Global Environmental Change 20 (2010) 502–510

Frame-based guide to situated decision-making on climate change

Joop de Boer a,*, J. Arjan Wardekker b, Jeroen P. van der Sluijs b

a Institute for Environmental Studies, VU University Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1087, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlandsb Copernicus Institute for Sustainable Development and Innovation, Utrecht University, The Netherlands

A R T I C L E I N F O

Article history:

Received 11 June 2009

Received in revised form 5 March 2010

Accepted 16 March 2010

Keywords:

Climate change

Adaptation

Decision-making

Frames

A B S T R A C T

The present paper describes a frame-based approach to situated-decision-making on climate change.

Building on the multidisciplinary literature on the relationship between frames and decision-making, it

argues that decision-makers may gain from making frames more explicit and using them for generating

different visions about the central issues. Frames act as organizing principles that shape in a ‘‘hidden’’

and taken-for-granted way how people conceptualize an issue. Science-related issues, such as climate

change, are often linked to only a few frames, which consistently appear across different policy areas.

Indeed, it appears that there are some very contrasting ways in which climate change may be framed.

These frames can be characterized in terms of a simple framework that highlights specific

interpretations of climate issues. A second framework clarifies the built-in frames of decision tools.

Using Thompson’s two basic dimensions of decision, it identifies the main uncertainties that should be

considered in developing a decision strategy. The paper characterizes four types of decision strategy,

focusing on (1) computation, (2) compromise, (3) judgment, or (4) inspiration, and links each strategy to

the appropriate methods and tools, as well as the appropriate social structures. Our experiences show

that the frame-based guide can work as an eye-opener for decision-makers, particularly where it

demonstrates how to add more perspectives to the decision.

� 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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1. Introduction

The complexities of climate change are confronting decision-makers with different sorts of ‘‘reality’’. During much of the pastthree decades, for example, they had to deal with a reality in whichclimate change mitigation and adaptation were sharply separatedboth in science and in politics. Back in the 1980s, as Kellogg (1987)mentioned, preventing (or delaying) the change and adapting tothe change were depicted as the two decision tree branches thatshowed the whole range of policy choices. In contrast toprevention, adaptation was the option for both sceptics andfatalists (Thompson and Rayner, 1998). Recently, however,adaptation, and more particularly, a strategic approach toadaptation has been recognized as an essential part of climatepolicy by scientists (Pielke et al., 2007) as well as by policy-makersinvolved with the United Nations Framework Convention onClimate Change (UNFCCC, 2007) and the World Business Councilon Sustainable Development (WBCSD, 2008). The contrastinginterpretations of adaptation reflect crucial differences in theframes that shape how individuals and institutions conceptualizethe relevant aspects of an issue. Climate change science and policy

* Corresponding author. Tel.: +31 20 5989555; fax: +31 20 5989553.

E-mail address: joop.de.boer@ivm.falw.vu.nl (J. de Boer).

0959-3780/$ – see front matter � 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2010.03.003

may especially be issues that can be framed and reframed inseveral ways (Nisbet, 2009; Robinson et al., 2006; Schlumpf et al.,2001). Although decision-makers may not simply be able to changetheir frame at will (Thompson and Rayner, 1998), it is important forthem to be made aware that ‘‘taken-for granted’’ frames, includingthe frames that are ‘‘built-in’’ in decision tools, can subtly shapetheir conceptions of reality. Also, decisions may gain from makingframes more explicit, for instance, by looking at weak signalsthrough various scenario lenses (Schoemaker and Day, 2009) or byreflecting on the frames that underlie controversy (Schon and Rein,1994). Based on the multidisciplinary literature on this topic, thepresent paper will examine how frames can be made more explicitin the context of decision strategies for climate change adaptation.

Frames are the topic of research in such varied fields asanthropology, linguistics, cognitive psychology, social and orga-nizational psychology, management science, sociology, commu-nication and media studies, social movements research, policyscience, science studies, and philosophy. Although there are slightdifferences between various definitions (Barsalou, 1999; Chongand Druckman, 2007; Goffman, 1974; Graf, 2006; Schon and Rein,1994), frames are generally conceived as organizing principles thatenable a particular interpretation of a phenomenon. As Fillmoreand Atkins (1992) note, frames can often be created by or reflectedin the language. For instance, references to specific patterns ofclimate change manifestations, such as ‘‘changes in snow’’ or ‘‘sea

J. de Boer et al. / Global Environmental Change 20 (2010) 502–510 503

level rise’’, may activate a frame of semantic knowledge relating tothe event. Because the frame of a complex event is neverexperienced directly in its entirety, subsets of frame informationwill become active to highlight some potentially relevant aspects(Barsalou, 1999). In the present example, climate changemanifestations can be framed in an event-like structure thatcombines aspects regarding scene, agency, location and time-line.Hence, the frame may include the aspects ‘‘attribution to climatechange’’ (which may be likely or unlikely), ‘‘identifiable places’’(e.g. existing or latent), ‘‘time horizon’’ (e.g. short- or long-term),and possibly also ‘‘uncertainty about science’’ (e.g. high or low),‘‘uncertainty about politics’’ (e.g. high or low) and ‘‘source ofinformation’’ (e.g. trusted or not). Within this frame, the climatechange manifestation can be understood as a specific co-occurringset of relevant aspects, e.g. ‘‘changes in snow’’ may be linked to acombination of ‘‘likely attribution’’, ‘‘identifiable place’’, ‘‘shorttime horizon’’, ‘‘low uncertainty’’, and ‘‘sea level rise’’ to acombination of ‘‘likely attribution’’, ‘‘latent place’’, ‘‘long timehorizon’’, and ‘‘high uncertainty’’. Also, within a frame each aspectmay be associated with its own frame and more specific sub-aspects (e.g. variants of uncertainty); this dynamic relationalstructure makes frames flexible and context dependent.

