Colonization as Planned Change

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Colonization as Planned Changed: The Korean Case Author(s): Yunshik Chang Source: Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1971), pp. 161-186Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/312030Accessed: 10-09-2015 17:41 UTC

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Modern Asian Studies, 5, 2 (1971), pp. i6i-i86. Printed in Great Britain.

Colonization as Planned Changed: The

Korean Case*

BY YUNSHIK CHANGt

WITH the Kangwha treaty in 1876 Korea ended its period of isolation and became exposed to foreign pressures. In I906, after a period of turmoil in Asian international affairs, Korea was declared a Japanese protectorate, and in 19o1 it became a colony of that country. Korea remained a Japanese possession until the end of the Pacific War in I945. This essay is concerned with some of the economic and social changes that took place in Korea under Japanese rule. The first part of the paper discusses the reorganization of the traditional economy by changes in institutional control over it, and the second part describes the growth of the economy during these years.

I. ACHIEVEMENT OF CONTROL OVER THE KOREAN ECONOMY

Institutional control over any economic system 'must include those governing the division of labour, the disposition of property rights, and the method of distribution.'l The Japanese government achieved this control over the Korean economy by I920, and only then was it able to integrate the country into the larger economic system of the Japanese Empire.

(a) Division of labour

Yi-dynasty Korea, which lasted from I395 to I9I0, exhibited rigid hierarchical distinctions of social status. Choice of occupation, style of clothing and housing, liability to taxes, rates and legal penalties, eligibility for conscripted labour and military service were determined

* This paper is a revised version of part of my doctoral dissertation and I am indebted to Ansley J. Coale, Irene B. Taueber and Charles F. Westoff. Helpful criticism was received from Michael M. Ames and Michael Kew, and I am particularly grateful to Ronald P. Dore.

t Department of Anthropology and Sociology, The University of British Columbia, and Population and Development Studies Center, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, Seoul National University.

1 Wilbert E. Moore, Economy and Society, New York, 1962, p. 9.



YUNSHIK CHANG

by an officially stipulated status hierarchy. The main divisions were: (a) the yangban or elites; (b) the chungin and ikyo or functionaries; (c) the

yangin or commoners; and (d) the chonmin or outcasts. These ranks were

closely related to occupation, although the latter were usually divided into four different categories: literati, farmer, artisan and merchant. The two orders of status and employment were linked by the fact that a man of superior status did clean work; the man of lower status, dirty work.

During the Yi-dynasty literati occupations in theory were exclusively occupied by the yangban.2 They entered the administration by examination or recommendation. Apart from being administrators, the

yangban were scholars, particularly of Confucian literature, and they sometimes constituted a politically influential, if not powerful, intellectual

community. The chungin, mostly residing in the capital city, provided the functionaries in the administration. They specialized in jobs that involved particular knowledge of language, medicine, astronomy, law and accounting. Like the chungin, the ikyo was another occupational group which became a distinct status category. They occupied the bottom level of the administration. The ikyo were divided into isuh and

kunkyo. The former were engaged in clerical work at the central and local administration, while the latter served as lower-rank military personnel; later during the dynastic period the kunkyo also developed police functions. The commoner was responsible for farming, craft- industries and commerce.3 Most of the craft-industries which were on a small scale, were run by the state with labour conscripted from the commoners. Only three civilian occupational roles in craft-industries were assigned to the free commoner: salt production, small scale iron- ware industries and pottery.4 Finally, the chonmin, the out-casts, were

mostly nobi or slaves, entertainers, sorcerers, and butchers.5 A man's employment was supposed to be hereditary. Moreover, jobs

2 For a fuller description see Sangbeck Lee, Hankuk-sa (The History of Korea), Seoul, I962, pp. 303-24.

3 Although ideally the yangban elites were excluded from farming, we should not ignore their role in agriculture as landowners. The term 'farming' is used here in a narrower sense, namely manual labour involved in land cultivation. Basically, management of land fell to the yangban elites.

4 There were also seven occupational roles which were legally stipulated as inferior work and assigned to commoners. These included servants in administration offices, sailors engaged in transportation of tax tributes, beacon-tenders, palace- tomb guards, and so on. These roles, however, were regarded as temporary occupations and most individuals engaged in them were also farmers.

5 But the nobi is not exactly an occupational category such as 'butcher'. Being a slave his work was dictated by the master who legally owned him.

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COLONIZATION AS PLANNED CHANGE

within each status category were divided internally into ranks, restrict- ing occupational mobility even within the same category.6 One obvious consequence of this was that at any level of employment recruitment of new members was not based on their qualifications for the job. Even for civil service posts, the examination which selected candidates tested only a memorized knowledge of classical Confucian literature.7 Furthermore this examination was completely dissociated from any practical training. Empirical knowledge never became incorporated into the traditional educational system.8 Among the lower status groups training in crafts and trades was restricted to apprenticeships.

Yi-dynasty Korea provided few opportunities for employment. The range of jobs was limited to administrative work, farming, cottage industries, and small businesses. Any projects which required large- scale aggregation of labour, planning and skills were carried out on an ad hoc basis.9 The restrictions imposed on occupational mobility by the status hierarchy together with limited opportunities for new work and the lack of vocational training seem to account for the failure, during the dynastic period, of any sign of increasing occupational differentiation. Although the status system became debased towards the end of the dynasty there is very little evidence that this significantly effected the occupational structure of the country.l?

The abolition of the traditional status system by the Japanese made

possible new rules for the division of labour. Positions at the upper level of administration which had previously been occupied by the yangban

6 For example, not all theyangban elites could achieve the upper levels of administrative positions which were almost exclusively confined to theyangban status.

7 Lee, op. cit., p. 268. 8 Perhaps the only part of the traditional world of work where there was some

rational orientation in recruitment was the army. However, the military officials at the top level were almost exclusively drawn from civil officials. For productive work covered by commoner's occupation the process of training never became institutionalized. It never was a problem. Although farming was regarded as the backbone of the economy, the government of the Yi-dynasty made little effort to develop agriculture. One of the major criticisms made by those silhakpa (knowledge for practical purpose) scholars in the eighteenth century was directed to the lack of governmental concern with agricultural development involving the improvement of farming methods, farm equipment, and the extension of irrigation systems. In fact, one silhakpa scholar Pak Chi-won severely criticized the indifference of orthodox Confucian scholars to farming and he himself compiled a book on the subject of agricultural improvement.

9 Tomonori Arii, 'Yi-cho choki no yoyaku' ('Statutory Labour in the Early Period of Yi-dynasty), Chosen gakuho (Korean Studies), 30 and 31 (January and April, I964), pp. 62-Io6 and 58-101.

10 Sukhyung Kim, Ch6sen hoken jidai n6min no kaikyu kosei (The Class Structure of the Peasant in the Feudal Period of Korea), Tokyo, 1960 (Japanese translation), p. i66.

