Grasping the Mental World of Diplomacy in the Late Modern Era: A Conceptual Framework

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GRASPING THE MENTAL WORLD OF DIPLOMACY IN THE LATE MODERN ERA: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Michael AUWERS∗

Abstract: In this article, I will elaborate a conceptual framework to analyse how the evolution of the diplomatic profession influenced the ideas and actions of diplomats in the late modern era. Starting from a critical overview of historical and social scientific literature on diplomacy, I will argue that if made suitable for historical research, the concepts of ‘international political culture’ and especially ‘diplomatic culture’ are very adequate methodological vehicles to tackle the issue. To support this argument, first I will identify the processes of democratization as the key driving forces behind social and cultural changes in the diplomatic profession during the early modern era. They indeed caused a significant turnabout in international political culture, which provoked what could be qualified as a crisis of diplomatic culture. International political and diplomatic culture are so-called “sponge words”, or words that “can soak up a variety of operational meanings but at some saturation point begin to leave a logical and functional mess behind”.1 To avoid this from happening, in the second and final paragraphs of this article I will clarify these concepts and increase their practicability for historical research.

Rezumat: În acest articol voi stărui asupra unei matrici conceptuale

pentru analiza cum profesia diplomatică a influenţat ideile şi acţiunile diplomaţilor din epoca modernă. Începând cu o vedere critică asupra scrierilor despre diplomaţie din istorie şi ştiinţele sociale, voi argumenta că dacă acestea ar fi făcute potrivite pentru cercetarea istorică, conceptele de „cultură politică internaţională” sau de „cultură diplomatică” sunt vehicule metodologice foarte potrivite pentru analizarea subiectului de faţă. Pentru a sprijini acest argument, iniţial voi identifica procesele de democratizare ca factori de schimbare sociali şi culturali din profesia diplomatică de la începutul epocii moderne. Aceştia într-adevăr au cauzat o reaşezare în cultura politică internaţională, ce a provocat ceea ce în cultura diplomatică sunt numite „cuvinte-burete”, sau cuvinte care „pot absorbi o varietate de sensuri operaţionale dar la un moment de saturaţie încep să lase o dâră de încurcături logice şi funcţionale”. Pentru a preveni aceste evoluţii, în penultimul şi ultimul paragraf al acestui articol voi clarifica asupra acestor concepte, mârindu-le practicabilitatea pentru cercetarea istorică.

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Keywords: diplomacy, international political culture, democratization of

international relations “Diplomacy never was quite what it used to be. Ambassadorial memoirs

almost invariably relate the profound changes that their authors claimed to have witnessed in its methods, style and content. Allowance has to be made for altered perspectives. The world perceived by a diplomat at the end of his career is bound to seem a very different place from that which he knew, or thought he knew, when as an attaché or junior clerk he transcribed and translated the correspondence of his elders.”2

The previous quotation contains some casually made reflections on the genre of diplomatic memoirs published in the late modern era. They are signed Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, authors of the seminal historical analysis of the diplomatic profession. The readers of diplomatic memoirs would certainly agree with this observation.3 But they might also regret that Hamilton and Langhorne do not elaborate upon it, and that apart from the very subjective and impressionistic contents of these memoirs, we know very little of how changes in the diplomats’ sphere of activity affected their mental world and the way they exercised their profession. This might seem a little surprising, because the cultural turn in International History has brought the diplomat back in. During the last decades, historians studying international relations no longer concentrate solely on the contents of negotiations, but include analyses of the historical context of diplomacy in all its complexities, which implies devoting considerable attention to the mental world of its practitioners.4 ¡ ¢ £ ¤ ¥ ¦ § ¨ £ © ¤ ª « § « ¬ £ ® ¥ § ¯ ¬ ° § « ± ¥ ª ¯ « ¢ ² ³ ´ µ ¶ · ¸ ¹ º » ¹ µ ¼ ½ ¾ » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ ¹ Â ² ° ª « ¬ ª « ² ª Ã ¤ © ¢ ¬ ± ¢ ²Ä Å Æ Æ ² Ç È É Ê ÈË Ì ¢ ¢ Í £ ® ¥ § ¢ © Î Ã Ï ¢ ¯ Ð § « ¬ Ñ ¢ Ò ¯ § Ó £ © ¤ ¢ Ô £ « ² Õ Ö Á ¼ » · » × µ · À ¸ Ø » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ º » µ È Ù Ú µ µ º Û Ø µ Ø µ ×Á Ö Á ¼ » · µ × Ø » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ º » Ü Û µ × Ý µ À Þ µ × µ º × Û Ö Ø ¼ » × µ × ¿ Û Ý À » Ö µ × ¸ Û ß » Ú Þ º » à Á µ × » à ¹ À µ ² á ° ¢ Ð â ® ¯ £ Ò § £ « Ð ã¬ £ Ç © ª ¨ § ¤ ¢ Ð È ä ¯ § ¤ £ å Ã ¢ Ð ² Ð ª ® £ § æ £ © £ ¤ ç Ð ² £ « è © Ã ¢ « ® ¢ Ð é ê ë ê ã ê ê ë ¢ Ð £ ì ® © ¢ Ð í î ² ä § ¯ £ Ð ² Î ¯ ¨ § « ¬ ï ª © £ « ²Ä Å Æ Ä Èð ë « ¤ ¢ ¯ ¢ Ð ¤ £ « ± ¯ ¢ è © ¢ ® ¤ £ ª « Ð ª « ¤ ¥ £ Ð ¢ Ò ª © Ã ¤ £ ª « § ¯ ¢ ñ ò ¯ Ð Ã © § ° ¢ ¥ ¨ Ô Ã ¥ © ² ¾ » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ º » µ Þ µ × ¹ ´ » ¹ ´ º µ ¸ À ×» Ú º µ · Ú ¸ º » ¼ Ú ¸ À µ ó Û À º Û · Þ µ × ¹ ´ » ¹ ´ º µ ô ³ ´ µ ¼ · µ º » × ¹ ´ µ õ Ú × ö º ÷ µ Û Ú Ø µ Á ¿ » · » × ¹ ´ µ ø ¼ · × ¹ ´ Û Ú Þ ÷ ù » × ¹ ´ µ Úú » × º ¼ · » × ¹ ´ µ · ó Û À º Û · ù » × × µ Ú × ¹ ´ ¸ ½ º Û Ú Ø û ¼ ÷ » ¼ À ¼ Þ » × ¹ ´ µ Á ü Ú × º » º Û º » ¼ Ú ¸ À » × Á Û × ² á ý ¢ Ð ® ¥ £ ® ¥ ¤ ¢ Ã « ¬ý ¢ Ð ¢ © © Ð ® ¥ § è ¤ î ² Ä Å Å Æ ² Ä þ ² Ç Ç È Ê É ÿ ã ÿ Ä Ê � ¡ § ¯ £ « § ò ¯ æ § ® ¥ ² ¾ » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ º » ¹ ´ » × º ¼ · Â × » Ú ¹ µ º ´ µ ¹ Û À º Û · ¸ Àº Û · Ú ² á � ¥ ¢ ¦ £ Ð ¤ ª ¯ £ ® § © � ª Ã ¯ « § © î ² Ä Å Å Ê ² ÿ � ² ÿ ² Ç Ç È É É Æ ã É É þ � ä ¢ ¤ ¢ ¯ � § ® Ô Ð ª « ² ¶ » µ · · µ � ¼ Û · Ø » µ Û ² º ´ µ� ¹ Û À º Û · ¸ À º Û · Ú � ¸ Ú Ø º ´ µ ¿ · ¸ ¹ º » ¹ µ ¼ ½ » Ú º µ · Ú ¸ º » ¼ Ú ¸ À ´ » × º ¼ · Â ² á ¢ Ò £ ¢ Ï ª è ë « ¤ ¢ ¯ « § ¤ £ ª « § © Ì ¤ Ã ¬ £ ¢ Ð î ²Ä Å Å � ² Ê ÿ ² Ç Ç È Æ � � ã Æ � Æ � ¡ § ¯ ¢ « ý ¯ § ¨ ã Ì Ô ª © ¬ § ± ¢ ¯ ² � · » Ú Þ » Ú Þ º ´ µ ¾ » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ º � ¸ ¹ » Ú È � À µ Á µ Ú º × ¼ ½¸ � µ ù ú » × º ¼ · » ¹ ¸ À µ × µ ¸ · ¹ ´ õ Þ µ Ú Ø ¸ ² á â ò ë � ª ¯ Ô £ « ± ä § Ç ¢ ¯ Ð ã Ì ï Î Ì Ä Å Æ Æ � Æ Ê î ² � © ª ¯ ¢ « ® ¢ ²â Ã ¯ ª Ç ¢ § « ò « £ Ò ¢ ¯ Ð £ ¤ � ë « Ð ¤ £ ¤ Ã ¤ ¢ � â § ¬ ¢ ¨ ² � µ ß µ · ³ ¸ À º ¼ û º · ¸ Ú Þ µ · × � � Ú ú » × º ¼ · » ¸ Ú × ² ¶ ¼ À » º » ¹ ¸ Àû ¹ » µ Ú º » × º × ¸ Ú Ø º ´ µ û º Û Ø Â ¼ ½ ¾ » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ ¹ Â » Ú º ´ µ � Û · ¼ ¿ µ ¸ Ú � ¼ Á Á Û Ú » º Â � � Û · ¼ ¿ µ ¸ Ú Ù Ú » ¼ Ú ²á � £ Ç © ª ¨ § ® � � Ì ¤ § ¤ ¢ ® ¯ § è ¤ î ² Ä Å Æ Æ ² Ä Ä ² ÿ ² Ç Ç È Æ ã Æ É È

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1. The Democratization of International Relations

As debates within both historiography and the social sciences have

shown, conceptualizing democratization is not an easy task.5 However, two distinguished features of the phenomenon can be discerned. From a sociological point of view, democratization means all kinds of evolutions that extend the leverage for social mobility to ever larger groups of people, while at the same time granting them access to diverse communication circuits. The rise of the mass media is a phenomenon that could be linked to this process. The political-institutional perspective on democratization, then, involves the decisions of governments to engage these increasing numbers of people in policy-making, by for instance, franchise extensions.6

