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CONCEPT OF TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS; ISSUES AND

APPLICATIONS

BY

CHARLES C. ANUKWONKE

Cc_anukwonke@ansu.edu.ng

Department of Environmental Management

Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu University Formerly

Anambra State University

March, 2015

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INTRODUCTION

The tragedy of the commons is a dilemma described in an influential article titled

―the tragedy of the commons‖ written by ecologist Garret Hardin which was

published in December in 1968‘

For forty years, it has been in the words of a World Bank Discussion Paper ― the

dominant paradigm within social scientist in assessing natural resource issues.

(Bromley and Cernea, 1989)

It has been used time and again to justify stealing indigenous people‘s lands,

privatizing health care and other social services, giving corporations tradable

permits to pollute the air and water and other environment.

Dr. G. N. Appel, (1995) stated that the article has been embraced by as a sacred

text by professionals in the practice of designing futures for others and imposing

their own economic and environmental rationality on other social systems of which

they have incomplete understanding and knowledge.

Certain questions results from the concept of the tragedy of the commons

according to Ian Angus (2008). They are as follows:

i. Will shared resources always be misused and overused?

ii. Is community ownership of land, forests and fisheries a guaranteed road

to ecological disaster?

iii. Is privatization the only way to protect the environment and the third

world poverty?

But Elinor Ostrom‘s research refutes this abstract concept with the real life

experience from places like Nepal, Kenya and Guatemala.

Concept Definition

The Tragedy of the Commons refers to a scenario in which commonly held land is

inevitably degraded because everyone in a community is allowed to graze livestock

there. It was embraced as a principle by the emerging environmental movement.

The tragedy of the commons is quite a pernicious myth. Garret Hardin‘s main

purpose was that only answer to the tragedy of the commons was to move all

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common lands or rights to the use of land into private ownership- thereby

establishing clear ―property rights‖

The tragedy of the commons states that individuals acting independently and

rationally according to each's self-interest behave contrary to the best interests of

the whole group by depleting some common resource. The term is taken from the

title of an article written by Hardin in 1968, which is in turn based upon an essay

by a Victorian economist on the effects of unregulated grazing on common land.

"Commons" in this sense has come to mean such resources as atmosphere, oceans,

rivers, fish stocks, the office refrigerator, energy or any other shared resource

which is not formally regulated; not common land in its agricultural sense.

Hardin based his argument on a story about the commons in rural England.

(The term ―commons‖ was used in England to refer to the shared pastures, fields,

forests, irrigation systems and other resources that were found in many rural areas

until well into the 1800s. Similar communal farming arrangements existed in most

of Europe, and they still exist today in various forms around the world, particularly

in indigenous communities.)

―Picture a pasture open to all,‖ Hardin wrote. A herdsman who wants to expand his

personal herd will calculate that the cost of additional grazing (reduced food for all

animals, rapid soil depletion) will be divided among all, but he alone will get the

benefit of having more cattle to sell.

Inevitably, ―the rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him

to pursue is to add another animal to his herd.‖ But every ―rational herdsman‖ will

do the same thing, so the commons is soon overstocked and overgrazed to the point

where it supports no animals at all.

The key message from William Forster on the commons is summarized as follows

the key message is:

"If a person puts more cattle into his own field, the amount of the subsistence

which they consume is all deducted from that which was at the command, of his

original stock; and if, before, there was no more than a sufficiency of pasture, he

reaps no benefit from the additional cattle, what is gained in one way being lost in

another. But if he puts more cattle on a common, the food which they consume

forms a deduction which is shared between all the cattle, as well that of others as

his own, in proportion to their number, and only a small part of it is taken from his

own cattle. In an enclosed pasture, there is a point of saturation, if I may so call it,

(by which, I mean a barrier depending on considerations of interest), beyond which

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no prudent man will add to his stock. In a common, also, there is in like manner a

point of saturation. But the position of the point in the two cases is obviously

different. Were a number of adjoining pastures, already fully stocked, to be at once

thrown open, and converted into one vast common, the position of the point of

saturation would immediately be changed" (Lloyd, 1833)