I63



YUNSHIK CHANG

were rapidly filled by Japanese immigrants, and remained in their control throughout the colonial period.ll This did not, however, deprive theyangban elites of all their privileges. With the establishment of private property rights, land previously held by theyangban remained with them under a new title. They became landlords and maintained their hierarchical relationship with the commoners or slaves who had previously cultivated their land.12 On the other hand those of the yangban elites who had no land, or did not move into the new administration, had to find a livelihood elsewhere in the cities, competing with commoners for jobs.

The abolition of traditional status restrictions did little to change the position of commoners, but some outcasts seized their opportunity. They sought to improve themselves either by moving into the cities or going to other towns, or by giving up their old occupations. Another new feature was the institutionalization and transmission of empirical knowledge and technical education. New farming methods were spread to Korean farmers through local administrative organizations, often with the aid of the police. Official farm technicians were assigned to local districts. Model or experimental farms were established in each province for agricultural research and to demonstrate improved farming techniques.

The elimination of the traditional status element in employment left those occupations not taken up by the Japanese open to the talents, theoretically at least. At the same time there was a growing requirement for properly trained men to fill jobs. New education was introduced which emphasized the practical aspects of education, and included vocational training. In contrast to the traditional educational system this new education was, in theory, open to all classes who could afford it. But in practice the government did not provide adequate facilities to fulfil this ideal and the proportion of the population able to take advantage of it remained very small. Yet occupational categories did become further differentiated. Moreover, those projects that used to depend upon unskilled labour service gradually came to be incorporated into the occupational structure. Choice of work became wider, and mobility within a profession and between occupations became possible. However, the Japanese replaced traditional status distinctions with ethnic discrimination and so limited the extent of social mobility.

Further, formal organization or bureaucratization was introduced

11 Yunshik Chang, 'Population in Early Modernization' (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation), Princeton University, 1966, Chapter 2.

12 See below, p. i68.

I64




into the work-process. Whereas villages had hitherto been almost self- sufficient productive units, from the early period of the colonial administration attempts were made to organize across village boundaries to facilitate firm control over the work-process. A farm association was organized as early as I905 by the Japanese immigrants in Korea in order to 'avoid confusion arising in the purchase and sale of land.' This was intended to protect Japanese property rights. Numerous

organizations of this sort were established in the first decade of the

Japanese administration. Some were directly related to traditional methods of production such as cotton-raising associations, seri-culture associations or irrigation associations; others were the new banks commercial and companies. Later, in the I93os, they were followed

by large-scale industrial plants.

(b) Private property ownership

Historians still debate whether private ownership of land existed in Yi-

dynasty Korea. Much of the argument, however, appears to revolve around definitions. In defining property ownership Wilbert E. Moore focuses on the system of rights of persons or other social units in scarce values. 'Viewed narrowly, property', he argues, 'defines the relations of persons to scarce values; viewed more generally it defines relations between persons. ... To talk of property at all implies therefore an actual or potential power relation between the person holding property rights and the person excluded from their enjoyment.'l3 Property rights may include any one or all of the following items: use, transfer, bequest, sale, appropriation of increase, or unearned increment, advan-

tageous non-use, destruction and so on.14 This list of rights covered by 'property ownership' varies from society to society. So does the power relationship between the person holding property rights and the person without them. Any argument about definitions of private property is

unprofitable. Instead it is necessary to explore property ownership in terms of the social structure-in other words, to describe agrarian relationships in Yi-dynasty Korea.

Since the structure of the traditional economy in Korea was predominantly agricultural, with very little craft industry and commerce, land was the major source of wealth.15 In Yi-dynasty Korea

13 Moore, op. cit., p. 12. 14 Ibid., p. 13. 15 Kwanwoo Chun, 'Hankuk toji chedosa, ha' ('The History of Korean Landhold-

ing System'), in Koryo Dehakkyo Minjok Munwha Yunkuso, (Institute of Ethno- Cultural Studies, Koryo University), Hankuk munwha sa daekye, II (An Outline of Cul- tural History of Korea, Vol. II), Seoul, 1965, p. 1397.

I65



YUNSHIK CHANG

the land was owned by the State. As the old proverb has it: 'all the lands within the territory of dynasty belong to the emperor.'l6 The State controlled the distribution of land, and ideally all the subjects of the dynasty received land to live upon according to their status. At the beginning of the Yi-dynasty, the land seized from the nobility of the previous dynasty, Koryu, was distributed to the supporters of the new regime, to the newly established yangban elites and to various organizations and charities supported by the State such as schools and temples.17 In theory the recipient of land, whether an individual or an organization, was allowed to rent part or all of it to the farmer- cultivator who was a commoner or slave, and, in turn, was required to pay land-tax to the government. In legal terms, the recipients of land were granted the sujo-kwon or 'rent collection right'. With very few exceptions, commoners and outcasts were not allowed to hold land.

The individual yangban recipient either cultivated the land himself through his own slaves or else he rented it to commoners or independent slave farmers. In the latter case the cultivator was explicitly granted by the State kyungjak-kwon or 'cultivation right', and he could not be dispossessed easily by the land-owner. Lands distributed to government bureaucrats reverted to the State upon their retirement.18 But from the beginning exceptions were made to this rule and portions of such land were bequeathed to the heirs of the original recipient. Public land was either cultivated by slaves or by commoners. Here again, the cultivator, even when he was not a member of an organization, was granted certain rights.

Thus land ownership in the Yi-dynasty Korea involved a system of rights in land with three separate claims divided among three separate social units: (a) the State, the ultimate owner, which gave out land and withheld it; (b) land-holders who had the right to collect rent; and (c) cultivators with cultivation rights.

From the early period of the dynasty detailed regulations set out rules 16 Chung Yakyong, Kyungsae Tupyo (Ideal Management of the World), quoted in K.

Moritani, 'Kurai no chosen nogyo shakai ni tsuite "no kenkyu no tameni", ('Studies of Traditional Korean Society') in Keijo Teikoku Daigaku H6mun Gakkai, Chosen shakai keizaishi kenkyu (Studies of the Social and Economic History of Korea), p. 506.

17 In the early period of the dynasty no land was allocated to the central administrative organization as its financial resources were secured from the land tax and tributes in kind. Later, this was reversed. See, Kwanwoo Chun, op. cit., p. I400.

18 At first land in this category was resumed upon the death of the recipient. Later, because of a shortage of land to pay civil servants, estates lapsed at the bureaucrats retirement. This had the effect of increasing rents, often above the legal limits, in order to provide a sufficient livelihood for a civil servant after he retired.

I66




for inheritance and donations and other transactions in land, and for issuing documents to certify these transfers. The right to rent-collection could only be sold or bartered for inheritable lands because the non- heritable land ideally reverted to the State upon the death of the incumbent. Only the cultivation-right of public lands was disposable: the tenant farmer on private land was not allowed to rent his cultivation-right to other tenant farmers since that would violate the status distinction between rent-recipient and cultivator.

