Civilian Crisis Management Studies - CMC Finland

CMCFinlandYEARBOOK2009onCivilianCrisisManagementStudies

CrisisManagementCentreFinlandYEARBOOK 2009

CivilianCrisisManagementStudies

CMCFinlandCivilianCrisisManagementStudies

Volume2:Number6/2009

CrisisManagementCentreFinlandYEARBOOK 2009

onCivilianCrisisManagementStudies

Kirsi Henriksson (editor)


Publication Editor

KirsiHenriksson,HeadofResearchandDevelopment,CMCFinland

Editorial Board

AriKerkkänen,Director,CMCFinlandHannuRantanen,ResearchDirector,EmergencyServicesCollegeJariMustonen,SeniorResearcher,CMCFinlandSenjaKorhonen,TrainingOfficer,CMCFinland

Advisory Board

ResearchFellowCedricdeConing,ACCORD,South-Africa&NUPI,NorwayEmeritusProfessorReijoE.Heinonen,FacultyofTheology,UniversityofJoensuu,FinlandGeneralSecretaryKristiinaKumpula,FinnishRedCrossProfessorLiisaLaakso,DevelopmentandInternationalCooperation,UniversityofJyväskylä,FinlandSeniorResearcherKariLaitinen,ThePoliceCollegeofFinlandProfessor,DirectorTuomoMelasuo,TamperePeaceResearchInstitute,FinlandDocent,LecturerPerttiMultanen,InstituteofDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofHelsinki,FinlandDocentArtoNokkala,NationalDefenceUniversity,FinlandProgrammeDirectorHannaOjanen,TheFinnishInstituteofInternationalAffairsSeniorAdviserChristerPursiainen,PermanentSecretariat,CounciloftheBalticSeaStates,SwedenDeputyExecutiveDirectorKristiinaRintakoski,CrisisManagementInitiative,FinlandDirectorTeijaTiilikainen,TheFinnishInstituteofInternationalAffairsEmeritusProfessorJarmoToiskallio,NationalDefenceUniversity,FinlandDocentPekkaVisuri,NationalDefenceUniversity,FinlandAcademyResearchFellowTarjaVäyrynen,InstituteforSocialResearch,UniversityofTampere,Finland

©CMCFinlandNovember2009Coverdesign:CommaGroupOyLayout:CrealabOy,KuopioPrinting:Edita,Helsinki

ISSN1797-2140ISBN978-952-67127-2-7

CMCFinlandPOBox1325FIN-70821Kuopio,Finlandwww.cmcfinland.fi

CrisisManagementCentreFinlandYEArBook 20098

Contents

Abbreviations..............................................................10

Acknowledgements....................................................12kirsi Henriksson

Foreword.......................................................................14Teija Tiilikainen

Introduction.................................................................16Ari kerkkänen – kirsi Henriksson

The gender perspective in the training and recruitment of Finnish civilian crisis management experts ................................................20Ville-Veikko Pitkänen

1Introduction2Gendermainstreaminginciviliancrisismanagement 2.1Gender–toosimplifiedortoocomplexaconcept? 2.2Benefitsofapplyingthegenderperspectivetocrisis

management3Recruitingfemaleciviliancrisismanagementexperts 3.1Structuralchallengesreducingthenumberoffemale

recruitsforciviliancrisismanagementtasks 3.2CMCrecruitment 3.3Waystoincreasefemaleparticipation4Thegenderperspectiveinciviliancrisismanagementtraining 4.1Structuralamendmentsintraining:deeperintegration 4.2Gettingawayfromexternalgendersessions 4.3Trainingthetrainers 4.4Asocio-constructiveapproachintraining 4.5Rethinkinggender:positiveversusnegativegender5Conclusion6Keyrecommendations

High integrity and feminine care: Female police officers as protectors in civilian crisis management ..............................................................48Elina Penttinen

1Introduction2UNSCR1325ActionPlansinfashion3Arewomennaturallymorepeacefulthanmen?Isittrue?

4 Gendered (and ethnicised) subjectivity in civilian crisismanagement

5Responsibilitytoprotect(whomandwhat)?6Conclusions:addingwomen,apoliticsofhope?

War-related sexual violence against women: Its dimensions and proposals for response..............................................66Maaria Ylänkö

1Introduction2Sexualviolenceandinternationallaw 2.1Historicalreview 2.2Achievementsofinternationallaw 2.3Whydoesinternationallawfailtofunction?3Gender-basedapproachanditslimits4Magnitudeofwar-relatedsexualviolence5Culturaldimensionofsexualviolence6Riskenvironmentsforsexualviolence 6.1Rapepatterns 6.2Whyrape? 6.3Sexualviolencebycontext7Socialconsequencesofsexualviolence8Physicalconsequencesofsexualviolence9UNSCR1820anditscriticism10Conclusion11Recommendations 11.1Coordination and critical selection of partners

workingagainstsexualviolence 11.2Collection of better data and work against

misinformationonsexualviolence 11.3Bringingtogetherlocalspiritualleaderstosearchfor

acommonground 11.4Encouragingstatestoratifyinternationalagreements

withregardtosexualviolence 11.5Eliminate and/or monitor risk environments for

sexualviolence 11.6Initiateorsupportnationalpolicyinregardstothe

childrenconceivedofrape 11.7Strengthening Rule of Law by emphasising the

rightsofvictims 11.8Integratedtrainingonsexualviolencetocourseson

crisismanagement 11.9Raisingawareness

CrisisManagementCentreFinlandYEArBook 2009 9

Reintegration in Aceh IndonesiaOpinions of the Finnish civilian crisis management experts.................................................92Tommi Niemi

1BackgroundandcontextoftheconflictinAceh 1.1Disarmament,DemobilisationandReintegration 1.2AcehandGAM 1.3TheAcehMonitoringMission 1.4Themethodandtheresearchquestion2UnderstandingthereintegrationinAceh 2.1Theobjectiveofthereintegrationanditstargets 2.2Themethodsofthereintegration 2.3Twoviewpoints3ThesuccessesandfailuresofthereintegrationinAceh4Conclusion

An introduction to Integrated Crisis Management...................................................110Cedric de Coning

1Achangefrompeacekeepingtopeacebuilding2Definitionofpeacebuilding3Peacebuildingphases4Peacebuildingactors 4.1Externalactors 4.2Internalactors5Toolsofpeacebuilding6TheUnitedNationsIntegratedApproach7Coordination 7.1Coordinationwiththemilitary 7.2Whatdoescoordinationmean? 7.3Thedimensionsofcoordination 7.4Separatingcoordinationandmanagement8Fromstrategytoevaluation 8.1Strategicdirection 8.2Planningandassessments 8.3Mobilisingresources 8.4Monitoringandevaluation

9Thelimitsofcoordination,integrationandthecomprehensiveapproach

9.1Conflictingvaluesandprinciples 9.2Conflicting rules, regulations and resource

managementprocesses 9.3Inappropriate management philosophies, processes

andtools 9.4Unintendedconsequences 10Conclusion

Authors ............................................................134


Abbreviations

ACFOA AustralianCouncilforOverseasAid

ACCORD AfricanCentrefortheConstructiveResolutionofDisputes

AMM AcehMonitoringMission

AMMHQDecommOfficeAcehMonitoringMissionHeadquarters

DecommissioningOffice

ASEAN TheAssociationofSoutheastAsianNations

AMISOM AfricanUnionMissioninSomalia

ASF AfricanStandbyForce

AU AfricanUnion

AUREU AfghanistanResearchandEvaluationUnit

AUSA AssociationoftheUnitedStatesArmy

BRA BadanReintegrasidandamaiAceh

CAP ConsolidatedAppealsProcess

CCA CommonCountryAssessment

CCM CivilianCrisisManagement

CFSP CommonForeignandSecurityPolicyoftheEuropeanUnion

CHAP CommonHumanitarianActionPlan

CIDA CanadianInternationalDevelopmentAgency

CIMIC Civil-MilitaryCoordination

CMC CrisisManagementCentreFinland

CMCO EUCivil-MilitaryCoordinationTool

CMI CrisisManagementInitiative

COHA CessationofHostilitiesFrameworkAgreement

CSIS CenterforStrategicandInternationalStudies

DCAF DemocraticControlofArmedForces

3DConcept Diplomacy,DevelopmentandDefenceConcept

DDR Disarmament,DemobilisationandReintegration

DDRRR Disarmament,Demobilisation,Repatriation,Reintegration,andResettlement

DFID DepartmentforInternationalDevelopment

DFS UnitedNationsDepartmentofFieldSupport

DOA/CAO DirectorofAdministration/ChiefAdministrativeOfficer(UN)

DOM DaerahOperasiMiliter(MilitaryOperationsZone)

DPA UnitedNationsDepartmentofPoliticalAffairs

DPKO UnitedNationsDepartmentofPeacekeepingOperations

DRC DemocraticRepublicofCongo

DSF DecentralizationSupportFacility

DSRSG DeputySpecialRepresentativeoftheSecretary-General(UN)

EBAO EffectsBasedApproachtoOperations

EC/ECHO EuropeanCommission/EuropeanCommissionHumanitarianAidDepartment

ECOWAS EconomicCommunityofWestAfricanStates

EGT EuropeanGrouponTraining

ESDP EuropeanUnionSecurityandDefencePolicy

EU EuropeanUnion

EUBAM EuropeanUnionBorderAssistanceMission

EUFOR EuropeanUnionForce

EULEX EuropeanUnionRuleofLawMission

FeministIR FeministInternationalRelations

GAM AcehFreedomMovement,GerakanAcehMerdeka

GDP GrossDomesticProduct

GTZ DeutscheGesellschaftfürTechnischeZusammenarbeit

HC HumanitarianCoordinator

HoM HeadofMission

HQ Headquarters

HVO CroatianDefenceCouncil

ICC InternationalCriminalCourt

ICRC InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross

ICRW InternationalCenterforResearchonWomen

ICTR InternationalCriminalTribunalforRwanda

ICTY InternationalCriminalTribunalfortheformerYugoslavia

IDP InternallyDisplacedPerson

IFI InternationalFinancialInstitutions

IGAD IntergovernmentalAuthorityonDevelopment

IHL InternationalHumanitarianLaw

IMF InternationalMonetaryFund

IMFT InternationalMilitaryTribunal,TokyoTribunal

IMPP IntegratedMissionPlanningProcess


INGO InternationalNon-GovernmentalOrganisation

IPA InternationalPeaceAcademy

IPTF IntegratedPlanningTaskForce

JAMA JournaloftheAmericanMedicalAssociation

JICA JapanInternationalCooperationAgency

JMAC JointMissionAnalysisCell

KATU KansalaisjärjestöjenKonfliktinehkäisyverkosto(CivilSocietyConflictPreventionNetwork)

Kit-PEP Post-ExposureProphylaxiskit(aka.PEP-kit)

LLM MasterofLaws

MFA MinistryforForeignAffairs

MSF MédecinsSansFrontières(DoctorswithoutBorders)

MINURCAT UnitedNationsMissionintheCentralAfricanRepublicandChad

MoI MinistryoftheInterior

MoU MemorandumofUnderstanding

NATO NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization

NAP NationalActionPlan

NEPAD NewPartnershipforAfrica’sDevelopment

NGO Non-GovernmentalOrganisation

NORAD NorwegianAgencyforDevelopmentCooperation

NUPI NorwegianInstituteofInternationalAffairs

OCHA UnitedNationsOfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs

ODCCP UnitedNationsOfficeofDrugControlandCrimePrevention

ODIHR OfficeforDemocraticInstitutionsandHumanRights

OECD OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment

ONUB UnitedNationsMissioninBurundi

OSCE OrganizationforSecurityandCo-operationinEurope

PCIA Post-ConflictImpactAssessment

PCRU Post-ConflictReconstructionUnit

PDSRSG PrincipalDeputySpecialRepresentativeoftheSecretary-General(UN)

PEP Post-ExposureProphylaxis

Polamk Poliisiammattikorkeakoulu(ThePoliceCollegeofFinland)

PRS PovertyReductionStrategy

PRSP PovertyReductionStrategyPaper

PRT ProvincialReconstructionTeam

RC ResidentCoordinator

RoL RuleofLaw

RR ResidentRepresentative

RUF/SL RevolutionaryUnitedFrontofSierraLeone

SADC SouthernAfricanDevelopmentCommunity

S/CRS OfficefortheCoordinatorforReconstructionandStabilization

SIDA SwedishInternationalDevelopmentCooperationAgency

SSR SecuritySectorReform

SRSG SpecialRepresentativeofSecretary-General(UN)

SV SexualViolence

TNI TentaraNasionalIndonesia(ThearmedforcesofIndonesia)

UK UnitedKingdom

UN UnitedNations

UNAMID AfricanUnion/UnitedNationsHybridoperationinDarfur

UNCT UnitedNationsCountryTeam

UNDAF UnitedNationsDevelopmentAssistanceFramework

UNDP UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme

UNDPRBEC UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme/RegionalBureauforEuropeandtheCIS

UNESCO UnitesNationsEducational,ScientificandCulturalOrganization

UNFPA UnitedNationsPopulationFund

UNHCR UnitedNationsHighCommissionerofRefugees

UNICEF UnitedNationsChildren’sFund

UNIFEM UnitedNationsDevelopmentFundforWomen

UNMIK UnitedNationsInterimAdministration MissioninKosovo

UNMIL UnitedNationsMissioninLiberia

UN-INSTRAW UnitedNationsInternationalResearchandTrainingInstitutefortheAdvancementofWomen

UNSCR UnitedNationsSecurityCouncilResolution

USAID UnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment

UNU UnitedNationsUniversity

WB WorldBank

WFP WorldFoodProgramme

WHO WorldHealthOrganization


Acknowledgements

Thepastyearhasbeenatthesametimerewardingaswellasdemanding.MuchhasbeenachievedthankstothecommittedstaffoftheCrisisManagementCentreFinland(CMCFinland).The rapid pace of evolution related to the civilian crisismanagementatthenationallevelandthelearningbydoingprocesswithinCMCFinland itself have requiredmotivation,flexibility as well as continuous readiness to absorb noveltasks. Besides theCMCFinland staff there exists a growingnumberofpeoplewhoare linked toCMCFinlandactivitiesandtheirsupporthasbeenavaluableassettoallofus.Ioweaspecialdebtofgratitudetosomeofthemontheoccasionofthispublication.

Firstofall, Iwould liketoexpressmygratitudetothosepartnersandexpertswithwhomwehavebeenabletoincreaseourunderstandingespeciallyingenderissues.TheNGOsundertheumbrellaoftheFinnish1325Networkandthemembersof the CMC Finland 1325 Steering Committee have helpedustoimplementtheUNSCR1325inoureverydaywork.Ms.Lesley AbdelafromEyecatcherAssociatesShevolutionandMs.Leena Schmidt fromtheFinnishUNIFEMwere thefirstonestoshowushowtoputonthe“genderspectacles”. InApril2009,theCMCFinland1325SteeringCommitteeorganisedaRoundtableinPristina,Kosovoon“Gender-BasedViolence:InvestigationandProsecution−SharingexperiencesbetweenFinlandandKosovo”.TheRoundtablewouldnothavebeenrealised without the help of the staff in the Human Rightsand Gender Office at EULEX Kosovo or without the activeparticipationofKosovoministries,authoritiesandNGOs.

Iamalsothankfultotheauthorswhohavebeenpatientlyrevising their texts.Andmywarmgreetingsgo toMr. John Mills,Ms.Tiina kanninen andMs.Meghan riley for havingassuredthequalityofthelanguage.

Toalltherefereeswhohaveparticipatedinthepeerreviewprocess,youalsodeservemywarmestregards.ThisyearIhaveespecially requested comments fromexpertsworking in themissionsandcrisissettings.Ms.Merja LahtinenfromEUMMGeorgiaandMs.Susanne BackstedtfromEULEXKosovohavegiven their comments based on their expertise. Executivedirector of the Finnish UNIFEM Leena Schmidt has not onlycontributed as a referee but she has also been followingcloselythegendermainstreamingatCMCFinlandasalreadystated above. Research Student Marjaana Jauhola from theUniversityofAberystwyth,Wales,UKhasmanagedtoprovidecomments while travelling in Aceh related to her work ongendermainstreamingandpost-Tsunamireconstruction.

Finally, IwouldliketodedicatethisYearbooktothe155Finnish civilian crisismanagement expertswhoare currentlyworking in different operations all around the world. Theyare “doing peace” in practice together with the people atthecrisissettingswhileweareponderingovermoreabstractissues in our research here in Kuopio. Still, we need boththeoryandpractice toprevent future conflicts aswell as tosolvethecurrentones.

Kuopio,Finland,6November2009

KirsiHenriksson,Editor

STATE PROVINCIALOFFICE OFEASTERN FINLAND


Foreword

The EU has gradually become an important actor ininternational crisis management. This year we celebrate thetenthanniversaryofthelaunchoftheEuropeanSecurityandDefencePolicy(ESDP).Tenyearsago,duringtheGermanandFinnishEUpresidenciesof1999,thekeydecisionsweretakenontheincorporationofmilitaryandciviliancapabilitiesunderthe EUpolitical leadership. Since thosedecisionsmore thantwentymissionsinfourcontinentshavebeencarriedout.

Ingeneral, the EUhasbeen seen to copewellwith thedemandingtasks thatare relatedtopeacemakingandpost-conflictstabilisation.TheEUseemstohaveanumberofclearassetsasaninternationalactorinthisfield.ThefirstofthemrelatestotheverycomprehensivecharacteroftheEuropeanUnion. Unlike most other actors, the EU crisis managementpolicyformsapartofitswiderCommonForeignandSecurityPolicy (CFSP),whichcoversall theexternal relations.TheEUshould therefore be able to use the whole set of differentinstruments–itspoliciesaswellasdifferenttypesofpoliticalandeconomicinstruments−insupportofitsgoalsinacrisisaffected region.Sometimes thecoordinationofpoliciesandinstrumentsisnotthateasy.TheLisbontreatywill,however,function in the very right direction as itwill provide the EUwith a much more coherent setting for external policies.Common policy objectives plus a more unitary system forpolicypreparationandleadershipthroughoutthewholefieldofexternalrelationsaremostwelcomeinthisrespect.

Another asset can be found in the EU’s character as aunionoftwenty-sevendemocraticmemberstates.TheunityneededbehindtheEUoperationsissometimesseentomakeitsdecisionsslowanditspoliciesincoherent.Ithasalsobeenargued to contribute to the lack of a strategic vision andproblemsin long-termplanning.Butontheotherhand,theEU’s character is itself thebest safeguard to thedemocraticcontrol of its internationalmissions: the fact that theyhavetobeapprovedbytwenty-sevendemocraticaudiencesgivesthemissionsaverysolidbasis.ThesameappliesalsotothecommitmenttotheUNcharterand itsprinciples intheEU’sinternationalactivities.TheEU’spossibilitiesforastrengthenedpolitical credibilityasa crisismanagementactor seem tobegood.

There are, however, critical voices as well. There arethose who argue that the EU has been underperformingparticularly inmilitarycrisismanagementas ithasonlybeenin chargeof smallormiddle-sizeoperations.WhileNATO isresponsiblefordemandingglobaloperations,theEUmissionshaveneitherbeengrowing insizenor levelof risk.AnothercriticalobservationrelatestothesuccessesoftheEUcapabilityprocesses. There are important member states that paydecreasing,ratherthanincreasing,attentiontotheEUinthisrespect.

InspiteofallchallengestheESDPhasstillbeenthefastestnew policy dimension to have ever been added to the EU’spolitical system. A common culture and more unified waysof thinking about crisis management and security policyin general are only in the process of emerging. It’s time tocongratulate the ten year old ESDP and look into its futurewithhope.

TeijaTiilikainenDirector(from1January2010)TheFinnishInstituteofInternationalAffairs


Introduction

Ari Kerkkänen − Kirsi Henriksson

TherearepromisingsignsthattheUnitedNationswillembarkon a new and enhanced era, and role, in peacekeeping,peacebuilding and crisis management. The new horizon isinsightastheUNDepartmentforPeacekeepingOperations(DPKO)‘NewHorizon’non-paperonpeacekeepingsuggests1.Thesedevelopmentsdeservea strongembraceas theUN isstill and will be the only genuine global actor representingthemajorityofstatesintheWorld.Who,ifnottheUN,canbetter provide an overall and comprehensive architectureand appropriate action in conflict transformation andpeacebuilding faced within challenges surrounding us? Thecaveats, bureaucracy, and limitations of the UN are knownand acknowledged. This, however, should not direct theinternational community to deviate from UN policy andtake action in seeking alternative ways and organisationsto replace the role of the UN but rather it should generatethe determination and the will to overcome the built-inbureaucraticandconceptualchallengesoftheUN.

TheUNhasalonghistory inpeacekeeping. Itsmethods,mechanismsandinstrumentsutilisedhaveundergonealongprocessofdevelopmentanddeliberation,graduallyevolvinginto the so-called UN Integrated Approach. Within theintegrated framework of peacekeeping and peacebuildingoperations,UNassetsareclarityand resourcefulness.This isthecaseat leastonpaper;puttingit intopractice isoftenadifferentmatter.TheUNhasalreadyconceptuallydevelopedacomprehensiveapproachinpeacebuilding;aprocesswhichishighlysoughtafterbytheregionalorganisationsliketheEUandNATO.TheUNconceptoftheintegrationdoesnotmeanmeddlingandmixingtherolesofdifferentstakeholders,policeremain intheirownroleandretaintheirchainofcommandas much as military remains within its chain of command.

1 Executive Brief DPKO/DFS ‘New Horizon’ non-paperon United Nations Peacekeeping, 24 June 2009.http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/newhorizon.pdf,lastaccessed9.11.2009.

Both, however, are inside the same larger frameworkof anintegratedoperation.Thisframeworkincludesaco-ordinatedactionby a large variety of otherUNagencies dealingwithconflict regions which can include the United NationsDevelopmentProgramme’s(UNDP)developmentprogrammesaswellashumanitarianandemergencyaidchannelledthroughthe Organisation for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs(OCHA).HumansecurityevolvedwithintheUNDPalreadyinthe1990sasitdirectedtheplanningactivitiesaswellasactualworkontheground.Lookinggoodonpaperisalreadyagoodstart, and this iswhere theother regionalorganisations aresignificantlybehindintheirdevelopment.

TheEuropeanSecurityandDefencePolicy(ESDP)hasjustmarked itsfirstdecadeandthepaceofdevelopingEUcrisismanagementcapabilitieshasbeenbreath-taking.Theconflictin the middle of Europe, in the former Yugoslavia, showedboththelackandtheneedofEurope’scapabilitytodealwithpeacekeepingandpeacebuilding.TheEuropeanCommunityMonitoring Mission (ECMM), transferred into the EuropeanUnionMonitoringMission(EUMM)intheformerYugoslavia,set precedence for current European civilian capabilities incrisismanagement.Sincethen,morethan20ESDPmissionshavebeenorarebeingcarriedout insuchfar-awayregionslike Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) and the DemocraticRepublicofCongoinAfrica(EUPOLRDCongo).Infact,itcouldbesaidthatthelargestEUcivilianmission,theEURuleofLawMissioninKosovo(EULEXKosovo),paysasortoftributetothebirthoftheEUciviliancrisismanagementcapability.

TheEUisafront-runnerindevelopingciviliancapabilitiesin stabilising and supporting recovery of conflict riddenregions.Structureshavebeencreatedandnationalcapacitiesenhanced. The EU has indeed made a great service fordevelopingtheUNcapabilitiesbysettinganexampleofutilisingciviliandimensionsinacomprehensiveandstructuredway.IthasgivenimpetusformoreenlightenedunderstandingwithintheUNoftheuseofcivilianinstrumentsasiswitnessedintheUN Rule of Law strengthening actions. In return, many UN


bestpractisesandconceptsshouldbemorewillinglyadoptedbyEUcrisismanagement–onceagain, there isnoneed tore-invent the wheel. The EU is and will remain a regionalorganisation,irrespectiveofitsglobalreach.Therefore,incrisismanagement theEU’s role iscomplementary to theUNandtheEUwillcontinuetoderiveitsmandatesfromUNSecurityCouncil Resolutions. For theUN, theEU is an indispensableassetthatcanandshouldbeutilised.2

CivilianassetswillbethekeyintheinternationalsupportofstabilisingandreconstructingAfghanistan.EngagementinAfghanistanwilltakeyears,ifnotdecades.Crisismanagementand peacebuilding models are being designed based onexperience gained from Afghanistan and more often thannot,thesehavehadavery limitedinfluenceandsuccess.Atthe same time, it should be kept in mind that Afghanistanis not necessarily the only model to be followed in thefuture. Building only on Afghanistan scenario may lead, atits worst, to developing strategies and concepts that arenot suited for challenges faced inotherpartsof theWorld.WhatAfghanistan,however, showsclearly is the verymuchneeded synergy between development co-operation andpeacebuilding.Parochialismandpartisanshipinpeacebuildingbelongsinthepast.

Twosignificantstrategieshavebeenproduced inFinlandduring the last two years. The Government of FinlandapprovedtheNationalStrategyonCivilianCrisisManagementinAugust20083andtheComprehensiveCrisisManagementStrategy will be approved during the autumn in 2009.These strategies are intended to enhance national strategicguidance inparticipating in international crisismanagementand peacebuilding. Though international participation isreviewed,themainemphasisisonnationalcapacitybuilding.On the civilian side, the Crisis Management Centre Finlandhas solemnly been responsible for all operational aspectsof Finland’s participation in crisis management operationsby civilian professionals and expertise. The strategies guidenationalcapacitybuilding,itishowevernoteworthytomentionthecomplicationsthatariseinfindinganapproachthatwouldreflect an overall consensus of different crisis managementstakeholders,eveninFinland.Onenationaldeficiencyinthisfieldhasbeenalackofresearch,specificallyinresearchthatconcentrateson in-depthanalyses anddrawconclusionsonthecurrentstateofaffairsincrisismanagementandinallofitsdimensions.TheCrisisManagementCentreFinlandcontinuestoemphasiseresearchasonesupportingpillarofitsactivitiesand this second CMC Finland Yearbook is the result of ourresearch undertakings during the year of 2009. Of course,this contribution is not intended to serve professionals only

2 A recent study by a pan-European think-thank, TheEuropeanCouncilonForeignRelations (ECFR)analysesthe weaknesses and potentialities of the ESDP. Korski,Daniel & Richard Gowan (2009): Can the EU rebuild Failing States? A review of Europe’s Civilian Capacities.http://www.ecfr.eu.

3 The National Strategy (2008) has been published inFinnish,SwedishandEnglish,seehttp://www.intermin.fi/intermin/home.nsf/pages/27C4038A35220CFCC22573AA0040E71D?opendocument,lastaccessed9.11.2009.

inthenationaldomainbutalsointheinternationaldomain.Comprehensiveness cannot be attained without having aprofoundandresearchbasedknowledgeandunderstandingofitsfullmeaning.OneofCMCFinland’spriorities,reflectedmoreintheYearbook2008,ishumansecurity.ThepublicationofthesecondYearbookisalsotomarkthelaunchoftheCMCFinlandHumanSecurityTrainingProgramme.

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Whileagreementsandcooperationpursuedbytheinternationalcommunitysetstheframeworkfornationalcapacitybuildingin thefieldofciviliancrisismanagementandpeacebuilding,thesubstanceto“manage”and“build”mustbethereinthefirstplace.Thereisacertainsetofgenerallyacceptedprinciplesforthisprocesswithintheinternationalcommunity,buttheyare not always agreed upon with a consensus. To promotehuman rights in crisis management and peacebuildingrequirestools,meansandmethodologiesfortheresponsibledesigners at the planning level of the operations as well asfortheindividualexpertswhoareimplementingthemission/operationmandatesinthefield.