The commons is important because it provides a way of regulating activity without

the state or the market…. Throughout history, the commons has been the dominant

form of regulation providing an alternative almost universally ignored by

economists who are reluctant to admit that substitutes to the market and the state

even exist.‖ (Wall 2005: p. 184)

Hardin used the word ―tragedy‖ as Aristotle did, to refer to a dramatic outcome

that is the inevitable but unplanned result of a character‘s actions. He called the

destruction of the commons through overuse a tragedy not because it is sad, but

because it is the inevitable result of shared use of the pasture. ―Freedom in a

commons brings ruin to all.‖

The tragedy of the commons concept is often cited in connection with sustainable

development, meshing economic growth and environmental protection, as well as

in the debate over global warming. It has also been used in analyzing behavior in

the fields of economics, evolutionary psychology, anthropology, game theory,

politics, taxation, and sociology. However the concept as originally developed has

also received criticism for not taking into account the many other factors operating

to enforce or agree regulation in this scenario.

In his 1968 essay and many subsequent articles, Hardin lumped together very

different social situations and problems, labeled them all ―commons‖ and claimed

that the ―tragedy of the commons‖ explained them all. He argued that the

destruction of the historical commons explained the collapse of fisheries,

overcrowding in US national parks, air and water pollution, ―distracting and

unpleasant advertising signs,‖ overpopulation, and even ―mindless music‖ in

shopping malls.

While his account is often labeled a metaphor, Hardin didn‘t say that those

situations were similar to commons. He said they were commons, and he

repeatedly referred to their problems not as similar to but as aspects of the tragedy

of the commons.

In addition, Hardin also pointed out the problem of individuals acting in rational

self-interest by claiming that if all members in a group used common resources for

their own gain and with no regard for others, all resources would still eventually be

depleted. Overall, Hardin argues against relying on conscience as a means of

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policing commons, suggesting that this favors selfish individuals – often known as

free riders – over those who are more altruistic. In the context of avoiding over-

exploitation of common resources, Hardin concludes by restating Hegel's maxim

(which was quoted by Engels), "freedom is the recognition of necessity." He

suggests that "freedom" completes the tragedy of the commons.

Criticisms and Issues of Debate

Over many decades, Elinor Ostrom has documented how various communities

manage common resources grazing lands, forests, irrigation waters, fisheries

equitably and sustainably over the long term. The Nobel Committee‘s recognition

of her work effectively debunks popular theories about the Tragedy of the

Commons, which hold that private property is the only effective method to prevent

finite resources from being ruined or depleted.

What Ostrom has demonstrated is the existence of social control mechanisms that

regulate the use of the commons without having to resort to property rights.‖ She

found the tragedy of the commons not as prevalent or as difficult to solve as

Hardin maintained, since locals have often come up with solutions to the commons

problem themselves; when the commons is taken over by non-locals, those

solutions can no longer be used. Robert Axelrod contends that even self-interested

individuals will often find ways to cooperate, because collective restraint serves

both the collective and individual interests. Axelrod, R (1984)

German historian Joachim Radkau thought Hardin advocates strict management of

common goods via increased government involvement or international regulation

bodies. An asserted impending "tragedy of the commons" is frequently warned of

as a consequence for adopting policies which restrict private property and espouse

expansion of public property. P. Mark, and Anderson, (1995)

The environmentalist Derrick Jensen claims the tragedy of the commons is used as

propaganda for private ownership. Jensen D, (2007)

He says it has been used by the political right wing to hasten the final enclosure of

the "common resources" of third world and native indigenous people worldwide, as

a part of the Washington Consensus. He argues that in true situations, those who

abuse the commons would have been warned to desist and if they failed would

have punitive sanctions against them. He says that rather than being called "The

Tragedy of the Commons", it should be called "the Tragedy of the Failure of the

Commons".