It is doubtful whether this land-holding structure ever existed in its ideal state. What is clear is that the traditional system with three components of ownership rights divided up into three status levels (including the government as one level) became disorganized toward the end of the dynastic period. The State's control over the distribution of land-rights was in direct conflict with the interest of yangban elites who wished to establish local bases of power. And theyangban made the most of their position in the administration to increase their power. Hence, in the latter part of the dynastic period, State control over the land fell into disorder, and for practical purposes land came into private hands. The most common method was to 'capture' a cultivator and his rights working on public lands. In order to avoid heavy taxation, the cultivator conferred his rights on an influentialyangban. In return he got tenancy privileges. Another method of appropriating land was for the yangban upon retirement not to give up part or all of the land he had received when he was a government officer. The provisions made at the beginning of the dynasty, allowing parts of estates to be heritable, helped this process. So did a regulation which allowed the individual subject, regardless of his status, to reclaim waste land. As a result, the influential yangban elites came to possess a vast amount of land over which the State had no control. There was also a tendency for some wealthy farmers to sub-lease their cultivation right to other farmers from whom they then collected rent. Thus, commoner or slave farmers evaded restrictions of status by claiming rent from land for which they had been granted only the cultivation right.

As the distinction between private and public land became confused, the regulations about the exchange of land were ignored. Transactions were completed directly between those who were engaged in the exchange without going through administrative channels. The docu- ment produced to certify the transfer was private, carrying no legal sanction, and usually referred in vague terms to the yield of the land, its location and boundaries. Any dispute over land ownership caused by the transaction could only be settled by the parties concerned.

I67



YUNSHIK CHANG

The Japanese put high priority on the reorganization of Korea's land system. Control of the land was crucial for control of the Korean

economy. Moreover, the imperial government was under pressure from Japanese entrepreneurs to create the right conditions for Japanese investment in land. The government therefore made land available as a saleable commodity and Japanese investment flowed in.19 The

Japanese had competed with other foreigners in opening up trade with Korea and they were encouraged to accumulate capital in Korea

by transferring it to land. Government control over land-holding was also necessary to establish a unified taxation system. From this was raised what was conveniently called the 'colonial develpment fund'. A series of government regulations and ordinances on land-holding were issued, particularly in 1906 and I9I2, to establish a new concept of private property, devoid of traditional notions of State ownership and shorn of any distinction between the rent-collection rights and the

cultivation-rights. These regulations also set up a public registration system for land, which recorded precise details of the location and value of estates. Further, the I906 Ordinance provided the legal basis for commercial exchange, mortgage and donation, thereby creating a land-market. Foreigners were also allowed to buy land in Korea.

In I906 the Government launched a nation-wide land survey. It took nearly nine years to complete. People with claims on land were

given a stipulated period to prove their rights. New titles of ownership were granted to those members of the yangban elites who could show

they held rent-receiving titles under the Yi-dynasty. But the farmer with only cultivating-rights was deprived of any claim to the land which he had been cultivating and became a landless tenant.

The Government then nationalized most of the land previously owned by the royal palace, and other public lands which had been rented to cultivators. The private land for which ownership was not identified owing to inadequate documentary certificates and the owner's failure to report to the government authority in time also fell into the possession of the Government. The vast amount of land thus nationalized was rapidly bought up by Japanese farm managers, including giant firms like the Oriental Development Company or the Fuji Industrial Company.20

As early as 91 0, Japanese settlers in Korea owned some 8.7 thousand

19 Headed by such giant firms as the Fuji Industrial Company and later the Oriental Development Company.

20 Hoon K. Lee, Land Utilization and Rural Economy in Korea, Chicago, 1936, Chapter I 2.

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chobo-about 3%/ of the total arable land. The land owned by the Japanese increased rapidly over the early period of the colonial regime and in 1930 amounted to 370 thousand chobo-about 8% of the total arable land.

The reorganization of the land-holding system involved a redefinition of status.21 The complex relationship between the owner of the land and the tenant-cultivator enmeshed in a traditional hierarchy was simplified to produce two new classes: those who owned the land and those who did not. The traditional status-system was eliminated, but at the same time an alien minority of land-owners came in at the top of the land-holding structure. At the time of annexation, according to the Government Statistical Yearbook of 1914, more than 5 I % of the total arable land was owned by less than 2% of the total number of farm households,22 while about 35% of the total farm households were landless tenants.

(c) Exchange

The colonial government reformed Korea's currency in its efforts to control the economy. Korean currency had not been unified. Several kinds of coins were issued under different pretexts, at different times and in different places. At the beginning of the protectorate regime, nickel coins were circulated in the central and north-western parts of Korea, while a brass coin calledyupchon was used in the southern and north-eastern parts. At the open ports, Japanese currency circulated freely. Furthermore private mints had been set up and these coins were as valuable as those minted by the Government. In I905, the protectorate regime revived the coinage law of 90I which had enacted that Korea was to have the same coinage system as Japan, with coins identical in denomination, fineness, and weight, differing only in impression.23 The Bank of Korea was established in I909 to carry out the currency reform. It had full charge of withdrawing old coins, both the nickel and the brass, and of replacing them with new ones.

21 Munkyu Park, 'Noson shakai bunkano kitento shiteno tochi ch6sa joky6 ni tsuite' ('On the Origin Land Survey as the Origin of the Differentiation of Rural Society') in Keij6 Teikoku H6gakkai, Chosen shakai keizai shi kenkyu (Researches into Korean Social and Economic History), Tokyo, 1933, pp. 525-9. See also, Takeo Suzuki, op. cit., pp. 72-3, and Chungshik In, Chosen no nogyo kik6 (The Agricultural Organization in Korea), Tokyo, 1940, pp. 51-68.

22 Farm households were divided into six categories: (a) landlord; (b) owner; (c) part-owners; (d) tenant; (e) tenant and squatter; and (f) squatter.

23 T. Hoshino, Economic History of Chosen (Korea), Seoul, 1920, p. 51 and Shikata, op. cit., pp. 44-65.

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YUNSHIK CHANG

The unification of the currency was followed by the establishment of banking organizations which began to effect agriculture, industry and local credit. The establishment of a banking system expanded the number of goods and service far beyond what had been possible before.

Gradually production and consumption began to be separated. The farmer, for example, put an increasing part of his agricultural product into the market. He also entered the market as a customer. Wider circulation of money and an expanding banking system led to the

enlargement of the market.24 In the old traditional village setting, the

pattern of exchange was, for the most part, based on mutual trust built up by close emotional ties, and not on a rationally calculated basis, measurable by objective criteria. An increasing degree of reliance on money, banks and markets implied a general transformation of the

economy.

(d) Communications

The exchange of goods and services in the new economic framework

required improved communications. The postal service had been started in 1876 and was soon followed by telegraphy and the telephone. In I90I the first railway line in Korea was built by private enterprise between Seoul and Inchon. This was followed by four major lines within the next five years. There were then 636 miles of track connect-

ing Korea's seven major cities.25 In I9IO the colonial government took over the management of the railways. Shortly after Korea was annexed the government also started to construct new roads as well as improving old ones.26 Communications in Korea were further facilitated by improvements in maritime transport. New ports were opened as trade with other countries increased, although this trade was mostly with Japan. As a result, markets, hitherto operating only locally, gradually became linked and centralized in a larger economic system.27

With the growth of the market-oriented economy, a new business 24 On the development of market system in Korea see Chungchang Mun, Chosen no

hijo (Markets in Korea), Tokyo, 1941, and Hiroshi Shikata, 'Shij6'u tsujite mitaru Ch6sen no keizai' ('The Korean Economy viewed Through the Market'), in Keijo Teikoku Daigaku Hogakkai, Chosen no keizai (The Korean Economy), Tokyo, I929, pp. I-286.