Gender,culturalawarenessandacomprehensiveapproach,amongstothers,aretoolstomanagecrisisandbuildpeaceinasustainableandcoherentway.Ofcourse,themajoraimofallpeacekeeping,peacebuildingandcrisismanagementactivitiesisthehumansecurityofpeople;theinternationalcommunityshould work in different crisis settings only to promote thepositive security of individuals towards freedom, to do noharmandtohumblylistenwhilementoring,monitoringandadvising.

Themajority of the articles in thisYearbook2009 focusstrongly on the gender thematic which has been a veryimportantbuildingblockforCMCFinlandasawholeduringthepast year.Ville-VeikkoPitkänendiscovers theprocessofgendermainstreaming insideCMCFinland.While there is astrongpoliticalwilltopushtheimplementationoftheUNSCResolution1325nationally–duetothepublishingofFinland’sNationalActionPlan1325inSeptember20084–thetrainers,humanresourcesofficersandresearchersareponderinghowtoimplementtheActionPlaninCMCFinland’sdailywork.Thearticle gives a number of recommendations to enhance themainstreamingprocessatCMCFinland.

Elina Penttinen continues with an analysis of theimplementation of the Action Plan while reflecting on theexpertise of Finnish female police officers. In her study,Penttinennotonlybringsexamplesofeverydaylifeindifferentcrisis settings toldby the femalepoliceofficersbut shealsoanalysestheconstructionofthegenderedexpertiseinciviliancrisis management. What is more important, increasing thenumberofwomeninordertoachievequickresults,atleastinthestatistics,ortoincreaseawarenesstounderstandtheroleofgenderinciviliancrisismanagement?Inordertogetthings

4 Finland’s National Action Plan 1325,http://formin-origin.finland.fi/public/download.aspx?ID=32702&GUID={6E789E51-2C81-4F67-B12D-23E7389922F4},lastaccessed9.11.2009.


doneproperly,Finnishfemalepoliceofficersfirstrelyontheirprofessionalism,secondontheirculturalbackground,andlastontheirgender.

Maaria Ylänkö proceeds with UNSC Resolutions whileanalysingalsotheResolution1820onsexualviolence.WhileUNSCR 1820 strengthens the previous UNSCR 1325 onWomen, Peace and Security,thearticlerevealsthecomplexityofthesexualviolenceissue.MaariaYlänkögoesbeyondthenormative, feminist, and developmentalist assumptions toreveal the cultural dimensions aswell as social andphysicalconsequencesofsexualviolence. Intheend, it isaquestionofthereintegrationofthevictim–woman,man,boy,girl–backtothesociety,andtheinternationalcommunitycanaidreintegrationinmanyconcreteways,notonlybyreportingthenumberofrapecases.

Maaria Ylänkö’s and Tommi Niemi’s articles analyse thesameissuefromdifferentperspectivesbutthephenomenonisthesame:reintegration,whichisthemostchallengingphasein the DDR-chain after disarmament and demobilisation.Tommi Niemi’s research is based on the interviews of theFinnishexpertswhoworkedintheAcehMonitoringMission(AMM)from2005to2006.TheAMMhastraditionallybeenregarded as a success in the history of ESDP operations;TommiNiemianalysesquiteprofoundlytheunderstandingoftheFinnishexpertswithrespecttothesuccessesandfailuresof the mission, however, the most important outcome isthe reflection on the reintegration process in civilian crisismanagementandpeacebuilding.

As we started this introduction with references to theUnitedNations,itisagoodmomenttoendthepresentationwith Cedric de Coning’s text on the integrated approach.Differentpeacebuildingdimensions,includingcomprehensiveand integrated approaches, are tools for those individualswho are working in the operations sometimes quite aloneand occasionally with a mandate that does not alwaysinteract with the peacebuilding context. Cedric de Coning’sarticle offers a profound and clear picture on the complexpeacebuildingpractisesoftheinternationalcommunityinthename of different strategies. While the comprehensivenessis an approach which guides all international actors in thecrisis setting in a coherentmanner towardshuman security,theultimategoal, the journey ismucheasierwhenwearinggenderspectacles.

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Theviewsexpressed intheresearcharticlesarethoseoftheauthorsanddonotreflecttheviewsofCMCFinland.


Ville-Veikko Pitkänen

Theurgencyofpromotingthegenderperspectiveininternationalcrisismanagementisa

goalmandatedgloballythroughanumberofresolutions,politicalactivityprogrammesand

recommendations.Thisarticledealswiththechallengeofimplementingthegenderperspective

intheworkoftheCrisisManagementCentre,Finland(CMC).Itexaminesthemanifestation

ofthegenderperspectivewithinCMC’sactivitiesfromtwoangles:thenumberofrecruited

womenasemphasisedbytheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilResolution1325andthe

implementationofthegenderperspectiveinCMCtraining.

The gender perspective in the training and recruitment of Finnish civilian crisis management experts


1 Introduction

Gendermainstreamingpromotesthegenderperspectiveinalltheactivitiesofagivenstructure,institution,ororganisation.Gender mainstreaming, though widely promoted in Finnishpublic administration policy1, is a relatively recent, andthus relatively restricted, strategy in the context of Finnishcivilian crisis management. This article focuses on gendermainstreaming in the context of Finnish civilian crisismanagement, specifically at the Crisis Management CentreFinland(CMC),basedatKuopioinEasternFinland.

Founded in February 2007, CMC is responsible for thetraining and recruitment of the Finnish citizens secondedto civilian crisis management tasks in international crisismanagement and peacebuilding operations. During its briefexistence,CMChasexperiencedarapidincreaseinpersonnel,responsibilities, trainingparticipants, and secondedexperts2.In thisdynamicoperational context,CMChas responded tothechallengetoimplementgenderperspectiveinthetrainingand recruitment of civilian crisis management experts invariousways.

In April 2008, CMC established its own 1325 SteeringCommittee consisting of specialists from Finnish ministries,universities and NGOs. The Committee coordinates andconsolidates thematic work around the United NationsSecurityCouncilResolution(UNSCR)1325onWomen, Peace and Security(2000).Inaddition,CMCcooperatesactivelywiththe Finnish NGOs involved with the implementation of theresolution3.Further,inordertosecurethegenderperspective

1 The need for gender mainstreaming in Finnish publicadministration has been explicitly stated in theGovernment Program (Valtioneuvoston kanslia 2007)andtheGovernment’sNationalActionPlanonEquality2008–2011(Sosiaali-jaterveysministeriö2008).

2 ThenumberofemployeesincreasedfromteninJanuary2008 to 32 in April 2009 (including trainees). Thenumber of attendees at CMC training sessions was1378in2007,increasingto1629in2008.ThenumberofsecondedexpertsinDecember2007was81,andoneyearlater138.InOctober2009,CMCdidreachitsgoalasstatedinFinland’sNationalStrategyforCivilianCrisisManagementof150civiliancrisismanagementexpertsintheoperations.

3 E.g. CMC personnel actively participates in the eventsoftheFinnish1325NGOnetwork,andCMCorganisesregular joint seminars with Finnish NGOs to deal withwiderquestionsrelatedtociviliancrisismanagement.

in the field work4 of Finnish experts, CMC has organisedgender training sessions for its personnel, and started todevelopwaystoapplygendermoreconsistentlyintheCMCtrainingcurriculum,aswellasintherecruitmentproceduresofitsexperts5.Inspiteoftheseefforts,however,CMC’sgendermainstreamingstillremainslimited.

Until now CMC has enforced the gender perspectivein two ways: firstly, by balancing the numbers of womenand men in the context of its own activities, and secondly,by facilitating the acquisition by recruited experts of theanalytical, observational, and applied tools of the genderperspectiveintheexperts’workinthefield,orascommonlyreferred to, facilitating the acquisition by experts of gender lenses. However, the concentration on the numbers ofwomenparticipatinginFinnishciviliancrisismanagementstilldominates the efforts to implement the gender perspectiveinFinnishciviliancrisismanagement,whichmaybeexplainedby two reasons. Firstly, the numbers of female participantsare easy to understand, and easily measurable, recordableand reportable, in comparison with evaluation of how thetraining or recruitment have progressed in paying attentionto participants’ or experts’ understanding of gender issues.Secondly, the strongemphasisonnumbers isdue toCMC’sdeterminationtoadvancetheimplementationoftheUNSCR1325 and the Finnish National Action Plan on 13256 inCMC’sactivities,bothofwhichstronglyemphasisetheneedto increase female participation in crisis management. Inaddition, theGovernment’sNationalActionPlanonGenderEquality and the Finnish National Strategy of Civilian CrisisManagement provide a strong mandate to increase thenumber of women in civilian crisis management. However,bypromotingthefundamentalideaofstrengtheningtheroleof women in civilian crisis management, these documents

4 The term “field work” refers here to the civilian crisismanagementexperts’workincrisisareas.

5 Interview12January2009.6 Finland’s1325NGOnetworkcontributedstronglytothe

birthofthe1325Nationalactionplanbylobbyingtheauthoritiesconcerned.Thustheimportanceofpushingfor stronger 1325 thematic work at CMC Finlandhas been emphasised not only “from above” by theministries,butforcefullyalso”frombelow”bytheactivecivilsociety.Interview16March2009.


resultinapracticethatcallsratherformainstreamingwomenin crisis management than for gender mainstreaming7. Inconsequence,theconventionhasnaturallybeenthatCMC’sreporting on gender mainstreaming has consisted more ofnumbersdescribingthedichotomisedbiologicalbalanceofthesexesthan,forexample,oftheevaluationofthecomprehensiveunderstandingofgenderintheworkofexperts.

Thisstudyconductedduringthefirsthalfof2009tacklesthechallengeofbringingthegenderperspectiveintoFinnishcivilian crisis management by utilising the expertise of theCMC staff – the gender mainstreamers themselves – basedon the logical premise that the most practical, meaningful,and committing methods of gender mainstreaming withinanyorganisationmustbesoughtinsidetheorganisationitself.Ownershiphasbeendetectedtobeoneoftheprerequisitesfortheactiveapplicationofthegendermainstreaminginsideorganisations8.InthecaseofCMC,theownershipbelongstotheCMCstaffinvolvedintrainingandrecruitingciviliancrisismanagementexperts.

As the strategy for implementing the gender policy inCMC’sactivitiesisstillinitsinitialstages,atatimewhentheattentionoftheorganisationhasessentiallybeenfocusedonthe stabilisation of CMC’s basic function, the training andrecruitmentofexperts,thewindowofopportunityforearly-phasedevelopment,alignment,andraisinggenderawarenessremainspromisinglyopen.Inaddition,thesituationisfruitfulbecause CMC’s brief period of existence has neverthelessbeen sufficiently long to generate prospective ideas for theimplementation of the gender perspective more profoundlywithintheorganisation.

The researcher’s aim was not to create a penetratingacademicreportonCMC’sgendermainstreaming,nortotesthowprofoundlythetheoryofgendermainstreamingfitsintociviliancrisismanagement.The researcher’smain targetwastofindconcretewaystoimplementthegenderperspectiveinCMC’swork,whichwouldeventuallyleadtotheapplicationofgenderlensesintheconcreteworkofexpertsinsuchfieldsasAfghanistan,Kosovo,orGeorgia.

In the search for operational practices to connect thegender perspectivewithCMCactivities, this studydepartedfromtheconceptionthatchallengesingendermainstreaminghavebeenlinkedtothefailuretoconnectgendermeaningfullyandnaturallywithindividuals’dailyworkandpractices,ortothe routine of seeing gender issues in too technical terms,mainlyusedby theunknown gender experts rather thanbyuninitiatedindividuals9.Itisoftenforgottenthatorganisations’

7 The numerical balance between men and women isgiven particular emphasis in Finland’s National ActionPlanontheUNSCR1325andintheFinnishGovernmentAction Plan for Gender Equality 2008–2011. Thecommonfeatureofbothdocuments is the targetofapercentagebalanceof40/60betweenwomenandmentrainedandrecruitedforciviliancrisismanagementtasks(see Kokkarinen et al. 2009; see also correspondingguidelines from the Finnish Ministry of Defence:Puolustusministeriö2009;cf.McKay2007).

8 SeeWells&McEwan2004;Mikkelsenetal.2002.9 Ase.g.Piálek(2008)argues,theexplicit(over)useofthe

term expert, the endless production of checklists and

mainstreaminggenderareoftenverydifferent in relation totheirmanaging-andoperationalstructures,tosaynothingoftheirgoals,andasaresultthereexistsavarietyofdescriptionsforeffectivegendermainstreaming.Thus,aworkablemethodof mainstreaming gender in one organisation may not beworkable inanother.Thestudyseeks toutilise theexpertiseof the staff, inviting them to reflect and find best practicestoimplementgenderinciviliancrisismanagement,sothatinthis framework the gender perspective is first detected andfamiliarised before being applied. The bottom-up approachof this study brings the reflection down to the CMC staffthemselves.

Theempiricalfindingspresented in thisarticlearebasedon a combination of observations and thematic interviews.TheobservationsweremadeduringavarietyofCMCevents(seminars,trainingsessions,dailywork).Individualinterviews(CMCstaff,CMCFinland’s1324SteeringCommitteemembers,experts and officials) were carried out during January-June2009. The main goals of the interviews were to bring outthe challenges in implementing the gender perspective inCMCactivities,andtofindmeaningful recommendationstoovercomethesechallenges.

The orientation of the study is normative: it involvesevaluation of the present state of affairs with the aim ofputting forward recommendations for the future. The goalhere is to assist the organisation to understand both thepotential and limitations involved in applying the genderperspective. The normativeness of the study creates somemethodologicalchallenges.Onechallengeisthereconciliationof the interviews; the differences in individual values andlife experiences mean that the improvements proposed byindividualsduringthethematicinterviewscannotbeidentical.In response to this challenge, the results of the study havebeen“verified”by the informants themselves,and thefinalreconciliation between the interviews has been solved bylookingforthecommonground.

Since the researcher resided inside the organisationstudied,asubstantialpartofthestudywasconductedthroughobserving and evaluating CMC activities and by informalinterviews of the individuals involved in CMC’s daily work.Thenon-formalpartoftheinformationgatheringprofoundlystrengthenedthestudy,sincetheresearcheroftengainedtheseopportunitiesby“accident”,duringlunchandcoffeebreaks,in situations where gender came up naturally, rather thandesignedly,intheconversations.Onreflection,theseinformalmoments when gender was not designed to be the mainfocus of conversation provided perhaps the most profitablemomentsforgatheringandtestinginformation.Conductingtheresearchontheactualpremisesoftheorganisationbeingstudied,insideitsactualwork,wasalsoverypractical:ifideas

tools, and the continual creation of specific acronymsandabbreviations,resultinaconventionthatgenderisconstruedassomethingtechnical. As a result peoplemayseethegenderapproachasbeingtheexclusivedomainof the [gender] “expert”. “Gender thus becomes aknowledge enclave, with its own tools, operationalframeworks, and jargon fortifying its walls”. See alsoPorter&Smyth1998.


needed double-checking, the researcher was able to knockondoorsandasktheinformantsfurtherquestions.Aboveall,theseoccasionsseldom left the researcherwithoutanswers,andtheresearchedtopicwasallthetime“keptfresh”underconstant discussion. On the other hand, as the researchercametorealise,thedoorwasopeningbothways:frequently,the staffmembers themselveswereencouraged to tell theirideasofpracticalgendermainstreaming.Thisagainmeantthatthe interviews“stayedalive”during thewholeprocess,andtheinformationwasgathered,notonlywhenrecording,butalsointimeswhentheindividualshad“ripened”theirideas.Hopefully,thisprocessofreflectionongenderwillcontinueinthefutureintheworkofCMC.

Apartfromthelimitsofitsnormativeness,anotherlimitingfactorofthestudycomeswiththeabstractnatureofgendermainstreaming.Whendealingwithclear-cut,measurablegoals,suchasnumbersofmenandwomen,whichispartofgendermainstreaming,theevaluationisrelativelyuncomplicated:hasCMCreacheditsappointedgoaltoappointbalancednumbersofwomenandmenforitsactivitiesornot,andifnot,why?Suchanevaluation isundoubtedly simpler than theanalysisof implementationofthegenderperspective inareaswhereformal national and international policies and standards areunattainable,asforexamplewhentestingwhetherCMChassucceededinbringingthegenderperspectiveintotheactualworkoftheciviliancrisismanagementexpert.Theevaluationof the abstract application of the gender perspective iscomplex, since there exist no benchmarks for such anevaluation.Ontheotherhand,whiletheverypurposeofthestudyistocontributetothoseoperationalstandardsthatbringgenderinsideCMC’sactivities;ithastoberememberedthatgender mainstreaming is ultimately a process rather than agoal,asiscommonlyagreed.Sothediscussionofwhetheranorganisationhassucceededorfailedingendermainstreamingin this sense is futile. Instead of concentrating on strictbenchmarks, it ismorevaluable to lookatexistingmethodsof gender mainstreaming, and at the overall constraints onimplementingacomprehensivegenderstrategy10.

10 Sandler1997.


2 Gendermainstreaminginciviliancrisismanagement

2.1 Gender – too simplified or too complex a concept?

How can a concept be mainstreamed unless it is fullyunderstood?Thisquestionrevealsoneofthemostsignificantchallengestothestrategyofgendermainstreaming.Lackofconceptual understanding and/or lack of understanding oftheimportanceofgendermainstreamingimpedetheseriousimplementationofgendermainstreamingstrategies11.Whileacceptingthefactthatsomeconceptstendtoworkbestwithrather blurred meanings – without being descriptively andrestrictivelydefined–theconceptof“gendermainstreaming”necessitatessomeelaboration.

As is common with innovative concepts, the adaptersof the concept have to know what the concept stands forbefore its systematic application. Further, in order to avoidlosing so-called “momentum” in adopting new concepts,this knowledge needs to be communicated as promptly aspossible. In the case of introducing the gender perspectiveintothedomainofcrisismanagement,thechallengeconsistsinmaintainingthemomentumof learningatthebeginning,becausetheconcept isdefinedeither intoosimplisticterms–asmerelyanissueofwomenvis-à-vismen–orintoocomplexterms,forexample,through“gendertraining”whichcoverssuchawidevarietyofexperiences,topicsandaudiencesthatanagreeddefinitionofgenderbecomesimpossible12.Eventually,bothattemptstodefinetheconceptproducethesameresult:the adapters of the concept, the civilian crisis managementexperts, willingly abandon the concept either to those whowanttoseetheissueprimarilythroughwomen’seyes,ortothosewhoenjoytheconceptualjargon,butfailtolinkgenderwiththerealworld.Itmustbenotedthatthelearningprocessongenderissuesthenremainssuperficial,andtheprospectsforadaptingtheconceptinpracticeareignored;theadaptersof the concept then become inclined to shift their interesttoward new terms in the constantly expanding conceptualjungleofcrisismanagement13.

11 Hannan2001.12 Interview2June2009.13 Oneoftheintervieweeshadattendedagendertraining

session which had from the beginning adopted an

Tomakeanysenseoftheconceptofgendermainstreamingfor the purposes of this study, it becomes obvious that theconceptrequiressomeexplanation.AstheexecutivebranchoftheEU,theEuropeanCommissionhasproducedadefinitionof gender mainstreaming which offers a good conceptualstartingpointformainstreamingeffortsinFinland.

Gender mainstreaming is the integration of thegender perspective into every stage of policyprocesses – design, implementation, monitoringandevaluation–withaviewtopromotingequalitybetweenwomenandmen.Itmeansassessinghowpolicies impact on the life and position of bothwomenandmen–andtakingresponsibility to re-addressthemifnecessary.This isthewaytomakegender equality a concrete reality in the lives ofwomenandmencreating space for everyone within the organisations as well as in communities – tocontribute to the process of articulating a sharedvision of sustainable human development andtranslatingitintoreality.14

Whiletheessenceof“mainstreaming”,accordingtothisdefinition, lies in integration, of the gender perspective inevery stageof[policy]processesasexplicitlyinthisdefinition,the term“gender” itself is left inambiguity.Atfirstglance,gender seems to be something associated with men andwomen. However, the real substance of the definition, it isarguedhere, lies in itsability to linkthemeaningofgendermoreequallyto“everyone”–gendermainstreamingcreates space for everyone. Thus, by referring to everyone thedefinition of gender mainstreaming shows a tendency torelocate the examination of gender beyond the dichotomyof the sexeswith theunderstanding that theapplicationofthegenderperspectiverequiresdeepercomprehensionoftherelationsbetweenhumanbeings.

AfterobservinggendermainstreamingpoliciesinFinland,visiting seminars and hearing everyday conversations, we

accusatory tone which eventually left the courseparticipantswithaverynegativeviewofgendertraining.SeealsoWetterskog2007.ThesimplificationofgenderisalsoidentifiedinMoser&Moser2005.

14 EuropeanCommission2008.Author’semphasis.


canconcludethatFinnsoperateessentiallywithasimplifiedmeaningofgender.OnepossiblereasonforthismaybetheFinnish translation, sukupuolinäkökulman valtavirtaistaminenreferring essentially to one’s biology, which fails to indicateany linkwith thesociallyconstructedgender identity,whichontheotherhand,ashasbeenpointedout,buildstheverycoreoftheunderstandingofgender15.Itisverypossiblethatthe Finnish translation may steer people’s minds to form asimplifiedpictureofgendermainstreaming.However,asthecommonconfusionbetweenbiologicalsexandsocialgenderandtheemploymentofthesetwotermsinterchangeablyposea fundamental challenge for gender mainstreaming outsideFinland16,aswell,thewayhowFinnstranslatethetermmaynotbe–afterall–enoughtoexplainthewholepictureoftheobstaclesineffectivegendermainstreaming.

Forsocialscientists,“gender”referstosociallyconstructedmasculineandfemininecharacteristics,while“sex”referstothe biologically determined categories of male and female.The theoryof gender sees that the roleof the individual inrelation to the environment in which he/she lives, works,studies or conducts other related activities is too complexto be defined solely by biology. What is believed, men andwomen,boysandgirlsofdiversesocieties indifferent timesaredissimilarnotbecausetheyarebiologicallydifferent,butbecausethesocialconstructioninagivenculture,time,andplacedefinesandredefinestheirrolesindifferentways.Theserolesarenotfixedbutlearnedandnegotiated,aswellasoftencontested. Besides differencesbetween the roles ofwomenandmen,rolesamongwomenandmenfluctuate,andbothwomenandmenmaycombinedifferentrolesindividuallyovertimeorevensimultaneously17.Infact,afterthecomplexityofgenderishighlighted,itmaybearguedthatwhileunbendingstereotypesbasedonthebiologicaldichotomyofsexesmayoffer us stability, the theory of socially constructed gender,beingunstable,bringsnothingbutconfusion.Thismaybeabetterreasonthantranslationdifficultiesforthefailuresofarofthedynamicperceptionofgendertorealisticallychallengethetraditionalconceptionofgenderasbeingmerelyanissueof biologicalwomenandmen.Whathas tobeunderstoodis that the idea that the two biological sexes should havetheir own predefined playgrounds and act according their“natural”characteristics is still very strong inmanycultures.Thisevidentlyrestrictstheacceptanceofsociallyconstructedgender.

In our everyday routines, it is not untypical to feel thatweknowwhatmenandwomennaturallyareorshouldbe,since we readily take gendered practices for granted. Thearrangements supporting gender roles are so profound, so

15 Connell 2001; 2002; Connell & Messerschmidt 2005;Britt&Adler2003.

16 See e.g. Mitchell 2004. The European Commission’sGuideonGenderMainstreaming (2004) identifies twodifferent approaches for mainstreaming. The woman-focused approach views women’s lack of participationastheproblem,whereasthe gender-focused approachismorepeople-centred.

17 Bouta2004,4;Valasek2008.

reinforced by history, that they seem to us to be natural18.Weinstantlyrecogniseapersonasamanorwoman,girlorboy–andfrequentlyactuponthesociallyadaptedsystemwebelievetobenaturalwhendealingwithpeoplebelongingtothese particular groups. However, being a small girl or boy,or an older woman or man, is not a fixed state, and theassumptions we make based on people’s biological sex areoftenmistaken. It is critical tonotice thatdifferent contextsprovide individuals with different gender roles to play, andthat inaverywiderangeofspheres, includingmanyformalandinformalareasoflife,suchasthestructuresofeducation,labour,healthormediaandsports,thesestrictlydefinedrolesarestronglyreiteratedinmostculturesaroundtheworld.Thevast,oftenout-of-sightarrangementstomaintainthegenderbalances, and the reluctance to accept wider gender roleswithindifferentsocieties,remindushowfarawaythestrategyof gender mainstreaming is from its ultimate goal, genderequalitywhichcoversthewidevarietyofhumanroleswhileacceptingeverypersonasheorsheis.

2.2 Benefits of applying the gender perspective to crisis management

Understanding thegenderperspective in crisismanagementoffersus tools toperceivephenomenawhichwewouldnototherwise perceive. The people living in areas currently incrisisaremostoftendefinedbyinternationalaidorganisationsaccordingtocertainstereotypeslinkedtotheirsex.Thecrisismanagementexpertoftenfindsherself/himself inasituationin which there is a strong temptation to judge people,whether locals or colleagues, on the basis of their cultural,religious or linguistic backgrounds or, for example, on age-relatedfeatures.However,perhapsthemostdefiningfeatureof an individual is linked to gender, and recognition of thisfactfacilitatestheunderstandingofgenderasatooltoenablecrisis management to achieve a better impact. The genderperspectivestrengthensciviliancrisismanagementbyofferingamorecomprehensive viewofboth subjectsandobjects incrisismanagement.

Consequently, the strategy of gender mainstreaming inciviliancrisismanagementisnotanendinitself,butameanstoachieveends.Excessiverelianceonourpredefinedmindsetconcerningthepeoplelivingincrisisareas,ordirectutilisationof our common views of the principal roles in post-conflictsocieties,suchasacceptinganarrowbutcommonparadigmofpeaceful, silentwomenopposingtheirviolentmen,blindexperts fromseeing thateach individualhas thecapacity tobeanaffectingandalternatingfactorinacrisis19.Unlesscrisismanagementexpertstakethegenderperspectiveintoaccount

18 Connel2002.19 Forexample,whilethelocalwomenaremanytimesopenly

victimisedbyconflict,thetendencytodisproportionatelydepictthemasvictims,asinconnectionwithtraffickingor prostitution in crisis areas, perpetuates inaccurateassumptionsabouttheircontributiontowarandpeace.Womenarenotsolelypassivevictimsbutoftenpowerfulagents. See e.g. Whitworth 2004; Utting 1994;Hentschel2006;Strickland&Duvvury2003,1.


intheirwork,theiractionsmaybebasedonthe(wrong)sexualstereotypesofthepeoplearoundthem,whichmayeasilyleadtomisconceptionsofthedynamicsincrisisareas.Atthesametime the adoption of gender perspective, for example, intheformofdeconstructinggenderedstereotypes,mayofferexpertsgreatercompetencetoperceivethevastdifferencesinrolesamongpeopleinthepost-conflictregions,aswellashowdifferentlypeopleexperienceconflict.Lookingcriticallyattheneedsofdifferentgroupsofpeoplewithinthesamebiologicalsexcategoriesnaturallybreadswiderequality,whichinturnisfundamentalforsustainablepeace.Thisiswhy,forexample,recognisingthatacertainoperationincrisisareashasdifferentimpactsonmiddle-agedmen,youngmen,oldmen,ormenwith disabilities, substantially strengthens the work of crisismanagementsinceitexpandsthetargetoftheaction.20

Properlyutilised,thegenderperspectivetakesintoaccountawiderarrayofpeopleincrisisareasandprovidesthecrisisworkerswithavaluabletooltoassesstheimpactoftheirworkon a wider range of people21. Recognising through genderperspective the divergent opinions in the host country, andtakingtheseopinionsintoaccounttoensureownershipandparticipationinpeaceprocessesarenotlimitedtosmallelitegroups,leadtomorelegitimateddecision-making.

