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Professor Dr Boško Bojović

Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Science Sociales, Paris

Balkanological Institute, Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Belgrade

RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES, RECONCILIATION AND TOLERANCE

THE WESTERN BALKANS IN THE EARLY 21ST CENTURY

The world, local, inter-state, inter-ethnic and civil wars, which were fought in the Balkans

in the 20th century, have left a deep imprint as well as painful wounds and scars in the

memory of the peoples living in this part of Europe. Ideological, bloc, ethno-confessional

and other divisions, including those being stirred up by clashing external influences, have

aggravated or prevented the overcoming of this frightful historical legacy. The lack of

democratic institutions, the weakness of the civil society and, probably even more so, the

absence of a clearly articulated willpower that the worst will not be allowed to repeat itself,

have precluded work on reconciliation, mutual acquaintance and understanding among

these geographically and culturally close peoples and communities over the longer period.

The absence of a market economy and the delayed, mostly basic transition, carried out

under the strong influence of a sclerotic and anachronous state imperative, are still stirring

up neglected animosities rather than trying to alleviate accumulated antagonisms. Thus,

the greater part of the Balkan region is still within the closed circle of its inherited and

newly acquired contradictions, so that it is becoming synonymous with unresolved

conflicts.

vesna ninkovic� 28/2/10 15:51Supprimé: unrealized

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What should be done and what will be the shortest and most effective road to overcoming

the “balkanization“ of the region and pacifying the Balkan powder keg, which has not been

completely incapacitated?

In the dawn of the Euro-Atlantic integration processes and procedures which have, in all

probability, included the so-called Western Balkans1 at long last, this question imposes

itself as an imperative for this part of South Eastern Europe.2 The consolidation and

strengthening of democratic institutions, development of a market economy and social

justice, as well as the general modernization process of society and communities, will

certainly facilitate and speed up these integration processes and, over time, largely

eliminate numerous inherited “mortgages“.3 This raises the question of how much the

deeply rooted oligarchic ethnocracies will succeed in slowing down modernization

processes in those societies where the middle class has mostly dissolved, the elites have

been eroded and civil society is still in its infancy, under the pressure of a cleptocratic

establishment. This question is of utmost significance due to the high degree of

criminalization of these societies, which has assumed such proportions that organized

1 Dimitris Drucas, “Agenda 2014: nova mapa puta za pristupanje Balkana u EU“, Politika, 18 November

2009; Ana Filimonova, “Srbija je ključ Evropske unije za Zapadni Balkan“ , Nova srpska politička misao,

November 2009, http://www.nspm.rs/prenosimo/srbija-je-kljuc-evropske-unije-za-zapadni-balkan.html. 2 Commission of the European Communities, 2008, “Communication from the Commission to the European

Parliament and the Council: Western Balkans: Enhancing the European Perspective“, 5 March, COM (2008)

127, Brussels; B. Bojović, “Western Balkans and Euro-Atlantic Integration“, in: National Reconciliation,

Inter-Ethnic and Inter-Confessional Tolerance in the Balkans. Reconciliation and Human Security,

Proceedings of the Fourth ECPD International Conference (Takehiro Togo and Negoslav P. Ostojić, eds.),

European Center for Peace and Development of the University for Peace established by the United Nations,

Belgrade 2009. pp. 94-95. 3 E. Arnakis, “The role of religion in the development of Balkan nationalism“, in: Charles and Barbara

Jelavich, The Balkans in transition: Essays on the development of Balkan life and politics since the

eighteenth century, University of California Press, 1963, p. 115; P. Moizes, The Yugoslavian inferno:

Ethnoreligious warfare in the Balkans, New York 1995.

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crime can cross the newly established borders more easily than can the stumbling national

economies. The low level of confidence in government institutions and the erosion of value

systems have also assumed such proportions that it is necessary to engage all existing

institutions in the improvement of the situation, especially those whose credibility has

mostly remained intact.

Such a conclusion refers primarily to those religious communities and institutions which,

with the vanishing of the great collectivist and internationalist ideologies, have been

abruptly brought into the foreground of social and political events.4 Those institutions are

now the most efficient transmission for ethno-confessional rallying and the ideological

support of the state and “partyocratic“ (party based plutocratic) natiocracies (nationally

based ruling classes). Brought into the focus of media attention and into the foreground of

social engagement during the stratification of a single-party system, the hierarchies of

religious institutions have become the instrument of interethnic conflicts rather than their

generator. Under the pretext of reviving the hitherto marginalized religious freedom, they

are still at the service of restructuring ethno-confessional rallying and identities. Thus, the

incomplete process of modernization of society has become regressive not only with

respect to the evolution of the emancipacted part of Europe, but also with respect to the

revival of authentic religious and ethical principles, which largely coincide with the values

of tolerance, mutual respect, peace building and dialogue in the great religious systems.