25 Seoul, Inchon, Pusan, Pyungyang, Shinuiju, Wonsan, and Taeku. 26 On the condition of transportation in Korea before the annexation see Homer B.

Hulbert, The Passing of Korea, New York, 1906, pp. 252-68. 27 As an index of increased exchanges at public market the government statistics

show the amount of commodities exchanged at the market. See below, Section II. See also, Chungchang Moon, op. cit.

I70




class began to emerge.28 At the same time productive activities, which had been mostly carried out within the household unit, gradually became organized into larger units. For example, in agriculture, the most traditional segment of industry, some parts of the productive process and the marketing of products fell under the control, of country co-operatives, farm associations, irrigation associations, etc.29

The economic policy of the colonial government during this period, however, was primarily directed towards developing Korea as a source of raw materials and as a market for Japanese manufactured products.30 Development of a large-scale manufacturing industry was deliberately limited by the government control over the flow of Japanese capital into Korea. Any competition between Japanese and Korean industries as parts of the same empire was carefully avoided.31 The Kaisha-rei (Regulation of the Incorporation of New Firms) was issued in I9IO to control 'disorderly' Japanese capital investment in Korea for, it maintained, Koreans were not ready for the management of large-scale firms. Whatever was the primary intention of the Kaisha- rei, its most notable effect was to restrain the rise of Korean capitalists. The Japanese capital that flowed into Korea during this period was mostly put into government projects such as transportation, communications, electricity plants and land. The Korean economy for the first decade after annexation remained a separate unit. Deliberate attempts were made to maintain different tariff and budget systems in Korea, although deficits in the Korean budget were subsidized by the Japanese government.32

II. THE SUBSTANTIVE GROWTH OF THE KOREAN ECONOMY

(a) The growth of agriculture After the first world war the Japanese adopted new economic policies in Korea designed to develop the colony as a complementary economy. The new policy was occasioned by food shortage in Japan. Agricultural output in Japan was no longer keeping pace with the growth of the

28 Mun, op. cit., pp. 09-I0. 29 Chungchang Mun, Hankuk nongchon danchesa (The History of Rural Organization in

Korea), Seoul, 196I. 30 Shikata, op. cit., pp. 157-85. 31 Up to the I920's any major plan of colonial agricultural development centred

on rice production was avoided because some Japanese landlords were interested in maintaining the high price of rice in Japan. They made every effort to block the import of foreign rice. See, Seiichi Tobata, Nihon shihon shiigi no kyoseisha (Makers of Japanese Capitalism), Toyko, 1964, p. 139.

32 Takeo Suzuki, Chosen no keizai (The Korean Economy), Tokyo, 1942, p. 64.

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YUNSHIK CHANG

population and the price of rice rose sharply. Food production inJapan, which was claimed to be at the maximum level, fell far short of demand. In 1918 there were widespread rice riots. Ohkawa and Rosovsky described the situation in the following words:33

In that year [I918], because of the growing shortage of rice, the retail price of this all important commodity stood at almost a record high, causing serious difficulties for the livelihood of the common people. Only a large and organized import program could prevent an economic and social crisis.

In response to the food situation in Japan, systematic efforts to increase agricultural production, mainly rice, were attempted in Korea with 'the Rice Increase Plan'. The major aims of the plan were 'not only to help solve the Empire's food problem but specifically also to develop the economy of Korea'.34 The Korean government planned to have about 400 thousand chungbo of paddy fields (amounting to

9 of the total existing area of arable land) reclaimed and improved within 30 years. The project would not only solve Japan's food problem but it would also promote the Korean economy and ameliorate rural

poverty in Korea. But the need for it shows that the rapid industrial

development of Japan since I9I0 had reached a stage where Korea could no longer remain a separate economy as in the early colonial

period. Korea gradually became part of the Japanese economy serving on the one hand, as a market for Japanese manufactured goods, and on the other, as a source of raw materials.

The Rice Increase Plan went through three separate phases. It was launched in 1920. In 1925, five years after the inception of the Plan, it was discontinued through shortage of funds. It was revived in I926 and was pushed forward until I934 when, after over-production had

brought down prices in Japan, the Plan was called off at the request of the Japanese Government. It was revived again briefly in I940 but without any significant result. The first two phases of the Plan were the most important. The plan was, in Johnston's words, 'the most ambi- tious, and was to prove to be the most effective, of the long-range

33 Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, 'The Role of Agriculture in Modern Japanese Economic Development', Economic Development and Cultural Change, 9, I, Part II, October, I960, p. 56. See also, Takechi Ouchi, 'Ch6sen ni okeru beikoku seisan' ('Rice Production in Korea'), in Keij6 Teikoku Daigaku H6gakkai, Chosen keizai no kenkyu (Studies on Korean Economy), Tokyo, I938, pp. 5-I6 and Seiichi Tobata, 'The Japanese Rice Control', in William L. Holland (ed.), Commodity Control in the Pacific Area, Stanford, I935, pp. 157-97.

34 The Government-General of Korea, 'The Land Ameriolation Undertakings in Korea', (November, 1928), p. 4, cited in Bruce F. Johnston, Japanese Food Manage- ment in World War II, Stanford, 1953, p. 52.

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measures adopted by the Government to solve Japan's food problem and prevent a recurrence of the difficulties accentuated by the rice riots of 1918.'35

Several long-range programmes under the Plan were carried out immediately, repeating the methods which had been applied to Japanese farming between I88I and I914.36 They were concerned

chiefly with rice and aimed both to extend the area under cultivation, and to improve the agricultural output per unit area. Wasteland and tidewater land were reclaimed, and advances in irrigation were applied to existing paddy fields. Increase of agricultural production was achieved by: (a) increased use of natural fertilizer; (b) improved seeds; (c) improved methods of cultivation; (d) improved farm equipment.