Crisis management work is misguided if an expert failstorecogniseimportantnuancesintheanalysisofcrisisareas.Incomplete conclusions about the crisis lead to ill-advisedactions.Anycrisismanagementworkthatdoesnottakeintoaccount gender dynamics may easily reinforce the existingproblemsandpowerimbalancesbetweenpeopleincrisisareas,therebyundermininganychanceofrealdevelopmentforthewholecommunity.22Ifcrisismanagementisharmonisedwiththegenderperspective,whichexaminesthediverseconcernsofwomen,men,girlsandboys,andeventakesintoaccountthevariationwithinthesecategories,theworkwillclearlybedone in amoreequal andopenmanner,whichwill in turnlegitimisethepeaceeffortsintheeyesoflocalpeople.

While the application of the gender perspective maybe most straightforwardly justified on the grounds ofequality, arguments highlighting improved quality of lifealsoneedtobementioned.23Sinceourpictureofthepeopleoccupyingcrisisareasisveryoftenfoundedongender-baseddescriptions,peopleincrisismayfeelcompelledtoassociatewith these narrow descriptions, because help has usuallybeen given to those who are recognised to belong to theparticular target group to be helped. In time of crisis, it islogical to assume that people feel compelled tomanoeuvrein line with gendered expectations, and thus to conformwith the most advantageous gender role pointed out by

20 As argued by Enloe (2002), a peace that fails to giveequalyrecognitiontothediverseneedsofpeopleisnota comprehensive, democratic, credible or sustainablepeace. Enloe (2002) argues that, the sortof insecuritymany people experience during armed conflictsis surprisingly akin to the forms of insecurity theyexperiencewhenthewarisover.SeealsoEnloe1993.

21 Reimann2001.22 Whitbread2004.23 UNDPRBEC2007.

the international organisation. Acquisition of the “identity”of a refugee woman, repatriated soldier, or even a rapedwoman, in theeyesof their rescuers,mayunfortunatelybethe only survival strategy for many who are suffering or inneed.Fromthispointofview, itmaybearguedthatpayingequalattentiontotheneedsofdifferentpeopleinthepost-conflictrehabilitationphaseensuresthatpeopleincrisisareasdonotneedto“fit”intosomeimaginedpicture,butinsteadcanrebuildtheirownlivesintheirownway,whichformanymeansanon-violentwayof living. If theexpertsworking inciviliancrisismanagementandpeacebuildingoperations seewomenforthemostpartasvictimsneedingprotection,andmen mainly as the perpetrators, this does not leave muchroomforvariation.Whathappenstomenandwomenwhodonot conformwith thepictureportrayedby theoutsiderswhoarehelpingthem?Sincethegenderperspective,whichfocusesonthreatstoindividuals,relievespeoplefromthestrictrolesbasedonstereotypes,italsomakesroomforavarietyofinterpretations of being a woman or a man. Consequently,this leaves individuals to live more satisfying and completelives,forexamplethroughagreaterinvolvementinthefamilyand caring activities, as opposed to aggressiveness, or anyothercharacteristicwhichneedstobemaintainedbecauseofexternalpressure.24

In addition, the recognition that crisis managementexpertsneedtobeawareofthegenderedbias intheirownthinking, which is steering their own actions, may enhancecrisis management. It is critical for these experts not to belimitedbybiased stereotypeswhich theyhave learnt to relyonintheirownculturalcontext.Thusoneadvantageofthegenderperspective,systematicallyapplied,isthatitforcesustofaceourowngenderbiasesbasedonourownexperienceswithin our own cultural settings. Equally important is toacknowledge that not only individuals but also institutionsand organisations25 carry certain gendered identities. Inthis “gender system”26, deeply rooted social arrangementshavegeneratedthemanoeuvrethatonlybycomplyingwithexpectationscanweavoidconflicts27.

Despite the increased attention given to the genderperspective within the framework of crisis management,thestructuresofpeaceoperationsstillcarrygenderbiases28.Recognition of the gender system in crisis management

24 Ibid.25 Reimann2001.26 See Rantalaiho et al. 1997, 6-7; Benschop & Verloo

2006.27 Similarlyasmysonlearnstoplaythegameofgendered

life in certain ways, since I reward him [many timessubconsciously]fordoingthe“boystuff”,Iamequallya product of my organisation’s gendered contextrewardingandpunishingmeaccordingtohowIfitintothiscontext.Asaman,myroleistoactincertainwaysincertaintimeandspace,simplybecausemybiologicalcategorisationasamansaysso.Similarly,awomancouldnotbeseenactingthiswaysinceshe lives inafemalebody.Ifthiswoman,however,actsinthissituationasIamexpectedtoact,shemaybecome,insomeone’sfiles,ananomaly.

28 Strickland&Duvvury2003.


is especially fundamental for the obvious reason that thepeaceoperationsareespeciallypronetoseeminglypowerful,but ultimately vulnerable and insecure manifestations ofmasculinity,causingmenandwomenincrisismanagementtoresorttounnecessaryviolenceandothermalpracticesincrisisareas (e.g. drunkenness, prostitution, sexual harassment).29Thegenderperspectivemayhelpexpertstofindtransformativeapproaches to escape prevailing power structures, and byavoiding strong artificial identities to promote their ownidentities, which instead of violence and domination mayhighlight negotiation, cooperation, and equality30. Thusacknowledgementof thegenderperspective inciviliancrisismanagementisevermorecritical.

29 See e.g. Higate 2007; Patel & Tripodi 2007; Sion2006; Kent 2005; Whitworth 2005; Whitworth 2004;Whitworth1998;RefugeesInternational2004;DeGroot2002;DeGroot2001;Crossette1996;Fetherston1995.

30 SeeConnell2001.


3 Recruitingfemaleciviliancrisismanagementexperts

CMC’s gender mainstreaming may be divided roughly intotwo aspects. First, CMC ensures that equal numbers ofmen and women take part in its activities (experts, trainingparticipants). Secondly, CMC ensures that recruited civiliancrisis management experts have adequate skills to identify,analyse, and apply gender in their work, that is, that theexpertsinthefieldwearso-calledgenderlenses.

3.1 Structural challenges reducing the number of female recruits for civilian crisis management tasks

Increasing the number of women recruits in order to showimproved gender perspective has commonly been criticised,particularly for the essentialising rather than equalisingnature of this approach31. However, what legitimises theconcentrationonnumbersincrisismanagement,asinanyfieldofaction,isthatultimatesuccessalmostalwaysnecessitatestheinvolvementofdiversepeople:bothmenandwomen,aswellasdifferentmenandwomen.Anotherlegitimatereasonis related to the universal practice in peace operations ofemployingquotastoempowerthewomenofconflictareas.Whiletheremaybedisagreementconcerningthefunctionalityof these quotas, it must be agreed that in order to beconvincing,peaceoperationsaimingtodemocratisebyquotamust themselves symbolise thecompositionof civil societiesfoundedonthebalancednumbersofdifferentkindsofpeople–includingthedifferentsexes.

WhenthenumericalbalancebetweenmenandwomenintheFinnishciviliancrisismanagementtrainingandrecruitingisreviewed,thegreatestchallengeclearlyliesinhowtoincreasethe number of women experts seconded in the field. Thenumberhasgraduallybeenraised:during2003–2004womenmadeup14%ofallsecondedFinnishexperts,while intheperiod2003–2007,womenrepresented19%ofallsecondedFinnishexperts.InMay2009womenalreadymadeup27%,whichhoweverstillfallsshortofthetargetbalanceof40/60

31 SeeHarding1995;Tint2004;Garney2004.

for women and men.32 More systematic work needs to bedonetoreachthisgoal.

Thegreaterchallengeofrecruitingmorewomenforworkinthefield,comparedwithchoosingwomenforCMCtraining,may be explained by CMC’s limited authority in selectingtheexperts for theactualoperations.WhileCMCselects itsowntrainingparticipants, thusenablingthemaintenanceofacertainsex-balance in itstraining,astheexampleofCMCbasic courses on civilian crisis management illustrates (Table1), CMC enjoys no such freedom in relation to secondedexperts.ThefactthatCMConlynominatestheexpertsforthepositionsinoperations–underthecontroloftheMinistryforForeignAffairs(MFA)andtheMinistryoftheInterior(MoI)–impliesthatCMC’shandsare,inasense,tiedwithrespecttothestrategicdecisionsmadebytheministries.

32 SeeKokkarinenetal.2009.


Table 1: Participation in the basic civilian crisis management courses by gender

Year Total Male Female Male % Female %

EU Core (1) 2005 25 18 7 72 28

EU-EGT Core (2) 2006 26 15 11 58 42

EU Concept Core (3) 2006 30 13 17 43 57

EU Concept Core (4) 2007 24 11 13 45.8 54.2

EU Concept Core (5) 2007 24 15 11 62.5 37.5

EU Concept Core (6) 2008 22 10 12 45.5 54.5

EU Concept Core (7) 2008 25 11 14 44 56

EU Concept Core (8) 2009 27 14 13 51.9 49.1

203 107 98 52.70% 47.30%

Building the Finnish civilian crisis management capacityfollows the outlines of the national strategy for civiliancrisis management drafted by the Finnish MFA and Mol inassociationwithMinistryofJustice,MinistryofDefenceandNGOs.33Thesestrategicoutlineshavedirectconsequencesonthe number of seconded women and men. At present, thecalls to contribute mainly come from the European Union.InMay2009,ofall thesecondedciviliancrisismanagementexperts,79%(Figure1)werestationedinEU-ledoperations,theremaining21%beingscatteredamongOSCE-,UN-,andNATO-led operations, with a few seconded directly by theMFA.

Figure 1: Finnish seconded experts in civilian crisis management by organisation

33 See Finland’s National Strategy for Civilian CrisisManagement2008:Civiliancrisismanagementdecision-makingatpage9.

The segregation of the labour market has traditionallybeenstronginEurope34.ThusthefactthattheEUprovidesthemainframeworkofFinnishcrisismanagemententailscertainchallenges to the goal of increasing the number of Finnishfemaleexpertsinthefield,sinceEUpriorityareasforciviliancrisismanagementstillleanheavilytowardspolicingduties35.

AlmosthalfofthesecondedFinnishexpertsworkinpolicingdutiesinESDPoperations(police,customs,andborder),dutiesprimarilyperformedbymaleexperts(seeFigure2).InOctober2008, of all the seconded Finnish experts 57 were policeofficers(8women),whichmeansthatpoliceofficersrepresentmorethan40%ofalltheciviliancrisismanagementexpertssecondedbyFinland.Inthepoliceforce,women“naturally”representtheminority.AccordingtothestatisticsofthePoliceCollegeofFinland,15%ofpoliceofficersinFinlandtodayarewomen. Of the 2008 entrants, one quarter were women36.Of all the permanent employees 11.5% were women. Inthecaseofborderguards,however,womenmainlycarryoutotherthanguardingduties.WhilethefirstFinnishwomanwasappointedasaborderguardin1997,women’srepresentationinguardingdutiesremainsnominal(2.4%in2008)37.

34 VanderLippeetal.2004.35 ThepriorityareasdefinedbytheFeiraEuropeanCouncilin

June2000werepolice,ruleoflaw,strengtheningcivilianadministration and civil protection, and monitoring(Consilium2008).ThefactthattheemphasisonpolicemissionswillmostlikelybestronginEUfuturemissionswasevaluatedbyaHigh-levelEUofficerlecturingattheCMCseminarin10June2009.

36 Polamk2009.37 Rajavartiolaitos2008.


Otherorganisationsinvolvedinciviliancrisismanagementemploy expertise offered by a variety of professionals. Oneexample is theOSCE38whichhasadifferentviewofciviliancrisismanagement,andoperationspromotingtheruleoflaw,democracy and human rights and the status of minorities,who offer more placements for women experts. Of all theFinnish long-andshort-termelectionobserversdeployedonOSCE (ODIHR) election observation operations, women andmenparticipateinfairlyequalnumbers(in2006,45/55%;in2007,43/57%;andin2008,50/50%).39

However,theEUoperationalcontextdoesnotfullyexplaintheFinnishnationalemphasisonpolicingdutieswhensendingexpertstociviliancrisismanagementoperations.ThemodestsecondmentofFinnishexpertstoUNoperationsfollowsthesame trend by emphasising police duties40. The fact that

38 Mazurana (2002) argues that operations with stronghumanrightsmonitoringmandatestendtohavemorewomen(35–37%ofoperationpersonnel).Accordingtothestatisticsfor2006,theOSCE(promotionoftheruleof law, democracy and human rights or the status ofminorities)offeredpoststo3257people,43%ofthemwomen.SeeOSCE2009.

39 ThesefigurescomefromthestatisticsmaintainedattheFinnishMFA.Interview23June2009.

40 The tendency to highlight police duties also whenrecruiting experts for other organisations wasemphasisedintheinterviews.Accordingtothestatisticsfromtheendof2008,CMChad56(7women)policeofficersinthefield:85%inEUledoperationsandtheremainder serving inotheroperations. Inaddition two(1man,1woman)expertswithpolicebackgroundwereworkinginothercivilianduties.SeeSisäasianministeriönpoliisiosasto,Kansainvälinenyksikkö2009.

Finland highlights policing, when recruiting civilian crisismanagementexpertsfurtherpostponesthegoalofincreasingthenumberofwomeninciviliancrisismanagement.

AslongasFinlandparticipatesindevelopingEUciviliancrisismanagementcapacitieswithouttakingpartmorefrequentlyin civilianoperations conductedbyotherorganisationswithdifferent approaches to civilian crisis management, and aslongastheEUconductsitsciviliancrisismanagementthroughmale-dominated areas of expertise, which seems to be thefuture direction, CMC will continue to send predominantlymen to operations. Increasing the number of women in thiscontextwillremainachallenginggoalinthefuture.

3.2 CMC recruitment

The interviews with CMC staff pointed towards a dualconclusion:ontheonehand,theneedforbroaderparticipationofwomen inciviliancrisismanagementwasacknowledged,butontheotherhand,inviewofthestructuralchallenges,thetaskof involvingmorewomenwasviewedas frustrating. Inmanyconversations,itwasaskedwhythenumberofwomenin the male-dominated areas of civilian crisis managementshould be increased when the transformation of the wholesystem might offer deeper, more meaningful solutions toescapefrommale-dominatedcrisismanagement.

However, given the problematic nature of the contextinwhichthenumberofsecondedfemaleexpertsshouldbeincreased, the development phase of the EU civilian crisismanagement, and also the importance of Finland as onecontributing member to the process, were noted. Despitethis challenging situation, there is a high level of eagernessto recruitmorewomen for civiliancrisismanagement tasks,andthegoalofinvolvingmorewomeninFinnishciviliancrisis

Figure 2: Seconded Finnish experts in civilian crisis management by profession


management has routinely been highlighted. In practice, ifqualified femalecandidateshavebeen found,CMChasputforwardmembersofbothsexesascandidatesforoperations.This procedure has transferred the final decision to theoperations.

”As long as we have a suitable woman applicant, her application will be posted together with a male application, even if the male applicant is “more qualified”(…)”41

As this manoeuvre may cause dissatisfaction amongsomeapplicants,giventhehighnumberofeagerapplicantswilling to be seconded by Finland to serve in civilian crisismanagement tasks, it has evokeddeliberation amongCMCstaff. Some dissatisfied applicants have voted for non-discrimination in order that none of the applicants shouldbe favoured on the basis of gender. After considering therelationship between the Finnish law on equality and thenational strategy of civilian crisis management, CMC hasfound no reason to halt the manoeuvre of nominatingqualified female applicants alongside male applicants. Thelawisnotbrokenaslongasthemostqualifiedapplicantsareidentifiedduring theapplicationprocess. Thefinaldecisionsaremadebytheoperationleadership,whoarefreetochoosethewomanorthemanwhomtheyregardasmostsuitableforthe given task. Nevertheless, many job advertisements haveclausesencouragingwomenapplicants.42Inthissense,CMCavoidsanyconflictwiththelegalconstraints.

While the law is merely a side-issue in the recruitmentof women, what seems to offer a greater challenge isthe intensiveness of CMC recruitment, caused both bythe unpredictability of the (EU) civilian crisis managementrecruitmentandbythelimitedcapacitytohandletheabundantinterestinciviliancrisismanagementtasks.AsexperiencedbyCMC, the unpredictability of EU civilian crisis managementrecruitingcreatessituationsinwhichthecallforcontributionsmaybemadequickly,without advancenotice, after a fairlycalmandsteadyperiod.Thisunpredictabilityandrapiditymayleadtounprepared,hastyrecruitmentofexperts.Sometimestheunpredictabilityinrecruitinghasledtosituationsinwhichfindingwomenhasbeensimplyimpossible.

“Sometimes the recruiting situation is so intense that we need to find just quickly someone suitable for the task. In these situations, an emphasis on military experience from conflict areas is a safe choice since the person has already proven their ability to get along in these settings.”43

IftherotationofEUciviliancrisismanagementoperationswere developed in the direction of better-coordinatedrecruitment and more predictability, as outlined by one ofthestaffmembers,itwouldalsoallowmoretimetobalancefemale-maleparticipationinciviliancrisismanagementwithinCMC.44 However, even improved predictability would not

41 Interview27January2009.42 Thepointoflegalitywasmadeinseveralinterviews:27

January2009;3February2009;26February2009.43 Interview27January2009.44 Interview26February2009.

disposeofallthechallengesofrecruitingwomen.CMCreceivesrequestsfrominterestedapplicantsataratewhichcannotbeadequately handled given their limited human resources.45In order to deal with this huge interest and to prioritise itsactivities,CMChasbeencompelledtolimittheadvertisementofvacantpoststoitswebsite.Forthesamereason,CMChasbeencompelledtoleaveoutdirectcontactnumbersofsomeHumanResourcespersonnelsoastoallocatemoretimefortheactualrecruitment.46Here,themountingchallengeseemstobehow to recognise the most qualified people from the mass of applicants47, including the most capable women. Again,fromthestandpointofincreasingthenumberofwomen,theproblemseemstobethelimitedcapacityofhumanresources.

3.3 Ways to increase female participation

In relation to the need to increase female participation incivilian crisismanagement, the interviews resulted in certaininnovativesuggestions,madeasifCMCwereoperatinginanidealworldwithadequatetimeandresourcesattheirdisposal.

AlthoughthestrategicblueprintsforFinnishparticipationinciviliancrisismanagementaremadeintheministries(MFA,MoI), there is a loophole in the procedure which CMC canutilise. CMC may suggest specific secondment positions forministriesifsuchpositionsarewellgroundedandfitintothenational strategy of civilian crisis management. Currently,CMCkeepsaspecialeyeonpotentialopeningsforwomenaswellasbeingpreparedtosupportqualifiedfemalecandidateswillingtoapplyforcertainciviliancrisismanagementtasks48.A dedicated head-hunter devoted to the specific task ofconnecting the rightpeoplewith the right jobswouldofferonesolutionforincreasingthenumberofwomen.

At the moment, the political mandate to increase thenumberofwomeninciviliancrisismanagementisremarkablystrong. The strategic decisions on Finnish participation tocivilian crisis management are made by the very ministrieswho have particularly supported the 1325 thematic issuesin Finland (MFA, MoI). Seeking positions with more genderneutral orientation and presenting these positions to the

45 A good example of the attractiveness of civilian crisismanagement tasks is the recruitment operation forEUBAMRafah.Fromnoonon20Januaryto10amon23January2009,the“openposts”sectionoftheCMCwebsitewasvisited631 times.CMChasone full-timestaffmemberansweringthecallsande-mailsconcerningopenpositions.Duringthemosthectictimes,thispersonreceives11callsperhour. Interviews27January2009;26February2009;

46 Interestingly,despitethefactthatCMChaslimitedthechannelsforcontacts,thefeedbackfromtheciviliancrisismanagement experts points to improved transparencyinciviliancrisismanagement recruitment. Interview27February2009.

47 Interview27January2009.48 E.g., areas which lack qualified civilian crisis

managementexperts intheEUoperationsare logisticsandprocurement, considered relatively strongareasofexpertise for Finland. Promotingwomenapplication inthese areas of expertise may offer a way to increasefemalerecruitment.Interview26February2009.


ministriesoffersonemeanstoincreasethenumberoffemaleexpertsinciviliancrisismanagement.

Onewayto improvefemaleparticipation inciviliancrisismanagement is “advertising” and “campaigning” on theissue.SofarCMChasorganisedawarenessraisingseminarsto expand public knowledge of civilian crisis management49twice or three times a year. These campaigns have mainlyconcentratedoneducational institutionssuchasuniversities.More “targeted” advertising, for example in the policecollege,theborderguardcollegeorotherinstitutionsholdingidentified potential recruits for different crisis managementtasks,wouldthusbeafurtherwaytoincreasethenumberofqualifiedwomen50.

One potential improvement would also be to developsupport forexperts’ families.This issuehasalsobeen raisedby repatriated experts51. In comparison with OSCE and UNfamily missions, EU civilian crisis management stands in thedevelopingstage,withtheresultthatitsoperationshaveyetto build any structures for family support on missions. Theabsenceof such structures probably reduces thewillingnessofwomentotakepartintheEUoperations,asitsimilarlyfailstomotivatemanymen.Womenarestillconsideredthemainhome-makersandtakethelargerroleinbringingupchildren.Becauseofthesepersistentconventions,thelackofsupportiveelementsforfamiliesinciviliancrisismanagementreflectstheviewthatthisdomainispredominantlyaman’sratherthanawoman’sworld.Thereconciliationofworkandfamilywithinciviliancrisismanagementhasthusbeendealtwithbyrelyingonthetraditionalview:thewoman’sworkyieldstoherfamily–theman’sfamilytohiswork52.

Moreover,bringing the familyaspect intoCMCactivitiesmaycontributetoamoreeffectiveciviliancrisismanagement.For example, researchers have long argued that stressmanagementandwellbeingfactorsinworkandfamilyarenotseparate, but profoundly related issues53. Thus, conductingoperations without family support suggests that the fullpotentialoftheFinnishexpertshasnotbeenreached.

“(…) if we consider the matters steering individual actions and thoughts in the field, the family must be one of the most significant factors (…).”54

Furthermore, the benefits of bringing the familydimension intociviliancrisismanagementwouldgobeyondanincreasednumberofwomen.Takingthefamilydimensioninto consideration would challenge the traditional, deeplynormative model of the independent male-peacekeeper

49 Duringthefirsthalfof2009,CMCorganisedHaluatko tietää siviilikriisinhallinnasta? (Do you want to know about the civilian crisis management?)SeminarsattheUniversities of Jyväskylä and Joensuu. In November2009,aseminarwasorganisedatthePoliceCollegeofFinlandinTampere.

50 Interviews 27 January 2009; 17 February 2009; 24February2009;26February2009.

51 A point discussed e.g. at CMC debriefing session forrepatriatedexperts29January2009;18June2009.

52 Pleck1977.53 Kinnunenetal2000,3.54 Interview26February2009.

versus his spouse staying at home. Re-connecting the twoworlds would automatically strengthen not only the genderperspectiveinciviliancrisismanagement,butalsothewholeof crisis management in a very meaningful way, becauseit would deconstruct the traditional view of an individualworkingincrisis,whoispredominantlyanindependentman,survivingwithnocommitmentsonthehomefront.Thiskindofpictureevidentlyfailstodescribetoday’scrisismanagementexperts.ManyofthesecondedFinnsaremothersorfathers,husbandsorwives.Thedecision-makersinFinnishciviliancrisismanagement should take this into account when seekingmoreefficientcrisismanagement.

Theinterviewswereabletoidentifyotherspecificwaysinwhichfamilysupportcouldbeimproved.WhileunderstandingthatESDPstillhasa longwaytogo indeveloping its familysupportforciviliancrisismanagementexperts–alsobecausedeploymenttohigh-riskareassuchasAfghanistanorDRCisincreasing–CMCcouldimproveitsfamilysupportonastepbystepbasis.TheprevailingideawasthatCMCshouldimproveinformation for family members concerning matters relatedto experts’ working conditions, holidays, home-coming andother work- and family-related issues. One way to proceedmightbetobuildsomefunctionsforfamilymembersintothepre-missionbriefingsorganisedbytheCMCtofamiliarisetheoutgoingexpertswiththeirrespectivemission.However,ithasalsobeennotedthatbringingpartnerstotheseeventsmustnotbeallowedtoputatriskthenetworkingofexperts,whichislikelytobeanimportantassetinthehostcountry55.Anothersimplewaytoimproveinformation-sharingwouldbetosendexperts’ families informativee-mails,or information inotherforms,aboutrecenteventsinoperations56.ThisagainwouldbeaveryminorandeffortlessstepforCMC,butimportantfortheoftenill-informedfamilies.

However, itwasmadeclearwithonevoice thatall suchinnovationswouldrequireearmarkedresources.

55 Interview18May2009.56 Interview4March2009.


4 Thegenderperspectiveinciviliancrisismanagementtraining

4.1 Structural amendments in training: deeper integration

Whilethenumericalgoalisgenerallyregardedasanimportantelement in promoting gender in the work of civilian crisismanagementexperts57,theweaknessofthegoaltoguaranteethemanifestationofthegenderperspectiveintheactualworkofexpertsinthefieldhasalsobeenacknowledged.

Thestrongemphasisonnumbers, indicatingthatgendermakes sense to many people predominantly in terms ofthe headcount of participating women, has led to a trendfor gender to be seldom meaningfully operationalised incrisis management, while the real prospects of the genderperspectivehavebeensidelined.Perhaps for this reason theterm gender still carries somewhat suspicious connotationseven among CMC staff. The burden of being somethingimposedfromabove,fromasuspiciousorigin,asopposedtobeingacritical reinforcement forciviliancrisismanagement,hasgeneratedapatternthatgenderissuesareeasilyresistedand executed only on demand, and even then superficiallywithout reflectionon the realconsequencesofapplying theperspective.Thishas led somepeople,even insideCMC, tocommentthattheovertconcentrationonnumbershasactuallymeant backward steps for wider gender mainstreaming inFinnish civilian crisis management58. The fact that Finnishcivilian crisis management is still a male-dominated domainsignifiesthatthenumbersofmenandwomenisnottheonlyissueinthediscussionofgenderinciviliancrisismanagement.Ascommonlystatedintheinterviews,itismoreimportanttoknowthattheperspectiveisrealisedintheactualworkoftheexperts.

Equal numbers of both sexes, as important as this goalis, inadequatelyguarantees theapplicationofgender in theactualworkof the experts. Fromageneral viewpoint, if anexpert fails to comprehend how the gender perspective isrelatedtotheexpert’sworkinthefield,heorshemayactuallyreinforcetheexistinggenderedbiasesincrisisareas.Thisiswhy,asnotedinseveralinterviews,themoreimportantquestionis:

57 Cf.Strickland&Duvvury2003,25.58 Interview4February2009.

howtoensuretheapplicationofthegenderperspectiveintheworkof[male&female]civiliancrisismanagementexperts?