Hardin simply ignored what actually happens in a real commons: self-regulation by

the communities involved. One such process was described years earlier in

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Friedrich Engels‘ account of the ―mark,‖ the form taken by commons-based

communities in parts of pre-capitalist Germany (Engels 1892)

―The use of arable and meadowlands was under the supervision and direction of

the community …

―Just as the share of each member in so much of the mark as was distributed was

of equal size, so was his share also in the use of the ‗common mark.‘ The nature of

this use was determined by the members of the community as a whole.

―At fixed times and, if necessary, more frequently, they met in the open air to

discuss the affairs of the mark and to sit in judgment upon breaches of regulations

and disputes concerning the mark.‖

Historians and other scholars have broadly confirmed Engels‘ description of

communal management of shared resources. A summary of an old time research

concludes:

―What existed in fact was not a ‗tragedy of the commons‘ but rather a triumph:

that for hundreds of years — and perhaps thousands, although written records do

not exist to prove the longer era — land was managed successfully by

communities.‖ (Cox 1985: 60)

Part of that self-regulation process was known in England as ―stinting‖ —

establishing limits for the number of cows, pigs, sheep and other livestock that

each commoner could graze on the common pasture. Such ―stints‖ protected the

land from overuse (a concept that experienced farmers understood long before

Hardin arrived) and allowed the community to allocate resources according to its

own concepts of fairness.

The only significant cases of overstocking found by the leading modern expert on

the English commons involved wealthy landowners who deliberately put too many

animals onto the pasture in order to weaken their much poorer neighbours‘ position

in disputes over the enclosure (privatization) of common lands. (Neeson 1993:

156)

Some countries don‘t share resources; they democratically organize and govern

their communities to manage those resources. That was also true of the historical

commons in Europe, and it‘s true of Indigenous societies in many parts of the

world today. As historian Peter Linebaugh writes:

―To speak of the commons as if it were a natural resource is misleading at best and

dangerous at worst — the commons is an activity and, if anything, it expresses

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relationships in society that are inseparable from relations to nature.‖ (Linebaugh

2008: p. 279)

Hardin, like the economists Wall describes, looked at the world with capitalist

blinders on. As a result, he couldn‘t recognize a community-managed non-tragic commons when it was right before his eyes.

In addition to providing no evidence that maintaining the commons will inevitably

destroy the environment, he offered no justification for his opinion that

privatization would save it. Once again he simply presented his own prejudices as

fact:

―We must admit that our legal system of private property plus inheritance is unjust

but we put up with it because we are not convinced, at the moment, that anyone

has invented a better system. The alternative of the commons is too horrifying to

contemplate. Injustice is preferable to total ruin.‖

The implication is that private owners will do a better job of caring for the

environment because they want to preserve the value of their assets. In reality,

scholars and activists have documented scores of cases in which the division and

privatization of communally managed lands had disastrous results. Privatizing the

commons has repeatedly led to deforestation, soil erosion and depletion, overuse of

fertilizers and pesticides, and the ruin of ecosystems.

Another critique arises in the sense that if all of those things were commons, then

the fact that he was wrong about the historical ―tragedy‖ completely undermines

his core argument.

Several people suggested that Hardin was really criticizing ―unmanaged

commons,‖ and thus presumably favoured a ―managed commons.‖ The problem

with that idea is that Hardin clearly thought that ―managed commons‖ was a

contradiction in terms.

In his original 1968 essay Hardin wrote that a commons ―if justifiable at all, is only

justifiable under conditions of low-population density.‖ As population grew, ―the

commons has had to be abandoned in one aspect after another.‖ The ―tragedy of

the commons‖ could only be avoided by abandoning the commons: either by

converting it to private property, or by imposing external controls that effectively

eliminate the sharing of resources.

He repeated that argument many times in later articles and books. In 1985, for

example:

―A commons is a resource to which a population has free and unmanaged access: it

contrasts with private property (access only to the owner) and with socialized

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property (access to which is controlled by managers appointed by some political

unit).‖ (Hardin 1985: p. 90)

Accordingly, Hardin defined the commons as unmanaged — so the claim that he

was arguing for ―managed commons‖ doesn‘t make sense.