Both the sociological and the political-institutional viewpoints on democratization are operating in the realm of late nineteenth and early twentieth century international politics. The period indeed witnessed some significant changes in the ways of international relations. More specifically, in the liberal democracies the notion that international politics should deal with the relations between peoples rather than the mere interactions between states took ever more root. Franchise extensions and the rise of the mass media made Western governments increasingly aware of a public opinion that pressed for transparency and accountability in the making of foreign policy. Introducing the novelty of involving entire societies, the First World War further revealed that the existing system of international relations was fundamentally unfit for purpose, for keeping the peace. There was even a widespread conviction that the diplomats’ bellicosity and conspiratorial machinations were greatly responsible for the drift towards war. Not surprisingly, this heavily fuelled critical voices who demanded the replacement of Great Power or ‘old’ diplomacy. It had to be replaced by a new kind of international relations based on publicity, openness and co-operation between nations and peoples.7 f ë ¨ Ç ª ¯ ¤ § « ¤ Ï ª ¯ Ô Ð £ « æ ª ¤ ¥ è £ ¢ © ¬ Ð £ « ® © Ã ¬ ¢ ñ Ì § ¨ Ã ¢ © ä È ¦ Ã « ¤ £ « ± ¤ ª « ² ³ ´ µ ³ ´ » · Ø g ¸ ß µ È¾ µ Á ¼ ¹ · ¸ º » ÷ ¸ º » ¼ Ú » Ú º ´ µ À ¸ º µ º ù µ Ú º » µ º ´ ¹ µ Ú º Û · Â ² Ñ ª ¯ ¨ § « ² Æ É É Æ � � § Ò £ ¬ ä ª ¤ ¤ ¢ ¯ ¢ ¤ § © È ²¾ µ Á ¼ ¹ · ¸ º » ÷ ¸ º » ¼ Ú ² ï § ¨ æ ¯ £ ¬ ± ¢ ² ä ª © £ ¤ � ² Æ É É þ � ¡ § ¯ £ ä § © ª « ¢ « ¢ ¤ § © È ² ³ ´ µ õ × ´ Þ ¸ º µ · µ × µ ¸ · ¹ ´¹ ¼ Á ¿ ¸ Ú » ¼ Ú º ¼ º ´ µ ¿ ¼ À » º » ¹ × ¼ ½ Ø µ Á ¼ ¹ · ¸ º » ÷ ¸ º » ¼ Ú » Ú � Û · ¼ ¿ µ ô ¹ ¼ Ú ¹ µ ¿ º × ¸ Ú Ø ´ » × º ¼ · » µ × ² � § ¯ « ¥ § ¨ ²Î Ð ¥ ± § ¤ ¢ ² Ä Å Å � Èh Í § ¯ « £ i Ó ¢ � ¢ « ² ü Ú À µ » Ø » Ú Þ ô Ú ¸ º » µ ß ¼ · Á » Ú Þ µ Ú Ø µ Á ¼ ¹ · ¸ º » µ » Ú µ µ Ú g µ × º ã � Û · ¼ ¿ µ µ × ¿ µ · × ¿ µ ¹ º » µ ½ ²á Ñ § ¤ £ ¢ ¢ « ¬ ¢ ¨ ª ® ¯ § ¤ £ ¢ ² Æ � É Å ã Æ É Ä Æ ñ § ® ¤ § Ò § « ¥ ¢ ¤ £ « ¤ ¢ ¯ Ã « £ Ò ¢ ¯ Ð £ ¤ § £ ¯ ® ª © © ª å Ã £ Ã ¨ ² Ó ¯ Ã Ð Ð ¢ © ² � ã É Ã « £ Ä Å Å � j Ñ § ¤ £ ª « ¢ ¤ ¬ ç ¨ ª ® ¯ § ¤ £ ¢ ² Æ � É Å ã Æ É Ä Æ ñ § ® ¤ ¢ Ð ¬ Ã ® ª © © ª å Ã ¢ £ « ¤ ¢ ¯ Ã « £ Ò ¢ ¯ Ð £ ¤ § £ ¯ ¢ ²Ó ¯ Ã i ¢ © © ¢ Ð ² � ã É Ã £ « Ä Å Å � î ² Ó ¯ Ã Ð Ð ¢ © Ð ² ¡ k Î Ó ² Ä Å Å � ² Ç Ç È Ê þ Ê ã Ê þ � Èl Ó ¯ Ã « ¢ © © ª k £ ± ¢ m m £ ² ü Ú º · ¼ Ø Û ÷ » ¼ Ú µ ² á n Ç £ « £ ª « Ç Ã æ © £ å Ã ¢ ¢ ¤ Ç ª © £ ¤ £ å Ã ¢ ¢ i ¤ ç ¯ £ ¢ Ã ¯ ¢ È ë ë ñ Æ É Æ � ã Æ É ÿ Å Èï ª © © ª å Ã ¢ ª ¯ ± § « £ Ð ç Ç § ¯ © o â ® ª © ¢ è ¯ § « p § £ Ð ¢ ¬ ¢ ª ¨ ¢ ¢ ¤ © ¢ ï ¢ « ¤ ¯ ª Ç ¢ ¯ ± © £ Ð ¤ Ã ¬ £ ¬ £ Ç ª © £ ¤ £ ® § ¢ Ð ¤ ¢ ¯ § ¢ª Ç £ « £ ª « ¢ Ç Ã æ æ © £ ® § ¬ ¢ © o ò « £ Ò ¢ ¯ Ð £ ¤ ç ¬ ¢ Í £ © § « ² ª ¨ ¢ Æ � ã Ä Å è ç Ò ¯ £ ¢ ¯ Æ É � Æ î ² ª ¨ ¢ ² â ® ª © ¢è ¯ § « p § £ Ð ¢ ¬ ¢ ª ¨ ¢ ² Æ É � ÿ ² Ç Ç È þ ã � � ¦ § ¨ £ © ¤ ª « § « ¬ ° § « ± ¥ ª ¯ « ¢ ² ¼ ¿ È ¹ » º È ² Ç Ç È Æ Ä ÿ ã Æ Ä � § « ¬ Æ Ê � ã



This ‘new’, public diplomacy never really took off, though. Surely, with the League of Nations an international institution enshrining these values was created, but it lacked effective power and hence the capacity of seriously altering the conduct of international relations. Nevertheless, traditional diplomats were often disgruntled at the presence of so many ‘amateurs’ in their working space, and many openly wondered if the world really needed these institutions at all.8 Furthermore, public criticism did urge governments to (continue to) democratize the access to the diplomatic career and to restructure career patterns along more meritocratic lines. These initiatives, which brought about the entrance of specialist attachés and other middle class newcomers, could not have pleased pre-War aristocratic diplomats, some of whom still considered diplomacy as their birthright.9 An even more profound challenge to the diplomat’s field of activity, however, came from national political leaders, who as democratically elected politicians considered themselves to be the only legitimate representatives of the peoples in the international arena. Already during the war and more visibly during the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, they firmly took charge of international policy execution. And while rapidly resorting themselves to the severely condemned pre-War methods of secret diplomacy, leaders of victorious nations such as French premier Georges Clémenceau, American president Woodrow Wilson and British prime minister David Lloyd George often gave in to the temptation to vigorously attack traditional diplomats.10 Lloyd George is known to have stated that: “Diplomats were invented simply to waste time… It is simply a waste of time to let [important matters] be discussed by men who are not authorized to speak for their countries.”11 Their successors, too, clung to the assumption that international conflicts could best be avoided by direct contact between those in charge, thus without the complicating mediation of diplomatic representatives. Henceforth so-called ‘conference diplomacy’ and face to face negotiations between state leaders prevailed, reducing the activities of professional diplomats to the handling of low-level and routine matters and preparing for future conferences.12 Æ ÿ � � Í § ¤ ¤ ¥ ¢ Ï Ì È Î « ¬ ¢ ¯ Ð ª « ² ³ ´ µ » × µ ¼ ½ Õ ¼ Ø µ · Ú ¾ » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ ¹ Â ² q r s r ã q t q t ² ¦ § ¯ © ª Ï ² ° ª « ± ¨ § « ²Æ É É Ê ² Ç Ç È Æ Ê � ã Æ ÿ � Èu ¦ § ¨ £ © ¤ ª « § « ¬ ° § « ± ¥ ª ¯ « ¢ ² ¼ ¿ È ¹ » º È ² Ç Ç È Æ � � ã Æ � Ä Èv ü Ý » Ø µ Á ² Ç Ç È Æ � É ã Æ þ ÿ Èw x ï ª ¢ « � § ¨ Ð ¢ ² ¾ µ Ø » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ º » µ µ · µ ß ¼ À Û º » µ ß ¸ Ú q t q t µ Ú Ø µ ¼ Á × À ¸ Þ » Ú Ø µ » Ú º µ · Ú ¸ º » ¼ Ú ¸ À µ¿ ¼ À » º » µ µ ¹ Û À º Û Û · ² á ý ¯ ª « £ ¢ Ô î ² Æ É É � ã Æ É É þ ² Ç Ç È ÿ � Æ ã ÿ � Ä � ¦ § ¨ £ © ¤ ª « § « ¬ ° § « ± ¥ ª ¯ « ¢ ² ¼ ¿ È ¹ » º È ² Ç Ç ÈÆ ÿ � ã Æ ÿ � § « ¬ Æ � Ê ã Æ � � Èw w � § Ò £ ¬ ° © ª � ¬ ý ¢ ª ¯ ± ¢ å Ã ª ¤ ¢ ¬ £ « ý ª ¯ ¬ ª « Î È ï ¯ § £ ± ² ³ ´ µ � · » º » × ´ ø ¼ · µ » Þ Ú � ½ ½ » ¹ µ ½ · ¼ Á y · µ Â º ¼õ Û × º µ Ú � ´ ¸ Á Ý µ · À ¸ » Ú ² á � ¥ ¢ � £ Ç © ª ¨ § ¤ Ð î ² ä ¯ £ « ® ¢ ¤ ª « ² ä ¯ £ « ® ¢ ¤ ª « ò « £ Ò ¢ ¯ Ð £ ¤ � ä ¯ ¢ Ð Ð ² Æ É É ÿ ² Ç È Ä � Èw ¦ § ¨ £ © ¤ ª « § « ¬ ° § « ± ¥ ª ¯ « ¢ ² ¼ ¿ È ¹ » º È ² Æ � Ê ã Æ � � È



The 1930s saw the residential diplomat’s professional activities regaining in significance. This was largely due to the – temporarily – decreasing importance of multilateral diplomacy in favour of its bilateral counterpart, an evolution that could be linked to the consolidation of totalitarian regimes and the ‘deviant diplomacy’ their leaders advocated. “If sent to represent his country’s interests in a totalitarian society”, Craig and Gilbert have argued, “[the diplomat] found himself, curiously enough, in a situation not dissimilar to that which faced the diplomat of the eighteenth century…; that is, if he was to be successful, he had to ignore the political, economic and social strata which democratic opinion insisted were important and to concentrate his energies upon the task of establishing a personal relationship with the despot and his immediate aides. In his relations with his own government on the other hand, he was forced to adjust his methods to the requirements of democratic sentiment or suffer the consequences.”13 The outcomes of the Second World War intensified the evolutions of the interwar period, as old and new states engaged under the headings of multilateral organizations, while conference diplomacy in the form of summits became ever more institutionalized. Furthermore, the increasingly technical character of contemporary diplomacy demanded specialists – rather than the generalists most diplomats were – to stand alongside political leaders in their face-to-face communications. If these ‘external’ pressures did not challenge diplomats enough, mounting demands for ‘internal’, bureaucratic democratization of the diplomatic corps surely did. Critics even openly wondered if diplomats were still needed in a modernizing world, since all they seemed to do was attending fancy parties in luxurious settings.14 Even more than during the interwar period, the public indeed saw national political leaders entering the international political stage and carry out important negotiations themselves. However, their apparent removal from the centre of world politics did not mean that diplomats could rest on their laurels: the increasing role of the state in everyday, extended their range of duties, too. The American ambassador Chester B. Bowles rightly observed that, after 1945, the age of “total diplomacy” had dawned, and that “ambassadors can no longer be content with wining and dining, reporting, analyzing and cautiously predicting”.15 w Ë ï ¯ § £ ± § « ¬ ý £ © æ ¢ ¯ ¤ ² ¼ ¿ È ¹ » º È ² � Èw ð Ì ¢ ¢ ¦ § ¨ £ © ¤ ª « § « ¬ ° § « ± ¥ ª ¯ « ¢ ² ¼ ¿ È ¹ » º È ² Ç Ç È Æ � � ã Ä þ Æ � Ó ¯ £ § « ¦ ª ® Ô £ « ± § « ¬ � § Ò £ ¬ Ì Ç ¢ « ® ¢ ²ø ¼ · µ » Þ Ú Õ » Ú » × º · » µ × » Ú º ´ µ � Û · ¼ ¿ µ ¸ Ú Ù Ú » ¼ Ú ô ü Ú º µ Þ · ¸ º » Ú Þ ¾ » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ º × ² Ó § Ð £ « ± Ð ¤ ª Ô ¢ ² ä § © ± ¯ § Ò ¢Í § ® ¨ £ © © § « ² Ä Å Å � ² Ç È Æ Èw f ï ¥ ¢ Ð ¤ ¢ ¯ Ó È Ó ª Ï © ¢ Ð å Ã ª ¤ ¢ ¬ £ « ¦ § ¨ £ © ¤ ª « § « ¬ ° § « ± ¥ ª ¯ « ¢ ² ¼ ¿ È ¹ » º È ² Ç È Æ � Ê È Ì ¢ ¢ § © Ð ª ä ¢ ¤ ¢ ¯ k § «¡ ¢ ¨ Ð ¢ Ô ¢ ² á ë « © ¢ £ ¬ £ « ± È � £ Ç © ª ¨ § ¤ £ ¢ ñ ¢ ¢ « Ô Ï ¢ Ð ¤ £ ¢ Ò § « ® Ã © ¤ Ã Ã ¯ î ² £ « ñ ä ¢ ¤ ¢ ¯ k § « ¡ ¢ ¨ Ð ¢ Ô ¢ é ¢ ¬ È í ²¾ » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ º » µ µ ¹ Û À º Û Û · ² ° ¢ Ã Ò ¢ « ² ä ¢ ¢ ¤ ¢ ¯ Ð ² Ä Å Å Å ² Ç Ç È Ê Æ ã Ê ÿ � Í £ ® ¥ § ¢ © £ ¢ ¨ ¢ « Ð ² ¾ µ ¿ ¸ × × » µ ß ¼ ¼ ·ß · µ Ø µ ô Ø µ µ ß ¼ À Û º » µ ß ¸ Ú Ø µ » Ú º µ · Ú ¸ º » ¼ Ú ¸ À µ ¿ ¼ À » º » µ µ ¹ Û À º Û Û · » Ú Ø µ z ¸ · µ Ú q { { | ã q t r | µ Ú ´ µ º· µ ¹ » ¿ » } · µ Ú Ø ¼ ¼ · � µ Ø µ · À ¸ Ú Ø ² Î ¨ Ð ¤ ¢ ¯ ¬ § ¨ ² Ó § ¤ § § è Ð ® ¥ ¢ ° ¢ ¢ Ã Ï ² Ä Å Å � ² Ç Ç È Ê Ä ã Ê Ê È



