Free rider or Trailblazer? Atypical Citizenship and the Meaning of Membership

Daniel Naujoks1

Paper presented at the 2014 Citizenship Studies Conference, at the Center for the Study of Citizenship, Wayne State University

Abstract: Notions, features and forms of ‘citizenship,’ understood as legal membership in a state, are changing the world over. As atypical citizenship concepts are on the rise, this paper analyzes the use of the ‘citizenship label’ in contexts that deviate from classic notions of full state membership. Drawing on the experiences of the Overseas Citizenship of India, the British Overseas Citizenship, and Citizenship of the European Union, this paper argues that while the rhetoric of citizenship is based on a common understanding and an ideal type of full membership there are important differences in the actual conceptualization of such statuses. The paper offers a conceptualization to discuss citizenship along six dimensions from the policy perspective. The increasing number of atypical citizenship concepts raises the question whether these are ‘free riders’ that are designed to benefit from the common notion of citizenship while being permanent exceptions, or whether they are trailblazers that show the way toward a more differentiated and diverse notion of citizenship itself. This has significant repercussions for citizenship and democracy theory and the meaning of membership.

Introduction

Notions, features and forms of citizenship, understood as legal membership in a state, are changing in many regions of the world. Relating to discussions in democracy and citizenship theory, as well as transnational studies, and cosmopolitism, this essay sheds light on three concepts that deviate from classic notions of citizenship, namely the Overseas Citizenship of India, British Overseas Citizenship, and Citizenship of the European Union. In an attempt to advance our understanding of differentiated conceptualizations of citizenship I will highlight differences in the construction of ‘special subjects’, moral obligations and the exercise of power, analyze the aspirations of political actors, the political rhetoric and explore the interplay between tangible rights and intangible narratives.

There are many angles from which citizenship policies can be analyzed. While I draw on the debates that led to the adoption of these statuses to analyze the concepts and aspirations, in this essay, I am not interested in the empirical details and major drivers of the policy-making processes. I also do not analyze the effects of such policy changes, which includes the deserving question whether the political

1 For welcome comments please reach the author at dn2380@columbia.edu. I would like to thank Dietrich Thränhardt, who set me on the path of this inquiry by suggesting a comparative research on atypical citizenship policies. I am indebted to Willem Maas, Saeed A. Khan, Costica Dumbrava, and Olivier Vonk for sharing their knowledge and for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this essay. Lastly, I am grateful for lively discussions of this essay at the 2013 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.

2

project states and policy actors aimed at by introducing certain membership statuses paid off and yielded the desired results (or any other results for that matter). The focus of this chapter lies on the way citizenship is conceptualized, communicated and used by state institutions.

There are several contestations of the standard view of citizenship regimes. Hammar (1990) coined the term denizenship for the citizenship-like status of long-term residents, Soysal (1994) highlighted the trend toward postnational citizenship and Cohen (2009) suggests analyzing the rights of individuals as a gradient category, introducing what she calls semi-citizenship. Recent scholarship has also examined multilevel citizenship and the provision of rights below and above the national level (Maas 2013). While these and other contestations from the viewpoint of citizenship studies generally focus on the substantive content of rights and duties of individuals in certain jurisdictions and their belonging and participation in social and political institutions (Isin and Turner 2007; Nyers 2007; among others), this essay focuses on legal membership categories that are labeled citizenship by state actors. These categories have important implications for exercising rights and being ‘engaged citizens’ in the broader sense of the term. I leave it, however, to future analysis to explore the links between legal citizenship status and the effective use of rights for people inside and outside the legal boundaries of the status.

Transnationality research has argued not to “naturalize” the nation state as the natural unit of analysis (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003). Scholars have shown that today many practices and realities take place in a third social space that is neither fully in the country of origin nor the country of destination.2 However, the importance and actual significance of state rules and regulations remains high for many aspects of transnational activities. The design and discussion, the acceptance or non-acceptance of special membership statuses may help us to question and/or corroborate several of the relevant questions transnational studies urge us to address. For example, how much territorial context and nation state need citizenship policies? To what extent do these atypical citizenship statuses recognize transnational behavior while, at the same time, they remain rooted in a state-centric nomenclature?

Democracy and citizenship theory raise important questions, such as, what is the content of citizenship

and what are the normative implications? Thus, Nyers (2007:1-2) urges us to examine who is a citizen

(and who is not) and what is citizenship (and what it might become). For instance, when the U.K.

introduced British overseas Citizenship it was feared that this would “be setting different standards of

citizenship.”3 Is equality a necessary and inherent value of citizenship or is it justified to differentiate between groups and have second-class citizens? Is it still adequate to refer to those persons as citizens?

What can we say about the (possible) differences in the normative evaluation, the state rhetoric and the

empirical effects of such statuses?

Providing answers to these questions would go beyond the scope of this essay. Instead my aim is to provide insights into the policy discourse, political rhetoric and conceptual arrangements of atypical

2 For the transnational approach toward migration studies, see Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc (1994), Faist (2000), Guarnizo, Portes and Haller (2003), Bauböck (2003), Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004) and Levitt and Jaworsky (2007). 3 Sydney Bidwell during the House of Commons debate on 28 January 1981.

3

citizenship statuses that may enrich further theoretical analysis. Questions that will be stimulated in this essay include: Why and how do citizenship-like statuses differ from just providing special rights? In how far is the conferment of special rights connected to the introduction of a citizenship status? To what extent are ideas about a certain state-citizen relationship invoked, alluded to and used? How do states “play” with these concepts, modify them and tailor them to their needs?

Comparing the units of analysis for different disciplines that engage in citizenship studies, in particular

the legal, political, and sociological models Mindus (2014:739) states that the legal dimension of

citizenship is based on a rigid dichotomy between citizens and non-citizens not allowing in-betweens. Based on the analysis of atypical forms of state membership I argue that while her observation is

consistent with the general perception and conceptualization of citizenship regimes there are some in-

betweens that have to be considered in a more comprehensive theory of citizenship. In this regard, this

analysis is related to analysis of emigrant or extra-territorial citizenship that often differ from full citizenship rights (Barry 2006; Fitzgerald 2006; 2008). Fitzgerald (2008) finds that emigrants and the

governments of their countries of origin negotiate “citizenship à la carte” based on voluntarism, citizen

rights over obligations, and multiple affiliations.4

This essay aims at more than highlighting the objective differences in the policy design of atypical membership policies. By examining the policy-making processes, the expressed expectations and the official implementation of the legal regimes the analysis contributes to a more nuanced understanding of how states create citizenship regimes. It highlights the dialectic of using established forms and terms and reinterpreting the concepts, which, in turn, has an impact on the underlying notions.

Case selection

The atypical citizenship regimes compared in this analysis have been chosen to represent a high degree of conceptual diversity while all operate under a state membership framework and the official label ‘citizenship’. Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI) serves as an example for diaspora membership policies and the avoidance of providing full dual citizenship. The British Overseas Citizenship was not only the ideational precursor of the OCI—albeit with a very different objective. It represents the re-interpretation of membership in the U.K. as a former empire and a post-colonial alignment of population classifications with recognized categories of nation states. EU citizenship is often described as ‘postnational citizenship’ (Soysal 1994:148) and captures the aspirations of supranational entities to replicate nation-state institutions, as is now also planned and discussed at the Union of South American

4 In Fitzgerald (2006:111), he specifies that emigrant citizenship may differ from resident citizenship by eligibility and specific rights. He adds that like forms of immigrant citizenship that have gradations of rights distinguishing the naturalized from the naturals, differences in rights for expatriate citizens violates the liberal norm that all citizens should be equal. Gamlen (2006) provides a large overview of different rights granted to diasporic state members, including different forms of political participation, including, no voting rights, voting rights if individuals come back to the country on the election day and full distance voting facilities.

4

Nations (UNASUR), the Andean Community (CAN), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Analytical Framework: Six policy dimensions of citizenship

Both in the academic use and in actual state practice, there are several meanings of citizenship and if and how it is different from nationality. Here, I will use the term ‘citizenship’ and not ‘nationality’ to denote an individual’s legal membership in a state.5 But what is citizenship and how do we classify its elements and components?

There are two ways of addressing the normative evaluation of atypical forms of citizenship, or any forms of citizenship for that matter. First, inspired by traditions of political philosophy, we can theoretically describe what citizenship is, subsume the concepts we find in the empirical reality and judge what criteria they meet and what elements of our concept they do not fulfill. Second, we can take an inductive approach where we derive the concept of citizenship not from theoretical reasoning but from a comparison of actual citizenship practices. This pragmatic perspective leaves room for definitional creativity of states and actors to shape various forms of memberships and allows heterogeneity. In the last vein, an Indian policy-maker stated in the debate on Overseas Citizenship that “Every nation has got a right to make a decision as to who will be or will not be its citizens. Citizenship of a country is a complex matter because of variety of citizenship laws throughout the world.”6

In this essay, I follow the latter approach observing the practice of special legal instruments that are labeled citizenship and the ways these forms mimic acknowledged full forms of citizenship. A proverb from Sri Lanka states that ‘the fish don’t talk about the water,’ meaning that we hardly consider what we take for granted. Under normal circumstances we are not required to attribute clear meaning to abstract concepts such as citizenship. Special statuses, on the other hand, need discursive and normative legitimacy and are under pressure to being justified as meaningful concepts. The underlying discourse reveals many of the implicitly understood meanings of state membership and thus, provides an opportunity for the fish to talk about the water.

From the state and policy perspective, six dimensions of citizenship policies can be distinguished. States can grant a status and create a state label (label and status dimension), they may (and generally will) substantiate the status with concrete and special rights and often also duties (privilege dimension), they may grant status holders certain powers to change the rules of the polity, most importantly by providing for political participation (political dimension). Further, the state has to consider the importance of this status for status-holders when they are outside of the country’s territory, i.e., vis-à-vis other countries (external dimension).

5 For a discussion on the terminology, see Naujoks (2013:10-12). Also see Adler and Rubenstein (2000:3–4); Bauböck (2005a:4); Bosniak (2000); Faist, Gerdes and Rieple (2004:917); Weis (1979:4–5). 6 R.K. Anand (Jharkhand), Rajya Sabha (upper house) debates on the Citizenship (Amendment) Bill 2005, on 29 July 2005, own translation from Hindi.

5

While the above dimensions describe the content of citizenship, the fifth dimensions concerns access to citizenship, i.e., the modes of its acquisition and loss and the definition, who is a citizen and who is not (boundary dimension). The last dimension looks at the use of the status as a rhetoric tool in states’ communication strategy (communication dimension).7

For the sake of clarity, there are important individual dimensions of citizenship that are not dealt with directly in this paper. These include how citizenship is experienced, how granted privileges and participatory powers are used, how emotional attachment to the political community that is the state is constructed and what it means to feel loyalty and allegiance to a political community.8

In the remainder of this chapter, I will briefly introduce the three citizenship policies that are in the focus of my analysis and will then elaborate on each dimension of the policies separately.

British Overseas Citizenship

The British Overseas Citizenship (BOC) was introduced by the British Nationality Act (BNA), 1981 alongside two other forms of citizenship, namely the British Citizenship and the British Overseas Dependency Citizenship. Differentiating between different categories of people that previously held the common ‘citizenship of the U.K. and Colonies’ (CUKC), this reconfiguration of citizenship statuses 7 I benefitted from other scholars who have distinguished such dimensions, such as Carens (2000:162) who differentiates the legal (formal rights and duties that one possesses as a member of a political community), psychological (a sense of identification with the political community) and political (one’s sense of representational legitimacy of those who act authoritatively on behalf of and in the name of the political community) dimensions. Bosniak (2000) distinguishes four separate conceptions, namely citizenship as a legal status, a system of rights, a form of political activity and a form of identity and solidarity. Also Faist, Gerdes and Rieple (2004:917) state that citizenship “essentially comprises three mutually qualifying dimensions: first and foremost, the notion of collective self-determination and democracy; second, the legally guaranteed status of equal political freedom and other rights; and third, membership in a political community.” Faist, Gerdes and Rieple also ascribe to nationality an interstate and an intrastate function. See also Bauböck (2005a). 8 In Naujoks (2013:197–253) I develop a grounded theory about how OCI affects different categories of identification with and attachment to India. For the identity and instrumental use of citizenship for naturalizing individuals, see Thränhardt (2008).

