Extremism and Policing Challenges in Pakistan By

Zulfiqar Hameed*

Pakistan has no comprehensive state policy and consistent state action in place to fight the

menace of religious extremism. There have been hardly any vigorous attempts by the state

to counter the religious-extremist world view and the actions emanating from it. Most of

the current manifestations of extremism are related to an Islamic conception of Jihad for

establishment of a purportedly Islamic state. Police, being the primary law enforcer in the

country, bear the heaviest burden for fighting this foe. However, this article shows that the

police organization is so seriously hobbled with problems of policy, organization and

capacity that it is barely able to cope with this problem. If the specter of extremism is to be

effectively tackled in Pakistan, the police organizations would have to be substantially

strengthened and the debilitating factors would have to be removed on a war footing.

Terrorism and Extremism- Incidents and legal action:

Despite the surge in terrorism incidents in Pakistan in the years since 2005, there has been

no consistent effort to address the roots of the terrorism problem. Since the beginning of

2005, Pakistan has faced an alarmingly high rate of terrorist attacks. These attacks spiked in

2009 and while they appeared to recede in 2011, the numbers are still worryingly large. Terrorist

attacks are not new to Pakistan and as per one estimate there have been at least 4438 incidents of

terrorist attacks in the country between 1974 and 2010i. Figures of fatalities vary, but as per one

estimate, there have been more than 40,000 fatalities in terrorist attacks between 2003 and 2012

in Pakistan.ii One of the major factors in play behind the acts of terrorism is the extremist

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world-view, mostly of a radical Islamic type, held by those involved in or supporting

terrorism.

Since actions speak louder than words, a look at the actual action taken by the police

against extremism can be seen from the data for legal action against extremism. The

following data is from Punjab and shows the cases registered by police in the last four

years. While looking at these figures, it is necessary to keep in mind that these were the

worst years for the whole of Pakistan in terms of terrorism incidents.

Table 1 Action against Extremism in Punjab- Some Indicatorsiii:

Cases registered 2008 2009 2010 2011

Amplifier Ordinance 3060 3760 4207 5396

Objectionable speech 6 16 8 14

Objectionable books 1 5 11 14

Wall chalking 2 8 12 17

Sectarian PO's wanted NA 63 71 111

Sectarian PO's arrested NA 0 1 0

It is inconceivable that there were only a handful of incidents of objectionable books or

speeches in the whole of Punjab in the years in question. It merely reflects the lack of action

against underlying factors driving extremism, militancy and terrorism. The consequences

of this are apparent in the mushroom growth of Islamic jihadi groups in Pakistan.

On the other hand there has been a steady increase in the number of cases of blasphemy

and other such legal action affecting mostly minorities or under-privileged groups. We can

see from the table below that the number of registered cases under the head of blasphemy

has been on a constant rise in the last five years across Pakistan. The bulk of these cases

are being registered in Punjab (77% to 85% of the total cases) and Sindh (13% and 22% of

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the total cases). This shows that the protection provided in the law against abuse is not

working effectively since there is no reason for actual incidents of blasphemy going up in

such a consistent manner. If the latter were true then the law meant to prevent incidents of

blasphemy is proving totally ineffective in achieving its espoused purpose.

Table 2 Reported Blasphemy casesiv

The situation as shown above is supported by the data collected by the Jinnah Institute this

year. It is clear that the protections for minorities are going down while action against

extremism is far from satisfactory.

WHY DOES POLICE NOT TAKE EFFECTIVE ACTION?

The obvious question at this juncture would be the reasons for not taking police action. The

following analysis delineates the challenges facing the police in taking strong action against

extremism and tries to explain the reasons for this traditional lack of action.

1) State policy and institutional atrophy:

Area 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Punjab 107 140 159 238 244

Sindh 24 26 53 49 37

KPK 0 5 2 1 4

Balochistan 2 1 5 1 1

Islamabad 0 0 0 0 0

Gilgit Baltistan

5 3 12 6 1

AJK 0 0 1 0 0

Total 138 175 232 295 287

4

It can be reasonably argued that this lack of action on the part of police has in large part

been caused by the state itself when it supported the policy of jihad in Afghanistan and then

in Kashmir. This meant that even in matters of internal security, for which police are

primarily responsible, the police were effectively told to have a ‘hands off’ approach. The

actions of state actors were driven more by the ‘strategic’ imperative and much less by the

need to keep internal peace and harmony in the society.

