lssue 195 E1 ;$2.25; C$3; 14FF

CZECHOSLOVAKIAThe end of the

consensus - ColinMeade

JAPANEmperors andconstitutions

JORDANA new face for the king

ALTHUSSERThe end of Althusser's

long march - byDaniel Bensaid

T

I -

I{, A

INSIDE:

WORI,D ECONOMYWill Germanypull

Europe free ofRecession? - second in

a series ofarticles byClwrles-And.re Ud.ry

rlI

I

November 26, 1990

a

dictatorship crumbles

KOREAThe growing isolation

of the North's "greatleader"Plus

Interviews withSouth Koreanunion activists

t

f

$IL

Il

CONTENTS

Contents:

ETHToPTA 3CRUMBLING, the Mengisturegime turns back towiLrd USand Israel - Francis Cazals

czEcHosLovAKtA 6RIGHTISTS take over theCivic Forum and attempt toexpel the left - CoLin Me ade

POLAND 9STRONG challenge frommilitant Committee ofInter-Enterprise Coordinationin Lower Silesian Solidarnosc

- Document

ussR I IREFLECTIONS of deepeningcrisis. Excerptsfrom the Soviet press

ROMANIA 13"NEO-COMMUNIST" regimenrakes a sharp turn towardprivatization GerryFoLey

WORTDECONOMY 14CAN the unification ofGermany save Europe from therecession that has started in theUnited S tates? C har le s - A ndreUdry

JAPAN 17NEO-MEDIEVAL show in themidst of a debate overinternationalintervention of Japanesemilitary forces - BernardGibbons

SOUTH KOREA 19LEADERS of independenttrade union confederationdiscuss perspectivesof rising union movement

-lnterview

NORTH KOREA 20REUNIFICATION of Koreaback on the agenda? EnzoTraverso

Ilround the World 21a Haiti O USSR O PortugalO Indonesia

ALTHUSSER 22AN ASSESSMENT of thelegacy of the Marxist"anti-humanist" philosopherDaniel Bensatd

JORDAN 24KING HUSSEIN uses the GulfCrisis to regain some anti-imperialist cover - LuizaMaria

IRELAND 2AEXTRADICTED hunger strikerin danger of death

FRANCE 28MASSIVE demonstrationsagainst run down of educationsystenl

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lnternational Viewpoinl #195 a November 26, 1990

II J

review ol neYJs andunder lhe

Fourth

appears

PALESTINE 26GEORGE HABASH lines upbehind Saddam Hussein.Excerpts from speech to theCongress of Arab PopularForces in Amman

PlusTHE IMPACT of the GulfCrisis on the Intifada

lnlernational Vie*poinl is catalogued bythe US Anematlva presstndex-

a News closing dale:

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ETHIOPIA

The Men$isregimecrumbles

tu it

o

I

-o

ai-

cor,^"'-ik,,...

,.I

SIXTEEN years after the revolution whichput an end to the reign of Emperor HaileSelassie, the military regime of HaileMariam Mengistu is near to collapse. somemonths ago the "Shengo" (Ethiopia'sparliament) called for a general mobilizationand ordered the enrollment of reservists ina final effort to afrect the outcome of thecivil u/ar ravaging the country.

Recognizing the setbacks suffered by thegovernment army, the Ethiopian presldentsounded the alarm to his fellow citizens in

5

his address on the occasion ot the anniversary of therevolution at the end ol September. The mllitary sltuation isindeed more and more worrying for the authorities.

FRANCIS CAZALS

dence conqueied through anned struggle.The EPLF faces an additional problcm,

as a rcsult of the intcmational situation,above all the Gulf crisis. The great pow-em are less than ever favourable to iheidea of Erirean indepcndcnce, and stillless to the perspective of a military victo-ry of lhe EPLF. Moreover, Mergistu hasjoined fte anti-Iraqi camp, which inclinesthe US to a greater indulgenca towards itsenemy of yestcrday. Finally, the dividedArab slates are less lhan cver in a positionto offer the EPLF the diplomatic covcr itwould need in case of an attack againstAsmara. The aid which it receives fromsome Arab count es is exacting a highprice today.

Little prospect ol seriousnegotiations

Despite Us-Sovicr pressEe for theresumption of negotiations between therebels and the government, no commonground is likely to eme.ge in the shortlerm. The Addis Ababa 8overnment -whose minister of foreign affairs, TesfayeDinka, met an EPLF dclegation in Wash-ington last month, on thc insistcnce of theUS state department

- will not go

beyond the promise of intemal autonomyfor an Eritrea cut off from the coastalprovince of Dankalie, whcre the Red Seaport of Asab is located.

In lhc abscnce oI a govemment comm it-mcnL in favour of a referendum on self-determination, clearly axised on the ques-tioll of independence for all Eritrea andconducted under the supervision of theUN, the EPLF is maintaining its commit-ment to *le aimed struggle. It has recentlyannoruced its intention of launching atAsmara "a final and decisive battle" forindependence.

In Tigre, the Tigrear People's Libera-

,'\l*i

.-'-'1!lr}- s o

which has for some decades led a fiercestruggle for independence. Last Februarythe Edrean nationalists took the Red Seapon of Massawa, and since then theyhave threatened Asmara, the capital ofEritroa. Arorod 120,000 government sol-diers are encircled therc, awaiting a pos-siblo assault by the Eritrean forces, whoregularly bombard dre town's airport.

Asmara receives no supplics by land,and only the planes coming from AddisAbaba link ir to the outside world. The200,000 Eritrean civili.ns in the lown,and fte 800,000 othels in thc surrormd-ing small towns which arc subject to theEPLF'S blockade, are being uscd by thegovemment forces as a human shield,and are threatened by famine.

Government attempts tohold Eritrean capital

Ooverruncnt troops, fearing the i[fil-tration of EPLF fighteN, are prevcntingall commcrce with thc aroas hcld by therebels. The lattq sccm however dividedon what military strategy to adopt. Thepresence of numerous E trean civilians,very many with rclatives among the gue

llas, would render any attack on Asma-ra very costly in tcrms of civilian losses.But, on the other hand, lhe military con-quest of the Eritrean capital by thc EPLFwould plaLc thc intcrnarional communirybefore the established fact of an indepen- 3

November 26, 1990 a #195 lnternalional Viewpoint

N';*ir''xf;ii1';'H:closer to Israel and convefiing itself toeconomic liberalism. Mengistu has thusabandoned any reference to the Sovietmodel with as much ease as he adopted itin the preceding years. Thc Workers' Par-

ry of Ethiopia has become the ElhiopianDemocralic Unity Parly. wjlhoul ceasingto be the sole political formation of thercgimc. The porrails oI Marx and kninhave disappeared ftom the Place of theRevolulion. AIld last March the govcm-ment adopted an economic reform whichliberalizes intemal commercial exchang-cs, offcr! invesmcnl facilities Lo loreigncapital and envisages the privatization ofcertain state enterprises and shops.

For the moment, the principal eflect ofthis reform has been to infiease the pur-chasing price fo. the agricultural productsof the peasants, and to encourage thefamers of the rural belt around lhe capitalto sell lheir commodities on the urbanmarket, thus incrcasing supplies a litde.But the economic programme has litdecharce of having any significant realeflect outside the capital as long as thecivil war - which absorbs half the statebudget- Iasls.

Govemment troops are being forcedback in Ore north by the forccs of lhe Eritrean Peopie's Liberatiol Froflt (EPLB,

ETHIOPIA

4

Eulogies lor Albania andStalin

Until rccently, somc leaders of theTigrean resistance wcre still culogizinglhe Albanian syslcm ard Joseph Slalin.Now, apparently, the movement is seek-ing to shed the Stalinist and inlolcrantimage creatcd by its original Pro-Albanian kemel in the eyes of intcmation-al opinion.

For some monlhs, the backbonc o[ thcEPRDF'S sEalc$/ has becn the proposalfor a provisional transitional govemment,open to all lhe opposition forccs as wcllas reprcscntatives of the current regime

- a sccnario inspired by recenl cvenls inEastem Europc. Nonethclcss, in Practice,lhc EPRDF'S a(titudc to the othcr forccsof rhe opposition has novcr been totallyfrce of a desire for donination. On thcother hand, thc Tigreal rcsistancercmains a rcgionally-bascd group. whichprevents it, in tIe multi-ethnic conlcxt ofEthiopia, from appearing by ilsclf as an

allemativc for thc wholc of lhe Ethiopianpcople. The nationalisl basis of its con-ceptions limiLs its attractive powcr in theot-hcr rcgions of fie country, nolablyamongst the AmhaJas and the Oromos.

The govemmcnt uses this to portray thcTPLF as a secessionist force and to stir uP[or its own bcnefit a "patriotic" rcflex inthe Amhara milieu.The attcmpt by theEPRDF ro challcngc for the leadership ofolhq ethnic aid nalional groups couldlead to confrontatiol with these nationaland social movcments.

Another rcgional rebcllion also exists.The Oromo Libcration Front (OLF.) is

activs miiilarily in thc west, along theSudancse fronlicr, and in the cast in

Harargue, with a very nationalist visionof its fight against the Addis Ababarc8ime, which it characterizcs as "coloni-alisf'. This anti-Amhara reaction has itsroots in the decadcs of oppression whichthc Orcmos have suffered (despite beingin a numedcal majority), as much underHaile Sclassie's cmpire as under theMengistu regimc.

Finally, $e small Ethiopian oppositiongroups are also engaged in anti-government mililary activitics, arnongst&em lhe members of the formorly ulua-left Ethiopian People's RcvolutionaryPafly, today allied to the monarchist par-tisans of thc desccndants of thc emperor.

On the othcr hand all civiliar opposi-tion has bern de.imated or forced intoexile. Occasionally thcle have beefl somes?oradic sludcnl rcvolts or finy muti-nies, but these have been quicklyropressed.

On thc defensivc militarily, the AddisAbaba regime is also being undermincdby its Sovict bloc allics who no longerbelieve in its capacity to consolidate itsclfmililarily, and have evcn begun to dis-cree0y question its condnued existence.All $csc allics, howcver, bcar a hisloricrcsponsibilily for the reinforcement inpowcr of the military clique in AddisAbaba. Cuban, Soviet and East Gemanadvisers have for many ycars supPo ed,sometimcs even in combal, &e kooPs oflJle Ethiopian regimc. Tlcse counldeshave also contributcd to thc totally falscimage of the rogime which cxists abroad.

Not so long ago, Crawtta, t},e datlYnewspapcr of thc Cuban Communist Par-[y, was publishinS entire pages of eulo-gies to thc "companion in struggle" and"rcvolutionary", Mengistu. The CPSUpushed had for Ue formation of thc rul-ing workers' Parry of Bhiopia (wPE), as

an inslrumcnl of conlrol and supcrvisionof rhe kebeles, $e neighbouhood com-mittees bom of ftcrcvolution.

Soviet bloc support forEthiopian dictatorshi p

Thc East Germans took in hand thetraining of thc rcgime's political policeand contributed lo a policy of agriculturalcollcctivization which was to provc a

uagic fiasco. Finally, thc Cubans andSoviets sacrificcd thcir former suppotfor thc Eritrcan sEugglc for indepcndcnccon thc allar of 0tcr alliancc with Mcngis-u.

The ftst to talie thcir distancc ware theC\bans, who first withdrcw their advise$from the zoncs of combat in Eritrca, thcnlcft thc coultry somc months ago. EastGermany has now disappcarcd and llleUSSR has reduccd its assistance. TheUSSR rcfused lo dcliver supplies of amrsand munitions \r'hich wqe covered by an

already signed contmct and refuscd tosign any ncw aIms conLracts. IB pilotshowevcr remain in command of someElhiopian plancs.

On the diplomatic level the USSR arldthe US proposed some months ago theholding of a regional conference forpeace in this area of Africa. Washingtonand Moscow are searching for a hypothel-ical global solution to the entangled con-flicts of this region of the world. Each ofthe states in this region is tryinB to tr(rl toits profit the intemal problems of itsncighbours. Sudan supports the Eritreans,whilst Addis Ababa is supporting Lhc

SPLA of Colonel Garang which is fi8ht-ing in southem Sudan. Erhiopia is alsoaiding the Somali National Movcmenl,which is fighting in the north of Somaliaagainst the regime of Siad Bane. And thisIist is far lrom exhaustive.

In November 1989, in a sPectacu)arrevcrsal of previous policy, diplomaticrclations were reestablishcd with Israel as

a counterpart to the ac{eptance by AddisAbaba of fte departure of the Falashas

Olack Ethiopian Jews). Dozens of Israclimilitary adviscrs have come to replace the

Soviets who have left. According to somcrepons they have even PaJticipated incombat alon8side govemmen! troops inthe region of Asosa, in the west of lhecountry, against the Oromo nationalists ofthc OLF, Thcre has also been sPeculalionthat lsrael was raking over fic faciliticsprovided for the Sovicts in the Dalhakislands oI[ E uea. Moreovcr, Tcl Avivhas supplicd light ams and bombs toAddis Ababa.

Regional strategY of lsraelistate

For Isracl, this suppon for Mengistuadds up to a tactical tulity of interests.The regional saategy of the Jcwish stare

has always been to seek allies againstwhat it calls "Arab hegemony in the RcdSca". Today, as in the time of Haile Selas-sic, lhis diplomatic option is also bcingprioritized by Addis Ababa. Howevcr,Isracl has neilher the means nor the dcsircto aid Mengisru in a marmel comparableto rhat provided by tho Sovicls over thclast len yeajs.

But this diplomatic and military aid is

enough to givc somc breathing space tothc Ethiopian regime. Moreover Mcngistucan also hopc to profrt from his supportfor thc Uflited States in OIe Culf conflict.Hcre, he is characterized above all by a

will to outbid othcr supponers of theimperialist effort, Thus, he has comc outin favour of the blockade of Baghdad andhas even propose.d the sending of an Ethi-opian conlingent to Saudi Arabia. Ilsccms that these positions have alrcadybccn rewardcd by Saudi imancial aid andgreater US goodwill.

Ten ycars after the popular uprisingwhich ovefl.hrew the feudal dictatorshipof Haile Selassie, this is the sad balarcesheet of fte petit bowgeois milirary fac-

tion which commaldcered and diveficdthc revolutionary process. Yet, in contmstto other changes of regime in Africa, and

lnternalional Viewpoint #195 a November 26, 1990

tion Front (TPLD have liberated a goodpart of their province. Profiting from therapid decline in the morale of the govern-ment forces, who are often badly traincdand forcibly recluited from the peasantry,the Tigrean resistance has extended il.s

field of action funher to the south, as faras Shoa, less lhan 200 kilomete$ fromthe Ethiopian capital. In t}le wakc of tlLis,thc TPLF has drawn into is mr*s somenon-Tigrcan oppositionists. For its Amha-ra pfirisans, it has foundcd lhe ErhiopianPcople's Democratic Movement(EPDM): it has formed, initially from itsprisoners of war ofOromo origin, an oro-mo People's Democratic Movcmcnt(OPDM): and more rcccntly an organiza-tion of frce officers has bcen founded.

All thcse movements rcmain sttictlysubordinated to the TPLF, in the contextof the Ethiopian People's RevolutionaryDemocratic Front (EPRDF). This coali-tion advocates *le over0lrow of the Men-gisru regime on the basis of a fairlygeneral democratic programme. On theeconomic plane, the EPRDF se4ms tohave no disagrcement with thc liberalreforms recendy undcrtaken by thc gov-emmcnl.

ETHIOPIA

in contrast even to the collapse of thecolonial regimes in Mozambique ardAngola, the Etiiopian revolution of 1974brought about a rcal change in the rela-tions of ownership in the countryside,wherc an anti-feudal agrarian reform wasimplemented trough a popular mobiliza-tion. But the dynamic of the process wasdirected and utilized by a Jacobin militaryclique which has progessively steppedinto the shoes of the former feudal digni-taries in at least tluee ways; relations withthe peasantry, Amhara chauvinism andthe "monarchical" conception of theregime (the maintenance of the empire byforce and constraint).

The famine of 1984-85 and fte forceddisplacement of fte population markedthe defeat of the agadan policy of Oleregime which issued from f}le revolution.They also revealed the complacency andthe contempt of fte petit-bourgeois andurban leaden for t}le rural population oflct counLry. It is in many rcspects rcmi-

nisccnl o[ the passiviry of Hai]c Selassiebefore the terlible famine of 1973, which,at fie time, constituted the spark for theradicalization of a good pafi of the civil-ian intelligenrsia and rhe Erhiopian mili-tary. ln 1984-85 a similar attitude openedthe way to the dcvclopment of the opposi-tion, notably lo the extension of the activ-itlcs of the Tigrean nationatists.

The new emperor in AddlsAdaba

Henceforth, President Mengistu opnlytook up the themes most favoured byHaile Selassie, in intemal policy as wellas foreign affairs. The most flagrantbetrayal of the regime is its refusal to rec-ognize the right of self determination oftlc Eritrean peoplc, the only solutionwhich can put an cnd to the civil war inthc rtoflh of Ethiopia. Or rhe conrrary,Mcngistu has pursued fte bellicose poli-cies of his predcccssor, notably thanks totle military suppon of rhe USSR. In for-eign policy, the Ethiopian leadors havetakcn as their own the themc of abesieged Christian Ethiopia sunoundedby a hostile Arab envircnment - a dis-course which is music to the ears ofI$ae-li diplomats.

Finally, the shrinkage of rhe rcgimearormd the Amharas goes hand in handwith a concenration of responsibilities inOre hands of Mengishr himself and thoseclose to him, such as his half-brother Kas-sa Kebede, responsible for relations withI$ael. Mengistu has constructed a vacu-um around himself, notat'ly in the almywhich he has partially decapirated afrer afailed coup d'6tat in May 1989, Dozensof ofncels were shot somg months ago onthe dkect insisrence of the head of state.There is no place for the least dissidenceor civil opposition in Addis Ababa.Meanwhile rhe United States is host tosome tcns of thousands of E[hiopian refu-gecs, several of them ministers who have

Today, the Soviet leade$ of the peres-troika cta have "discovcred" *ut it wasvery prcsumptuous to sce in this regime areal point of support for fte Sovier Union.This discnchantment allows them to passcasily on to diverse projects of regionalncgotiations with lhe United Sares, ro rheprofit of the laner alone. These are lhefruits of a theory and a practice in whichthc fatc of DcoDIes and their socia] inrer- Fesrs are toraily i'gnorea. * C

The struggle for EritreaERITREA ls a small country about the size ol England,

stretching along the Red Sea to the north of Ethlopia. lt has3,500,000 Inhabitants, for the most part Muslim and

Christian. More than three quarters of the population isrural. Eritrea has always had a separate ldentity to Ethiopia,

and its various component kingdoms united in the 8thcentury under the threat of invasion from the Nilotic powers

to the north and Ethiopla to the south. The area aroundMassawa came under Ottoman control in 1557. From 1 869

onwards, ltalian colonialism extended its hegemonythroughout the country - this was sealed by a frontier

agreement with Great Britain and Ethiopia signed in 1903.Following ltaly's def eat ln the Second World War, a federal

union with Ethiopia was lmposed by the United Nations andGreat Britain in 1952 - this envisaged a con nuing

autonomy for Eritrea. On November 1 4, 1962, the Ethiopianarmy annexed the whole of Eritrean territory, leading to theoutbreak of a war of liberation which has continued since

then. Whilst initially several opposition groups existed, theErltrean People's Liberation Front, established ln 't 977, has

emerged as the maior component ol the liberationmovement.

Traditionally ldentified with a pragmatic "Marxist-Lenin ist,'outlook, the EPLF has recently been moderating its

ideological tone;thusr according to All said Abdallah, EpLFpolitical bureau member responsible for foreign relations,"Our programme is clear; we are for multipartyism and the

market economy" (Le Monde, May 18,'tgg0). However,Abdallah did not deny the "left influences" which continued

to mark the EPLF'S policy, and a Financial Times reporterfound that "life In the liberated areas has a socialistic

f lavour";food and clothing are distributed by the economicdepartments of EPLF commlssions, polltical education is

mandatory for the entire population and "even in thelrenches there are no ranks, no saluting" (FI Decembe t,

1989). *

demandcd political asylum (including,vcry rccently, thc vice-minister oi for,eign affairs).