Figure 1: Dimensions of Citizenship Policies from the State Perspective

Rights & Duties

Label

!"!"

!"!"

Boundary #

State

# Third State

Political

Communication

External

6

reflects the U.K.’s struggle to redefine its membership categories during the transition from empire to nation state. The main thrust of the BNA 1981 was to define British citizenship and to distinguish it from the other two labels.9

Before the British Nationality Act 1948 came into force in January 1949, Britain knew only British subjects, comprising everybody who owed allegiance to the British Monarch, and British Protected Persons whom the British had granted protection. As Canada created its own citizenship in 1946 and India and Pakistan gained independence in 1947, the U.K. created the citizenship of the U.K. and Colonies (CUKC). This was an extremely wide category that included in 1977 some 950 million people in all major regions of the world.10

Already before the BNA 1981 came into force, many formal citizens, that is, CUKCs, were barred from entering the U.K. The anomaly in Britain’s citizenship conception was that through the Commonwealth Immigrants Acts 1962 and 1968, and the 1971 Immigration Act, Commonwealth passport holders and CUKCs were subject to immigration control unless they, their parents or grandparents or—for female citizens—their husband had been born, adopted, naturalized or registered in the U.K. This status of being ‘connected to the United Kingdom and Islands’ was referred to as patrial. Thus, of the 950 million British subjects and CUKCs only a few enjoyed any significant rights toward the U.K. The basic idea behind the British Nationality Act 1981 was to provide new labels for existing de facto categories. Indeed, very few changes in the rights, access and other dimensions of British citizenship were part of this legislative project.11 The 1981 Act formalized this relationship by naming those who had the right of abode in the U.K. British citizens, those who had the right of abode in dependent territories British citizens thereof12 and all the rest with no tangible rights or privileges British overseas citizens.13

9 See Hansen (2000) for an analysis of the processes that led to the BNA 1981 and on the immigration discourse in the U.K. 10 Edward Gardner during the House of Commons debate on 28 January 1981. 11 An important exception is the limitation of ius soli to those settled in the U.K., thus, excluding the children of sojourners, tourists and irregular migrants who were born on British soil from citizenship. 12 Britain's 14 Overseas Territories, as the former Overseas Dependency are called today, spread throughout the globe, are diverse communities. They range from the tiny island of Pitcairn with its 47 inhabitants, set in the middle of the Pacific Ocean, to Bermuda, which has a population of over 62,000 and is one of the world's major financial centers. 13 Another interesting legal category under British law is the “British Subject without citizenship”. This status referred to people in or from British India who did not obtain Indian or Pakistani citizenship after these countries enacted their citizenship laws in 1950 and 1951. While this was supposed to be a very preliminary status, the 1980 White Paper states that this status “has therefore remained in existence longer than originally expected” but “since it relates to people before 1949, the numbers are diminishing.” (U.K. Home Office 1980:28). It was estimated that in 1980, there were approximately 50,000 such persons (ibid., p.30). In 2002, the British government estimated their numbers at around 35,000 persons (statement by Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office, Lord Filkin, in the House of Lords debate on 9 October 2002). See Fransman (1998:193–6) for a detailed description of this status.

7

Overseas Citizenship of India

In order to meet the diasporic demand for dual citizenship, India created two special membership statuses. In 1999, the Indian government launched the Person of Indian Origin Card (PIO card),14 and in late 2003, legislation on the Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI) was adopted as another membership category.15 However, under the initial OCI scheme, which was limited to ethnic Indians who were citizens of one of 16 specified countries,16 not a single person obtained OCI status. In 2005, the provisions regarding OCI in the Citizenship Act, 1955 were amended, inter alia extending the scope of OCI to citizens of all countries except Pakistan and Bangladesh, after which the scheme was formally launched in January 2006.17 Until July 2012, more than one million OCI cards had been issued, almost half of which went to applicants in the U.S. and Canada, and 20 percent in the U.K.18

The concrete benefits and privileges that OCI and the PIO card grant its holder are discussed in the privilege dimension below. Suffice to say for now that both entitle members to facilities relating to visas, education and investment in India, while neither provides political rights. Both OCI and PIO card holders are, thus, excluded from voting and holding public office in India. While PIO cards issued after September 2002 have a 15-year validity, overseas citizenship is a life-long status.19

Citizenship of the European Union

The idea of a common European citizenship has been under discussion by Europe’s leaders since the late 1960s. At the beginning the idea of a nascent common European citizenship had been associated with the freedom of movement and expressed by several of Europe’s political leaders (Maas 2007). At the Copenhagen summit in 1973, a report on European identity was adopted by Europe’s heads of state and government that included a focus on particular rights for citizens and other dimensions relevant for citizenship. In the following years, working groups and particular delegations elaborated on the rights aspect, the possibility of establishing a passport union and the scope for granting European citizenship (Maas 2007). Importantly, the European Commission published its report “Towards European Citizenship” in 1975 and two years later, the European Parliament adopted a resolution that supported the concept. However, it took to until the early 1990s before the concept got enough political traction to be incorporated into the Treaties of the EU.

14 The scheme was revised in 2002, most importantly reducing the previous prohibitively high application fee from USD 1,000 to USD 300. See Ministry of Home Affairs’ Notification F.NO.26011/4/98-IC.I. of 30 March 1999, amended by Notification No. 26011/4/98-F.I of 19 August 2002. 15 Vide the Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2003, notified on 7 January 2004, which came into force in December 2004. 16 The countries were Australia, Canada, Cyprus, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K. and the U.S. 17 The changes were brought by the Citizenship (Amendment) Ordinance, 2005, which was promulgated by the President on 28 June 2005. The ordinance was confirmed by the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2005, enacted on 24 August 2005. 18 For more information on the development of OCI card issuances and their characteristics, see Naujoks (2013:62–5). 19 PIO cards issued before September 2002 had a validity of 20 years.

8

The Maastricht Treaty—adopted during the 1991 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC)—established the citizenship, which underwent only minor changes by amendments during the following IGCs in Amsterdam (1997), Nice (2001) and Lisbon (2007). Every person holding the nationality of a Member State of the European Union is automatically at the same time a citizen of the Union (Art. 20 (1) Treaty of the Functioning of the EU (TFEU)).20

Regarding terminology, the EU Treaty introduced “citizenship of the Union”. However, ‘EU citizenship’ and ‘European citizenship’ are also used by a variety of players.21 Often, European citizenship implies a larger citizenship concept in the tradition of T.H. Marshall (1950) combining economic, political and social rights. However, in other instances, European citizenship is used as a synonym for Union citizenship.

The label and status dimension

All citizenship regimes start with a label. The official name attached to a person or a group of persons that implies the relationship between this group of people and a state. This name generally refers to a legal status as a conglomerate of rights and duties between the state and the individual. The status dimension of citizenship policies is often not explicitly addressed. Citizenship as a status means that a special membership concept is adopted with a name that evokes certain expectations about citizenship and nationality.

Several scholars have emphasized that most of the rights and characteristics associated with EU citizenship were already partially outlined by the 1957 Treaty of Rome and the Single European Act,22 especially the freedom of movement, which has been expanded and complemented by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice.23 Thus, the idea of citizenship was superimposed over a range of pre-existing privileges. In other words, the idea of a unifying status per se was critical.

Closa (1992:1137) finds that the introduction of Union citizenship introduced for the first time “a systematic concept of citizenship in the Community ambit”. More than the rights itself it offers a systematization of such rights, centered on the common label ‘citizenship.’ Thus, the label and status function was paramount.24

20 Vide its Article 8.1. The numbering of the EU Treaty articles has been repeatedly revised to take into account the legal developments of the text. I will refer to the articles as per the current version of the treaty. 21 In older documents also the term ‘Community citizenship’ is used. 22 See Closa (1992); Best (1994); Meehan (2000), Yakut (2010), to name a few. 23 Closa (1992:1149) and Best (1994:27) remind us that three Member States had granted already the right to vote in municipal elections to all resident Member State nationals (namely, Denmark Ireland and the Netherlands), while three others granted this right on a reciprocal basis or to certain categories of immigrants (namely, the U.K. Portugal and Spain). 24 Already in 1975, the European Commission elaborated on the granting of special rights versus European citizenship. It observes two principal differences between the two options. The Commission explains that the latter appears to imply the existence of (a) supra-national institutions which have been elected and (b) supra-national law which create reciprocal rights and obligations between the citizens of the Member States and the

9

One major objective of the establishment of EU citizenship was the psychological effect of such a membership status on the citizen. Arguably, for this purpose the status as such was important. In its first report on the Citizenship of the Union from December 1993, the European Commission proudly announced that this had created “a direct political link” between the citizens of the Member States and the European Union “with the aim of fostering a sense of identity with the Union.”25 It also finds that “Its purpose is to deepen European citizens’ sense of belonging to the European Union and make that sense more tangible by conferring on them the rights associated with it.”26 Consequently, the European Parliament refers to the “inherent bond” in citizenship and states that it must be defined as a concept in itself and in such a way as to constitute a genuine form of a status.27

Introducing a general status of an EU citizen who, in principle, enjoys the freedom of movement, regardless of economic activities, seemed a step toward addressing one of the oldest criticism of the EU and its rights regime, namely that existing rights “were restricted to the ‘citizen-as-worker’ instead of reflecting the normative principle that people are citizens because they are human beings” (Meehan 2000:13).

Also the Indian case illustrates the importance of the status dimension. In 1999, the Indian government had introduced the Person of Indian Origin Card, or PIO Card, which provided many essential privileges, such as the right to stay indefinitely in the country (during the 20 year validity of the card, which later got reduced to 15 years). In addition, there are several special rights that allow persons of Indian origin without any particular status to buy real property and invest into companies. However, the High-level Committee on the Indian Diaspora “asked many [members of the Indian diaspora] why they were so keen on dual nationality. Their answer was twofold: firstly, they argued that if the Government had already offered practically all the benefits of dual nationality under the Scheme of PIO Cards to the entire Indian diaspora, it should have no difficulty in providing for dual nationality for citizens of a few specified countries by legislation; and secondly, they considered a legislative provision of dual nationality a higher form of the acknowledgement of their linkage with Mother India.” (2002:526) Thus, independent from the benefits or privileges granted, the special status of ‘citizenship’ matters. It is the symbol of acknowledgment and the official label that count, and in this regard, OCI is similar to EU citizenship as an attempt to superimpose a label over existing rights.

Let us now turn to the status and label dimension of British Overseas Citizenship (BOC). Carens (2000:166) argues that in the conventional understanding of citizenship there is a tight fit between the

supra-national entity. Commission of the European Communities, Towards European Citizenship. The Granting of special rights. Report presented to the European Council on 3 July 1975, COM (75) 321 final, Annex 2. 25 European Commission, Report on the Citizenship of the Union, December 1993, COM(93) 702 final. 26 European Commission, Report on the operation of the TFEU, quoted in European Parliament, Intergovernmental Conference, Briefing Note No. 10 (20 February 1997) on European Citizenship. Similar arguments are made in the ‘Fundamental positions of Austria for the Intergovernmental Conference’, quoted in European Parliament, Intergovernmental Conference, Briefing Note No. 10 (20 February 1997) on European Citizenship; by Irish Prime Minister Charles J. Haughey’s address to the European Parliament on the outcome of Dublin European Council, 25–26 June 1990, 11 July 1990, archived at www.webcitation.org/6Nbz5TfSo; and U.K. Select Committee on European Legislation (1995). 27 European Parliament resolution on Union citizenship, 14 June 1991, A3-0139/91.

10

legal and the psychological dimension. The lack of this ‘tight fit’ for many citizens of the U.K. and colonies seemed the starting point for BOC. The British government explained that BOC “represents the relationship with the United Kingdom held by people connected with countries which were once part of the British Empire; or whose ancestral connections with the United Kingdom or its present dependencies are not sufficiently close to qualify them for British Citizenship or Citizenship of the British Dependent Territories.” (U.K. Home Office 1980:20) However, despite the lack of the quality to be labeled British citizens, these people were still provided with a status, or a label. The rationale for the creation of BOC is twofold. On the one hand, the U.K. aimed at providing all former citizens of the U.K. and colonies (CUKC) with a new status. Statements such as “Any CUKC would acquire one of the three citizenships. None of them would be excluded” are mentioned frequently in the government’s 1980 White Paper and throughout the parliamentary debate on the 1981 British Nationality Act. This appears to reflect the U.K.’s international obligation to avoid statelessness28 and to not withdraw its citizenship status generally from certain individuals and groups.29 Because they had a status that sounded like citizenship they needed a status that resembled citizenship, at least at the nominal level.