The result of this policy has been the intentional ignoring of the negative consequences of

extremist ideologies for the society. Police were not allowed or expected to take action

against objectionable speeches, books or recruitment efforts. In fact these were covertly

supported by the state. Perhaps an unintended but foreseeable corollary has been that

since police were traditionally not allowed to take any action against such thinking, it has

now become almost a part of the accepted practice to ignore such issues until it is too late.

This conscious policy of protection to the Islamic groups by the ‘establishment’ (even when

they were involved in serious breaches of law) and some political parties in the past has

meant a diffidence on the part of the police in taking vigorous action even when there are

overt statements espousing the intent to take serious action against extremism. Part of this

reluctance draws on the past experience of the police as an institution and part of it draws

on a collective atrophy of the police capacity to take such action.

2) Police capacity for effective action:

Even though it is clear from international experience that police action is one of the most

effective tools at the disposal of a state to fight terrorism and insurgenciesv, the preferred

methods in Pakistan have historically been other than police action. A big reason for this

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has been a lack of capacity of the police in Pakistan and an absence of attention to

strengthening police despite a demonstrable need for police reformvi.

The capacity issues of police are manifold and are well documentedvii. These include

paucity of trained investigative staff having the necessary wherewithal to tackle complex

cases, absence of advance intelligence/analysis capability, no access to modern information

sources like mobile phone data as well as financial transactions, lack of modernization and

a reputation for corruption as well as inefficiency. These inadequacies are exacerbated by a

system rewarding politically connected officials at the cost of the efficient ones and one

that reduces operational autonomy of police senior leadership due to intervention by a

host of outside actors. All these capacity issues mean that even where the police want to

take action, it would be seriously hampered by these capacity constraints.

3) Weak state and a besieged police force:

Described as ‘the negotiated state’viii, the state of Pakistan has historically been a weak one.

However the last few years have seen the fortunes of the traditional wielders of state

authority in Pakistan plummet to new lows in no small measure due to an ascendant media

and a newly proactive judiciary. Police force has been especially at the receiving end in this

new dispensation where it has been beleaguered by frequent brow beating by the media,

judiciary and other organized groups like lawyers. Traditionally symbolizing the authority

of the colonial state, ordinary people cheer on the courts and the media when police is

being humiliated and mocked. A snap shot of the misery that the police force is going

through can be gauged from the following dataix from Punjab Police.

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Table 3. Cases Against Police Officers in Punjab 2011

Registered Cancelled Challaned

Criminal cases 654 255 230 Cases Under 155 Police Order 751 248 232

A police force that has to face more than fourteen hundred criminal cases during one year

as a part of performance of its duties and where five percent of the total force is awarded

major penalties within nine months in a year cannot be expected to be in a normal state of

mind. The situation in other provinces cannot be expected to be very different when this is

the situation in the biggest province of the country. The morale within the police

department has been adversely affected, self-image is very low and there is virtually no

pride in doing a job that is vital for the society.

This turn in the fortunes of the police has led in turn to police force being so much on the

defensive that it is now very reluctant to take any action even where the situation warrants

immediate action. This reflects most adversely in the police department’s work in terms of

protecting the vulnerable sections of the society and in working as a representative of the

law against powerful and entrenched groups. Such a beleaguered police force cannot

perform adequately its duty of protecting the weaker segments of the society against the

onslaught of vociferous, powerful and often violent groups of people.

There have been some attempts at changing the uninterrupted stream of cases being

registered against police officers by requiring that there should be a mandatory

Dismissal/ Removal from service/ Retirement 2561

Forfeiture of Service 4245 Reduction in Pay or Rank 372

TOTAL 7178

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requirement of a fact finding inquiry before registration of a case under the police order.

However there has been limited success in this venture as the Rules required to be

formulated for this requirement have not been put in place in any province except in Sindh.

There is now a consistent demand on the part of police officers that their work can only be

meaningfully done if there is an independent Police Complaint commission in place for

conducting fact finding enquiries before any criminal case is registered against any police

officials.

4) Threats and attacks on police officers :

The last few years have been very challenging for the law enforcement agencies in the

country due to the constant onslaught of terrorist attacks on them. Police being a symbol of

state authority has been a prominent target of these terrorist attacks. Police officers

throughout Pakistan have had to endure many losses during this fight against terrorism

and extremism. The following charts clearly bring to the fore the extent of the problem of

personal safety of police officersx.

Chart 1.

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The number of attacks on police has been consistently going up during the last five years

and is in thousands. The number of police officers being martyred and injured in the line of

duty each year is running into hundreds since 2007 as is evident from the following charts.

Chart 2.