The dynastic conception of the regimehas bccome such that, whcn Mengistuconfided rccendy to a merting that thcrehad bcrn sevc.al attcmpts on his lifc, hcadded that in case of his death, his sonwas rcady to ta-I(c ovcr Uc rcins ofpowcr

- a hypothesis that thc Erhiopian pcoplewill be very lttle inclined ro accepr.

The fiasco ofthe Erhiopian rcgimc alsoconstitutes the most flagrant rcfulation ofSoviet theories of states of this t)?e, cle-vated lo the status of revolutionaryregimes. It is of course legitimate to posethe question of wheher rhe Erhiopianrevolution of 1974, taking account of the

social formation of the cormtry, couldgive birft to a true socialist, dcmocraticard revolutionary leadership. But norhingobliged the Kremlin ro give irs supporr roa reprcssive and opprcssive miliraryregime - nothing, obviously, except itsown bureauqatic self-inlerest.

November 26, 1990 a #195 lntemalional Viewpoint

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

AT THE end of October 1990, a leadershlp meeting of theCzech part of Czechoslovakia's ruling Civic Forum/Publicagainst Violence coalition (OFA/PN) elected dogmaticf ree-marketeer Vaclav Klaus as its new leader. On October 30,the same body, on Klaus' proposal, voted to expel thelelt-wlng Lelt Alternative and Obroda groups from the Forumon the grounds that they had "departed from the political lineof the OF". At the meeting, according to the protocol, Klausclaimed that the "greatest enemy of OF ls [eading humanrights activist and revolutionary Marxistl Petr Uhl" and that itwas necessary to peel off the leftist current. shortly afterKIaus' election, Czechoslovakia was f inally granted MostFavoured Nation trading status by the United States.

COLIN MEADE

dissidents - is ma*ed by ulopiarism.He summcd up his credo in the main inde-pendent daily Lidoti noviny on June 21,1990: "The East Ewopean rcvolutions of1989 did not provide any fuldamentallynew ideas on key questions concemingpolitics, economics and l'he laws of inter-nalional politics - and I would add t]at itdoes not really matter. The importantthing is to realize this fact and to accepthwnbly (both) tested solutions and oldtuths as soon as possible." According toPavel Rychetsky, the deputy chair of theFederal Assembly, Klaus' election "is a

positive evenl I have constantly empha-sized the fact that the time of dissidenceand of demolishing the s(ate is over"2.

ln line with Oris call for stabilization.Klaus is opposed to extreme anli'communism and rising nationalism inSlovakia, both of which threaren to dis-rupt the statc3. He will also, one imagincs,bc against wasting further time o[ suchchimems as Foreign Minister Jiri Dienst-bier's statcment in January that Czecho-slovakia would end its involvement in thcarns trade "wirhout Laking into accounlwhat the pragmatists say or \lhether itwill be a blow to the state's coffe$" 4 orthe vision of a "pluralist Euope withoulblocs" ouUined by Dienslbier in Januaryand revivcd by the Hclsinki Citizens'Assembly which met in Prague this Octo-ber (see /V 194).

Centre and left unlte againstright

The allempr to expcl L,eft Allemativcand Obroda from Civic Forum has mctwith considerable resistance. The OF par-lianentary fraction has come out againstit, and, according to fte Cuardiar Q,on-don) of November 6, "sizeable numbenol Fofl.rjn MPs in the Federal and Czcchparliamenrs rebellcd againsr rhe decision,desc bing it as an 'undcmoqatic out-rage"'.

An lntcr-paJliamenlary Civic Associa.tion (ICA) has beeIl formcd by OF depu-ties as a counterweight to Klaus' Club ofthe Dcmocratic Right, involving figuresftom beyond those threatened with expul-sion, among them the social democratRudolf Battek and Val[ Komarck. TheICA states its aim as being to keep theCivic Forum true to its original pro-gramme, as a broad dcmocralic socialmovement, resisting "ftc artificial idco-logical division of the OF into right andIeft." 5

A spokesmar for kfi Altemative, NIar-lin Hckrdla, commented: "our lhinking isreally at odds wilh what is happening now

I .t I-A[,S' Dutsch has becnI!

"..o-runlccr bv the rornatlon

f, or a "club ot the uemocratrcf La,gn, rncruorng ovcr ru mcmbers of rhe OF's fraction in lhc Fcdcralparliamcnt and coincidcs with lie discus-sion in parlianent on thc so-called "smallprivatization law", which dcals with thcchangc of owncrship of small firms, businesses and properties. These arc to besold at public auctions in two rounds,uirh only Czechosloval citizcns bcingallowcd to talie part in the firstround. Noprcferential treafircnt is given to currentemptoyees

- a source of considcrable

discontcnt amongst said cmplolces inrc.cnt months. This goes hand in handwirh a bill to organize restitution ofprop-erlics - cxcluding agriculture - confis'catcd aftcr 1955.

This is to be followcd by a "largc pri-vatization law", to dccide the falc of thebig state monopolies. Thc tenth variant ofthis lattcr, adopted as a proposal by lhcgovemment at the start of Novcmbcr,cnvisages thc issuing of "coupons" toevery Czclhoslovak citizell which canonly bc uscd to buy sharcs. ForcigIr own-ership is ro be limircd. If thc timcrablc isadhered to, a final version of this lawshould take effect in Spring ncxt ycar.Almost a year aftcr lie "genllc rcvolu-tion" put an end to lhe neo-Slalinistrcgimc that had ruled Czechoslovakiasincc April 1969, pro-capitalist hardlin-ers havc scized the initiative in lhe strug-gle over the future of fie country.

Vaclav Klaus, dcscribcd as a "main-slrc.u]l cconomist who bclievcs in b:Isiclextbook economic thinking" is thefinalce ministq in the Federal govcrn-ment. For months therc have bccn repo sin lhe press about tcnsions bctwccn him

and figtllcs allegedly wishing to pursue a"third way" betwecn full-scale privatiza-tion and the impqativcs of social prote.-tion.

Ir would be hard to find arly leadingfigure giving explicit support to such a"third way". Nonelhclcss Klaus' tarSet islhe outlook of Prcsidcnl Havcl and hiscircle who are considcrcd excessivelysEnsitive to the social costs of capitalistrestoration in practice, and thus guilly of"populism". Such populism also consistsin rcfusing to break dccisively wilh thosemaintaining "vague hopes still linked Iosocialism in one way or anothea'.r

A number of prominent figwes asso-ciated with the moderatc viewpoint, not'ably Valu Komarck, an cconomist whoczrme to prcminence during the Novem-ber evcnts, have sccn lhcmsclvesrcmovcd from influcntial positions inCivic Forum ilt recent wccks, whileKlaus beat a closc fricnd of Havel's,Martin Palous, for lhc leadins position inoF.

Discreet but systematicoposition

Klaus'growing authority rests on adiscrcct but systematic opposition to lllcsryle of thc tcam that shot lo powcr aftcrthe Novcmber rcvolution. His clcction tothc hcad of Civic Forum was followcdby a scdcs of intcrviews in the Czecho-slovak mcdia - usually wifi headlinesalong thc lincs of "$e sta of a ncwepoch"

- in which his vicws on all sub-

jcc6, from the Slovak crisis to anti.communism to economic Policy weresolicitcd, as if the counLry had a new rul-er. In Klaus' vicw the thinking of theHavcl team - many o[ them long-lime

l. Latervicw wi$ PeIr Havlil, an advi$! to Klaus, inM lo.4a ha

^ta- Octotyt 22- I99A-

2 f,.#.tr, Ocbh.r 30,1990.

6lnternational Viewpoint #195 a November 26, 1990

3. 1vas..l intdiew, October 29,I 99O4- Nd Yotk Tin.s, r..rary 25,1990.5. Svrbodl rlavo, Novdbd l, 1990.6. Or"a^rb &^it, Novdbei I , I 990.7 - Rudl ptdro, Novmb.t 1, 1990.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

in Civic Forum, but not witi its originalcondition. I would like to iemind peopleof the OF's election slogan: 'lhe partiesare for their membels, we arc for every-one"'. 6 And Obroda's Milos Hajek insdt-ed: "insofar as OF turns into a right-wingpafly, I, as one of the founders of CivicFomm, deny thar they will then have theright to the Civic Forum label." ,

The right wing offensive takes placeagainst a backgiound of sliding publicconfidence in the governmeflts cle.ted inJune, in the Civic Forum movement andin politics in general. An opinion pollpublishcd in Septcmber found rhar 2970 ofpeople in Bohemia, 3270 in Moravia and437, in Slovakia bclieved that the changessince last November were more aboutreplacing peGonnel in the top posts thansubstantial reform. The poll also revealedOrat while in lm\\uy 4OEo of people hadbe4n ready to ger involved i[ public life,this had fallen to 2-470, Communist parrysuppo els, and supporters of thg Slovaknalionalists and Moravian regionalistmovcments! however, retained considem-bly more interest in taking on politicalresponsibiliry. Nonetheless the poll alsodiscovcred rhat thcrc "were big hopcs indrc forthcoming local clections in Novem-bcr. Thc hope was that ftese would stafl areal change in thc systcm".3 A subscquentpoll found tlat only l47o of respondentsin thc Czech Lards (Bohcmia and Mora-via) had grcal confidence in rhe Civic For-um, while some 2070 had o confidence atall.e

The govcmmcnt tcam has futhcrmoreantagonized a lor of pcople by appearingas a club of ex-dissidents, sharhg out thetop positions amongst themselves. Havclhimsclf is surrounded by advisols

- usu,ally personal friends - who form a sortof "second goverrurenf' outside parlia-menlary conrol.

Rule of the ex-dissldentcom mandantes

Al rhis level Klaus' moves can appcar

as a step towards clearcut democraticpolitics against rhe rule of rhe ex-dissident commandantcs. The vaguenessof the Civic Forum's srucures - esscn-tial to Klaus' victory - is also a charac-teristic of the elitist liberra anism of rhenew governing stmtum. The rton-existcnce of a defined pafiy structue is acondition for Havel's abiliry to appear asabove day-to-day politics, while in facrdirecting much of whar happens. Itseams that in some areas local Civic For-urns function as exclusive clubs ntherthan as a organization that those whowant to can join, and according to PetrIJhl, there are only a few hundrcd or per-haps a fcw thousand Civic Forum acti-vists at a regional and district level.lo

The OF's media spokcsperson, Vladi-mir Zeleaty, furthermorc, admits that thestudent movement which provided muchof lhc impetus behind the Novembcrevcnis no longq exists, and there is noOF group ar Praguc's Charles Universi-ty. ll

Evidcntly any party or figure whoappears to rcpreselr Orc possibiliry ofopcn discussion and dccisive movement

- whcther towards thc "free markct" aswith Klaus or towards legional ornation-al independence or autonomy, as withlhc Slovak and Moravian movcmcnls -will have the bcncfit of a widesDreidfc.ling that hard dcaisions are urgcn yneedcd.

At the same limc, Klaus and the pro-capitalist righr fc€l thar rhcy musr gctdown to work to crcatg adequate instru-ments for thc bloody busincss of tumingCzechoslovakia into a normal peripheralcapiralist country, with a position in theEuopean perking order similar toCreece or Poturgal. Czechoslovakia was

- and remains - one of fte most com-pletcly nationalized economies in thoworld, including a lor of our-of-date"smokcslack" industry, Any altempt toralionali;c this monstcr witlout strongpowqs of conlrol and if nccessary vetoby those adverscly affcc(cd, will givc a

frightening push to social disintegmtion.The privatization assault takes place,

fwthermore, against a deteriorating eco-nomic background, due both to intemaland extcmal factors. The East Germanmarket has now been closed off, while lhesupply of oil from the Soviet Union hasbcen cut at a moment when $e Gulfcrisishas shut off possibilities of finding cheapaltematives, Czechoslovakia will alsohave bc€n hit by the anri-Iraqi sanctions,since Iraq has big dcbts wirh Czechoslo-vakia.

The rocky road toprivatizatlon

Nonetheless, despite the apparent pro-market conscnsw, the hlloduction of pri-vatization and its economic prere4uisitc,free prices, have in fact hardly got undcr-way. Where changes have been madc,rhey have prcvoked rcactions. Proposalsfor the privatization of shops and restau-rants via public auction werc met withstrikes by workers in these secto$ who"pointed out that they would have to bidagainst black marketeen and formerapparatchiks, who were the only Czecho-slovaks with sufficient capital to buysmall businesses." l2

Lidoyl raviny o'J.Octobcr 30, reports onthe poslponement of a strike by haguetransport workers, who wanted to ensuethat "privatizal.ion" took place in a folmfavouable to their intcrcsts, On Novem-ber 3, thc same papcr rcpofis on a mine$'slrikc against plans to close a pit. ByNovcmber l, some 900 minqs were slilloccupying thc minc. Strikes againsr pricerises and petrol rarioning have bccntheatencd in the oil industry, The tradeunions have come out in favow of formsof private ownership favouring employ-ecs raftcr than open auctions.

Communist party posesproblem tor the left

Vaclav Klaus'rcsponse to criticism ofhis progmmme is rhat of his poliricalco-drinker, Margaret Thatcher,"'l'here is,to ahernatiye (TINA)', asshc has been telling rhe British andanyono clse who has cared to listenfor ovcr a decadc. And ir is indccdtrue that the weakness and disarray ofthe left is a crucial source of strenSthfor the pro-capiratist righr. The Com-munist Pany leador, Vasil Mohorira,reccntly claimed rlat the country wasenlering a pcriod of intcnsc confrcn-tations and proposed that the CP re-establish its facrory cells.

8. Lid.rt novinr, Octob.t 10,1990.9. Udor, @vi,t, O<^*'d tZ 1990.lO tnEivicw pi0t SLvc P.inrcr, in th. Austnti-E sci.Iist p.ftly, Dil.cr t rian, Nov6bc! 6.1990. r990.ll. Irrcrvicw BIh Srcvc Pei'Er, Odob€r 10,1990.l2 Accordirg ro Srev. painld. Dipct A.tio,,octob.r 2l, 1 990. 7

ct sfi

/t//

7'I

I

- = ..--I'Give back what you have 3toton,' -

,,tnv63t wh.t youhav. .toton,,(liom Lidov6 hoviny]

November 26, 1990 a #195 lnternationat Vlewpoint

co lata

t/

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Such was thc oulrage that this proPosal

creatcd including a 20,000 strong

dcmonstralion in haguc - fiat Mohori-ta backcd down and has now bccn

replaced as pary lcadcr. The CP has

already lost most of its pre-Novcmber

splits by organized currenl.s. It is none-thclcss possiblc that lhc pafiy \ir'ill

al.tempt with some success some social

demagogy in lhc coming pcriod, wilh lheintcntion o[ bcing rc-admittcd in oneform or anothcr to lhe corridors of pow-

Apart from the CP there are a number ofcuIrcrts who rcfer in one way or anothetto lefFwing ideas and the raditions of tieworkerc' movement, among them thcSocial Demoqats (who are split into twowings, one inside the Civic Forum, thcofier independent of it), $e DemocralicForum current which split from the CP aIthe sLarl of lhis year. Obroda, which main-ly contains individuals prominent as

"refom Commuflists" in the PragueSpring of 1968, the Irft Altcrnative andthe Anarchists. Evidcntly, developing apolicy towards fte Communist Party isone of the strategic problems for a viableleft in Czeahoslovakia, as well as thequestion of intemational contacts.Another issue is how to assess prescnldevelopmcnls in Civic Forum and how torclate the Ilced for an organized left to l}ledesire to creatc a broad social movement.

Left searches lor an"integrating element"

The various left grcups and currenlshave be4n secking ways of uniling lhcircfforts. The Czechoslovak Social Dcmo-cralic Palry, which slaye-d ou'.side CivicForum, looking towards thc momcntwhen a "modem pafly slrucnrle" wouldcome into cxistence -

via lhc disintegra-tion of OF - is now putting itself forwardas the "inlcgrating element" of the demo-craric left. Obroda appea$ to bc rcspond-ing to these ovefiures.I3

Elsewhere, tift Altemative and lheCzechoslovak Democlatic forum are Plan-ning to collaborab on the production of ajoint newspaper. According to Jiri Koudain l]lc Lefl Altemative monrhly, Polarila,"the hysterical shouting [from the right]about the formation of a left are unforru-nately untrue. The demoqatic left findsitself in a phase of trying to find its ownidenrity and prcfile. Sporadic attempts at

dialoguc. and somctimes collaboration,take place in the shadow of fears cast byrhe dark shape of the Communist Parry."l'Noncthelcss, Left Alternarive and olher

such grcups arc attempting to speak to theneeds and fe-clings of the Czechoslovakworkers, supporting for examPle a Clubfor Sclf-maraged Popular Enl.erFiscswhich aims to "put forward a conccpt forthe de-statization and privatization of thcnational propefiy which is a rcal alterna-tive to lJle existing goverrunent proPo'sals."r5 Furthermore thcy have thepossibilily of drawing on all the fomlcsshopcs for radical social change arouscd

last year, and which are curcntly bcingdisappointcd by an indeaisive Sovernrnentwhose libertarian utopiarism lacks a

socialist backbone. As lic pollsrcls citodabove notcd: "A crisis of Civic Forumis...a crisis of the whole reform pro-cess.'d'*

mcmbership and suffered a numbq of cr

lnternational Viewpoint #.195 a November 26, 1990

rS.L o ro'i^y, Novqbq 7,1990.14. Pola,iia. Nov@ber 5, 1990.

l5.Pahn,a, Novanb.r 5, 1990.

the lederatlzed stale structures to come to the tore'

ber 7, 1990).

movement

8

POLAND

, , TORN bctwecn Walesa andll Mazowiccki. betwccn support lbrthe programme of Balcerowicz and theaspirations of the workels, we are under-going a profound identity crisis. On theone hand, Solidamosc is associatcd withthe economic policy of the govemmentand its effects for the majority of workers.On the other, these same workers expectSolidamosc to defend their interests. Thissihration produces a form of schizophre-nia inside the trade union and disarrayamong its militants. tom bctween theirloyalty to ou.r goverunent and thattowards the peoplc in the workplaces.

"The choice is cled: either Solidarnoscwill take cognizance o[ ils tradc unionfunction -

which the workeG (that isthose who have to sell their labour powerfor a wage, whether it is workels or intcl-lcctuals, whcther thcy are employed in a

factory or a faculty) nccd - or Solidar-nosc will become a museum piece and theworkeE will find a new tool, betlcr adapt-ed l.o the defence of thet iaterests.

"The Committee for Intcr-EntcrpriseCoordination (l\4KK), which compriscs17 Wroclaw cnterpriscs, was formed iirAugust 1990 to reflect on this subject. weshare the conviction that Solidamosc mustbecome an effective representalive of Oleworkers in the face of the new marketmechanisms, the tramformations in thesphcre of propcrty, of unemploymont, of01e privileged position of thc fomernomcnklatura.

The impact of theBalcerowicz programme

"Our tladc union must in particular tumits attention to l.he Balcercwicz pro-gramme. This cnvisages a fall in ildustrialproduction of the ordcr of 10-157o, where-as rhe real fall betwecn January and Mayof this year was 3070. Consumer priceswerc 1509c higher in April of this yearthan in lasl Dccembcr whereas salaricshave fallen by around 43qo, Unemploy-ment at the end of September had alreadyreachcd 926,400.

"If our trade union docs not enter publicnegotiations with the govemmcnt aroundour cconomic programme. the discussionwill take placc in the strcct and Polandwill be r.ansformed inlo a reseNoir ofcheap labour artd a dumping ground forthe rest of Europc.

"Inside the regional leadcrship such adiscussion has been lacking. The oricnta-tion of the regional leadcrship has gonecounter to the opinion in the workplaces.Wladyslaw Frasyniuk - for whom I feelsomc sympathy and whom I respect pro-foundly - has chosen to takc on top levelresponsibilitics inside ROAD, an organization which identifies itself with the gov-emmcnt and with the programme ofBalcerowicz. It does not add up to a per-sonal conflict with Wladyslaw Frasyniuk.It is not a question of ROAD alone. Wewould havc Lhc samc siluarion if Lhe prcsi- 9

November 26, 1990 a #195 lntematlonal Viewpoint

POLAND

dcnt of the regional trade rmion becamethc leader of the Alliance of the Centre[Walcsa's parry]. I desirc only that theproblem oI thc idcntiry of Solidamosc -its place in Lhe new economic and socio-political landscape - is settled on thebasis of rcspect for the principles of inter-nal democracy of the trade union, by adiscussion around prcgramme, a regionalcongress and the election of leade6.