The other, less pronounced reason is that there was a reminiscence of the British Empire. The idea about Britain as a global power and the connection to its history made such a citizenship-like status appealing. It is important to highlight that BOCs were not just a random selection of people, who for a mysterious reason ended up with this label. These people were connected to the British Empire by the planned and officially sanctioned movement of people within the structures of the Empire and the social spaces created by it. That these people were stateless and did not acquire the citizenship of their countries of residence or did not feel fully a part of these countries is also closely connected to the British colonial policies, its ‘divide and conquer’ strategy and the relation it had with its colonial subjects. Thus, several British parliamentarians stress the moral responsibility of the United Kingdom to provide inclusive policies for those individuals.30 During the parliamentary debate, it was found that “Anomaly may be piled upon anomaly as a result of this well-intentioned, natural—and, I think,

28 The key international treaties in this regard are the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, which the U.K. ratified in 1959 and 1966, respectively. While this was of no effect for the British government at the time, also the final declaration of the United Nations High-level Dialogue on international migration and development in October 2013 underlines “the right of migrants to return to their country of citizenship, and recall that States must ensure that their returning nationals are duly received”. 29 The government assumes also that “many of them will have another citizenship or nationality.” (U.K. Home Office 1980:7). In 2009, the U.K. Border Agency states that “British Overseas citizenship is a form of British nationality in that provision for its acquisition and loss is made by the British Nationality Act 1981. We would also not concede that such a person is a ‘stateless person’ as per the definition of that term in the 1954 Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons.” (U.K. Border Agency 2009 Are BOC’s British Nationals (19 August 2009) as cited by the Australian Refugee Review Tribunal (Research Response Number: GBR35077)) 30 Critics point to the moral responsibilities of the U.K., as “These include people who were promised that, when the colonies in which they lived became independent, they would be able to keep a British passport and come to this country when they wanted to do so.” John Tilley during the House of Commons debate on 28 January 1981.

11

somewhat sentimental—wish to preserve what the right hon. [J. Enoch Powell] rather unkindly described as the ‘debris’ of the British Empire.”31

However, the British exercise raises normative questions, such as can put states any label they want? Or, to what extent are they bound by realities, by corresponding moral and legal constraints? What ‘genuine connection’ has to exist between people labeled as citizens and the labeling country?32 During the parliamentary discussions, strong criticism was expressed in this regard:

“[T]he Bill has retained what I might call the rag-bag principle, which landed us with citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies. [...] to none of those categories, other than British citizens, do any real entities correspond. They do not correspond to States. […] They are merely a residuum that has been lumped together for purposes of convenience and designated as a citizenship.”33

Importantly, conventional core privileges of citizenship, such as the right to enter the country were not conceded to British Overseas citizens, as I will discuss later. While BOC is a status that was clearly designed in contrast to the fuller and more comprehensive membership forms of British citizen it still keeps an inclusive element of providing the concerned populations with a British label. The status dimension and the external dimension are the only two relevant dimensions for this concept. Thus, even though the rationale behind the adoption of such a status was rather the exclusion of persons living in the former British colonies, the idea of keeping an empire and to some extent retaining these overseas populations incorporated into the British Empire led to a status which was hardly more than an empty shell.

Interestingly, the Overseas Citizenship of India was based on legal formulations of the British Overseas Citizenship. The influential High-level Committee on the Indian Diaspora (2002:531) recommended that “a provision analogous to Section 12 of British Nationality Act, 1981 shall be included in the Citizenship Act. […] The provision which we recommend is patterned on the British Nationality Act, 1981”. Thus, the introduction of OCI, which aimed at somewhat including overseas Indians into the Indian state development project, draws on the legal provisions of Britain’s Overseas Citizenship, which aimed primarily at excluding certain British subjects. This might have several reasons. The first, more pragmatic, reason is that British Overseas Citizenship was a ‘tried and tested’ policy option and the idea of a ‘working British legal construct’ could have been instrumentalized by policy entrepreneurs to legitimize an unusual status. This could be connected to reservations of policy makers to adopt something completely new and instead adapt existing policy measures. At a more substantive level, the connection between the two statuses might however be stronger than it seems at first glance. Both were special statuses that conferred a name or a label without too many real benefits. Both aimed at distinguishing different (and hierarchical) classes of citizenship and played with the idea of full membership and membership-minus. In each case, the question arises: how many privileges and rights

31 Charles Fletcher-Cooke during the House of Commons debate on 28 January 1981, referring to a statement made earlier that day by J. Enoch Powell. 32 The right of the U.K. to exercise diplomatic protection is discussed below in the external citizenship dimension. 33 J. Enoch Powell during the House of Commons debate on 28 January 1981.

12

have to be granted alongside the pure label to be accepted as a marker of social and national identification? The question is: how much weight pulls a status alone, or to what extent does it need tangible privileges?

The privilege dimension

Privileges and claims34 are critical because without them it becomes fuzzy what membership in a state means. Thus, it is important to fill the status with tangible privileges and meaning. The privilege dimension is particularly important for atypical forms of citizenship—but not only. While there is a general idea what ‘ordinary full national citizenship’ is, this is less the case for these special statuses. Thus, to give meaning to the label special rights have to be associated with it. The importance of this dimension for full citizenship is evidenced by Carens (2000:171) who recalls that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is the thing most often cited when people are asked what it means to be Canadian. Legal scholar Schauer (1986:1515–6) argues that citizenship may bond a society into a community, provided some tangible benefits and entitlements are connected with it.35

This is the reason, why EU citizenship had to be filled with rights. Part two of the TFEU contains the provisions for “Non-Discrimination and Citizenship of the Union” and regulates the latter in Art. 20–24. These are in particular the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, the political rights discussed in the following section and the right of consular protection discussed in the external dimension. As discussed above, one major objective of the establishment of EU citizenship was to enhance the feeling of belonging and attachment. While the status of Union citizenship appeared essential to European policy makers, the status needed to be given content. Thus, the European Commission stresses that European citizenship can make European citizens’ sense of belonging to the European Union more tangible by conferring on them the rights associated with it.36 The U.K. Select Committee on European Legislation (1995) finds that the aim of rendering deeper and more tangible the European citizen’s feeling of belonging to the European Union “has not however always been translated into provisions which confer genuine rights, the rights of citizens being only occasional or incomplete so that in reality the concept of citizenship does not yet seem to match up to citizens' expectations. […] Should the citizens' rights already enshrined in the Treaties be developed and/or extended?” The expected effect of such conferment of rights is reflected in several policy statements. For instance, the Austrian delegation found that the specific rights associated with citizenship were “not substantive

34 According to Hohfeld’s (1919) distinction between several categories of rights, privileges, or liberties, are rights that do not correlate to the duty of another person or the state, while claims do correlate with a duty of another actor. Cohen (2009) discusses several categories of rights in her conceptualization on individuals’ levels of semi-citizenship. 35 This holds true in spite of the fact that scholars observe a devaluation of citizenship, that is, that citizenship status becomes less important for access to services and liberties, see Soysal (1994); Spiro (2008). 36 European Commission, Report on the operation of the TFEU, quoted in European Parliament, Intergovernmental Conference, Briefing Note No. 10 (20 February 1997) on European Citizenship.

13

enough and the concept as such has not been successfully implanted in the collective consciousness”37 and Greece suggested to increase the references in the Treaty to European citizenship.38

This exemplifies the felt need to fill the label of ‘Union citizenship’ with substance and meaning, that is, with rights. It warrants emphasis that one of the key rights associated with EU citizenship—the right of free movement—is of practical relevance only to the small fraction of citizens in the EU, for whom moving to another Member State is an attractive option. Thus, the European institutions are eager to portray the status as having additional rights and, for this reason, enumerate privileges, such as the right of equal access to the EU Civil Service and the Treaty’s prohibition of discrimination on the basis of nationality. From the 1991 Spanish memorandum that contained the first detailed proposal for EU citizenship to resolutions by the European Parliament and declarations by several countries, it was proposed to include the recognition of certain civil and basic rights into the catalogue of rights.

Overseas citizenship of India grants its holder certain privileges, such as the right to enter the country and work there. Although OCI is introduced in the Citizenship Act, the act does not enumerate the rights of overseas citizens. Apart from restrictions, such as limiting political rights, holding government positions and government employment, the benefits of OCI are exclusively given through government notifications. The major right is ‘parity with Non-resident Indian citizens.’ Non-resident Indians, or NRIs, are full Indian citizens who reside abroad. It shall be stressed that OCI provides parity with NRIs, but not with Indian citizens in general. Further, it is important to look at the legal sources of certain rights. This is not a formalistic, legal argument; it has real implications as well as important normative connotations. Granting equal treatment via a notification does not easily derogate statutory law in other fields. The actual legal position of overseas citizens is, thus, quite weak.39

Since the launch of Overseas Citizenship in 2006, the Indian government has announced some ‘additional benefits’ during its annual diaspora conference, the Pravasi Bharatiya Divas.40 In 2007, OCI card holders were given parity with Indian citizens abroad in the matter of inter-country adoption of Indian children, for domestic air fares and for admittance into national parks and wildlife sanctuaries. In 2009, the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs granted OCI card holders parity with NRIs for working as doctors, dentists, nurses, pharmacists, advocates, architects and chartered accountants. And the parity

37 Austria’s document ‘Fundamental positions of Austria for the Intergovernmental Conference’, quoted in European Parliament, Intergovernmental Conference, Briefing Note No. 10 (20 February 1997) on European Citizenship. 38 Greek document “Towards a People’s Europe – democracy and development, quoted in European Parliament, Intergovernmental Conference, Briefing Note No. 10 (20 February 1997) on European Citizenship. Maas (2013:19) enumerates additional benefits that were proposed in different points in time by several member states. 39 This weaker status is also shown when it comes to the forced termination of OCI as compared to full Indian citizenship. Whereas both statuses can be canceled through government order, only OCI can be revoked if this is necessary "in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of India, friendly relations of India with any foreign country, or the interests of the general public." Further, there are formal requirements and remedies in place for the deprivation of citizenship that do not exist for the cancellation of OCI registration. See Art. 7D of the Citizenship Act, 1955 for the cancellation of OCI registration and Art. 10 of the Citizenship Act, 1955 for the deprivation of citizenship. 40 Most of the small special privileges were suggested already by the High-level Committee on the Indian Diaspora (2002:368).

14

with NRIs was extended to entry fees for national monuments, historical sites and museums. Further in 2012, the privilege was added that Indian State governments should ensure that OCI registration booklets are treated as overseas citizens’ identification and included a facilitated rule for providing proof of residence. It is obvious that the principal aim of providing these privileges lies not in the privileges themselves. Instead the communication value of the fact that benefits are given and the attempt to fill the status of OCI with meaning appear to be the main driver.

From the start, the reform of British citizenship law in the late 1970s leading to the British Nationality Act 1981 did not want to change any privileges or rights for the affected, or re-labeled, individuals. This is particularly the case with regard to the right to reside in the U.K. One of the principal reasons for Britain’s citizenship reform was that the citizenship of the U.K. and Colonies (CUKC) “does not identify those who belong to this country and have the right to enter and live here freely; in consequence it prevents the United Kingdom from basing its immigration policies on citizenship” (U.K. Home Office 1977:4). Especially since “In most Western countries, citizens—and citizens only—automatically have that right.” (ibid. p.9). Thus, already the 1977 Green Paper made clear that BOC “would not carry with it the right of entry to the United Kingdom” (ibid. p.6). This way, the British state would bring “their status more closely into accord with present-day circumstances” (ibid. p.11).

The right of abode for all citizens is also enshrined in the Fourth Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights, which states that “No one shall be deprived of the right to enter the territory of the State of which is a national.” While the U.K. did not ratify said protocol this highlights the tension between atypical membership categories that are labeled citizenship and normative assessments.