Climate change manifestations have become increasinglysalient to decision-makers and the public at large. As severalauthors (Dempsey and Fisher, 2005; Halsnæs et al., 2007; Kirshenet al., 2008) emphasize, however, decision-making on adaptationshould take into account that the expected impacts of policyoptions on society tend to be very context specific. This is partlydue to the complexities of climate change itself, which may causeconsiderable uncertainty over climate change projections and itsimpacts (Dessai and Hulme, 2004; Lempert et al., 2004). Also therole of other human-caused environmental changes, such aschanges in regional land use patterns, can make a large differenceto the end result. In particular, it is the specific combination ofclimate change and other environmental changes that may createthe most significant impacts for society. Consequently, decision-makers should develop a strategy that is informed by a rich store ofinformation and, at the same time, ensures a sufficient degree offlexibility and adaptability (Lindblom, 1990; Thompson and Tuden,1959; Thompson, 2003). Whether their strategy for decision-making leads to adequate action will strongly depend on the wayin which they frame the specific aspects of the situation, such as co-occurring sets of ‘‘time horizon’’ and ‘‘uncertainty’’ (Robinson et al.,2006; Schlumpf et al., 2001). For instance, instead of focussing onthe question ‘‘How can we reduce uncertainty in our estimates offuture climatic conditions?’’ it may be important to give moreattention to the question ‘‘Given that there is considerableuncertainty about our future, how can we best manage thiscoastal area to reduce risk and increase system resilience?’’ Hence,situated decision-making may well be facilitated by making framesand frame-based decision strategies more explicit and using themfor generating different visions about the central issues.

After a short elaboration of frame analysis – in particularregarding frames that are relevant for discussions on science-related issues, such as climate change – the next sections of thepaper will address some critical choices and assumptions ofdecision-making. One of the most important choices is selecting adecision strategy, which, in turn, may shape the choices ofappropriate methods and tools, as well as the social structure thatfits the process. Our approach has been developed in interactionwith a number of adaptation projects at the regional and locallevel. These projects were supported by a large national researchprogramme in the Netherlands that is built around the principles ofclimate-proofing (see Kabat et al., 2005). It aims to bring scientistsand practitioners together in the context of selected ‘‘hotspots’’,such as the Port of Rotterdam and the Province of Groningen (see

below). Our work has resulted in a frame-based guide to situateddecision-making.

2. Frames applied to science-related issues

2.1. Frame analysis

Enabling the actors involved in decision-making to figure outwhat the crucial frames are is a challenging task. Frames can beexpressed by various representations, such as how a problem isstated, who is expected to make a statement about it, whatquestions appear relevant and what range of answers might beappropriate. However, frame analysis is often hampered by thedifficulty of unravelling the sheer flexibility and context-depen-dency of frames (Barsalou, 1999; Goffman, 1974). As mentionedbefore, the frame of an abstract term, such as a concept, an event, ora plan, is never experienced directly in its entirety. Even inhindsight, professional skill and knowledge may be required tocarefully reconstruct the event-like structure of an environmentaldiscourse (Hajer, 1995; Moser, 2005). However, there is room for amore strategic approach, since frames are based on a sharedcultural background of experiences, beliefs and practices. Oneoption is to look at a strategic level for contrasting patterns ofperception and communication. For example, the increasingsalience of climate change manifestations sharply contrasts withthe conceptualizations of climate change in terms of abstract anddistal properties that were common in the recent past (Bord et al.,1998). The term ‘‘distal’’ (versus ‘‘proximal’’) here and in thefollowing text relate to having a more long-term (versus short-term) focus. The contrast between perceptions focused on distaland on proximal threats agrees with patterns of differencesbetween distal and proximal levels of thinking (i.e. abstract versuscontextualized) that have been reported in the literature (Liber-man and Trope, 2008; Wakslak and Trope, 2009) and that are alsoof relevance for the interpretation of climate issues.

Another set of contrasts can be recognized when social actorstry to influence each others’ frame by using particular commu-nication symbols (framing devices, see Gamson and Modigliani,1989). Important symbols include metaphors (e.g. SpaceshipEarth), historical examples from which lessons are drawn (e.g.the most dramatic recent disaster), and visual images (e.g. pictureof a polar bear). By adopting one of the frames they attempt to opencertain positions in favour or against an issue. Presumably, muchabout this role of frames can be learned from the voluminous workthat has been done in the field of science and technologycontroversies. Social scientists who have analyzed public discus-sions on (policy relevant) science-related issues argue that theseissues are often linked to only a few frames, which consistentlyappear across different policy areas (Gamson and Modigliani,1989; Nisbet, 2009). For example, synthetic pesticides, such asDDT, have been framed as a blessing for humanity (before the year1962), but also as ‘‘Pandora’s box’’ (after the publication of RachelCarson’s Silent Spring in 1962), as a matter of specific risks andbenefits to be decided on scientific evidence (with the rise ofecotoxicology as a science in the 1980s and 1990s), and as a keyfactor to keep certain industries competitive (along with each newpesticide regulation). These contrasts between promotion andprevention strategies can be linked to broader literature on goal-directed behaviour (Higgins, 1997, 2000) and people’s attitudestowards interventions in the natural world (de Boer, 2010).