"Our region could become the nucleusarcund which a new identity for Solidar-nosc is formed. The tradition of the years1980-81 and the fact that during the slateof cmergency wc wcre one of the strong-cst and best-organized zones, lhe fact thatthroughout this period thc continuity oithc entorprisc sructures of Solidamoscwas preseryed in our region - all thiscould help us today to find new solutions.

"Thc regional lcadcrship must bringtogclher all thc initiatives arising frominside the workplaces. Wc mustrcnew Lhc

practice of 1980-81, that of weekly mcct-ings of the rcgional leadcrship with thcrcprcsentatives of the biSScst entcq)risesof the region and of regular mcetings ofrhc rcgional lcaders with (hc lrade unroncommissions and thc workers insidc thecntcrpdscs.

Need for regular internallnformatlon

"The union must have a genuine systemof intemal information. Il is scandalousthal thcre has not bcen in our region a scri-ous lradeunion bulletil to provide an cffi-cicnt system of circulaling informationbclwccn all theenlcrpriscs ofrhc rcgion.

"With all lhe esteem that I have for thepcople cmployed by thc cxecutive o[ thctrade Mion, I fiink that they cannotrcplace the lcadcrship of thc union. Thctmnsfer of dccision-making from thcelccted structurcs lowards thc cxccutiveslruclwes is a sign of burcaucratizationand cvidcnce of the gravc crisis o[ Soli-damosc.

"The orSanization o[ thc wotk insidethc region and of its leadership docs nothowever conslitule a goal in itself. lt mustscrve the defcnce of the interests of tlreworkers. To this cnd, the regional lcadcr-ship must cstablish commissions chargedwith the analysis of the cconomic, socialand political situation of the workersinsidc theenlerpriscs, bol}l public and privalc.

"The rcgional leadcrshiP must be capa-blc of helping each entcrprise, from Lhe

point olvicw of its cmployees, in thc faceof thc economic chanSgs undcrway -privatization. bankruplcy of cnlcrprrsesand uncmploymcnt. We ftust immcdiale-ly undertake lhe calculation of ftc cost ofliving so as to dispose of our own data onthc pauprisation of the society. we mustscck to eslablish contacts with radeunions in rhc foreign enterprises which

10 Xl:i]',ffll"'i:h::.''lT; """."ff :?

labour, the behaviour of ftese firmstowards lhe workers and the trade unionsin othcr counEies and paflicularly in thetlird world, so as tojudgc whcrher what istaking place is lhe transfq to our coultryof ecologically damaging productioninadmissible elscwhcle.

"lf *re worksrs are to bc able to respondin the face of the market transformations,they must have access to information. Theagencics of the regioflal leadershipchargcd with these problems mustemploy the best specialists and disposc ofmodem data processing means, like bankso[ compulcrized data on Lhc changes inthe structue of the rcgional economy, ofits ownership, allowing thcm to monitorjob vacancies, unemployment, profes-sional illness, thg situation of youth alldthe old, thc erological situation, and soon. wc can count on thc hclp ofthe west-em uade unions who sympalhize with ouractivity for the implementation of such aprojc.t.

Rebuild unity of workers andlntellectuals

"This activity will not bc possible wi$-out thc help of spccialists or more gener-ally intellectuals. I do not bclicve thathsids Solidamosc a division bctweenworken and intcllectuals is possible. Wewere togclher in the s[ikcs and in theprisons, in the struggle for a fteer andmore just world. lt is tmacccptable thatour roads should separate today.

"The rcgional leadership will certainlyobtain the help of Oe scicntific milieuxand of inteuectuals to organize a Centreof Socio-Profcssional Rescarch of ouruadc union.

"Thc branchcs arc, togcther with thcworkplaces, thc principal terrain of tradcunion activity. It is ncccssary then 10 doevcrylhing so that inside Solidarnosc thedivc$e reprcscntations of thc bmnchescan organize thcmsclves and present thetactic they havc agrccd on throughout theunion. But to abandon our cuEcnt slruc-twc in cxchangc for a venical bnnchstructwe would be contrary to our tcn-ycar old fadition and would put injcopar-dy rhc pdncipal charactqistic of Solidar-nosc - the dcfcnce of the weakcrbranchcs by lhe sfonger. The maintc-nancc of our unity will dcpcnd on thestrcngth of thc union and lhc role which itwill be capablc ofplaying in fie futue.

"Thc Womens' Commissions of Soli-damosc mustplay an important role in theactivity of thc regional leadcrship. wom-cn are, asidc from youth aIrd old peoplc,thc most thrcalcncd social group today.Thc womcns' Commissions can dynan-ise the work of our union and offer it ncwhorizons.

"Wc must addrcss oursclvcs to the ncwgcnqation of workcrs, aPprentices andstudcnts, and find a common languagewith thc youth who arc abscnt from ourranks although l'hcy wcrc rhc most aclivc

in the struggle for the legalizatiol of soli-damosc duing these last years. We must,as oftcn as possible, suppofi t}le initiativesof the youth, for example in obtaining acultunl ccnffe for the altemative youthmovcments, or a meeting place for thcassociations of conscientious objectors.

Conrlront chauvlnism andantl-semitism

"We must inspire ouselves with thcethos of Solidamosc and thc lraditionalvalues of our movement to confront chau-vinism, anti-semitism and racism. We donot have the ght to close our eyes tothese phenomena. On this teEain weshould seek unity of action wilh all thosewho, likc us, dcfcnd lolerancc, includingthe st ctly political organizations.

"Wc have to devalop cooperation withforeign trade union orgarizatioN, includ-ing dirccr enLerprise links. wc musl bringour suppon lo thc independcnt lradc unionmovcment which is foming in central andeastem Europe and, in particular, estab-lish p vileged links wilh thc trade unionsofthercgions of Gcrmany and Czechoslo-vakia bordering us, so as Io undeflale inthe futule common ecological and eco-Iromic projects. We must show out tadeunionist fratemity bwatds those who,Oroughout the whole world, struggle fortrade union and political ghls. The sanlefratemity which the world showcdtowards our sEuggle after December 13,1981."lt adds up only to a minimum pro-

griunme, to a presentation of the problemsthat confront Solidamosc. I hoPe that ourtrade union will find enough strength torenew itself in the new economic and

socio-political landscape of our country,rhar it will forge an identity that will allowit to rcFcsent with dignity the intcrestsoftthc workers. lt is with lhis hope that I takeDart in the conpress of Solidamosc ini-ower Silcsia." *

:

lnlernatlonal Viewpoint #195 a November 26, 1990

\

\

USSFI

"Achieyements" ofOctoberIN RESPONSE to the indepcndence-minded governments of lhe rcpublics andfre liberal opposition, who opposed cele-brating the anniveBary of the Octoberrcvolution, the ollicial Soviet press pub-lishcd many anicles defending the logacyof Lhe revolution.

One of thc more notablc was the front-page article h Pravda of Octobcr 23 bytwo academics, P. Volobuev and O. Ioffc.They cited the defensc of the BolshovikSovemment by the Czarist gencral Brusi-lov: "And here is the testimony ofanoted,non-socialist gelleral, A. A. Brusilov:

"The rcvolution was a necessity forRussia....The Bolsheviks in manyrespects were right. They rcoted out thedecayed Russian aristocracy, and tookaway the woalth accumulated over manyyears by the industrialists and landowncrsat thc expense of the Russian people. TreBolsheviks, fiully, saved the territot ialinteg t iry of R(ssia." four ernphasis.]

This idea that thc Soviet Union was arcstored Russian empire led in fact to aseclion o[ lhe counlerevolulion goingovct to supporting the soviet slate.Togethcr wilh an irrationalist current inthe Bolshevik milieu l.hey became knownas "national Bolsheviks." Their influcncercached a hcight during the war wi0rPoland. It is one of thc sourccs of Stalinisrsocial chauvinism. *

By e I o ru ssi an nati on ati st sWHILE Lhc growth of rhe Ukrainiannational democratic movement has beon aconslanl prcoccupaLion of Pravda firecent months, in lhe last weeks theSoviet CP daily has started raising analarm abouf the Byelorussians.

Irl ils November 6 issue, it tepofted:"According to Zycie Worsazawy lrl].ePolish prestige dailyl, ar rhe end of Ocro-bcr in the Polish city of BielaWieza in ftecounry of Bialyslock, a meeting tookplace betwecn leaders of he People'sFront o[ Byclorussia and Byelorussiancmigres from lhc USA, England, Polandand other countdcs.

Plans were discussed for forming anindependent state on the Erritory of Byel-orussra.

Onc of l}le lcadcrs of the Byelorussiannationalists in Poland, Ianovich, !,ointedorl in Ztcie WaBzaW, 'None of theSoviet rcpublics alone is able to achievcindependence. Thc idca has ripcncd offorming a Ballic ro rhe Black Sea unioninvolving Eslonia. Larvia, Li|l]uania,Byelorussia and LIkahe. The condition

for achieving this objecLive is the brcakup ot rhe USSR and the dcmocralizarionof Russia.

"But I'he achicvemenl of this gocl isbcing blocked by the West, which fears asudden shift in the balarce of forccs inIhc world that could lcad to unforeseea,blc consequences."

The Novembq 12 issue carlied a shortstory under the hcadlinc, "[s this consoli-dalion?" which rcported a statement bythe Byclorussian CP Bueau on a demon-sradon held by thc Peoplc's Front onNovemberT:

"Notcd in particular was lhc clcar ant-govcmmcnt, anti-Communist charactcrof lhe maich and mccting hcld by lhePcople's Front in Minsk. The tensestmomcnt was Lhe incidcnl at the monu-ment of V. I. [.cnin. A leadcr ofrhs Byel-onrssian Pcople's Front, zEe\onPoznyak, dcmanded that a group of tenpe$ons be allowed to go up to the basc ofthe statue to place obje.ts that he consid-crcd charactcrized the 73-year history ofthe counlry.

" When this pemission was not given,a few hundred pcoplc tricd by force tobrcak through the police lines around thcmonuncnt. Dcspile qurtc sharp resis-tancc, a few succceded. On thc stalue oftlrc chief of thc rcvolutiol and thcfounder of thc statc, national [Byelorus-sianl flags werc placcd....

"Thc Burcau o[ I'hc CP of Byelorussiaconsidcrs that thc govcmmcnt of lhcrcpublic should nrake a principlcd asscss-mcnt of who faciliratcd rhc carying outof this anti-Sovicl action."

The Byelorussian CP and govemmcntrcmain among thc last bastions of unre-conslrucled Stalinism. But thc Peoplc'sFront won imponant victorics in Minskin the last.elccrions and has becn growingrapidly. t

Prlvate PropertyA LEGAL EXPERT, Dr. E. Su}<hanov,offcrs a weighly defense of private prop-efly in the November 5 issue of Pravdrz

- lhe privare propcrty of thc CommunistParty, that is.

The introduction to lhc picce says,"Rqlcntly, dcfcnso of thc right ofowncr-ship has bocamc cspecially timely."

Thc problcm, Sukhanov cxplaincd, isthc growth of dcmands for nationalizinglhe CP's propefly, and rhis afrcr rhe gov-cmment has taken such important stcpstoward establishing a "sratc based onlaws" in which the rights of owncrswouldbc guaranteed.

"As is well known, the Law on Owncr-ship in the USSR went into force on Jurc

I of this year. For he filst time in our leg-islation it provided for clear legal defenseof owners from direct interference of gov-errment organs in the sphere of fteir prop-erty.

"Ir clearly distinguished cases of illegalviolation of the rights of owners (includ-ing by govemment bodies) and caseswhcn ownership is limited on legalgrormds, in both cases offedng owners theappropdate rights to defend rhcir prcpeflyinterests.

"In thc fiIst category are cases when theright oI ownership is violated as a rcsult ofactions contrary l'o laws of govemmcntadminis[ative bodies ( from ministrics otdepaflmcnts to the adminisEations or theoffice of the cxccutive committee of alocal soviet) or a local govemment organ(a local Soviet of Pcople's Depuries andlowcr bodies).

"Very rmforfunately, such illegal actsare now occurring not. infrequently, and inthis regard the distinction between theauthority of govcmment orgfis and thegovemmenl and judicial aurhoriries isbcinS totally ignored.

"Fo. exarnple, not lor,E ago MoscowNews (see, for example, No. 43, October28, 1990) reponcd fiat l}le Yaroslav cirysoviet had adopled a resolution calling foran 'invcntory' of thc party's property. TheKemcrovo disEict soviet [center of themirers' movcmentl sct up a 'Commissionto Make An lnvenrory of rhe Propcfly offic CPSU.' In Donctsk [anorhcl centcr ofthe miners' movcment], a strike rally'demanded nationalization' of the party'sProPerty.

"lt is clear that all resolutions ofrhebod-ics named (leaving aside thc resolutions ofrallies, which have no legal value)-..aresubordinatc to the law, including the lawon propcrty.

"Whcn such goverrnent organs adoptIlormative or individual resolutions con-flicting wilh Ore law or going beyond rhcirmandate and violating the ghts of prcpcr-ly owncrs. for cxample by dcclaring'cxclusivc ownership' by the local sovietof propcrty or nanrral resources on its ter-ritory, or'lationalizing' rhe property ofspccific owners, such rcsults will bedealarcd invalid on l'he complaint of $eowncr or peNons whosc righG have beenviolatcd (page 34 of fie Law on Properry).

"Morcover, all losses suffercd by own-erc as a result ofthc adoption of such reso-lutions is to bc compensated for fully fromlhe means at the disposal of the corre,sponding govemmcnt body or administra-lion". Sulhanov explained rhar a acorbachcv's direcrive [daze] oI Ocrober I I

I

November 26, 1990 a #195 lnternational Viewpotnt

USSR

12 established that property could only betaken away from its owner by coru t ordo.

"Considering the un formnately wide,sPread disrespccl for lhe law in our socie-ty, the legal nihilism displayed even bylocal govemmcnt bodies, the presidcnt'sdiective also called on the law-enforcingorgans, not only ro firmly stop any illegalconfiscation ofproperty, but to takc meas-ures of a prcvcntalive character by pullingunder protcctio[ propcrty threalcned wirhillcgal confiscation.....

"lt is to bc hoped that the thorcughSoingimplementation of fte demands in lhcdirective will crcate firn guarantccs ofstability of economic and legal propcrtyrelations, make it possible in fact 10 con-solidate the legal order, and thcrcby toassure an imponant precondition for rcalransition to a civilizcd markel economyand a statebased on laws." )t

How to ftglht thenomenklaturaTHE INDEPENDENT Lithuanian Com-munistPafiy Iwhich rcpresents the bulk ofrhc old CP in the republicl is energcticallytrying to shift the onus o[bureauqacy andauborita anism onto Sajudis and thc gov-cmment itcontrols.

For exan1ple, the october 25 issuc of iBdaily, Tiesa, oIferc a long article by thesccrctary of lhc party's Central Commit-tcc, Gediminas Kirkilas, subtitled: "whycreale a new nomenklatura under thc cov-cr of fighting thcnomenklatrrla?"

Kirkilas wriles: "It is symptomatic tharaftcr the announccmcnt of the decisions ofrhc Sixrh Plenum of the LKP ll-irhuaniarCPl, the senscless and incorrect stanceagainsl thc party was rcinforccd.

"This is strange, becausc if our oppo-ncnts havc a sound mind and conccm forLithuania, they could easily undqstandthat at our lupcomingl spccial congrcss,wc will finally removc our "Comnrunistbadge," both the ideology and politicalpraclice of Marxism-Lcninism. sctlleaccounts with our past and becomc a rcalparliamcntary parry Uat will no longcrrcprcscnt in Lithuania 'thc pos! iLy ofrcstoring a pro-CommLlnlsl rc8li.

Thc LKP, moreovcr, no longcr had any-thing do do with thenomcnklatua:

"[Lhas to be cla fied whatthenomonklatura is....Thc LKP Ccntlal Committe€system of confrrming nomenllaturacadresceascd functioning in themiddlc oflast ycar.....l suspcct that now thc parlia-mcntary majority is trying to form a

nomcrlklatwa, bccause the dcpartmcntheads are bcing choscn from 'rcliablc'pcople bccause...the crirerion of compe-lcnce is not bcing given thc most wcighl."

Kirkilas admonishcd thc govcmmentnot 10 rcpcat mistakes of Lhc Bolshcviks,such as d.ivilg away intcllecluals, ofwhom thcrc wcre many ir the rar*s of theLKP, or tuming on thcir former allics in

a 4:l lhc fight for re form:l3 kl us not rcpcat Lhe palh of lhe Rus

sian revolution of 1917, While it was nec-essary to overthrow the czar, the Bolshe-viks allied ihemselvcs with others. Butafter that they tumed first of all againsrtleir closest allics. While Sajudis ne€dedthe cover of Communists, they nccdcdJust. Marcinkevicius, B. Cenzclis and v.Bubnys and m.rny others. Now they arepractically encmics oI thc people."

Kirkilas evcn seemed to oppose t}lc ideaof a pafly press in gencral. "An idcologi-cal press, no matter what il may be -Soviet or Populist [a refcrence to the pre-war ruling partyl

- forccs peoplc intoconformism, adaptation."

The article was directed mainly at callsfor removing the old bureaucrats. It citcda refcrcncc by A. Maldeikcnius in Lier!-vos Rlle Lo the purge caried out by USoccupation authorilies in Japan.

Kirkilas' answer to such demands wasthe following: "Thqc is only one way tofight the nomenklatwa. It is the markct,indcpcndence in manageial and econom-ic initiative."

In other words, forgct about workcrsdcmocracy. That might lead to a lamcnla-ble loss of"qualificd" cadres. )k

Red bout$eoisleTO PROVE its ncw pluralist convictions,Pruvda tcg\\luly runs a "discussionshe4t." The onc in the October 3l issuefor the first timc gave space to currcntsoutside the Communist Party, publicizingthcir conferences.

Another first was an articlc by V. Baku-Iirl, which took up the qucslion of"rccon-vcrsion" of thc nomcnklatura:

"Today fie question ofowncrship oflhcmeans of production is aSain coming toLhc ccnter of attention. If aftcr Octobcrthis propeny was taken away from lhcbourgeoisic and transfcrred into thc handsof thc prolelaian govemmcnt, in thc1920s and espccially thc 1930s thc righBof administc ng it and in part using itwcrc usurpcd by the nomenllatura.Today, in lhe conditions of pereslroik:.4,whcn thc qucstion has actually bean

Zigrids Dzedulis drew a fairly grey pictueof the Latvian Popular Front's Thfud Con-grcss on Octobq 6. His article was pub-lished in the October 13 issue ofLiteraturaun Moklo, subdtled "A subjec-tive rcflcction on the LTF'S [Latvias Tautas Frcntas, Lalvian Popular Front]congress." He u,rore that the galhering"clearly rcfleated the exhaustion and apa-thy of Ore section of society that tlreeyears ago founded the organization sing-ing folksongs arld wavingbanners."

Thc problem was that nothing funda-menral had changed .

"Everyone expe.ted radical measuresfrom the parliamcnt and the govcmment

- radical action and quick results. TheLawians are expecting action that willenable them to survive, to protect them-selves from Russilication and cxtinction.

"But the govcrnment, which does flothave its own army , border guards, or relia-ble sccurity installalions. which does notcontrol il.s territory, harbo6, airports, onlypartially thcmeans ofproduction and whatis produced and whose economy is sub-jected ro an indircrt blockade, is practical-ly incapable of tulfilling suchexpectalions.

"ln this situation, the govemment isobligcd to take stcps that are unpopularwith fte people. lt is said ftat since lhceloolions. the LTF has lost about 50,000votes.

"In thc history books we havc read aboutdual powq in Russia. But it secms ftatthere is multiple power today in Latvia -thc xrmy. tle MvD. lhc neo-Slalinisl wingof tlrc Latvian CP Ccntral Committee, thcgencral majugels of the industiial ellte!'pdses subordinated to the USSR and thcMafioso network of trade officials, whoincrease political ohaos, consciously fos'tcr interetlmic hared and dclibomtclyplundcr the national cconomy."

Polirical debalc has bccn dcvcloping inthe Latvian front in he face of such diffi-cultics.