Thus, instead of being the transmitter of authentic value systems, the hierarchy has been

4 Radmila Radić, “Crkva u politici i politika u Crkvi“, in: Srpska elita, Helsinške sveske 1, Helsinki

Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, Belgrade 2001, pp. 71-75; Z. Milošević, Tranzicija i Srpska crkva,

Belgrade 2004, pp. 25-31; Angela Ilić, “Odnos religije i društva u današnjoj Srbiji, Religion and Tolerance“,

Journal of the Center for Empirical Researches of Religion, Novi Sad, No. 3, 2005, pp. 47-48.

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placed at the service of simple adherence or belonging, to the detriment of the authenticity

of religious messages of peace and tolerance.5

Why should religious institutions be entrusted with the responsibility, or even the

obligation to work on reconciliation and understanding between the hitherto or still

conflicting communities? The answer should be primarily sought in the dividing line

between state and social communities which, in the Western Balkans, largely coincides

with that of religious and confessional groups. Contrary to contemporary European

integration processes, the one-time multiethnic and multicultural society has turned into

ethno-confessional state communities, tending towards the further division of those of their

parts which are still mixed.

The role of religious communities in the reconciliation process could be especially efficient

when religious education is in question because – apart from teaching one’s own religion –

it is also possible to encourage respect for and tolerance towards other religious and

cultural communities. However, it can hardly be expected that one’s religious education

can also deal with other religions. Therefore, it will be useful to have state-run schools

include in their syllabus the history of great religions and confessions as a subject, which

would also contain the basics of their teachings. This would increase confidence and

facilitate the acquaintance with culture and universal value systems, while at the same time

5 B. Bojović, “Religion – Identity – Modernity in Post-Yugoslav Serbia. From Traditionalism to Tolerance

and Pluralism”, in: Inter-Ethnic Reconciliation, Religious Tolerance and Human Security in the Balkans,

Proceedings of the Second ECPD International Conference (Takehiro Togo, Jeffrey Levett and Negoslav P.

Ostojic, eds.), European Center for Peace and Development of the University for Peace established by the

United Nations), Belgrade 2007, pp. 310-325.

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eliminating both the deeply rooted and the newly established stereotypes about other

communities.

We live in a time when the European Union and other parts of the world aspire towards the

model of a multicultural and multiconfessional society. Despite the opposite tendencies,

religious institutions are also oriented toward encouraging tolerance and dialogue between

different religious communities, as well as the dialogue to exchange experiences between

believers and agnostics or atheists, who also invoke the right to some kind of spirituality.

Within the European integration process, which will also include the Western Balkans, one

can expect intensified business, economic and cultural exchanges.6 Younger generations

will be increasingly included in the cultural and university exchange programmes, such as

ERASMUS MUNDUS and TEMPUS. The state borders will not be closed any more and

the exchange of human and natural resources will be governed by market laws and not by

state ones.

Religious institutions will increasingly less need to act towards closing themselves within

their own religious, ethnic, cultural and state borders.7 Considering the traditional tendency

towards an inward-looking attitude and the past, which is partly due to the age composition

6 R. Manchin, “From a key player in the Balkans to a prospective EU candidate country”, Branding Serbia

Seminar, Brussels, 2 July 2007 [www.emins.org]; A. Rusi, “Post-Cold War Regional Co-operation”, in: The

Balkan Prism, J. Deimel and W. van Meurs, eds., Verlag Otto Sagner, Munich 2007. 7 P. Kalaitzidis, “Iskušenje Judino. Crkva, nacija i identiteti: od istorije božanskog uređenja, do istorije

nacionalnog preporoda“, Nova srpska politička misao, http://starisajt.nspm.rs/Debate/2004_CP_kalaidis.htm,

Synaxis, 79, Athens 2001, pp. 51-65 (in Greek); Ibid., “La Tentation de Judas. Église, Nation et Identités: de

l’histoire de l’économie divine à l’histoire de la renaissance nationale“, Contacts, 197, January-March 2002,

p. 42; Ibid., “Pravoslavlje i savremeni grčki identitet“, Indiktos, 17, 2003, pp. 44-94; Ibid., “Bog i cezar. O

krizi u sceni Grčke“, Imerissia, Athens, 5 June 2004 (in Greek).