2.2. Contrasting interpretations of climate-related issues

The frames applied to science-related communication suggestthat two strategic contrasts can lay the ground for a simpleframework to highlight interpretations of climate-related issues.

Table 1Two strategic contrasts combined.

Perceptual distance Goal orientation and focus

Promotion orientation Prevention orientation

Distal view (long-term, broad categories) Using broad categories to represent general features

and focusing on gaining positive outcomes (hits)

Using broad categories to represent general

features and focusing on avoiding negative

outcomes (errors)

Proximal view (short-term, narrow categories) Using narrow categories to represent contextualized

features and focusing on gaining positive outcomes (hits)

Using narrow categories to represent

contextualized features and focusing on

avoiding negative outcomes (errors)

J. de Boer et al. / Global Environmental Change 20 (2010) 502–510504

The first contrast is the difference between a promotion orprevention orientation to goal-directed behaviour; the secondinvolves taking a distal or proximal view on an object. The two arecombined in Table 1. After a short explanation of this framework, itwill be applied to various ways in which climate-related issues arebeing framed.

Generally, a promotion orientation makes the person sensitiveto positive outcomes and hits (as opposed to errors) that may begained through aspirations, accomplishments, and ideals (Higgins,1997, 2000). In contrast, a prevention orientation makes the personsensitive to negative outcomes and errors that have to be avoidedby fulfilling one’s moral obligations and responsibilities. Thisdifference is not just a matter of personal mindsets – theorientations can be associated with certain institutions, subcul-tures within an organization, or occupational groups. Engineers,for example, are said to be safety oriented and inclined to‘‘overdesign’’ for safety (Schein, 1996).

In linewiththesecondcontrast, takingadistal(versusa proximal)viewonanobjectmay evokebroad categories torepresent itsgeneralfeatures rather than its more contextual and incidental aspects(Liberman et al., 2007). This may include more abstract moralprinciples to judge the object. In contrast, a proximal view inducescategories that are narrower to represent more detailed andcontextualized features. A proximal view is more constrained byconcrete realities and it may very well go together with intentions toimplement a plan (Goldstone and Barsalou, 1998). Again, theseperceptual differences also have cultural relevance. They are closelyrelated to differences between holistic and analytical ways ofthinking, each of which may have become more useful and moreavailable in one culture than in another. For instance, Easterners tendto engage more in holistic perceptual processes whereas Westernerstend to engage more in analytical ones, but this preference should beseen as a matter of default (Nisbett, 2003).

Table 2Science-related frames (adapted from Nisbet, 2009) grouped into four strategic contra

Perceptual distance Goal orientation an

Promotion orientat

Distal view (long-term, broad categories) Social progress fram

Defines the issue as

of life or harmony w

Middle way frame

Puts the emphasis

possible compromi

polarized views

Example: Plan to re

and mitigation

Proximal view (short-term, narrow categories) Economic developme

Defines the issue as

improves competiti

Conflict/strategy fram

Defines the issue as

a battle of personal

Example: climate p

Building on this framework, Table 2 captures the different framesthat may underlie discussions on science-related issues andprovides relevant examples. Table 2’s upper right cell representsa distal approach to prevention orientation. Prevention-orientedframes aim to avoid errors in dealing with, for example, the earth’satmosphere or with climate change adaptation. This may becombined with broad categories of thinking about moral aspectsof climate change. Al Gore’s movie ‘‘An Inconvenient Truth’’ fits wellinto this pattern, calling for precaution in the face of potentiallycatastrophic impacts. Regarding the rise of the CO2 concentrationand the extrapolation thereof into the future, Gore noted that‘‘Ultimately, this question is not political, but a moral issue . . .. If weallow that [the extrapolated rise] to happen, it is deeply unethical’’.He continued to describe various impacts that may occur whenclimate change remains unchecked, and noted that future genera-tions will judge our actions today (‘‘what were our parentsthinking?’’). Gore often stressed certainty and scientific consensus;other Christian voices in the public debate on climate change divergeon what is the most ethical way forward. In the United States, variousgroups and commentators discuss climate change as an ethical issuerelated to intergenerational equity, the implications for the poor,and the relation between humankind and nature (Wardekker et al.,2009b). While the groups diverge in their assessments of policystrategies and the pro’s, con’s, outcomes, and fairness of these, they –including the climate-sceptical ones – use very similar ethicalstarting points and imagery (e.g. stewardship over ‘‘God’s garden’’and passing on the ‘‘gift of creation’’).

The work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC) and the national report of the second Dutch Deltacommittee(Deltacommissie, 2008) on flood safety in the Netherlands take amore proximal view of prevention orientation (lower right cell ofTable 2). The Deltacommittee report aimed to develop an integratedvision for the Netherlands for centuries to come. Despite the report’s

sts, with examples about climate issues.