Ir rcmxins to bc sccn iI the options wcrefurlhcr clarified al its lalest congrcss. *

raiscd of nrming ovcr gov-emment property (to onedcgrce or arothcr and indiffercnt forms) into thehands of thc workqs, anew Soviet bougeoisie isrying ro gcthold of it.

"Our ncw bougcoisiehas a fair bit of politicalexpcricncc, sincc one ofits componcnts is thc verysamc nomcnllatura, oust-cd from its managerialchaits by pe r e s t r o i ka". *

Latyian front ata tuminEl point?IN THE PAPER of thecrcativc unions, thelaunch pad of thc nationaldcmocral.ic movemcnt.

)

lnternatlonal Viewpoin, #195 a November 26, 1990

a-a-

ROMANIA

SweepinEprivatizations PlannedDHASTIC price raises on November 1 represent a decisiveturnlng polnt for the regime that emerged f rom the overthrowof Ceaucescu. Freeing of prices and accelerated privatization'together with devaluation of the national currency, wereannounced by the premier, Petre Roman, in his report toparliament on October 18. lt is hardly a coincidence that only aweek betore this, the minister for economic guidance, EugenDiimarescu, declared that the government intended to removethe managements elected by the workers in the wake of therevolution and to replace them with its own appointees.

NLIKE the other regimes inEast Euope and the USSR, theRomanian govemment hadpromised that it would not car-

ry out socially painlul forms of "marked-zation." For one l"hing, thc Romanianrevolution occured after the effects of themmket reforms in Poland had becomeclear.

The Romanian leaders declaied thatsince the entire Romanian population hadpaflicipated in the uFising, lhey could notcondemn Romanials to unemployment.In fact, drc fight against Ceauccscu hadopened the way for the development ofindependcnl unions and organizaLions inthe workplace.

The "neo-Communist" govemment(that is, tlle rcgime made up of pcoplewho had been rcformers in Ceaucescu'sCP) uscd fea$ of "markctization" tomobilize workers against students andothers who called for its ovcrlhrow in thename of alti-Commrurism. In fact, thc stu-dcnts and lhe frc. enlelprise oppositionhad no chance of ousting the rcgime, serv-ing at most as transmission belt for thepressure of Westem govemments. Nowthe govemmcnt faces a potentially muchmore potent opposition.

Miners against students andprice rises

Symptomatically, the Jiu Valley miners,who scrved as an auxiliary police for theregime in June againsl the students, haveexprcsscd strong disapproval of thc priccraises. (le Monde, No'rember 11, 1990.)The Confederation of Frce Trade Unions,which has been close to the govemfient,has also protested srongly.

In an TV special November 3, Romandebated reprcsentatives of five tnde-union confcderations, arguing that it wasneccssary to convince the IMF ald t}te

Wortd Bark Ihat Romania was "sol-vcnt."

The goverruncnt's fund arnental argu-ment is that there has boen a disastousdecline in the economy since the rovolu-tion, and lhqefore it has no choice but toprivatize. In its Octobe. 18 report to par-liament, Roman said that in the ffst ninemonths of this year, industrial productioldropped by 27 -'l9o arl/l exports by 4670.Thc latter figure is probably largely arcsult of the diversion of food cxpons tothe domestic market aftcl thcrevolution.

The price riscs arc scheduled to takeeffcct between Novembs 1, 1990, and$c end o[ 1991. Thc lirst category isgoods supplicd by at least threc business-es or manufacturers. Thcy wcle frecd onNovembcr l. Thc sccond calcgory, ener-gy, fuel and renrs will slay fixcd until theend of 1991.

Progressive lreeing of pricesplanned

Contols on prices of nccessities,including foodstuffs, were loosencd onNovembq l. They are to bc allowed toise to a pdcc ceililg [rat is to takeaccount of highcr production costs. It js

not clcar how much the prices for suchgoods will go up, bul there are estimatesthat thcy may rise by more than 100 per-cenL

Betwcen Novcmbcr 1, 1990, and Octo-bcr 31, 1991, workers and pcnsioncrs arcsupposed to gct compcnsation from thestate for highq living cosls. By the endof 1991, pricc contols arc to bc cndcdfor the second and third catcgorics.

Also on November 1, the national cur-rcncy. rhe lcu. was devalucd by 66.77o.,from 20 to 35 lei pcr dollar. IL had prcvi-ously devalued in January Aom 16 to 20pcr dollor. The black-market ralc isaround 100 to the dollar. The leu is sup-

poscd to bccome converl.ible in January

l99t. *trictr must involve a drasticdecline in its value. An inflation rate of3OO to 400 percenl is expected in 1991.

Roman's declared objcrtive is to pdva-Lze 5oEa of the economy within threeyears. Slaning in January, il will bc possi-

ble to sct up prjvale enlerPrises. Wit n

six months, all state cnterprises are sup-posed to be transfomed either into auton'omous administrations or commelcialcompanies. Starting in March t991 for-cign invcstors will bc able to hold a

majority of the stock, oI even 100 Percent, if they crear entcrprises.

The Romanian government and theWestem press prcsent the opposition tothese mcasutes as coming from case-

hardened burcaucrats of the old regime.But so far the open fight against them hascome from the rade-unions and otherindependent forces. A significant seclionof the burcaucracy at least should be ableto find niches in a markctized systcm. Foronc thing, marketization gives thc rulers a

way out of being held dircctly responsiblefor the suffering of the population expect-ed during the winter.

The minister of reforms, Adrian Seve-rin, has said that in factory management,"We nced people who have no vestige ofsocialist solutions in their minds." 2

In a sense, the govcmment is right that ithas no altcrnativc to privatization. Thebucaucracy has proved its incapacity todcvelop the economy. Dcmocntic work-ers' organization would mean the mpidelimination of the burcauqacy root andbranch, if it were organized on a nationalIevcl. On the other hand, important scc-tions of $c burcaucra(y can live quilc a

long while with a process ofp vatizationand prcbably fmd niches within it.

Dramatic decline in industrialproduction

The dccline in industrial production thatRoman cited in his rcpo is typical ofcountries in tulmoil. The prcblem is whatis the long-run solution. The experiencesin the USSR and the East Europe showorat the suffc ng of the population will beincreased rathcr than mitigated by pdvati-zation. Judging frcm the protests againstthc price rises, Romanian workers under-sland that. The difliculty is that that fiereis no political orSanizalion in Romaniathat represents thcir political intercsts,which could dcvelop an altemative eco-nomic plan.

The "llco-Communist" govemmcnt hasnow revealed its truc natue as the exprcs-sion of a fundamcntolly antisocialist,anri workinB class burcaucracy. a conspir-acy of thieves who see thet future in col-lusion with the well-established and moresuccesslul Lhievcs who rule in the capital-ist countrics. *1. S@ anjcle by Jos6-Alian Felo ;A 12 Marde orOcbber5,1990. 13

GERRY FOLEY

November 26, 1990 a #195 lnternational Viewpoint

WORLD ECONOMY

THE American economy ls clearly in recession, but can theunification of Germany pull Europe free from the effects? lnthe following article, tirst publlshed in the November 2, 1990issue of the Swiss revolutionary Marxist fortnighuy La Brdche,Charles-Andre Udry describes the costs and implications ofunification Ior the German and world economies. This articleis the second instalment of a series on the world economy -the f irst, dealing with the American economy, was publishedinM94.

CHABLES-ANDRE UDBY

Europe:against

a fortressrecession?

eco[omics such as l}le FRG alld Japan.This is the other part of rhe question. ,4priari, a decoupling or deslnchronizationtbetweel rhe American rccession and theeconomy of the newly reunified Gemanyand Japan appears the most likely scenar-io for the year to come.

The intemational environment is fluid

- made thus both by the culf CYisis butmorc fundarnentally by the eftects of thcgigantic economic shifts between theUSA, FRG/Europe arld Japan, againsr abackdrop of the opcning up of EastemEuope ard increasingly strict control oftle South. There is a weak link in the sys-tem, the Ame can f,mancial system,which has the potential to accelqate thconsct of an intemational economic crisisof immeasurable dimensions. Economistsknown for their sober judgement areadopdng loncs which would make eventhe most uEecolstructed catastrophistMarxists hcsitate. Phitippe Lefoumier ofExpansion magazine, in a long articlcentitled "Capitalism faces its rcal chal-lenges", writes: "Thc US is facing the oilshock in a situation of structural weaknessthat calls into question the funclioning ofcapitalism.

"A financial crisis with unforeseeableconscqucnces is likcly. because tlis is a

crisis not iz the system but o/ the sys,tem....As in 1929. This is the rcal chal-lcngc for capitilism....The syslem is bcingled off the rails by the domilant economywithin il.. Can it save itself?"3

What flows ln can flow outThe "borrowcd" growth of the US econ-

omy was thanks to thc Japancse, Germanand other surpluses. The moncy thatflowcd to the USA could flow back in lheothcr dircclion if thcre is bad news inAmedca, such as a fall in the dollar, or anattractive se in Iapanese or Cermaninlcresl ralcs. This would add a massivestock market crash onto the mountingwavc of bankruptcies.

Thc synchronizcd falls in the world'sstock maJkets - two in thc pasl drrecyea$

- have rcvcaled the tensions in themoncy world. Thcre is a financial systemwhich is closely integralcd and plugged in24 houls a day on the one hand. On theother, there is no global control over lhissystcm. Furthcrmore tensions bstween tlethrc.c main economic blocs - USA/Canada/Mcxico, Japar and its economicsatcllitcs, and FRG,lEurope

- will grow

if thcrc is an economic slowdown or

14

VERY day brings sombre newrepofls on the state of lhe USeconomyl. The apparent glim-mer of encouragemcnt in thc

ncws Lhat Grcss Domestic Product grcwby slightly more than the predicted 0.87oin 01c third quartcr of this ycar overlooksa number of facts. In fact, this "8rowth"is lhc rcsult of incrcasirg stocks, rhill islo say, of $c impossibilily of sellingwhat has bcen produced owing to thcwcakness of demand. In ordcr to gct ridof thcse stocks, lower ordcrs will bcplaccd, production cut and jobs abol-ishcd.

And in facl, in recent wceks wc havebccn told that orders by Amcrican fiImsf cll by 1 .1 Eo in Scptcmbcl, rhc third dropin four months; thc number of rcgistereduncmployed at thc end of Scptcmber hadriscn by 400,000 as a wcckly average, thehighest level since 1985 (whcn lhc ralc ofuncmployment officially reached 77o oftho activc population); rhat preliminaryrcsults for firms in lhe I}lird quarter of1990 reveal that 5070 of ficnr are seeinga scrious [all off in profils: tl,.rr ,ringsalcs dcclincd by 87o in conpar withA[gust: that General Motors is cxpectingto suspcnd production in 11 of ils 28plans in Novembcr and thar "rhis Chrisrmas will bc one of the most winry sinccthc l98l rccession, wiDr buycrs lookirgfor chcaper goods and buying cvcrydayitems rather than luxuries."2

Indced, du ng ftc budget dcbate, thcDcmocrats rclrcalcd on a plan for a spe,cial tax on fur coats costing loss lhan510,000 so as not to upset. their clccto-ratc.

Banks face mountingproblems

Thc banks havc morc and more prob,lems, Siving se to the Black Friday ofOclober 26. There are bad loans to thc

Third World, and to bought up andindcbtcd cntcrprises. And Lhen Lhere isthe crisis in the property and construc-tion markels, with the rcpossession ofpropc ics which arc now worth muchless ftan l}Ic credits originally exrendcd.Furthermorc, consumen arc havingincreasing difliculty in meeting lhcirdebts.

Anyonc with scvcral crcdit cards isable to gct hold of an advance of some550,000. Crcdit card tending by bankshas been l}te objcct of intense competi-tion. Pcrsonal loans have risen fromS300bn in 1980 to $795bn in 1990.3

lmpact of US recession onworld economy

This raiscs the question of whar impactthe US rcccssion - which looks set tobe scrious, quite long and accompanicdby financial calasrrophes

- will havc on*Ie rcst of thc world c.onomy, includingon Europe and Japan. Onc part of theanswcr lics in a simple facti ilr 1988 l'heUSA importcd goods worth 959-6bn -lhat is, 15.47a of the total of worldimpofls and 16.670 of impofis of manu-facnrred goodsa. It is thc world's numberone importing country. ln 1987 fieywcre in sc€ond placc, bchind the FerlcralRepublic of Gcrmany (FRC), for theimport of "commcrcial scrvices" (dis-patch, carrying seflices, lravcl and soon) which aae relatcd to the import ofgoods.

The USA has bcen pulling the worldeconomy along, fucllcd by crcdil, overthe past cight years.5 Thus, as GeorgeMelloan notcs: "an Amcdcan rcccssionis equivalcnt to a world recession or atleast to rcduced world growth" above allthrough fte r€duction of Americandcmand.6 This depcnds of coure on lhesize and duration of the recession, aswell as on the intcrnal dynamic of key

lnternational Viewpoint #195 a November 26, 1990

1 . S@ U. .nicte by C.A Udry i! /Y I94.2. ,'.rrr.,n w,,t (BW) Novdbd 5, 1990 .nd OclGbet 29, r99O- The Walt strc,, Jauel ([WSJ), Ocro-bs 30, 1990 and Ocbb.r 24, 1990.3. Sudd, Tincr, O.tbb.t 23, l99O .ad l^t rnati,^alIl.ddTnbb. @I), O.u*.t D, ],99{.4. GATT, "1, Comcrc.Int6aridlal l9E8,89" VoLll p.3 and p3O5. sca fty .flicl. in l, ,,a.rp, Novmblr 13, l9E?,jBt.ft.r th. 1987 nel m.*.t @sh.5. 7wS./, Ocrobs 23, I 9'90.'t . L Bri.h., lbc X. 1990.E. t'E:paaiar. O.lobd lE-30,l99O

WORLD ECONOMY

r

thal are closely tied to Cerma-ny?

One of the characteristics ofthe pedod of growth seen in a

number of EuoPean coun-tries and in Japan since 1984-85 has bcrn a significantresumption of productiveinvestmeflt, even if this hasbeen oveBhadowed by finan-cial speculationro. Thisinvestment has been stimulat-ed by thc recovery in the prof-itability of firms, and helpedsince 1987-88 by acceleratedmodemization of the produc-tive apparatus (computeriza-tiorvcommunications) as wellas by the edargemenr of pro-ductive capacities given theperspectivc of European uni-fication and incrcasinglyfierce competition on theworld market. In 1989,investments rcsc by 6.7qo nreal terms in the EuropcanCommunityl t.

This has contributed to aslight fall in registered rmem-ployment in the EC - downfrom 10.87o in 1985, to 9.7q"in 1988 and 97o in 1989. Pre-dictions of fu her falls thiswillter, which were still beingmade in June, are now how-

ever in question. Most affocted by unem-ployment are women (except in the UK),and those under 25 (excepl in the FRG),although there are big differencesbetween countries. There is, nonetheless,one ge[eral charactcristic: lhe duation ofunemployment has continually grownsince 1974. Thus in the FRG, 39.3Eo ofthe uncmploycd had been oul oI work formore than a year in 1983, but rhc figurewas 46.'19o in 1988. In France the figuretose frorn 42o/o in 1983 to 43.9qa i^ 1990,in Italy from 51.14o in 1983 to 69qc n1g88.tr

Reorganization of workprocess

Throughout Ewope the organization ofthe work process is tcnding lowards flexi.bilily, part-time work, tempomry work,subcontracting and so on. However, theforms in which the demarrd for flexibitiryis applied to the workforce differ depcnd-ing on the relation of social and tradeunion forces and the contmctual rulesalready established. At lhe same time bot-tlenecks appear in the labour market dueto the lack of qualified workers givqr therapid pace of technological change.

The slight decline in unemploymentand a series of "good years" have seen areappearance of wage mililancy, both inthe private and, cven morc strongly, thepublic sector. lt is Lhus hardly surprisingthat, at the ftst sign of a change in theeconomic climate and with specific sec-

tors - cars, ele.ronics - facing diffi-culties. the bosses are lawching a cam-paign for ncw austerity measures and arcmaking big cutbacks. Thus Fiat has put70,000 workers on short time and Philipps is pla4ning 15,000 redundancies.

Such sackings by thc thousand are a

foretaste of the brutal rcorganizations thatwill take place with an economic slow-down and the redeployment of Europeanproduction in the mcdium term (the singlemarket and the East). A new phase of der-egulation is about to begin, in a climate ofintense inter-impedalist competition.

But let us return to Cemany. Beforc theunification, West Germany was theworld's biggest exporter of goods - witha total value of $323.4bn or ll.29a ofworld tmde in 1988, compared to$321.6bn for thc UsA and $264.sbn inJapan. It was the sccond biggest importer($250.6bn or 8.470 of total worldimpors)r3. Thus, in 1989, West Germanyrereived 15.49o of France's expofis,11.96Eo of exporrs of rhe UK, 16.987ofrom ]taly, 18.767, from Belgium/Luxembourg, 25.864o from the Nether-lands, 34.4270 from Austria,20.527o fromSwitzerland, l2-'lo9o ftom Sweden afld5.'79Vo from Japanra. Thc Germar loco-motive cannot pull the European tlain byitself, but on the other hand, its principalEuropean partners will have no chance ofmaking it through the coming stomsunscathed.

West German capital keepsEast Germany for itself

The five new Liinder of what was onceEast Germany, Sachsen, ThUringen ( thetwo most indusfialized), Sachsen-Anhalt,Bmndenbug and Mccklenburg-Vorpommem

- were not ar important

markct for West Eumpean exports. Here,Austria was in the lead wit}l L37o of totalimports. Thus it is the overalt dynamic ofthe unified Cermarr statc which mattersfor the "European pafiners" rather lhanlhat in fie ex-CDR wil}I ils 15 millioninhabitants. Cefiainly, there are oppofiu-nities in the East, but it is West Germanirms, opuating as a mafia (according toCarlo Bcnedc[i, thc boss of the lLalianlllrn Olivetti) who arc going to exploitthem.

In the curent clectoral climate in Gor-many. ficrc arc slrongly divcrgcnl opin-ions on the situation being put forward.After the rousing declarations from theKohl government and his hnance ministerTheo Waigel, the five main German eco-nomic instiutes have come out with amuch more sober assessment, prcdictirg

recession. And this will take place at atime wheir the two "superpowers", iheUSA and USSR, arc on thet way,*uough ditterenl kinds of economic cri.sis, to losing their superpower slatus.

The olher unknown in Lhe siruation isthe volatility of the oil price, which hasbeen amplified by the Nymex funrresmarket set up in 1983. Here, prices are setaccording to the predictions of the opera-tors, such as whcthcr thcrc will bc war inthc Gulf, rather than the rcal state of sup-ply and demand9.

A war or a prolonged crisis would tendto push up the oil pdce alld stimulateinflation. This would affect the result-s offirms and drive up interest rates, thusholding back investnent by squeezingprofits. Nor is there any good rcason forlower interest rates, givcn the weight ofthe American deficit, the general financialinstability, which makes lenderc moredsmanding, and the flow of capitaltowards the East.

However thc oil price untnown is farless dangerous than the the prospe.t of animplosion of the Ame can financial sys-lem and a "segmentation" of the worldfinancial network.

Then there is a lhird unknown visibleon the horizon, which is alrcady givingdse to unease in some economic insti-tutcs. How will the West German ecollo-my absorb the shock of unification in thecoming two years and what effects willthis have on lhe economies o[ coufltries

9. Se /Y 194.

10. See La Br,ich.,lbe 29, 1990 on the @soB forUrc une,(pe.ted cotinuation or L\e b@m afier llle19E? crash.

11. E onmic Fo@as! of the Euop@r Cdmilsim.Jue 11, 1990.12 OECD, "P6p<.tiB de l'6ploi" July 1990.I 3. GA'IT, op. cir.14. Ftdh$wtet Allgheia Zeit$e, O.toixt U. 1990. 15

November 26, 1990 a #195 lnternational Viewpolnt

a growih rate of 1.57o for 1991. No oneknows precisely how lhe various asDeclsof unification arc going lo work tirem-selves oul. Evcry day brings ncw surpris-es, usually in rhe form ofbills for bilionsof D marks - including one forDMlSbn due to a technical erIor du ngmonetary unification.