As observed already, the concentration on numbers haspointedtowardsaconventiononbothsidesbywhichthestaffhavebeentrulyconcentratingonthebalancedrepresentationof women but the real understanding of gender has beenpoor. The limited use of gender inside CMC supports theargumentthatiftheconceptofmainstreaminggenderisnotdeveloped further toward wider application, the orientationof the concept will quickly become locked into the hetero-normativeconceptofsexes,whichseestheissueonlythroughmenandwomen,59resulting ineasydismissalofanyfurtherapplication of the concept. The following reactions werevoicedintheinterviews:

“(…) by looking at numbers, quotas, and percentages [of women] in the process of recruiting and training, as I see it, we have somehow taken several steps backward (…).”60

Otherssawthattheconcentrationonnumbershasguidedtheworkofciviliancrisismanagementdownthewrongpath:

“(…) from my point of view as a trainer and recruiter in the field of civilian crisis management, it would be more important to ensure that the individual is ready for the operation, and that his/her personal character is suited to the operation. I don’t see that we should now stare too much at the 40/60 balance in women and men. More important would be to send in the right persons (…).”61

Since CMC is the leading centre of expertise in Finnishciviliancrisismanagement,executingitsnationaltasksundertheMinistry of Interior, itswork shouldnotbe restricted tothetrainingandrecruitmentofsecondedexperts.ItisfeltthatCMCalsohasadutytocontributetothewiderdevelopmentofFinnishciviliancrisismanagement.ThisperceivedrolealsohandsCMCvitalresponsibilitiesinconnectionwithexpertiserelating to gender. Since CMC’s functioning in crisis areasis visible through the expertise of its seconded experts, it is

59 Scambor&Scambor2008.60 Interview4February2009.61 Interview24February2009.


natural that the focus on numbers should be shifted moretowardsensuringtheapplicationofthegenderperspectiveintheactualpracticalworkoftheseexperts.Inbuildingthiskindofcapacity,themostsignificantresponsibilitywassituatedinthetrainingofciviliancrisismanagementexperts.

The primary goal of CMC training is to furnish futurecivilian crisis management experts with tools to understandtheinternationaloperationalenvironmentinthecrisisarea62.ThetrainingofferedbyCMCrangesfrombasictohighlevelcoursesandpreparestheparticipantsparticularlyforEuropeanUnion and United Nations civilian crisis management andpeacebuilding operations. Consequently, given the widevarietyofCMC training, tailoring thegenderperspective toparticulartrainingpurposesisimportant.

However, regardless of the special needs of diversetrainingcourses,the incorporationofgender inciviliancrisismanagementtrainingtoooftenseemstofailfortwodistinctreasons, as identified through observations, and restatedin the interviews: the first challenge seems to be, how to incorporate gender in training as a natural rather than external issue;andthesecond,how to convince training participants of the importance of gender as an essential element of civilian crisis management work63.

4.2 Getting away from external gender sessions

As stated earlier, CMC still stands in the early phase ofdevelopment of civilian crisis management training. Inconsequence, the gender perspective in CMC training alsoremainsunderconstruction.However,thegenderperspectivehasnotbeenabsentfromCMCtrainingsessions.

62 Taitto2008.63 Interview16April2009.

GenderhasbeenperceivedinCMCtrainingupuntilnowforthemostpartasan importantbutratherseparate issue.Theconcepthasusuallybeendiscussedtogetherwithothercross-cutting themes such as human security, human rightsandculturalawareness,themesthatarestronglyemphasisedineveryaspectofCMCactivities.

The Table 2 below illustrates gender in CMC training,depicting a five-day imaginary civilian crisis managementtrainingcourse64.Thegenderpartofthetrainingwascarriedout in one separate, fairly short, session, facilitated by aspecialised,outsourced,gender trainer.Assigningaseparatespaceforgenderhasbeenrationalizedintwointerlinkedways.First, inthiswaygendertraininghasbeeneasilyconducted.Secondly, while recognising that importing external genderexperts into training courses may be costly, using separategenderexpertshasbeenviewedasnecessarybecauseCMClacksproficiencyingendertraining65.Thusinthismodel,themaintaskofthetrainingdesignerhasbeentofindagenderexpertabletoconductshortsessionsaboutgender,whichcanbeseenasatopicquiteseparatefromthecorefocusofthetraining.

Accordingtoanalysisofcoursefeedbackandinterviews,the approach of keeping gender separate - bringing theconceptquickly inandoutof the training - satisfiesneitherCMC training participants nor the designers of the trainingcourses.Asoneofthestaffmemberspointedout,

“As our all training courses contain a specific gender module, it sometimes remains disconnected with the other course content – if we believe it [gender] to be a cross-cutting theme in our training, in fact this is not realised.”66

64 ThelengthofCMCtrainingcoursesvariesfrom2to14days.Overall,theaveragelengthofaCMCcourseisfivedays.

65 Interview20February2009.66 Interview20February2009.

Table 2: The current approach in bringing the gender perspective into CMC training


Another commentator, this time a training participantveryfamiliarwithgenderissues,providedaconstructive,butdistinctlycynicalpieceoffeedbackonCMCgendertraining.The feedbackpointsout thestilldevelopingnatureofCMCgendertraining.

“(…) To see that gender has been dealt with during the morning of the second training day, not during the last afternoon, is actually a positive sign. When gender issues have been dealt with in the conclusion, it has created an image of some involuntary theme imposed from above, to be dealt by the training institution only after more central issues (…).”67

Another problem, experienced and pointed out in theinterviews,isthatsometimestheinstructorconductinggendertraining is seenas an“outsider” regarding the themes thatthetraininghasbeenapproaching.Here, thegender trainereasilybecomesseenasapersonwhopaysaquickvisitinthemiddleoftrainingtoinstallthetechnicalgenderissuesintothetraining,andthework isdone.Thishasfurtherexternalisedgenderissuesfromthetraining’scorefocus,sincetheconcepthasbecomesomethingcomplexanddifficult tobehandledonlybyaspecialisedtrainer:

“Although gender is a natural part of crisis management, it has somehow weirdly become a kind of specialised training theme, which it shouldn’t be.”68

Training the gender perspective in civilian crisismanagementtrainingatCMCthusoccupiesapedagogicallydifficult position. Training designers seeking to include thegender perspective in civilian crisis management trainingworrynotonly abouthow thegenderperspective couldbeembedded thematically in the training, but also about how suitablethegendertraineristotraingenderissuesgiventheparticular audience of the particular course.

Evidently,plantingthegenderperspectiveinCMCtrainingrequires fromthegender traineraprofoundknowledgenotonlyofthesubjectofgender,butalsoofthethemesthathavebeendiscussedoneachtrainingcourse.Sothenextquestionis:howthenshouldthelinkbetweengenderandthetrainingthemesbefound?Sincetheinterviewsrevealedthenaturallylimited familiarity of the “outsourced” gender expert withCMC training themes, somenewsteps tobring thegenderaspect intoCMCtrainingcourseswhileavoidingthetrapofcontextual disparity have been discussed. These include theideathatinsteadofinvitingspecialisedgenderexpertstoholdspecialisedgendersessions,CMCshouldconcentratemoreonequipping itsown trainerswith the toolsneeded to includethegenderperspectiveintheirindividualtrainingsessions.

Theapproachoftrainingthetrainersmayneverthelessofferthechancetobringgenderintotraininginamoreintegratedway.Equally,itwouldindicateexpandingownershipofgenderissues inside CMC, since CMC would itself be the “mainclaimant”inapplyingthegenderaspecttoitsowntraining.Aspointedoutintheinterviews,thisexpandedownershipwould


openmorewaystoconsolidateinfluentialgendertraining,inwhichCMCwouldbeabletoconduct itsoperationsonthebasis of its own shared perspective on gender, familiar andcoherenttoeveryone involved.Whatthissharedperspectiveshould be requires further discussion in the future insideCMC.Accordingtosomeinterviews,inordertofacilitatetheadoptionof thegenderperspectivewithinCMC, thecentreneedsitsowngenderstrategy.

“(…) The strategy would help us to find the main way (…) according to which each of us would act. This strategy would facilitate us to see beyond numbers, as well as make us genuinely act in ways, which move the centre’s gender mainstreaming on to the next, deeper level (…).”69

OnechallengingelementofthestudystemsfromCMC’syounganddynamicnature.Sincetheorganisationisevolving,thesituationtodaycanbepredictedtobequitedifferentinayear’s time.CMC’sexplicitpolicyofsupporting itsownstaffmembers’ international assignments [leading to high staffturnover], the continuing expansion of CMC’s activities, theacquisitionofnew responsibilities, and thehuge increase instaff,all indicate thatasanorganisationCMC iscommittedtoconstantreassessmentandlearning.Fromthegenderpointofview,thisdynamicentailsthatifthegenderperspectivehasbeenbroughtintoCMC’sdailyoperationsmainlybyinterestedindividuals,ashassofarbeenthecase,whentheseindividualsleave,thegenderperspectivewillalsodepart.Thisframeworkonceagainlegitimatestheneedforagenderstrategy:inordertobecomeamoreprofessionalcentreofexpertise inciviliancrisismanagement,CMCneedsinstitutionalised,ratherthanpersonified,genderpractices.Astrategy to formally identifythegenderperspectiveasbelongingtotheworkofCMC,andto describe CMC’s core values and objectives in relation togenderissuesinsuchawaythateveryoneinvolvedwouldbefamiliarwiththiscommonvisionandreadytoapplyit,wouldessentiallystrengthenthegenderperspective intheworkofCMC.

4.3 Training the trainers

TheanalysisofCMCFinlandtrainingpointstothefollowingconclusion:effectiveimpositionofgenderelementsinciviliancrisismanagement trainingcourses requires that thegenderissues be brought into contact with the specific themes ofthe civilian crisis management trainings. To be accepted,and furtherprocessed, in themindsof trainingparticipants,the gender elements of the training courses need to bemeaningfullyintegratedwiththecoretrainingthemes.

Inordertotrainexpertsinbordersecurity,customs,humanrights or police operations, the gender trainer should firstandforemostbefamiliarwiththeworkoftheseprofessions.This indicates that the gender trainer carries a great dealof responsibility, and the expectations of the trainer’scompetencegobeyondcompetenceongenderissues.Thisinturnmeansthattheapproachofinvitingoutsourced,external

69 Interview4February2009.


genderexperts tobring thegenderaspect intociviliancrisismanagementtrainingneedsthoroughre-examination.

OwingtothefactthatCMCbasicciviliancrisismanagementtraining contains multiple themes related to the field work,CMC has implemented these training courses using severaltrainers.Trainingthesetrainerstoimplementthegenderaspectintheirspecifictrainingsmaythereforeofferanadvantageousway forward in bringing the gender perspective into CMCtraining70.Itneedstobenotedherethatintegratinggenderinthiswaymaynotbeacceptedwithoutconsiderablepersuasion.Ashasbeenpointedoutintheliterature,sometimestraineesmayevenfeelresistancetowardsgenderissues,whichmaybeanemotional reactionbymenandwomenwhohavemuchinvestedinthepatriarchalsystem,thelegitimacyofwhichmaybequestionedingendertraining71.

Training the trainers would mean that the genderperspectivewouldmainstream intoCMCtraining inamoremeaningful, internalised manner. In specialised coursesorganisedfornarroweraudiences,suchasaudiencesconsisting100%ofpoliceorborderexperts,inwhichtherangeoftrainingthemesisnotsowide,integratingthegenderperspectiveintocoursecurriculamayactuallybesimplerthanintegratingtheperspective into basic courses dealing with multiple themesof civilian crisis management, and consequently requiringmultiplewaystointegrategender.Table3illustratesafuturemodelforCMCgendertrainingasframedintheinterviews.In thismodel, thebasic conceptualopening ismadeduringthefirstday.Theactualgendertrainingproceedsthroughthesubsequenttrainingmodulesinstructedbydifferenttrainers.

As discussed earlier, gender easily becomes understoodas either a too simple or a too complex issue. Thus, the

70 This topic was discussed several interviews. One waywould be, as pointed out in the interviews, for CMCto train its own gender trainers, including how theperspective could be applied in the trainers’ owntraining, dealing with the EU pillars or practicalities inthefield.Interviews:15January2009;4February2009;20February2009;27February2009;22April2009.

71 Porter&Smyth2001,16.

necessityofincludingadedicated,moretheoreticalsessionongender is recognised.Theopeningsessionneeds toaddresswider theoretical beliefs on gender, tackle the widespreadmisconceptions of gender, and deconstruct some commongendered stereotypes. It would also be essential to makeclearthatgenderisnotjustaboutmenandwomen,butthatdifferences among men and women are part of reality72. Inviewofthefragilityoftheopeningphaseingendertraining,andhoweasilythemomentumtoreflectandlearnthegenderperspectivegetslostingendertraining,theopeningsessiontointroducetheissueshouldbeverycarefullydesignedforeachparticularaudience.Onewaytoactivatetrainingparticipantsongenderissueswouldbetoconcentrateonthebenefitsofthegenderperspective incrisismanagement,asopposedtothenegativeconsequences,whichwillbeelaboratedfurtherbelow.

Anotherwaytostrengthenthetrainers’skills inbringinggenderintociviliancrisismanagementtrainingwouldinvolvetheideaofafacilitatorwhowould“facilitate”theappearanceof gender inside the CMC trainings73. This facilitator wouldbeable tosupport theunderstandingofgenderamongthetrainingparticipants.Theideaofafacilitator,however,carriestheriskthatgenderwouldonceagainbeseenasanintellectualconceptpossessedonlybyanexternalexpert.Giventhattheexternalisationofgenderhasbeenoneofthetypicalproblemsingendertraining,theideaofaspecificfacilitatorneedsmoredelicateelaboration.

The rationality behind the inclusion of gender in CMCtraining by training the trainers was also seen as legitimatebecause this approach could be utilised in civilian crisismanagement training provided outside CMC. Given that

72 Ibid; Kaschuba & Lächele (2004) have also observedthatinadulteducation,gendermainstreamingisofteninsufficiently linked with the development of genderpoliticsandgendertheoriesandtheresultsofscientificresearch.

73 Interview28April2009.

Table 3: Alternative model for gender in CMC training


trainerswouldbepreparedtoincludethegenderperspectivein their own training sessions which they conduct in othercontexts,infrontofdifferentaudiences,trainingthesetrainerswouldideallymeanthatmainstreaminggenderwouldnotberestrictedinsidethewallsofCMC.Further,oncethesetrainersare trainedwith theknow-howtoautomatically include thegender perspective in their future CMC training, the resultwouldbeasmoother,moresystematictrainingdesign,inwhichgenderissuesarealreadymainstreamedintotrainingcontent.Inaddition,“trainingthetrainers”ofotherorganisations,e.g.military,offersawayforwardinfunctionalimplementationofgendermainstreaming74.

Afterstepshavebeentakentooperationalisethegenderperspective, follow-up measures are equally important. Asystematicevaluationoftheimpactofgendertrainingshouldbe conducted in order to determine the advantages anddisadvantages of gender training. More follow-up studieson the longer-term impacts are also desirable. A follow-upstudy to investigate how experts have utilized the genderperspectiveintheirworkmaybeonepathtofollow.Another,more challenging task would be to evaluate the gendertrainingfromtheperspectiveofthelocalpeopleincrisisareas.

4.4 A socio-constructive approach in training

OneoftheleadingprinciplesofCMCtrainingisthevisionthateachparticipantcontributesaspecialinputintothetraining75.Thesocio-constructive approach,whichhighlightstheroleofthe individualasanactiveandresponsiblegroupmember76,views the training participants themselves as capable ofcreatinganactivelearningenvironment.Fromtheperspectiveofgender,furtheremploymentofthisapproachcanbeseenasanaturalwaytostrengthenthegenderperspectiveinciviliancrisismanagementtraining.

As pointed out earlier (see Table 1), CMC has generallybeen successful in balancing its participation in trainingcourses equally between men and women. This balancestrengthensthegenderperspectiveinthetraining,sinceequalrepresentation of both sexes enables more natural genderdynamics within the training. However, by adoption of thesocio-constructive approach, the scope of CMC’s selectionof training participants has widened beyond the sex of theapplicants.

Untilnow, in theselectionof trainingparticipants,CMChas reviewed the applicants’ educational, professional andexperiential background to ensure that the training coursescontain a comprehensive pool of participants possessingdifferentknowledgeandexperience.Inpractice,applicationsareinvitedfromvariousprofessionssuchasthepolice,customs,border, civilian administration, rule of law, human rights,logistics,humanresources,andinformationmanagement.Thistraining philosophy, which emphasises the unique expertiseof each training participant, generates a comprehensive

74 Interview27February2009.75 Interview15January2009.76 Taitto2008.

coursedealingwithavarietyof issues77.Henceanapplicantpossessingthepotentialtobringthegenderperspectiveintothe training could strengthen the gender perspective, andpayingparticularattentiontopotentialapplicantsintermsofthegenderperspectiveoffersoneopportunitytostrengthentheroleofgenderinCMCtraining.

Thesocio-constructiveapproachnotonlymeansthatthepersonshouldbe“competent”or“skilled”atworkingwithgender issues,but includes incorporatingparticipants in thetrainingwhohave,forexample,facedgenderbiasintheirownexperience. Such an applicant equipped with “self-learnedgenderlenses”couldbe,forinstance,awomanwithamilitarybackground,oramancomingfromafemale-dominatedNGOor from another occupation strongly associated with theoppositesex.Yetagain,cultivatinggenderinthiswaywouldmeanthattheperspectivewouldbebroughttothetrainingnaturally frombelow,avoiding thecommonproblemof theexternalgenderperspectiveimposedfromabove.

“(…) These kinds of individuals have personally gone through such a roulette [by explaining their existence in the context dominated by the opposite sex] that they would readily wear clear gender lenses – it is frequently extremely challenging to adapt in a [sexually] homogenous group of people (…) to answer people about the choice of a path not typical for one’s sex.”

If applied systematically, the socio-constructive approachfortifiesthegenderperspectiveinCMCtraining.However,thisapproach also contains challenges requiring further backupfromothermethods.WhathappensifCMCtrainingcourseslackparticipantswithactiveabilitytobringtheperspectiveintothetraining?Whathappensiftheselectedgender cultivatoractspassivelyduringthetraining?Whilethesocio-constructiveapproachoffersaprospectivemeansofbringingthegenderperspectiveintoCMCtraining,ithastobeseenaboveallasanempoweringtoolforgendertraining,ratherthananultimatesolution.

Another problem of the socio-constructive approach isposedbythedilemmaofthenumericalambitiontoincreasethe number of women vis-à-vis the objective of increasingthenumberofparticipantswithgenderlenses,withpotentialcapacitytobringgenderintothetraining.Thedilemmahereis which way to go: to select a woman simply because ofher sex, or a man with gender lenses? Should numbers beprioritisedinordertomainstreamwomen,orshouldthemoreprofoundapproachbeadoptedofmainstreamingthegenderperspectivewithoutregardtotheapplicant’ssex?Theselectionbecomesevenmorechallengingwhencriteriaformeasuringthisgenderexpertiseorreadinessaresought.Surely,inmostcasesthetemptationwouldbetorelyontheapplicant’ssex.

77 Interview15January2009.


4.5 rethinking gender: positive versus negative gender

Changing the face of gender

The final section dealing with gender training discusses thereform of the customary view of the concept of gender inthe context of civilian crisis management. It is argued here,onthebasisoftheobservations,conversationsandinterviewsof recent months, that the general trend is undeniably toportray the gender perspective first and foremost in termsofitsnegativeconsequencesratherthanitspositiveimpacts,and that this poses perhaps the most salient challenge totrainingtheperspectiveinthisspecificcontext.Thefactthatlearningprocessesingendertrainingareveryoftenrelatedtoresistanceanddefensivenessindicatesahighpotentialtoturnthetrainingintoanegativelearningexperience.

Adopting thenegative sideofgendermaybe the resultof the low value given to gender issues in civilian crisismanagement.Afurtherreasonmaysimplybethelackoftimeduringtrainingsessions.Thesolutionistovaluegenderissuesequallywithothertrainingmodulespreviouslyconsideredas“more important”.Aspreviouslyobserved, inCMC trainingthegenderperspectivehasbeengivenanarrowniche,sharedwithothercross-cuttingthemessuchashumansecurityandculturalawareness.Theshorttimeallocatedtothethememayresult in the convention that the trainers feel compelled tosqueezethegendermoduleinordertoincludeonlythe“mostimportant”topicsgenerallyassociatedwithgender.

Unfortunately, when gender is discussed, it is commonto refer to such issues as how to avoid mistakes (usingprostitutes, sexually harass colleagues or locals) instead ofseeingthegenderperspectiveasamorecomprehensivetoolstrengthening the work of civilian crisis management. Thisconcentration on the negative aspects may hinder those intrainingfromseeingthepositiveconsequencesthatthegenderperspective is able to bring to civilian crisis management.Recognition of how the negative approach affects gendertraining,oftenleadingtocounter-reactions,canfacilitatetheemphasis on the alternative, positive idea of gender in thiscontext,whichinturncouldautomatically limitthenegativeconsequencesofneglectingthegenderperspectiveinciviliancrisismanagement,which iswhatgender training inciviliancrisis management has first and foremost to avoid. Theimportanceofreinforcingthepositiveratherthanthenegativeaspect thus becomes fundamental. However, this paradigmshift from negative to positive gender requires a systematicchangeinthemindsetsofthosewhoarethinkingaboutandtraininggender.

Negative gender: avoiding mistakes in different cultural contexts

Thefirstaspecttopointoutisthattheconcentrationonthenegativesideofgenderisendorsed,perhapssub-consciously,inside CMC. To illustrate this point reference need only be

madetotheconnotationgenderissueshaveinCMClearningobjectives(Table4).

Table 4: The objective of gender training within the CMC training as depicted in the course descriptions

• Understand the concept of gender and genderrolesasopposedtosexualdifferencesandbeabletointroduceagenderdimensioninconflictanalysisand resolution, i.e.givepractical examples for theempowermentofwomeninpost-conflictsocieties;

• Beawareofpotentialgender-relatedproblem areas inconflictorpost-conflictsocieties, i.e.trafficking,prostitution,femalecombatants;

• Understand the implicationsof conflict forgenderrolesandpotential risks inthelightofhumanandcivilrightsprotectionandparticipationinsociety;

• Understand the adverse effects for post-conflictrehabilitation inherent in ignoring gender roles inthehost.

Aglanceattheobjectivesofthegendermodulesrevealsthatgenderissuesrelatefirstandforemosttoproblem areas astraffickingandprostitution,andthatignoring gender roles means potential risks and adverse effects in civilian crisismanagement.

While the detrimental consequences of forgetting thegenderperspectiveinciviliancrisismanagementarereal,thelearningmotivationmaydecreasewhenthepositivegainsofmainstreaminggenderarenotmentioned78.Thedifficultyhereisthatbyrepresentinggendersonegativelyfromthebeginning,gender trainingatCMChascreated for itselfacomplicatedstartingpoint,withwhichCMChastostruggleduringtherestofthetraining.Thedepictionoftheroleofgenderissuesintrainingobjectivescorrespondstotheprejudicesmanypeoplealreadyfeelat thebeginningofgender training,whichmayagainbetheresultofthetendencytoemphasisemainlythenegativeaspectofgender.However,theseprejudicesareoftenthemostchallenginghurdlesforgendertrainerstoovercome.

Thetendencytolinkgenderwithnegativeconsequenceswaspresentedevenmorestronglyinsomeinterviews.Manyintervieweeslinkedgenderwithculturalawareness79,butalsoherethewideremphasisseemedtobeonavoidingmistakes

78 Toillustratethispoint,itmaybeaskedwhatwouldbethe outcome of training some other themes of crisismanagement,suchasteambuilding,orprocurementincivilian crisismanagement, if theaim in these trainingsessions would predominantly be to point out thenegativeconsequencesofnotbehavingcorrectly.

79 Thelinkagebetweengenderandcultureinciviliancrisismanagement was important from many perspectives:firstly, civilian crisis management work is done inculturally different frameworks, and consequently,alwaysneedstobeseeninthesespecificcontexts;andsecondly,themulticulturalnatureofcrisismanagementoperations also requires cooperation,which takes intoaccountthelinkagebetweengenderandculture.


resulting from gender bias in a culturally different setting.Several interviewees were able to reveal a personally livedincidentfrompastworkexperience.Oneoftheintervieweesrecalled an illustrative story about a colleague, a Muslimwoman,whohadbeenaskedonadatebyaWesternmalecolleague. Though she had politely refused the invitationon the basis of her cultural background, she had becomestigmatised in the eyes of her male colleagues as a lesbianwhoonlygoesoutwithfemalecolleagues80;similarreflectionswere heard from the other interviewees. The replication ofwarnings, such as that the female experts cannot risk theirwork e.g. by “using spontaneous language as in home”81,or that“in certain cultures” itwasbest to leave the“most pointless” behaviour at home82, are typical of much of thediscussionofgenderinciviliancrisismanagementwork.Themainusefulnessof thegenderperspectivehasbeenseen inenablingmistakestobeavoided.

Thestronglinkingofgenderissueswithprostitution,sexualharassment,andothersexuallytunedactions,mostlyinstancesofmenbehavingbadly, isalsoevident in thediscussionsongenderissues.Tohighlightthemalpracticesoccurringincrisismanagementisnaturallyaveryimportanttopic83requiringthemaximumnecessaryattention.However,itmustalsobeaskedwhether the malpractice of internationals is best dealt withduringciviliancrisismanagementtrainingcoursesconductedin Finland, or whether there would be other more relevantvenues to address these issues, such as induction trainingfor operations which include the code of conduct training.Anotherquestiontobeaskedis,whataretherealchancesofatraininginstitutionchangingtheattitudesofitsadulttrainingparticipants inashortweekortwo.Themorepessimistic inthisrespectwouldpointoutthatsinceusingprostitution,forinstance, does not happen by impulse, but requires a moresystematic process (travel to the brothel, client/customerencounter,paymentetc),thissuggeststhatforsomepeopleitmaybemorallyeasiertouseprostitutionortoconductotherkindsofgenderedmalpractices.Aspointedoutaptlybyoneofthestaffmembers,thetraininginstitution’scapacitytochangeindividual(gendered)attitudes,learnedandnegotiatedoveralifetime,shouldnotbeoverestimated.

“If someone does not possess a comprehension of gendered practises (…) we [CMC] cannot teach this in a couple of hours.”84

80 Interview24February2009.81 Interview3February2009.82 Interview24February2009.83 In April 2009, a seminar organised by CMC 1325

Steering Committee in Pristine, Kosovo, exposed theseminarparticipantsagaintothecaseofthemisconductof internationals.The localNGOsexpressedtheirdeepunhappinesswithactingaswatchmenforinternationalsvisitingbrothels,andperpetratingtheirpositionthroughother malpractices – a message fitting only too wellwith stories heard from other operations around theworld(CMCFinland1325SteeringCommitteeSeminar:“Gender-BasedViolence: InvestigationandProsecution–SharingexperiencesbetweenFinlandandKosovo”,2April2009.SeemoreatCMCFinlandwebsite).

84 Interview20February2009.

While it is true that improving the gender sensitivebehaviour of civilian crisis management experts must beaddressedatsomestageofthepreparation,withreferencetolocalsandotherinternationalsworkingintheoperations,theendresultoftenseemstobethatthegendertrainerstepsintothetrapofaccusing,whichsubsequentlymakesparticipants“see red”, and the momentum for deeper understandingeasilybecomeslost85.Howtomovetheapproachtowardsapositiveviewofgenderisademandingbutnecessaryissue.

Positive gender: its relevance to experts’ work and thinking

A positive conception of human beings, in this case theexpertsinthefield,seesthemalpracticesincrisismanagementmissions,suchasprostitutionandotherformsofexploitation,as only the behavioural pattern of a small internationalminority.Thusputtingmoreeffortintotraininggenderissueswhich are more relevant to the experts’ substantial work–asopposed towarningsofmalpractices theywould in allprobabilityavoidanyway–hasthepotentialtoproducemoremeaningfullearningongenderissues.