TABLE I

Index Number of Agricultural Growth, Korea

Amount Amount (inyen) of (in suk) of Rice yield Exports Land under

Year agricultural rice per acre of rice cultivation products products

I915-I9 I00 100 100 oo0 100

I920-24 I8 IO6 io6 I67 99 1925-29 14o I09 Io6 286 10o3 I930-34 153 I26 I 6 375 IO4 1935-39 185 I50 127 379 105

The result of the Plan, summarized in Table I, was remarkable. Over the two decades from 1915-19 to I935-39 the five-year average value of total agricultural output (at constant prices) more than doubled. Rice production during these two decades increased by 50%; the average rice yield per acre, by 26%. Although land under cultivation increased by 5%, the increased production came more from improvement in farming methods. More impressive than the productivity increase was the increase in agricultural exports. Exports (almost exclusively to Japan) increased 3.8 times, far exceeding the increased production. Between 1915-19, Korea exported to Japan some two million suk of rice per year, 15% of total output, whereas between 1935-39, the amount was 7.5 million suk, or 37% of total out-

35 Ibid., p. 52. 36 G. C. Allen, A Short Economic History of Modern Japan, London, 1962, pp. 61-78.

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put. The growth of rice exports met the increased Japanese demand and kept the retail price of rice 'almost parallel to the general price movement.'37 By I930 this was to bring Japanese farmers into opposi- tion to the plan and it was dropped in i934-

How far did the Rice Increase Plan benefit Korea? The fact that rice exported to Japan exceeded the increase of rice grown in Korea meant a reduction in the consumption of home-grown rice.

Cheaper, coarser grains were imported from Manchuria as a substitute for the rice exported to Japan. This import of other grains, however, did not offset the curtailed per capita consumption of rice. As Table 2

TABLE 2

Per Capita Food Consumption, Korea (in suk)

Total Year Rice Index Other Index consump- Index

grains tion

I915-19 0.707 ioo 1.324 Ioo 2.03I IOO 1920-24 0.638 90 I34I I0I 1.979 98 I925-29 0.512 72 1.300 98 1.812 89 I930-34 0.444 63 1.216 92 I.660 82 I935-39 o.641 9 I I-93 90 I.834 9?

Source: Calculated on the basis'of data in Chungtaik Kang, 'Ch6sen ni okeru shokury6 mondai no hatten katei' ('The Process of the Development of Food Problem in Korea'), N6gyo keizai kenkyu (Studies of Agricultural Economy), I6, 2 (June I940), pp. I92-220.

shows, per capita consumption gradually declined over the colonial

period. Although it went up in the last five-year period it was still less than that of 1915-19. Johnston points out:38 'the large exports seem to have involved not only a qualitative sacrifice in substituting coarse

grains for rice, the preferred cereal, but also a quantitative sacrifice of the level of food consumption.' How were these 'forced' or 'starvation' exports-and there is general agreement on these characterizations39- achieved? Was it that farmers voluntarily sold more rice for the extra income? On the contrary, the explanation lies in the fact that there

37 Ohkawa and Rosovsky, op. cit., p. 56. 38Johnston, op. cit., p. 56. 39 Hisao Yanaihara, 'Ch6sen-san-mai zoshoku keikaku ni tsuite' ('On the Rice

Increase Plan in Korea'), NJVgyo keizai kenkyu (Studies of Agricultural Economy), 2, i, (Feb- ruary 1926), pp. I-32, and Ky6sei Yukiyama, 'Ch6sen ni okeru n6gyo jink6 no seikaku' ('Characteristics of the Rural Population in Korea'), JZnko mondai kenkyu (Studies of Population Problems), 4, 8 (August, I943), pp. I-55.

I74 YUNSHIK CHANG




was a drastic change in the structure of land-ownership. Korea began her colonial period with a large proportion of landless farmers and the

proportion of tenant and semi-tenant increased rapidly during the

period. The land under cultivation moved into the hands of minority of landlords of which a substantial proportion was believed to be

Japanese or Japanese firms in Korea. In I930, the landlords, mostly Japanese absentee landlords, who comprised less than 5% of the total farm population, owned some 6o % of the total arable land. Four out of five Korean farm-households were tenants or semi-tenants and on

average, one half or more of their crops went to the landlords as rent. One source indicates that most of the rice collected as rent moved into the export trade and about 60% of Korea's exports came from the landlords.40 As Johnston points out, this heavy burden of rent in kind 'tended to increase cash stringency of the small farmers, which in turn had the effect of increasing the percentage of the crop which was commercialized'.41 Thus the magnitude of Korea's exports after 1930 is to be explained by absentee landlords' control over much of the land, which both directly extracted rice from the farmers and also forced them to sell more of what was left to them.

(b) Rise of new industries

A move away from agriculture began in the mid-I930s. This process was again closely associated with the radical change in the position of Korea in what was later to be called the 'co-prosperity sphere'.

After the economic depression in Japan, which was partially influenced by the world depression, Japan's penetration of the main- land, begun in the 1920s, was extended further into Manchuria, Inner Mongolia and North China. This move was not only intended to offset a change in the balance of power consequent upon the consolidation of China and Russia, but it represented the preliminary move in a new expansionist scheme to build an empire in Eastern Asia underJapanese sovereignty.42 In this wider scheme of Japanese colonization, Korea's strategic position between Japan and Manchuria became more important. Korea was viewed as a base for advance into the continent.43

40 Johnston, op. cit., p. 55. 41 Ibid., p. 56, see also Yanaihara, op. cit., p. 15. 42 Carl Crow, (ed.), Japan's Dream of World Empire: The Tanaka Memorial, New

York, 1942. 43 One of the most ardent intellectual spokesmen for this view, Takeo Suzuki, was

then professor of economics at Keijo Imperial University. See his 'Hokusen route-ron', ('On the North-Korean Route') in Keijo Tekoku Daigaku Hogakkai, op. cit., pp. 32-62.

F

I75



YUNSHIK CHANG

Thus Korea (together with Taiwan) was called upon to develop the

non-agricultural sectors of her economy. The rise of new industry was also in part a response to the imbalance between the predominantly agricultural economy and the rapid growth of population that Korea witnessed as a result of continued high fertility combined with a

declining mortality rate.44 In the thirties, pauperization among Korean farmers was becoming

increasingly a pressing problem even for the colonial policy makers. The growth of agricultural productivity without a substantial development of Korean industry meant that the economy was not able to absorb the growing surplus agrarian population. At the same time the concentration of land in the hands of absentee landlords reduced the income of the increasing number of tenant farmers.45 Gradually, Korean industries came under the control and guidance of the colonial

government. A report prepared by the Committee for the Survey of Korean

Industry in 1936 set out the major changes in Korea industry that were to come:46

The economy in Korea, viewed in international context necessitates a change in industrial policy from one previously centered on the primitive industry toward a total development in a wider range of industries. It should be aimed at the joint development of both industry and agriculture, the welfare of industrial workers, and the rapid development of the mining industry, which is still in the initial stage, while maintaining agriculture as the backbone of the economy. It is also necessary to have a closer connec- tion between Japan and Manchuria and to assume responsibility for the economic needs of the entire imperial area. In carrying out these policies, we ought to be aware of the situation of the world economy, and especially under present grave circumstances we should strive to be victors in the world economic struggle by total utilization of the resources in our economic sphere. At the same time, with the goal of meeting the military need in a wider sense, the pace of development needs to be controlled in order to take into consideration our financial, banking and other conditions.