d focus

ion Prevention orientation

e Morality/ethics frame

improving quality

ith nature

Defines the issue in terms of

right or wrong; respecting

or crossing limits

Pandora’s box frame

on finding a

se position between

Defines the issue as a call for

precaution in face of possible

impacts or catastrophe

concile adaptation Example: Al Gore’s movie: An

inconvenient truth

nt frame Scientific uncertainty frame

investment that

veness

Defines the issue as a matter of

what is known versus unknown

e Public accountability frame

a game among elites,

ities or groups

Defines the issue as responsible use or

abuse of science in decision-making

roof city Example: sea level discussion

J. de Boer et al. / Global Environmental Change 20 (2010) 502–510 505

long time horizon, it has a narrow, specific, concrete focus, forexample, on specific sea level scenarios. The report details the latestscientific insights on specific changes, their impacts, and possiblepolicy options. As the uncertainty associated with projections onsuch long timescales is very large, the committee explored theplausible upper limits of regional climate changes (sea level rise andriver discharge in particular) for the Netherlands. They assessed,through modelling, the implications thereof for long-term watersafety and fresh water supply. This upper-limit scenario assumed aglobal mean temperature rise of 6 8C in 2100 and accelerated sealevel rise through rapid non-linear melting response to warming ofthe Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets. The report’s publicationstimulated a lively public debate on dealing with scientificuncertainty in designing long-term policy strategies. For example,many wondered whether the recommendations should be followed,considering the fact that the assumed scenario was considerablymore extreme than the national meteorological institute’s nationalclimate scenarios. This debate on specific sea level scenariosdistracted somewhat from the long-term vision-development thatwas intended. In contrast to the more holistic vision and viewpointsexpressed in the report’s chapter headings (e.g. ‘‘developing with theclimate’’), many of the recommendations were, in fact, fairly top–down engineering and implementation-oriented, such as nationalscale flood safety regulations and dike improvement, a mechanismto warrant long-term availability of financial means required tomaintain flood safety under the extreme sea level rise scenario, andthe appointment of a national ‘‘delta director’’.

Both prevention-oriented frames contrast with two promotion-oriented frames. Promotion-oriented frames highlight the possiblegains that climate-related issues can entail for society. A proximalexample of this is the notion of a ‘‘climate-proof city’’ such asexpressed in the city of Rotterdam, the Netherlands (lower left cell ofTable 2). The city, which host Europe’s largest seaport, is adjacent tothe North Sea, at the mouth of the river Rhine, and includes dike-protected areas below sea level as well as areas outside the dikedefence zones (at 2.5–5 m above sea level). It is expected to facenumerous challenges due to climate change. However, themunicipality aims to establish a strong economy and attractivecity. Being (and clearly appearing) well prepared for climate changeis considered an important factor in promoting these aims (see e.g.Wardekker et al., 2010). The city aims to be a frontrunner on bothadaptation and mitigation. It emphasizes and advertises variousstrengths and ambitions, such as innovative action, initiative andleadership, reframing climate change from a ‘‘threat’’ to an‘‘economic chance’’. In our workshop with local actors, manypractical adaptation options were generated using concepts such asclimate-proofing, resilience, and water as opportunity for urbandevelopment. In 2007, a city-wide programme, the RotterdamClimate Initiative (RCI), was created to realise the ambitions, providea concrete action plan (with clearly defined goals), and monitor theprogress. The RCI includes partners such as the city’s municipaldepartments, the port authority, the local environmental protectionagency, and the local employers’ organization.

A more distal, promotion-oriented approach (upper left cell ofTable 2) may be typical for attempts to reconcile potentiallycompeting policy objectives, such as climate change mitigation andadaptation. At the regional level, this approach was taken in thenorth of the Netherlands, where the sea-bound ‘‘Hotspot Groningen’’project was led by the Province of Groningen. The project, at theinterface between sea level adaptation, sustainable energy optionsand spatial planning, was designed by a landscape architect. In ourworkshop with regional actors, he emphasized that the concept of‘‘growing with the trends’’ (versus ‘‘blueprint planning’’ to resistthem) should play an important role to make the region climate-proof, and more generally ‘‘future-proof’’. The project’s activitiesincluded stakeholder dialogues and creative workshops, as these

were considered more suitable for structuring ‘‘wicked problems’’and developing and creating societal support for options than‘‘scientific analysis’’. Initially, the findings were intended to informthe Provincial Environment Plan, which provides the legal basis tointegrate plans with respect to environment, traffic and transport,water, and spatial planning. However, tensions seemed to existbetween the Hotspot project and the setup of the Plan. Although thePlan started with a phase of searching for inspiration regardingdesirable futures, vision-development was replaced relativelyquickly by an approach that focused on proximal intentions. Theswitch of frames may be attributed to the desire of the provincialdeputy to have measurable targets that are legally enforceable.Although members of the Hotspot team were honoured with severalinternational awards for their advanced planning concepts anddesigns, the provincial strategy has, in fact, moved from the upperleft cell of Table 2 to the lower right cell.

Taken together the four cells of Table 2 can improve ourunderstanding of the various ways in which climate issues may beframed. In addition, the contrasting features of the four cellsindicate that none of the frames is a stand-alone guide to anadaptive choice. Each frame has its strengths and weaknesses inarticulating the specifics of a situation. Prevention may have to becomplemented with promotion (or vice versa), and the distal viewof broad strategic planning needs a more implementation-oriented, proximal way of thinking about how measures can beorganized. Hence, introducing a contrasting frame may be used toopen-up the process of decision-making.

3. Frames built-in in decision tools

3.1. Decision strategies

In the process of decision-making, frames will have crucialimpacts on the selection of a decision strategy. This refers inparticular to those aspects of a particular frame that highlightuncertainty about science and uncertainty about politics. In otherwords, the question is whether the actors involved in decision-making need more scientific knowledge and/or more deliberationon preferences. These questions can fruitfully be addressed usingThompson’s seminal approach to strategy development. Accordingto Thompson, the two basic dimensions of decision are beliefsabout (1) the cause/effect relations that are instrumental for whatthe decision might actually accomplish and (2) preferencesregarding the possible outcomes of the decision (Thompson andTuden, 1959; Thompson, 2003). Depending on the specifics of thesituation, both dimensions can take a range of values. However, forthe sake of clarity of the presentation, they are often dichotomized;i.e. the actors involved in decision-making perceive certainty oruncertainty regarding causation and certainty or uncertaintyregarding outcome preferences.