One recognised weakness is that the gender trainershavefailedtomainstreamgendersuccessfully intothemaintraining themes. Inorder tohavemore impact, the trainingneeds to incorporate gender more meaningfully into theactual work of crisis management, and preferably into theexperts’dailywork.Inthecaseofborderexperts,forexample,moreemphasisonhuman traffickingandhow todealwithvictims could offer a more meaningful approach to trainingthegenderperspective86.Themeansofapplyingthegenderperspectivetoexperts’sometimesveryspecificwork incrisisareasalsorequiresmoreattentioninthetraining.Inaddition,theneedtolinkgenderissuesmorenaturallywithparticipants’personalexperienceshasbeenpointedout.This reflects thecommonvision inadulteducationthatreflectionsstemmingfromthe learners’ownconcreteexperiences strengthen themotivation for learning. Using examples from experiencewouldensurethattheoryandpractisearelinkedfromtheverybeginning87.Regardingthis linkage, the interviewsthrewupmanypotentialideas:

85 Oneof the interviewees coming from themilitaryhadattendedagendertraining,whichhadaveryaccusingtone. In this training, the trainer’s dichotomisedperspective on gender equality as equality betweenwomen and men created irritation among the classparticipants.As seenby thisparticipant,at this timeabetter gender trainer would have been a person withability to link gender to the actual work of militarypersonnel(Interview21April2009).Anotherinterviewee(18 May 2009) recalled a training session on genderwhichstartedwiththetrainer’sangryannouncementtothemaleparticipants“Youareallarseholes”–tomakethe point that men behave badly. See also Wettrskog2007whowritesabout”moralizing”ingendertrainings.

86 Mackay 2008, 8; the Gender and Security SectorReform Toolkit (2008) edited by Bastick and Valasekoffersvaluableinsightsintotherelevanceofgenderfordifferentareasofexpertise.

87 SeeVuorinen2001,44.


“one way would be that participants would consider, for example through some particular exercises, gender regarding his/her own specific field of expertise.”88“Concrete case-exercises, integrated in the training, to identify particular situations.”89

“one way would be to ask training participants to bring in some personally lived situation in which stereotyping has resulted in confusion.”90

In addition, one way to associate gender issues morewithpracticalworkwouldbe todevelop caseswith a cleargenderdimensioninthescenarioexercises.TheseexercisesareanimportantpartofCMCtraining,andafterall,oneofthecomponentsthetrainingparticipantsseemtorememberbestwhenrecallingtheirtrainingexperiences.

Another factor that gained attention when ponderingmeaningfulmethodsforgendertrainingwasself-reflectiononone’sowngenderedattitude,which frequently seems tobemissingfromtheWesterndiscoursesofgendermainstreamingin conflict areas: to be an effective implementer of gendermainstreaming in the field, one must look in the mirror. Itis impractical to try to learn gender dynamics in culturallydifferentpost-conflictsocietiesifweareunabletodetectthegendereddimensioninourownactions.Asoneofthestaffmembersanalyticallycommented:

“Gender is something we tend to outsource so often, as if it was something happening in developing countries, not here within.”91

ThetruthisthatWesternersmayconcentratesohardonthewomen,boys,girls,andmenof–fromtheirpointofview–“irrational”,even“backward”92crisisareasthattheyfailtoseehowtheirowngenderedthinkinggreatlyinfluencestheirworkincrisisareas.

Thus,therecognitionofhowgenderedconceptionsimpactone’sownsub-conscious thinking,eventuallydirectingone’sactionsinthefieldwork,maysuggestapromisingdimensiontobebroughtforwardintraininggender.Thismay,however,beanuneasytask,sinceforWesterners,andparticularlyforFinns93whoconfidentlytaketheirgenderequalityforgranted,almost patronizing others, introspection may painfully bringto light their own frailty on gender issues. The reality thatgenderinequalitylivesvividlyinsideourownbordersisoftenforgotten, and here so-called modernity seems to explainmuch of the case. In a modern nation like Finland, thenotion thatmany issueshave alreadybeen solved seems todominatemanyminds.However,thedilemmaofmodernityisthatwhilebeingmoderntakesmanyforms,modernitytakesmanyissuesforgranted.BeingmoderninthecaseofFinland

88 Interview20February2009.89 Interview17February2009.90 Interview20May2009.91 Interview27February2009.92 ApointmadebyWhitworth2004.93 Seee.g.Jokinen2009.

certainly means that the country stands in the forefrontregardingseveralissues,includinggenderissues.However,theargumenthereisthattheunderestimationofourowngenderbiasesweakensourmotivation to learngender issues, sincetheconceptofgenderisseenasbeingsomethingunfamiliartous,belongingtocountriesfaraway.Here,someexamplesfrom our own domestic gender issues would bring gendercloser to training participants, in order to enable them toperceivethatgenderisnoexternalissue,affectingonlycrisisareas, but rather that gender bias affects people in Finlandaswell:maleunemployment,alcoholism,suicide,widespreaddomesticviolence,effectsoftheglassceiling,andtheobviousgenderpaygap,aswellasthehardattitudestowardshomo-andtranssexuality,areamongthemostevidentexamples.

When the possibility was discussed of overconfidencein respect of gender issues, arising perhaps from our own(Western) society, one of the matters raised was that thisegoismandsenseof“superiority”mayblindustothegenderperspectiveinotherplacesoutsideourborders:

“[it] restricts us from self-reflected evaluations of the [gender] questions – because we may think by default that we think correctly – and if we are unable to put together any self-reflection, we may be incapable of recognising the problems around us, both within our own surroundings and surroundings alien to us, since we don’t have the ability to be sensitive to these issues. Subsequently, we may start to think that we are just working here…or we get frustrated (…).”94

“Also in this case, one has to be conscious of one’s own set of values, and of the ethical world where one was born and raised […] It is really important that one is able to question one’s own thinking and principles.”95

Aspreviouslydiscussed,totakeupthechallengeofself-reflectionisnotaneasy,butcertainlyanecessarytask,sincetheself-evaluationofone’sownthinking isoften the factoridentifyingtherealprofessionals.Keepinginmindtheprocess-likenatureofgendermainstreaming,itissafetosaythatonlyafterCMChassecuredself-reflectionofthistypeinthemindsofitsexpertswillthegendermainstreaminghavetrulystarted.



5 Conclusion

Thetimespentsearchingforapproachestobringthegenderperspectivemeaningfully into theevolvingactivitiesofCMCFinland was time well spent. The study was able to raise afew important challenges linked to the application of thegenderconceptintherecruitmentandtrainingofciviliancrisismanagementexperts.Moreover,themethodofinvitingpeoplethemselvestopondertheissueinalllikelihoodsupportedtheself-reflectionofCMCstaffongenderissues,andsharpenedtheirownthinkingaboutthegenderperspectivewithintheirdailyroutines.

Moreover,theopportunitytointerviewthestaffworkingondifferenttaskswasanenlighteningexperiencewhichenabledmetoseethevastnumberoftaskssuchstaffarecommittedto performing every day. The interviews and observationsnot only confirmed my assumptions of the strong sense ofgenderthestaffgenerallybringstoCMCthroughtheirownexperiences,butalsoprovidedmewitharealisticideaofthedifficultyofaddinganythingtoCMC’salreadybusyworkload.ThedevelopmentofCMCgenderperspectivemustbeseeninthisdemandingcontext.Thenation-wideemphasisongenderissueshasbeenmatchedbytheenthusiasticattitudeofCMCstafftodeveloptheperspectiveinciviliancrisismanagement.

However, in terms of gender, as with any other issueto be brought into a dynamic context of this nature, moresystematiceffortsareneeded.CMChasgenerallysucceededwith numbers, particularly if one considers the structuralchallenges.WhenthetotalnumberofFinnishwomensecondedisconsideredinthelightofESDP,withitsstrongemphasisonpolicingduties in civilian crisismanagement, thenumberofwomen actually exceeds expectations. This is, nevertheless,nottoimplythattheworkisdone.Moreinnovativewaystoincreasethenumberofwomenareneeded.

On theonehand, the sole emphasis onnumbers is notinitselfasufficientapproachtoaddressthegenderedworldofconflict-pronesocieties.AshasbeenlearnedbyexaminingCMC’s busy recruiting, at the moment the allocation ofresourcesmakes the fulfilmentof the taskof increasing thenumberofwomenparticipantsthemostexplicitgoaltobringgenderissuestothefore.Howeverthissetprioritymeansthatthemainemphasishasbeen laidonthenumberofwomeninsteadofexaminingwhat kind of womenarebeingrecruited.

Inconsequence,thisapproachmaystrengthenthegenderedstereotypesofwomen,sincetheyarewantedmainlybecauseoftheirsex,notbecauseofwhotheyare,whichcontradictsthefundamental ideawhichgendermainstreamingseekstointroduce.

On the other hand, the application of the genderperspectivemuststartfromthepeoplethemselves,womenandmenalike.TheconversationswithCMCstaffmemberscalledforanewparadigmofthinking: insteadofnumbers,effortstowardsgendermainstreamingought tobeaimedratheratrecognising the readinessof individuals toapply thegenderperspectiveintheirthinkingandworking.Thisparadigmshift,particularly if applied in civilian crisis management training,mayofferamoremeaningfulandpracticalwaytobringthegenderperspectiveintotheworkofexpertsinthefield.Thismayeventuallycontributetothe impactoftheseoperationsonthehumansecurityoflocalpeople.

So far, the main challenge in training has been to linkgendermeaningfullyandpracticallywiththevaryingtrainingthemes.Themultidimensionalnatureoftrainingcontentandthe variations in course participants’ backgrounds have ledtotheroutineprocedureofservinggenderinallthetrainingcourses fromthe sameplate. Innovativemethodsofgendertrainingwhichpayattentiontothediversityoftrainingcoursesandparticipantsareneeded.Thisstudywasabletoputforwardsome innovations for more integrated gender training. Themostrepeatedidea,whichwastoshiftthetrainingtowardsa “train the trainers” approach, offers a workable way toimprove the training. This change may not be as easy as itsounds, asbothparticipants and trainerswouldneed tobeableandwillingtoembedgenderintotheirfavouritesubjects,andthereforebemotivatedtothisendeavour.

In reality, a training institution’s capacity to change anindividual trainee’s values is extremely limited, or at leastthe process takes longer than two weeks. What are thepossibilitiesforatrainingorganisationtochangethemindsetof a thirty- forty- or fifty-year-old expert, whose genderedthinkingandworking towardothershavebeen constructedovera lifetime,withinoneweekor two?Consequently, themost effective way to implement gender in civilian crisismanagementmaysimplybetoensurethat the right people


with the right character conduct civilian crisis managementduties.Fromthegenderpointofview,therightpersonwouldbean individualwithanopenmind toevaluate thegenderperspective in his/her everyday actions. However much theexpertsaretrained,thetruthremainsthatthefinalevaluationofthemeaningofgendermainstreamingismadeduringtheindividual work of each seconded expert. This requires theselectionprocessofciviliancrisismanagementexpertsforthefieldandforthetrainingtobemoreinclusive,withmoretimeallocatedtoconsiderationsofvalues.Itisverypossiblethatbydetectingtherightvaluesamongstthecandidateexperts,theapplicationofgendermaybecomeguaranteed.

Furthermore, funding and resources need retargeting tobetterreflectthestrongpoliticalwilltoimplementthegenderperspectiveinFinnishciviliancrisismanagementtrainingandrecruiting.Ifthisstrongpoliticalwillisunsupportedbyadequateresources,thepoliticalwordmongeringmayeventuallyleadtoadecrease inmotivationofpeople toapplygender in crisismanagement.IfCMCreallywantedtoplayasignificantroleinapplyinggenderinFinnishcrisismanagement,ashasoftenbeen planned and stated in political plans and documents,the lack of earmarked resources, reflecting the real levelof this ambition, contradicts these plans and documents.Althoughimplementingthegenderperspectiveinciviliancrisismanagementneedstobeunderstoodasinvolvinganattitudechange in individual minds, developing the vital first stepsin this attitude change requires the allocation of time andresources. If gender structures in civilian crisis managementtraining and recruiting were adequately funded, there is agoodchance that thegender issuewouldbecome lesseasytodismissassecondary.Resourceswouldconfirmthatgenderforms an important part of civilian crisis management. Thepolicies highlighting its importance therefore need to bereinforcedwithresources.

ThegenderperspectivelivesactivelyinthecollectivemindofCMC,andtheinspirationtoextendtheperspectivedeeperintoCMCaspirationshasbeennoticed.Whiletheinspirationto implement gender mainstreaming was not necessarilycongruentwithstaffmembers’conceptualunderstanding, itmayultimatelybearguedthatthewholeconceptof“gender”is flexible, or understood differently in different places andtimes.SothestudysoughtacommonapproachtoapplyingthegenderperspectiveinCMC’sactivities.


6 Keyrecommendations

1) The need for its own gender strategy.IfCMCis topush itsexperts towardsdeeperthinkingongender, inorder to facilitate this process, CMC needs its own genderstrategy. The strategy needs to be able to describe CMC’scorevaluesandobjectivesongenderissuesinsuchawaythateveryone involved,CMC staff, trainees, trainingparticipantsand recruited experts, would be familiar with this commonvisionandreadytoapplyit.

2) Increasing the number of women in innovative ways. CMC should organise more targeted campaigns toadvertiseandraiseawarenessaboutciviliancrisismanagementduties.Adedicatedperson(genderheadhunter)totracetherightpostsandconnectthemwiththerightapplicantsshouldberecruitedfor theHumanResourcesdivision.CMCshoulddevelopfamilysupportforrecruitedexpertsandtheirfamiliesboth in thefieldandbackhome, forexample,by includingfamiliesinbriefingevents.

3) From external gender expert to training the trainers. Theuseofspecificgendermodulesinthetrainingshouldbetransformedintoamoreintegratedapproach.Themain emphasis should focus on strengthening the trainers’skillstolinkthegenderperspectivewiththeirspecificareaoftraining.Thenegativeportrayalofgender issuesrequiresre-examination: instead of a “do-no-harm” approach, a moremeaningfulwaytolinkgenderwiththeactualworkofexpertsis needed. In order to secure a place for gender within thetraining,oneway toproceedcouldbe toappointagenderfacilitator,whowouldfacilitatetheperspective’sappearanceinthetraining.

4) Evaluation. CMC should establish follow-upmeasures to evaluate systematically the impact of gendertraining and gender mainstreaming at CMC Finland. Thefollow-upmeasuresneedtoincludenotonlytheperspectiveof the training participants but also that of people in crisisareas.

5) Further research. How to move the recognisedattitudes on gender more towards a positive picture is ademanding, but at the same time fundamental issue in theframework of crisis management. Unless there is progresstowardsa trueacknowledgementof thebenefitsofgenderincrisismanagement,thecommitmenttogenderequalitywillbecomelostoncemore.


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Sukupuolinäkökulman valtavirtaistaminen hankkeissa ja ohjelmissa, Seminar,Sosiaali-jaterveysministeriö,Helsinki,Finland,27April2009.

CMC Finland & CMI Joint Seminar: Gender and Mediation: How to Improve Women’s role in Peace Negotiations? Kuopio,Finland,14May2009.

Siviilikriisinhallinta ja kansalaisjärjestötoiminta. CMC-KATUSeminar,Kuopio,Finland,10June2009.

Leinonen,Mika-Markus(2009).AlectureattheCMC-KATUSeminar,Kuopio,Finland,10June2009(byvideoconferencefromBrussels).

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High integrity and feminine care: Femalepoliceofficersasprotectorsinciviliancrisismanagement

Elina Penttinen

Thevisibilityofviolenceagainstwomeninrecentconflictshasbeenusedasgroundsfor

argumentsdemandingmorefemalepersonnelforpeacekeepingandciviliancrisismanagement

(CCM)missions.FollowingtheleadofNorwayandSweden,alsoFinlandpublishedaNational

ActionPlan(NAP)in2008,soastoimplementUNSecurityCouncilResolution1325(UNSCR

1325)Women, Peace and Security.Inpractice,theplanshouldresultintheincreaseofthe

numberofwomenonpeacekeepingandCCMmissions,andaddagenderelementintoall

conductedprojects.Thispaperasks,whatisbeingaddedandincreasedwhenitiswomenthat

areondemand?Inparticular,thepaperinvestigatesthemeaningsofgenderedandethnicised

subjectivityinsecuritypoliticsinwhichNordicwomenareseenas the solutionforbettercrisis

managementintheformofoperationalefficiency.Thestudydrawsfromin-depthinterviews

ofFinnishpolicewomen,andtheirnarrativesofprovidingsecurityonCCMmissions.Thepaper

arguesthatthedominatingnarratives,whichessentialisewomenwithcareandempathy,

areattemptstoreformulateanewidealofasecurityagent,whoiscapableofincorporating

responsibleandespeciallyethicalactiononthemissions.However,asthesequalitiesarebeing

seenasfeminine,theeyesareeasilyturnedtowardsthewaysinwhichfemalestaffhasthusfar

exemplifiedthepositionofethicalcompetence.


It was actually my first day on the job, and although it was late March it was surprisingly cold and it was snowing, not much, but snowing anyway. We were one Indonesian and a Jordanian, one interpreter, one Serb, and a Croat from the local police. It was about eight in the morning so we go out from the police-station and the interpreter says: “ok, so we will meet back here at 1 p.m.” The internationals used to go back home when it was cold! And I said: “What? We came here to work, and we are going to walk. And no one is going home.” I was the only woman there, and still at that time the same rank as them, I only became manager later on. So, they would not believe me and insisted that it was too cold and that they always stayed at home when the weather was like that, and said: “Why don’t we vote on it?” And I said: “That’s fine, let’s vote, but one woman’s vote equals a thousand and today we are going to walk!” The boys were quite bitter the whole day, but in the end I earned their respect.

The most difficult thing for me to deal with was the kidnapping of children. Having to tell about this to the parents was the most demanding thing. It is just as hard as having to deliver the news of someone’s death. No one can know how hard it is until they have had to do it. Still, when confronting the parents, we do say and try to convince them that we will do everything we can, that we will negotiate and try to get their children back. It is important to say that we will do everything, although negotiating with the militia is often futile, when they will always first deny with bright eyes: “No, no, we have not taken anyone.” But there was that one time. We just happened to be in the area. We just happened to be there, when I saw the kidnapping of one girl. And it was because I saw it myself that I went after her, and I just marched into this centre. I knew that the girl was there, since I knew where they took children, before moving them in the training camps that are out there in the country, and not within our area. So, it is important to get to them before they are transferred. The guard at the gate of course denied everything and told us: “There is no girl here! No child has been brought here!” But there was absolutely no use for this, since I had seen them take her, and I was not leaving without her. So, we get into an argument and the guard, a short fellow, starts yelling at me: “If you go any further I will shoot you!” At this point, my interpreter starts intervening and telling me that this may not be a good idea, that I should listen to the guard and that we really should go; it is not safe. But I tell him to tell the guard to just go ahead with it. “Tell him: Go ahead! Shoot me! Let it all out! But I have diplomatic immunity, and if he shoots me there will be a big case about it. I have been ensured access to all the places in this area and I am not leaving here without that girl!” Well, it was not exactly true about the access to all the places. We did not have access inside the camps, but it was a good argument to use, since that camp was in our area. So then his superior came at that point and we really get into it, not in a physical fight but close. They did not shoot me then, but later my interpreter said that he would not have been so trusting.

It is these little things. I brought the kids at school in Sri Lanka a telescope made in Finland. I figured that, maybe, when these kids will look at the night sky and see the moon then, maybe they will realise that, war is in fact a really stupid thing.


1 Introduction

Thevisibilityofgender specificviolence innewwars,whichtargetespeciallycivilianpopulation,hasbeenthegroundsforthebirthoftheUNSecurityCouncilResolution1325Women, Peace and Security1.Theeffectsofwarthathadbeenignored,orconsideredprivateorsideeffectsofwar,werenowmadevisible2.Muchhastodowiththewaysinwhichthefightinginethnic conflictsof the1990sdiffered from the systemofoldwarsbetweennationstates3.Inthenewwarsthewarringpartiesaremorecomplex,rangingfrommilitarytoparamilitarygroupstoorganisedcrime,andthedifficultiestodistinguishbetweencivilandmilitary,publicandprivateformsofviolencehave become especially common. Therefore, although thephenomenon of sexual violence as such is not new in warsituations,thescaleofsexualviolenceintheethnicconflictsof the 1990s has raised a demand to address this in crisismanagement, peacekeeping, and overall peace processes.The UNSCR 1820, for example – a follow-up for UNSCR1325–recognisessexualviolenceasaweaponofwar.Thus,theroleofwomenandgirls inpost-conflictsituationisnowrecognised,andtheirinclusioninpeaceprocesseshasbecomeaprevalentnecessity.Sexualviolenceisnotonlylimitedtowarsituations,however,buttheproblemofprostitutionalongsideinternationalpeacekeepingmissionshasalsobeenrecognisedandaddressedasasecurityissue.Therecognitionofextremeand systematic sexual violence thus brought internationalattention to women and girls in recent wars, and was alsothe grounds for the UNSCR 1325, which addresses sex/gender specific violence, calling for solutions in which therole of women is fundamentally recognised. My aim in thispaperisnottodiscussthemovefromoldtonewwars,ortoanalyseparticularformsofsexualisedviolence,buttodiscussthegender-specificpoliticsthatensuedfromtherecognitionof these new strategies of fighting. I will not, however,dwellmuchonthedebateontheessentialisationofwomen

1 Skjelsbeck 2006; http://www.iwtc.org/1325_word.pdf,accessed9.6.2008; Seealsohttp://www.peacewomen.org/un/sc/1325.htmlforthefulltextoftheUNSCR1325Women, Peace and Security.

2 Skjelsbaek2006;Höglund2003;Rehn&Sirleaf2002.3 Kaldor2004;2006;2007.

within theResolution1325, since thedeconstructionof theResolutionisalreadyquitewellknown4.

Although there is well founded criticism towards theResolution for essentialising women into a single category,equalling gender to mean women, and ignoring thevulnerabilitiesofcivilianmenandboys, theResolution1325is an important move towards finding new solutions fordealingwithsex-specificviolenceinconflictandpost-conflictsituations. Itopensapossibilitytoseriouslybegintodiscuss,whatthesegenderedformsofviolenceentailintermsofthewaysinwhichpeacekeepingeffortsarebeingconducted5.TheadoptionoftheResolutioninNationalActionPlansindicatesthatthereisastrongpoliticalwilltoacknowledgesex-specificviolenceinrecentconflicts,andtoconsideritsconsequencesforpost-conflictreconstruction.Yet,thedownsideisthattheActionPlansmaybejustthat;anaspectofpoliticalwillthatdoesnoteasilytrickledownortranscendtotherealityofthecivilian or military missions. This paper deals with the gapbetweenthesetworealities,andacknowledgestheisolationofathird–thatis,theacademicworldinwhichweanalyseboththepoliticalrealmofspeechandplans,andtheactualworldof real men and women doing the work and living the lifeof internationalmissions.Mycuriosityhereinvolvesasimpleandspecifiedtasktoanalyse,whatthepoliticsof increasingwomenisaboutatthepoliticallevel.Inotherwords,whatisitthatisneededandaddedthroughtheActionPlans,whentheyspelloutthegoaltoincreasethenumberofwomenoninternationalmissions?

TheneedtoincreasethenumberofwomeninpeacekeepingandonCCMmissions is basedon several assumptions thatseem to be taken for granted. These assumptions describeanunquestionedbelief systemadoptedat thepolitical levelof ministries and international organisations. First, there isthe idea that local women in post-conflict areas will mostlikelyfind iteasier to seekhelp fromfemalepersonnel,andto talk to women rather than men about their experiencesandabouttheviolencedonetothem.Itiseasiertoapproachwomen because they are perceived as more trustworthy,

4 Väyrynen2004;2010.5 ThismeansNATO,UNandESDPmissionsoftheEuropean

Union.


moreempathetic,and lesscorrupt.Yet, it isalso recognisedthat,insomesocieties,womenarenotallowedtospeakwithforeign men at all and, therefore, could not reach for helpindependently if the internationals consisted solely of men.Increasing the number of women in peacekeeping and inciviliancrisismanagementisalsolegitimatedbytheideathattheyare less likely tomisbehaveon themissions thanmen,thatis,tosexuallyabuselocalwomen,engageinbuyingsexualservices,ormisusealcohol.Forthisreason,itisalsoconsideredthatthepresenceofwomenonthemissionswouldaffectthemalestaffpositively,andkeepthemincheckfromexcessivemisbehavioronthemissions.Womenareimaginedtoassumetheseattributesofhighintegrityandcare,bothtowardsthelocalpopulation in thepost-conflictareaaswellas towardstheirmalecolleagues.

The origins of these assumptions stem from the activeroleof feministpeaceactivistmovements,whichhavebeenemphasising women as more peaceful than men due towomen’sroleasmothersandcaregivers.AlsothepoliticsofgenderequalityadoptedbySwedenandNorway in relationtocrisismanagementindicates,thatincreasingthenumberofwomenwillresultinoperationalefficiency6.

Thispaperstemsfromacuriositytowardtheroleassignedtowomenincrisismanagement,whichleadintoseekingoutfemalepoliceofficerswhohadbeenonpolice,monitoring,or peacekeeping missions, and were willing to share theirexperiences in an interview7. In these interviews, the policeofficerswereaskedtoreflectontherelevanceofthepoliticsof increasingwomen, soas toconsiderhow theunderlyingassumptionsrelatedtotheireverydaywork.Thegoalintheseinterviewswastofindouthowthewomen,whowereseenasthesolution,sawthemselvesthematteroftheirgenderandethnicity in reaching operational efficiency. In this research,the objective was to hear the female police officers’ ownopinionsonwhethertheincreasedamountofwomenwouldresultinmorethanthegender-balance,orgender-equalityoftheinternationalstaff;towardsthehighergoalofoperationalefficiencyandasenseofbalancewiththelocalpopulation.

6 ThisisemphasizedespeciallybytheGenderForceprojectinSweden.Seehttp://www.genderforce.se.

7 The female police officers interviewed for this projectwere sentanemail request toparticipate in this studyandsharetheirexperiencesintheinterviews.Byautumn2007, there had been twenty Finnish female policeofficersonciviliancrisismanagementmissions(sincetheearly1990s),ofwhom Iwasable to intervieweleven.Mostofthewomenhadbeenonmorethanonemission,starting fromtheearlynineties.Twoof themalsohadmilitarypeacekeepingexperience.In2008,thenumberofFinnishwomeninCCMmissionsincreasedsomewhatwiththenewEULEXmission inKosovo,aswellas theEUmonitoringmissioninGeorgia.InMay2008,Ispent10days inKosovoandhadthepossibility to interviewFinnishfemaleofficersworkingfortheEULEXmission.Ialso interviewedtwoFinnishmaleofficers,whowerecurrently working for the EULEX mission, but had amilitary background in peacekeeping and UNMIK.DuringmystayinKosovoIalsometwithanumberofwomenfromlocalwomen’sNGOs,suchasDora Dores,andone to one kosova.