For the moment, the lastsurvey by fte DIHT (Deuts-cher Industrie-und-Handelstag) finds businessconfidence holding up. Thesurvcy is entitlcd "In theWest an unintcrupted boom,in fre East, the principle isstill hope."ts Investrnentintentions rcmain as high asin autumn 1989. There is awcakening in the construc-ljon sector, but the openingsin thc five L?inder are realand not just prospective.Wc.st Gcrman eco-busincss isalso looking forward to goodtimcs, all the morc so in thatstatc and state-supportedcredit will be important inthe depollution of the ex-GDR. While at lhe momcntall this is still on the dmwingboard, Wcst Geman induslry, which hasmade this field its own, could see itsintcrnational position strengthcned.

ConsumpLion plays a driving rolc inthis parr of lhc cyclc - its high point. Forexarnple, despite a se in mortgage inter-csl ratcs, Lhe demand for house buildingis growing slrongly. In thc first ninemonths of 1990, growlh is 537o up on thecon"esponding pqiod last year. It is est!malcd that some 300,000 ncw houses willbc built in 1990 as against 230.000 in198916. Since 1987 a total of 80C.000houscs havebeen built.

Boom in West German carsales

Anothcr loading sector for demand iscars. Wtilc slagralion and cvcn dcclincare afflicting the Europcal motor indus,rry. thc Ccrman produccrs are srcppingup production. 6070 of consumer credit

*hich rose overall by gto in 1980 -is for the puchase of cars.17 The netgrowlh of numbcr of cam sold in the ex-GDR since the start of 1990 is 150,000,on monlhly avarage. The one for oneswap of GDR-marks for D,Marks hasplayed an important role in this increasein puJchasing power for consumer goods.Many of the cars bcing bought in ftc cx-GDR are secondhand, coming fiom WestCemany and also Switzcrland. But thismakcs room for sales of new cars in theWest. Thcre the overall growth is cxpccfcd to amount to 1 million cars in 1990.13

Dcmand in the East does not representan especially extensive market for a prc-ductive apparatus with a global reach anddoes not immediately require investments

in the five L?indq. Consumer durablescan easily be sent eastwards ftom theWcst, where the productive capacities ofOre existing plants can be adjusted tomccl Ue cxua demand. In fact. produc-tive capacily is bcing used to an incrcas-ingly high d,e$ce

- 89.9Eo in 1990 as

agaiflsr 89.57, h 1989, 87.470 in 1988utd, 84.5?o tn 198'11e .

Large-scale investmcnt in rhe Easr isgoing to take place more slowly tharoriginally envisaged by the Treuhalldan-stalt. thc body chargcd with privaizingthe 8,000 big East German fims. Accord-ing to Dctlev Rohweddq, the Treuhand'sboss, "this big salad is worth DM600bn"'. But, it seems, nobody walts tobuy this salad. The machinery is obsoleteand would in any case only duplicate pro-ductive capacitics cxisling in thc West.The interest paymcnts on debt are prohib-iLive - DM Iobn. Rcfiling $e planls ina way that would mect Wcst Cermanenvironmcntal standards would be vcrycxpcnsivc. Futhemore wages aie rotlow enough to altracl investors, sincc, inordcr to kccp peoplc from flocking out ofthe ex-GDR, wages there have becn set at?07, of Western levcls.

In addition, the ex-GDR's traditionalEast European markcts will shrink &ast!cally as of thc end of 1990. Prices of EastGe.man goods will thercafter be costed inDMs, at a time when l.he weaker US dol-lar is becoming more attraclive. East Ger-man motorbikes will be replaced byAsian mopeds. Gorbachev meanwhilehas jusr rcccivcd two important crcditsallowing him to pr[chasc goods in Spain(Slbn, of which half is for the import ofconsumer duables to bc paid in threeyears) and in France (10bn francs, a partof which is to pay dcbts and the other tobuy grain, and goods and services).

Aftq dragging their fcet for a timc,Mercedes, BASF and Volkswagen havesigncd important agrcemcnts with rheTreuhand. But thcse three giants are

pushing for the expenses to be met by thestate, arguing that therc are other invest-ment possibilities (for Mercedes in Portu-gal) or financial difficulties (Volkswagen,whose pre-tax profits have fallel by DM1.lbn comparcd ro 1989)21.

The relation between the occupation oIthe Eastern market by West-

em firms on the one hand andiavesonent for reco structionthere on the other has not beenresolved.

This, however, is only onefacet of the problem. The otheris represented by the socialcost of unification over fiveyears. Hans Fahning, directorof Hamburg's Landesbank anda longtime member of theassociation of West Gcrmanbanks, has denounced the lackof glasnost conceming the var,ious deficits - of the fcderalstate, the L?inder, the com-munes, the railways, the postand social security. The realcost of unification is dissolvcdin the confusion. Aftcr anexarnination of va ous itemsof expenditure

- the interrlaldebt of the ex-GDR, the finan-

cial needs of t}Ie Treuhand, the debt of theex-CDR's health insurance schemes, Iiabilitics of East German state insuranceschemes, not taken over by the Allianzgroup

- Fahning arived at a figule of

DM I 00bn2.

16

q

e

a

lnternalionaMewpoinl #195 a November 26, 1990

WORLD ECONOMY

Burgeoning state budgetdeficit

The official federal budget deficit isexpected to reach DM 66.8bn. This is notan enornous sum, taking into accountGermany's weallh. However, this figureleaves out most of the debt iesulting lromthe unificatiol. According to Die Zeit B,

the deficit will rcach DM 100bn. At tlisrhythm of growth, the Fedeml publicdebt, estimatcd at DM 557bn in 1990 onthe basis of the figure of DM66.8bn forthis ycar, will reach DMl000bn in fouryqus.

According to a study by Morgan Stan-ley, quoted by Klaus von Doluranyi,, thesocial costs of unification - unemploy-ment and sickncss, old age and housingbencfits - for the ex-GDR will reachDM 50bn a year for the next four yearswhile reconstruction will cost DM130,160bn each year for ten yeam.

Lct us look at lhe problem ofunemploy-ment. On lhe basis of a growlh mle of7.5Eo fi 1991, Lhe vaJious iNtitutes comeup wil}l a figurc of 3.7 million uncm-ploycd in Easr Gcrmany and 2 mil)ion inthe lvest. Other estimates have arrived ata total figurc of 5.2 million unem-ployed2s. How is such a wave of unem-ployment to be paid for, at a time whenpublic debt is $owing at aII unprecedent-ed rate? There seems little altemalive to

WORLD ECONOMY / JAPAN

an increase in taxes and social chalrges.This is cefiainly Hans Fahning's conclu-sion. Such rises will hold back consump-tion after a time, At the same time,inflationary prcssures, due to a dete orat-ing relation betwecn debt and sav'mgs -even if this remains high -

will appearand ilterest rates will rise, in an intema_tional climate that also pushes interestrates upwards. Some firms have bigcapacilies for self-financin8, but otherswill be in difficulties, as was seen withNixdorf computers, which was saved bySicmens. lnvcstmenls will bc held back.

The unification operation will in thecoming years modify the place of fieGrcaler Cermany as an exporler of capital, wheher by limiting the surplus of cap-ilal or by making it an importer ofcapital.It is hard to assess thc consequences ofthis change.

Does Kohl have an economicplan?

Thcle may be another surprise in thcpipc-lhc. Kohl has certainly had a clear polical plan vr'hich he has caried outcffcctively. However it is not clear thatthere is any fivc year economic plan toback it up, even if therc is no reason todoubt the final successful outcome of theunification.

However, in the short term we may wellfind that the DIHT'S survoy for l99l willelicit ralher less enthusiastic rcsponsesthan this year. In a darkening intemationalclimate and with a high DM. Cermanynlay see iE exports !o its main tradingpartners

- France, Britain, Italy, theNetherlands, the USA, Belgiurn and Swit-zerland - fall, all lhe more so in thatrecession has already set irl in the USA,Canada, Britain, Italy, Spain and Swedenand even France has bacn hefid to sneeze.

You would need a crystal ball to predicthow thc inlcmolional and domeslic fac-tors will work themselves out in Germa-ny. The most likely hypothcsis is that thedesynchronization betwecn the Gcrman-Icd bloc, the USA and Japan will continuefor another year, baring a massive finan-cial collapse on Wall Sreet. But what isnot clear is whether the world economycan rcorganize itself around the Gcrman/European and Japary'Asia poles without anew global recession. To see more clearlyit is necessary to view the situation ftomrhe Japanese anglc. as \rc \-\ ill do in ournext issue. )k

15 - H @d.kbl"u, Octolet 3r, 1990, p-77 .

16..Ibid.. Ociob€r 30 1990.I7 . Di. WeU, Octot*t 23, 1990, d&laratid of thc con-srscdd ministd, Gdda Ilasselfeldt.1,8. Ha zbblafi, OctotEt 30, l99O-19. D.r Spiesel,no- 44.t99O. p.29.20. Ibid, no- 41, 1990, p. 152.2l . &r ,.iar, Ocrobd 29, 1990.22. Ha^dekblatt. O.tob€t 30, 1990.23. D ie 7ait. Octobet 19, r99O-24- D.t S pie sal,

^o. 42, 1990, p.2AA.

E- IWSJ, O.tots 23, 1990, and lladzbblau, O.to-LEt 26-27 , t99O.

November 26, 1990 a #195 lnternational Viewoint

Emperors andGonstitutions

ALTHOUGH the Gulf crisis has shown the f undamental unityof the imperialist states ln slapping down any challenge to

their authority lrom the dependent countries, it has alsothrown a spotlight on long-simmering tensions between them.

The debate over German and Japanese participation in theGulf war elfort should be seen in thls context. ln Japan, thedebate is taking place against the backdrop of a continued

drive by ruling class circles to rehabilitate theim perial/chauvinist tradition of the pre-World War 2 period.The ceremonies for the inauguration of the new JapaneseEmperor, Akihito, held on November 12, take on a special

significance in the light ol this.

BEBNARD GIBBONS

f tlE coalition "Down $ ith clorifi-I catron or tnc Emocror svstcmlI Joinr Action asainst thc icc+s-L,on a"ra,non tc\ lsokut-^o-Ket

al].d DdijosaD", supporei by, amongothe6, the Japaiese Trotskyisls of theJapan Rcvolurionary CommunistLeague, was organized in April 1990wilh thc aim of stopping thg- Sokai-no-Rei and thc Daijosai. thc tuo majorShinto cercmonics hcld by rhc Japaresestate for Akihito, the ncw Tenno (thcspecial Japanesc term rcservcd for lheEmpcror

- i! means "hcavenly sove-

reign"). Thc ^So,trzlno-Iei took place onNovcmbcr 12; the Daubsai is schcduledfor two weeks later.

In all, it is cstimatcd that the ceremo-nies will cost somc Sl5 million. In theSokui-no-Rei ccrcmony, the new Temodeclares that the peoples of lhc worldmust obey him, "the sorl of fte gods" andrccognize their subordinate rclalionshipto him.

In the Darb.rdi, Akihito joins Ore spi tof his ancestor, the Sun Goddess Amate-rasu, thercby becoming a "living god"and absolutc ruler, thcn forces the Japa-nase pcople to swear allegiance to him,as their forcbcars did, and rcccives trib-ute from them as proofof submission.

The coalition says that "thrcugh theseceremonies Akiiito, like his farher, Hiro-hito, sceks to confir:m himself as 'son ofthe gods' and as thc supreme ruler notonly of the people of Japan but of everyarea of the world". Tho coalition pointsout that the cercmonies have fte aim ofrestoring Shinto as Japan's stare rcligion

and sanctifying the lineage of the Tenno'sfarnily, thereby legitimizing discrimina-lion. Whilsl tlc main opposition parlies.including the Socialists and Communists,have skirted rhe issue (alrhough thcy boy-cotted the cercmonies), the coalirion hasbrought (hc Japanese far left together withscveral Chistian and traditional Buddhistorganizalions, as wcll as the Buralu min.an oppressed mhority peoplc.

Tacit recognition ofchauvinism and fanaticismMass meetings and rallies werc held in

Tokyo, on November 12 against theSokui-no-Rei and planned for November22 amd 23 against the Daijosai - wirJrprotests in many other Japanese cities. Anational calavarr campaign against thechauvinist rituals was launched on Octo-ber 10.

The coalition is asking for internationalsupport and an intemational boycott ofccremonies which it says imply "tacit rec-ognition of the chauvinistic, racist andfanatic idcology of Temoism.....we aresurc that if pcoplc ouBide Japan undcr-stood thc rcal meaning of these ceremo-nies they would never want their leadersto attend the .Sakzi-nr-Rci"

The ceremonies arc indicative of theJapanese ruling class's desirc to mark abrcak with Japan's post-1945 hisrory. TheTcnno system and the state religion ofShinto provided the ideological basis forJapanesc aggression against neighboringcormtries in t}le 1930s and 1940s. Afterthe 1945 defear, bolh the wafiime empcr- 17

I

JAPAN / SOUTH KOBEA

or Hirohito and the Tqnno systcm srrl-vivcd in the framework of thc so-callcd"symbolic Tcnno system", whichinvolved Hirohito's renunciation of hisdivine status, and the removal of Shilto as

the statereligion.Akihito's acccssion takes place in the

context of the deske of a significart sec-tion of the Japancs€ ruling class to bringJapan's military capacities into linc withits enormous cconomic powcr (Japan'slow level of mititary expendiurc was ofcourse a signilicant factor in the dcveloP-mcnt of this power, providing it with a

comparativc advantage in relalion to otherimp€rialist states). The Japanese militaryhas been deeply hvolvcd in lhe Fepara-tion of these coemonics.

Decline ln support lor PrlmeMinister

The proposal of Primc Ministcr ToshikiKaifu to send mcmbcrs of tic JapancseSclf-Defence Forcc (as the armcd forcesare known) to the Gulf (in a "non-combat" rolc, under thc guisc of a "UNPcace Cooperation Corps') has run intoconsiderable opposition and broughtabout a sharp drop in his pcrsonal stand-ing i[ the opi on polls. Aflicle 9 ofJapan's US-dictatcd 1947 Constitutionunilatcrally renounces war and the use offorce, ard rulcs out thc maintenancc of an

amly or othcr "war Polcntial" on its lcrritory.

whilst this article indicatcd the desire ofthe Unitcd States to bring to hccl ils impc-iialist rival in the Pacific, it rcflcctcd a

very rcal pacifist and anti-militarist senti-ment aunongs! thc Japancse masscs, whohad suffered tcrribly in a war foistcd uPonthcm by thc militarist cliquc which hadscizcd power in the 1920s.

Indecd, it was thc Americans them-sclves who urged on and facilitatcd JaPa-

nese reamament in thc contcxt of theCommunist victory in China and theKorcan war.

In 1948, only a ycar aflq lhc conslilu'tion was adoptcd. Washington was urgingthc creation of a JaPanese Pararnilinryforce. A "rescrye guard" was crealed in1950, composed of about ?5,000 mcn(maly, former officers of t}re imPcrialamy) -

this was chargcd wift asswing

I 8 ;lfilii,,,T,ilY ln"^u'J.Tf, J'il..,*'i;

pwsucd in Japan. This rcserve guardformcd the nucleus of what bccame in1954 the Self-Defence Force. From the1960s onwards Japanese rightists haveagitated for a rcvision of article 9.

The force of the aflicle had alreadybeen severely weakened by the securityheary with rhe US signcd in l95l(rencwed, despite very fierce popularopposition, in 1960) as well as Japan'sactivo role as a base for the US war effortin Korea and Vietnam. The military bud-gct has grown by an avqage of 69o pcrycar since 1961 and has now passedbcyond the psychologically imponantthrcshold of l7o of GNP. Japan's ar:medforccs arc now 250,000 srong, and mili-tary cxpenditure is mnning at $25-30 bil-lion Per year.

Srong pressurc from the US govem-ment for a Japanese commitment to thccrusade in the Gulf has comc in a situa-tion where Japanese-Us rclations arealrcady straincd bcrause of the 2/l tradeimbalancc bctwccn thc lwo countrics.Kaifu's initial rcsponsc to this presswewas to send moncy to fund the war effofl,but it took weeks to establish govemmen-tal consensus on a contribution of $4 bil-lion - there arc sharp clcavagcs withinJapan's ruling Libeml Democratic Partyon how to respond 10 US pressure.

The proposal lhat uoops be scnt met a

wave of parliamcntary and public opposi-tion (apou published in thc daily newspa-

Wt Asahi showed 78% of JaPanesepeoplc opposcd to thc sending of toopsabrcad, as against 157o in favour. 547a

were opposed even to the scnding ofunarmcd civilian units. (Sce Iy 194).Thcre wcre srong prctests also fronrJapan's ncighbours, particulcrly Chinaand South Korea.

lmportant victory tor Peacemovement

On Tuesday Novcmbq 6, Lhe Proposalwas finally withdnwn - ihc govcrrmentrecognized that it had no chance of pas-

sage in thc uppcr housc, 'xherc the com-bincd opposition partics hold a majority,and many doubtcd its chances of gcttingtluough the Iower housc, whcre the LDPis io fte majo ty.

The chauvinist offensive of fie Japa-

ncsc ruling class is by no mcans ovcr -the govcmmcnt now plans to draw uP

ncw lcgislation to enable Japan to partici-patc in futurc UN authorized "peacekccp-ing" activities. But whatcvcr lies ahead,

thc defeat of Kaifu's proposal is a signifi-cant victory for lhc anti-mililarist majori-ty wiftin Japanese socicty, and it hasprovided a major fillip for the intcmation-al movcment against thc war by showingthat mass opposition can bring rcsults.

Furlhcr information on opposition toacccssion ccrcmoniss from; Informalioncentcr on Impc al Succession, UnitcdChurch of christ, Nishi-waseda 2-3-18,Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, Japan. -t

ffi_

i'.TF\r.. ,

,:i-]als! ,

l,

I

OW many ol your membershavs been detained slncethe wave ol protests andgeneral strike that was

coordinated by Chun No Hyep inApril/May?

Kim Sang Bock: Thare are curently450 workers imprisoned by the govem-ment for engaging in strile action andabout 100 workers in hiding. Thcse areprcdominantly leading activists in Chl.m

No Hyep who were singled out by gov-emment forces for arest when thcystormcd illto facto es and shipyards tocrush the strikes.

a What is the presBnt situallon asregards on-going lndustrlal dis-Putes?

I(SB. One place of paflicular conccm tous al thc momcnt is the Samsung ship-yard. Samsung is the sccond largcst com-pany in Korca and its management,supponcd by the government, activclyprohibils ftee trade union activily. Thcyeven wcnt to the lengths of setting up aghost union in order lo ry to undcrmineworkels' attempts to establish their owndemoqatic Minjung rmion.

When worke$ persisted in rhcir effortsto build an independent union rhcyincured such heavy repression from thepolice and management that one workercommittcd suicide in protest at lheabsencc of democratic ghts. We wouldbe grateful if labour movemeflt activistscould givc Lhcir full support to such initia-tivcs.

Kim K)u4g Enr,. ln Seoul alone eightunions are al lhe momcnt laking actionagainst the lock-out. These are mair ywomcn workers, like fte 600 on strike atthe Nau Prccision Company which makesVATEL codless phones. In this particu-lar casc lhe women organized a go slowin protost at the 7Eo pay offer. Thc capital-ists rctaliated by amouncing the closrdown of the company, while at the samerime hi ng scabs and bribing some strik-ing workcrs to coltinue production.

Evcry day the slriking workers go topickct at the factories and everyday theyarc arrested by the special dot police task

force and by hired thugs known as Kusu-dey who work alongside the police. Thcyarc then usually forced onto buscs anddrivcn to clearings a couple of miles out-side of Seoul where thcy are released. Inthe very hot weather we have recenllyseen police shutting workers in buseswith lockcd windows, and leaving tiemtherc for lwo to tlree hours in tic Slaringsun.

a Many people have been amazedat Chun No Hyep's ability to coordi-nale such a largo wave ol slrikesand protests lust two months attelits lormalion. How do you Proposo10 maintain the momentum until thenexl series ol wage settlements?

KKE- Wc always kncw that tho govem-

lnlernational Viewpoint #195 a November 26, 1990

l

I

SOUTH KOREA

SINCE 1987, when the mllitary dictatorship of Chun Do Wanfell and a massive democratlc movement arose among theyouth, South Korea has seen a succession of strike waves.These struggles have led to a significant rlse ln wages andconsumption and a general rise in the living standards of

South Korean workers. lt has also led to maior developmentsin the organization of the Korean workers' movement.