Table 3 presents the patterns of uncertainty of the twodimensions. Whether cause/effect relations are believed to beuncertain may depend on several conditions, such as the actors’beliefs that the existing knowledge is incomplete, that there isinherent uncertainty or uncertainty due to competition withopponents (e.g. rivals in the market). Outcome preferences canbecome uncertain in situations where a single individual ororganization appears to hold multiple, opposing preferencesregarding the outcomes of possible actions. An additional typeof uncertainty occurs when there are external constraints thatmake the actors involved in the decision dependent on others whohold veto power over some possible preferences. This may happenwhere regional decision-making is restricted by strategic planningprocesses that are coordinated by governmental institutions andother agencies (Few et al., 2007). In sum, Table 3 may be veryhelpful in telling complete stories about uncertainty, including

Table 3The two basic dimensions of decision combined to identify different decision

strategies (after Thompson, 2003).

Beliefs about

cause/effect

relations

Preferences regarding possible outcomes

Certain Uncertain

Certain Causation and outcome

preferences are certain,

data are voluminous

Uncertain due to

Computational strategy

*Opposing preferences

*External constraints

Compromise strategy

Uncertain Uncertain due to Uncertain due to

*Incomplete knowledge *A combination of reasons

from the upper right cell

and the lower left cell

*Inherent uncertainty

*Competition with rival

decision-makers Inspirational strategy

Judgmental strategy

J. de Boer et al. / Global Environmental Change 20 (2010) 502–510506

quantitative and qualitative aspects of uncertainty (Patt, 2007; vander Sluijs et al., 2005, 2008).

Table 3 also provides logical links between uncertainties andstrategies of decision-making. Actors who are confronted withuncertainties regarding causation and outcome preferences shouldadapt their decision strategy to these issues (Thompson and Tuden,1959; Thompson, 2003). Provided that there is at least a certaindegree of commitment to reaching agreement, they may chooseone of the four types of decision strategies.

� If the actors believe that there is enough certainty regarding bothcausation and outcome preferences, decision-making is rela-tively straightforward, although it may require a computationalstrategy to process voluminous data (upper left cell of Table 3).� If outcome preferences are clearly known and shared but cause/

effect relations are uncertain or disputed, the actors must rely on ajudgmental strategy to find a solution (lower left cell of Table 3).� In contrast, if cause/effect relations are certain but outcome

preferences are uncertain or disputed, the actors need acompromise strategy to identify an acceptable preference (upperright cell of Table 3).� Finally, if both causation and outcome preferences are uncertain

or disputed, the most likely action of the actors is to avoid anydecision on the issue, unless an inspirational strategy can beintroduced to create a new vision or belief (lower right cell ofTable 3).

3.2. Suitable decision tools

Each decision strategy can be elaborated to find methods andtools with built-in frames that fit the strategy. Table 4 shows anumber of options.

Table 4Methods and tools that are relevant for the decision strategies.

Beliefs about

cause/effect relations

Preferences regarding possible outcomes

Certain

Certain Computational strategy

*Cost-benefit analysis tools

*Multi-criteria analysis tools

*Accounting tools and physical analysis tools

Uncertain Judgmental strategy

*Scenario analysis tools, expert panels, simulation g*Model tools (biophysical, socio-economic, integrate

*Checklists for judging model quality and uncertain

A computational strategy (upper left cell of Table 4) may rely onconventional forms of decision support, such as multi-criteriaanalysis tools (MCA) and cost-benefit analysis (CBA). The built-inframe of these methods sees the decision situation as a problem forwhich an optimal solution might exist, provided that trade-offswill be accepted. The notion of trade-offs can be an argument to optfor a transparent, quantitative evaluation of the options. CBA canidentify the most advantageous solution or at least those optionsfor which benefits are greater than the costs, because it may attacha monetary value to every aspect considered relevant to society. Infact, this monetarisation is framed as aggregating independentindividual choices in a market context. However, CBA is notadapted to long time horizons (>25 years) and may generatequestions about the ethics of interest rates and long-termdiscounting (Stern, 2007; Turner, 2007).

Alternatively, the decision situation may be framed as aproblem whose solution should satisfy a wide set of constraints(upper right cell of Table 4). Following a compromise strategy, thedecision-makers may want a course of action that is acceptable toall kinds of stakeholders. To find a common preference, partici-patory tools can be applied, such as community planning tools,which can be framed as building on deliberative democraticforums (Welp et al., 2006). Such a frame involves some form ofopen, goal-directed conversation or ‘‘dialogue’’ between decision-makers, experts and other stakeholders, which may createfavourable conditions for the exchange of diverging arguments.It should be noted, however, that people with diverging argumentscan only communicate meaningfully if their frames overlap to acertain degree (Brockriede, 1992).

Where outcome preferences are clearly known and shared butcause/effect relations are uncertain or disputed, the actors mustrely on a judgmental strategy to clarify matters (lower left cell ofTable 4). It is in particular the nature and the relevance of scientificuncertainty that can lead to difficult discussions between decision-makers and experts, as well as between experts among themselves(Dessai and Hulme, 2004; Lempert et al., 2004). Insight into thestrengths and weaknesses of advanced tools such as influencediagrams (including Bayesian Belief Networks) and dynamicmodels (including computable general equilibrium models) willrequire an analysis of critical choices and assumptions. Uncer-tainty about the impacts of the behaviour of other people on thedecision’s outcomes may require a game theoretic approach.