Thisstudydrawsfromthesein-depthinterviewswithelevenFinnishfemalepoliceofficersandtwocivilianfemalepersonnelwithoutpolicebackgroundontheirexperiencesofprovidingsecurityas“awoman”.ThewomenIinterviewedhadbeenonanumberofmissionsinplacessuchasBosnia,Croatia,Kosovo,SriLanka,andDarfur,andonmilitarymissionsinLebanonandGolan. From these interviews emerges the hypothesis that,becauseempathyandcareareemphasisedasrequiredqualitiesfor personnel in crisis management operations dealing withcomplexandsensitivesecurityissues–suchasviolenceagainstcivilianpopulation– it isunderstandable that“women”areperceivedasanexampleofsuchethicallycompetentsecurityagents.Thisisbecausetherequiredqualitiesaretraditionallyseenasfemininecharacteristics.Therefore,itiseasytofocuson“women”peace-keepers,especiallyastheydostandoutasaminorityinmaledominatedcrisismanagementstaff,andastheiractionsandcompetencethusfarhasshowntobeinlinewiththeideal.Whiletherehasbeenashiftintheobjectiveofsecurityininternationaloperationsfromstate-centricsecuritytohumansecurity,alsothecompetenceofcrisismanagementstaff is shifting accordingly to include the capability of, andresponsibilityforprovidingsecurityforcivilianpopulationsincomplexsecurityenvironments.However,themisperceptionshere involve equalling this new action competence withqualities naturally possessed by women because of theirgender.Inthispaper,it isshownthat,inordertogetthingsdoneproperly,Finnishfemalepoliceofficersfirstrelyontheirprofessionalism,secondtheirculturalbackground,andlastontheirgender.


2 UNSCR1325ActionPlansinfashion

Although eight years has passed since the Resolution 1325was first issued by the UN Security Council, the time hasfinallycomewhenthequestionofwomenisseriouslybeingadoptedatthenationallevelofthecountriesthathavesignedtheresolution.Finlandpublisheditsnational1325ActionPlaninSeptember2008, following the leadofSweden,Norway,Iceland, Austria, and the Netherlands – to name but a fewof thecountries thathave theirownActionPlans8.Gender-mainstreaming of civilian and military missions has nowbecomean integralpartofforeignpolitics,somuchsothatthe President of Finland Tarja Halonen wishes to make it aBrandofFinnishForeignpolicy9.

The objective of the National Action Plans is obviouslyto bring the gender element visible at all levels of crisismanagement,andtoaddmorewomenintheoutgoingstaffto both conflict and post-conflict areas. This is legitimatedcertainly by basic gender-equality arguments, as well asarguments for operational efficiency10. The Action Plans arealsoawaytomeasuretheeffectivenessandimplementationof the Resolution, and to show to the United Nations thatthememberstates take it seriouslyat thepolicy level11.ThemainconcerninrespecttotheNAPs,whichinonesensetrytooutshineoneanother, isthattheissueofgenderequalityandtherecognitionofgenderspecificviolencestaysonlyatthelevelofpolitics,anddoesnotseriouslytrickledowntotheoperationalrealityofthemissions.ThisisindicatedalsobythesuggestionthatthemerenumberofActionPlanswouldbea

8 See e.g. http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/human-rights/pdf/Women_PeaceSecurity-en.pdf;http://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/foreign-ministry/foreign-policy/human-rights/women-peace-security-scr-1325.html; http://www.peacewomen.org/un/UN1325/DutchActionPlan_article.pdf; http://www.mfa.is/media/frambod/women_peace_security.pdf;Accessed18June,2008.

9 TarjaHalonen,Speech19September2008,PublicationseminaroftheNationalActionPlan.

10 See especially example in the GenderForce project,http://www.genderforce.se/About_Genderforce.htm,accessed17.6.2008.

11 The United Nations Secretary-General’s Report from25 September 2008 on Women, Peace and Securityindicatesthis.ReportS/2008/622.

proofoftheeffectivenessoftheResolution.Myfirstconcernhere is, whether the Action Plans can efficiently result inconcretechangesinthewaysinwhichtheactualpersonnelincrisismanagementconducttheirwork.Thisconcernisbasedonscepticismtoward thewillingnessof institutions, suchasthepoliceorthemilitary,totaketheeasilyridiculed“genderissues”seriously,andtochangetheirconductsothatgenderequality among staff becomes possible. This means a needforawarenessamonginternationalstaff, inmissionssuchasEULEX,onhowtheactualpoliceworkisgendered;thatis,aneedforpolicementoconsidergenderasanintegralelementof theirwork in tasks suchaswitnessprotection,homicide,investigationoforganisedcrimeandcorruption12.

A second concern rises from the possibilities of womento gain high level positions in crisis management, and thepossibilitytobreakopenthemasculinistinstitutionsinwhichmenkeeptogethercloselyandlookaftereachother’sinterests.IntheEULEXmission,forexample,atthefirstCategoryleveltherearenoSeniorStaffpositionsheldbywomen ineitherOfficesoftheHeadofMission,Justice,Administration,PoliceorCustoms13.

A third concern rises from the previous. This has todo with the enormous gender based requirement of highintegrityandfemininecarethathasbeenassignedtoveryfewwomenactuallyworkinginthesemissions–assignedtothem,because theyaremarkedby theirgenderas female,andbytheirethnicityasNordicwomenstrivingforgender-equality.

ThelastconcernthatIhaveregardingthenational1325Action Plans has to do with the ideology inherent in thediscourseofthePlans.Thisisanideologythateasilyequatesgenderwithwomen,representingahighernumberofwomeninpeacekeepingandciviliancrisismanagementasasolutiontothenumerousproblemsthatthemissionsperpetrate.Theideaofincreasingthenumberofwomeninordertosolvethemisbehaviourofmalecolleagues,andtobetterrecognisetheneedsoflocalwomen(andgirls)soundsanawfullotlikethe

12 Personal communication with Head of Human Rightsand Gender Office, Sirpa Rautio, EULEX Kosovo, 22

October2008,Prishtina,Kosovo.13 Report by Human Rights and Gender Office, EULEX,

Prishtina,Kosovo.


ideaofAdd-Women-and-StirfromtheearlydaysofFeministInternationalRelations(FeministIR)research14.Addingwomenin thefeministpastwasawayofseeingandfindingwherewomenare in internationalrelations,andthenstirringthemwiththeusualanduncontestedIRmethodology–intostudiesrecognisableastheDisciplineofInternationalRelations15.Whatwasregardedproblematicwiththisspecificapproachwasthatwomenwereconsideredasaunifiedanduncontestedgroupand,indeed,thegenderedassumptionsofthemainstreamIRmethodologywerenotaddressed16.Yet,addingwomenandstirringwasanimportantphaseinfeministIR,sinceitopenedtheneedtoquestion thegenderedontologyof IRdisciplineand to develop ways to acknowledge gender as sociallyconstructed. Indeed, following Judith Butler, in IR theory aswellgenderistoberegardedasamatterofperformativity.17Individuals enact and reiterate their gender through theiractionsandsubjectivity.Gender ina sense isanassignmentwhichcanbeperformedindifferentways,todifferentdegreesand, indeed,moreor less successfully.Thisdirectsus to seegenderedsubjectivityasamatterofmasculinityandfemininityenactedandincorporatedbydifferentindividuals.Therefore,infeministstudiesaswellasinIR,theideathatourbiologicalsexdeterminesourattitudesandbehaviour in lifehasbeendismissed. Instead, the emphasis is now on seeing howgenderedsubjectivityissociallyconstructed.

This analogy raises several questions which transformthe ghost of feminist past into a living body of feministIR today. As regards the popularity of the Action Plans intoday’sinternationalpoliticsthiscompelsustoaskanumberof questions. First: Why is it that this stance of increasingthe number of women is so powerfully adopted in crisismanagementandpeacekeepingtoday?Inotherwords,whyistheresuchanemphasisonaddingandrecognisingwomennow, eight years after the original launch of the UNSCR1325?Moreimportantly,whatisbeingaddedandrecognisedwhen it is women that are being added and recognised?Second: What is assumed, in this practice of adding andstirring women, about the gendered subjectivity of men inrelationtocrisismanagementandpeacekeeping–whicharethe businesses involved in the managing of the Other, theundemocratic, violent and irrational, qualities that mix thegenderandethnicityoftheprotectorsandtheprotected.

AsregardsthegenderedsubjectivityofmenandwomenproducedintheActionPlansthetroubleisthat,whenempathy,peacefulnessandcareareunderstoodasqualitiesaddedandincreased by “women” on the missions, indirectly, “men”become produced as the binary opposite of these qualities.That is, if it is seen that women are easier to approach,moreempatheticandcaringitissimultaneouslyimpliedthatmen,asacategory,areseenasmoreproneto irresponsiblebehaviour. Certainly, this is not the objective. Indeed, thisexamplerevealshowmenincrisismanagementareseenasan

14 Murphy1996.15 Sylvester1994.16 Penttinen2004;2008.17 Butler1990;1997.

ungendered,andthemeaningoftheirgenderintheirconductofthemissionsisnotadequatelyacknowledgedortheorised.However, the example also shows thedifficulties imbued inthepoliticsofgenderequalityandgenderessentialistnotions.

What needs to be discerned here is the distinctionbetween thequalities and characteristics that aremasculineandfeminine,andthatthesecannotbereducedtogenderedindividuals. In other words, not all women on the missionsareempatheticandresponsible,andnotallmenirresponsibleanduncaring.Indeedresponsibility,ethics,andthecapabilityto recognisehumansubjectivity inothersarequalities toberequiredfrombothmenandwomenworkinginthefield.Thisentails,however,anunderstandingthatgenderissomethingthat cannot be escaped, in a sense that it continues toaffect theways inwhichone reacts and is perceived in theenvironmentofinternationaloperations.Thisissupportedalsoby the experiences of female police officers interviewed forthisresearch.

Onthebasisoftheseinterviewsitseems,thatwhatreallyis in demand in crisis management operations is a capacityto manage oneself before managing others. This capacityof self-management is assumed to be something whichwomennaturallyhaveastheyarethecaregiversofothers.Inthis regard, thequestion reallybecomes interesting.Namelywhat, exactly, is being increased when the capacity of self-managementisbeingincreased,andwhatdoesthisentailinterms of gendered subjectivity in crisis management? Whatkindsofpositionsdoesthisassigntowomenandmen?JarmoToiskallio describes the same quality in the military contextasActionCompetence18.Thismeansthecapacitytoactinarightwayinacomplexandchangingsecurityenvironment.Itismorethanjustcorrectbehaviour,foronecanactinacorrectwayaccording to themandateof themission, yet thismayresultinincapacitytoprotectcivilianpopulationinpractice–as,forexample,intheSrebrenicamassacre19.

Here, the question of what is added when women areaddedrevealsitselfasapossibilitytorethinktheunderstandingofsecurity,aswellastherequirementsofcompetenceforcrisismanagementprofessionals.Thiscompetenceismorethanjustexpertiseinone’sownprofession20.It isamatterofcapacityfor the right action at the right time, in cooperation withinternationalstaffaswellasthelocalpopulation.Withtheserealisations, we begin to really get closer to a transformedcrisis management that is capable of acknowledging thecapacityofemotionalintelligence21–whichisacompetencebelonging both the sexes. The argument presented in thispaper is that emotional intelligence in crisis managementsituationstranslatestoawayofworkingintheactualrealityofthefield likeaprofessional surrender.Professionalsurrendermeansmorethansimplysituationalawareness. Itmeansthecapacitytobepresent“inthenow”andtoindividuallyactintherightwayinordertoprovidehumansecurity.Professional

18 Toiskallio2004.19 Misewski2004.20 InterviewwithProf.HelenaRanta,LeaderoftheFinnish

ForensicTeam,March2009.21 Goleman1997.


surrenderis,inaway,thesameasactioncompetence,yetitemphasisesthehighprofessionalismofcrisismanagementasamasteredskill22tofallbackupon.Itisaskillthatcreatestheconfidencetoact“inthenow”byinherentlyconnectingwithempathy,care,andtherecognitionofsubjectivityofthelocalcommunity–evenifitwouldmeanexceedingthedescriptionsofthejoboneisassignedto.

22 Amasteredskillissuchthatonedoesnotneedtothinkabout it, or thrive towards it and it seems to happennaturallyandwithease,althoughithastakenyearsofpractice. Here, I want to compare crisis managementmastery to a mastered skill of ballet or chess. (SeediscussioninKlemola2004)


3 Arewomennaturallymorepeacefulthanmen?Isittrue?

The ontological assumption that women are more peacefuland empathetic than men has been contested by studiesshowingevidenceofwomen’sinvolvementasperpetratorsofviolence,notonlyinethnicconflictsbutinmilitaryinterventionsaswell23.However,problematisingtheinherentpeacefulnessof women is not prevalent in the Action Plans. One reasonforthisisthattheoriginalResolutionistitled“Women,Peaceand Security”, and the Action Plans are nationally adoptedversionsofthisResolution.Yet,thereisatendencytorenamewomenwithgender,inordertoavoidtheessentialisationofthecategoryofwomen24.

Itseemsthatforwomeninpeacekeepingandciviliancrisismanagementthereisareadilymadescriptbywhichtoliveandconductworkon themissions.Thepositionassigned in theNAPstowomenistobethesolutiontothenumerousproblemsthatthemissionshaveperpetrated.Thisdoesnotrefertoanyparticularpositionswithintheorganisationswhichtheyhavebeen assigned to, but instead a gender-based expectationof higher work ethics – simply because they are women.Embodying the position of a woman in crisis managementorpeacekeepinghasturnedintoanassignmentwhichservestheobjectiveofoperationalefficiency.Whetherit isviolenceagainstcivilians,ormisconductofmalecolleagues,beingthesolutiontosuchacknowledgedproblemsplacesanenormoustrustinthehighintegrityoffemalestaff.However,accordingtotheinterviewsconductedforthisresearch,thefemalepoliceofficersdoeasilyliveoutthescriptofempathyandcare,whichis expectedof themon thebasisof their gender. Thus, thetrustplacedonfemalestaffisnotwithoutanygrounds.Withwomenformingaminorityinpeacekeepingstaff,andhavingperformed according to the ideal competence of an ethicalsecurity agent, the idealprofessional isnowseen tohaveaNordicwoman’sbody.

Thisbeingsaid,thepointhere isnottoessentialiseherewhat a woman is (or is not). Instead, the objective is torecognisehowaperson,genderedasawomanandhavinga

23 Sjoberg2006;Sjoberg&Gentry2007;Carpenter2006;Jones2006;Zarkov2007.

24 Seee.g. the1325ActionPlanby Iceland,http://www.mfa.is/media/frambod/women_peace_security.pdf,accessed18.6.2008.

Nordicculturalbackground25,breaksthestereotypical imageandenergyofthemasculinistpoliceandmilitaryinstitutions,andthereforestandsoutwhenpoliciesaremadetoamelioratecrisismanagementoperations.Yet, this research shows thatalthoughtheemphasisisonaddingwomen,whatisdemandedmorespecificallyarethequalitiesofNordicpoliceofficers,andespecially female police officers. This relates to the culturalidea of Finnish women as a hard workers, yet empatheticand having especially high integrity. It is these women thatdo not easily fit in as the binary opposite of the masculinehero;meaningastereotypical imageofa femininebeautifulsoul26 to be protected27, for whom breaking a fingernail isa disaster, woman who cannot and is unwilling to drive, awomanwhothroughflirtatiousbehaviourdelegateshertaskstomalecounterparts.TheNordic,or inthiscasetheFinnishpolicewomanchallengessuchimagesofthefemale.However,as she is in between the binary opposites of the masculineprotector and the passive protected, she is also not one oftheguysinateamofinternationals.Thewomeninterviewedmentioned their physical attributes – being tall, blond andstrong–assomethingthatalsoinfluencedthewaysinwhichtheywerereceivedbytheirinternationalcolleagues,orbythelocals. They described their own position and that of theirNordicfemalecolleaguesashighlyprofessionalwomenwhostand out from the male majority of the international staff.Their positions and actions highlight the meanings given togender and ethnicity in police work, as they belong to theminorityonthebasisoftheirgenderandculturalbackground.The women interviewed sketched the difference of femalepolice officers in the international working environment invariousterms.Womenarelesslikelytogetdrunkonregularbasis,forexample,theydonotnecessarilylookforromanticendeavourswiththeircolleagues,andmostlikelywillnotbuy

25 Nordic cultural background is a point of contrast toSouth European, African, and Asian cultures andgenderedidentities,andisassuchaculturalcontrasttothemeaningofgenderedsubjectivity inthese“Other”cultures. This contrast of cultural gender identity hascomeupinalltheinterviews.

26 Sjoberg2006.27 SeeYoung(2003)foradiscussionoflogicofmasculinist

protection.


sexualservicesfromlocalwomen,orbeinvolvedsexuallywiththe local staff28. In short, the Nordic policewoman behaveswellandisdedicatedtodoherbestonthemission.Assuch,sheisabinaryoppositeofnotonlyhermalecolleaguesonthesamemission,butalsooftheperceptionofwhatafemininewomancanbe.

28 Intheinterviews,thestoriesofthemissionlifeoftheirinternationalcolleaguesformedapositionagainstwhichthewomencontrastedtheirownworkingethic.


I had three children at the time. We went there, the whole family. I made a point that my children get acquainted with the neighbours’ kids, so they would have friends. I also learned a few words of local language, so I could talk a little bit, buy vegetables and the like. We still go back there for holidays and see the people we became friends with, and send each other gifts at Christmas.

It is important that women are involved in peacekeeping, if for nothing else than setting an example. That a woman can do this, that a woman can read and write, have a job, drive a car, travel and have children at the same time.

I have noticed that, for both the colleagues in the local police and for the local women, as a woman, I am extraordinary, that as a woman I am so much more, easier to approach, to talk to.

Despite the emphasis on gender-balance and the need toincrease the number of women in crisis management andpeacekeeping,thefactremainsthatwomenstillareaminority.ThisistruealsoaboutthecurrentEULEX29missioninKosovo,which has reached its full operational capacity well afterthe National Action Plans of the participating EU countrieswere published. Some countries, such as Sweden, make anexceptionandincludeanequalnumberofmenandwomenintheiroutgoingstaff,whilesomeEUcountriesdonotsendoutanyfemalepoliceofficersatall.

Inthissense–astheyaresofewinnumber–thereisafeelingof exceptionality related to theNordic female policeofficersininternationalcrisismanagement.Thisexceptionality,accordingtothewomeninterviewed,mighthaverepresenteditself ina sense that theywereputonapedestalandwerebeing very highly respected or, on the contrary, they wouldbe treatedwith completenonchalance.Manyalso felt that,

29 EULEX is the largest Rule of Law ESDP mission in EUhistory, including mentoring and assistance to buildKosovo’s ownpolice, judicial andbordermanagementsystems.

as women, they have to prove themselves, to work twiceashard;buteventhatwasaccepted,since itwasnotmuchdifferentfromwhatitwasliketoworkinFinland.Often,ourconversation would turn to the difficulties, lack of respect,belittlingandharassmenttheyhadexperiencedwhenjoiningtheFinnishPoliceServiceasyoungfemaleofficers.

Intheinternationalmissions,theirexperience,workethicsand Finnishnationalitywouldalso yieldpositive results. Thewomen felt that Finnish police officers were given moreresponsibilitiesandhigherpositionsintheorganisationmoreeasily than other nationalities. Gender, combined with highprofessionalism,wassomethingthewomendidfindworkingforthemintheiractualeverydayworkonthemissions:“NoneofmyNordic(female)colleagueswouldusetheirgenderfortheir advantage, but they would use their professionalismalongwiththeirgendertogetthingsdoneproperly.”

Thereasonstoget involved in the internationalmissionswere described also with a sense of empathy and care. Asenseofpurposeandpersonalfulfilmentweregainedinthepossibility toassist thepost-conflictcountries inestablishingtheruleoflawandinbringingstability,evenifitwereforalittlewhileonly:“We are not there to solve the whole conflict, but to help, to make things better, even if it would be for the short while we are there.”Themotivationtoparticipateintheinternationalmissionswasgenuinelyabout care,willingnessto be involved, and assist in the process of transformation:“The reason for me to go was to be there for them, to be present and share my expertise. our job was to unite the local police – and who would be better for the job than a Finnish policewoman?”

Similarly,learningfromtheinternationalcolleaguesaswellas forming friendshipswith the localswas something tobegainedfrominthemissions,andhenceconsideredinvaluable:

What I have learned is to relax and not to worry about minor things. Maybe we Finns are sometimes even too serious.

When Icamebacktopolicework inFinland,andsomeone would call to make a complaint aboutsuchthingsasaneighbourspreadinggravelontheirproperty, I had to take a really deep breath and think

4 Gendered(andethnicised)subjectivityinciviliancrisismanagement


that, for this person, this issue is really important. While for me, it seemed so futile after having been dealing with much graver issues, in places where people have lost their loved ones and live with next to nothing, and still manage to go about their daily lives with dignity.

Listening to the stories gave the impression that thesewomen do follow their hearts and are truly ready to takechances. The stories of how they got involved in particularmissions, and the events that followed, seem to be filledwith incredible coincidences, surprising events, situationsthatcomeupandworkoutinunanticipatedways.Toexplainthe experiences of these women in their professional lives,whetherintheirhomecountryorabroad,couldbedescribedasbeinginalignmentwiththeirpassionandsenseofself.Itcouldbedescribedbyasenseofflow,aprofessionalsurrender,meaningawayofworkingintuitivelyandpassionatelyinthepresentmoment. It shows that they arenotonly experts ininternationalcrisismanagement,butmasters. Inthis regard,they relyonboth, theirprofessional skillsandexperienceaswellastheirintuition,sothattheycanactattherightmomentin the right way as the opening stories indicate. Indeed,workingintuitivelyalsomeansadifferenceinattitudetowardthe post-conflict situation, which the women shared. Theoperationandthefieldwereseenasfilledwithpossibilities,insteadasbeinginfestedwithirresolvableproblems.Thesenseof passion for the work and doing their personal best wassomething that was recognisable in the approach by whichthesewomenexplainedtheirwork,andsharedthestoriesoftheirexperiences:

The way I see it, is that those areas that we go to, kosovo or Darfur, are so full of possibilities. one just needs to see them and go for them. There is so much that we can do more than the job we are sent out to do. For example, I became involved in a project of teaching women to build energy saving ovens and to cook with them. These ovens save women’s time since, before, they would cook with three stones. It takes so much wood to heat those three rocks, it is inefficient. With the stove project we could do something small, but very practical to assist the local women. I also used to go to the local university and library. There, I would borrow books and give them to my (male) colleagues to read, and say: ‘Here is a book for you, read this!’ So that they could read in their own language, and learn something about the local culture.

Seeingitpossibletoactinarightwayattherighttimealsomeansthatoneisconfidentwithoneselftoknow,intuitively,what is theexactly rightaction in thechangingandvaryingcircumstances. The female police officers were examples ofsuchconfidence, for in their storiesofhow they conductedtheir work on the mission or at home they would not letothers’opinionsaffectthethingstheythoughtwerepossibleforthemtodo.Becauseofthisattitudetheylivedoutstandingandexcitinglives.Assuch,theynotonlysetanexamplefor

thoseotherstheyweresenttoassist30but,moreimportantly,for their Finnish and international colleagues as well. Theexamplethatthesewomengiveisthat,byfollowingone’sownintuitionandstrengthregardlessofwhatanyoneelsethinksispossible,andbyallowingoneselftofeeltheexcitementofit,everythingworksoutandlifebringsyouthemostincredibleexperiences,fantasticnewconnections,andfriendships.

But in order to achieve this way of relying on one’sprofessionalism and intuition at the same time, one has togiveupalltheprejudicesandallowtheotherstobeastheyare,withoutdemandingthemtochange–whethertheyaretheculturallydifferentcolleaguesatworkwiththeir“quirky”habits(inrespecttoNordichabits),orthelocalswithcultureand customs different from each of the internationals. Thisinvolvestherecognitionthat,althoughinthehomecountriesoftheinternationalsthingsaredoneacertainway,practicescannot necessarily be taken directly to the places were themissions are being conducted. Instead, what is required isa way of doing things that respects the local community.Allowingfordifference isawayofdoingthatdecreasestheresistanceofthe localcommunityagainstthe internationals.Thismeansbeingwilling to learn the local culture, learn atleastafewwordsofthelanguageandthewaytogreetpeoplewith respect; it means being open to new experiences andthecapabilitytorecognisethecommonhumanitythatweallshare.

It was after a house search at one in the morning, when we were looking for this one murderer – we made a big commotion about it, fully armed and everything. When we were leaving, I turned to the old lady in the house and said in Albanian: “We are sorry for the disturbance we have caused.” In response, her face lit up and she smiled and gave me a big hug, as if I had done something very special for her.

Thereisapossiblegenderdifferencepresenthere,asthestoriesabout theactionsandbehaviourof the internationalmalecolleagueswerenotalwaysflattering. Inthestoriesonhowtheactsandbehaviourofmenandwomendifferinthefield, there was often a distinction made in the degree ofopennessandtolerancetowardsothercultures.Notnecessarilywould all the women on the mission be passionate aboutdoingtheirworkproperlysoastohelpandassistothers,butitseemedthat,moreoften,itwasthemalecolleagueswhohadratherselfishinterestsandwerenotinterestedinchangingordevelopingtheirownidentityindialoguewithothers.Examplesweretoldaboutmalecolleagues,whotravelandlearnaboutthecountryinwhichtheywerestationedat.Some,however,wouldgooutsideonlytogettheticketfortheirholidaybackhome,orgototherefugeecampforaphotographtotake

30 In all the interviews, it came up that the professionalpolicewoman was seen as an example for the localwomeninpost-conflictcountries;that it ispossibleforwomentoworkandhaveafamily.Thewomenfelttheycouldbeanexampleinthelittlethings–thatwomencanalsodriveacar,forexample–orin“bigger”things,suchasthefactthatwomen,too,canhaveseniorpositionsinprofessionallife.


home as a souvenir. Yet, for the female police officers, thepassionforworkmighthavemeantembracingthemissioninwaysthatnotallcolleagueswerereadydo,suchas livinginthesametentwithacolleaguefromAfrica.

Some say that we are so different (Nordic in relation to Africans). But the way I see it, is that we are so much the same.


Asalreadymentionedinthebeginning,theacceptedreasonto increase thenumber ofwomen in peacekeeping andoncivilianmissions is that theyarebetter receivedby the localpopulation.Therelevanceofthis ideawasaddressedduringtheinterviewsbut, insteadofreflectingbackonthemissionexperiences, the discussion would most often turn on thewaysinwhichthemalepoliceofficersrelatedtotheirfemalecolleagues during the missions. Therefore, the meaning ofbeingawomaninamaledominatedorganisationseemedtobemoreimportantinrespecttothemalecolleaguesthanthelocalpopulation.Indeed,inrelationtothelocalpopulation,thewomeninterviewedexplainedthattheirculturalbackgroundasFinnscamebeforetheirgenderasfemale.Finlanddoesnothave a history of a colonialist country, and is known for itsneutrality and serious work ethics. These associations wereseenashelpful for thewomen in theiractualworkof crisismanagement.

However, if the gendered subjectivity matters more inrelationtomalecolleaguesthanthepopulationatwhichtheoperationisdirected,wearecompelledtoask:What,exactly,is being increased when it is thenumber ofwomen that isincreased?Whatwassharedbythewomenintheinterviewswasthatafemalecolleaguerepresentstothemalecolleaguea person with whom one can share worries and hardships,dealingwithstressfulsituationsatworkorathome.Itiseasierfor the men to discuss with their female colleagues aboutdifficultiesintheirpersonallife–indeedbecausefemininityisassociatedwithempathyandcare.

Thestressfulatmosphereofthemissionsandbeingfarfromhomeaddstobothpersonalandprofessionalpressure.Inthesettinginwhichwomenformaminorityinoverallmasculinistinstitutions, this pressure may unfold as suggestions, oroutright sexual harassment. Some of the women that Iinterviewedhadalsobeenonmilitarypeacekeepingmissions,andhadexperiencefrommoreintensesituationsthanthoseofthecivilianmissions.Thesewomenfeltthatonthecivilianmissionssexualadvanceswereslightlyfewerandthepressuremilder. This was because it was easier for civilian staff toformrelationshipswithlocals–whichoftendidhappenwithinterpreters,forexample–whereasonmilitarymissionssuchpossibilitiesdonotexist.Thealternative,then,isoftentobuy

commercialsexualservices,whichcanbesoughtonlyduringleavesfromthemilitarycampassuchpracticesareprohibitedduringthemission.