The most important of these has been the birth of anindependent trade unlon, Chun No Hyep, which has been

playing a leadlng role in these struggles desplte f iercerepression from the bosses and the state (see lV 184). We

publish below an interview with two leaders of Chun No Hyep,Kim Sang Bok, member ot the unions Policy planning Olficeand Kim Kyung Eun, vice-secretary of the regional council ofSeoul. The interviews were conducted in July for ryby paul

Field.

stnrggle as a tl[eat to them and the

Present syslem.

a Has any consideration been givento the possibility oI setting up apolltlcal party linked to Chun NoHyeP?

KSB: Thcre has bccn some talk witiinother pans of thc democratic movementabout setting up a People's Party. Offi-cially there have been no pronormcementsby Chun No Hycp concerning *ris,alhough in principle therc are differencesof opinion wilhin Chun No Hyep ovcl fteusefulness of such a development.

For example, should we bc spedingsome of our time and energy lrying toform such a patty, or should we conccn-tnte all of our time upon the impoflantbusincss of strengthcning and consolidat-ing the base ofour union movement as weare at the moment. What do you think?If a legal political party was formcd

that, while proposing ro defend the work-crs was at ths same time very much pafiofthe present system, and was opposed toanything that fundamenrally challenScdit, like lhe l,abour Party in Brirain, shouldwe support it?

O The clandestino condilions thatKAGTU ar€ being lorced lo operaleunder ars not th€ most conduclve,ot the maintenance of inlernaldomocracy. OthEr progressive dem-ocratic unlons, such as Solidarnoscln Poland, lound that when theywent underground their int€rnaldemocratlc acllvlty was restricted.What steps are being takon to pre-serve accounlability within Chun NoHyop?

,(Sr. Even those leaders that are in hid-ing at the moment are still in regular con-tact wirh rhc rank-and.file membcrship.Unlikc the FKTU wc are organized fromthe bottom up. our vcry formation carnea-s the rcsult of three ycaN of activity byindcpcndent unions who felt therc was anccd to coordinate action on a nationalbasis. The reason we have bcen success-ful in mobitizing workcn is that it is ourmembcrship, thc worke$ themselvos,who make thc dccisions.

In cach of thc unions workcrs partici-pate in the running of fie union through anumbq of sub-committees that cover arange of issues including organization,strikes and women's issues. We wcrebome oul of lhe undcmocratic way inwhich the unions and the govemmcntexercise control and the workers need toempower thcmselves. Our continuedgrowlh depcnds olr maintaining the vilal-ity of ow intemal democracy.

O Are you conlident about thefuture?

KSB; We aLre sue of victory. Whatcverthc state and the capilalists do, they can,not dc[eat lhc workcrs. We will remainEuc to the banner of Chun No Hyep. *

ment and the capitalist class would doevcrything in thcir powcrs to dest oy analional organization of democradcunions in the fifsl six months aftcr its for-mation.

Our intention was thercfore to defendthc movement hrough struggle. Theskike at the Hyundai shipyald in Ulsanand wi$in the Korean broadcasting sys-tcm followed by the lhre€ day generalsfike in 200 factories or more acrossKorea succeedcd in brcaking the dead-lock and demonstratcd the ability ol fteworkers to organize mass aclion.

In the seaond six months of our cxis-tence wc are hoping to raise workers'consciousness about widcr issues such ashousing, job sccurity, and rhe appallingwork conditions that cause thousands ofindustrial accidcnts every year. Wo alsohope to consolidare the basc of KAGTU.At lhe moment we are in cffect a nationalcouncil of re8ional rade unions whcrcasottl aim is to become a national fedgmtionofindusrdal rmions.

a How does KAGTU continue iotunclion with so many of lts loadingaclivists ln prlson or in hlding?

KSBr The situation is very difficulr.However, it is truc to say that every newstruggle is prcducing new leade$, whileat thc same time we are relying upon sup-port and solidarity from the rest of lhedemocralic movement, most notably fromdre student movement and the progressiveMinjung thcology wing of rhe church.

a KAGTU was set up earlier thisyear by Minju democratic unions

establlshed during and atter the1987 slrike wave mainly becausethe pro-govornment Federalion ofKorean Trade Unlons lalled todelend the lnterests of the workers.What has the relationship betwe€nthe two organizalions been sinceyour lormation?

KSB] Our basic position has alwaysbcen to call for the maximum unity ofthe working class. In the tlucc yca.rsbctwccn thc srruggle for dcmocracy in1987 and the foundation of Chun NoHycp wc consistently fought within theFKTU to male it accountable to itsmcmbcr! but at evcry fum wc camc upagainst rhe bucaucratic lcadership rhardonlinates and in tum subordinatcs theunioll to the govemmcnt.

Ncvcrthclcss, thc fact that evcry unionis forccd by law ro aflilialc ro FKTUmcans that thqc are nrany activists in lhcFKTU with whom we work vcry closcly.Moreover the fact thar ir is illegal ro givemoney to our organization has meantthat there arc many unions that whilercmaining part of the FKTU look ro usfor leadcrship.

As far as working wirh rhc FKTUnationally is conccmcd we callcd uDonlhcm to joinlly sponsor rhe May Day cet-ebrations and to assist in orgarizing thefuneral of thc workq who dicd at theSamsung shipyad, but they refused. Asan organization lhat has becn inslrurnen-tal in dcfusing thc workos srrugglc ardin forcing them to acccpt the will of thecmploycrs thcy obviously scc t"hc devel-opmcnt of a ncw national dcmocraticunion movement based on working class 19

November 26, 1990 a #195 lnternational Viewpoint

NORTH KOREA

The growing isolationof the "great leader"

ON OCTOBER 1,1990, the Soviet andSouth Korean authorities announced,through a loint declaration lssued ln NewYork, the establishment o{ diplomaticrelations between the two counlries. Adiscreet but etlective toreign policyoffensive had already permitted theSouth Korean regime to re-establishoflicial relations with East Europeancountries, even before the events ofautumn 1989 there.

ENZO TFAVERSO

ing to an cditorial in 0reregimc's olficial joumal,Rodo^g S in r'rtt, teprintedin the English languageweckly, Pyongyary T imes,on October 6, the link-upbetween Seoul and Mos-cow was the result ofpere.r-troika, wl,;ch was lsadingthe Soviet Union towards"nrin, chaos and confu-sion". Today's SovietUnion, continucs the edito-fial, is not that ofthc past.Ilhas degencrated andchangcd ils naturc. "Forthis reason it seeks newfricnds, morc in tune with

about reunification. Kim II sung has notruled out the option of a federation thatwould not call into questiol the differentsocial natures of the two states, but he hasput as the prior condition for any negotiation the withdrawal of the Ameican mili-tary contingent of43,000 troops stationcdin the South. The South's goverrmentpresently considen this inadmissible,decla ng itselfready to getrid of?,000 ofthe foops as a proof of "goodwi ll ".

The summit mecting betwe€l YonHyong Muk and Kang Young Hoon, thcprime ministers of North and SouU Korcarespectivcly, has been greeted in the intcr-national press as proof of a change of cli'mate, without any evidence ofreal changcin inter-Korean relations. These meetingsmight pcrhaps lead to a ceflain rclaxation,which in itself would be a step forward.given Ure current total absence ofdialogueand communication between the twocount cs. Thc re-establishment of postalrolations and even a limited exchange ofvisits bctwe€[ citizens of the two stateswould be an enormous rclief for the thou-sands of Korean families tom apafi by lhewar,

The last meeting betwccn a few dividcdfamilics took placc in 1985 aI thc fronticrpost of Pan Moun Jon, under Red Crossauspiccs, after which all relations werebroken off. when, last Septembcr, theidea of a tcmporary opning of thc fron'tiers was floatcd for a few days,61,355South Korean citizcns immediatcly putrheir namcs down for a trip to lhe Nonh(Newip?et, August 27, 1990).

Pressure ol public opinion lnthe South

Pyongyang has bcen confronted by an

imperative need to break out of its interna-tioflal isolation, while Scoul has to dcalwith growing pressure from public opin-ion, which has never ceased to considcrreunification as a fundamenlal andunavoidable issue. The unification ofGcr-many has put the Korcan national qucs-tion back on the agenda. Ce ainly, thcSouth Korean lcadership is drcaming of aGerman-style anncxation of Orc North.But fte polilical conditions for such anopcralion do not (at least as yct) exist.Dcspite its difticulties, Kim Il Sung'srcgimc has not reachcd the levcl of disin-tegration of the twilight years of Honeck-er's GDR. The country's isolation and dlegrip of thc regime's Stalinist sructurcshavc cffectively sealed the country offfrom oxtcmal influenccs.

Unlikc theCDR, whcrc mostofthepop-ulirtion was able to walch West Germantelevision, North Korean citizels are notaffected by South Korean media and nointellcctual dissidencc has bcen able toappcar. Kim ll Sung's regime. despile itscxtremc personality cult, remains thcinhcritor of a nalional liberation struggle,with its suffc ngs and sacrifices thalremain alive i[ Ihepopulalion's memory.

I HE FACT THAT rhis announcc-I m:;ru*il,");l,lt:f Us in the r'approchcmcnr

bctween the soviet Union and SouthKorca. Sincc the meeting bctween theSouth Korcan prcsident Roh Tae Wooand Corbachev in San Francisco duringre Sovict leaders'visit to the US last

April, thc news had been awaitcd. Itcomcs at the cnd of a pcriod o[ increasingtrade and other contacts which stafledwith thc onsct ofp?reJlroit4 and accelcr-atei aftcr thc fall of Chun Do Wan's mili-tary dictatorship in 1987-

The economic rcforms in the USSRopcn up an e[ormous markct for SoulhKorcan industry, which, at lhc end ofthrcc dccadcs of spcctacular and unintct-ruptcd $owth, is bcginning to cncountcrscrious difficultics. The Soviet markctoffcls the possibility of reviving SouthKorcan exports, notably of cals, telcvi-sions and wordproccssors. South Korca'scommercial offcnsivc is not only aimedtowajds thc USSR and Eastem Europc.China, wir.h which Scoul has longhad sig-nificant tradc, is also a target.

Evidcntly all this is very worrying forNorth Korea, which is increasingly isolated and facing growing economic prob-lcms. Aftcr thc fall of Romania'sCeausescu and Ea-sl Gcrmany's Honcck-er, Noflh Korca's "grcar leadcr" Kim llSunS -

who had amounccd a fcw ycalsprcviously his intention of abdicating infavour of his son, Kim Jong ll

- must

havc felt ncrvous. But this has only nrade$c tension bctwecn North Korca and itsex-allies in Eastcm Eurcpc more intcnse.

Aftcr thc announcement o[ thc re-cslablishmcnt of rclations bctwe€n SouthKorea and the Soviet Union, the Pyon-gyang regime reacted by issuing for the

2 0 ll:l ;'mu#.s* ::H:":ix':*H:

its changcd natue." Gorbachev has thus"sold &e digIrity and honour of a socialistpower" aIId betraycd "lhc intercsls andtrust of an ally" in exchaflge for a fcwmillion dollars.

Economic dependence onSoviet trade

It is not yet possible to say whethersuch talk is simply momentary anSer orthe signal of a brcak bctwcen ryongyangand its historic ally. Ccrtainly a brc.Iwith fte USSR would carry a high costfor ftc Norlh Korcan economy. ln 1986the Sovict Union took in 51.470 of No hKorean exports and Fovidcd 60.570 ofits impofls. Howev6, even if thcrc is notormal diplomatic break, it is clcar thalthc tcrms of Soviet-Nonh Korcan eco-nomic relations a.rc fundameIItally chang-ing. Thc Soviet Union has alrcadyannounccd its intcntion of ccasing cheapoil sales to Nonh Korca .nd trading onlyon thebasis ofworld markct prices.

Mcanwhile thc countrics of thc ex-Sovict bloc no longer intond to have"privilcgcd rclations" wi0r \ongyarg.This mcans a 20?o fall in Norlh Koreancxpons lhis ycar (sce 7)? Economist,August 25, l9m). Thc risk of ending upin a situation of alrnost total internalionalisolation - with thc support of China,Vietnam and Cuba - musl be \\'orryingfor Kim n Sung. Thc prcblcm of isolationis compoundcd by a growing 8apbctwccn thc cconomic pcrformance ofthc two parts of Korca. With Lwicc thcpopulation, the South has a gross nationalproducr t]Irce timcs that of fte Nofih.Pyongyang faccs complctc marginaliza-tion.

This is the contcxt of tlrc rcsumption ofnegotialions bctwccn thc tq'o Koreangovemmcnts on thc question of rcunifi-carion. In fact, thc meetings are nol really

lnternational Viewpoint #195 a November 26, 1990

NORTH KOREA / AROUND THE WORLD

HAITIA "candidate of thepeople"GENERAL elections are due to takeplace in Haiti on Dccember 16, 1990, ifthe arrny and thc followers of the formerdictator Duvalier do not prcvent then byviolence, as they did in 198?. On Octo-ber 14, the Duvalicdsts crcatcd a partyand announced that they had "comc ourof their hiding place". Three days later,Duvalicr's formcr chief torturer andminister of lhe intorior, Roger Lafontant,armounced his candidacy lor the post of

In South Korea, the demand for reuni-fication has an anti-governmcnt and anti-impeialist edge. The civil war, whichbroke out irl 1945 after 35 years of Japa-ncse colonial domination, left the countryravaged. The division at the 38th parallel,after a bloody collflict that tlreatened toIead to a rlird world war, lefr l-he South ina state of semi-colonial dependence on theUnited States. For this rcason demoqaticand leftist militants in the South have ananbivalent attitude to the North. Censor-ship. vulgar anti.Communism and the licsof the Sou0r's military regimes haveresulted in the North Korean rcgime seem-ing less repulsive thar il. in fact is.

Thc Northom state is often viewed. ifnot as a model, givel lhe total lack ofdemocracy, at least as an example ofnational pridc and national indepcndencein the face of their own authoritarian andcorupt govcrrrment, under the thumb ofimperialism.

For the South Korean ruling class, reun-rficalion * ould be a way oI enlarginE lhcirindusuialbase anJ makin8 Korea. wil.h ils60 million inhabitants, the second capital-ist power in Asia, after Japan. For Ole

workers, studcnts and exploitcd masses oflhe South, i! would represent above all a

continualion of the national libcrationsftuggle. Thus compariso s between Gcr-many and Korca must be entered uponwith caution. The division of Cennanywas the result of t1c defeat of an imperial-ist power in thc Second World War, whiletie division of Korea perpetuatcd a condi-tion ofnational opFcssion in}le tcd frcmcolonialism.

Thjs is the background to the courageous journey of a young lcflisl militant,Im Suk Yong, to Pyongyang, and *tc

president of the rcpublic.The ncxt day, Fathcr Jean-Bertrand

Aristide, libemtior rheologian and rodaya popular hero, took up th9 challenge anddeclarcd himself "fie candidare of rhepeoplc".

He intcnds by this gesturc ro unleash a"tidal wavc" so as to bar thc way to theTontons-Macoutcs cithcr by way of thceloctions, or, if fair elcctions do not takeplace, outsideoIthem. His candidacy hascxcitc{i grcat cnthusiasm. In a fcw days,somc hundreds of thousands of pcoplehavc inscribed thcmselvcs on thc clccto-ral lisls.

heavy penalty he incured (sec 1y 180).However, it is bccoming increasinglyclear that this national liberation struggledoes not havo an ally in the North Korearegimo. Tlc lattcr's aim, dcspite thc offi-cial propaganda, is nol rcunificalionwhich it would accept only under its owncontrol, which is not on the cards - butthc maintcnance o[ its ow)r bureaucraticpower.

Renewal of relations withJapan

Anothcl consequence of its intcmation-al isolation has bcen Pyongyang'sattcmpts to rcnew rclations with Japal.Only relflivcly minor ohstrclcs lo lhisscem to rcmain, given that Japan hasexprcssed ils rcadincss to pay cornpcnsa-tion of $4.8bn for thc pcriod o[ colonialdomination, bclween l9l0 and 1945 (TleEcoramist, August 25, 1990). NorthKorca is thc only counlry with whichTokyo has no diplomatic relations,dcspile thc prcsence of a largc Koreancommunity in Jrpan, $hosc symf'athicsarc dividc<l between Seoul and Pyon-gyang.

Recent visits by delegations ofthe Japa-nese Socialisl Party and (ruling) LiberalDemocratic Party to Noflh Korea arc asign of ir dcsirc for rcconcilintion inTokyo. and cvcn. wilhin ccrlrin limits.the possibility of cconomic aid. But thiswill not bc cnough lo gct Kinr Il Sung'sStalinist dynasly out of ils isolalion, fillrhe growing cconomic gap $'ith Lhe

South, or halt its slow declinc. If cchoesfrom Lhc Beijing spring and Sovict 8/as-noll rcach Pyongyaag, thc Norlh Korcanregime may scc its own cnd coming. )k

The candidacy ofFarher Aristide under-mines the projecls ofboft the Duvalieristsand the US imperialisB, who have had, forsome time, their own favowed candidateon fie lists. The Duvalicrists, who haveattemptcd to assassinalc Father Aristidescvqal tifics since 1986, could wellcmbark on a ncw orgy of bloodshcd in ficcoming weeks. )k

INDONES'AFree union formedACCORDINC to a rcpofiir.the Financialfin er (Novcmber 15, 1990), "a group ofworkers and human righls activisls inIndonesia have formed an independenttrade union, which, undq the name SctiaKawan (Solidarity), aims ro challenge rhemonopoly of the countly's one officiallysanctioned union."

The union plans to campaign for betterwagcs and working conditions rluough a

union "frcc Iron1 the influencc of industry,employcnt and d:rc government." Askcdabout lhc dangcr oI rcpc)ling forcign capi-tal cure[tly attracled to the countrythrough cheap wages, the organizers com-mcnted that chcap labour meant "disaslcrfor thc workcls". The union claims 5.000mcmbers and plans to hold a congrcss atlhc starl of D('ccmbcr to adopt slarues andcleat lcaders- *

USSRThe Fourth htefiational inthe Soviet ptessTHE Scptember 11 issue of thc Moscowu,cckly Nerv hrnes publishcd a long inter-vicw with Emest Mandcl of ore FouthIntcmational. This is ftc first time thal rereadcrs of this wcckly, which is publishcdin 8 languaScs, and Sovicl rcaders in gen-eral, havc bccn given a positive view ofthc Fou h Intcmadonal.

Undcr the headlinc "We arc rcvolution-arics", Mandel analyzcd the strategy ofthe Fourth Inlcmational in the thrce sec-

tors of the world rcvolution, including thestrategy of political revolution in thebucaufi atized workers' slates.

MrnJcl rcilcratcd lhc nuan(cd analysjswhich hc has devclopcd ovcr some yearsof thc changes undcrway in the SovietUnion (in simplificd fom; "yes" to glds-norl, "no" 1o all that which, ir perestroikrr,inlplics thc dcterio.ation of thc stuldard ofliving of rrc working class).

Thc joumalist $rlo introduccd the inter-view undcrlincd that, for Soviet readcls\\,ho have not read Mandcl until llow, and

::"*"* t:i'Jl:il,'i"fl j;3":ff1 [:; 2 INovember 26, 1990 a #195 lnternational Viewpoint

AROIJND THEWORLD / ALTHUSSER

interview would provoke astonishment, ifnot shock. The joumalist explained "Thcprincipal discovery that an imparrial read-er would make..,. is that one has l.he

imprcssion that Mandel has espcciallyborrowed his themcs frcm divefie reprcsentarives oI lhe polilical tcndcncics inthe USSR, to make a sorr of synthesis ofthem, altributing to the finished productrhe namc of the idoology of contcmPoraryTrorskyism". Bul this inlcrprelationcomes up againsl an incontcslablc facL -this so calted sylthesis was developcdwcll before the arrival of Mikhail Corba-chev inpower! 'lk

PORTUCALSeventh Conglress of PSRTHE seventh Congress of the Revolulionary Socialist Party (PSR

- Ponugucse

scction of the Fouflh Intemational) lookplace in Lisbon October 5-7 in the prcs-ence of 80 delegates and numcrousguests, notably dclcgations from thc Por-tuguese Commlrnist Pafly (PCP), thcSocialist Youlh. thc Popular DemocrrticMovcmcnt (MDP), lhe Associalion of tlreCaptains of April, Ole Josd Afonso Asso-ciation , thc two principal tradeunion fed-erations, and numcrous perconalities.