The colonial government tried to attract Japanese capital and skill to move to Korea. Restrictions on the establishment of new factories was minimized. Trade union laws or labour laws which might have interfered with the industrial development had as yet to be enacted.47 Land prices were controlled to help to provide suitable land for new

44 Yunshik Chang, op. cit., Chapter 4. 4 Ibid., Chapter 4. 46 Quoted in Takeo Suzuki, op. cit., p. 98. 47 Seiichi Ojima, Sen, man, chi shinko keizai (New Industries in Korea, Manchuria and

China), Tokyo, I938, p. 35.

I76




industrial plants and to reduce the costs of new projects. In the early I930s the growth of capital in Japan was not followed by further investment in that country owing to the depression. Japanese capital therefore was put to work in Korea. The Korean economy was not under such strict cartel control as was that ofJapan, and interest rates were relatively high. As a result, although the contribution made by Korean entrepreneurs to capital formation in this period was not

negligible, finance for new industries was to a large extent provided by Japanese entrepreneurs in Korea and Japan.48 According to one

estimate, the capital invested by civilians in industries (excluding agriculture and animal husbandry) amounted to 4.3 billion yen, of which only Io% was provided by Koreans.49

The colonial government sponsored the development of electric

power, exercising an overall control and offering various forms of

subsidy to all generating stations. With the establishment of a hydro- electric power station based on the Yalu and Tuman rivers, the potential capacity of electric power was estimated at some four million k.w. in I935, far more than the amount then required. Resource surveys were also made, and in 1935 it was estimated that some 200 minerals and ores had been newly found in Korea, a majority of them useful for new industries.

(c) Growth of literacy

A literate labour force was needed for the new industries. After annexa-

tion, elementary education was considerably expanded while higher education remained extremely limited. Unfortunately very little information is available about the level of education of the Korean labour force in different occupations. Only the I944 census provides data, and these are classified only by province, by age and by sex. Table 3 gives retrospective estimates from these data to show the

regional distribution of the male population having primary school education or more in previous census years. Although the proportion varies from province to province in each census year, each province experienced a substantial increase in literacy particularly during the last decade and a half of the Japanese period.

48 Akitake Kawai, Chosen kogyo no gendankai (Current State of Korean Industry), Seoul, 1944, p. 55; Masabumi Suzuki, Ch6sen keizai no gendankai (Current Stage of Korean Economy), Seoul, 1939, pp. 258-65; and Hosho Horie, 'Chosen Reizai no kindaika ni tsuite' (On the Modernization of Korean Economy) Keizai ronso, (Economic Review) 56, 5 (May, I943), pp. 90-100.

49 Masabumi Suzuki, op. cit., p. 265.

F*

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I78 YUNSHIK CHANG

TABLE 3

Percentage of Men Aged 20 to 30 with Primary School Education or More estimatedfrom I944 census

Province 1944 1940 1935 1930

All Korea 29.2 22.8 I6.4 Ii.4

Kyonggi-do 43.5 34.4 28.o 21.6

Chungchon-pukto 22.8 17.3 13.7 9.4 Chungchon-namdo 24.4 18.9 14.7 I0.0 Kyungsang-pukto 22.2 17.1 13.4 9.2

Kyungsang-namdo 29.4 23.4 7.9 I .5 Cholla-pukto 23.2 i8.o 13.9 9.3 Cholla-namdo 25.3 20.7 15.6 9.8 Whanghao-do 25.6 18.7 14.0 9.4 Pyongan-namdo 34.2 28.0 22.5 15.2 Pyongan-pukto 27.6 20.9 i6.o I0.9 Kangwon-do 20.8 15.9 12.5 8.9 Hamkyong-namdo 29.9 24 I I9.3 I2.9 Hamkyong-pukto 27.9 31.I 23.I I4.5

(d) Summary of economic growth

The overall picture of economic growth in Korea during the colonial period emerges from the indices of Table 4. The gross output of goods (not services) nearly quadrupled in the course of a quarter century (an annual growth rate of 5.4 Y)-per capita gross output of goods by 3.7 o%. The proportion of this increased production exported grew from under 6% to 27%. A similar increase occurred in internal trade, although the figures recorded in Table 4 certainly underestimate this since they are derived from officially registered public markets. A close look at the structure of trade, however, indicates characteristics typical of a colonial economy. For most of the colonial period production for exports was largely accounted for by agricultural products and raw materials which were mainly oriented to the markets in Japan. Korea imported manufactured products and those came mainly from Japan.

The change in emphasis in the government's economic policy after 1930 is clearly shown in the sudden increase of the value of products of both mining and manufacturing industries between I930-I934 and

I935-I939. During the period, mining production increased by more than four times, while the production of manufacturing industry increased by about three times. In the period from 1935 to 1939 mining



TABLE 4 Economic Growth of Korea, I9qo-I939

(Average Annual Values in Thousands ofyen at constant prices)

I910-I4 1915-I9 1920-24 1925-29 I930-34 1935-39

Value of Total Industrial Products Agricultural Products Forest Products Marine Products (Catch) Mining Manufactures Per Capita Gross Output Total Exports

Exports to Japan Exports to Foreign Countries

Total Imports Imports from Japan Imports from Foreign Countries

No. of Factories Employing 5 or more Workers No. of Workers in All Ethnic Groups Manufacturing Koreans

No. of Markets

No. of Market Openings Value of Goods Exchanged in Local Market

Price Index (Bank of Chosen) t

431.4 574-5 670.7 785.2 792.8 1,63I-3 368.7 442.2 499.6 540-9 595.7 810.9

20.9 I5.5 28.2 31.4 53.6 81.8 11.2 37.0 33.9 50.5 61.4 II3.1 t 7.0 11.7 8.2 12.I 28.0 97.8 0

23.5 68.I Ioo.8 150.3 234-I 527.7 29.8 34-9 36.9 39.8 45.6 71-3 (Yen)

25.2 67.9 110.5 I75.8 237-4 4240 19.6 57.8 I00.7 I61.4 212.I 345-3 0

5.6 IO.I 9.8 I4.4 25.3 78.7

29.3 81.2 118.8 I91.4 266.8 537-5 25.9 55. 8 759 I35.0 217.6 465.1

3-4 25.4 42.9 56-4 49.2 72.4

442 1,363 2,943 4,562 4,096 6,287 Z

18,487 38,036 60,371 89,256 II5,70I 213,092 15,530 32,239 49,886 75,338 83,084 126,596*

I,I46 1,217 1,253 I,354 1,4I0 1,509

83,736 91,3I4 96,32I IO9,17I I21,591 134,849

61.4 84.2 15.4 I73.2 190.7 314*4

I00 68 221 202 I41 I76

* 1935-37 only. t From Kenichi Ohno, Chosen kyoiku mondai kayken (Collected Documents on Korean Education), (Seoul, 1936), p. 323. t From E. B. Schumpeter (ed.), The Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo, 930-40 (New York: The Macmillan Co., I940), p. 289. -

Sources: Chosen Keizai Nempo I939 t Chosen Tokei Nempo 1942



YUNSHIK CHANG

and manufacturing accounted for 40% of the total gross output of

goods, compared to 27% for the previous five years. However, agriculture still dominated the economy as a whole. More than 40 % of the total gross output of goods in 1940 was still agricultural and more than 60 % of the total population found their means of livelihood in agriculture. Although the rapidly increasing amount of manufactured industrial products came from new factories, Korean industry still retained

many traditional elements. Household industry50 accounted for 40.I % of the total gross value of industrial products in I933. Although this decreased after 1936, the share of household industry still accounted for