International political culture

In the previous paragraph, I have explained how processes of democratization indirectly changed the diplomatic profession, while at the same indicating some reactions of diplomats to these evolutions. In this paragraph, I will introduce and critically evaluate the concept of international political culture in order to shed light on the intermediate level that lies between the processes of democratization on the one hand, and the changes in the diplomatic profession on the other hand. The next paragraph will be devoted to how the concept of diplomatic culture can contribute to our understanding of the diplomats’ actions and reactions to these evolutions.

Both the concepts of international political culture and diplomatic culture were originally coined in the late 1970s by the Australian political scientist Hedley Bull. Bull is considered to be one of the founding fathers of the English School or International Society approach in International Relations (IR) Theory.16 Scholars who adopt this approach, view international politics as more than just relations between abstract states. In their opinion, states form a society that – like national societies – is guided by rules and norms. An anthropological notion of culture, as constantly evolving modes of thoughts, patterns of behaviour, and preferred norms and values, operates as this society’s supporting idea.17 In Bull’s vision, culture is essential to the normative cohesion of international society, because it effectively pervades all three of international society’s interrelated levels. Culture in the works of Bull could be represented as three concentric circles: the outer circle of ‘world’ culture refers to international society as a whole, and encompasses the cultures of the intermediate rank of the states (international political culture) and of the sublevel of states’ representatives (diplomatic culture).18

In his masterwork The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics (1977), Bull defines international political culture as “the intellectual and moral culture that determines the attitudes towards the states system of the societies w h Ì ¢ ¢ � £ ¨ � Ã « « ¢ ² ü Ú ß µ Ú º » Ú Þ ü Ú º µ · Ú ¸ º » ¼ Ú ¸ À û ¼ ¹ » µ º Â ô õ ú » × º ¼ · Â ¼ ½ º ´ µ � Ú Þ À » × ´ û ¹ ´ ¼ ¼ À ²° ª « ¬ ª « ² Í § ® ¨ £ © © § « ² Æ É É � Èw l � Ã © £ ¢ ¢ ¢ Ò ¢ Ð ² � Û À º Û · µ ¸ Ú Ø ü Ú º µ · Ú ¸ º » ¼ Ú ¸ À µ À ¸ º » ¼ Ú × È � ¸ · · ¸ º » ß µ × ² � ¸ º » ß µ × ¸ Ú Ø ³ ¼ Û · » × º × ²° ª « ¬ ª « ² ª Ã ¤ © ¢ ¬ ± ¢ ² Ä Å Å ÿ ² Ç È Æ Æ Ä Èw u ü Ý » Ø µ Á ² Ç Ç È Æ Ä Å ã Æ Ä þ � � § ® £ « ¤ § n o ¦ § ± § « ² ³ ´ µ ~ Û µ × º » ¼ Ú ¼ ½ � Û À º Û · µ ² á ü Ú º µ · Ú ¸ º » ¼ Ú ¸ À û ¼ ¹ » µ º Â¸ Ú Ø » º × � · » º » ¹ × î ² n i è ª ¯ ¬ ² n i è ª ¯ ¬ ò « £ Ò ¢ ¯ Ð £ ¤ � ä ¯ ¢ Ð Ð ² Ä Å Å � ² Ç Ç È Ä Æ Æ ã Ä Æ Ä � � § ¨ ¢ Ð � ¢ ¯ � ¢ ¯ £ § « ²ú µ Ø À µ Â � Û À À ¸ Ú Ø º ´ µ » Ø µ ¸ ¼ ½ Ø » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ º » ¹ ¹ Û À º Û · µ ² á ë « ¤ ¢ ¯ « § ¤ £ ª « § © Ì ª ® £ ¢ ¤ � § è ¤ ¢ ¯ ¤ ¥ ¢ ï ª © ¬ � § ¯ î ²° ª « ¬ ¢ « ² Í § ® Í £ © © § « ² Æ É É � ² Ç Ç È � þ ã � � È



that compose it.”19 His conceptualization echoes the very popular notion of political culture that was developed more than ten years before by political scientists Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba. In their study The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, they termed (the) political culture (of a nation) as “the particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members of the nation”. Political objects comprise all kinds of political bodies, political persons and political decisions, the whole ‘system of the state’, so to speak, while patterns of orientation bear a great deal of resemblance to ‘attitudes’ and the members of the nation, of course, form that nation’s ‘society’.20

Nowadays, over thirty years after The Anarchical Society’s publication, the concept of international political culture has established its omnipresence in IR Theory, but – strangely enough – further conceptualization efforts have been very rare while Hedley Bull as its coiner has been largely ignored. A notable exception to the former phenomenon is Legitimacy and Power Politics. Mlada Bukovansky, the author of that book, adopts a constructivist approach to understand the shift in international political culture caused by the American and French Revolutions of the late 18th century. In an admirable attempt to reconcile history and IR Theory, she draws on the conceptual work of historians Paul Schroeder and Lynn Hunt to construct an elaborate analytical framework, which does not, however, offer a clear-cut definition of what international political culture means to her. At the very end of her theoretical discussion, she concludes that “international political culture should be studied as a system of rules about political authority”, while somewhere in the beginning she claims to conceive culture as “the intersubjective structure or overall pattern of knowledge and beliefs held by a society at any given time”. Reading between the lines, then, her central contention appears to be that international political culture is composed of shared knowledge and rules grounded in claims about legitimate authority that in the late 18th century shift from “dynastically legitimated monarchical sovereignty” to “popularly legitimated national sovereignty”.21 For the study of the history of the diplomatic profession in times of democratization, Bukovansky’s approach could be very profitable. Indeed, the changes in international political culture w v ¦ ¢ ¬ © ¢ � Ó Ã © © ² ³ ´ µ õ Ú ¸ · ¹ ´ » ¹ ¸ À û ¼ ¹ » µ º Â È õ û º Û Ø Â ¼ ½ � · Ø µ · » Ú g ¼ · À Ø ¶ ¼ À » º » ¹ × ² Ó § Ð £ « ± Ð ¤ ª Ô ¢ ²Í § ® Í £ © © § « ² Æ É É � ² Ç È Ê Å ÿ È x ý § æ ¯ £ ¢ © Î È Î © ¨ ª « ¬ � Ì £ ¬ « ¢ � k ¢ ¯ æ § ² ³ ´ µ � » ß » ¹ � Û À º Û · µ ô ¶ ¼ À » º » ¹ ¸ À õ º º » º Û Ø µ × ¸ Ú Ø¾ µ Á ¼ ¹ · ¸ ¹ Â » Ú ø » ß µ � ¸ º » ¼ Ú × ² Ó ª Ð ¤ ª « ² ° £ ¤ ¤ © ¢ ² Ó ¯ ª Ï « § « ¬ ï ª ¨ Ç § « � ² Æ É � � ² Ç Ç È Æ Ê ã Æ ÿ È w Í © § ¬ § Ó Ã Ô ª Ò § « Ð Ô � ² � µ Þ » º » Á ¸ ¹ Â ¸ Ú Ø ¿ ¼ ù µ · ¿ ¼ À » º » ¹ × ô º ´ µ õ Á µ · » ¹ ¸ Ú ¸ Ú Ø ø · µ Ú ¹ ´ · µ ß ¼ À Û º » ¼ Ú ×» Ú » Ú º µ · Ú ¸ º » ¼ Ú ¸ À ¿ ¼ À » º » ¹ ¸ À ¹ Û À º Û · µ ² ä ¯ £ « ® ¢ ¤ ª « ² ä ¯ £ « ® ¢ ¤ ª « ò « £ Ò ¢ ¯ Ð £ ¤ � ä ¯ ¢ Ð Ð ² Ä Å Å Ä ² Ç Ç È Æ � ã � Å È� ¥ ¢ ® £ ¤ § ¤ £ ª « Ð § ¯ ¢ ª « Ç Ç È ÿ ² Ä Ä § « ¬ � Å È Ì ¢ ¢ § © Ð ª � Ã « ® § « Ì È Ó ¢ © © ² µ Á ¸ » Ú Þ õ Ú ¸ · ¹ ´ Â È µ ß » µ ù¼ ½ Õ À ¸ Ø ¸ � Û ¼ ß ¸ Ú × Â ô � µ Þ » º » Á ¸ ¹ Â ¸ Ú Ø ¿ ¼ ù µ · ¿ ¼ À » º » ¹ × � ² á � ¥ ¢ ¢ Ò £ ¢ Ï ª è ä ª © £ ¤ £ ® Ð î ² Ä Å Å Ê ² � � ²Ê ² Ç Ç È ÿ þ � ã ÿ þ � È



that occurred in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries can be regarded as later manifestations of the same evolution.

However, I have two concerns with Bukovansky’s conceptualisation of international political culture. First, it is not very clear to me what is so international political about it. Surely, to some extent the shift in political culture provoked by the American and French revolutions could be qualified as international, but the definition of Bukovansky does not so much apply to society’s shared knowledge and beliefs about the system of international politics. Secondly, what about society, what about the producer of international political culture? Indeed, it is very difficult to study the agency of society as a whole. In his review of Bukovansky’s book, Duncan Bell rightly argues that in constructivist IR theoretical works, such as Legitimacy and Power Politics, the human agent is under-theorized, and that the approach does not allow for any significant differentiation to be made between collective agents (societies) and individual conscious agents (members of societies). As a consequence, constructivists mostly are unable to explain the often historically vital behaviours and self-understandings of particular agents in specific intellectual and political contexts.22 To increase its practicability, the concept of international political culture indeed requires at least some division into identifiable agents (or mouthpieces). Even more so if one would want to grasp how these (groups of) agents interacted with (members of) the diplomatic corps throughout the late modern era.

