiture for a breach thereof”.126
This act of Prohibition was a thinly veiled warning to his
contacts back home as to what was happening in British colonies
regarding the revolutionary activities of the “United Colonies”.
While the Tuckers would have been certainly concerned about their
interests abroad, they were not the only merchants on the island.
Indeed the concern would have been for the entire trade network
on the island. In only a little more than two months’ time, the
Declaration of Independence was ratified.
To underscore how important it was for Bermuda to trade with
the colonies for its subsistence, a full nine months after
England banned trade with the American colonies the Council
petitioned the Governor to allow for sanctioned trade with the 124 Letter from St. George Tucker to Hon. John Page dated March 31, 1776. Copy,Swem Library at William and Mary, the Coleman-Tucker Collection, microfilm roll M-12, page 1.
125 Letter from St. George Tucker to Hon. John Page, March 31, 1776, p. 2.
126 Letter from St. George Tucker to Hon. John Page, March 31, 1776, p.1.
98
Americans. The petition stated: “we have no staple of any kind,
by which we can procure the common necessities of Life, nor can
we encourage the most distant Hoppe of reaping any supplies from
the Production of the Country…” The petition continued to state
the “impracticability of the plan” [to supply Bermuda from
England] and urged the Governor to “consider seriously the
Distresses of the Inhabitants of this little Country and at the
same time kindly grant them every Indulgence and Relief in your
Excellency’s Power”. At the end of the meeting a “Form of
License” was presented before the Board to allow for the
“procurement of provisions”.127 In effect, they established a
back door to trading with the American Colonies.
A previous letter dated just less than a year earlier,
August 26, 1775, gave St. George sensitive troop placements and
speculation of movements. A contemporary of Tucker’s, Archibald
Campbell stated that, “they are unified in their December hour,
127 J. C. Arnell (editor), Minutes of His Majesty’s Council: Bermuda-August 15, 1775, BermudaJournal of Archaeology and Maritime History, Volume 12, (Canada, Bermuda Maritime Association: 2001), pp. 162, 163.
99
they have reduced their number to 1000 men under the command of
P. Kerry”. Apparently there was a conflict in the ranks. Serving
under Kerry, it was related that a Col. Neilson, “will not serve
under him as he is supposed to be one of the delegates to
Congress”.128 This was extraordinarily valuable information.
Campbell was conveying areas of danger to St. George Tucker.
This information would be very helpful if he was to decide to
launch or land vessels carrying cargo. In the same page, Campbell
warned St. George that Boston was growing with British troops
under Lord Summerset, and Campbell let him know that Boston was
cut off from trade for the time being. The independent streak
that had been developing for generations in the New World was
clashing with the conservatism of the Ancien Regime. St. George
Tucker and the trading elites were in the thick of it.
This was a contest of two eminent members of the Hydrarchy,
competing on the highest levels against one another. Henry
128 Letter from Dr. Archibald Campbell to St. George Tucker, August 26, 1775, College of William and Mary, Swem Library, Special Collections, Coleman TuckerPapers, Microfilm M-11, p. 2.
100
Tucker remained on the Council through the 1782 minutes and
played an active role in the governance of the island.129 George
Bruere continued to maintain his position through to 1780, the
gunpowder theft notwithstanding.130 The entire affair indicates
the extreme ties the Atlantic World had developed between each of
the regions: of Bermuda, England, and North America. That one
colony could face starvation and ruin, should trade with the
other be severed, was a strong bond indeed. It also demonstrated
the lengths that colonists would go to in order to maintain their
colonies, their status within it, and the rights they so fiercely
believed were their birthright.131 This was the seeds of undoing
for England as a primary power in their former western empire.
129 J. C. Arnell (editor), Minutes of His Majesty’s Council: Bermuda-August 15, 1775, BermudaJournal of Archaeology and Maritime History, Volume 14, (Canada, Bermuda Maritime Association: 2003), pp. 192-207.
130 Jarvis, p. 390.131 Continental Congress, Extracts from the Votes and Proceedings of the American Continental Congress, p. 27.
101
\
Conclusion: Evolution of an American Identity
In addressing the independent economic identity that
Americans developed, the date of December 1775 is paramount.
That is the date at which Parliament saw fit to exclude any and
all trade of its country and colonies with the American colonies
in rebellion. The effect of this was to exclude them from trade
with Great Britain at large, and in the language of the
Navigation Acts, define them as other than English. If that is
the case, then an argument can be made for the date of the
creation of an American identity as recognized by a foreign power
as December 1775 with the Prohibitory Act, and by the very power
that did not want them to go in the first place. This placed the
102
American colonies in the same category as every other foreign
power when viewed by the Navigation Acts, excluded from the trade
privileges by Great Britain.
The historian Merrill Jensen called it “Independence by the
Act of Parliament” and the direct language from the Prohibitory
Act (22 December, 1775) stated,
All manner of trade and commerce is and shall be prohibited with the colonies [in rebellion]…and all other ships and vessels whatsoever, together with theircargoes apparel, and furniture and all other ships and vessels trading in any port or place of the said colonies, or going to trade, or coming from trading, inany port or place, shall be forfeited to his Majesty, as if the same were the ships and effects of open enemies, and shall be so adjudged, deemed, and taken in all courts of admiralty, and in all other courts whatsoever.132
The progression from initial settlement, outpost for
dissention and reliance on the mother country made the Atlantic
World an incubator for new ideas in governance and international
trade. The conflicts and competition between the maritime
elites, the Hydrarchy in tandem with the Navigation Acts, drove a
132 Jensen, p. 853.
103
wedge between the colonists and the mother country, setting the
colonists on a direction toward free trade. That infighting
allowed new concepts of self to develop in the colonies which
profoundly shaped the political course of the continent. It acted
as a training ground for international relations and fostered a
new economic identity and sense of self in the New World.
England and its policies were itself the crucible that forged
American identity out of the ingredients the Atlantic World
provided.
104
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