Thus, the new categorization “would not affect anyone’s existing right of entry to the United Kingdom.”41 That means those who had no right of abode in the U.K. without prior immigration control would not obtain such a right. Citizens of the U.K. and Colonies who were labeled British overseas citizens did not have such a right of entry before the new legislation and would not receive this privilege after the new act came into force. Hence, the new categorization perpetuated the unique situation that somebody would be a nominal citizen of a country but not have the right to enter it.

In fact, the right of abode may be regarded as the first and foremost reason for not extending full citizenship to these persons. The U.K. Home Office (1980:5) points out that if this group “were to have British Citizenship the potential immigration commitment would be so large as to be quite unacceptable”. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office stated that “To grant British citizenship to this group would enable them to enter this country immediately and to settle here at any time and it would be possible for all of them to come here at once. This would not be acceptable, particularly at the present time, to the country at large, and I do not think it would be in the interests of

41 Secretary of State for the Home Department, Merlyn Rees, during the House of Commons debate on 27 April 1977.

15

those concerned at the present time.” 42 For this reason, opposition policy-makers called the BNA 1981 “not a nationality Bill at all, but an immigration control Bill.”43

Another privilege associated with BOC is diplomatic protection. For overseas citizens who would not have another citizenship, the government proclaimed that British Overseas citizens are entitled to diplomatic protection by the British government “in the same way as any other British national”, and would be eligible to hold a U.K. passport describing his or her citizenship (U.K. Home Office 1980:20-1). “British overseas citizenship will provide certain protection, and I do not think that it should be undervalued. There will be British consular protection for British overseas citizens”.44 It may be questionable whether the U.K. would indeed have the right to claim diplomatic protection, whereby a state is entitled to protect its subjects against acts contrary to international law committed by another state. In addition, it is not clear whether citizens have an actionable right to request such protection from their government. I will briefly come back to this issue when discussing the external dimension of BOC.

The British overseas citizenship is a status that appears to be as good as void of any real privileges, an empty shell. When asked “What will be the rights and duties—the content of citizenship—for the people in category [of BOC]” parliamentarians were told that “the Bill does not have anything to say-neither have previous Nationality Acts-about civic duties and rights.”45

Overall it was feared that by introducing British overseas citizenship, the U.K. would “be setting different standards of citizenship.”46 Thus it has been observed that the BNA 1981 “has not succeeded in bringing together status on the one hand and rights and duties on the other.”47 Parliamentarians remarked that it “seems to confer no right of abode and a passport that is almost meaningless”.48 This

42 Lord Belstead, then-Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office, during the House of Lords debate on 22 July 1981. In 2002, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs declared that in 1981, that Government was so obsessed with the potential threat of mass migration to the United Kingdom from Hong Kong on its being handed over to China that they were prepared to ride roughshod over the claims of 200,000 people living in the other dependent territories. See Ben Bradshaw, House of Commons debate on 22 November 2001. 43 Roy Hattersley during the House of Commons debate of 28 January 1981. The speaker explains this assessment by pointing out that “Anyone who reads the White Paper will see that, time after time, it talks about numbers, rates of entry and entitlement to settle here.” 44 Secretary of State for the Home Department, William Whitelaw, presenting the White Paper in the House of Commons on 30 July 1980. 45 Question by Enoch Powell and answer by Secretary of State for the Home Department, William Whitelaw, during the House of Commons debate of 28 January 1981. During the same debate David Steel criticised more broadly that the BNA did not set out rights of citizenship. He suggests, “If we were to attempt to do that, we would say that citizenship of the United Kingdom should automatically confer certain rights upon the bearer of that nationality. Those rights should include the right of abode in the United Kingdom and territories [...], the right to leave the country and to return freely, which implies, apart from exceptional cases, with the right of appeal, the right to a passport; the right to assistance abroad from embassies and consulates; the right to vote, to stand for public office and to sit on juries; the right to take employment, including employment in the public sector; and the right to be considered for such employment without discrimination on grounds of race, religion or sex.” 46 Sydney Bidwell during the House of Commons debate on 28 January 1981. 47 J. Enoch Powell during the House of Commons debate on 28 January 1981. 48 Arthur Davidson during the House of Commons debate on 30 July 1980.

16

lack of rights lead opposition parliamentarians to refer to BOC as “British overboard citizenship by which we cast adrift the embarrassing jetsam of the Empire [… or a] useless curio to remind them of the last days of the Raj [which] is really old statelessness writ large.”49 Summarizing the criticism, a British Member of Parliament states: “It confers on them the right to live nowhere except at the discretion and with the good will of the host Government in the country in which they happen to be at present. It is a citizenship that cannot be transmitted to children except at the discretion of the Home Secretary, and that could in some cases lead to the possibility of statelessness. But the final solution, if I may use that emotive expression, is reached on the death of the holder of British overseas citizenship, because, fortunately for the Government, it is non-transmissible, and dies with the demise of the holder.”50

In the introduction of this paper, I have referred to a question raised by transnationality research, such as how much territorial context and nation state need ‘citizenship policies’? In the case of BOC, clearly some people expressed their opinion that the link between BOCs and any territory is too weak to be the basis of any kind of citizenship.

“British overseas citizenship will be the only citizenship in the world that is not linked with any territory, nor carry with it a right of entry and abode in this country.”51

“British overseas citizenship as established by the Bill will not be a true nationality at all. It is not attached to any territory. It confers no rights on the holder, except the right to apply for a passport. […] even those who apply successfully will get passports that admit them to the land of nowhere.”52

An element that appears to be of relevance when designing citizenship policies it the idea of duties. All three atypical citizenship forms assessed here contain references to certain duties while this dimension seemed rather meaningless for all concepts.

The Treaty of the Functioning of the EU (and all treaty texts since Maastricht) make clear that citizens of the Union shall be subject to the duties imposed by the Treaty (Art. 20 (2) TFEU), without elaborating what duties these might be. In this regard, the British Government expressed its concern “that the creation of rights would eventually lead to pressure for reciprocal duties. The EC Treaty provides that citizens of the Union ‘shall be subject to the duties’ imposed by the Treaty, but these have not been developed and the Government believes it is right that they should not be. National citizenship can involve obligations of military service, and nation states impose duties of taxation. The EU,

49 John Tilley during the House of Commons debate on 28 January 1981. Other policy-makers complained that BOC “would have virtually no citizenship rights. [...] It is not so much a status as subterfuge. [...] it offers them virtually nothing.” Roy Hattersley during the House of Commons debate of 28 January 1981. 50 Michael Marshall during the House of Commons debate on 28 January 1981. 51 Elwyn Jones during the House of Lords debate on 22 June 1981. 52 Victor Mishcon during the House of Lords debate on 22 June 1981.

17

however, is not a state, and should take care not to develop ideas which feeds people’s fear that it has a vocation to become one.”53

A month later, in April 1996, representatives of Member States’ Foreign Ministers voted on several issues regarding changes in through the Amsterdam Treaty. Inter alia, they voted on the introduction of certain obligations, e.g., Euro humanitarian service. However, only Greece and France voted in favor, while Germany, Spain, and Sweden signalled an uncertain or negotiable position and all other representatives abstained.

Interestingly, the British Nationality Act 1981, section 42 and schedule 5 set out a similar oath of allegiance for British overseas citizens as it did for British citizens, British Overseas Territories Citizens, and British subjects. Following registration as British Overseas citizen individuals have to pledge that “on becoming a British Overseas citizen, I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second”.

In his citizenship review for the British Prime Minister, Goldsmith (2008:38) justifies this by declaring that the “reciprocal link between protection and allegiance is shown in the form of the oath and pledge taken by those who acquire British citizenship or one of the forms of British nationality. Goldsmith (2008:42) also refers to a certain liability for certain offences in the U.K. if committed abroad. This points to the applicability of criminal law for which the active and passive nationality principle is widely recognized.

In the first draft of the Citizenship (Amendment) Bill, 2003, overseas citizens were required to solemnly affirm or swear that they will “bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established, and that I will faithfully observe the laws of India and fulfill my duties as an overseas citizen of India.”54 Within the legislative proceedings, the oath was, however, eliminated because it was felt that it could conflict with primary duties of the “main” citizenship. Today, the OCI process is merely administrative and no different from receiving a visa. At no point in time were the duties attached to being overseas citizens discussed or concretized. This provision was deleted because it was held that “the allegiance to the Constitution cannot be divided and it would create problems with their primary citizenship” (Standing Committee on Home Affairs 2003, para. 7.6.2).

Political Dimension

Closa (1992:1139) states that political rights are the “defining and primordial element of citizenship” and he adds that “In domestic law, the term ‘citizen’ applies only to persons in possession of full political rights.” (Emphasis in the original) Also Faist, Gerdes and Rieple (2004:917) state that citizenship “essentially comprises three mutually qualifying dimensions: first and foremost, the notion 53 U.K. White Paper, “A partnership of Nations. The British Approach to the European Union IGC 1996”. March 1996. 54 See the Second Schedule to the Citizenship (Amendment) Bill, 2003, as introduced on 9 May 2003 to the Rajya Sabha, the Upper House of the Indian parliament, and published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary, Part II Section 2, from 9 May 2003. The oath is almost identical for persons naturalizing in India who have to swear that they will fulfill their “duties as a citizen of India.”

18

of collective self-determination and democracy; second, the legally guaranteed status of equal political freedom and other rights; and third, membership in a political community.”

The common association of citizenship and political powers is based on the tradition of Western political philosophy that is grounded in the experiences of the Greek city-states that have shaped much of democracy and citizenship theory. However, it is important to bear in mind that non-democratic states do not provide such powers to their citizens while the formal concept of citizenship as state membership remains unchallenged by the lack of democratic rights.55

At different points in time, in many countries female citizens did not have equal voting rights, and neither did descendants of African slaves in the United States, before the equality of all citizens became an acknowledged standard. In 2013, the Center for Systemic Peace’s POLITY index classified 20 countries as autocracies—in which citizens’ participation is sharply restricted or suppressed—53 as anocracies— characterized by institutions and political elites that are far less capable of performing fundamental tasks—and 94 countries as democracies (Marshall and Cole 2014:24).56 Classifying state members without political rights as subjects and only those with political powers as citizens57 may be a relevant terminological differentiation for political philosophy, but it seems less important from the perspective of citizenship as legal state membership and its discursive conceptualizations.58

The disassociation between citizenship and its political dimension is a remarkable feature of the British debate, not only for the residual category of BOC but also for full British citizenship. From the start of the discussion in 1977, the Labour and the Tory government made clear that there is no clear connection between voting rights—referred to as ‘civic rights’—and citizenship.

“What we want is citizenship, and, indeed, citizenship in the same way as it is in most other countries in the world where there are rights. However, civic privileges are a separate matter. Of course they are related […] Civic rights are not part of nationality law. It must be made absolutely clear that that is the case. […] it is not the case that nationality by itself, basically important as it is, is connected with civic rights. The State has the right to give civic rights to whom it likes.”59

55 As there is a tendency of citizenship studies to focus on concepts derived from a specifically European lineage (Nyers 2007:2) it is important to expand the discussions to practices that fall outside the typical conceptual frame. 56 In 2012, Freedom House (2014a) classified 122, or 63 percent, out of 195 of the world’s countries as ‘electoral democracies’ while the remaining 73 countries were not counted as such. “Electoral democracies” are countries that meet certain minimum standards for political rights, including with regard to the electoral process and overall political rights (Freedom House 2014b). 57 See Mindus (2014:738), referring to the Aristotelian distinction and its resurgence in the aftermath of the French revolution. 58 In addition, there are several additional and diverging meanings given to these terms. Spinoza ([1677] 1891:301) terms people citizens, as far as they enjoy advantages and subjects, as far as they are bound to obey the state’s ordinances or laws. On the other hand, the British Nationality Act of 1948 declared British subjects all citizens of Commonwealth Countries with independent citizenship regimes, who would latter be labeled Commonwealth citizens (Fransman 1998:186–7). 59 Secretary of State for the Home Department, Merlyn Rees, during the House of Commons debate on 27 April 1977.