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Balochistan 4 11 40 23 33

KPK 180 222 275 185 153

Sindh 1497 1793 2386 2514 2911

Punjab 316 299 296 264 201

0500

100015002000250030003500

Att

acks

Pe

r ye

ar

Attacks on Police (Excluding Bomb Blasts)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Balochistan 0 0 7 0 3

KPK 68 80 106 52 46

Sindh 34 59 45 74 54

Punjab 36 35 25 37 25

020406080

100120140160180200

Shah

ee

d A

nn

ual

ly

No. of Police Officers Martyred (Excluding in Bomb Blasts)

9

Chart 3.

Faced with such herculean challenges, it is indeed a daunting task for the police force to

take vigorous action against extremist elements without a clearly spelt out policy of

support for the police department. A department that sees the evidence of state not caring

for it and frequently abandoning it in the direst hours of need can scarcely be expected to

adopt a forceful stance against powerful extremist forces.

Realizing the inadequacy of the compensation being offered to police martyrs and the

adverse effect on police morale, provincial governments have now revised the

compensation package for the police martyrs. The package now gives one-time cash

compensation of Rupees three million to the family of the martyr as well as continuation of

pay to the widow and family till the normal retirement age of the martyr.

5) Laws and Procedure:

Pakistan has a specific law to deal with extremism and cases of terrorism, but it is inadequate in

many ways. The Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 (The Act) was enacted federally and applies nationally

except for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Two serious criticisms have been

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Balochistan 0 1 23 2 10

KPK 138 200 230 122 126

Sindh 137 177 176 148 126

Punjab 90 90 103 69 93

0100200300400500600

No

. In

jure

d a

nn

ual

ly

Police Officers Injured in Attacks (Excluding in Bomb Blasts)

10

leveled on the law. The first is that it is overly broad and does not have sufficient safeguards

against abuse of the special provisions it containsxi

. The other is that it is ineffective in its actual

objective i.e. punishing terroristsxii

.

The Provisions in the law dealing with the underlying factors leading to terrorism are inadequate

in several ways. Cases against writing of objectionable books and written materials as well as for

making hateful speeches have to be registered under the ATA act but the procedure and evidence

related matters are regulated by the ordinary laws on the subject i.e. the Criminal Procedure

Code and the Qanun-i-Shahadat Order. The Evidence Act requires that there is oral testimony

against someone regarding the allegations for proving the charges. In a case of producing hate

materials, for instance, the difficulty of proving (through oral evidence of an eye witness) the

facts that a particular person wrote the material in question and then distributed these is obvious.

The dilemma is further complicated due to the absence of a witness protection program and the

fact that the persons producing such hate materials usually come from proscribed or dangerous

organization with a proclivity for resorting to violence whenever required.

The new types of evidence collected through mobile phone data, emails, phone tapping,

social media and financial transactions are still not admissible in evidence because the law

has to be amended to regulate the recovery of these types of evidence. The bill for

regulating such evidence is languishing in the parliament and needs an impetus from the

government. Any privacy concerns must be addressed soon and the bill should pass with

the necessary amendments. The capacity issues documented above exacerbate the problem

of handling and presenting the evidence in court.

Recommendations:

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a) The intent of the state to fight all types of extremism and terrorism has to be clearly

manifested through words and actions. The doubts about the commitment of state

organs can only by cleared by clearly articulated policies and follow up action in

accordance with the policy.

b) There can be no selective application of laws with respect to shades of extremism

and any action has to be across the board.

c) Issues of police capacity in terms of manpower, technical expertise and access to

information have to be addressed on a top priority basis through establishment of

adequately-resourced counter-terrorism departments within each provincial police

department. Artificial barriers erected in obtaining cell phone information through

administrative instructions by Pakistan telecommunication Authority (PTA) have to

be removed to facilitate access to required information.

d) All good faith actions of the police department should be protected from malicious

civil action or criminal prosecution through establishment of a commission for fact

finding enquiries before any action against police officers.

e) Rules and administrative instructions need to be framed to mandate a preliminary

fact finding enquiry before registration of any criminal cases against police officials

under the Police Order and the Criminal Procedure Code.

f) Any departmental action proposing to inflict a major punishment on a police official

must be preceded by a regular departmental inquiry.

g) Special squads need to be formed within each police department to investigate cases

of attacks on police so that good investigation is followed up by effective

prosecution to ensure punishment of involved criminals.

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h) The Anti-terrorism act and Evidence Act should be amended to provide a better

legal regime for action against extremism. A special category of cases be created

under the ATA for hate material and objectionable books with possession and

distribution as a separate, strict liability offence. Standard of evidence for proving

such offences has to move away from oral testimony and possession has to be the

substantive offence.