Finally, an inspirational strategy (lower right cell of Table 4)may include tools to stimulate creativity, such as the developmentof learning-scenarios (Berkhout et al., 2002). In fact, there are twodiverging frames of creativity (Nguyen and Shanks, 2009). Somepersons, such as the Hotspot Groningen team mentioned before,tend to emphasize the value of spontaneous insight and themagical ‘‘Aha!’’ moment that occurs when a long-sought ideasuddenly appears at the conscious level. Other persons emphasizesystematic approaches to exploring problems and potential

Uncertain

Compromise strategy

*Participative tools, e.g. stakeholder analysis and focus groups

*Argumentation support tools

*Negotiation tools

Inspirational strategy

aming *Cognitive aids, e.g. checklists for prompting new

ideas, ‘‘rich picture’’ drawingd)

*Development of learning-scenariosties

Table 5Different social structures that fit the decision strategies.

Beliefs about cause/effect relations Preferences regarding possible outcomes

Certain Uncertain

Certain Computational strategy in a bureaucratic structure Compromise strategy in a representative structure

Uncertain Judgmental strategy in a collegial structure Inspirational strategy in an informal structure

J. de Boer et al. / Global Environmental Change 20 (2010) 502–510 507

solutions. The occurrence of insight is often associated withrestructuring or reframing a problem space, for example, byputting the problem in a broader perspective or by zooming-in on aparticular detail. Both approaches should be supported by goodpreparation and the participation of people who have goodknowledge about a particular domain and who are able to thinkflexibly and synthetically.

3.3. Suitable social structures

A closely related strategic consideration is the notion thatinstitutions and groups have organized themselves differently toaddress different kinds of decision-making problems (Thompsonand Tuden, 1959; Thompson, 2003). Hence, when the actorsinvolved in decision-making want to adapt their decision strategyto the uncertainties regarding causation and outcome preferences,they also have to consider the social structures that are appropriatefor the issues. Table 5 displays the most appropriate socialstructures for each of the strategies.

A computational strategy that is based on cost-benefit analysis,for example, should take into account that this tool can only beapplied in a comprehensive way under specific conditions.Compliance with certain rules and conventions regarding thechoice of discount rates is crucial to provide comparative insightsinto the financial costs and benefits of the options. Accordingly, themost appropriate setting for the use of cost-benefit analysis may bea bureaucratic structure that guaranties that every issue is routedto the appropriate specialist (upper left cell of Table 5). If publicdecision-makers want authoritative statements about the resultsof computations, these will have to be produced by an officialplanning bureau or committee (e.g. the Deltacommittee). How-ever, this does not preclude any other groups from usingcomputational tools, such as a simplified or ‘‘quick scan’’ CBA,just for exploratory reasons.

A compromise strategy has to be developed if there isagreement by all parties regarding the expected consequences ofthe available alternatives but lack of consensus over preferences.From an organizational perspective (Thompson and Tuden, 1959;Thompson, 2003), the most appropriate setting to handlecompromise types of issues economically and efficiently is arepresentative structure of intermediate size that facilitatesdetailed and subtle exploration of the several preferences (upperright cell of Table 5). In complex democratic societies, however,this type of rational problem solving should take into accountthat there are many ways to frame a representative structure andto develop criteria that include or exclude potential participants.For example, a framing of the ‘‘climate proof city’’ not widelyshared by its residents might be contested by individuals andgroups who feel excluded (e.g. Owens, 2000). As mentionedbefore, local decision-making may also be restricted by strategicplanning processes that are coordinated at some higher-level(Few et al., 2007). Hence, the social structure will often have tobe adapted to fit the local cultural and institutional context inorder to work.

A judgmental strategy is called for if causation is uncertain ordisputed; this may require a collegial structure, such as a self-governing voluntary group that is competent by virtue of theirexpertise to make a judgment (lower left cell of Table 5). If none of

the experts has indisputable and complete evidence, no membershould be allowed to outvote or override the judgment made byother members and a majority judgment may be necessary. Aspecific variant is the Delphi method, which uses a model of‘‘anonymous’’ interactions in a panel of experts (Kleindorfer et al.,1993). However, what experts often take for granted as anonymouspeer review is a frame that may not be shared by all the actorsinvolved in decision-making. Hence, it is crucial that theproduction of information is not only perceived as credible andrelevant but also as legitimate in the sense of being respectful ofstakeholders’ divergent values and beliefs, and fair in its treatmentof opposing views and interests (Cash et al., 2003).

The fourth type of issue is one in which both causation andoutcome preferences are uncertain or disputed (lower right cell ofTable 5). In fact, these conditions make it difficult for all parties toprevent disintegrating tendencies, such as loss of contact ordecreasing commitment to reaching agreement. Therefore, theactors involved may try to avoid any decision on the issue, unless anew vision or belief can be developed (Thompson and Tuden,1959). Promoting the inspirational aspects of a decision strategymay require an informal setting that offers incentives for collectiveproblem solving. Such a creative kind of activity may be stimulatedby charismatic leaders or successful models of new visions.Metaphor development may be a significant step, since metaphorscan provide a common language to communicate complexconcepts to others and gain their support. The already mentionedcase of Hotspot Groningen shows, however, that it is not easy for aninformal group of creative professionals to overcome the politicalconstraints of a government institution. Using Snow’s notion of‘‘frame bridging’’ (Snow et al., 1986), it may be said that theinformal group was not equipped to bridge the gap between theirframe regarding the issue and that of the formal organization.