19

The following government repeated this standpoint in the debate explicating that “The proposals for nationality do not impinge on voting rights. […] They do not impinge on voting rights because voting rights arise from the Representation of the People Act. […] I think that they are genuinely separate.”60 That is a truly remarkable feature, especially since the political component and ramifications of citizenship reforms are the most controversial as political parties (and other societal groups) fear a shift in power and new platforms for “new” values.61 This again underlines that the British Nationality Act 1981 was nothing but a labeling exercise with very limited real world implications.

Also Overseas citizenship of India does not entail any political rights. In fact, while the Indian Citizenship Act does not enumerate a single privilege of OCI, it explicitly bars OCIs from any active or passive political participation. Already the High-level Committee on the Indian diaspora (2002:528) felt that “it will not be practicable to grant any electoral rights or the right to hold any elective office in India to persons to whom dual citizenship is granted.”

Not giving OCIs political rights seemed to be a consequence of India’s reluctance to give its citizens overseas in general political power, as well as of the intended auxiliary nature of the status. When OCI was adopted and discussed, Indian citizens living abroad had no voting rights. This changed when in September 2010, the Indian parliament passed the Representation of the People (Amendment) Act, 2010, providing non-resident Indian citizens the right to register their names in the electoral roll and to vote in Indian elections provided that they come to India on the polling day. OCIs continue to be without voting rights and the Indian political system seems unlikely to provide such rights. This is also connected to the policy-makers idea that OCIs would live permanently abroad and would only occasionally come to India. In this case, democracy theory has emphasized that it may correspond to democratic ideals to exclude expatriate citizens from voting rights (Bauböck 2003; 2005b; Barry 2006; Spiro 2006; Carens 2013). In addition, all OCI’s must have another citizenship and it has been discussed whether double voting rights would be problematic from a democratic point of view.62

There are several political rights that are associated with EU citizenship. Most importantly, Union citizens have the right to vote and to stand as candidates in elections to the European Parliament and in municipal elections in their Member State of residence. Further, they have the right to petition the European Parliament, to apply to the European Ombudsman, and to address the institutions and advisory bodies of the Union in any of the Treaty languages and to obtain a reply in the same language. Further in 2007, the Lisbon Treaty introduced a new form of public participation for European citizens, the Citizens’ Initiative, which allows one million citizens who are nationals of a significant number of

60 the Secretary of State for the Home Department, William Whitelaw, during the House of Commons debate of 30 July 1980. Comments by single parliamentarian that “Does not the right to vote stem in part from one's position as a British citizen? If we are not to discuss the matter on this White Paper, will my right hon. Friend indicate when we might discuss the two serious anomalies, first, of British subjects resident abroad who are disfranchised and, secondly, of foreigners in this country who register as voters and vote?” did not resonate in a discussion on the subject. 61 For a discussion of these fears and the objections to dual citizenship and naturalization based on it, see Naujoks (2009). 62 As I have argued elsewhere, the objections brought to forth to double voting rights are generally unjustified (see Naujoks 2008; 2009).

20

EU countries to call directly on the European Commission to bring forward an initiative of interest to them within the framework of its powers.

The external dimension

In the classic conception of citizenship (or nationality) and under public international law, the state is responsible for its citizens, it has to accept them into their territory and can claim diplomatic protection if their rights are violated and make claims on their behalf. Nationals travel on the basis of a travel-document that is tied to their nationality, i.e., a passport, and the country’s standing and agreements with other countries chiefly determines the ease or difficulty of entering other countries with that passport. When in distress, nationals residing abroad have regularly the right to seek help from the consular representation.63 Faist, Gerdes and Rieple (2004:917) ascribe to nationality an interstate and an intrastate function. The former is seen in defining “a people within a relatively clearly delineated territory, to protect the citizens of a state against the outside, at times hostile, world.”

This interstate function is almost completely absent from OCI, since it does not delineate OCI card holders as Indian citizens to third countries and it is not geared toward their protection abroad. With the OCI certificate, they cannot travel to other countries, and even to enter India, they need their primary passport with the U-visa that is connected to the OCI status. OCI was the attempt to create a status that included diasporic Indians into the Indian state without creating confusion about their status toward their country of residence. Former Indian Prime Minister I.K. Gujaral confirms the policy that is known as ‘Nehru doctrine,’ that “We never encourage our people abroad to have dual loyalty. The loyalty must remain with the country of adoption. [...] The idea that we encouraged basically was, that wherever an Indian is living, then he must be looked at as one of them. And we have never encouraged a duality of loyalty, because dual loyalties create problems for them.”64

Closa (1992:1164) reports that in the first drafts of the Maastricht Treaty, citizens of the Union were entitled to the protection of all Member States in any third country. In the final text, however, this privilege would be subject to the principle of subsidiary representation, that is, if the country of nationality does not have a representation in the country in which the person requires assistance. This right is now enshrined in Art. 23 TFEU.65

Introducing the British Government’s Green Paper on the citizenship reform in 1977, the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Merlyn Rees, underscored that CUKC as a nationality concept has not been accepted in Europe because “it is not citizenship in the sense of the term accepted elsewhere. It is most important that we get it right, because the final concept should mean that a British citizen, once

63 Under public international law, the right to claim diplomatic protection is a right of the state, whose national is in distress. However, under domestic law, the individual can have a claim vis-à-vis her government. 64 Interview with former Prime Minister IK Gujaral and the author on 5 June 2008. For the Nehru doctrine, see Dubey 2003. 65 The European Parliament states that the concept or status of citizen implies that vis-à-vis third countries, citizens must be accorded full protection by the community as a whole. See, European Parliament resolution on Union citizenship, 14 June 1991, A3-0139/91,

21

given that classification, should have the right to free movement in Europe because we have defined it by statute.”66 While this statement refers to British Citizenship and not to British Overseas Citizenship, it is clear that the recognition of the status by third countries is of seminal importance. This is particularly the case in the European Economic Community, as the precursor to the European Union was called then, and the privileges that were attached to citizenship status in a Member State.

But also British Overseas Citizenship has importance in the external dimension. Indeed, one could argue that BOC is hardly anything but an external label with close to no internal content. As alluded to earlier, it may be doubted that the U.K. could actually exercise the proclaimed diplomatic protection on behalf of its overseas citizens. The International Court of Justice decided that, in order for a state to exercise diplomatic protection, in addition to the formal citizenship status, there must be a genuine connection with that state.67 While it could be questionable whether BOC is ‘citizenship’ under the terms of public international law; BOCs ‘genuine connection’ with the U.K. could be ever more doubtful. Anyways, at the most, the U.K. would have such a right for those, who do not have another citizenship.68

During the parliamentary debate several Members of Parliament referred to the eventual duty of the U.K. to accept British overseas citizens if they were deported from their countries of residence. One policy-maker followed this obligation as a corollary to the expressed right of the U.K. to offer protection to those individuals. It was argued that “All those people with the word ‘British’ in front of their category—whether they are British citizens, British overseas citizens, British subjects or citizens of the British dependent territories—are presumably entitled to the protection of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom [...] Therefore, since we presumably deserve, vis-à-vis third countries, the obligation and the right to intervene on behalf of such persons, we presumably have to accept the corollary, which is that we have to receive them, if they are deported to this country.” However the policy-maker points out that “According to the Court of Appeal case of Thakrah, we do not accept such persons if they have not a right of entry into this country, even though we have the duty and the right to intervene on their behalf with foreign Governments. Therefore, unless the various categories with the word "British" in front of them are rationalized-now that we are involved in a modernisation of our nationality law—the Government are in some danger of getting into an anomalous position vis-à-vis third States.”69

In spite of the limitations of British overseas citizenship, a recent British court case revealed that an India-born women had lost her Indian citizenship because holding BOC, she was considered ‘holding 66 House of Commons debate on 27 April 1977. 67 International Court of Justice, Nottebohm Decision (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) in: ICJ Report 23 (1955), p. 23. In court further finds that “it may be said to constitute the juridical expression of the fact that the individual upon whom it is conferred […] is in fact more closely connected with the population of the State conferring nationality than with that of any other State.” 68 According to international treaties concluded since 1930, and according to the rulings of international tribunals, diplomatic protection cannot be exercised by one State against another of which the person concerned is also a national (see Martin 2003:15). On the other hand, there is also a view that the country of effective citizenship should be entitled to exercise diplomatic protection against all other states, cf. Hailbronner (2003:22) for further references. 69 Charles Fletcher-Cooke in the House of Commons debate on 28 January 1981.

22

another citizenship’ under the terms of Indian citizenship law.70 Thus, any nominal status called ‘citizenship’ may have importance vis-à-vis other countries.

Boundary dimension

A key element of any citizenship policy is to determine who will obtain such a status. This refers to the question of the rules for citizenship acquisition, as well as the loss of the status. In this regard, one can differentiate between transitional and permanent rules. The latter seek to regulate on a permanent basis, who acquires citizenship status, how and who does not. The former determine the eligible persons and the modes of acquisition at the time of the introduction of the citizenship status and for a transitional period.

For full citizenship in a nation state, case-to-case acquisition is the exception. The vast majority of citizenship acquisitions happen ex lege and automatically either by being born in the country (so called ius soli) or by descent (so called ius sanguinis). Cases of individual acquisition through naturalization or registration are much rarer. For example, in the U.S., only 18 out of 289 million citizens, or six per cent, are naturalized citizens, while the remaining 94 per cent are native-born citizens.71

Drawing the boundaries of membership statuses is connected to normative questions of exclusion and inclusion and to what degree polities can decide what groups will benefit from the newly created status and what populations may not. When polities design special statuses and draw the lines of citizenship regimes, these exercises hardly ever take place in a void. In principle, they are—and rightfully so—connected to concrete perceptions of populations. Thus, in order to understand the discussions and policy-making processes one has to know, who the people were that the respective policy change targeted.

On 1 January 1983, all former CUKCs, who did not fall under the other two categories, acquired automatically overseas citizenship (section 26 BNA 1981).72 Thus, British overseas citizenship is a status that was conferred upon individuals automatically by law. The law had to be clear about who those persons were. As a special status, it did not provide the possibility to ‘opt in’. In addition, status holders were generally barred from transmitting the status to the next generation. However, the law allowed minors to register, on a continuous basis, for BOC at the discretion of the Secretary of State (section 27 (1) BNA 1981). In addition, certain persons would automatically become BOCs if they otherwise would become stateless (schedule 2 BNA 1981). Limiting the passing on of BOC to the next generation, the 1980 White Paper argues, “it would be contrary to the general principles to be embodied in the new Act to include a general provision for people with these distant connections to pass on citizenship further” (U.K. Home Office 1980:20). Thus, the Secretary of State for the Home 70 High Court of Justice, The Queen on the Application of Vagh vs. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 3 May 2012. 71 2010-2012 American Community Survey data. 72 Further, on 1 July 1997, British Dependent Territories Citizens of Hong Kong who would otherwise have become stateless also acquired automatically BOC (vide Art. 6 (1) Hong Kong (British Nationality) Order, 1986, no. 948.