In diplomatic historiography, the concept of international political culture experienced a similar lack of attention: despite the cultural turn which reached International History in the 1990s, less than a handful of historians studying international relations in the early twentieth century have undertaken efforts to conceptualize international political culture. Two of them are the Dutch historians Coen Tamse and Michael Riemens. Seemingly oblivious to Hedley Bull’s insights, they have assumed a different approach to international political culture, putting great emphasis on the particular ‘style’ of foreign policy makers along with the reception of international relations by societies throughout the West.23 In his study of the evolution of international political culture between 1880 and 1940, Riemens claims that “international political culture is styled by state and government leaders, rivals of those leaders from home and abroad, civil servants with advisory and executive functions, public political discourse, the media, the public opinion of the society in whose service the government has placed itself and representatives of international Ó ¢ © © ² ¼ ¿ È ¹ » º È ² Ç È ÿ þ þ È Ë � § ¨ Ð ¢ ² ¼ ¿ È ¹ » º È ² Ç Ç È ÿ ÿ Ê ã ÿ � � � £ ¢ ¨ ¢ « Ð ² ¼ ¿ È ¹ » º È ² Ç Ç È Ê Æ ã Ê � È Ì ¢ ¢ § © Ð ª ë « ¢ Í ¢ ± ¢ « Ð ²y À ¼ Ý ¸ À » × µ · » Ú Þ µ Ú » Ú º µ · Ú ¸ º » ¼ Ú ¸ À » × µ · » Ú Þ È � ß µ · ´ µ º Ý µ À ¸ Ú Þ ß ¸ Ú Ø µ » Ú º µ · Ú ¸ º » ¼ Ú ¸ À µ ¿ ¼ À » º » µ µ¹ Û À º Û Û · ² á ¡ ª Ð Ð ¨ § « « ë « Ð ¤ £ ¤ Ã Ã ¤ È Ó ¢ « § ¬ ¢ ¯ £ « ± ¢ « Ò § « ¬ ¢ ± ¢ Ð ® ¥ £ ¢ ¬ ¢ « £ Ð Ò § « Ç ª © £ ¤ £ ¢ Ô î ² ý ¯ ª « £ « ± ¢ « ²Ä Å Å � ² Ç Ç È � Å ã � ÿ È



organizations and institutions”. In contrast to Bukovansky, Riemens thus provides a detailed categorization of the multitude of agents that constitute society. A shift in international political culture, he continues, takes place “when the international political discourses and actions of agents and institutions change in style, when the international public space modifies geographically or with respect to content and when the composition of the participants in the international debate undergoes transformations”.24 Although I believe Riemens is basically right in his analysis, I do have some remarks on his conceptualization of international political culture. One concerns his use of the hazy term ‘style’ as a central feature in his understanding of international political culture: what exactly is style, and how do you make it operational in order to measure change? This is a matter historians discussed about in the 1980s, too, but without satisfactory outcomes.25 Another regards Riemens’s fragmentation of the producers of international political culture: this might be a little excessive, especially if one considers the methodological problems created by identifying the particular agency of each one of these producers. Indeed, international political culture does not operate in a vacuum but, on the contrary, functions in dialogical interaction with, to give just one example, the ideas and practices of members of the diplomatic corps,. In any case, to grasp the evolution of the culture of the diplomatic corps in the late modern era, a more dynamic and identifiable notion of international political culture and the agents that bear, use and produce it, is necessary. This should be one that that identifiably affects diplomatic culture.

In constructing a working definition of international political culture, I have therefore chosen to revive the insights of its coiner. So far in only one diplomatic historian, Hedley Bull’s definition seems to have met with full approval.26 This is remarkable, because historical studies of the diplomatic profession in the late modern era inevitably lead to identifying the processes of democratization as a major impetus to its evolution, and from this perspective, Bull’s concept can be very rewarding. As mentioned before, Hedley Bull defined international political culture as “the intellectual and moral culture that determines the attitudes towards the states system of the societies that compose it.” He thus understands international political culture as determined by society’s attitudes, which are presumed to be very susceptible to democratic change.

Bull’s concept of international political culture needs some reconsidering, though. On the one hand, I would choose to concentrate on ‘the conduct of international relations’, instead of on the more abstract IR ð £ ¢ ¨ ¢ « Ð ² ¼ ¿ È ¹ » º È ² Ç È Ê Ä È f Ì ¢ ¢ � ª « § ¤ ¥ § « ¦ ¢ © ¨ ¯ ¢ £ ® ¥ ² ¶ ¸ Û À ú Â Á ¸ Ú × ¸ Ú Ø ú µ Ú · » � ¸ × ¿ ¸ · ô ¹ ¼ Ú º · ¸ × º » Ú Þ Ø » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ º » ¹ × º Â À µ × ²á Ì ¤ Ã ¬ £ § � £ Ç © ª ¨ § ¤ £ ® § î ² Æ É � � ² Ê ÿ ² � ² Ç Ç È � � É ã � � Æ È h k § « ¡ ¢ ¨ Ð ¢ Ô ¢ ² ¼ ¿ È ¹ » º È ² Ç È Æ Å È



theoretical notion of ‘the states system’. On the other hand, I have a more fundamental problem with ‘the attitudes … of the societies’. It goes without saying that these are very difficult to grasp and should be concretized. A first step towards the realization of this aim, would be to look into the analytical category of ‘public opinion’, since this – arguably – constitutes the reflection of society’s attitudes. However, as Jürgen Habermas has concluded, because public opinion is very susceptible to elite manipulation, the formation of the true opinion of the public can only be approximated.27 The American sociologist Herbert Blumer created a more pragmatic concept of public opinion, arguing that “in any realistic sense public opinion consists of the pattern of the diverse views and positions on the issue that come to the individuals who have to act in response to public opinion”.28 So Blumer is basically saying that public opinion is formed by effectively expressed views that reach and affect their subjects. In the late modern era and with regard to public opinion on the members of the diplomatic corps, these are certainly – to agree with Habermas – elite voices, namely those of democratically elected politicians and of publicists. However, this does not fully solve the problem, because diplomats themselves also formed part of society and thus of public opinion, and on more than one level, they could be seen as producers of international political culture as well. They interacted dynamically and dialogically with their structural environments. More specifically, they acknowledged and reacted to criticisms uttered in parliament and published in the press. They indeed took part – albeit mostly implicitly, through the publication of memoirs or articles on foreign policy – in ‘public debate’ on how and by whom relations between states should be executed. International political culture, then, is ‘the intellectual and moral culture that determines public debate on the conduct of international relations’.

Diplomatic culture - Deconstructing the Concept In this paragraph, I will argue that a practical notion of diplomatic

culture is well-suited to analyse the stances that diplomats took in the public debate on diplomacy. As I mentioned before, Hedley Bull was the first to coin the concept. Bull considered diplomatic culture, which he coined as “the common stock of ideas and values possessed by the official representatives of states”, to be an integrated part of international political culture, the official representatives of states being members of national societies as well. Furthermore, this set of ideas and values shared by this cosmopolitan elite l � � ¯ ± ¢ « ¦ § æ ¢ ¯ ¨ § Ð ² ³ ´ µ × º · Û ¹ º Û · ¸ À º · ¸ Ú × ½ ¼ · Á ¸ º » ¼ Ú ¼ ½ º ´ µ ¿ Û Ý À » ¹ × ¿ ´ µ · µ ô ¸ Ú » Ú Ü Û » · Â » Ú º ¼ ¸¹ ¸ º µ Þ ¼ · Â ¼ ½ Ý ¼ Û · Þ µ ¼ » × × ¼ ¹ » µ º Â ² � Æ É � Ä � ï § ¨ æ ¯ £ ¬ ± ¢ ² ä ª © £ ¤ � ² Ä Å Å � � � § © ¤ ¢ ¯ ° £ Ç Ç ¨ § « « ² ¶ Û Ý À » ¹� ¿ » Ú » ¼ Ú ² Ñ ¢ Ï Ó ¯ Ã « Ð Ï £ ® Ô ² � ¯ § « Ð § ® ¤ £ ª « ² Æ É É þ È u ¦ ¢ ¯ æ ¢ ¯ ¤ Ó © Ã ¨ ¢ ¯ ² ¶ Û Ý À » ¹ ¼ ¿ » Ú » ¼ Ú ¸ Ú Ø ¿ Û Ý À » ¹ ¼ ¿ » Ú » ¼ Ú ¿ ¼ À À » Ú Þ ² á Î ¨ ¢ ¯ £ ® § « Ì ª ® £ ª © ª ± £ ® § © ¢ Ò £ ¢ Ï î ² Æ É ÿ � ² Æ Ê ² � ² Ç È � ÿ � È



constituted a fundamental factor in the preservation of international order and hence in the future of international society. Bull, always very susceptible to historical arguments, then suggested that the diplomatic and international political cultures sustaining (European) international society in the centuries before the First World War, were much stronger than the ones at his time of writing in the Cold War period. This could be explained both by the rather superficial foundations of diplomatic culture in contemporary national societies, and by the lack of an international political culture that powerfully reinforced diplomatic culture. The solution would be to deepen common cosmopolitan cultural elements, i.e. the common ideas and values ingrained in societies in general as well as in their elites, and to include both Western and non-Western intellectual and moral features.29 In other words, international society needs a stronger and more comprehensive diplomatic culture.

Drawing on the idea of inevitable confrontation between Western and non-Western societies, Bull’s disciple James Der Derian, almost a decade later, wrote an intellectual history of diplomacy as a ‘genealogy of Western estrangement’. He stressed that to understand the existence and the evolution of diplomatic culture, students of diplomacy should focus on the alienation of societies from one another rather than on their interdependence in the international states system. According to Der Derian, the mediation of this estrangement by symbolic power and social constraints formed the essence of diplomatic culture and revealed its necessity.30

However, Der Derian’s postmodern argumentation, based on the genealogical techniques of Nietzsche and Foucault and on the alienation theories of Hegel, Marx and other political thinkers, did not really catch on, and the concept seemingly sank into oblivion. One reason for this could be that the idea of diplomatic culture did not seem particularly relevant in the 1970s and 1980s, when international relations appeared to be dominated by clashing ideologies. But after the end of the Cold War, and especially in the wake of the events of 9 September 2001, issues of culture in international relations received fresh attention.31 The concept of diplomatic culture, too, resurfaced and briefly established its omnipresence in IR Theory. Possibly instigated by Iver Neumann’s plea for further clarifying the notion and for increasing its practicability, several English School theoreticians of International Relations v Ó Ã © © ² ¼ ¿ È ¹ » º È ² Ç Ç È Ê Å ÿ ã Ê Å � � n o ¦ § ± § « ² ¼ ¿ È ¹ » º È ² Ç È Ä Æ Ä ÈË x � § ¨ ¢ Ð � ¢ ¯ � ¢ ¯ £ § « ² ¼ ¿ È ¹ » º È ² n i è ª ¯ ¬ ² Æ É � þ ² Ç Ç È Ê Å ã ÿ Ê � � ¢ ¯ � ¢ ¯ £ § « ² ¼ ¿ È ¹ » º È ² Ç È É Æ é � ¥ £ Ð Ç § Ç ¢ ¯Ï § Ð Ï ¯ £ ¤ ¤ ¢ « £ « © § ¤ ¢ Æ É � � í ÈË w § � ¨ ª « ¬ ï ª ¥ ¢ « ² � µ Þ ¼ º » ¸ º » Ú Þ ¸ ¹ · ¼ × × � Û À º Û · µ × ô ü Ú º µ · Ú ¸ º » ¼ Ú ¸ À � ¼ Á Á Û Ú » ¹ ¸ º » ¼ Ú » Ú ¸ Úü Ú º µ · Ø µ ¿ µ Ú Ø µ Ú º g ¼ · À Ø ² � § Ð ¥ £ « ± ¤ ª « ² Ä Å Å Ä ² Ç È Ê � n o ¦ § ± § « ² ¼ ¿ È ¹ » º È ² Ç Ç È Ä Å É ã Ä Æ Å � ý ¯ § ¨ ãÌ Ô ª © ¬ § ± ¢ ¯ Ä Å Æ Æ ² ¼ ¿ È ¹ » º È ² Ç È Ê È



started elaborating upon the definitions of Bull and Der Derian.32 Most of them narrowed diplomatic culture down to the conglomeration of shared values and ideas arisen from the interaction between professional diplomats, while some widened the concept to include norms, rules and institutions divided by a whole range of political entities involved in diplomacy.33 But what these political science studies have in common, is their emphasis on diplomatic culture as an international and transnational phenomenon. Although slightly alternative views do exist, diplomatic culture in IR studies generally refers to shared norms and worldviews grown out of the encounters within an epistemic community of diplomatic participants from all over the world.34 This is not to say that English School IR theorists completely ignore the national dimension in diplomatic culture. Quite the contrary, they fully recognize diplomacy’s position on the bridge between national and international politics, as well as the diplomats’ double mandate as representatives of both individual states and international society.35 However, I think it is fair to state that so far they have paid too little attention to the national/domestic element in their empirical studies, which has sometimes led them to wrongfully downplay the relative weight of this dimension in diplomatic culture. In her analysis of the diplomatic corps from the mid-seventeenth century until the present day (but which focuses on the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries), Mai’a Davis Cross even goes as far as to claim that the uniqueness of the diplomatic corps as an epistemic community lies partly in the fact that diplomats “are not subject to domestic pressures or to public opinion.”36