Dealing with sexual advances during the mission takessensitivity, and also good sense of humour, according tothe interviewedpoliceofficers. They explainedanumberofstrategiestodealwiththeseissues;namelybrushingthemoffas a joke, and avoiding situations inwhich sexual advanceswouldoccur,suchaspartiesinvolvingheavydrinking.Yet,onecannot completely avoid such places and situations. And itshouldnotbenecessarytoavoidsocialgatheringsjustbecauseof the likelihood of sexual advances. Here, the response tosexualpassescouldbeasensitiveconfrontationofthe issuebysaying,“waitaminute,whatishappeninghere,Isupposeyou reallymissyour family”–and then thesituationwouldturnintoadiscussionofwhatwasreallybotheringthemalecolleague,andawayfromthesexualtension.

Theissueofheavydrinkingandpartyingcameupintheinterviews as an example of the difference between femaleandmaleofficers inhow theywould spend theirweekendsanddaysoff.Thefemalepoliceofficerswerenotsokeenonsuchactivities,andsomesawitasathreattothesecurityofthe mission: “I always worried about what the guys would blurt out while drunk. If you drink on the mission, you better not do it with the locals. I always had a good excuse though, as I could say that I was driving and so politely decline the drinks that were offered when we met with the locals.”

In the stories on how gender matters on the mission,partying and drinking and bragging about partying anddrinking, seemed to colour the everyday of their malecolleagues.Certainly,thisdoesnotmeanthatthesamewastrueofallthemenonthemissions,orthatnoneofthewomenwouldbeinvolvedinsuchactivities,yetitportraysthekindofculture,orlife,thattheinternationalsliveonmissionsoverseas.Moreover, it portrays the grand-narrative of the differencebetweenmotivationsofmaleandfemalecolleaguestogoonaninternationalcrisismanagementmission.Itseemsthat,forwomen,themissionistomakeadifference,albeitsmall,intheworld.Themainmotivationfortheinterviewedwomenwassharingtheirexpertise,doingeverythingonecaninimprovingthestabilityofaconflictorapost-conflictsituation–andin

5 Responsibilitytoprotect(whomandwhat)?


returnlearnaboutanewcultureandmakenewfriends.Yet,theyseethatthemajorityofmenweremoreinterestedinanadventure,andthetaxfreecar.

On the other hand, the mission was referred to as adifferent world; a world in which different rules apply, anaquarium,orevenasanisolatedisland.Thisreferstothelifeof the internationals,aplace they together form inanotherplace, in opposition to that place where they are stationedandtheplacethatishome.Itseemsthatthingsthatcannotbedoneathomeareallowedandacceptedasnormality inthisseparateandisolatedworldofthemission(placeuponaplace).Insuchaplace,drinking,promiscuity,andsexualaffairs–whethercommercialorotherwise–areacceptedaspartofthenormalmissionlife.

Thelocalpopulationandcultureformapointofcontrastagainstwhichthemissionlifeasanisolatedplaceisformed.The locals are seen as different and often difficult tounderstand. Inthediscoursestherecertainlyare jokesaboutthe lazinessand lackof initiativeof the locals, in respect totheprojectsthattheinternationalsaretryingtocarrythrough.It is as if the internationals are there to implement projectsregardlessofhowtheywillbereceived,andwhethertheywillhavethedesiredeffect.

Yet, the women interviewed recognised that the gapbetween the life lead by the internationals on the missionsandthelifeofthelocals issogreatthatachievingthegoalsof themission–suchasendingcorruption– isoftennearlyimpossible. In a sense, this recognition is about seeing theinherentparadoxbetweenachievinggoalsofthemissionandthewaysinwhichthemissionsarecurrentlybeingcarriedout.Thefemalepoliceofficersexpressedanunderstandingtowardtheir local colleagues for taking bribes, as the salaries paidmightnot even cover thebasic livingexpenses, especially ifthepersonhada largefamily tosupport.Whenthesalariespaid to the local police or border guard are extremely low,andnotevenatenthofthesalariesoftheinternationals,maleor female –who in addition are there for a short timeandcanthenleavebackhome(withtheirnewcar)–whocouldblamethemfortakingbribes?Insuchasituation,thefemalepolice officers felt that, if one would seriously want to endcorruption, it is not enough to just tell the local colleaguesto not take any bribes – especially because there were noconsequencesthatwouldfollow.

It seems then that, in places such as Kosovo, theinternationalshave inasensecreatedaworldof theirown,in which they create the reason for their own existence aswellasthedemandfortheirmission(forwithoutit,thepartywouldbeoverandthehighlevel,prestigiouspositionswouldbegone).Assuch,thelifethathasbeencreated–whichisthelifeof the internationals living inandcreatingaplaceupona place – is very much a gendered creation. It represents amasculinist and colonialist culture, and the locals in KosovogivethiswayoflifeaWesternman’sface31.Theresentmentforthismasculinistculturecreatesademandforchange.Indeed,inKosovoitisseenthatfemalepoliceofficers,andamilitary

31 SeealsoVäyrynen2008.

operationinsteadofacivilianone32,willbreakthisplaceupona place which the international CCM missions UNMIK andEULEXhavecreated33.

Inthisrespectitdoesseemthat,politically,itwouldbeawisemovetosendoutfromtheNordiccountriesindividualsthat are gendered as women. For they are, on the basis oftheir femalebody,givenabetter chance toworkas civiliancrisismanagement staff, asphysically theydonot representthe male majority. Women being seen as more responsiblefor their actions and more interested in promoting changeandhumansecurityinpost-conflictsituations,theybreakthecolonialistimagewiththeirgenderedphysicalpresenceaswellas theirNordicculturalbackground. Indeed, in termsof theresponse to theirpresenceby the local community, the factthat Finlanddoes not have a past as a colonial ruler seemsto work especially in the favour of female police officers.But the need for adding women may be far more practicalthan that. Women are simply perceived as more righteousandresponsible,thatis,aslesslikelytosharethemasculinistcultureofdrinkingandsexualexploitation.

Indeed,forthisreason,thereisanadditionaltaskassignedtowomenastheirnumberisincreasedonthemissions,andthatisthetaskoftakingcareofandlookingaftertheirpartyingcolleagues. This may be a heavy burden to bear. Keepingcolleaguesontherighttrackisextraworkthatisassignedtowomenonthebasisoftheirgender.Thispositionofempathyand care is something that all the interviewed women atsomepointhadhadtodealwith.Insuchmoments,situationsor events, gendered identities concretise and expectationsbecomenegotiated,eventhoughthiskindofworkthefemalepoliceofficershardlyhadsetouttohavewhenleavingforthemission.Asoneofthemsaid,“isn’t a woman always a mother also?”Butthen–ashasbeenmentionedabove–formany,suchsituationswerealreadyfamiliarfromtheworkplaceinthehomecountry.

Yet, one should bear in mind that care and empathyare not qualities solely reserved to women, or reducible tofemale gender. Seeing only women as capable of care andempathysilencesandrulesoutthewaysinwhichmenshareand enact these same qualities and goals. Here, the mostimportant aspect to be emphasised is professionalism, andalso the kind of willingness to work hard that is associatedwith theFinnishworkethics.The femalepoliceofficershadalso had other projects that exceeded their job description,suchasorganisingthecollectionofusedfootballstobegiventoyoungstersorclothestorefugeecamps,evenatelescopeasintheopeningstory.Theseprojectswerecarriedoutwiththeirmalecolleagues,whowerealsowillingtodomorethanthejobdescriptiondemanded.Theseextraprojectsexceeded

32 On several occasions when talking with local peopleinKosovo,whenaskingwhatwouldhappen if all theinternationalswouldleave,theresponsewas:“We want to keep kFor, the rest can go.”ItseemedthatthetrustinEULEXtobemoreefficientthanUNMIKwasnotverystronginthebeginningMay2008.KFORontheotherhandwasseenasanessentialprotection.

33 E.g. in Interview, 29May 2008, Prizren, Kosovo. Dora Dores,Kosovo.


the limits of the narrow conception of security, and indeedshowed how the principles of human security are beingimplementedintheeverydaylifeofthemissions,evenbeforehumansecurityhasbecomeaguidingprincipleofciviliancrisismanagement.“It is a matter of emotional intelligence and not gender.”Inotherwords,itisamatterofactioncompetence,aqualitythatisnotreservedonlyforwomenonthemission,albeittheythusfarhavebeenexemplifyingitintheirworkintheinternationalcontext.

The women interviewed for this project showed suchactioncompetenceintheireffortstogobeyondthelimitsoftheir jobtoprotect,knowingtherightaction intuitivelyandbykeepingthegoaltohelpthelocalpopulationinmind.Thisaspectwasalsoseenasthemostrewardingpartofthejob,the moment when one is able to help at least one person,onesituation,oronenegotiation.Andthisissomethingtheycoulddobybeingalignedwiththepresentmoment.Inthesemomentsandevents,skillsthatwouldgobeyondthenormaldutieswereneeded,aswellaswillingnesstobepresent,tobeinthemoment.Inasense,itisagainamatterofwillingnessto put oneself on the line for the others, who indeed arerecognisedassharingthesamehumanity,beingthesameasI. It gives back a sense of exhilaration, to exceed the limitsof what is thought of as possible to achieve in a particularjob,or inaparticularmission.Yet, thesewomenhave theirhighlevelofprofessionalismandexperiencetofallbackupon,whichenables themtocounton themselves,alignwith thedemandsofthepresentmoment,andachievesuccessinthenearly impossiblesituationswheresomeoneelsemighthavealreadygivenup.


6 Conclusions:addingwomen,apoliticsofhope?

So, to answer the question: What exactly is sought afterwhen it is the increase of number of women that is indemand in civilian crisis management? The argument hereis thatwhat is indemand isacapacityofmanagingoneselfbefore managing others. It is indeed about responsibility,high professionalism combined with empathy and care, therecognition of subjectivity in others – meaning both theinternational colleagues and the local populations. It couldbeseenasactioncompetence,emotionalintelligence,orthecapability of professional surrender in the now of the crisismanagement–inthemission’spresent,whateverthatpresentmomentmightbe.Indeed,itisamatterofmanagement,self-disciplineandmastery,ofbothpoliceworkandtheconceptofhumansecurity.

Thismeansthatthemotivationtogoonamissionshouldbeapersonaldesire toexpandand shareknowledge, learnfromthelocalcultureandadjusttothechangingenvironment.Indeed,thequestionofgenderbalanceis,rather,aquestionofinternalbalance.Itisamatterofdiligenceandsensitivity.Inotherwords,beforeoneisabletobringpeaceandstabilitytoapost-conflictareaoneneedstobeinbalanceher/himself,inapersonalandsubjective gender balance.This,indeed,wouldalsoincreasetheoperationalefficiencyofthemissions.

Assuch,thepoliticsofincreasingthenumberofwomenisapoliticsofhope.Foritishopedthatfemalepoliceofficersormilitarypeace-keepersaremorelikelytoembodyandlivethis subjectivegenderbalance,andhenceoperate from thepositionsofempathyandcare in respect to theircolleaguesandthelocalpopulation.Hopingasaformofpoliticsisnotastrongformofpolitics.Hopingiswithoutagencyand,assuch,it isweak.Whenonehopes that a desiredoutcomewouldhappen,onegivesuponesownpowertoaffecttheresultsoftheactionstaken.Hopingispassiveandleavesoutcomestobedeterminedbycircumstancesthatarealsoseenasunfoldingwithoutdecisionmakingorindividualaction.Ittakespowertokeeppowerrelationsinplace34andinthecaseofpoliticsofhope,thepowerkeepingthepowerrelationsoftheoperationinplaceremainsinvisible.Oneseemstosimply(passively)hope,thatthepeoplesentonthemissionswillactthewaytheyare

34 Enloe1996.

supposedtodo,andhencefulfilthedemandsexpectedfromthem.

Certainly,thepoliticsofhopeisnotwithoutanygroundsatall. Indeed,thishoping isbasedontheexperienceofthepast, which shows that dedicated, professional and hardworkingwomenseektogooutonthemissionsandarewillingtoputthemselvesontheline.Yet,theweaknessreliesinthefactthatresponsibility,dedication,empathy,andcarecannotbe reduced simply to gendered subjectivity, in this case topolicewomen.Asstudiesandnumerousexamplesshow,alsowomenarecapableofviolence,exploitationandmisbehaviour.Womenarestillaminority inthepoliceandmilitaryand,assuch,anodditywhohas towork twiceashard toearn therespect.Sheisalsoundermoreclosescrutinyofherbehaviour.Womeninthepoliceorinthemilitarycannotusethephrase“boyswillbeboysandmenhavetheirneeds”to legitimateheavydrinking,orbuyingsexualservices.Inregardtowomeninthepoliceandthemilitary,thisphrasejustdoesnotmakesense.Yet, it isnother femalebody thatpreventsher fromsuchactivities;butitisherfemalebodythatmakesherstandoutincaseofmisconductonthemission.

Therefore,thefirstremedyfortheweakpoliticsofhopeisthedeconstructionofessentialismofthemalegender,andhence the meaning of “life on the mission” in masculinistinstitutions.Thismeansadeconstructionofthestereotypicalimageofmenasdrivenbysexualaggression,seekingtogoon the mission for adventure, new car or the prestigiousposition, and other benefits that the international missionbrings.Politically,theendorsementofthisstereotypecreatesasitsbinaryoppositethepositionoftheNordicfemalepoliceofficerasresponsible,caring,andrighteous.Neitherofthesestereotypesbeing reducible togender,politicsbasedon thebalancingof these stereotypesby simply increasingmoreoftheotherisuntenable.

Itseemsthattheincreaseofwomenisacorrectivemeasuretothemisbehaviourandproblemsthathavearisenfromtheso called “mission life”. Hoping that men behave betterwhenwomenarearoundputsanenormousresponsibilityonwomenonthemissions,especiallyastherearesofewofthem.Despite the politics of increasing the number of women incrisismanagement,andregardlessofthenumberofcountries


which have published 1325 Action Plans, the number ofwomenselectedtocrisismanagementoperationsstillremainsverylow,withsomecountriesnotselectingwomenatall.Alsointhisregard,thepoliticsofhopeisnotveryeffective.

The position of professional surrender and actioncompetenceneednotbequalitiesembodiedbywomenincrisismanagement.Itmaybeembodiedbyindividualsgenderedasmenaswell,bothinternationalsandlocals.Whatisrequiredisatransformationofthepossibilitiesofgenderedandculturalsubjectivity,sothatthereareotherwaystoenactmasculinistsubjectivity of the international than the disrespectful,exploitative form now so familiar from peacekeeping andcivilianmissions.

Inthisrespect,subjectivegenderbalanceisrequiredandneeded in order to truly reach for operational efficiency.Indeed,onecouldarguethatthepoliticsof1325ActionPlansis not Add-Women-and-Stir, but Add-Women-and-Hope.Theargumenthere isnotagainstaddingwomen,quite theopposite. The argument is for the capacity of self-reflexivityandresponsibilityoftheactualmenandwomenworkingassecurityproviders in themissions. The call is for capacityofmanagingoneselfbeforemanagingothers,meaningacapacityof self-inquiry intoone’sownbeliefs regardingone’sneeds,desires,andaddictions.Thecallisalsoforanunderstandingofhowthesebeliefsareconstructedinthelivedexperiencesofone’sowngenderedandculturalsubjectivityinthecontextofciviliancrisismanagementmissions.

Thisiswhatisnecessary,ifindeedthereremainsthedesiretoincreasethenumberofwomen–forotherwisethetaskofhighintegrityandfemininecaremaybejusttoomuchfortheactualwomenonthemissionstobear.


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Maaria Ylänkö

Sexualviolence(SV)isathreattohumansecurityinbothintimesofwarandpeace.Asthe

majorityofvictimsincurrentarmedconflictsarecivilians,SVhasalsobecomeageneral

securitythreatinmanyconflictareas.InJune2008,UnitedNationsSecurityCouncilResolution

1820qualifiedSVasa“wartactic”withthehopethatthisdefinitionwillsupportin

increasingawarenessagainstSVandinprosecutingthemilitaryoffenders.Despiteimportant

advancementininternationallawsincethe1990sintheprosecutionofwartimerapeand

despiteincreasedattentionplacedontheissue,asawarcrimerapestillremainsovershadowed

byotheratrocitiesandsystematicallydisregardsthevictims.Theemphasisoftheinternational

communityhasbeenonprosecutingandpunishingtheperpetratorsSV,whilethevictim’s

needsandrightshavebeenpushedaside.PresentingSVasagendermatterorasacultural

phenomenonmaynotbethemostusefulpointofview.PragmaticactionsagainstSVshould

stillbetaken.Eventhoughthisstudyisanalysingsexualviolenceglobally,aspecificpriorityis

giventothecaseofDemocraticRepublicofCongo(DRC)wheretheauthormadeafieldtripin

July2009.

War-related sexual violence: Itsdimensionsandproposalsforresponse


1 Introduction

RecentdecadeshaveprovideddocumentedevidenceofSVandmass-scalerapeinwarzonesaroundtheglobe:inAsia,Africaaswellas inSouth-EasternEurope.Sincetherearenomoreclearwar zonesandhome fronts in contemporary conflicts,wars take place in the middle of the civilian populations.Thereisreasontobelievethatthegeneralincreaseofsexualatrocitiesinrecentarmedconflictsisrealandnotabiasduetoincreasedmonitoring.Thenatureofwarhaschanged,ashavethemeansofwagingwar.

TheYugoslavwarsof1991–1995markedaturningpoint;sexual atrocities became publicised and put pressure onUnitedNations to respond.Asa result, remarkable changeshave taken place and SV is now well defined as a specificwarcrimeininternationallegislation.Manybettermentsandjuridicalinnovationshavebeencarriedoutsuccessfullysothattodaytheinternationallawfitstheproblemofwar-timerapes.Obstaclesforprosecutingperpetratorsandthosecommandingtheir inferiors to rapehavebeen removed, thedefinitionofrape has been broadened and the burden of proof for thevictimhasbeenreduced.

In the level of discourse practiced by the internationalcommunitythereisnospacetoperceiveSVasaconsequencethat unfortunately, or inevitably, occurs in armed conflicts.TheUnitedNationsaddressesSV specifically in twoSecurityCouncilResolutions:theUNSCR1325onWomen, Peace and SecurityandtheUNSCR1820, the latterwhich isdedicatedspecifically against SV.Also, the InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross(ICRC)andnumerousinternationalandnationalNon-Governmental Organisations (NGO) have formulatedpoliciesandprogrammesagainstSV.

When rape is viewed as a war weapon, it begs thecomparison to prohibited weapons like napalm and bringshopethatSVcouldbebannedandoutlawedalike.There isalsoatendencytoparceldevelopment,eradicationofpovertyandequalitywithSVinarmedconflictsandexpectationsthatifthestatusofwomencouldbepromotedSVwouldvanish.

Despite heightened global awareness, the measuresagainst war-related SV still remain only on paper, postersand bites on computer screens. Although international lawcurrently gives enough means to prosecute and to punishrapists,inpracticethereisalackofimplementationofthese

lawsandtheimpunitythataccompanieswavesofSVsuggeststhatthereisalackofpoliticalwilltoactconcretely.ThereisalsoalackofpracticalknowhowregardingmethodstostopandtopreventoutbreaksofSV.

Strengthening Rule of Law (RoL) and carrying outSecuritySectorReforms(SSR)arenecessarystepsinordertoeradicateSV.However,thisislargelyaquestionofresources.In a post-conflict situation the administration required todealwithgender catastropheshas inevitablybeendisruptedand generally there is lack of judges, tribunals and prisons.AwarenessabouttheexistenceofSVisnotenough;awarenessshould be converted to compiling databases, constructingbuildings,andtrainingmedicalstafftocareforthevictimsofrape.AreaswherewavesofSVhavetakenplacecanalsobedifficulttoaccessbecauseofguerrillafightsandpoorroads.

Duringtimesofpeace,rapeisacrimethatisunderstoodtobeaprimarilypsychologicaltrauma;howeverthisunderminestheviolentnatureofthecrimeanddisregardsthephysicalharm.Itisnotgenerallyknownthatrapesthattakeplaceduringwarcanbeextremelyviolentandcanhavepermanenteffectsonthevictim’shealth.Physicalinjuriesandconsequencesofrapecanbeasinvalidisingandasdevastatingasdamagecausedbyfirearms.1Yetrapedwomenarenotclassifiedaswarvictims,unlikewoundedsoldierswiththeirwivesandfamilies.

1 Wakabi2008.


2 Sexualviolenceandinternationallaw

ThemostabundanttopicoftheliteratureonSVsince1990spertains to its juridicalaspects.However, thisnewemphasison juridicaldevelopmentsdoesnotmean that rapehasnotbeenoutlawedinarmedbattlesbeforebyothermoralcodes.Violenceisusuallybannedbycustomarylaws,andforcedsexisunderstoodtobeaformofviolence.2

2.1 Historical review

In Europe, the earliest written documents condemning warandpeacetime rapedatesback to the1600s. The1863USArmy Regulations (so-called Lieber Code) listed rape as awar crime.Still,until theendof theSecondWorldWar,SVremained a matter that did not require intervention by theinternationalcommunity.3

After theSecondWorldWar, theallied forcesagreed tocreateaninternationaltribunaltoprosecutetheNazisforwarcrimes; the tribunals tookplaceat thecityofNuremberg in1945and1946.Theprosecuted,whethermilitaryormembersof organisations, were accused as having an individualresponsibilityforcommittingcrimesthatweredividedtothreetypes: crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes againsthumanity.4

Rape was recognized as a crime against humanity byfollowingthepreviousinternationalcustomarylawsregulatingwars,buttherewasstillagapinthequalificationofSV.ThenegligenceofrapemayalsohaveresultedfromtheNurembergTrials focus being on the mass destruction of human life.Moreover, SV that took place during deportations and inconcentrationcampsseemedtobeconsideredamilderformofviolencewhenitwascontrastedagainstmassmurders.

2 Islamiclawalsostipulatesthatthatastateofwardoesnotmakeanexempt for theprohibitionof rape; rapeis also outlawed in the Old Testament (Deuteronomy22:28): “If a man happens to meet a virgin who isnotpledgedtobemarriedandrapesherandtheyarediscovered,heshallpaythegirl’sfatherfiftyshekelsofsilver.Hemustmarrythegirl,forhehasviolatedher.Hecanneverdivorceheraslongashelives.”

3 Talmar2008,11.4 Ibid,23.

In theTokyoTrials for Japanesewar crimes in1946and1948,rapecrimeswereexpresslyprosecuted,buteventhenmostlyinconjunctiontoothercrimes.TheTokyoTribunal(alsoknown as IMFT, International Military Tribunal) nonethelesssucceededinincludingrapeasaviolationinthelistofotherrecognized crimes such as, mass murder and torture, andbroke thus silenceonSV.Still,onlyapartwas investigated:for decades thereafter, the abuse of 200 000 women ascomfort women by the Japanese government was ignoredand denied by Japan. Also, the victims of rape in Nanking(principallyChinesewomen)in1938didnottestifytobeingraped.Therefore, ithasbeenwidelystated in literature thatinpractice theNurembergand theTokyoTribunals failed toadequatelyprosecutesexcrimes.

The Geneva Conventions of 1949 were the instrumentsthat established protection against rape for woman in amodern and universal way. The core of InternationalHumanitarianLaw(IHL)thatregulatestherelationsbetweenthe state and the public spheres was comprised in theConventions. In addition, there were 50 specific provisionsaboutnon-discrimination thatprovidedspecialprotection towomen.Yetonthelistofgravebreachestherewasnoexplicitreference to gender based violence. They remained, onceagain,ascrimesthatweresubjecttodomesticjurisdiction.RapewasnotspecificallymentionedintheGenevaConventionsof1949,butacommonarticle3(1)(c)prohibitedoutragesupon“personaldignity”.5

Rapeandsexualassaultbecameclearlyoutlawedinonlyby theamendmentprotocolsof theGenevaConventions in1977.Article27protectswomenagainst“anyattackontheirhonor,inparticularagainstrapeenforcedprostitutionoranyother formof indecentassault”.Theadditionalprotocolsofthe Geneva Conventions Security in 1977 prohibit rape asgroupedunderthedefinitionof“anyattackontheirhonor”andspeaksaboutwomen’s“dignityaswomen”.

The emphasis ondignity, honour anddignity aswomenhas later been criticized as offensive from the victim’s pointofview,sincetheiruseimpliesthatarapedwomanbecomesdishonoured and her dignity as a human being would be

5 Talmar2008,15.


determinedbyhersexuality.Anothercentralproblemhasbeenthedefinitionofrape.Definingrapejudiciallyisabout,1)thetechnicalityoftheact,2)theuseofforcebytheperpetratorand3)thelackofconsentofthevictim.

Inthe1990s,twointernationaltribunalswereestablishedtoprosecuteforwarcrimesthathadtakenplaceinconflictsthat were still not settled. As there was no internationallyagreeddefinitionofrape,bothneededtodefineindependentlythecrimeofrapefortheirstatutes.Theclassicalrapetrialshademphasisedwoman’s consent toapenile invasion,butnowtheywereaboutthetechnicalityoftheact,aboutwhetherasuperiorcouldberesponsiblefortherapesbyhissubordinatesandaboutcoercionofathirdpersontorape.6

The first one to be founded was International CriminalTribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Hague, theNetherlands,forthewarcrimesinformerYugoslavia.DuringtheYugoslavianwars,thesystematicuseofrapeandforcedpregnanciesinBosniabytheBosnianSerbsagainstCroatsandMuslimsputpressureontheUNtoreact. InFebruary1993,theSecurityCouncildecidedtoestablishatribunalthatwasmandated to prosecute persons who were responsible forserious violations of international humanitarian law in theterritoryofformerYugoslaviasince1991.

ThesecondonewastheInternationalCriminalTribunalforRwanda(ICTR)thatwasfoundedtoinvestigatethegenocidein1993and1994.7InthesamewayasforICTY,theSecurityCouncilvotedforcreatingatribunalthatfinallywasdecidedtotakeplaceinthecityofArushainTanzania.

Both trials came to approximately similar conclusionsabout thedefinitionof rape.Themostoutstandingcases inthis regard were the Akayesu case about crimes originallycommittedinRwandaandtheFurundjiza caseforwarcrimesin Bosnia. Both cases were the impetus for innovations indefiningandprosecutingrapeasawarcrime.

Jean-PaulAkayesu8wasthemayoroftheTabacommuneinRwanda fromApril 1993until June1994. The communebecame a theatre for mass murders and rapes. First of all,thecaseofAkayesuresultedinabolishingtheprerequisitetoprovelackingconsenttherapetakesplaceduringaconflict.Thiscametobethe“Rule96“ofinternationallaw.Itstatesthatduringaconflictsituationconsentshallnotbeallowedasadefence.

Secondly, the Trial Chamber did not go into a physicaldescriptionofrapeasarguedbytheprosecution,butchosetoconsiderrapeas“aformofaggression”.Thecentralelementsofrape“cannotbecapturedbyamechanicaldescriptionofobjectsandbodyparts”.Hence, fromtheAkayesucaseon,insertion of any object into bodily sexual orifices may alsoconstitutearape.

The third precedent set was that a commander can befoundresponsibleforrapescommittedunderhis leadership.Jean-Paul Akayesu was not accused of carrying out rapeshimself, but for ordering and encouraging to rape as a

6 Laviolette1998.7 SV has also been processed in Cambodia War Crimes

Tribunalsince2006.8 CasesofAkayesuandFurundzijacitedbyTalmar2008.

superior. Finally, the fourth innovationwhichwas related tothe alleged ethnic persecution, was that “rape and SV (…)constitutegenocideinthesamewayasany other act aslongastheywerecommittedwiththespecificintenttodestroy,inwholeorinapart,aparticulargroup,targetedassuch.”