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of religious hierarchies, one can expect some resistance against being open to as well as a

lack of confidence in the modernization processes. Cultural, educational and other elites

can provide considerable support in the process of the modernization of religious

hierarchies and institutions, all the more so because the younger generations in those

hierarchies are more inclined towards openness and tolerance.

In the greater part of Europe the modernization process brought about significant changes

with respect to religious institutions and their hierarchies. In the modern sociology of

religions, these changes are called “deregulation“, which implies the weakening of the

authority of these hierarchies relative to the members of their communities, as well as the

increased significance of authenticity relative to their formal belonging to a community.8

This means that the quantity criterion has been replaced by the measure of authentic

belonging and active participation in the life of a community. In a time of increasing

individualism, this inevitable phenomenon can hardly bypass late-transition countries.

Therefore, it is in the interest of religious institutions to accept the inevitable

modernization process rather than to offer futile resistance by turning to the romantic

myths of the past.9

The development of democratic institutions and a market economy, improvement of

communications, an increased standard of living and the advancement of social justice,

legal and general safety, which can be expected parallel to the enlargement of the

8 Daniele Hervieu-Leger, Le religion pour mémoire, Paris 1993; ibid., Le pèlerin et le converti. La religion en

mouvement, Paris 1999. 9 B. Bojović, “Jagnje Božije i Zvijer iz bezdana”, Književna reč, No. 500, Belgrade, January 1998, pp. 94-95.

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European Union, are also speeding up the modernization process in the Balkans, as is also

the case with other countries in transition.10

Nevertheless, the most important reason, which imposes the need for the increasing

involvement of religious institutions in reconciliation and respect among ethno-

confessional and state communities, lies in the confidence they enjoy in the broadest

sections of the population. The vanishing of the great ideologies, which marked the history

of the 20th century, has created a vacant space which is filled by religious value systems

by force of circumstances. Religion has always been necessary not only to satisfy the

human need for meaning, but also to preserve social consensus. To that end, the state has

also placed religious institutions at the service of social stability. Weakened and with its

prestige shattered, a country in transition has no other choice but to rely on religious

institutions in order to maintain its authority. Thus, religious institutions have been placed

at the service of ethno-confessional rallying and the ideological support of ethnocentric

regimes. In order to illustrate this causal interaction, it is necessary to refer to sociometric

data. As a late-transition country, Serbia in the early 21st century can serve as a good

example.11

According to the census conducted in Serbia in 2001, 95 per cent of its population declare

themselves as belonging to some religious community; 4.5 per cent do not declare

10 S. Ferrari, “Conclusion: Church and State in Post-Communist Europe“, in: S. Ferrari (ed.), Law and

Religion in Post-Communist Europe, Peeters Uitgeverij, Leuven 2003, p. 422; Nonka Bogomilova, “Ethnic,

Religious and Confessional Relations in the Balkans, Reflections on the Contemporary Religious ’Revival’,

Religion, Secularization, Globalization“, Religion in Eastern Europe XXIV, 4 (August 2004), pp. 1-10; S.

Flere, “Slovenia: at a distance from a perfect religious market“, Religion, State and Society, June 2004, Vol.

32, No. 2, pp. 151-157. 11 B. Bojović, “État, confession, modernité dans le Sud-Est européen. La cas de l’ex-Yougoslavie», Bulletin

des sciences sociales, No. 5, Ed. L’Harmattan (2009), pp. 61-90.

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themselves and only 0.5 per cent declare themselves as atheists. According to one survey

conducted in Vojvodina at that time, 60 per cent declare themselves to be religious

persons. In the 1980s, only 20 per cent of the respondents declared themselves to be

religious persons.12

According to the survey conducted by the UNDP in Serbia in 2005 (Human Development

Report for Serbia), 75 per cent of young people declare themselves as belonging to some

religious community; 46 per cent are against having a mosque near their place of

residence; 41 per cent are against marriage with an Albanian; 31 per cent are against

marriage with a Muslim; 30 per cent do not accept an atheist as a marital partner, 27 per

cent as their children’s teacher and 17 per cent as a business partner; 43 per cent reject

communication with atheists, while 57 per cent accept it.13

Abolished in 1948, religious education was reintroduced into the state community of

Serbia and Montenegro in 2001,14 while in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia that was

done in 1991.