23

Department, William Whitelaw, underlined that children born after the Act comes into force to parents who have become British overseas citizens will not themselves hold that citizenship.73

The British Overseas Citizenship would serve as a residual category of all former CUKCs, who would be neither eligible for full British Citizenship or for citizenship of the British Dependent Territories. The British government had in particular persons in mind, who were connected to a former dependency (U.K. Home Office 1980:5). Most of these were of Indian origin and lived in Malaysia, Kenya and India. The British government estimated their numbers 1.5 million, admitting though that no reliable system existed for a count. It was estimated that about 200,000 of such individuals had no other citizenship.74

With regard to Overseas Citizenship of India, India’s political history has caused technical difficulties in drawing the legal contours of who should be eligible for such a membership. People had left colonial India in the 19th and 20th century for all continents. Upon independence in 1947, British India was divided into Hindu-majority India and Muslim-majority Pakistan while, in 1971, East Pakistan split from the western part of the country to form modern-day Bangladesh. The partition of India and Pakistan in 1947 led to an enormous migration of people, estimated at between 12 and 18 million (Hill et al. 2004). About half of the migrants (mainly Muslims) moved from India to Pakistan and half (mainly Hindus and Sikhs) moved in the opposite direction. Hence, the population of Pakistan and Bangladesh is “of Indian descent” when the concept is looked at from the perspective of the undivided, pre-1947 India. The uneasy fit of the sizeable pre-independence diaspora into membership schemes in the Republic of India is thus reflected in the definitions of eligible persons.75

In the beginning, the OCI scheme was supposed to be restricted to a few countries only. The original Bill as introduced into the Parliament in 2003 contained a list of eight countries to whose citizens of Indian origin OCI could be granted.76 The Parliament’s Standing Committee on Home Affairs included eight more countries.77

This was based on five reasons. First, it was argued that the demand for ‘dual citizenship’ was restricted to these countries; for the time being, diaspora communities in other parts of the world were not interested.78 Second, national laws in several other countries, for instance South Africa, La Reunion and

73 House of Commons debate of 30 July 1980. The opposition criticized this by referring to “the final solution, if I may use that emotive expression, is reached on the death of the holder of British overseas citizenship, because, fortunately for the Government, it is non-transmissible, and dies with the demise of the holder.” (Michael Marshall, during the deliberation of the British Nationality Bill in the House of Commons on 28 January 1981). 74 Victor Mishcon during the House of Lords debate on 22 June 1981. Mishcon explains further that “those in India are, almost all of them, persons originating from East Africa who went under pressure to India after they had lost their right of entry to the United Kingdom and to whom the British Government are committed to admit to this country at some time.” See also See Fransman (1998:276). 75 For an in-depth discussion of the eligibility criteria for OCI, see Naujoks (2013:57-62). 76 Those were Australia, Canada, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, the U.K. and the U.S. 77 Namely, Switzerland, Greece, Israel, Sweden, France, Cyprus, Portugal and New Zealand. 78 The High-level Committee on the Indian Diaspora (2002:509) states, “Most PIOs, except those in North America, Europe, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore have not evinced any particular interest in dual citizenship. Those PIOs would be more interested in PIO Cards.” The limited demand in certain ‘highly developed

24

Guadeloupe, would not allow for such a status.79 The third reason for this limitation lies in the general security concerns held by India’s security agencies, including the Ministry of Home Affairs. Home Minister L.K. Advani reportedly stated that the selection of countries was driven by “our thinking about our national security” and done “in a way that will not jeopardize our national security.”80 A forth factor can be seen in the attempt to provide specific incentives for diaspora actors in affluent countries, whose role for India’s economic development was assessed particularly significant.

There is an additional reason why a list of selected countries was initially chosen in India. Already Section 12 of the pre-2003 version of the Citizenship Act, 1955 contained a provision, according to which the government could confer “all or any of the rights of a citizen of India on the citizens of any other countries”, which would then be specified in a special schedule in the appendix of the act. The idea of special treatment of selected countries was therefore already built into the architecture of the citizenship regime and its modification seemed easier (and easier to sell to potential opponents of such a change) than a sweeping ‘to all countries’ change. However, the discussion at the Standing Committee on Home Affairs shows that these countries were the beginning of a more comprehensive list.81 Expressly excluded from registering as OCIs are citizens of Pakistan, Bangladesh and other countries notified by the Indian government; so far, however, no additional countries have been added to the negative list.82

EU citizenship follows automatically from official citizenship status in one of the EU Member States. It cannot be acquired directly and it is not open to anybody who is not a national of one of the Member States. Meehan (2000) refers to criticism that the evolution of European citizenship replicates in a larger arena, the physical and social exclusion of people without the right nationality. Also Hansen (1998) states that the greatest inadequacy of European citizenship is its failure to address the situation of the millions of third country nationals permanently residing in the EU, referring to the disappointment accompanying the Maastricht Treaty’s citizenship provision.83 Here, I leave aside the important

countries’ is stressed several times in the report. See Naujoks (forthcoming) for an analysis of the policy-making process and the different factors. 79 These explanations are also part of the 107th Report on The Citizenship (Amendment) Bill, 2003, para 5.1 f. 80 Home Minister L.K. Advani, as quoted in The Hindu on January 11 and February 4, 2003, archived at www.webcitation.org/6N0AOCDa5 and www.webcitation.org/6N0ARVL5E, respectively. 81 For the PIO Card, a negative list of countries excludes anyone who was at any time a citizen of Afghanistan, Bhutan, China, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, or a citizen of Bangladesh and other countries as may be specified by Government of India; see Section 2, clause (b) of notification No. 26011/4/98-F.I dated August 19, 2002 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs. 82 Based on Section 25A of the Citizenship Rules, 1956, official information disseminated by the Home Ministry and Indian consulates abroad, states that eligibility is restricted to citizens of countries that “permit dual citizenship in some form or another.” This limitation is, however, not based on the text of the Citizenship Act. 83 Discussing European Citizenship, several actors also raise the question of rights and obligations of residence other than citizens, see European Parliament resolution on Union citizenship, 14 June 1991, A3-0139/91. The Spanish proposal for European Citizenship from 21 February 1991, planned to give the European Council the right “to fix the detailed arrangements for applying this Title to persons who are not citizens of the Union.” In the years preceding the adoption of European citizenship, there were several attempts to detach political rights from nationality. The European Parliament’s Legal Affairs Committee argued that the “right to vote and to stand for election should depend on a given period of residence in a country rather than on nationality”. Report on a Draft

25

normative question to what extent these third country nationals should be incorporated. From the reading of the genesis of Union citizenship it appears however, that their exclusion was not an objective of the project. The main challenge to governments was to create a status that would resemble national citizenship and that would bring ‘the EU closer to its citizens’. The conventional, contemporary idea that ‘citizenship’ is not based on residency but on a stronger status and link may have caused exclusion but it was regarded rather a ‘normal’ corollary of conceptualizing citizenship along the lines of national state membership. This policy nonetheless raises the question how much exclusion needs citizenship as a policy of integration and to what extent can this be a rhetorical exclusion and to what extent has it to be a substantial one?

Interestingly, none of the three special statuses reviewed here includes a provision for conferring the status to the next generation by descent. The off-spring of Indian or British Overseas Citizens or of EU citizens do not derive such statuses directly from their parents. Instead, they are eligible or automatically obtain their status because of their own connection with the country (both overseas citizenships) or as a consequence of their national membership in a EU Member State. While this connection is related to the status of their ancestors the connecting family member is not intended to have (had) OCI or BOC himself or herself.

Communication Dimension

What citizenship means is largely constructed in social discourse. And this discourse is shaped by official communication about citizenship and the symbolic value attributed to it. For this reason, it is important to assess the usage and attributed meaning in the official language used on government websites, in reports, brochures, and speeches. The communication dimension is in many ways related to the (hoped-for) psychological effects of citizenship. Several scholars have explained the means used by states, governments and political leaders to use symbols, ideologies and stories of peoplehood (Smith 2003) to constitute political identities and attachments.84 The right communication strategy—it is hoped—will help to foster a common ‘national identity’, a sense of belonging and attachment. Governments’ starting point is the conventional understanding of citizenship. In fact, they use the term ‘citizenship’ because they want to allude to and play with the conventional understanding that ‘the man or woman on the street’ has. In this dimension, state actors use the citizenship label and the associated rights for political rhetoric and employ rituals, such as ceremonies and oaths, to shape the targeted populations.

The government of India’s communication strategy shows interesting variations over time and is characterized by a high ‘PR factor’ of OCI. As argued in Naujoks (2010), since the 1980s, India’s diaspora relations have witnessed a major policy paradigm shift, which I have dubbed as ‘from the invisible diaspora to the diaspora empire’ and ‘from the traitor tune to a pride paradigm’. However, can

uniform electoral procedure for the election of Members of the European Parliament, PE Doc A 2-1/85 22.3.85, as quoted in Closa (1992:1146). 84 For an overview, see Gordon (2007:368–9).

26

a diaspora-friendly rhetoric work without conferring rights? Or to what extent does the home country have to grant rights and privileges in order to appear as a credible, committed partner in the joint diaspora-homeland venture? As is well-established, actions speak louder than words. Thus, there was the need to manifest the declared paradigm shift with concrete policy outcomes. This is also confirmed by Barry (2006:59) who finds that a metaphoric or rhetorical strengthening of membership is not sufficient in all cases to respond to emigrant claims for more institutionalized inclusion into the national polity.

OCI is framed as a message that India listens to the diaspora’s demands, acknowledges their contributions and recognizes their dual status. With regard to full dual citizenship, India seems to have found a feasible way to counter the existing claims by referring to the fact that this is not allowed by the Indian Constitution. This argument is generally accepted, despite the fact that it is legally not convincing85 and considering that the constitution could be amended, as it has been done in several other countries.86 In addition to constitutional inadmissibility, reasons of national security given by the political system as further objections to full dual citizenship are also widely accepted.87 The acceptance of these reasons is easier because the general communication strategy from the political system has overcome the traitor tune and is now a matter of pride.

European institutions use the concept of citizenship in their direct communication and attempt to rally people around a common label. For instance, the European Commission regularly drafts reports on EU citizenship and the year 2013 has been declared the European Year of Citizens with opportunities to learn about the rights and opportunities open to them thanks to EU citizenship.88

An important communication feature of citizenship policies lies in the status function described above. State entities find it easier to refer to a general status and exemplify its meaning by referring to specific rights than advertise the rights themselves. In fact, in 1993, the European Commission stated that the right of residence for community nationals is governed by ten Council directives and regulations adopted between 1968 and 1990 and by a 1970 Commission regulation. Thus, it appeared more feasible to communicate about one status that encompasses several rights than referring to a host of rules and regulations. This was also the case with OCI and the regulations for investment and economic activities. While other regulations and norms often provide the real privileges, OCI and EU citizenship are convenient ‘flat rate policy vehicles’ to communicate these benefits.

Table 1 provides an overview of the different citizenship dimensions for the three atypical membership statuses examined here. While the main thrust of these dimensions lies not in a binary ‘yes/no’ distinction, the above explorations show that BOC and OCI omit several elements that are normally associated with state citizenship regimes. However, regardless of the final status, the above analysis revealed the importance to discuss the six dimensions for all forms of membership. Thus, an objective

85 See High-level Committee on the Indian Diaspora (2002: Chapter 36); Master (1970); Naujoks (2013:299). 86 As did Colombia in 1991, Costa Rica in 1995, Brazil and Mexico in 1996, see Jones-Correa (2001). 87 For an analysis of security related arguments and narratives in the policy-making process of OCI, see Naujoks (forthcoming). 88 See, EU online presentation, archived at www.webcitation.org/69eBePOr6.

27

comparison of the three statuses reveals the differences in their conceptualization while the in-depth analysis of the policy-making and implementation processes shows the rationales, motivations, and expectations that have to be incorporated in a more comprehensive theory of formal state membership.

Table 1: Citizenship Dimensions for Atypical Membership Policies

Dimension EU Citizenship British Overseas Citizenship (BOC)

Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI)

Label ! ! ! Privilege ! ! Political ! External ! !

Boundary

Inclusion Formal citizens of EU member states

CUKCs, who were not eligible for full British Citizenship or citizenship of the British Dependent Territories (mostly persons of Indian origin, who migrated at the time of the British Empire to Malaysia and Kenya).

Overseas Indians, especially those in OECD countries

Exclusion As corollary: Third-country nationals residing in EU

The category of BOC in itself can be considered an exclusion from fuller forms of citizenship.

Citizens of Pakistan and Bangladesh. Informally also Indian diaspora communities whose ties are more distant.

Communication ! !

The seed and shell function of citizenship

Is the label-dimension of citizenship only a psychological trick to manipulate the sense of belonging of citizens, to increase governability, and ease the exercise of power? It can be argued that the label and status function is indeed relevant for several perspectives.

First, it increases people’s activities to mobilize around certain institutions and labels such as citizenship. This is an empirical, not a normative statement. Second, it creates scope for changes and additional rights that may be added later by political institutions. Third, and most importantly, the idea that citizenship is more than the sum of its individual rights leads courts and other institutions to the creation of new rights and to the expansion of others. Thus, the idea of membership and full membership that is inherent in the common understanding of the term ‘citizenship’ can lead to developments that were not planned by the policy-makers in the beginning. How much control parliaments and governments keep over the status depends on the social and legal context and the strength of institutions.