He was more explicit in an article written to mark the 30th anniversary of his

original essay: ―A ‗managed commons‘ describes either socialism or the privatism

of free enterprise.‖ (Hardin, 1998) Since he equated socialism with bureaucratic

state control, it is clear that for him the ―managed commons‖ was not a commons

at all.

Several readers understood that Hardin later changed his mind, that he said the

tragedy only occurred in ―unmanaged commons.‖ One pointed to this sentence, in

a speech Hardin gave in 1980:

―As a result of discussions carried out during the past decade I now suggest a better

wording of the central idea: Under conditions of overpopulation, freedom in an

unmanaged commons brings ruin to all.‖ (Hardin 1980)

During the 1970s and 1980s, Hardin‘s description of the historical commons was

so thoroughly debunked by historians and anthropologists that he resorted to

denying that he ever meant to be historically accurate. In 1991, he claimed that his

account was actually a ―hypothetical model‖ and ―whether any particular case is a

materialization of that model is a historical question — and of only secondary

importance.‖ (Hardin 1991)

An academician Elliot called Hardin ―one of the most important thinkers of the

20th century‖ wrote that his description of the traditional commons was a ―thought

experiment,‖ so criticism of his historical errors is irrelevant. (Elliot 2003)

In a 1977 essay, for example, Hardin referred explicitly to ―the way the common

pasture lands of England were converted to private property,‖ by Parliamentary

Enclosure Acts in the 1700s and 1800s. These Acts, he wrote, ―put an end to the

tragedy of the commons in this aspect of agriculture.‖ That‘s a very explicit

statement about historical facts — there‘s nothing ―hypothetical‖ about it. (Hardin

1977: p. 46)

So Hardin‘s later claim that historical facts don‘t matter was an attempt to rewrite

his own history. He only claimed the story was ―just a model‖ after it had been

thoroughly disproved.

Applications in Management of Natural resources

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The tragedy of the commons according to Wikipedia can be considered in relation

to environmental issues such as sustainability. The commons dilemma stands as a

model for a great variety of resource problems in society today, such as water,

forests, fish, and non-renewable energy sources such as oil and coal.

Situations exemplifying the "tragedy of the commons" include the overfishing and

destruction of the Grand Banks, the destruction of salmon runs on rivers that have

been dammed – most prominently in modern times on the Columbia River in the

Northwest United States, and historically in North Atlantic rivers – the devastation

of the sturgeon fishery – in modern Russia, but historically in the United States as

well – and, in terms of water supply, the limited water available in arid regions

(e.g., the area of the Aral Sea) and the Los Angeles water system supply, especially

at Mono Lake and Owens Lake.

Other situations exemplifying the "tragedy of the commons" include congestion

caused by driving cars. There are many negative externalities of driving; these

include pollution, carbon emissions, and traffic accidents. For example, every time

'Person A' gets in a car, it becomes more likely that 'Person Z' – and millions of

others – will suffer in each of those areas.

More general examples (some alluded to by Hardin) of potential and actual

tragedies include:

A. Planet Earth ecology

1. Uncontrolled human population growth leading to overpopulation.[3]

2. Air, whether ambient air polluted by industrial emissions and cars among

other sources of air pollution, or indoor air

3. Water – Water pollution, water crisis of over-extraction of groundwater and

wasting water due to over irrigation

4. Forests – Frontier logging of old growth forest and slash and burn

5. Energy resources and climate – Environmental residue of mining and

drilling, Burning of fossil fuels and consequential global warming

6. Animals – Habitat destruction and poaching leading to the Holocene mass

extinction

7. Oceans – Overfishing

(Hardin, G (1968); I.A. Shiklomanov, (2000); Wilson, E.O., (2002); and

Leakey, Richard and Roger Lewin, 1996)

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B. Publicly Shared Resources

1. Spam email degrades the usefulness of the email system and increases the

cost for all users of the Internet while providing a benefit to only a tiny

number of individuals.

2. Vandalism and littering in public spaces such as parks, recreation areas, and

public restrooms.