Within the wider academic field of IR studies, the concept of diplomatic culture has lost much of its prestige over the past few years. Part of the Ë ë Ò ¢ ¯ Ó È Ñ ¢ Ã ¨ § « « ² ³ ´ µ � Ú Þ À » × ´ û ¹ ´ ¼ ¼ À ¼ Ú ¾ » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ ¹ Â ² � £ Ð ® Ã Ð Ð £ ª « ä § Ç ¢ ¯ Ð £ « � £ Ç © ª ¨ § ® � ²Ñ ¢ ¤ ¥ ¢ ¯ © § « ¬ Ð ë « Ð ¤ £ ¤ Ã ¤ ¢ ª è ë « ¤ ¢ ¯ « § ¤ £ ª « § © ¢ © § ¤ £ ª « Ð � ï © £ « ± ¢ « ¬ § ¢ © o ² Ä Å Å Ä ² Ç È Ä Ê ÈË Ë � ¥ ¢ è ª ¯ ¨ ¢ ¯ £ « ® © Ã ¬ ¢ ¤ ¥ ¢ ¢ Ð Ð § � Ð ª è � £ ¢ ¤ ¯ £ ® ¥ ¡ § Ç Ç ¢ © ¢ ¯ ² ä § Ã © Ì ¥ § ¯ Ç ² ¡ £ Ð ¥ § « Ì È § « § § « ¬� � « « ¢ â © £ m § æ ¢ ¤ ¥ Ã Ð Ð ¢ © ² £ « ¦ § « « § ¥ Ì © § Ò £ Ô ² ü Ú º µ · ¹ Û À º Û · ¸ À ¹ ¼ Á Á Û Ú » ¹ ¸ º » ¼ Ú ¸ Ú Ø Ø » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ ¹ Â ÈÍ § © ¤ § § « ¬ ý ¢ « ¢ Ò § ² � £ Ç © ª è ª Ã « ¬ § ¤ £ ª « ² Ä Å Å ÿ ² Ç Ç È Ê � Ê ã ÿ Å Ä � Ì § Ð Ð ª « Ì ª è ¢ ¯ ² ³ ´ µ ¾ » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ º » ¹� ¼ · ¿ × ¸ × ¸ û Â Á Ý ¼ À ¼ ½ ¾ » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ º » ¹ � Û À º Û · µ ² á � ¥ ¢ � £ Ç © ª ¨ § ¤ £ ® ï ª ¯ Ç Ð § Ð § « ë « Ð ¤ £ ¤ Ã ¤ £ ª « ª èë « ¤ ¢ ¯ « § ¤ £ ª « § © Ì ª ® £ ¢ ¤ � î ² Ó § Ð £ « ± Ð ¤ ª Ô ¢ ² ä § © ± ¯ § Ò ¢ Í § ® ¨ £ © © § « ² Ä Å Å þ ² Ç Ç È Ê Æ ã Ê � � § « ¬ Í § £ o § ¡ È� § Ò £ Ð ï ¯ ª Ð Ð ² ³ ´ µ � Û · ¼ ¿ µ ¸ Ú ¾ » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ º » ¹ � ¼ · ¿ × È ¾ » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ º × ¸ Ú Ø ü Ú º µ · Ú ¸ º » ¼ Ú ¸ À � ¼ ¼ ¿ µ · ¸ º » ¼ Ú½ · ¼ Á g µ × º ¿ ´ ¸ À » ¸ º ¼ Õ ¸ ¸ × º · » ¹ ´ º ² Ó § Ð £ « ± Ð ¤ ª Ô ¢ ² ä § © ± ¯ § Ò ¢ Í § ® ¨ £ © © § « ² Ä Å Å þ È � ¥ ¢ © § ¤ ¤ ¢ ¯ £ « ® © Ã ¬ ¢ý ¢ ª è è ¯ ¢ � � £ Ð ¢ ¨ § « ² ¶ ¸ � õ Á µ · » ¹ ¸ Ú ¸ ô Ý Û Á ¿ » Ú Þ » Ú º ¼ Ø » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ º » ¹ ¹ Û À º Û · µ ² á ë « ¤ ¢ ¯ « § ¤ £ ª « § © Ì ¤ Ã ¬ £ ¢ Ðä ¢ ¯ Ð Ç ¢ ® ¤ £ Ò ¢ Ð î ² Ä Å Å � ² � ² ÿ ² Ç Ç È ÿ Å É ã ÿ Ê Å � § « ¬ � £ © è ¯ £ ¢ ¬ Ó ª © ¢ Ï Ð Ô £ ² ¾ » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ ¹ Â ¸ Ú Ø ü Ú º µ · Ú ¸ º » ¼ Ú ¸ À� ¸ ù » Ú y À ¼ Ý ¸ À » ÷ µ Ø µ À ¸ º » ¼ Ú × ² Ó ¢ ¯ © £ « § « ¬ ¦ ¢ £ ¬ ¢ © æ ¢ ¯ ± ² Ì Ç ¯ £ « ± ¢ ¯ ã k ¢ ¯ © § ± ² Ä Å Å þ ² Ç Ç È þ � ã þ þ ÈË ð Î © ¤ ¢ ¯ « § ¤ £ Ò ¢ Ò £ ¢ Ï Ð £ « ® © Ã ¬ ¢ ¤ ¥ ª Ð ¢ Ï ¥ ª Ð ¤ Ã ¬ � ¯ ¢ ± £ ª « § © ¬ £ Ç © ª ¨ § ¤ £ ® ® Ã © ¤ Ã ¯ ¢ Ð È Ì ¢ ¢ è ª ¯ £ « Ð ¤ § « ® ¢� � ¯ ± ¢ « ¦ § § ® Ô ¢ ² õ û � õ � � × Ø » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ º » ¹ ¸ Ú Ø × µ ¹ Û · » º Â ¹ Û À º Û · µ ô ¼ · » Þ » Ú × ² Ø µ ß µ À ¼ ¿ Á µ Ú º ¸ Ú Ø¿ · ¼ × ¿ µ ¹ º × ² ° ª « ¬ ª « § « ¬ Ñ ¢ Ï � ª ¯ Ô ² Ä Å Å Ä ² Ç Ç È Æ ã Ê � § « ¬ ° È ï § ¯ © Ó ¯ ª Ï « ² ü Ú º µ · Ú ¸ º » ¼ Ú ¸ À ¿ ¼ À » º » ¹ ×¸ Ú Ø º ´ µ Õ » Ø Ø À µ � ¸ × º È � À Ø · Û À µ × ² Ø ¸ Ú Þ µ · ¼ Û × Þ ¸ Á µ ² ä ¯ £ « ® ¢ ¤ ª « ² Ñ ¢ Ï � ¢ ¯ Ð ¢ � ² Æ É � ÿ ² Ç Ç È Æ Ê ã Æ ÿ ÈË f ý ¯ § ¨ ã Ì Ô ª © ¬ § ± ¢ ¯ ² ¼ ¿ È ¹ » º È ² Ç È � � ä § Ã © Ì ¥ § ¯ Ç ² ³ ´ µ ü Ø µ ¸ ¼ ½ ¾ » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ º » ¹ � Û À º Û · µ ¸ Ú Ø ü º ×û ¼ Û · ¹ µ × ² á ë « ¤ ¢ ¯ ® Ã © ¤ Ã ¯ § © ® ª ¨ ¨ Ã « £ ® § ¤ £ ª « § « ¬ ¬ £ Ç © ª ¨ § ® � î ² Ç Ç È Ê � Æ ã Ê þ É ÈË h � § Ò £ Ð ï ¯ ª Ð Ð ² ¼ ¿ È ¹ » º È ² Ç È Ä þ È



explanation certainly lies in the nationalist backlash that has been looming large in contemporary international politics and is likely to have incited not only many IR theorists but also diplomatic practitioners to question the relevance of diplomatic culture. Wilfried Bolewski, a former ambassador and current professor of diplomacy, even goes as far as to claim that “the fact that diplomatic practices and values are often transgressed in pursuit of national interest remains a strong argument for the disputed existence … of a diplomatic culture.”37 Surely, with this statement Bolewski throws out the baby with the bath water. However, in so effortlessly making a convincing argument against the existence of diplomatic culture, Bolewski reveals that English School IR theorists have so far devoted their attention to debating how the concept should be defined, rather than to empirically studying it or, at least, developing a methodology to do so. More importantly, the reasoning that leads him to this statement points to some valuable insights for the study of diplomatic culture. Bolewski draws on historical analyses of the development of foreign offices to argue that institutional differences between countries and national political realism create distinctive cultural characteristics that easily supersede transnational, diplomatic ones.

So if we accept Bolewski’s argument, we would have to strengthen the national perspective in the study of diplomatic culture. It is no coincidence that Bolewski appeals to work by historians to make this suggestion. As John Breuilly has properly stated, despite the rising prominence of trans- and supra-national subjects, current historiography still finds it difficult to break with the nation as frame. Professional historiography indeed evolved synergistically with the nation-state and is organized accordingly.38 Breuilly’s statements are definitely legitimate, but there is an upside to this approach, namely the historian’s expertise in dealing with history from the nation state perspective.

This definitely applies to International History: assuming the predominance of political realist thinking in policy making, the centrality of the state and the existence of anarchy in international society, historians working in this field interpret international policy making almost exclusively from a national framework and have published many institutional histories of national foreign services. Admittedly, most of these are insulated organizational overviews that generally lack both reference to international political developments and a comparative understanding. But there are exceptions that do contextualize the evolution of the diplomatic corps, the most important of which remain Zara Steiner’s 1982 Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World, and the more recently published essay collection Les administrations nationales et la Ë l Ó ª © ¢ Ï Ð Ô £ ² ¼ ¿ È ¹ » º È ² Ç È þ þ ÈË u � ª ¥ « Ó ¯ ¢ Ã £ © © � ² � ¸ º » ¼ Ú ¸ À » × Á ¸ Ú Ø ú » × º ¼ · » ¸ Ú × È û ¼ Á µ µ ½ À µ ¹ º » ¼ Ú × È ³ ´ µ ø ¼ · Á ¸ º » ¼ Ú ¼ ½� ¸ º » ¼ Ú ¸ À é » × º í ú » × º ¼ · » ¼ Þ · ¸ ¿ ´ » ¹ ¸ À ¾ » × ¹ ¼ Û · × µ ² á Ñ § ¤ £ ª « § © £ Ð ¨ ² ¦ £ Ð ¤ ª ¯ £ ª ± ¯ § Ç ¥ � § « ¬ ¤ ¥ ¢é ¢ í ï ª « Ð ¤ ¯ Ã ® ¤ £ ª « ª è ¤ ¥ ¢ ä § Ð ¤ î ² � § Ð ¥ £ « ± ¤ ª « ² Ä Å Å þ ² Ç Ç È Æ � ã Æ É È



construction européenne. Une approche historique, edited by Laurence Badel, Stanislas Jeannesson and N. Piers Ludlow.39 It is clear that a practical concept of diplomatic culture should not only allow for such approaches to be deepened, but also for the transnational, the international, and the national perspective on the history of the diplomatic corps to be reconciled.