Generally, decision-makers should take into account that it isimportant to consider the match between decision strategy andsocial structure, especially if they want to change their strategy.For example, decision-makers who operate in the context of abureaucratic structure may not be in a good position for choosinganother type of strategy than a computational one. If anorganization, such as a governmental agency, adopts one of thefour decision strategies as its dominant strategy, it may have tocooperate with other organizations to exercise a different kind ofstrategy, for example, to involve local stakeholders in a repre-sentative structure. Alternatively, it may be necessary to create anovel organization (or committee) to address issues for whichtraditional structures are ill suited.

Another strategic consideration is the relationship between thescience-related frames and the decision strategies. Fig. 1 illustratesthat there may be a loose coupling between the various elements ofdecision-making. For example, an economic competitivenessframe may give rise to a computational strategy to check theoptimum. Similarly, a morality frame may lead to a compromisestrategy in order to check the constraints of a morally acceptablesolution. A scientific uncertainty frame may require a judgmentalstrategy to clarify what is known versus unknown. And a socialprogress frame that aims to reconcile opposing policy objectivesmay have to be fleshed out by an inspirational strategy. However,these linkages are not the only possibilities and Fig. 1 can be seen asa heuristic device.

Fig. 1. Loose coupling between science-related frames and decision strategies.

J. de Boer et al. / Global Environmental Change 20 (2010) 502–510508

Our interaction with a number of adaptation projects at thelocal and regional level showed that the information that issummarized in Fig. 1 works as an eye-opener for actors involved indecision-making. This relates in particular to the expose ofcontrasting frames and the way in which they may open-updecision-making. For instance, experts from knowledge institutesconsidered it very helpful to separate the various questions theyreceived from policy-makers into question regarding scientificuncertainty and questions about political uncertainty. They usedthis frame-based distinction to prioritise their research activitiesand to improve their communication with policy-makers. Based onthese experiences we have written a tool catalogue in which wepresent characteristic examples of how various tools mentioned inTable 4 deal with framing (Wardekker et al., 2009a). The examplesare meant to demonstrate that it may be very fruitful to use morethan one frame and more than one strategy after another. If thebuilt-in frames are made more transparent, tools can be used as‘‘boundary objects’’ or focal points around which knowing-in-practice may arise (Spee and Jarzabkowski, 2009); i.e. tools are notonly important instrumentally for problem structuring, problemsolving and decision-making but also productively to stimulateinteraction across professional boundaries and enable sufficientlyshared meanings to move forward.

4. Discussion and conclusions

This paper has discussed several crucial aspects of frames andtheir role in decision-making in the area of climate change. Framescan particularly be of help in adding new perspectives to a decisionprocess and in checking whether the participants are able tounderstand each other. Adding new perspectives may be crucial forseveral reasons. The first is that it opens up the option space so thatnew and otherwise overlooked response options may emerge.Another reason is that any complex decision is often nested withina broader set of aspects (Kleindorfer et al., 1993). These aspectsmay include promotion or prevention oriented objectives, as wellas abstract long-term visions and more narrowly definedimplementation-related issues. One of the experts in scenariodevelopment, van der Heijden (2004), notes that a single stand-alone scenario project does not very often lead to ‘‘blindinginsights’’ on what to do. It does not sensitise decision-makers tomultiple interpretations of weak signals and may result in whatMarx et al. (2007) call the single-action bias, that is a propensity totake only one action to respond to a problem, such as just raisingthe dikes, in situations where a broader set of remedies is called for,e.g. to make a system more resilient.

Adding new perspectives is also relevant because a single framewill induce a passive acceptance of the information given(Kahneman, 2003). Instead, contrasting frames may be used to

stimulate more active participation in decision-making andinclude groups, such as knowledge producers and stakeholders,who may fruitfully contribute to this process. A careful considera-tion of frames in their role of organizing principles may lead to amore in-depth understanding of the information tools that can beused to support situated decision-making. This will facilitate abetter match between supply and demand of information amongall the actors involved, i.e. knowledge producers, decision-makersand stakeholders.

A closely related point is that actors can only communicatemeaningfully if their frames overlap to a certain degree. If theframes of two persons share too little, they will be unable to co-operate in the same process and their interaction may result in a‘‘dialogue of the deaf’’. In the context of climate-related decision-making, however, overlapping frames are not self-evident. Thetools that are available to support decision-making have beendeveloped by experts from strongly divergent disciplines, coveringboth the natural and the social sciences. This divergence maycreate many frame-based problems. For example, due to thetechnical nature of computational tools, these decision supporttools may become counterproductive if their outcomes cannot beshared with decision-makers and stakeholders who see them-selves as problem owners but have fundamentally differentframes. If decision-makers and stakeholders do not recognizehow their input has been incorporated in the analysis, they willlose their trust in the legitimacy of the information production(Cash et al., 2003).