With regard to the European Citizenship, already the Spanish proposal from 21 February 1991 emphasizes that the “concept and content of citizenship are conceived of as having an evolving dimension”. Thus, the Spanish proposal included an article that would give the European Council the right “to add rights and obligations over and above those laid down in the Treaty”. As one can see, this

28

provision is similar to the granting of such a right to the Indian government for OCI. The proposal also spelled out that the Union should take into account the development of the rights and obligations of citizens. While these provisions never got incorporated in the treaty, the dynamic nature of the concept has been stressed by many actors.

Closa (1992:1168) concludes his review of the new citizenship that “above all” it has provided a solid basis for further enlargements of the rights attached to citizenship. Delanty (2007) calls it a “putative European citizenship” and O’Keefe assessed that its importance lies not in its content but rather in the promise it holds out for the future (O’Keeffe 1994 as quoted in Chryssochoou 2000:227). The existence of the label combined with the idea of full membership and their rights-connection led to the fact that every revision of the EU Treaty attempts to add new privileges.

As alluded to above, other institutions, in particular the European Court of Justice and the Commission have enlarged the meaning and importance of the concept. As legal scholars find, having a separate chapter and provisions indicates that citizenship has not only declaratory character (Closa 1994; Yakut 2010). In fact, the European Court of Justice played a critical role in developing rights associated with European citizenship (Wiener 2011). Yakut (2010) shows that the court has moved from a market interpretation of understanding citizenship as an economic citizenship to a more substantive, political citizenship concept. In the Grzelczyk decision, it observed that Union citizenship is “destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States” and conceded social citizenship rights in the form of social aid to a French citizen living in Belgium.89

The Immigration Law Practioners’ Association (ILPA 2001) claims that “No one should be without the right of abode in the country of their nationality. Every British national should have a right of abode in the U.K.” Consequently, the ILPA urges the British government to “[u]pgrade all living British passport holders to British Citizens with right of abode in the U.K., by registration by entitlement”. Indeed, two important changes occurred in the U.K. First, the British Overseas Territories Act 2002 changed the title of British Dependent Territories citizens to that of British Overseas Territories citizenship, and it also granted to such citizens the right of abode in the United Kingdom. Second, the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 allowed British Overseas Citizens, British Subjects and British Protected Persons who have no other nationality to register as British citizens and hence acquire the right to enter and live in the U.K.

If BOCs had not been granted their nominal status, which—as discussed above—gave them virtually no rights or privileges, then they would not have benefitted from the change of law in 2002, which make it easier for some of them to become British citizens. Thus, an inherent feature of such statuses is what one may want to call the ‘seed function’ of citizenship. Even though the rights may be extremely limited at a certain point in time, the fact that such a status exists carries the potential for more rights and a continuous development. This may be connected to the name that such a status provides (and thus makes it easier to think about this category of persons), as well as inherent normative ideas of what citizenship means. In his review of citizenship at the request by the British Prime Minister, Goldsmith

89 See, ECJ, Case C-184/99, [2001] ECR I-6193, para. 31 – Grzelczyk.

29

(2008) suggests that the residual categories of citizenship—with the exception of British Overseas Territories Citizenship and British Nationals (Overseas) status—should be abolished and to provide the concerned individuals access to full British citizenship.90

Thus, a status may be regarded an empty shell. But it is easier to fill an empty shell than to create a new one. Thus, the mere fact that a status exists and that our conventional understanding attempts to associate statuses with tangible rights and benefits, leads to a tendency to expand such statuses and to give meaning to them.

Concluding remarks

It could be argued that atypical membership policies that are labeled as ‘citizenship’ are designed to (fraudulently) use the commonly accepted meaning of citizenship, while in reality they cannot be classified as citizenship polices, as they lack fundamental attributes. The increasing number of atypical citizenship concepts raises the question whether these are ‘free riders’ that are designed to benefit from the common notion of citizenship while being permanent exceptions, or whether they are trailblazers that show the way toward a more differentiated and diverse notion of citizenship itself.

To understand a concept, the margins and border areas are always the most promising field of inquiry. Borderline cases represent contestations of the accepted principles and through the contestations, the reactions to these challenges and its consequences we can understand the fluid space of meaning-making. Looking at atypical forms of citizenship helps us to better understand the several dimensions of citizenship and the contours of what citizenship means and implies.

An aspect of citizenship that is hardly ever discussed—because, generally, it is obvious—is that the label ‘citizenship’ implies membership in a state. While state citizenship has been compared to club-membership (Straubhaar 2003) club-membership has not been called citizenship. This is one reason why European Union citizenship is a special case. It is debated what the legal status of the EU, and earlier, of the European Community or Communities is (Maas 2007; 2013). Undoubtedly, it is not a state, which led Soysal (1994:148) to the assessment that EU citizenship “clearly embodies postnational membership in its most elaborate form”. Thus, the British Government underlines that the EU is not a state and that it should not create fear among the citizens that it aspires to becoming one.91 For example, Denmark insisted on declaring unilaterally that, “Citizenship of the Union is a political and legal concept which is entirely different from the concept of citizenship within the meaning of the […] Danish legal system.”92 The discussion here questions, however, whether it is indeed “entirely different.”

90 Goldsmith (2008:6) explains, “Though this change will only affect relatively small numbers of people, it is important to address the history involved in the residual categories as part of renewing our common bond of citizenship”. 91 U.K. White Paper, “A partnership of Nations. The British Approach to the European Union IGC 1996”. March 1996. 92 Denmark’s unilateral declaration during the European Council meeting in Edinburgh on 11–12 December 1992. Interestingly, Laursen (1994:79) reports 1992 poll data from Denmark, which in the end decided against the

30

Some observers are interested in judging whether these concepts are indeed forms of ‘citizenship.’ This, of course, involves a firm idea of what citizenship is. Since OCI is confined to market exchange and “divorced from the ‘political’ and ‘social’ limbs of the trio of citizenship rights”, Sahni (2009:5) classifies the status as economic citizenship, while Xavier (2011:44–6) refers to the concept sui generis. The government’s High-level Committee on the Indian Diaspora (2002:363) expressed that the PIO card in a sense “provides for ‘dual nationality’ to an extent without dual citizenship. [...] Whereas an Indian citizen’s passport is a document of citizenship, a PIO card is a passport of nationality or national origin.” This expresses a similar conception of citizenship and nationality as adopted by several Latin-American countries in which nationality is a general status of belonging whereas citizenship is connected to rights and obligations.93 As quoted above, when British overseas citizenship was introduced it was feared that the U.K. would “be setting different standards of citizenship.”94 Thus, the classic text on British nationality law states that “It would be more apt to call [BOC] a status […] than a citizenship” (Fransman 1998:279).

The High-level committee on the Indian diaspora (2002:522) found that “the conditions on which nationality operates and the rights and responsibilities of dual citizenship are determined and worked out by each state.” Reviewing these atypical forms of citizenship, it is interesting to note the tension between accepted concepts of what citizenship means, on the one hand, and the need to tailor membership policies to specific needs, on the other. This reminds us that too often we might have a too firm and fixed concept of what citizenship and membership in a country mean and that there are atypical citizenship forms that still may capture some of the traditional elements while abandoning others.

Thus, what is citizenship? Is it the sum of the rights and duties, and what is the minimum threshold to consider a status ‘citizenship’? The reason why questions related to citizenship often appear either too easy to answer from a rational point of view or to slippery and amorphous from a more substantial angle, is that the status of citizenship refers to the concept of membership in a community. Although there are clearly defined rights and duties associated with this membership the question is whether these are exhaustive, and what this membership may mean at a less tangible level.

As a starting point, the meaning of citizenship is constructed by social discourse. The reason why many think that being a citizen is more than having the right to vote and the duty to defend the country (to

citizenship of the Union. While 19 per cent of Danes were in favor of creating a United States of Europe, only 13 per cent favored a common citizenship. Laursen explains that some feared that they would lose their Danish citizenship. Also the Reflection Group, established by the European Commission, reiterates that “citizenship of the Union is perceived as a threat to national identity in some Member States and [some members] do not think it appropriate to develop either the substance of the concept or the concept itself.” (quoted in European Parliament, Intergovernmental Conference, Briefing Note No. 10 (20 February 1997) on European Citizenship) In order to ease these fears, the Amsterdam Treaty clarified that EU citizenship “shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship.” 93 This is the case for countries such as Argentina, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela. Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004:1019) recall the distinction made by states between citizenship delineating the character of members’ rights and duties within the national polity and nationality as legally delineating a category of belonging without granting full citizenship rights. 94 Sydney Bidwell during the House of Commons debate on 28 January 1981.

31

name the arguably best-known rights and duties) is that we have constructed a certain idea about community and citizenry. Having or getting a passport as a token of membership is thus viewed as meaningful. When we ask for the meaning of OCI, it is not enough to look at the privileges granted with it. We must also look at the social meaning that is attributed to it. This meaning is constructed through the official language used by government institutions, practices and assessments by diasporic actors and the mainstream discourse in India, especially in the Indian press. However, as long as some official status issued by the state contains the word ‘citizenship’ in its name, the discourse has a tendency to reflect this name and construct a citizenship meaning around the concept. For this reason, nomenclature matters.

In a qualitative study I conducted with diasporic Indians in the U.S. and U.S.-returned migrants in India, most participants recognize at a rational level that OCI is less than full dual citizenship. Nonetheless, when not asked “what is OCI?”, they refer to it as dual citizenship and it generally fulfils the function of dual citizenship, although not always and not for everybody (Naujoks 2013:215-23).

I do not want to judge whether any of the special statuses examined here in fact constitutes a form of ‘citizenship’. I believe this needs to be answered with regard to specific questions and with a concrete purpose in mind. However, the question leads us to asking what the minimal preconditions and qualifying element of citizenship are and why.

Is equality of all citizens a defining feature and is second-class citizenship thus not citizenship? Are voting rights an essential part of citizenship? I wish to highlight again that we are approaching this question from citizenship as a state label and not from the viewpoint of citizenship studies looking at enfranchisement within states and populations. While EU citizenship includes the right of equal access to the EU Civil Service and is related to the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of nationality, British and Indian overseas citizenship are characterized by an explicit inequality with full citizens. That is, they are designed as categories below the full resident citizen status. A senior official in the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs explained that in the discussions on expanding overseas citizens’ rights “the Home Ministry again said: no, you can’t give the same rights to a foreigner as you give to an Indian citizen.”95 For this reason, the Indian government provided only parity with non-resident Indian citizens and also only by the way of a government notification that cannot derogate statutory law.

U.K. policymakers found that the idea of equality suffered as the immigration “distinctions within a common citizenship have been hard to follow” (U.K. Home Office 1977:9). Indeed, the U.K. Home Office states that the CUKC does “no longer accurately define those who have the normal attributes of citizenship” (ibid. p. 10). Thus, the Government refers to a standard of citizenship and an established content of that concept. Conceptualizing the new scheme, the British government finds that it should “reflect the strength of the connection which various groups of people have with the United Kingdom in the world today” (ibid.).

In fact, while equality is a concept that for many is intrinsic to citizenship, democracy theory argues that external voting might pose problems to democratic institutions (Bauböck 2003; 2005b; Barry 2006;

95 Interview with the author in July 2008, name withheld for anonymity.

32

Spiro 2006; Carens 2013). Also Carens (2000:8) states that “we may sometimes come closer to equality by adopting practices of differentiated citizenship than by insisting on identical formal rights.” While Carens has the larger citizenship idea in mind and not the state-membership status, this might apply as well to this category.

As mentioned throughout the paper, my aim here is not to answer these questions but to enrich some of the discussions with policy observations from the three atypical membership statuses of British Overseas Citizenship, Overseas Citizenship of India and EU citizenship. If Ong (1996) had not coined the term ‘flexible citizenship’ for individual behavior that tries to balance and maximize different legal and social statuses in several countries, the state policies dealt with in this paper could be described as such. It is interesting to note that all three statuses discussed here are auxiliary in nature. Only BOC can be the only state-status that a person may have. But when BOC was introduced policy-makers were certain that only a few 200,000 individuals would be exclusively BOCs while millions more would have BOC in addition to their primary national citizenship. Both OCI and EU citizenship require formally another citizenship and cannot replace the main citizenship. In both cases, there was debate on the relationship to full membership or a fuller citizenship status but concerns against such a status were too strong. The concepts are formally conceived as multi-layered membership regimes.