12 D. Radislavljević-Ćiparizović, “Religija i svakodnevni život: vezanost ljudi za religiju i crkvu u Srbiji

krajem devedesetih“, in: S. Bolčić, A. Milić: Srbija krajem milenijuma: Razaranje društva, promene i

svakodnevni život, Belgrade, 2002, Sociological Research Institute of the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade;

CEIR/CEIR%20-

%20Centar%20za%20empirijska%20istraživanja%20religije%20%20AKTUELNO%20TRŽIŠTE%DUHOV

NOSTI.html. 13 http://hdr.undp.org/fr/rapports/national/europecei/serbia/Serbia_nhdr_2005.pdf, pp. 39-40. 14 Angela Ilić, “Odnos religije i društva u današnjoj Srbiji“, Religion and Tolerance. Journal of the Center for

Empirical Researches of Religion (Novi Sad), No. 3, 2005, pp. 47-78; Zlatiborka Popov, “Pravoslavlje i

izazovi demokratizacije, multikulturalizma i tolerancije“, Religion and Tolerance. Journal of the Center for

Empirical Researches of Religion, Novi Sad, No. 4, 2005, pp. 95-109 (Résumé in English).

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According to the survey conducted at the time when religious education was reintroduced

into Serbia and Montenegro, 81 per cent of pupils declared themselves in favour of

religious education in schools, of whom 64 per cent opted for religious education as an

elective subject, while 19 per cent were against it. Based on the sample of 635 respondents

in 2002, the survey showed that 20 per cent of them declared themselves in favour of

religious education as a compulsory subject, 10 per cent responded that it should be

conducted only on religious premises, while 5 per cent declared themselves against any

religious education.15

According to the survey conducted in 2003, one year after the introduction of religious

education into Serbia, 47 per cent of parents and 59 per cent of secondary school pupils

accepted the content of religious education in full, while 27 per cent of parents and 21 per

cent of pupils accepted it only in part. For both of the two categories, 14 per cent of

respondents were undecided.16 The fact that 74 per cent of parents and 80 per cent of

pupils – whereby there were twice as many parents and three times more pupils who fully

accepted religious education – shows clearly the dynamics of accepting religious

education, which is in favour of younger generations.

The sociometric data on religious education today, eight years after its introduction into

Serbia and Montenegro, are very scarce and insufficient to derive any more specific

conclusion, although it is known that conducting religious education has considerably

declined as compared to its beginning. This can be largely attributed to the unpreparedness

of religious institutions to meet such a great demand, the lack of teaching staff and so on,

15 D. Djordjević, D. Todorović, Mladi, religija, veronauka, Belgrade, AGENA – Niš, KCC, 1999. 16 Zorica Kuburić, “Realizacija verske nastave u osnovnim i srednjim školama“, CEIR/ZKuburREALIZACIJA%20VERSKE%20NASTAVE%20U%20OSNOVNIM%20I%SREDNJIM%ŠKOLAMA.html

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in addition to a general decrease in the quality of teaching, especially, in secondary

schools.

The abrupt introduction of religious education certainly leads to greater differentiation

relative to religious teachings, as well as to a rise in the authentic adoption of universal

value systems, in contrast to formal belonging to ethno-confessional communities. This

social and educational process most likely leads to the development of individualism and

the weakening of stereotype belonging. In this way, transition societies are approaching the

values of civil and open societies. Religious hierarchies are in such a position that the

adoption of modernization processes is in favour of their social appropriateness, which is

not contrary to their teachings.17 They will adopt such a view all the more so if state

institutions and social elites stop encouraging them to carry out ethno-confessional

differentiation and especially if they are encouraged to work on reconciliation and

tolerance among different cultural and religious groups and communities.18

Paris-Brioni, October 2009

17 D. Hammerman, “Building Bridges, An Analysis of How Religion Can Be Used to Heal Societal Wounds

along Racial and Political Lines“, Religion and Tolerance. Journal of the Center for Empirical Researches of

Religion, No. 12, Novi Sad 2009, pp. 249-260. 18 A. Torres Gutierrez, “Neutrality of Public Authorities and Religion“, Religion and Tolerance. Journal of

the Center for Empirical Researches of Religion, No. 12, Novi Sad 2009, pp. 201-216.