The present analysis of contrasting frames can be positionedbetween more cognitive and more political approaches. In apolitical context, there is at least a genuine tension between actorswith different interests and frames, and those of them who havemore power have more control over the frames that are being used.However, at points of policy-uncertainty, there are chances for lesspowerful actors to define the frame, at least temporarily. Becauseclimate change manifestations may contribute to policy-uncer-tainty, this is an important point, as revealed by the HotspotGroningen case. What happened in this case has much in commonwith policy stories described by Schon and Rein (1994: p. 91) aboutdesigners who create a policy plan, which they put out into a largerarena, where other actors respond to the plan guided by their moreimplementation-oriented interests and frames. As they compete tocontrol the plan, it may evolve in ways that differ from what anyone of them had intended. Although this seems to be a classicproblem of planners versus implementers, it should be taken intoaccount that climate change manifestations may cause manydisputes and much uncertainty. This prospect makes it necessaryto perform more detailed research into how the problem ofplanners versus implementers is related to processes of decision-making on climate change adaptation.

One limitation of the paper is that we did not address the issueof managing the decision process. Thompson and Tuden (1959)already referred to process-related problems, such as confusion ofissues, structural constraints, inappropriate decision teams andexpansion tendencies in decision issues. As decision-makerschange their beliefs about cause-and-effect relations, for example,types of issues that at one time are identified as appropriate for ajudgment strategy may at another time be defined as computa-tional problems, or vice versa. Also, different decision-makers mayrespond to the same situation in different ways, some seeing it as amatter for computation, others as a judgment matter, and stillothers as requiring bargaining. According to Schoemaker and Day(2009) moderate conflict, as opposed to little or extreme conflict,leads to the best decisions, but the conflict must be among ideas,not individuals.

If the issue to be decided is linked to serious pre-existingconflicts, strategy development should first create a more neutral

J. de Boer et al. / Global Environmental Change 20 (2010) 502–510 509

starting point. Even then, however, both a judgmental and acompromise strategy may fail due to increasing tendencies ofpolarization. The heat of debate can lead experts who endorse aparticular solution to overstate their case, discount missinginformation and refer to moral justification for the solution theyprefer. When this occurs, the issue is no longer one of judgment butone of compromise. Similarly, an issue that seems fit for acompromise strategy may generate difficulties in the identificationof causation. Next, proponents may discount causation theoriesendorsed by their opponents and dismiss the corresponding‘‘facts’’. As a result of this polarization, parties may start to threateneach other with trouble on unrelated matters (Thompson andTuden, 1959). Obviously, this is precisely what has happened inseveral climate-related discourses (Kellogg, 1987; Nisbet, 2009).

If sharp conflicts can be reduced or alleviated, reframing mayhelp to open-up the process of decision-making (Schon and Rein,1994). A crucial way to reframe a situation may result fromchanges in people’s interpretations of a topic. For example, it maybe helpful to put climate change adaptation and mitigation in thecontext of a higher-level objective, such as sustainable develop-ment (Robinson et al., 2006), thereby enabling decision-makers tospot options that they initially missed. Emphasizing the functionalrelationship with sustainable development makes it easier tocombine the impacts of adaptation and mitigation with those ofother environmental changes. Placing a particular issue in a largercontext is not only relevant to handle bargaining issues, but it canalso help to crystallize consensus about preferences if the partiesinvolved are unaware of the similarities of their preferences.Alternatively, reframing may occur by means of zooming-in on theactual specifics of a situation, for example, by organizing a site visitto a particular area. This may be the starting point of a moreinnovative approach to an issue.

An important area of further research is to examine whether theexpose of contrasting frames that was presented in this paper willalso be useful in other parts of the world. Although there are manydifferences between, for example, Asians and Westerners in howthey conceptualize the world, these differences are now commonlythought of as different default hierarchies. For example, Westernersare morelikelyto insistonusingformal logic,while Asiansarewillingto live with more contradiction, but this difference is not absolute(Nisbett, 2003).Moreover, inourapproachthere isroomfor both.Thefirst group may see the decision situation as a problem for which anoptimal solution might exist, to be found by a computationalstrategy. The second group may see the decision situation as aproblem whose solution should satisfy a wide set ofconstraints, to befound by a compromise strategy. The main point is that all the actorsbecome aware of these potentially hidden differences.

Overall, our experiences demonstrate that climate changemanifestations may induce much uncertainty related to scienceand policy. In this context, a frame-based approach can contributeto a comprehensive repertoire of methods and tools for adaptationplanning and implementation. In particular, presenting more thanone frame may work as an eye-opener for actors involved indecision-making. Contrasting frames may be used to stimulatemore active participation and enable policy-makers to avoid lock-in on a non-reflected frame. Because each frame may have itsstrengths and weaknesses in articulating the specifics of asituation, it may be fruitful to use more than one frame afteranother. In sum, decision-making may gain from making framesmore transparent and promote systematic reflection on frames.

Acknowledgements

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the IARUInternational Scientific Congress on Climate Change: Global Risks,Challenges and Decisions, Copenhagen, 12 March 2009. The paper

is based on work in the context of two research projects. The first isthe ADAM (Adaptation and Mitigation Strategies: SupportingEuropean Climate Policy) project, supported by the EuropeanCommission under the 6th Framework Programme, Priority:Global Change and Ecosystems. The second is the Dutch Climatechanges Spatial Planning Research programme (CcSP), projectIC10. The authors would like to thank Karin Backstrand, JanetteBessembinder, Karen Buchanan, Arie de Jong, Florrie de Pater,Maria Falaleeva, Hasse Goosen, Alex Haxeltine, Judith Kloster-mann, Rien Kolkman, Rob Roggema, Lodewijk Stuyt, David Tabara,Marleen van de Kerkhof, Kaj van de Sandt, Anne van der Veen,Eleftheria Vasileiadou, Pier Vellinga, and the anonymous reviewersfor their intellectual contributions to the work described in thispaper.

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