Since the last decade witnessed the publication of several historical studies that adopt the concept of diplomatic culture, it might be interesting to see how they have dealt with it. A quick literary overview reveals that most international historians writing about diplomatic culture have largely ignored the debate in IR theory, and that conceptualization efforts in their works are sometimes inexistent and often hardly substantiated.40 It also reveals that – contrary to what might have been expected – the national perspective on diplomatic culture is not predominant. As they investigate historical episodes and patterns of events that occurred before the ubiquity of the nation-state, most writers on early modern diplomacy tend to view diplomatic culture as the Saussurian langue of a network of diplomatic actors from various European regions but who share common beliefs and mentalities.41 Their approach thus resembles that of the English School. But also students of nineteenth and twentieth century diplomacy often transcend the nation as the framework within which their historical analysis takes place, or even create a dialogue between national and international diplomatic cultures.42

Some do limit their scope to the culture of one foreign ministry, though. Michael Auslin’s analysis of the treaties that Japanese officials concluded with Western diplomats halfway the nineteenth century provides an excellent example of a historical study that both operates from a national framework and conceptualizes diplomatic culture. Seemingly oblivious to doing so, Auslin adapts the insights of Bull and Der Derian to a national political context. He defines (Japanese) diplomatic culture as “the set of accepted interpretations and beliefs about the relationship between the foreign and the domestic, and the traditional patterns of interacting with the outside world”, while his central Ë v ý ¯ § ¨ ã Ì Ô ª © ¬ § ± ¢ ¯ ² ¼ ¿ È ¹ » º È ² Ç Ç È ÿ ã � § « ¬ Æ Æ ã Æ Ä Èð x Ì ¢ ¢ è ª ¯ £ « Ð ¤ § « ® ¢ Í § ± « Ã Ð � ¬ ¢ ² ³ ´ µ Á ¸ · · » ¸ Þ µ ¼ ½ ³ ´ ¸ Á µ × ¸ Ú Ø ´ » Ú µ È µ ½ À µ ¹ º » ¼ Ú × » Ú º ´ µ� Ú Þ À » × ´ ¶ ¸ À ¸ º » Ú µ · µ À ¸ º » ¼ Ú × q � | { ã q � � � ¸ Ú Ø º ´ µ ¹ Û À º Û · µ ¼ ½ Ø » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ ¹ Â » Ú µ ¸ · À Â Á ¼ Ø µ · Ú � Û · ¼ ¿ µ ²á � ¢ ® ¢ « ¤ ¢ ¯ £ « ± Î ¨ ¢ ¯ £ ® § î ² Ñ ¢ Ï � ª ¯ Ô ² Ó ¢ ¯ ± ¥ § ¥ « Ó ª ª Ô Ð ² Ä Å Å þ ² Ç Ç È Ê Æ � ã Ê ÿ ÿ Èð w � ª æ � n Ð æ ª ¯ « ¢ ² ¾ Â Ú ¸ × º Â ¸ Ú Ø Ø » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ ¹ Â » Ú º ´ µ ¹ ¼ Û · º ¼ ½ û ¸ ß ¼ Â ô ¿ ¼ À » º » ¹ ¸ À ¹ Û À º Û · µ ¸ Ú Ø º ´ µ³ ´ » · º Â � µ ¸ · � × g ¸ · ² ï § ¨ æ ¯ £ ¬ ± ¢ ² ï § ¨ æ ¯ £ ¬ ± ¢ ò « £ Ò ¢ ¯ Ð £ ¤ � ä ¯ ¢ Ð Ð ² Ä Å Å Ä � ¦ § ¨ £ Ð ¥ Ì ® ª ¤ ¤ ²¾ » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ º » ¹ ¹ Û À º Û · µ » Ú ¼ À Ø · µ Þ » Á µ � Û · ¼ ¿ µ ² á ï Ã © ¤ Ã ¯ ¢ Ð ª è ä ª Ï ¢ ¯ £ « â Ã ¯ ª Ç ¢ ¬ Ã ¯ £ « ± ¤ ¥ ¢ ° ª « ±â £ ± ¥ ¤ ¢ ¢ « ¤ ¥ ï ¢ « ¤ Ã ¯ � î ² ï § ¨ æ ¯ £ ¬ ± ¢ ² ï § ¨ æ ¯ £ ¬ ± ¢ ò « £ Ò ¢ ¯ Ð £ ¤ � ä ¯ ¢ Ð Ð ² Ä Å Å þ ² Ç Ç È � � ã � � Èð Î « ¢ i § ¨ Ç © ¢ ª è ¤ ¥ ¢ è ª ¯ ¨ ¢ ¯ £ Ð � ¯ £ ¢ ¬ ¯ £ ® ¥ ¡ £ ¢ Ð Ð © £ « ± ² û µ À ½ ã ¿ µ · ¹ µ ¿ º » ¼ Ú ² º ´ µ ¼ ½ ½ » ¹ » ¸ À ¸ º º » º Û Ø µº ¼ ù ¸ · Ø ¿ ¸ ¹ » ½ » × Á ² ¸ Ú Ø y · µ ¸ º ¶ ¼ ù µ · ¾ Ö º µ Ú º µ È µ ½ À µ ¹ º » ¼ Ú × ¼ Ú ¾ » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ º » ¹ ¹ Û À º Û · µ Ý µ ½ ¼ · µ g ¼ · À Øg ¸ · ü ² á � ¢ ® ¢ « ¤ ¢ ¯ £ « ± Î ¨ ¢ ¯ £ ® § î ² Ç Ç È Ê ÿ � ã Ê � � È n è ¤ ¥ ¢ © § ¤ ¤ ¢ ¯ Î © § Ð ¤ § £ ¯ ¡ ª ® ¥ ª ã � £ © © £ § ¨ Ð ² ³ ´ µ¹ Û À º Û · µ ¼ ½ Û × × » ¸ Ú ¸ Ú Ø û ¼ ß » µ º Ø » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ ¹ Â ² � ¸ Á × Ø ¼ · ½ º ¼ � » º ß » Ú ¼ ß ² q t | | ã q t � t ² ò « £ Ò ¢ ¯ Ð £ ¤ � ª èÍ § « ® ¥ ¢ Ð ¤ ¢ ¯ ² Ã « Ç Ã æ © £ Ð ¥ ¢ ¬ ä ¥ � ã ¤ ¥ ¢ Ð £ Ð ² Ä Å Å � È



contention is that ‘the transformation of diplomatic culture led to sweeping changes in Japanese society as a whole”. Or in other words, a change in diplomatic culture led to a change in one society’s international political culture. In this way, Auslin’s focus on the national dimension of diplomatic culture has led him to reverse the view of Bull and Der Derian. More importantly, his understanding of the concept accounts for what we seek in order to grasp the cultural history of the diplomatic profession, that is, for the dynamic and dialogical relation between the diplomatic corps and the society that it represents. This approach also discloses itself in how Auslin conceptualizes evolutions in diplomatic culture: “Ultimately, a diplomatic culture changes due to the failure of the strategy that it animated. Once the barriers protecting that culture are breached, new meanings and interpretations are constructed to respond to the loss of a coherent understanding of the world.”43

Arguably, concentrating exclusively on national frames could be judged apt for the study of diplomatic culture in a relatively secluded society, or even more broadly in a period that saw the apparent generalization of the nation-state form across the globe. However, just as much as an excessive focus on the international and transnational aspects of diplomatic culture, such an approach does not reveal the reality of diplomacy in all its historical complexity. Criticisms of Samuel Huntington’s theory of the clash of civilizations have abundantly proven that cultural systems are far from coherent but overlap and constantly interact.44 It would be hard to deny that mid-nineteenth century Japan’s foreign policy executives were in contact with diplomats from other countries and influenced by an international and transnational diplomatic culture.

To sum up, the previous reflections all indicate that a truly comprehensive methodological assessment of diplomatic culture should be able to both incorporate national, international and transnational perspectives on the phenomenon, and to take into account the insights of historians and political scientists.

There have been diplomatic historians that paid attention to the conceptualization efforts undertaken by IR Theorists. Moreover, these scholars have also tried to broaden these insights while – as their field of study and professional habitus requires – putting greater emphasis on the evolutionary aspect of diplomatic culture. In the introduction to The Diplomat’s World, an essay collection on 19th century diplomatic culture, the editors Markus Mösslang and Torsten Riotte have pleaded that diplomatic culture should “include all aspects of diplomatic practice”, or “a multitude of analytical categories” like ð Ë Í £ ® ¥ § ¢ © È Î Ã Ð © £ « ² � µ Þ ¼ º » ¸ º » Ú Þ ù » º ´ ü Á ¿ µ · » ¸ À » × Á È ³ ´ µ Û Ú µ Ü Û ¸ À º · µ ¸ º » µ × ¸ Ú Ø º ´ µ ¹ Û À º Û · µ ¼ ½� ¸ ¿ ¸ Ú µ × µ Ø » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ ¹ Â ² ï § ¨ æ ¯ £ ¬ ± ¢ § « ¬ ° ª « ¬ ª « ² ¦ § ¯ Ò § ¯ ¬ ò « £ Ò ¢ ¯ Ð £ ¤ � ä ¯ ¢ Ð Ð ² Ä Å Å ÿ ² Ç Ç È Æ ã � Èð ð Ì ¢ ¢ ï ¥ ¯ £ Ð ¤ £ § « � £ « ¬ © ¢ ¯ ² ¾ » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ º » µ µ º » Ú º µ · ¹ Û À º Û · ¸ À » º Ö ô À µ × ¹ ¼ Ú × Û À × ½ · ¸ Ú ¹ ¸ » × � ³ Û Ú » × ² q � | | ãq { r | ² á ¢ Ò Ã ¢ ¬ o ¦ £ Ð ¤ ª £ ¯ ¢ Í ª ¬ ¢ ¯ « ¢ ¢ ¤ ï ª « ¤ ¢ ¨ Ç ª ¯ § £ « ¢ î ² Ä Å Å Ê ² � Å ² ÿ ² Ç Ç È � Ê ã É Æ È