3. Knowledge commons encompass immaterial and collectively owned goods

in the information age.

Modern Solutions

Articulating solutions to the tragedy of the commons is one of the main problems

of political philosophy. In absence of enlightened self-interest, some form of

authority or federation is needed to solve the collective action problem. In a typical

example, governmental regulations can limit the amount of a common good that is

available for use by any individual. Permit systems for extractive economic

activities including mining, fishing, hunting, livestock raising and timber

extraction are examples of this approach. Similarly, limits to pollution are

examples of governmental intervention on behalf of the commons. Alternatively,

resource users themselves can cooperate to conserve the resource in the name of

mutual benefit. Another solution for some resources is to convert common good

into private property, giving the new owner an incentive to enforce its

sustainability.

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References

Axelrod, Robert (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.

ISBN 0-465-02121-2.

Angus, Ian. 2008. ―The Myth of the Tragedy of the Commons.‖ Climate and

Capitalism, August 28, 2008. http://climateandcapitalism.com/?p=513

Appell, G. N. 1993. ―Hardin‘s Myth of the Commons: The Tragedy of Conceptual

Confusions.‖ http://tinyurl.com/5knwou

Bromley, Daniel W. and Cernea Michael M. 1989. ―The Management of Common

Property Natural Resources: Some Conceptual and Operational Fallacies.‖

World Bank Discussion Paper. http://tinyurl.com/5853qn

Cox, Susan Jane Buck. 1985, ―No Tragedy on the Commons.‖ Environmental

Ethics 7. http://tinyurl.com/5bys8h

Elliot, Herschel. 2003. ―The Revolutionary Import of Garrett Hardin‘s Work.‖

http://tinyurl.com/5tokrk

Engels, Friedrich. 1892. ―The Mark.‖ http://tinyurl.com/6e58e7

Hardin, Garrett. 1968. ―The Tragedy of the Commons.‖ http://tinyurl.com/o827

Hardin, Garrett. 1977. ―Denial and Disguise.‖ in Garrett Hardin and John Baden,

editors, Managing the Commons. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and

Company. pp 45-52

Hardin, Garrett. 1980. ―An ecolate view of the human predicament.‖

http://tinyurl.com/t98c

Hardin, Garrett. 1985. Filters Against Folly, How to Survive Despite Economists,

Ecologists and the Merely Eloquent. New York: Viking Press.

Hardin, Garrett. 1991. ―The Tragedy of the Unmanaged Commons: Population and

the Disguises of Providence.‖ in Robert V. Andelson, editor, Commons

Without Tragedy:Protecting the Environment from Over-Population – A

New Approach. Savage MD: Barnes & Noble

Hardin, Garrett. 1998. ―Extension of the Tragedy of the Commons.‖

http://tinyurl.com/bow6h

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Jensen, Derrick (2007), "Endame Vol 1: The Problem of Civilisation" and

"Endame Vol II: Resistance" (Seven Stories Press)

Kelly Andersson "Tragedy of the Common Forest" Oregon Daily Emerald

I.A. Shiklomanov, Appraisal and Assessment of World Water Resources, Water

International 25(1): 11-32 (2000)

Leakey, Richard and Roger Lewin, 1996, The Sixth Extinction : Patterns of Life

and the Future of Humankind, Anchor, ISBN 0-385-46809-1

Linebaugh, Peter. 2008. The Magna Carta Manifesto: Liberties and Commons for

All. Los Angeles: University of California Press

Ostrom 'revisits the commons' in 'Science'".

Perry, Mark (June 1995). "Why Socialism Failed". The Freeman 45 (6).

Radkau, Joachim. Nature and Power. A Global History of the Environment.

Cambridge University Press. 2008

Wall, Derek. 2005. Babylon and Beyond: The Economics of Anti-Capitalist, Anti-

Globalist and Radical Green Movements. London: Pluto Books

Wilson, E.O., 2002, The Future of Life, Vintage ISBN 0-679-76811-4

W F Lloyd - Two Lectures on the Checks to Population (1833)

Wikipedia.com