Thc large number of delcgatcs con-fimlcd the growth of the PSR's work, nolably in ncw rcgions and new sectors.Ncarly half thc participants wcre youth(the average age at thc Congress was 27)and $e majority had been in thc PSR forlcss than threc years.

The new CenEal Committee contains alot of new faccs

- it includes an impor-

tant youth representation and even a mili-tant whose political history began in 1961in thc prison cclls ofthe dictator Salazar_

The conference balancc shcct showcdthat nearly 60 public mcctings have bccnheld in rhc past two ycarc, aucndcd bymorc than ) 5.000 pcoplc. around rhc bigcampaigns lcd by rhe PSR (anri racism,anti-militarism, dcnunciation of the neo-Iascist gangs and in responsc to Lhe mur-dcr of PSR lcadclJos6 Carvalho

- sce 1Ill'75 a\d l'71) - drc PSR also micjc ananalysis of ils elccroral campaigns.

Thc Congrcss revicwed rhe campaign itled around thc lriat of the assassins ofJosd Carvalho, and approvcd the crcationof an anti-fascist infomlalion ccntrc.

Finally, the mcmbcrs of tle pSRdcfined thcir plan of aclivities for the ncxltwo years. )k

TROPA NAO

22

End of Althusser'slon$ marchTHERE is a sort of iournalistic embarrassment surroundingthe death ol Louis Althusser, a homage granted with a badconscience. lt seems that all that is left to remember of thisdefender of "theoretical anti-humanism" is his humangentleness and his qualities as a teacher. The personal drama

- the killing of his wile in a lit o{ depression - is recalled withprurient lascination, but his work is discreetly dlsmissed.

DANIEL BENSAID

owEvER, frankness showsmore rcspcot than "makingallow:rnccs". Like most nov-icc Communists in the 1960s,

wc rcad Aldrusscr wiLh passionate inter-est, pcncil in hand, underlining and anno-tating. Evcn so, in the prc-1968 [FrcnchTrotskyisLl JCR (Jcuncsscs CommunistesRdvolutionaircs), thqc wcrc not nlanyAllhusscdans.

In 1968 Emcsl Mandcl publishcJ his"Formation of the Economic Thought ofKarl Marx", a polcmical altcmative rcad-ing of Marx, criticizing All.husscr'snotion of an "epistemological rupturc"Lretwccn tho young and old Ma in thelight ol thc Cruhd.tisse. In 1975, we pub-lishcd a collection of articles entilled,slmply, Contre .,1rA6sel (AgainstAlthusser). In othcr words we wereagainst him, pcrhaps Lo lhc point ofcxccss.

Althussu bathcd Marxism in l.he acidofhis "epistcmological rupturc", wirh theintenlion of cstablishing il.s sraturc as asoicnce. ln so doing, hc Jiced rlreory lrcmthc naggirrg intcrlcrencc of day to daypolitics. He frccd us from thc pcriod ofCold War "armed philosophcrs". "Wewerc philosophe$ without works, whomadccvery work into polilics."

Althusser emancipatestheory

Hcnceforth, Ai0lrlsserdcclared,,,thco-relical practice is its own criterion. con-taining wiLhin ilsclf dcfinite rulcs forcvaluaring thc quality oI it\ o\t,r| produul,thal rs lo si) lhc sciunlificily of Lhc products oI scicntific practicc." For Communist sLrrdcnls in conflict with thc totcm oftlrc party, such an cnlancipation oI l.hcorygave lhc signal for clfcctive frecdom ofthought.

Alfiu\scr grantc{l Marxrsm a ncw scicnritic (lignil). ln rhc introduclion ro ltisbook For Man, hc spoke of l}lc frus[a-tion of the Communist inrcllcctual pcr-

ceivcd as a mercenary petitioncr. "Therewas no way out for a philosophq. If hcspoke or \rTote philosophy at the behcst ofLhc party. hc wirs reduced to commcntaricsor to small variations for internal use onwcll-known quotations. Wc had no audi-ence oulsidc our own circles."

Marxism was to gain the prccious recog-nition of acadcmia. This was a godsendfor the rising gcneration, caught up in l.he

big expansion of higher educatiol. Scr,vants of an all powcrlul, sincc lrue. sci-cnce, these intellcctuals were lreed lromguilt Lowards thc "parry of lhe workingclass".

Now they wcrc thcmselves producers,since, so the master taughl them, it wouldhcnceforth be nccessary [o "conceive ofunderstanding as production." They wcreto have, at one and the same time, fhe tech-nocratic power of this science and thegood conscicnce ofsupporting the cause.

Theory liberated frompractice

In this way, Althusser appearcd as a lib-crator. Here was thcory liberatcd ftompracticc. To the point whcre the philoso-phcr wcre to shut rhcmselves up in lhcirivory towers and breek off all relationswirh practice.

This ratifie.d the rclarions betwecn thercvolutiona.i), prctensions of this theoreti-cal reflovation and the actual policy pur-sucd by rhc Frcnch Communisr Pafly in1968. In Lhis armcd pcacc bctwe€n rheoryand practice, policy remained undcl thecontrol of the poliricians of rhc parry lead-crship.

With the goal of clevating Marxism toacademic dignity, Althusser invited us tocntcr inlo a dialoguc with psychoanalysis,linguistics, and structural althropology.Al lhe samc timc, it was the cused unionof historical materialism and dialecticalmaterialism, distantly dcscclldcd fromBuliharin's "Populcr Muual ol MzfiistSociology"

- well dcmolished by Gram-

lnternational Viewpoint #I95 a November 26, 1990

ALTHUSSER

m atedal ism."On the one hand a dis-

tinct science of history, onthe other "a science of thedistinction bctwcen truthand falsehood". Betweenthesc l.wo, polilicsremained in the compe-tcnce of tho party.

sci in the Prison Notebooks, given officialstatus by Stalin in his immofial "Dialecti-cal and Historical Materialism" - thatenabled the marriage of Stalinist positivism ("Marxism-Leninism ) and the posi-tivist traditiois of French academia.

Since "the knowledge of history is nomore histodcal than the knowledge ofsugar is sugary" history can be sunmedup ir terms of profit and loss.

Althusser polemicized particularlyagainst the "theoretical leftism" of Lukacsand Gramsci, accused of "confusi[g underthe heading of historical matedalism twodistinct disciplines, o[ the one hand thctheory of history, on the other, dialectical

For him "lhe only left c tique of the Sta-linist dcvialion" was thc "silent but aclivecritique accomplished by the Chinese rev-olution".

In this scenario, *re Stalinisr ranks inPrague and Budapesl, thc Hitler/ Stalinpact and the camps werc chicken feed.

Theoretical errors based onphilosophical deviations

Althusser had equipped himselt inadvance with ajustification for this lastirlgblindncss.

The "theoretical deviatio$ tha!have ledto the great histo cal failures of the prole-ta at" werc "at bottom" philosophical

deviatiom."We are now near to

understanding why theysubmcrged even fhosewho denounced them -in a cefiain sense theywere inevitable in func-ion of the inevitablebackwardncss of Marxistphilosophy itself."

How happy is philoso-phy, that car tum up inthe twilight afrer the bat'de and contemplate theruins, after the poor politi-co has had to wade all daylong in the mud andblood!

It would be illusory tosuggest that the presentcan evel be fully understood, but even so, all theliquidated dissidents andoppositionists attest to thefact that the history thathappened was not thconly possible one, andthat Stalinism was neverobligatory.

What cannot go on anylonger in the CommunistParry appearcd later, inr 9?8.

As late as 1976, Althus-ser was saluting the 22ndCongress of the Frcnch

Communist Party as "adecisive event".He was critical of the abandonment of

the dictatorship of the proletariat as wcllas lhe party's intemal regime, but wel-comed the strategic innovations (this wasthe high tide of Eurocommunism) and categorically rajccted the notion of the dghtto organize tendencies. What could not beallowed to last had aheady lasted far toolong.

Armed with the sharp scalpel of science,Alrhusser thouglt thal he could dismisshistory. Buthistory struck back. Yet, para-doxically, Althusser's work now seems tohave Sained a quite new subvcrsivcimport. In the present pedod, to "readCapituf' vrith and against Althusserremains lhe point o[ dcpanure for ouI rea- 4:i atsoned rebellion. :t 3C

Intervention intostudent crisis

Ultimately, rhe lifting ofthe burden of guilt fiom theshouldc$ of thc intcllectu-als had its counterpart inAlthusser's 1963 text onstudent pioblems.

This was a diect inter-vention into a crisis in theUnion of Communist Stu-dents, which still sends ashiver down the spine: "Alldiscussions betweefl Com-munists are scientiflc dis-cussions. This is the basison which the Mafiist-Iainist concept of criti-cism aad sclf-cdticismress. The right to criticismand l]le duty of self-criticism have one alrd thesame principle

- the realacceptalce of Maryist-Leninist science and itsconsequences."

TIlc dislinction drawn between lhe tcch-nical and social divisions oflabour gave a"Marxist" justificatior

- besidcs its pcd-agogical funclion

- o[ the exisling uni-

ve$ity and mandadnal ordcr, on thecondition that in the matedal taught "thepermanent dividing line between $e tech-nical and social division of labor[, fiemost constant and profound class divide"between "true science" and "pure ideolo-gy" was established.

Such an approach could lead both tocomplete submission beforc lhe vcrdictsof this n:ue science oI to puely mentalrcbellions against everylhing that could belabelled false bougeois sciance. And thisat a time when the very concept ofscicnceilselfneeded a hard critical look.

It is the texts Althusser wrotc bcforc his

belief in the immineIlt miracle of ftcworld rcvolution and thus undcnake theconsfuction of socialism in one country.He drew all thc consequences frcm Lhis* to defend this coultry at all costs as therearguard of all socialism in the world,and to make of it, bcsieged by impcrial-ism, a fofiress that could not be captued.

"To this end it was neccssary to givep oriry to heavy indusry, which pro-duced thc tanks of Stalingrad, whichscrvcd thc Sovict peoplc in thcir heroicIife-and-death strugglc to ftee the worldfrom Nazism. This is also our history.Ald tluough the caricatwes and eventragedies of this history, millions of Com-munists leamed thc p nciples of [-enin-ism, even if Stalin taught *rem as

dogmas".

November 26, 1990 a #195 lnternational Viewpoint

self-criticism and evolutioll in the 1970sthat made of "Althusscrianism" a schoolor current of ftought.

In lhepolitical world, Althusser inevita-bly came up against the wall of Stalinism.He treated it as a product of a "thcoreticaldeviation" rather [han a formidable histor-ical counter-revolution, equipped with allthe thoroughly non-conceptual weight ofpurges and labour camps.

In his 1973 Reply to lohn Lewis, thepositive side of Stalin was still allowcd toprevail over the negative: "Stalin cannot,for clear and sEong rcasons, bc rcduced tothe dcviation that \ue associate with hisname.., He had other historical medts. Herealized that it was nccessary to renounce

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A new face for the king

24

LTHOUGH the area coYeredby the Kingdom ofJordan nev-er represented a source of natu-ral wealth for imperialism,between 1921 and 1957 British

colonialism providcd the finance andtraining for the setting up a central gov-emment.2 From 1958 to 1967, Londonwas replaced in this role by US imperial-ism, and after the 1967 defcat by the Culfoil states. In 1971-74, the isolation of theJordanian regime in the region whichrcsulrcd frcm jts crushing of rhc Palestin-ian movement on its territory brought anincreasein aid from the United States.

This "capacity" of the regime to findncw paymaslers in accordancc wilh thecrcumstances cannot cover up its rllldcr-lying inte$ation into imperialist policy,whatever margin for maneuver it mayhave. This dependence influences the Jordanian social formation. Chrcnic deficiain the budget and trade balancc arcfinanced by forcign aid and subsidies,which make possible a hypefirophy of thestate bweaucracy in relation to the pro-ductive sectors.

Thus, a third of all jobs arc accountedfor by the state, military and adminis[a-tive apparatuses. Indusry accounas foronly 8 per cent. The majority of worke.sand lechnicians emigrate lo Saudi Arabiaand the Gulf. In 1979, 15 per cent of thecconomically active population wereuncmployed. From thc slandpoinr oI ilsimpcrialist and Arab pro-Westem pay-masters, Jordan is an important "produc-er" and "expofter" of military-politicalservtecs.

The special character of Jordan's inte-gration into imperialist policy rcsts on theneed to produce such services, in order togain foreign financing of thc state appara-tuses, whose sizc incaeasr .,! thc cxpcnscof investments in thc p(,(i',lctive scctors.The lack of commodity production in turnengenders a chronic economic crisis, withhc dcticit bcing madc up by torcign aid.

The recession that has prevailed since1982 is linked to a decline in aid ftom rhepro-Wcstem oil states. 3The regimc couldhave avoided this, if ir had managcd roreplace ruined Lebanon as the commercial and technical inrcrmcdiary bctwe.nthe imperialist countries and the Arab oilstates.a In line with faliing oil rcvcnues,the drop in lhc sc( ond halt ol $e 1980s inemigrant rcmifiances from Jordanianworkers in the Gulf states led to a shrink-in8 of the state's forcign cuncncyresources, which are essential for imporlsand for making up the deficir in the bal-ance of trade (which amounts to moredran half of the GNP).5 Two-rhirds of

WHEN lraq lnvaded Kuwait,the Jordanian regime,

already in a sharp politicaland economlc crlsls

aggravated by the intifada,was trying to reorganize

political life in the kingdom.Through a national pact, itwas trylng to assure the

opposition's collaboration ingetting the masses to pay the

bill for the crisis. The Gulfevents offered King Hussein

the opportunity to regainsome credibility by takingadvantage of his specialrelationship with Saddam

Hussein. He set himself up as"mediator" between lraq and

the imperialist powers,pleading energetically tor a

settlement of the lraq-Kuwaitconflict within an Arab

framework'. The followingarticle is based on one in

Arabic by Omar Salem, whichis to be published in the

upcoming issue ofAl-Mitraga, a iournal of

Fourth Internationalists in theArab region.

LUIZA I\iIABIA

GNP is accounted for by thc govemmentapparatus, as against 24 pcr ccnt forindustry and 2 per cent for agriculturc.

In 1988, forcign dcbr rcse ro $11.5 bil-lion and intercst o[ it exceeded a third ofthe annual srale budgcr.6 This crisis,along wirh rhc brcaking of links wilh rheWest Bank, brought on a drop in the val-ue of the Jordanian dinar and inflation.So. jiltcry busincssmcn changcd theirdinars for foreign currcncy (cspeciallydollars). The cmigrant workcrs stoppcdtheir rcmittances oI dollars and Saudi

als, and figulcs in thc rcgime plungcdinto black markct curency speculation.

Following the cessation ofpaymcnts onthe debt, thc ending ofimpcrialist financ-ing brought a halt to rhe ongoing projects.Forcign cuucncy rcserves fcll to thepoint that the govemment, hcadcd by

t . See the tpo interyiews wiu King HBsein by Bririshand US TV, whjch werc pubbshcd in lhe lordrrianpr6s m August 5 and 6.2. British aid to Jordan Epsoted 33% of fie ialrq\budger in 192e and tose to 73% in 1946.3. Thc Bolulions of t\e Bagh&d sumit in 198?included aid fo! $e .lordanian regine ro thc rune of$1.2 billion a y6 to! a durahm of I0 yq6. Sin-eI 982, UE re8ime has got 168 than haf Ua!.4. This explains the concotrati@ of capilali$ if,vsr-mmr in the equiprnqt and eryice sec|o6. This6momts to n@r1y &ree quaneF of toral invesr.dr,wh e m 1986 and 108? 13% ol bvsrnffL was iriadustly and 1 7. in agricultDre.5. Rmillanccs frm miSran wo*els worc seca"!rvcly 4?5.4m.400 rnd 317 m!l]lm Jord.nirn dmanIrm 1984 to 198?.6. 'Itre paymc of inrcg! on rhc dobt d{lined afrqthe Bcheduling deided on in 1 989 io ag@mm! wir.\fic IMF. In I 992, wh6 paymors arc io tsme, inler-es! on fi. debt wiil amou! to morc rhan half of GNp.7. ThcB vas a popular outctf agsinsr rhe bnb6 paid rcihe kinS add L\e chicf of $e afry h lhe ams dabwith FBnce and G.@! Bdrainl rhe involvdd! of rheking a.d his h@d of cabiner, also distd of Royal AirJordan, in pillagiog lhis .mpany; .nd rhe 'gifrs"@eived by $e cown prin.e, who is dir@lor of rho

lnternationaMewpoint #195 a November 26, 1990

Rifai, was forced to sell off a third of thecountry's gold holdings.

Aware of the link between the c sis andthe practices of the regime's dignitaries.Jordanians started to make hu of tle kingand his courtiels, starting with the pre-mier, Rifai- They became disfustful of thewhole top echelon of the state apparatus. ?

On April 17, the press reported a pro-gram of structural rcforms decided onjointly by the govemment and the Interna-tioral Monctary Fund (MF), as well as arise of 307o in the p ces of peftoleumproducts. On a stop off in London on theway to Washington, the king and Rifaiannounccd rhal legislalive elcclionswouldbeheld.

A clash bctwccn truck d vels andpolicc ill lhc south of lhe country gave thesignal for an explosion of anger by thepopulation. Armed conftontations tookplace, as lhe uprising spread to the centerand north of the countr"y. The army arrest-ed dozens of demons[ators in Amman,Zarqa, Irbid and other cities.

Government undertakespolitical reorganization

Fourteen demons[ato$ were killcd. Butthe updsing forced the king to retum prccipitously from the United Statcs torcspond to thc crowds that werc demand-ing the ouster of the Rifai govcmmcnt. Itwas dismissed- Aware of lhe erosion of itssocial base, the regime wldertook apoliti,cal reorganizarion. A transitional goverfl,ment was fomed by Zeid Ben Shaker,with lhe task of prcparing the legislativeelections. It was this leadeNhip that

JORDAN

launched the vague notion of a "nationalpact."

The electoral code in force until the1980s divided up the seats among regiorB,clans and tribes. Moreover, Article 18banncd candidacies by persons belongingto unrecognized parties, while the onlyorganization recognized by the regimewas the Islamic fundamentalist MuslimBrotherhood.

Zeid Ben Shaker's govemment amend-ed rhe code on the eve of the fall I 989 leg-islative elections. The m.rmber of seatswas increased fiom 60 to 80, and the elec-toral districts were draw[ to favor rualareas and rhose inlabited by people of Jor-danian origin, at the expense of the ubanareas and those with big concentrations ofPalestinians.

The Muslim Brothers have enjoyed con-siderable freedom of organization andaction in Jordan for 40years. The regime has fol-lowed this couse since itsinception in order to barthe way to Communismand Arab nationalism.This odentation reachedirs heighr in 1980, whenthe govenunent of MudarBadran (the present headof govemment) nearlycame to blows with theSrian regime. Despitesome frictions with themonarchy, the MuslimBrothers have continuedto usc the mosques asplatforms, and thct prcssis legal.

The Muslim brothersfielded 35 candidates,won 22 seats, and helpedto bring in allies belong-ing to otler religious cur'rents. Their electioncampaign includednationalist slogans, suchas "Liberate Palestinefrom the Mediteranean to the Jordan",opposed to a peaceful settlement withIsrael. They also raised democraticdemands that chimed in with those of theother pafiies

-changing the constitution,

abolishing the emergency laws and mar-tial law, and so on.

The success of the Muslim Brothers

QJ .sqa) aJLd the other religious curents(12.570) was a rcsult also of regional con-sidcrations in the choice of tleir candi-dates. All the Palestinian deputies elected,with a single exccplio[, came from theranks of the fundamentalists. In all, theIslamic constcllation won 32 seas

- 22for the Muslim Brothen, eight for theindependcnts and two for the House of theKoran Movement. The independentIslamics got four ministerial posts in thenew Badran govemment.