While there is no major wave to reinvent state citizenship newer statuses continue to contest the homogenous notion of the concept. Regional forms of citizenship are in the planning under the auspices of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the Andean Community (CAN),96 and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) while Ecuador included the concept of ‘universal citizenship’ in its constitution (which includes that the country recognizes the free movement of all people on the planet).

The discussion around the three atypical membership statuses reveals that states operate in grey areas of membership statuses that partly acknowledge existing forms of state membership by mimicking it and partly pushes the boundary of what state membership means. Regardless whether we regard these phenomena as outliers and freeriders or whether we treat them as trailblazers that lead the way toward a more flexible regime of membership, this analysis reminds us to adopt a differentiated approach to assess the interlinkages between state and group membership, legal statuses and the varied inclusion of groups into polities.

References

Adler, Daniel, and Kim Rubenstein. 2000. International Citizenship: The Future of Nationality in a Globalised World. Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 2, Faculty of Law, University of Melbourne.

Barry, Kim. 2006. Home and Away: The Construction of Citizenship in an Emigration Context. Public

96 In his capacity as president of the Andean presidential council, Ecuador’s president Rafael Correa highlighted that “the big challenge for [the Andean community] is to establish Andean citizenship, by creating a space for exercising new rights, freedoms or additional guarantees to those recognized by the States” (author’s own translation from Spanish). See Press Release, 17 October 2008, archived at www.webcitation.org/6S1mab8Te.

33

Law and Legal Theory Working Paper 23. New York University School of Law. Basch, Linda, Nina Glick Schiller, and Cristina Szanton Blanc. 1994. Nations Unbound. Transnational

Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments and Deterritorialized Nation-States. Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach.

Bauböck, Rainer. 2003. Towards a Political Theory of Migrant Transnationalism. International Migration Review 37 (3), pp. 700–23.

——. 2005a. Citizenship Policies: International, State, Migrant and Democratic Perspectives. Global Migration Perspectives 19. Geneva: Global Commission on International Migration.

——. 2005b. Expansive Citizenship: Voting beyond Territory and Membership. PS: Political Science and Politics 38 (4), pp. 683–87.

Best, Edward. 1994. The Maastricht Treaty: What Does It Actually Say and Do? In: Finn Laursen and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The ratification of the Maastricht Treaty: issues, debates, and future implications. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 17–46.

Bosniak, Linda S. 2000. The State of Citizenship: Citizenship Denationalized. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 7 (2), pp. 447–510.

Carens, Joseph H. 2000. Culture, Citizenship, and Community. A Contextual Exploration of Justice as Evenhandedness. New York: Oxford University Press.

——. 2013. The Ethics of Immigration. New York: Oxford University Press. Chryssochoou, Dimitris. 2000. Democracy in the European Union. London/New York: I.B. Tauris Closa, Carlos. 1992. The Concept of Citizenship in the Treaty on European Union, Common Market

Law Review 29, pp. 1137–69. Cohen, Elizabeth F. 2009. Semi-Citizenship in Democratic Politics. New York and Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press. Delanty, Gerard. 2007. European Citizenship: A Critical Assessment. Citizenship Studies 11 (1), pp.

63–72. Dubey, Ajay. 2003. Indian Diaspora in the Caribbean and Africa: Identity Issues and Responses of

India. In Indian Diaspora. In: idem (ed.) Indian Diaspora. Global Identity, New Delhi: GOPIO International, Kalinga Publications, pp. 117–45.

Faist, Thomas, Jürgen Gerdes, and Beate Rieple. 2004. Dual Citizenship as a Path-Dependent Process. International Migration Review 38 (3), pp. 913–44.

Faist, Thomas. 2000. Transnationalization in International Migration: Implications for the Study of Citizenship and Culture. Ethnic and Racial Studies 23 (2), pp. 189–222.

Fitzgerald, David. 2006. Rethinking Emigrant Citizenship. New York University Law Review 81(1), pp. 90–116.

——. 2008. Citizenship à la Carte. Working Paper 3, Center for Global Studies, Fairfax, VA: George Mason University.

Fransman, Laurie. 1998. British Nationality Law. London et al.: Butterworths. Freedom House. 2014a. Freedom in the World 2014 Methodology, Washington D.C., archived at

www.webcitation.org/6S7eeibsy. ——. 2014b. Freedom in the World 2014, Washington D.C., archived at

www.webcitation.org/6S7fkW8As. Gamlen, Alan. 2006. Diaspora Engagement Policies: What are they, and what kinds of states use

them? Working Paper No. 32, Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, University of Oxford. Goldsmith, Peter. 2008. Citizenship: Our Common Bond. London: Ministry of Justice. Gordon, Susan M. 2007. Integrating Immigrants: Morality and Loyalty in US Naturalization Practice.

34

Citizenship Studies 11 (4), pp. 367–82. Guarnizo, Luis Eduardo, Alejandro Portes, and William Haller. 2003. Assimilation and

Transnationalism: Determinants of Transnational Political Action among Contemporary Migrants. The American Journal of Sociology, 108 (6), pp. 1211–48

Hailbronner, Kay. 2003. Rights and Duties of Dual Nationals: Changing Concepts and Attitudes. In: David A. Martin, and Kay Hailbronner (eds.), Rights and Duties of Dual Nationals – Evolution and Prospects. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, pp. 19–26.

Hammar, Tomas. 1990. Democracy and the Nation State: Aliens, Denizens and Citizens in a World of International Migration. Aldershot: Avebury.

Hansen, Randall. 1998. A European citizenship or a Europe of citizens? Third country nationals in the EU. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 24 (4) pp. 751–68.

——. 2000. Citizenship and Immigration in Postwar Britain: The Institutional Foundations of a Multicultural Nation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

High-level Committee on the Indian Diaspora. 2002. Report on the Indian Diaspora. New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India.

Hill, Kenneth H., William Seltzer, Jennifer Leaning, Saira J. Malik, and Sharon Stanton Russell. 2004. A Demographic Case Study of Forced Migration: The 1947 Partition of India Paper presented at the Population Association of America 2004 Annual Meeting, Boston, 1–3 April 2004.

Hohfeld, Wesley Newcomb. 1919. Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as applied in Judicial Reasoning. Walter Wheeler Cook (ed.). New Haven: Yale University Press.

ILPA (Immigration Law Practioners’ Association). 2001. Submission to Lord Goldsmith for the Citizenship Review: The Different Categories of British Nationality. http://www.ilpa.org.uk/data/resources/13110/07.12.603.pdf

Isin, Engin F., and Bryan S. Turner. 2007. Investigating Citizenship: An Agenda for Citizenship Studies. Citizenship Studies 11 (1), pp. 5–17.

Jones-Correa, Michael. 2001. Under two Flags: Dual Nationality in Latin America and its Consequences for Naturalization in the United States. International Migration Review 35 (4), pp. 997–1029.

Laursen, Finn. 1994. Denmark and the Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. In: Finn Laursen and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty: issues, debates, and future implications. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 47–60.

Levitt, Peggy, and Nina Glick Schiller. 2004. Conceptualizing Simultaneity: A Transnational Social Field Perspective. International Migration Review 38 (145), pp. 595–629.

Levitt, Peggy, and B. Nadya Jaworsky. 2007. Transnational Migration Studies: Past Developments and Future Trends. Annual Review of Sociology 33, pp. 129–56.

Maas, Willem. 2007. Creating European citizens. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. ——. 2008. Migrants, states, and EU citizenship's unfulfilled promise. Citizenship Studies 12 (6), pp.

583–96. ——. 2013. Varieties of Multilevel Citizenship. In: idem (ed.), Multilevel Citizenship. Philadelphia:

University of Pennsylvania Press, pp. 1-24. Marshall, Monty G., and Benjamin R. Cole. 2014. Global Report 2014. Conflict, Governance, and

State Fragility. Vienna, VA: Center for Systemic Peace. Marshall, Thomas H. 1950. Citizenship and Social Class, and Other Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press. Martin, David A. 2003. Introduction: the Trend toward Dual Nationality. in: David A. Martin and

35

Hailbronner, Kay (eds.), Rights and Duties of Dual Nationals, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, pp. 3 – 17.

Master, Meher K. 1970. Citizenship of India. Dual Nationality and the Constitution. Calcutta: Eastern Law House.

Meehan, Elizabeth. 2000. Citizenship and the European Union, ZEI Discussion Paper. C63/2000, Bonn: Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung.

Mindus, Patricia. 2014. Dimensions of Citizenship. German Law Journal 15 (5), pp. 736–750. Naujoks, Daniel. 2008. Macht und Identität. Eine Diskursanalyse zur doppelten Staatsbürgerschaft.

Zeitschrift für Politik 55 (4), pp. 387–412. ——. 2009. Dual citizenship. The Discourse on Ethnic and Political Boundary-making in Germany.

Focus Migration Policy Brief, Migration in Europa e.V. and the German Federal Agency for Civic Education.

——. 2010. India and its Diaspora. Changing Research and Policy Paradigms. In: Dietrich Thränhardt and Michael Bommes (eds.), National Paradigms of Migration Research. Göttingen: V&R Unipress, pp. 269–300.

——.2013. Migration, Citizenship and Development. Diasporic Membership Policies and Overseas Indians in the United States. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

——. (forthcoming) The Securitization of Dual Citizenship. National security concerns and the making of the Overseas Citizenship of India. Diaspora Studies.

Nyers, Peter. 2007. Introduction: Why Citizenship Studies. Citizenship Studies 11 (1), pp. 1–4. Ong, Aihwa. 1999. Flexible Citizenship the Cultural Logics of Transnationality. Durham, NC: Duke

University Press. Sahni, Binda. 2009. Economic Citizenship in India: A Socio-Legal Comparison of Two Cases.

Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics, Working Paper No. 46. Heidelberg: University of Heidelberg.

Schauer, Frederick. 1986. Community, Citizenship, and the Search for National Identity. Michigan Law Review 84 (7), pp. 1504–17.

Smith, Rogers M. 2003. Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Soysal, Yasemin. 1994. The Limits of Citizenship. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Spinoza, Benedictus de. [1677] 1891. The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza. Volume I: Introduction,

Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, Tractatus Politicus (translated by R.H.M. Elwes). London: George Bell and Sons.

Spiro, Peter J. 2006. Perfecting Political Diaspora. New York University Law Review 81 (207), pp. 101–25.

——. 2008. Beyond Citizenship: American Identity After Globalization. New York: Oxford University Press.

Standing Committee on Home Affairs. 2003. 107th Report on the Citizenship (Amendment) Bill, 2003. New Delhi: Parliament of India, Rajya Sabha.

Straubhaar, Thomas. 2003. Wird die Staatsangehörigkeit zu einer Klubmitgliedschaft? In: Dietrich Thränhardt, and Uwe Hunger (eds.), Migration im Spannungsfeld von Globalisierung und Nationalstaat, Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, pp. 76–87.

Thränhardt, Dietrich. 2008. Einbürgerung. Rahmenbedingungen, Motive und Perspektiven des Erwerbs der deutschen Staatsangehörigkeit. Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Foundation.

U.K. Home Office. 1977. British Nationality Law: Discussion of Possible Changes. Green Paper.

36

London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office ——. 1980. British Nationality Law. Outline of Proposed Legislation. White Paper. London: Her

Majesty’s Stationary Office U.K. Select Committee on European Legislation. 1995. The 1996 Inter-Governmental Conference: the

Agenda, Democracy and Efficiency. The Role of National Parliaments. http://ec.europa.eu/dorie/fileDownload.do?docId=104755&cardId=104755

Weis, Paul. 1979. Nationality and Statelessness in International Law. Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff International Publishers.

Wiener, Antje. 2011. European Citizenship. http://www.academic-foresights.com/European_Citizenship.html

Wimmer, Andreas, and Nina Glick Schiller. 2003. Methodological Nationalism, the Social Sciences, and the Study of Migration: An Essay in Historical Epistemology. International Migration Review 37 (3), pp. 576–610.

Xavier, Constantino. 2011. Experimenting with Diasporic Incorporation: The Overseas Citizenship of India. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 17, pp. 34–53.

Yakut, Bahadır. 2010. The ECJ Case Law Concerning Articles 17 And 18 of the EC Treaty and the Subsequent Effect on the Right to Move Freely. Ankara Avrupa Çalışmaları Dergisi 9 (1), pp. 147–64.