22% as late as I939.51 Household industry dominated in the food

industry, the lumber industry and the textile industry.52 Since the industrial statistics of the Government for the early period

included in the total number of workers in manufacturing those who were engaged in handicraft industries, it is not possible to draw any conclusions from the figure of Table 4 concerning the average size of

manufacturing enterprise. There is every reason to think that it was

steadily growing although in I939 the majority of factories had, on an

average, fewer than 50 workers. The distribution of factories and

factory workers by the size of the factory in 1939 is as follows:53

Size of Factory Total 5-30 3o-00 oo00-2oo00 oo00-oo000 1000 & more

No. of Factories 6,953 5,676 939 189 132 17 No. of Workers 212,459 55,492 47,468 26,022 49,724 33,753

More than 80% of the total number of factories had from 5 to 30 workers. Only 17 factories had more than ,000o workers.

To assess the position of Korean industry within the 'co-prosperity Sphere' it is possible to compare the Korean manufacturing industry with that of Japan for the four years from 1936. The comparison is as follows :54

50 Industry conducted at the home of the 'entrepeneur' and by members of his family usually in their spare time. See, Seikaku Ito, Chosen ni okeru katei kogyo chosa (Survey of Household Industry in Korea), Seoul, I937, and also, Andrew J. Grajdanzev, Modern Korea, New York, 1944, pp. 149-52.

51 Kawai, op. cit., p. 235. 52 Ibid., pp. 235-36. The share of the household industry in the gross value of the

total manufacturing industry in 1939 was as follows: 48.9% in the lumber industry; 45.8% in the food industry; 8.9% in machinery and tools; 7.9% in the chemical industry; 6.3 % in ceramics; and so on. See also, Grajdanzev, op. cit., pp. I50-2.

53 Kawai, op. cit., pp. 150-2. 54 Ibid., p. 254.

I8o




No. of Factories Korea Japan

No. of Workers Korea Japan

The gross value of manufac- Korea tured industry (in Iooo yen) Japan

I936

5,927 90,602

I48,799 2,592,687

466,921 12,257,588

I937 1938

6,928 6,624 o6,oo5 112,332

166,709 I82,771 2,936,5I2 3,217,715

638,254 79I,I3o I6,356, 76 I9,667,270

Shortly before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Korea, with one-third of the population of the empire, had only 5 % of the total number of workers and the gross value of her manufacturing industry barely accounted for 5 % of the total.55

(e) Population trends

What happened to the population during this period? Data from the annexation to I925 are unreliable; thereafter census data provide fairly good information. The following two tables summarize the available

figures for Koreans in Korea, Japan and Manchuria, and for non- Korean residents in Korea.

TABLE 5

Koreans in Korea, Japan and Manchuria, I925, I930, 1935, 1940 and 1944

Year Korea Japan Manchuria Total

190 I 3,313,o17 500 200,000 I3,513,517 1925 I9,020,030 121,000 533,000 I9,674,030 1930 20,438,I08 419,000 607,000 21,464,1 17 1935 22,207,274 625,000 662,000 23,494,274 I940 23,547,465 1,265,049 I,450,284 26,262,798 I944 25,900,942 - -

Sources: Census Report for Korea, I960 (Summary); Fifth Report of the South Manchuria Railway Co.; Census Report for Japan, 1925, 1930, I935 and 1940.

TABLE 6

Japanese and Other Aliens in Korea

Year Japanese Chinese Man- Taiwanese Others churian Karafutan

I925 444,340 58,047 - 9 1,447 1930 527,0I6 91,783 -34 I,364 1935 619,oo5 58,563 - 220 1,563 I940 707,337 - I,585

Source: Census Reports for Korea, 1925, 1930, 1935 and I940. 55 Ibid., p. 254.

i8i

1939

6,953 I37,422

212,459 3,766,709

I,091,780 24,360,130



YUNSHIK CHANG

The total population of Korea during these years grew by 1.78% in I925-29, by i.8I % in I930-34, and by 2.23% in I935-39. This growth was almost certainly due to declining mortality. However, the period also saw a considerable migration of Koreans elsewhere. Emigration drained off 28% of the net increase of the Korean population between 1925 and I944. The migration to Manchuria in the early part of the

period was largely unsponsored. Koreans moved mostly into southern Manchuria and the Chintao areas and engaged in farming. The migration was further stimulated by the establishment of the new state of Manchukuo, particularly after 1935 when the Japanese government gave assistance to migrants who wished to settle in Manchuria. Migration to Japan fluctuated during the period up to 1938, showing annual increases of between Io,ooo and Ioo,ooo. After Koreans became liable to Japanese conscription in 1939, however, there was a sharp increase. From I939 to I945 some 800,000 Korean

youths were drafted into the Japanese Army, and another 250,000 Koreans went to Japan, chiefly as labourers in the mines.

As for immigration, the number of Japanese in Korea was more than I % of the total Japanese population, greater than the number of Koreans in Japan in the early part of the period; but gradually the balance swung the other way, and after I935 Koreans in Japan became nearly twice as numerous as Japanese in Korea.

(f) Occupational structure

Unfortunately, only the I930 and I940 censuses included information on the population who were gainfully occupied. Moreover, there are some difficulties in reading the figures, especially in discriminating between unemployment and employment and in classifying occupation into industrial categories. There appears to have been a sharp decline in the number of women in the labour force during this period, but this results from the application of different criteria for defining industries in each census. Women workers will be excluded from our discus- sion of the occupational structure. Similarly in the manufacturing industries different classifications have been used from census to census. However, using the figures with care the following picture can be drawn: The total number of male Koreans gainfully occupied, increased barely 2% over the decade from 1930 to 1940. Owing to the dominance of agriculture in the Korean economy, the substantial increase in the actual size of the other occupations was offset by the removal of the labour force from agriculture. Roughly three-fourths of the total

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0

TABLE 7 O Industrial Categories of Male Occupations, Koreans, Japanese and Total Population, 1930 and 194o (thousands)* Z

Total Population Koreans Japanese > 1930 1940 Ratio 1930 1940 Ratio I930 1940 Ratio H

Number % Number 5/0 1940/ Number % Number Y% (940/ Number % Number % (1940/ (1930) 1930) 1930) 0