“norms and perceptions, official and private capacities, class and origin, or religion and race”. These “had to be constantly renegotiated”.45 Also Belgian historian and diplomat Peter Van Kemseke willingly admits to be highly influenced by the insights of Hedley Bull. Over ten years ago, he was possibly the very first historian to coin ‘diplomatic culture’ in the introduction to an eponymous collection of essays. Bull’s contention that diplomatic culture forms integrated part of international political culture, is essential to the Van Kemseke’s thesis on the evolution of diplomatic culture since the Middle Ages. But as a political historian, Van Kemseke also reveals some amenability to political history’s cultural turn. Applying the insights of American anthropologist Clifford Geertz on the concept of culture, he develops a definition of diplomatic culture as “a historically grown, enduring aggregate of ideas, traditions, and norms disseminated by diplomats practising their professional activities”. A few lines further, Van Kemseke restates this definition in an even more Geertzian manner, asserting that “diplomatic culture consists in all kinds of procedures, carefully created myths, rituals and symbols that sometimes have to be discovered and decoded.”46 The conceptualizations of Mösslang & Riotte and Van Kemseke, I believe, are very fruitful for studying the history of diplomatic culture in modern times. First, in offering his fellow historians a conceptual framework based on the insights of Bull and Geertz, Van Kemseke effectively reconciles IR Theoretical understanding of diplomatic culture to the cultural turn in political historiography, thereby contributing to bridge the hampering divides between the fields of history and political science.47 Mösslang & Riotte do more or less the same, combining IR Theoretical reconsiderations of Bull with the views of an historian analysing diplomatic encounters from a cultural stance.48 Second, the conceptual frameworks of both Van Kemseke and Mösslang & Riotte allow for changes in diplomatic culture to be interpreted. Van Kemseke categorizes four mutually effecting tendencies which eventually “ended the closed, aristocratic character of the diplomatic profession once and for all”. He identifies them as democratisation, mediatisation, professionalization and ð f Í § ¯ Ô Ã Ð Í � Ð Ð © § « ± § « ¬ � ª ¯ Ð ¤ ¢ « £ ª ¤ ¤ ¢ ² ³ ´ µ ¾ » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ º × � g ¼ · À Ø ô ³ ´ µ � Û À º Û · ¸ À ú » × º ¼ · Â ¼ ½¾ » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ ¹ Â ² q { q s ã q t q r ² n i è ª ¯ ¬ ² n i è ª ¯ ¬ ò « £ Ò ¢ ¯ Ð £ ¤ � ä ¯ ¢ Ð Ð ² Ä Å Å � ² Ç Ç È � ã É Èð h k § « ¡ ¢ ¨ Ð ¢ Ô ¢ ¼ ¿ È ¹ » º È ² Ç Ç È Æ Å ã Æ Æ Èð l Ì ¢ ¢ ¤ ¥ ¢ ¨ ¢ ¤ ¥ ª ¬ ª © ª ± £ ® § © § « ¬ ® ª « ® © Ã ¬ £ « ± ¢ Ð Ð § � Ð £ « ñ ï ª © £ « â © ¬ ¨ § « § « ¬ Í £ ¯ £ § ¨ � ¢ « ¬ £ Ã Ðâ © ¬ ¨ § « ² � · » Ø Þ µ × ¸ Ú Ø Ý ¼ Û Ú Ø ¸ · » µ × ô ´ » × º ¼ · » ¸ Ú × ² ¿ ¼ À » º » ¹ ¸ À × ¹ » µ Ú º » × º × ² ¸ Ú Ø º ´ µ × º Û Ø Â ¼ ½» Ú º µ · Ú ¸ º » ¼ Ú ¸ À · µ À ¸ º » ¼ Ú × ² ï § ¨ æ ¯ £ ¬ ± ¢ ² Í ë � ² Ä Å Å Æ È Ì ¢ ¢ § © Ð ª ý ¢ ª è è ¯ ¢ � ª æ ¢ ¯ ¤ Ð ² ú » × º ¼ · Â ² º ´ µ ¼ · Â¸ Ú Ø º ´ µ Ú ¸ · · ¸ º » ß µ º Û · Ú » Ú ü ² á ¢ Ò £ ¢ Ï ª è ë « ¤ ¢ ¯ « § ¤ £ ª « § © Ì ¤ Ã ¬ £ ¢ Ð î ² Ä Å Å � ² Ê Ä ² Ç Ç È þ Å Ê ã þ Æ ÿ � § « ¬ ª æ ¢ ¯ ¤ � ¢ ¯ Ò £ Ð ² ü Ú º µ · Ú ¸ º » ¼ Ú ¸ À ¶ ¼ À » º » ¹ × ¸ Ú Ø ¾ » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ º » ¹ ú » × º ¼ · Â ô ø · Û » º ½ Û À ¾ » ½ ½ µ · µ Ú ¹ µ × ² á ¦ ã� £ Ç © ª � ë Ì Ì � â Ð Ð § � Ð Æ î ² Ä Å Æ Å Èð u ë « ® § Ð Ã ï ¥ ¯ £ Ð ¤ £ § « � £ « ¬ © ¢ ¯ ² ¾ » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ º » ¹ ú » × º ¼ · Â ¸ × ¸ ø » µ À Ø ½ ¼ · � Û À º Û · ¸ À õ Ú ¸ À Â × µ × ô Õ Û × À » Á ã� ´ · » × º » ¸ Ú µ À ¸ º » ¼ Ú × » Ú ³ Û Ú » × ² q � | | ã q { r | ² á � ¥ ¢ ¦ £ Ð ¤ ª ¯ £ ® § © � ª Ã ¯ « § © î ² Ä Å Å Æ ² ÿ ÿ ² Ç Ç È þ É ã Æ Å � ÈÌ ¢ ¢ Í � Ð Ð © § « ± § « ¬ £ ª ¤ ¤ ¢ ² ¼ ¿ È ¹ » º È ² Ç È � È



traditional diplomacy’s shift away from the centre of world politics, while also stating that “material changes and changes in international political culture transform the diplomatic profession, and eventually, diplomatic culture too.”49 Mösslang & Riotte tell a very similar story, but list all these elements of change under the heading of modernity.50 Elaborating on the insights of IR Theory’s English School, historians like Mösslang & Riotte and Van Kemseke try to investigate the dynamic and dialogical interaction between diplomats and their structural environments. Tellingly, Mösslang & Riotte plainly state at the very beginning of their book that they want to study “the interrelationship between individuals … and the structural context … of diplomacy”.51 In this way, they introduce a ‘negotiating perspective’ in the notion of diplomatic culture. Finally, these authors clearly delineate the target group of their studies, namely professional diplomats, or more precisely the members of the diplomatic corps.52 Not only is this an easily identifiable social group – history has provided us with all sorts of official lists as to who did and who did not belong to this community – its members also simultaneously embody the national, international and transnational dimensions of diplomacy.53

However, the definitions of diplomatic culture developed by these bridge builders between IR Theory and Diplomatic Historiography are not entirely operational in an in-depth, analytical study of the cultural history of the diplomatic corps in the late modern era. They simply contain too many analytical categories that are moreover very differently linked to the target group and are not always clearly defined. In the case of Mösslang & Riotte, their statement that diplomatic culture should include “all aspects of diplomatic practice”, makes this abundantly clear. But it also goes for Van Kemseke’s conceptualization. More specifically, there seems to exist a dichotomy between his notion of diplomatic culture as an “aggregate of ideas, traditions, and norms disseminated by diplomats” on the one hand, and the “procedures, carefully created myths, rituals and symbols” on the other hand. These two compilations of categories indeed operate at very different levels, so how do you gear them to one another? Furthermore, Van Kemseke does not sufficiently clarify rather ambiguous concepts as democratization and mediatization, nor does he ð v k § « ¡ ¢ ¨ Ð ¢ Ô ¢ ² ¼ ¿ È ¹ » º È ² Ç Ç È Æ Æ § « ¬ Ä þ ã Ê ÿ Èf x Í � Ð Ð © § « ± § « ¬ £ ª ¤ ¤ ¢ ² ¼ ¿ È ¹ » º È ² Ç Ç È Æ ² ÿ ã þ Èf w Í � Ð Ð © § « ± § « ¬ £ ª ¤ ¤ ¢ ² ¼ ¿ È ¹ » º È ² Ç Ç È Æ § « ¬ ÿ ã þf k § « ¡ ¢ ¨ Ð ¢ Ô ¢ ² ¼ ¿ È ¹ » º È ² Æ Å � Í � Ð Ð © § « ± § « ¬ £ ª ¤ ¤ ¢ ² ¼ ¿ È ¹ » º È ² Ç È Æ Æ Èf Ë n « ¤ ¥ ¢ ª « ¢ ¥ § « ¬ ² ¤ ¥ ¢ ¯ ¢ § ¯ ¢ © £ Ð ¤ Ð ¢ « Ã ¨ ¢ ¯ § ¤ £ « ± § © © ¬ £ Ç © ª ¨ § ¤ £ ® ¯ ¢ Ç ¯ ¢ Ð ¢ « ¤ § ¤ £ Ò ¢ Ð ¤ ª ª « ¢ ® ª Ã « ¤ ¯ �£ « § ± £ Ò ¢ « Ç ¢ ¯ £ ª ¬ ² è ª ¯ £ « Ð ¤ § « ® ¢ ñ � § Ò £ ¬ Ó È ¦ ª ¯ « é ¢ ¬ È í ² � · » º » × ´ ¾ » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ º » ¹ µ ¿ · µ × µ Ú º ¸ º » ß µ × ²q � { t ã q � { t ² ï § ¨ ¬ ¢ « � ¥ £ ¯ ¬ Ì ¢ ¯ £ ¢ Ð ² ÿ � ² ª � § © ¦ £ Ð ¤ ª ¯ £ ® § © Ì ª ® £ ¢ ¤ � ² ° ª « ¬ ª « ² Æ É Ê Ä È n « ¤ ¥ ¢ ª ¤ ¥ ¢ ¯¥ § « ¬ ² ¤ ¥ ¯ ª Ã ± ¥ ª Ã ¤ ¤ ¥ ¢ Æ É ¤ ¥ § « ¬ ¤ Ï ¢ « ¤ £ ¢ ¤ ¥ ® ¢ « ¤ Ã ¯ £ ¢ Ð ² ¨ ª Ð ¤ � ¢ Ð ¤ ¢ ¯ « ® ª Ã « ¤ ¯ £ ¢ Ð ¥ § Ò ¢ £ Ð Ð Ã ¢ ¬� ¬ £ Ç © ª ¨ § ¤ £ ® § « « Ã § © Ð o ® ª « ¤ § £ « £ « ± © £ Ð ¤ Ð ª è ¤ ¥ ¢ ¨ ¢ ¨ æ ¢ ¯ Ð ª è ¤ ¥ ¢ £ ¯ « § ¤ £ ª « § © ¬ £ Ç © ª ¨ § ¤ £ ® ® ª ¯ Ç Ð È � ª ¯Ó ¢ © ± £ Ã ¨ ² Ð ¢ ¢ õ Ú Ú Û ¸ » · µ Ø » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ º » Ü Û µ µ º ¹ ¼ Ú × Û À ¸ » · µ é © § ¤ ¢ ¯ õ Ú Ú Û ¸ » · µ Ø Û ¹ ¼ · ¿ × Ø » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ º » Ü Û µ í ²Ó ¢ © ± £ Ã ¨ È Í £ « £ Ð ¤ ¯ � ª è � ª ¯ ¢ £ ± « Î è è § £ ¯ Ð ² Ó ¯ Ã Ð Ð ¢ © Ð ² Æ É Å Å ã �



adequately explain how they relate to one another and to the material changes and the transformations in international political culture that are said to alter diplomatic culture. Could a pragmatically constructed concept of democratization not harbour all four of the tendencies Van Kemseke sees at work in the late modern era? Mösslang & Riotte treat the concept of modernity in a similar vein: it seems to harbour a wide variety of technological innovations as well as political and social changes.

Rebuilding Diplomatic Culture

Drawing partly on previous conceptualizations but mostly on Glen Gendzel’s ideas on the concept of political culture, I have created a working definition of diplomatic culture that is fit for analysing how the evolution of the diplomatic profession influenced the ideas and actions of diplomats in the late modern era. Diplomatic culture, then, is ‘the structure of meaning through which members of the diplomatic corps develop ideas, perceive interests, and act on both’.54