Notes.

*Zulfiqar Hameed holds an MBA degree from the Lahore University of Management Sciences and LL.M

from the Louisiana State University USA. He is a senior police officer with extensive experience in

investigation as well as operation of police. He has worked on several important terrorism

investigations while posted as SSP Investigations Lahore.

i University of Maryland USA. (n.d.). Global Terrorism Database. Retrieved November 10, 2012,

from START Project:

http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=attack&casualties_type=&casualties_m

ax=&country=153.

ii South Asia Terrorism Portal. (n.d.). Retrieved November 17, 2012, from Pakistan Data Sheets:

http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/index.html

iii Statistical officer, Investigation Branch Punjab Police. (2011). Annual Crime Figures. Lahore:

Punjab Police.

iv Ibid.

v Seth G Jones, M. C. (2008). How Terrorist Groups end. Arlington, Va: Rand Corporation. See also

Sepp, K. I. (2005, May-June). Best Practices in Counter insurgency. Military Review, pp. 8-12.

13

vi Abbas, H. (2011). Reforming Pakistan's police and law enforcement infrastructure. Washington DC:

United States Institute of Peace . International Crisis group . (July 2008). Reforming Pakistan's

police. Brussels/Islamabad: International Crisis Group.

vii Fair, C. C. (2009, June 30). Policing pakistan. Wall Street Journal Asia.

viii Lieven, A. (2011). Pakistan A hard country. London: Allen Lane.

ix Statistical officer, Investigation Branch Punjab Police. (2011). Annual Crime Figures. Lahore:

Punjab Police.

x National Police Bureau . (2012). Annual Crime Figures. Islamabad: National Police Bureau,

Government of Pakistan.

xi Hameed, Z. (2012). The anti-terrorism law of Pakistan: Need for reform. Social Science and policy

Bulletin, 2-9. Amnesty International. (1997). Pakistan Legalizing the impermissible: The new anti-

terrorism law. London: Amnesty International.

xii Hameed, Z. (July 2012). Anti Terrorism Law. In H. A. ed., Stabilizing Pakistan through police reform

(pp. 49-56). New York: Asia Society.

Bibliography and additional Readings.

Abbas, H. (2011). Reforming Pakistan's police and law enforcement infrastructure. Washington DC:

United States Institute of Peace.

Amnesty International. (1997). Pakistan Legalizing the impermissible: The new anti-terrorism law.

London: Amnesty International.

Conflict and peace studies. (2010). Radicalization in Pakistan: A comprehensive study. Islamabad:

Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies.

Fair, C. C. (2009, June 30). Policing pakistan. Wall Street Journal Asia.

Hameed, Z. (2012). The anti-terrorism law of Pakistan: Need for reform. Social Science and policy

Bulletin, 2-9.

Hameed, Z. (July 2012). Anti Terrorism Law. In H. A. ed., Stabilizing Pakistan through police reform

(pp. 49-56). New York: Asia Society.

14

Hoffer, E. (1951). The true believer: Thoughts on the nature of mass movements. New York: Harper

and Brothers.

International Crisis group . (July 2008). Reforming Pakistan's police. Brussels/Islamabad:

International Crisis Group.

Kennedy, C. H. (2004). The creation and development of pakistan's Anti-terrorism regime 1997-

2002. In S. L. al, Religious Radicalism and security in South Asia (pp. 387-412). Honolulu: Asia

Pacific Center for security studies.

Lieven, A. (2011). Pakistan A hard country. London: Allen Lane.

Lisa Curtis, H. H. (2009). Reviving Pakistan’s Pluralist Traditions to fight extremism. Washington DC:

The Heritage Foundation.

National Police Bureau . (2012). Annual Crime Figures. Islamabad: National Police Bureau.

Sepp, K. I. (2005, May-June). Best Practices in Counter insurgency. Military Review, pp. 8-12.

Seth G Jones, M. C. (2008). How Terrorist Groups end. Arlington, Va: Rand Corporation.

South Asia Terrorism Portal. (n.d.). Retrieved November 17, 2012, from Pakistan Data Sheets:

http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/index.html

Statistical officer, Investigation Branch Punjab Police. (2011). Annual Crime Figures. Lahore: Punjab

Police.

University of Maryland USA. (n.d.). Global Terrorism Database. Retrieved November 10, 2012, from

START Project:

http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=attack&casualties_type=&casua

lties_max=&country=153