Agriculture & Forestry 5,043,698 (78.3) 4,553,876 (69.I) 0.90 5,019,154 (8I.1) 4,542,877 (71.5) 0.9I 12,625 (7.0) 10,999 (4.7) 0.87 Fishery 99,779 (1.5) 119,466 (I.8) 1 20 92,890 (1.5) 113,591 (I.8) 1.22 6,821 (3.8) 5,875 (2.5) o.86 > Mining 33,421 (0.5) 170,150 (2.6) 5.09 29,842 (0.5) 159,972 (2.5) 5.36 958 (0.5) 10,178 (4.4) Io.62 CA Manufactured Industry 304,105 (4.7) 439,186 (6.7) 1.44 246,960 (4.o0) 374,230 (5.9) 1.52 37,334 (20.6) 64,956 (28.0) 1.74 I Commerce 345,I17 (5.4) 431,908 (6.5) 1.25 286,456 (4.6) 392,6o6 (6.2) 1.37 34,213 (I8.9) 39,302 (I6.9) 1.15 r Transportation 104,937 (I.6) 146,202 (2 2) 1.39 80,631 (1.3) 106,164 (1.7) 1.32 18,557 (Io0.2) 40,038 (I7.2) 2.I6 Government and

Profession I63,640 (2.5) 215,601 (3.3) 1.32 96,6I9 (i.6) 156,252 (2.4) 1.62 66,389 (36.6) 59,349 (25.6) 0.89 t Domestic Service 28,966 (0.5) 36,967 (o.6) 1.28 28,298 (0.4) 36,817 (o.6) 1.30 I45 (o.i) 150 (o.I) 1.03 Z Others 319,386 (5.0) 472,464 (7.2) 1.48 308,877 (5.0) 471,177 (7.4) 1.53 4,090 (2.3) 1,287 (0.5) 0.31 I

Total 6,443,049 Ioo.o 6,585,820 (Ioo.o) 1.02 6,189,727 (ioo.o) 6,353,686 (ioo.o) 1.03 81,132 (100oo.o) 232,134 (ioo.o) 1.28

* Other Ethnic Groups are excluded. Sources: Census Reports for Korea, 1930 (Section in all Korea), Table 49, pp. 246-47; Census Reports for Korea, 1940 (Summary) Table 14, pp. 72-3, Table 15, pp. 112-27. >

Q



YUNSHIK CHANG

increase of non-agricultural occupations could have been filled up by the farmers who left their farms. The percentage of Korean males

engaged in agriculture decreased from 81 % in 1930 to 72 % in I940.56 Although in I940 the proportion of national income produced by manufacturing industries was rapidly catching up with the proportion produced by agriculture, the demographic response was not substantial. The numbers in manufacturing increased by 50% over the decade but still made up only a little more than 5 % of the economically active

population in I940. The most impressive expansion took place in

mining-there was a five-fold increase in numbers in response to the

government stress on mining development-but in terms of employment opportunities, mining did not occupy an important position. Another notable change in the occupational structure during the colonial period, in comparison with that of traditional Korea, was the

proportion of the population engaged in commerce. It is clear from Table 7, however, that the demographic impact of

the changing economy on the Korean population as a whole was not reflected equally in each of Korea's major ethnic groups. Inasmuch as 'economic development' in Korea was initiated and dominated by Japanese in Korea and Japan, a large portion of the new sectors in Korean industry was occupied and controlled by the Japanese. Most

Japanese in Korea who were gainfully occupied were born and brought up in Japan and theirs was a highly selective migration, co-ordinated with the economic policy of the Imperial government. They were skilled and professional personnel, entrepreneurs and officials seeking opportunities in colonial administration and economic expansion. As Table 7 shows, for both census years, more than 80 Y% of the Japanese in Korea were in non-agricultural sectors. Given that the Japanese labour force (both sexes) in Korea comprised only about 5 % of the total, the following figures show how far they were over-represented in the major non-agricultural categories.

I930 I940 Manufacturing industry 12.3o% 14.8% Transportation i 77% 27.4% Commerce 9.9% 9.1 % Government and Professions 40.6X% 27.5%

It should be noted that while the proportion of Japanese in manufacturing industries and transportation grew appreciably between I930

56 If women are included, the figures become 78% and 73% of the total labour force-a figure difficult to interpret because of the great fall in the number reported in manufacturing. Again changes in census definitions make interpretation of the figures difficult.

I84



COLONIZATION AS PLANNED CHANGE I85

and 1940, the proportion in government, professional, and commercial

pursuits decreased rather sharply. The actual number of persons employed in government and the professions increased by 30 % during this period, yet the number ofJapanese working in these fields decreased by 5%, while the number of Koreans increased by 57%. Most of the

growth occurred in the lower ranks of the civil service and in law, medicine and secondary-school teaching.

Why did Koreans move more into government and professions than into industry, although the industrial labour force was growing almost as fast as that in these professional and administrative fields? The answer can only be speculative. One reason is that the colonial government imported highly skilled manpower required for the development of new industries in Korea from Japan. A second reason lies in policies applied to higher education. Entry into colleges and the university was restricted to Koreans. The curriculum was biased against techno-

logical subjects. The main emphasis was put on the moral aspects of

higher education in the colony that would help foster loyal subjects to the emperor. College education thus was mainly concentrated on humanistic rather than technological training. This curriculum fitted traditional ideas of the role of education in society. The idea that society was divided into the rulers and the ruled had dominated Korean

society for more than five centuries. Both officials and scholars were almost exclusively recruited from the yangban elites. Colonization

changed the situation in two ways: first, it substituted Japanese for the

yangban at the top of society, secondly, education became regarded as a means for upward mobility from previously lower social classes. But in an agrarian society, there were only a few possible occupations or

professions which promised college graduates higher incomes and

prestige, especially where the development of non-agricultural industries was dominated and controlled by the aliens: they were the administrative services, medicine, law and teaching. Moreover, while Koreans could rise in these professions the presence of the Japanese hampered them in other sectors of the economy. The lack of capital which characterized Korean industry throughout the entire colonial period, prevented expansion of new industries.

(g) Conclusion

Korea went through an economic transformation during the three and a half decades of colonial rule. The country was developed, not as an autonomous unit, but as part of the Japanese empire. The changes in



YUNSHIK CHANG

the Korean economy during the period closely reflect colonial economic policy, which was deliberately planned and effectively carried out by the imperial regime. The major aims of those policies, however, cannot be adequately accounted for by the Korean situation alone. They were designed to meet imperial needs and colonial Korea fulfilled her obligation even at the expense of her own welfare. Any economic competition between Korea and Japan was carefully controlled. Thus the shape of industrial structure of Korea during the colonial period must be viewed in light of the role it played within the empire.

The demographic impact of the economic transformation reflects a more general colonial situation. The colonial period came to an end with three-fourths of Korea's people still engaged in farming. With the growth of the Korean population, the rise of new industries in the late thirties created new jobs which were less than the increase in agricultural labour force. Industry could do no more than absorb the surplus agricultural population, keeping the absolute number constant. Because 'economic development' in Korea during this period was initiated by the Japanese, a large portion of the new sectors in Korean industry was almost completely dominated by the Japanese, usually leaving opportunities for Koreans only at the unskilled level. This is clearly shown in the recruitment patterns in the new industries. Those who moved from the agricultural to the industrial sector were mostly young men concentrated in the age group, 15-24. Thus, while the economic development of Korea in the early twentieth century was in some ways very successfully and efficiently engineered by the imperial government, it was a partial and incomplete development.

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Colonization as Planned Change

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