The left panies - the Jordanian Com-

munis! Party, the Democratic People'sParty (DPP

- linked to the Democratic

Front faction of the PLO lcd by NayefHawatneh), Ceorge Habash's PopularFront for the Liberation of Palestine andthc narionalist faclions. including rhe various wings of the Baath (raqi, Syrian andlcft Baathists)

- did not go beyond thepopulation's immediate demarrds, andthcir slogans wcre often confused withthose of the fundamentalists,

Left fails to agree minlmumprogram

Incapable of rallying around a mini-mum program, they suffered from thercdrawing of election distlicts. lhe brcvityofthe campaign and thepopulation's lackof interest in the elections. Each of thethree main left parties got a seaf. Theindependent left candidates got thrceseats, and thenatiolalist movement, five.

The National Bloc, made up of candi-dates favorable to fte regime, got themajority in parliament.

It was the Muslim Brcthers' successthat led to lhe naming of Mudar Ba&an,lhcir ally in thc confronlalion with tneSyrian govcmment in 1980, as head ofgovemment. The installation of this for-mer chief of intelligence (1969- 1970) andformer head of govemment (1976-1984),a well known champion of repression,was supposed to inaugurate a phase ofdemocratic change.

Starting immediatcly aftcr its installa-tion, the new govemment has intoduceda sedes of measues in parliamcnt widen-ing general fteedoms

- a "freezing" of

martial law !\ith a view lo abolishing il(the notion of a "freeze" docs not appearin the constitution), the relcase of hun-dreds of political prisollers, restitution ofseveral lhousand passpor8 confiscaredundcr the previous Badmn govemment

and abolition of the Rifai goverlmenr'sdecrees rcstdcting the fteedoms of tradeunions and the press. Thus, getting thejump on the parliamcntary left, whichabstained at the time of the vote, Badmngot a majority and took up the task ofestablishing the National Pacr.

For a long time, the left pa ies have notcalled for changing the constitution.Adapting to the monarchy, they agreed totake pafi in a royal commission to draw upOle Pact ftat was set up in April 1990. IssaMadaflant (a deputy and mcmber of thePolitical Burcau ofthe CP) and Dhib Mur-ji (a deputy and member of rhe Popular&ont) justified their pafiicipation byexplaining that tlle Pact "witl remove rheobstacles that have blocked poliricalaction by the masses" and "cancel out thenegarive aspecls oI the regime's previouspolicies." 3

As for Tayssir Zibri, geII-eral secretary of the DPP,he said that if there was tobe any dispute, it shouldnot be over the principle ofthe Pact but over its form":and that there was "agree-ment on the plan for a seri-ous and positive course...toget out of the political andeconomic clisis." ro Hcdeclared himself ready toabandon a part of hisorganization's progam, ifnecessary, in order to seeka "common denominator."This policy of cofipromisewith the monarchy hasbecome the commondenominator of all the leftpafiies-

The demonsfationsagainst the massacre ofPal-estinians in Rishon-le'Zionin May 1990 werc onlysupported by a few individ,uals on the lcft, in their per-sonal capacity. The CP

went so far as to organize committees to"calm the masses," as in Zarqa. The oppo-sition got goverrunental thanks where itmanaged to channel the mobilizations. Itoffered its apologies where it failed to doso.

Finally, the latest episode of this shame-ful story is that rhe CP, the Popular Frcnr,and the DPP sent a tclegram ro rhe Ambhcads of slate mccLing in June 1990 inBaghdad, implo ng them to aid the Jorda-nian regime financially so that it could"stand up to Israel and suppot the i riz-da." In thesc circumstances, tle Gulfcrisishas enabled the king to play a rcle on rheinternational scene without tamishing hisnew reputation as a "democrat" and hisrc:ently rcfubished "nationalist" escutch-

8. So@h by Isa Madanat !o L\e Royal Cdnissio!,publshed in lhe Jordania! newspapei ,4r,-Slaar, May2!,1990.9. ArL.tr@r, June 3, 1990.10. dri',lraar, Lhrch 31, 1990. 25

..:!''i} *.:.$:*!:*

t.

a

November 26,1990 a #1gS lnternationat Viewolnt

JORDAN/PALESTINE

eon. He has posed as a mediator for set-tling the Iraqi-Kuwaiti conllict within an

Arab framework. The Arab solution,while accel!ing imperialist dominalion inlhe region, rejects lesorting to militaryoperalions. It calls for maintaining somelimited but essential gains for Iraq - itsfteedom of acccss to the Gulf (through ter-ritodal conccssions) and payment ofcom-pcnsation to Baghdad for thclosses inflicted on its oil business by theCulf emirates. It takes up the call of Yas-ser Arafat and King Hussein for an inter-national conference to seltle thcPalestinian problem. Hussein's ve6ion ofthe "Arab solution" also Proposes the set-ting up of an Arab investrnent fund to pro-mote development in the region whileguaranteeing stabilty.

The Jordallian regime's policy isexplained by its fear of the upsets thatwould inevitably result from an armedconfrontation between thc United Statesand Iraq. Its opposition to a military solu-tion, and its urm to the reformist lcft aIIdthe fundafirentalist movement are creatingillusions among the population. In fact,conrary to what many imagine in Jordan,King Hussein has not brokcn with theimpcrialisB. Ho has supported a1l the UNSecurity Council resolutions on IIaq. Heendorscd the Saudis'right to appeal forUs forces to protect them from Iraq.Whenthe king hcld back from condemning theinvasion of Kuwait, the prcss, the left andthe fundamentalisa drcw the conclusionthat he was supporting lraq. When hc pro-posed an "Arab option", evoking fte dan-gcrs tha! would a se fiom a militaryoplion in the region, his coufiieB present-ed him as an "aflti-impeda1isr." And whenhe suppoficd lhc IIN Secu ty Cou[cil rcs-olutions, the same people justified hischoice. Respect foi intemational law onthis question, thcy said, called for doingthe same on the Palestinian question.

With some popular sections getting ide-as about arming themselves, the king Eiedto get aiead of them by calling for a "pco-ple's army" (that is, the uaining of civil-ians by the royal amy). On the otherha[d, increases in the prices of nccessi-ties, supposedly because of the needs ofrhe struggle, were gor through with thesupport ofthe left. Imporialist pressues toget the king to line up clcarly againsrBaghdad havc incrcascd, along withpromises of compensation for the lossesincurred by ths interruption of expo s toIraq. Thcking has won somercal victodesdomestically. He has becn able to pull rhewool over the eyes of lhemass movement,as attested by thc appcarance of his por,trait alongside that of Saddam Hussein inthe dcmonsrations that have taken placein Jordan but also on the Wcst Bank. TIisis a new coronation for the sovcreign, butthis timc he is disguiscd as a "left wingmonarch," who has madc his pcace withCeorge Habash and Nayef Hawatmch at

26 H;:lflT:r:i*?:, PoPurar For'res in

Geor$e Habash on warand peace in theMiddle EastON SEPTEMBER 15,1990 the Congress of Arab PopularForces took place in the Jordanian capital of Amman. The solecommon theme of this vast meeting of groups with verydifferent outlooks was opposition to Western intervention inthe region. After being banned tor 20 years, thls meeting sawthe return of the leaders of the left of the Palestine LiberationOrganization (PLO) to Jordan. Under pressure lrom a growingmass movement of both Palestinians and Jordanians,Jordan's King Hussein has been forced to open up thellood-gates of political self-expression in the kingdom.

The very lact that George Habash, the head of the PopularFront for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), was presentshows lhe change in the atmosphere in Jordan over the pastmonths. Since the start of the crisis, Dr. Habash has beendistinguished by an uncritical attitude of support for "thepeople and army of lraq and to the lraqi political leadershipand our brother Saddam Hussein." Such uncritical support isall the more surprising in that it comes after a decade ofembittered relations between the PFLP and the lraqi regime.George Habash's Iong speech to the Congress, of whichexracts are printed below, also raises other lssues - (SaraLJabet).

DOCUMENT

lnlernational Viewpoint#195 a November 26, 1990

I I [tT'1":i",xi,'f;xi":* ;::f,"Jmcntal fashion. It is uscful - and

I say this ftom a point ofview oltotal sup'pod to our haqi brothers - to state cer-taix things dirccrly

- our encmy, that is

thc US administrarion, hds \ on a batllc inits "cold war", lcd since the end of theSecond World War, against ftc socialis!bloc and rhe Soviet Union.

It is prcparing to act in a world with asole pole, dominated by the Uaired Srarcs,rather than a nlulti-polar or bipolar world.This new fact must be intcgrated in ou.ranalyses.

We must also take into account rhe dif,ficull) o[ thc ba[le lhal wc arc icading inthe currcnt world siluation. The changesat a world lcvel ovcr the past year meanthat Ihe national liberation forccs of thewhole world are from now on compelledto cormt abovc all on thcmsclves...

Aftcr having bencfited from thesechanges, aftcrhaving won the "cold war",wilh l}le collapse of some of the socialistregimes and rhe inability of the SovietUnion to aid Lhe nalional libcration forc-

es, fte United States dares to speak of a

"new wodd oider".I do not know if you have rcad or heard

the rccent spcech of Ceorge Bush a fewdays ago in which he speaks ofthis.

For the first time Lhe Amcrican administration speaks of a "ncw world orde/'bascd on an agreement between the twogreat powcrs. If you look at this speech,you will clearly see how the US intends toorganize lhc new inlemalional siruation.Wog to alL hose Third World counrrieswhich cannot be milked....

Prepared for war orsettlement

If the American administration wanrswar at any price, we are ready for it. And ifthcrc is any possibility of a political set-tling of accounts that would permit Iraq,as woll as the Palesdnian cause and theArab nation to realize certain of theirobjectives, I say that we can take thisrcad....The initiative tal(en by haq [rheprcposal ro excharge Iraqi withdrawalfrom Kuwait for Israeli withdrawal ftom

PALESTINE

the Occupied Territoriesl has opened adoor for us that will allow us to prcsent ourcase to the whole world....What does tlisinitiativesay?

It says rhal if lhe US adminisualion isattached to intemational legality, then tlfslegaliry, embodied in UN resolution 194,has recognized tlre right of the PalesLinianpeople to rcturn to Palestine. But this hasnot taken place. I am myself from the townof Lod, but I ce ainly arn not livinS there.There is another tIN resolution (3236)which rccognizes our right to self-determination and another (3276) ourdght to set up a state.

And, if someone were to point out thatthese are orlly rcsolutions of the GeneralAssembly, there are also Security Councilresolutiorx

- thanks to lhe Intifada lhe

Security Council has adopted resolutions605,607, and 608 which speak, at least, ofhe applical.ion of $e Geneva convention.Butdespite all this, the US hasnot moved.There have becn no thneats, no fleet dis-patched and no blockade imposed lonI$aell.

International legality is twoway process

We now dispose of an argumcnt in theface of the world, and the US administra-tion in the ftst place. We can say lo them:"Undc.st.md us; ifyou want to sort out theGulf questiol on the basis of internationallegality, we also have somcthing to say onthis question."

we are all ready to sit around a negotiat-ing table to discuss all the questions of theMiddle East in the light of intemationallegality. But if you want to separate thesequestions, wc are not idiots. We do notaccepl thal lhc Amcricans acl only on lhcirown account.

We say that we will accept intcmationallJw il lhe United Nalions inlcnd( to scri-ously apply its resolutions. That includesthose relating to Israeli withdrawal fromthe south ofLebanon and $e occupied terrirorics, as well as resolulion 660. on Iraqiwithdrawal from Kuwail.

They must all be applied; otherwise wewill allow ouselves to sav that we haveour Arab revolutionary tegitimacy". *

{

The Gulf and theintifada

DOCUMENT

11 THE IMPACT Of tho GUlfevents on the iitifada }ras bec,lreally enormous. This has been

reflected concretely, as we have secnrecently, by an intensification and sprcadof the confrontalions. They have sprcadto all of Palcstine, including rhc tcrrito-ries occupicd in 1948.

Il has to bc noted, however, lhat inspite of this escalation oI the intikda,mcdia covcragc has declincd. The rcasonfor this should not be sought in thc ncwconditions of the confrontation, as theywould have us believe, but in a deliberateattitude of the media towfid thc crisis.

It should be stresscd, in fact, l.hat thcintifada's rcactiort to the conftontationunderway in the Culf was in accord withits natue. It is a call to fight, to intensifythe struggle against the camp of our ene-mies - imperialism, Zionism and Arabreaction.

This not a question of applaudinga leader-symbol nor a call to stcp up dip-lonulic clforls to defusc lhc crisis. Ir isralher a call for confrontation expressedin thc sloguN of lhe i ntifada, ro| supportfor the settlcment between Saddam andthe United States that the Arab govcm-ments want.

Crisis has economic costsfor Palestinians

Moreovcr, the crisis has had direct eco-nomic conscqugnccs for thc ittifada,Thcy came [rom the dccline o[ cmi-grants' remitnnces to their families in theoccupicd tcrrirories. and thc dccline inthe financial aid given by lhe oil states tothe PLO.

Ths scope of lhese cffccts is obvious ifyou rcalizc that ncarly 650,000 Palcstin-iars depcnd for the ir cxistence on jobs inthc Culf stales. and thal cmigrant remit-

tances amount to nearly a third of &e GNPof the teritories of the irrilizr1.

According to some estimates, the oilstates have already expelled a quartgr of amillion Palestinians, including 41,295ftom Saudi Arabia, 5,100 from Qatar,3,630 ftom Oman and 5,850 from Dubai(according to Shaher Saad, general secre-tary of the West Bank confederation ofnnions, in Ash-Shaab of September 11,1990).

It is an ill wind, howeve., that blows noone any good. These negative effects canhave positive consequences. They caninqease the return of the emigrants to Pal-estine in lhe face of the immigration ofSoviet Jews and thek settlement as colo-dsts.

They rcinforce the idea of self-reliance,the return to fte land, the crcation of coop-erative projocts for industdal or craftdevelopment, and thus consolidate tJlebasis of the new econor,],y of the intifada.

Radical reform of PLOnecessary

Moreover, the ecoflomic elfects of thecrisis make ncc€ssary a radical financialand administrative retorm of the PLO, inthe framowork of a democratic rcform, oreven transformation, of its institutiofls.Such a rcform must be aimed a[ eliminat-ing the parasitic institutions and appara-tuses that gobble up the PLO'S resources,and at getting rid of corruption and paron-age.

It is also necessary to remove the ftlthych bureaudatic layer that enjoys huge

pivileges, such as villas, luxury cals andsla8gering travel expcnses, involvingstays at first-class hotels - in a word, Ihelayer that lives Iike oil sheikhs.

It is Lhis samc parasitic lalcr that main-tains the closest rclations with the wolstArab reactionaries in the Gulf, Saudi Ara-bia and elsewhere. lt is is one of the bases

for a policy of seeking a deal to settle thePalestinian qucstion. It lives from pcd-dling this merchandise, which has becomegreatly devalued today.

Thc evcnrs undcrway in the Culf regionand the confrontation with the enemycamp of imperialism, Zionism and Arabrcaction have dealt a decisive blow to thelogic of a peaceful Arab-Palestinian settle-ment. This schemc had long been totteringunder the blows of Lhc intifada and Lheelfects of the shattering of the illusion thata settlcment could be reached with theLabour [Maadv] doves.

That hopc fadcd aftcr thc fomation of a'hawk" soverrlmcnt led by Shamir and lllincludintshtuon, t-evy. Neuman nd oJ.- Z I

November 26, 1990 a #195 International Viewpoint

lN THE BAOAA Palestlnlanretugee camp ln Jordan,the Palestlnlan Marxlstresearcher Khaled Ayedspoke on September 16 torthe celebratlon ol the1,000th day ofthe lntlfada.The talk was on the effectsof the Gulf crlsls on thePalestlnlan struggle. Thelollowlng are marorexcerpts.

PALESTINE/ FRANCE

2A

Save Dessie Ellis!HIS APPEAL turned down by thelrish High Court, Dessie Ellis wasexlradited to Britain on November14. He was in his 36th day of a hun-ger slrike, had been hospitalizedand was sullering increasing difli-culties with his sight. An AFP dis-patch noted that this is "the firstextradition of its type since 1987,when the European Convention onTerrorism was signed." The dangertherelore exists that this extraditionwill open the way lor others,

Ellis, a 37-year old lrish republi-can who has sorved nearly nineyears in prison, is accused of com-plicily in explosions in Britain thatlook place, in facl, while he wasjailed or under surveillance of thelrish political police. He is beingcharged under the conspiracy laws.Ellis has announced that he isdetermined to die rather than beburied alive in a British prison andbe subjected to the mistreatmenlother lrish prisoners have sullered.It is imporlant to protest the extradi-tion of Ellis and his trial in Englandby every means possible. Messagesot support and reports of protestsshoufd be sent to A, Phoblacht, SSPsrnell Square, Dublin 1, lreland. *

Coninued l@m prcvious page

er champions ofwhat they call the tcrrito-rial integrity of Erctz Ivacl lthe Land ofIsracll. The sclrlcmcnr policy and logicwcre also rebuffcd by the Americals, asshown by the intcrruption of Lhat dialogueof thc deaf wrongly called thc Amcrican,Palcstinian dialogue.

The situation crcatcd by the A anlicimpcrialists' invasion of rhc Arirbianpcninsula has undemined the vcry fowl-dations of the peacc initiative and srrategy adopted by thc Palesrinian NarionalCouncil in Algiers in 1988.

The Camp David Egyprian regime ofMubarak can no longcr be countcd on as amedialor of an acoord with Washington,as lhose who conceived lltis iniliativethought.

In tum, Washington, is lo longer eventhinking of demanding new concessionsfrom the PLO leadcrship and srill less ofmaking demands or putting pressure onthc state of Israel for the ncgotiationswirh the Palcstiniars $al tl)e championsoflhe pcace initiative hopcd ro scc hcld inCairo.

As for thc Zionist entiry, it is now con-cenlrating its effofls on thrcc objectives

- integrating hund.eds of thousands ofJcwish immigrants lrom rhc SovietUnion, trying to put an end to the itifadaand watching thc events in Jordan andgelting ready to confront them.

With thcsc concems, Isracl is not evcflinterested any more in the diplomalicmaneuvcrs coniected with the seltlementgame". *

IIEMONSTRATIONS invotvinglJSuldrcd5 ol thqusands of school sru-dents took place throughout France onMonday November 12 demanding ade-quate resources for their schools. Themovement, which started in the workingclass suburbs around Pa s, has beengrowing since mid-October. Coordina-tion is maiDly in rhe hands of two ad hoccommittees - one associated with a lcftfaction in thc Socialist Party, thc orhercontrolled by thc Jeunesses Commu-nistes (Comrnunist party youth),

The students' central demand is lor anincrease in the national cducation bud-get to providc morc tcachers, smallcrclasscs and rcpairs to schools. Behindthis dcmand lies the fear of ending upunemployed or in insecure emplo).ment.Indeed, sincc 1986, of the 640,000-700,000 schoolJeavcrs arriving on the

job market, only some4O0,000 had found a jobsix months later. At thesame time, the stateddesire of the Socialist gov-ernrnent that "8070 of thepupils should rcach thebaccalaurdat [the Frenchmatriculation exa..nina-

tionl stagc" ha.s led to growiflg resent-ment, given the substantial differencesbetwecn the means at the disposal ofschools in the cher inner-city areascompared lo t}te suburbs. Thus seleclioncontinues in a different way.

The government, with president Mitter-rand playing an aclive role, has bccnattcmpting to give an appearance ofbeing interested in a "dialogue" wilh theschool students without giving away toomuch in real tcrms. Promises of a moredemocratic regime in schools have beenmade, while the (inadequate) sum of {ouland a half billion additional francs hasbeen given to regional authorities to usc,ifthey wish, on education.

Thc movement has won considerablcpublic support, including from teachers'unions as well as parents' associations atlocal level. *

Jor study ar'd research

THE second edition of the Notebookslfor Studt and ResearchNumber l,.,ThePlace of Marxism in History,'by lirnest Mandel (40 pages,93,50, f2,20Ff) is

now available,A complete rerie\y of the basic tenets of Marxism as they emerged from the

socialist movements of Marx,s time,..This work by Ernest Mandel is not onlyan extremely precious educational tool - an initiation in lllarxism from anactivist and committed standpoint-but also an original contribution that

enriches and renews the debate on the place ofNlarxism in history,, (MichaelLiiwy).

All pxymelts should be made out to Pierre Rousset; mail orders to NSR,2 rueRichard Lenoir, 93108, Montreuil, France.

l^)t:4B]OOKS

lnternalional Viewpoint #195 a November 26, i 99O

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