The latter part of this conceptualization allows us to detect three main points of attention. First, referring to members of the diplomatic corps, this was, as it is now, essentially an elite culture.55 However, it is necessary to establish the social identity of diplomats by means of prosopographical research, because this can reveal how the social stratification of the diplomatic corps evolved under the influence of democratization. In recent years, some research on the late modern diplomats’ social backgrounds, levels of education, fortunes, career paths, etc. has been published, but it remains limited to foreign services of the former so-called Great Power countries.56 Second, with regard to the diplomat’s ideas and perception of interests, an intellectual history of the diplomatic corps can reveal to what extent the shifting social composition of diplomatic communities as well as the changing international political culture, influenced the diplomats’ professional world views. This means enquiring into the discourses of this elite social group: it entails considering elements of self-representation, perception of political processes and its actors, as well as the f ð ý © ¢ « « ý ¢ « ¬ m ¢ © ² ¼ ¿ È ¹ » º È ² Ç È Ä ÿ É Èf f Ì ¢ ¢ Í ¢ ¤ ¤ ¢ Ó ª ¯ £ ¤ m ² ³ ´ µ ú » Ø Ø µ Ú � Û À º Û · µ » Ú ¾ » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ º » ¹ ¶ · ¸ ¹ º » ¹ µ È õ û º Û Ø Â ¼ ½ º ´ µ ¾ ¸ Ú » × ´ø ¼ · µ » Þ Ú û µ · ß » ¹ µ ² á â ¤ ¥ « ª © ª ± £ § Ì ® § « ¬ £ « § Ò £ ® § î ² Æ É É � ² Ä � ² Ç Ç È ÿ � ã � Æ Èf h Ì ¢ ¢ è ª ¯ £ « Ð ¤ § « ® ¢ ë Ð § æ ¢ © © ¢ � § Ð å Ã ¢ ² Ù Ú µ Ö À » º µ µ Ú Á Û º ¸ º » ¼ Ú ô À µ × Ø » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ º µ × Ø µ À ¸ Ö ¿ Û Ý À » Ü Û µé q { � q ã q t q r í ² á ¦ £ Ð ¤ ª £ ¯ ¢ ² ç ® ª « ª ¨ £ ¢ ¢ ¤ Ð ª ® £ ç ¤ ç î ² Ä Å Å þ ² ÿ ² Ç Ç È � Æ ã É � � â § ¬ ¢ ¨ ² � ¸ Ø » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ º » µ½ · ¸ Ú � ¸ » × µ ¸ Û À µ Ú Ø µ Á ¸ » Ú Ø µ À ¸ y · ¸ Ú Ø µ y Û µ · · µ ô Ý ¸ × º » ¼ Ú Ø � Û Ú µ ¸ · » × º ¼ ¹ · ¸ º » µ ¸ Û × µ · ß » ¹ µ Ø µÀ � � º ¸ º ² á k £ « ± ¤ £ ì ¨ ¢ Ì £ ì ® © ¢ î ² Ä Å Å � ² É É ² Ç Ç È Ê Ê ã ÿ É � � ¥ ª ¨ § Ð n ¤ ¤ ¢ ² � � Û º Ø ¼ ¼ · µ À » µ ½ ½ ¼ · º ´ µõ · » × º ¼ ¹ · ¸ ¹ Â � � � Û · ¼ ¿ µ ¸ Ú � ¼ Ý » À » º Â ¸ Ú Ø ¾ » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ ¹ Â ² q { s | ã q t q r ² á � ¥ ¢ � £ Ç © ª ¨ § ¤ Ð � � ª ¯ © ¬ ñ � ¥ ¢ï Ã © ¤ Ã ¯ § © ¦ £ Ð ¤ ª ¯ � ª è � £ Ç © ª ¨ § ® � ² Æ � Æ � ã Æ É Æ ÿ î ² n i è ª ¯ ¬ ² n i è ª ¯ ¬ ò « £ Ò ¢ ¯ Ð £ ¤ � ä ¯ ¢ Ð Ð ² Ä Å Å � ² Ç Ç È Ä Ê ã� þ È



diplomats’ various loyalties. In constructing a conceptual framework for understanding the entanglement of domestic politics and international relations, Robert Putnam has aptly characterized diplomacy as a two-level game. Putnam highlights national political leaders as the players of this game. At the national level, they have to reconcile different domestic groups that each try to impose their own view on foreign policy issues. At the international level, they have to ably defend the resulting compromise and minimize the negative outcomes that foreign developments could have for their country.57 In a similar way, studying the history of professional diplomats from a cultural perspective requires coming to terms with the reality of diplomacy as a two-level-game. The diplomatic agent, being an employee of his home country’s Foreign Office, is a part of his domestic society as much as he is a member of the international diplomatic community. These different identities imply that various intertwined structures of meaning shape his ideas and condition the perception of his interests: the most important are the culture of his Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is at least partly conditioned by a more general national political culture, and the cultures of the diplomatic communities in their host countries, which, again, are partly determined by these foreign countries political cultures. Third, to reveal the action counterpart of these ideas and interest perceptions, namely the diplomats’ professional behaviour, a social anthropology of diplomacy is necessary to determine to what extent the processes of democratization influenced or even changed the diplomats’ activities as a public servant. Here too the already mentioned intertwined structures of meaning are at work. The diplomats can be studied as careerists in an hierarchically structured Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and as members of the international diplomatic community who are executing national foreign policy. In their actions, diplomats manifest their loyalties. Political scientists have identified several institutions (the international diplomatic community, the national Foreign Ministry, the political leadership in their host countries) that diplomats pledge allegiance to and have extensively theorized on the internal conflicts that could arise from this.58 A lot of historical research remains to be done to substantiate these insights by empirical evidence.

This brief characterization of diplomatic culture is set up to account for the national, international and transnational dimensions of the diplomatic corps’ mental world. It can also overcome many of the criticisms formulated against the cultural approach to International History. Despite significantly enriching the discipline, in particular with regards to the use of culture as an interpretive f l ª æ ¢ ¯ ¤ ä Ã ¤ « § ¨ ² ¾ » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ ¹ Â ¸ Ú Ø ¾ ¼ Á µ × º » ¹ ¶ ¼ À » º » ¹ × ô ³ ´ µ � ¼ Þ » ¹ ¼ ½ ³ ù ¼ ã � µ ß µ À y ¸ Á µ × ²á ë « ¤ ¢ ¯ « § ¤ £ ª « § © n ¯ ± § « £ m § ¤ £ ª « î ² Æ É � � ² ÿ Ä ² Ê ² Ç Ç È ÿ Ä þ ã ÿ � Å Èf u � ª ¥ § « ý § © ¤ Ã « ± § « ¬ Í § ¯ £ ¦ ª © ¨ æ ª ¢ Ã ± ¢ ² ¶ ¸ º º µ · Ú × ¼ ½ ¾ » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ ¹ Â ô õ û º Û Ø Â ¼ ½ µ ¹ · Û » º Á µ Ú º¸ Ú Ø � ¸ · µ µ · ¶ ¸ º º µ · Ú × » Ú � ¼ · ù µ Þ » ¸ Ú ¾ » ¿ À ¼ Á ¸ ¹ Â ² á � ª Ã ¯ « § © ª è ä ¢ § ® ¢ ¢ Ð ¢ § ¯ ® ¥ î ² Æ É � � ² Ä ² Ä ² Ç ÈÆ Æ Ä � � § Ò £ Ð ï ¯ ª Ð Ð ² ¼ ¿ È ¹ » º È ² Ç È Ä ÿ � Ì ª è ¢ ¯ ² ¼ ¿ È ¹ » º È ² Ç È Ê � È



framework for human behaviour, the cultural turn has presented international historiography with some conceptual and analytical problems. The conceptual lack of clarity of what culture is and what it is not, stems from Clifford Geertz formulation of culture as man’s “webs of significances he himself has spun”. This definition is potentially limitless and therefore limited as a means of understanding human action.59 It inevitably leads to the cliché that everything is culture. Instead of studying everything, it might be more useful to focus on the interrelation of ideas, interests and actions of members of the diplomatic corps.

On a more analytical level, cultural approaches to International History are often criticized for their ignorance of the dynamic relationship between cultural predispositions and the structural environment in which they exist. In fact, in The Interpretation of Cultures, Geertz already recognised the risk that “cultural analysis… will lose touch with the hard surfaces of life – with the political, economic, stratificatory realities within which men are everywhere contained.” Again, this flaw can be overcome by a conceptualization of diplomatic culture that focuses on ‘human practice’, and thus on the interaction of ideas, beliefs and identities with the structural environment in which action takes place to produce practices.60 This is to introduce the agent-structure perspective into the history of diplomatic culture. It more specifically leads to questions like ‘Did democratization change the structures of diplomatic practice, i.e. the body of ideas about diplomacy and the configuration of the available resources in the diplomatic field? Democratization related processes like franchise extensions and the rise of the mass media indeed contributed to taking foreign policy making away from Foreign Offices and placed it into the hands of democratically elected politicians. But how did diplomats, as agents, react to these changing structures, or in other words: how did these changing structures affect diplomatic culture, i.e. the way diplomats developed ideas (e.g. about their societal role as foreign policy executives), the way they perceived interests (for instance regarding their professional future as organizational reforms instigated by politicians might have altered career advancement opportunities), and lastly, the way they acted on these ideas and interests? Finally, if we accept William Sewell’s theory of structure and acknowledge that, through their practices, agents can affect and ultimately transform structures, then did, and if so, how did the diplomats’ reactions to processes of democratization influence or even alter the schema’s of thought about diplomacy one more time.61 These, I believe, are all important elements of a new research agenda, studying the diplomatic corps from a cultural perpective f v � § ® Ô Ð ª « ² ¼ ¿ È ¹ » º È ² Ç Ç È Æ � � ã Æ � Å � ï © £ è è ª ¯ ¬ ý ¢ ¢ ¯ ¤ m ² ³ ´ µ ü Ú º µ · ¿ · µ º ¸ º » ¼ Ú ¼ ½ � Û À º Û · µ × ² Ñ ¢ Ï � ª ¯ Ô ²Æ É þ Ê ² Ç Ç È � ² Ê Å Èh x ë æ £ ¬ ¢ ¨ Èh w � £ © © £ § ¨ ¦ È Ì ¢ Ï ¢ © © ² � ¯ È ² � ¼ Þ » ¹ × ¼ ½ ú » × º ¼ · Â È û ¼ ¹ » ¸ À ³ ´ µ ¼ · Â ¸ Ú Ø û ¼ ¹ » ¸ À ³ · ¸ Ú × ½ ¼ · Á ¸ º » ¼ Ú ²ï ¥ £ ® § ± ª ² ò « £ Ò ¢ ¯ Ð £ ¤ � ª è ï ¥ £ ® § ± ª ä ¯ ¢ Ð Ð ² Ä Å Å � ² Ç Ç È Æ Ä ÿ ã Æ þ ÿ È



Concluding remarks

In a widely discussed essay published on H-Diplo, H-Net’s diplomatic

and international history discussion network, the eminent political scientist Robert Jervis stated that “from the political science side, it seems to me that the investment and affections are a bit asymmetric in that most of us see the great importance of international history, while historians draw less from political science and sometimes have the temerity to doubt the value of the discipline.”62 According to Jervis, international historians generally do not seem to appreciate the work by their colleagues studying international relations from a political science perspective. And indeed, the debate between historians and political scientists about how to study international relations has been going on for decades now, and it is striking that studies contributing to the dialogue almost invariably explain how political scientists can and need to draw more on theoretical insights offered by historians in their approach to IR, instead of the other way around.63 In this article, the other way around is how I have tried to go. More particularly, I have examined how the IR theoretical concepts of international political culture and diplomatic culture can be suited to historical research into the mental world of diplomacy in the late modern era. Critically overviewing the existing literature, I have argued that we need to pragmatically construct working definitions that enable us to incorporate the national, international and transnational dimensions of diplomatic practice. More importantly and more broadly, this research into the concepts of international political and diplomatic culture has revealed the benefits for historians to draw extensively on insights from the social sciences. Social scientific theories could contribute substantially to the historical discipline by their strong penchant for structural thinking.64 Such an approach is essential if we would want to understand and interpret the social-cultural aspects of a fundamental phase in the diplomatic corps’ transition from a European subculture linked through aristocratic fraternity to an international meritocratic community based on professional solidarity and the belief in the practical benefits of diplomacy.

h ª æ ¢ ¯ ¤ � ¢ ¯ Ò £ Ð ² ¼ ¿ È ¹ » º È ² Ç È Æ Èh Ë Ì ¢ ¢ ý ¢ ª è è ¯ ¢ � ª æ ¢ ¯ ¤ Ð ² ¼ ¿ È ¹ » º È ² Ç Ç È þ Å Ê ã þ Æ ÿ È Ì ¢ ¢ § © Ð ª ¤ ¥ ¢ § ¯ ¤ £ ® © ¢ Ð ª « ¤ ¥ ¢ ¯ ª © ¢ ª è ¥ £ Ð ¤ ª ¯ � £ «£ « ¤ ¢ ¯ « § ¤ £ ª « § © ¯ ¢ © § ¤ £ ª « Ð £ « Õ » À À µ Ú » Û Á È � ¼ Û · Ú ¸ À ¼ ½ ü Ú º µ · Ú ¸ º » ¼ Ú ¸ À û º Û Ø » µ × ² Ê þ ² Ä ² Ä Å Å � ² Ç Ç È Ê Ä þ ãÿ Ê � Èh ð Ì ¢ Ï ¢ © © ² ¼ ¿ È ¹ » º È ² Ç È Æ ÿ È

Grasping the Mental World of Diplomacy in the Late Modern Era: A Conceptual Framework

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