As for the juridical innovations of ICTY, Anto FurundzijawasalocalcommanderofaspecialpoliceunitoftheCroatianDefence Council (HVO) 1991. His case was the first one toprosecuteamilitaryleaderforrapewhichwascommittedbyhissubordinatesduringasituationofinterrogation,(andnotinasituationinthecourseofarmedconflict).Italsoestablishedafirstcasewhereasingleoccurrenceofrapethatoccurs inconjunctionofawarwasregardedawarcrime.9

Although Anto Furundzija did not himself physicallyperpetrate the violence, the Chamber sentenced him guiltyfortortureandoutragesuponpersonaldignity.HiscasethusexpandedthedefinitionofrapeininternationallawfromthemerephysicalandmechanicaldefinitionthatwasemployedbytheAkayesujudgment.

The ICTY also established a connection between forcedpregnancyandgenocideandtherewereseveralotherjuridicalinnovationsmadeinordertoidentifythepracticeofSV.Itisno longer regardedasabyproductorcollateraldamageofmilitaryconflicts.

2.2 Achievements of international law

Themostimportantbettermentsofinternationallawsincethe1990scanbesummedasfollows:RapeandSVareseparatelyanddistinctivelydefinedunderinternationallaw,sothattheycan by no means be regarded as a by product of anotherissue.Theconsentasdefenceiseliminatedinanycasewherecoercionisshownandprohibitedevidenceofthevictim’spriorsexualconduct,“Rule96”,andevenasinglevictimof rapecangiverisetoaconvictionforwarcrimes.

ThelawonSVhasbeenmadesymmetricalwhichmeansthatit isacknowledgedthatbothfemalesandmalescanbevictimsofSV.Rapehasthusbecomeagenderneutralconceptand special concern has been taken with the vocabulary.Accordingtolawrapeisnowaboutthe“invading”thebody,andnotabout“penetration”.OnecanbeconvictedofrapeandSVwithoutbeingthephysicalperpetratorandsuperiorscanbeheldcriminallyresponsibleforrapescommittedundertheirsupervision.

Allinall,rapeandSVweresuccessfullyprosecutedaswarcrimes in ICTY and ICTR war tribunals, and there has beenaremarkablechangeinthewaysexualcrimesaretreatedininternationallegislation.Itisstillnoteworthy,thateventhoughrapeandSVwereexplicitlyincorporatedunderallegationsforcrimesagainsthumanityandwarcrimes,noneof the initial

9 AntoFurundzijasubjectedacivilianwomanofBosnianMuslimorigintoaninterrogationattheheadquartersinMay1993.Thewomanwasquestionednudeinfrontofsoldierswithoneofthemthreateningherwithmutilationifshedidnottellthetruth.Thewomanwasforcedbyanothersoldiertoperformsexualactswithyetanothervictim, who was a Bosnian man. Anto Furundzija waspresentanddidnothingtostopSV.


indictmentsbythecourtsincludedsexualcrimes.IntheICTYand in the ICTR, the amendments about sexual crimesonlyoccurred in themiddleof the trials. The ICTYand the ICTRwerealsosetupwithoutanymechanismofcompensationforthevictims.Moreover,thetrendtolinkrapetoothercrimes,such as genocide is sometimes dubious since the proof forattempted genocide is more difficult to attain than a proofforarape.10

2.3 Why does international law fail to function?

Although the recognition of seriousness of SV has grownimmenselyininternationallaw,therearestillreportsofSVinmanyconflictzones.Whyhas theevolutionof internationallaw been failed to be transformed into practice? There areseveralfeasibleexplanations.

First,theoutbreaksofSVtellnothingabouttheeffectivenessof international legislation. International law isbarelya tooltopreventSV.Anylawsareresponsesinretrospecttocrimesthathavealreadytakenplace,andinretrospecttheaffectedpeopleusuallysaythattheyneverimaginedthattheirhomeareawouldonedaybecomeatheatreofsexualatrocities.

Second, contemporary wars tend to be internal conflicts that involveethnicand religiouselements. Inmanycountries military leaders which are representing statesand consequently have the power to ratify or not to ratifyinternationalconventions,arereplacedbywarlords,druglordsandever-splittingtroopsinwhichthereisoftennoclearchainofcommand.Atthebottomofthechainofcommandinthebrigades,theassaulterscanbeextremelypoor,noteducatedand illiterate and thus out of reach of information aboutinternationallaw.Militaryleaders,onthecontrary,canbewelleducated,sometimesdespiteofamisleadingguerrilla-imago.

Inthatregard,theinternationallawhasactuallyintervenedsuccessfully by bringing at least an important part of thesewarlordstoTribunals(ICTY,ICTPR,InternationalCriminalCourtICC).Internationallawfunctions,buttherearesometimestoounrealisticexpectationsaboutitsefficacy.

Third, the timing of international intervention to aconflict brings in aspects and well-grounded accusations ofpartiality. Today’s international war crimes tribunals, unliketheirpredecessorsatNurembergandTokyo,arefoundedontheprincipleofeven-handedjusticeforallvictimsofseriousviolations of international humanitarian law. An importantdifference to the past examples of Nuremberg and Tokyotribunalswereex posttribunalsinthattheywereestablishedafter the acute violent situation and military victory. Whathas arisen in recent years as a second type of internationaltribunal, a kind of an ex ante tribunal, which is establishedbeforetheinternationalsecurityproblemhasbeenresolved.11

Still,thecrimesofcriminalscanbeeffectivelyinvestigatedonlywhen the surrounding conflict has calmeddown to alevelinwhichallthepartiesoftheconflictcanbeimpartially

10 Stern&Fouchard2008.11 Arsanjani&Reisman2008.

judgedandwitnessescangivetheirtestimonywithoutfear.12AsforthecreationoftheICCanditsmandatetointerveneinconflicts,TheRomeStatute13wascreateduponanassumptionthat governments would be reluctant to surrender theircriminals to the ICC.This indeedhasbeen thecasewithexChadianpresidentHisseneHabreandtheSudanesepresidental-Bashir, the latter being accused of being responsible forthousandsofrapesofwomenandgirlsamongotheratrocities.TheDRChasproventobeacounterexample.Atthecreationof the ICC, thedraftersdidnotevencontemplate includingcaseswhereastatewouldvoluntaryreferitswarcriminalstotheICC,letalonethatastatewouldinvitethefuturecourttoinvestigateandprosecutecrimesthatoccurredinitsterritory.14

This nonetheless has proved to be the policy that DRChasadoptedwithsomeofitswarlords15accusedofrapesofcivilians inconjunctionwithotherwarcrimes. Insuchcases,the ICC prosecutes military superiors that can be heldresponsible for rapes. At the same time, the internationalcommunity is addressing a part of a war that is still verymuch alive and in which the assignor party is claimed tohavebeen involved in somecapacityat some stage. In thatcase, international lawdoes not function in theway itwassupposedto.

Fourth,thepersonsinvolvedincasesofSVtendtoremainsilent.Thereisreluctancefromthesidesoftheperpetrators,thevictimsandthewitnessestoaddressthematterduringoraftertheconflict.SVattackstheunspokenmoralvaluesaboutpurity,fidelity,motherhoodandfatherhood.

F ifth, international law does not yet target theconsequencesofSV.Theconsequencesthatareexperiencedbythevictimsandtheircommunitiesarethetrueproblemsof SV: this includes masses of rejected women, healthproblems,andparalyseddailyeconomy.ChildrenconceivedoutofSVarerejectedandtheycanbedeprivedofhavinganame.Reproductiverightsarenotintegratedtointernationallegislation on SV.16 Forced pregnancy is a war crime ininternational law17andcanevenbedefinedasa formof

12 In that regard already the ICTR in Rwanda has beenseverelycriticizedfornothavingfailedtoindictasinglesoldier of the Rwandan Patriotic Force for killing orassaultingcivilians,whichriskstocausetheTribunaltobedismissedasvictor’s justice.

13 http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/EA9AEFF7.14 Arsanjani&Reisman2008,329;Quénivet2005.15 ThomasLubangaandJean-PierreBembaforexample.16 AccordingtoWHOdefinition:“Reproductiverightsrest

ontherecognitionofthebasicrightofallcouplesandindividualstodecidefreelyandresponsiblythenumber,spacing and timing of their children and to have theinformationandmeanstodoso,andtherighttoattainthehigheststandardofsexualandreproductivehealth.They also include the right of all to make decisionsconcerningreproductionfreeofdiscrimination,coercionandviolence.”

17 IHL 7(2). “Forced pregnancy” means the unlawfulconfinementofawomanforciblymadepregnant,withthe intent of affecting the ethnic composition of anypopulation or carrying out other grave violations ofinternational law. This definition shall not in any waybe interpreted as affecting national laws relating topregnancy.


genocide,butawoman’s right todecide tokeeporabortthepregnancydependsonnational legislationconcerningpregnancy. Incountries,whereabortion isoften illegaloraccess toa legal abortionhighly restricted,deaths fromabortionarehundredsoftimeshigherthanincountrieswhereabortionislegal.18

Finally, SVoften takesplace in the so-called failed or collapsed states,where thenational judicial systemhascollapsedor iscompletelyunavailable.According tosomeestimates, in theDRCthereare1250positions for judgesunfilledandabout80percentofpeople lackaccesstoanykindoflegalsystem.19

18 AccordingtoWHOreportin2004,68000womendieperyearduetounsafeabortions.

19 PeterSampsoninCrafting Human Security2008,49.


3 Gender-basedapproachanditslimits

Atfirstglance,rapeisalwaysagendermatterintimesofpeaceaswellasduringwars.Agender-basedapproachtoSVarguesthatarmedconflictpolarizesdifferencesandinequalitiesthatalreadyexistedbeforetheconflict.Anarmedconflictwouldonly exacerbate a traditional setting, one in which men arethe aggressors and women are regarded as the supportersoftheirhusbands,fathersandsons.Traditionally inWesternlawstherehasalsobeenageneralexpectationthatwomenshouldbeprotectedasmothersorpregnantwomen.DuringtheSecondWorldWar,theinternationallawsstemmingfromtheHagueConventionscontainedprovisionsaboutprotectingfamilyhonour.

Assaulting women and young girls in a conflict settingcan also be perceived as a phenomenon that logically goesalongwiththegeneraltrendofcontemporaryarmedconflictsinwhichciviliansaccountforthemajorityofvictims:womenandgirlsmostoftenfittotheciviliancategory.Nevertheless,SV thatoccurs inawar settingdoesnotalwaysfit into thestereotypical conceptionsofgenderviolence.Menandboyscanalsobe sexually assaulted.Moreover,womenalso serveas soldiers and it is not exceptional to say that women inpositionsofpowerhavealsocondonedrapeasawartactic.

The UNSCR 1325 written in 2000 and UNSCR 1820from 2008 both focus on women; women as particularlyvulnerabletargetsofwarandonwomenaspotentialsubjectsofpeacebuildingbyempowerment.Thecombinationof thetwoviewpointsislikelytodrawattentionelsewherefromthefact that rapedwomenare victimsofwar, justaswoundedmenarevictimsofwar.Thereisnoshortcutfromhealingtoempowerment.

Theemphasisofthegenderaspectinevitablyrenderstheaspectofviolence toa secondaryposition.Asnotedabove,rapewasnotprimarilyseenasviolenceandtortureinthehistoryof legislation,butasdishonouringawomanandher family.Hencethegender-basedapproach iscarefulnot tovictimisewomenbut toempower them, this isparadoxically close toa traditional understanding of rape as a matter of honourbecauseitbypassesthestageofbeingavictimofviolence.Ifamalesoldierisshotinbladderandrectumduringwarandhelosescontinence,itisclearthathisprimaryneedistohavea surgical intervention. His empowerment and reintegration

intosocietyisaquestionthatwillbeaddressedoncehehashealedfromthewound.Hisrighttoacompensationasawarinvalid is recognized, although in practice there may be nofinancialresources.Whenawomaniswoundedinthesamewaybyrape,thereisabiastounderstandthedamageinfirstaspsychological,socialandcultural.

Despite the growing awareness about SV in armedconflicts,therehasbeenageneralfailureofgovernmentstoimplementapolicyofhealthcareforrapedwomenthatworks.Unlike inwarsurgery, therearenogovernmentalhospitalsspecialised in treatmentof SVnor are there centralisedregistersofspecialistswhohavethepracticalknowhowtotreatinjuriescausedbyrape.

AgenderperspectivestressingempowermentcanalsobeanexcusetostagnatetheactionsagainstSVintoalevelwherethewomenvictimsaregatheredtowomen’scentres,nursedby women nurses and put next to a sewing machine fortrainingbyawomanteacherandgroupedtoformwomen’scooperatives. They can have access to consult womanlawyerson theircase,but in theabsenceofmechanismsofcompensation,thevictimherselfwillgainnothingbystartinga juridicalprocessagainstherassaulter. Inpracticeagenderperspectivecan reallybeused to suppressawoman’s rightstochoose,asanindividual,themedicalaidshereceivesandrehabilitationmeasuresthatconcernher,whethershewantstocarryapregnancytofulltermorwhethershehastherighttoabort,andwhatkindofvocational trainingwouldfitherandwhatshelikes.

Inshort,thegenderperspectivecaneasilybeunderstoodas we know what is best for women. After all, it is not sosurprisingthattheassociationsgotochildren,home,sewingmachines,andthelike.Insum,thereisariskthattheclaimedgenderperspectivemarginalisesSVtoaspecificdomainofagenderaffairorwomen’saffairthatdoesnot integratewiththegeneralattemptstostrengthenRoL.


4 Magnitudeofwar-relatedsexualviolence

SV in armed conflicts is an issue which has becomedocumented numerically only recently. During the SecondWorld War, the Japanese government placed approximately200 000 comfort women in military brothels. In the TokyoTrials approximately 20 000 women were estimated to beraped inNanking.Otherwisegender related violationswereneitherspecificallymonitorednorenumerated.

EstimationsaboutthenumbersofvictimsofSVsincethe1990ssuggestanincreaseinfrequencybutremainoftenveryirregular by method of collecting, and sometimes carelesslypresented. In literature, the most often presented estimateconcerningBosniaandHerzegovinaisfrom20000to50000,themarginoferrorbeing intensofthousands. InRwandangenocide in 1994, the number of rape victims is usuallyreportedas500000victims,withoutamplitude.

In Eastern Congo (DRC) the United Nations PopulationFund(UNFPA)hasconducteddatacollecting inseveralpostsaround the country for more than four years: there wasaltogether 17 000 reported cases per year. The rape caseswere reported both to the police and doctors. Informationwascollectedbysurveymethods,butthestationsaroundthecountrywerefartoodispersed.20

SVismonitoredinincoherentmannersindifferentconflictareas, and sometimes the figures may be overestimatedor boosted for fund raising. Estimates on “percentages ofwomen being raped” are particularly problematic becausetheyareincorrectlybased;beingrapedcannotbecomparedto being contaminated by a virus. The estimates also lackaccuracyaboutageandthegeographicallimitsofcollection.For instance, according to Physicians for Human Rights, inSierra Leone “fifty percent” of the women and girls havebeensubjectedtorape,tortureorsexualslaveryincivilwarsfromthebeginningof the1990s.21However,as formedicaldatabasedonincidences,inSierraLeoneamedicalresearchgroup published in a study in 2002 according to which 94of 991 of respondents and 396 of 5001 female household

20 UNFPA2008.21 EstimationofPhysiciansforHumanRights2002.

membersinSierraLeonereportedwar-relatedsexualassaults.Inpercentagesthiswouldonlybe9%and8%respectively.22

All inall, thereare remarkable inconsistenciesonscalingthecasesorfrequenciesofSVindifferentconflictareasandthese differences cause a problem of credibility. Carelessestimations can add the risk of fuelling the actual politicalconflicts because they can be interpreted as propagandaagainsttheaccusedperpetrators.Theinaccuracyinallegationsaboutrapeisonereasonwhyrapehasnotbeentakenseriouslyasawarcrime.Atthispoint,therehasnotbeenmucheffortbetweenresearchersordatacollectorstofindexplanationsforverydifferentestimationsonthefield.Forthesereasonsthereisanurgentneedforbetterdata.

22 Amowotz&al.2002.


5 Culturaldimensionofsexualviolence

Rape always takes place in context. The present day rapewavesduringwarthatareknownbythepublichaveoccurredin Africa and in South-East Asia. Is the occurrence of war-relatedrapewavesdeterminedbythesurroundingcultureanditstraditions?

InWesterncountrieswheresurveyshavebeenconductedon SV during times of peace, a general finding is that theperpetrators of SV are in most cases men who are knownto thewoman. In conflict situations, theperpetratorsof SVare more likely strangers to victims. In that sense it alreadybecomesproblematictotalkaboutrape cultures,asthepartiesofthewarcanbeoriginallyfromdifferentcultures.

In wars women become vulnerable to rape in occupiedterritories, when fleeing from conflict areas, and in refugeecamps. In displacement, the perpetrators are soldiers,demobilized soldiers or policemen, and they can even bepersonswhoweresupposedtoaidandprotectcivilians.Fromthatpointofview,SVinarmedconflictsdoesnotemergefromlocal culture, but from a violent confrontation of differentgroupsofdifferentculturalorigins.23

Mass rapeshave takenplace innearhistory, theSecondWorld War included, and are geographically scattered:Germany, Japan, South-Eastern Europe (former Yugoslavia),Chechnya, Indonesia and Central Africa. Yet, SV in armedconflictsisassociatedtoprevailingculturaltraditionsanditisexpectedthatviolenceagainstwomenwouldbeinextricablylinked with women’s participation to decision making. SVwouldthusbebothacauseandconsequenceofwomen’slowstatus.Womenwouldonly represent reproducers of cultureandreligionwithoutbeingsubjects.Systematicneglectoftheotherparent’skinshipisaclearmarkeroflinearityinfavourofthenoticedparty.

For instance, in Bosnia, the mass rapes were sometimesinterpreted as emerging from a prevalent patrilinear cultureandthegeneralimportanceofreligionintheBalkans.Victimswere most often Bosniaks and the perpetrators were non-Muslims. SV was not always limited only to rape, but alsoforcedpregnancies.Accordingtoseveral interpretations, theaimwas to forcewomenmakechildrenofanother religion.

23 Héritier1996.

Thechildrenwerethereforeconvertedtoanotherreligionandthecultureorreligionofthewomanwastotallydisregarded.24

Arguments about women’s low status have also beenmentionedinregardstoCentralAfricaasoneexplanationforthecurrentwavesofSV.Accordingtopopularexplanations,womeninAfricawouldberegardedonlyaspropertyofmen,anditissometimesstatedthatAfricanpopulationsingeneralwouldhaveverystrictcontrolsoverfemalesexuality. Infact,regionsaffectedbywar-relatedrape inRwandaandEasternCongo touch the so-called matrilinear belt where womenhavemorelibertiesthaninNorthernandinSouthernAfrica.Theselibertiesconcernfreedomtodivorce,toenhanceoneselfeconomicallyandlibertyofmovement. Ithasbeencommonandacceptableforawomantotravelaloneandtohaveherownindependentcommercialactivities.Thisdoesnotequatefor sexual freedom, but the fact that women’s sphere ofmovementhasnotbeenasrestrictedtothehomesteadlikeinNorthernAfricahasitspracticalimplications.Evenifwomen’spositionisrenderedpowerlessbythewar,theargumentaboutthe low status of women in Central Africa does not makesense incomparison to the statusofwomen inmanyotherculturalareas.

IntheNorthernpartoftheAfricancontinent,intheDarfurareaofSudan,thewarhasbeenengenderedandSVisusedwartactic,25butthefamilystructuresarepredominantlypatrilinear.Although,ifpatrilinearity26iscitedasanenablingbackgroundforSV,itshouldequallybenoticedthatpatrilinealstructureshavealsobeenregardedasmorerestrictiveinwhatcomestosexual freedom,andwomen’s freedomofmovement. Thus,inDarfurianculturethethresholdtousesexualassault(rape)asawarweaponwouldbehighersincewomen’ssexualityingeneral is more regulated. Still, systematic rapes have beenreported.ThedynamicsofSVaswarweaponinDarfurisstilldifferent from Central Africa. In Darfur, rapes are revengedbycounter-rapesofwomenoftheenemy,whereasinEasternDRC rapes are more opportunistic. SV is said to have gone

24 Nahoum-Grappe1996.25 Prunier2005;2009.26 Partrilinearity is often mixed with patriarchy, which

implies that father,or thegrandfatherhas theprimaryauthorityofthehousehold.


“beyond the conflict”, which means that random rapes bymilitiasandarmedgroupswouldhavebecomeanendoftheterroritself.27

InIndonesiatherehavebeenseveralreportedwavesofSVin conflicts on different islands since the 1990s. Indonesiantraditional family structureshavebeenmarkedby importantmatrilinearpredominancedespitethescatteredgeographyofthe archipelago. In practice, this can be seen in a relativelyhigh level of economic independence that many womenenjoy. Women often take care of the family’s economicissues and operate their own small-scale business. As such,amatrilinealculturaltraditiondoesnotguaranteeabsenceofgendermisbalanceatthedisadvantageofwomenorabsenceofwomen’ssubmission,butitdoesgiveawomanrightstoherchildrenandproperty.28

It might be that cultures where women have greaterautonomy and more independence, they are especiallyvulnerable and defenceless when rape is used as a warweapon in an armed conflict. In the DRC one popularexplanationmodel29comparestheriskofdeathtoriskofrape.Duringwar,acouplemustdecidewhoperformsatask(tendto cattleor to collectwaterorfirewood)with the threatofanarmedassault, the risk foraman is tobekilledand therisk forawoman is thatshewillbe raped. Incomparison itseemsthatitisbetterforawomantoberapedthanforamantobekilledandtherebythewomanischosentobeexposedto the threat. Furthermore, when a woman is raped in theDRC,aconsequenceisthatsheisrejectedbythecommunity,oftenwithherchildren inaccordancewithmatrilinear logic.Traditionally,thesocietytoleratesthatwomencanberejected,and the assumption is that women can survive alone andmaketheirownlivelihoodsomehow.Inawarcontextthisisnot possible, and the multitude of stigmatised and rejectedwomenisaparticularsocialdisaster,oragenderdisaster.

Inconclusion, it ispossibletofindcounterargumentstothestereotypicalblamingofpatriarchyforrapewaves.Aswellitcouldbeclaimedthatpatriarchyprotectswomenmore,asopposedtomatrilinearculturesthatexposewomentosexualassaultsbyproviding themagreater freedomofmovementandbecausemen(husbandsandbrothers)have less interestforsanctionsandreprisals.Inareaswheremenaretraditionallynot taskedwith thedutyofprotectingwomen,womenareeasiertargetsforphysicalassaultinawarcontext.

Inpracticeitisdifficulttocontestcorrelationsbyempiricaldata between cultural complexity and sexual freedom. Assuch, there is no reason to claim that in a war situation, apatriarchyorapatrilinearculturearepronetoSVthanothers.

27 Seee.g.AmnestyInternational2008.28 McAmis2002.29 ToldbyalocalNGOworkerinBukavuinJune2009.


Table 1: Beyond assumptions on culture: risk of sexual violence and woman’s freedom (RiskfactorforSV+ProtectivefactoragainstSV–)

1)Matrilinearfamilystructuretradition,CentralAfrica,Indonesia

RiskofSV+/–

2)Patrilinearfamilystructuretradition,Bosnia,Darfur

RiskofSV+/–

Womenenjoygreaterindependence(frommen)

– Womenhavelessindependencedependenceonmen

–

Morepermissivesexattitudes + Morerestrictivesexattitudes +

Yet the cultural aspect in rape waves can never bedeniedbecausea specific formofcruelty30 isalways relatedtoaparticular logicofbeliefs that is commonbetween theperpetrator and the victim: both share the conception andsymbolism about violence, about humiliation and aboutshame.Forinstance,inforcedpregnanciesinBosniatherewasasymbolicmessagetoconvertBosnianwomen’schildrenintoChristians.InCentralAfrica,theuseofwoodeninstrumentsinrapesymbolizesinfertility.

IfSVinwarscouldbeexplainedbylocalcultures,itshouldalsobeaskedwhetheritwouldhavebeenpossibletopredictandhencepreventSVbeforehand.Explanations referring toa rape-prone culture tend only be pronounced afterwards.For instance, was it foreseeable in the former Yugoslaviain the 1990s? In any case, knowledge about the prevailingculture can nonetheless help in anticipating consequencesaboutmassraping.InEasternDRC,forinstance,themannerin which victims of SV are rejected on a mass scale can beexplainedbytheincapacityoftheculturetocopewithmassivestigmatisation,whereasinthepatrilinealbelt,rapesaremorelikelytoberevenged.

30 Nahoum-Grappe1996,287.


6 Riskenvironmentsforsexualviolence

6.1 rape patterns

Insteadofrape-pronecultures,itisalsopossibletotalkaboutenvironments where the risk of rape becomes high. Theadvantage is that environment ismore concrete todescribeandeasier todocument thanculture. Inpractice there isanoverlappingwhichcanbecalledasrape pattern.

Inso-calledclassicrapecases,theactofrapeissupposedto be an isolated case. The description of the context mayrefertothestateofdrunkennessinaparty.Rapeinparticularis associated to a scenario of forced sex between twoindividuals, in which the surrounding conditions do notdetermine the criminality of the act. The critical element indefiningrapeisthewoman’sconsent.Ifthevictim’smeanstodefendherselfwereabsent,eventheclassicrapewhichtakesplace in time of peace, can also be defined as institutionalSV.MaritalrapecanberegardedsociologicallyasinstitutionalSV, regardless of whether it is criminalised in the nationallaw.31Nevertheless,generallyspeaking,rapesareperceivedasoccasionalandrandomcasesduringtimesofpeace.

Thedifferencebetweenpeace andwar is however notclear cut especially in contemporary internal war contexts.Amilitaryenvironment in itselfcan increasetheriskofrapeeven during times of peace; women risk being harassed orraped in mixed armies. Another specific environment thatseems to create an atmosphere where SV is likely to occurmorefrequently iscontextofsports:professionalsportsandsports clubs, football teams having leisure time or similarcontexts.32Itishardlyacoincidencethatbothenvironments,army and sports, are much based on discipline, physicalpowerandcompetition.Also,pornographyintheformofthecommercialisedsexindustrycanbanalizeandnormalizeSV.33

Although in real life there are such border lineenvironments, the context surrounding rape – namely warsituation–wasfoundedasthecriticalfactorwhenrapefinallybecamerecognizedasawarcrimeby the international law.SVwasstillnottheinitselftheinitialsubjectofconcern,but

31 Adams2005.32 Messner2005.33 Dines2004.

itbecameaspecifictopic laterwithinthegeneralneedthatarosetore-determinewarcrimesinthepost-ColdWarera.In1992,theUNSCsentaCommissionofExpertstoinvestigategrave breaches and violations of International HumanitarianLawthatweretakingplaceintheYugoslavwars.Theareasoffieldinvestigationswereclassifiedinthreecategories:1)masskillingsanddestructionofproperty,2)treatmentofprisonersand detainees, and 3) systematic sexual assault and ethniccleansing.34

Asforthesexualassaultandethniccleansing,in1994theFinalreportoftheUNSCCommissiondiscoveredfivepatternsofrapecases:35

1)Individuals or small groups committing sexualassault in conjunction with looting andintimidationofthetargetgroup.

2)Individuals or small groups committing sexualassault in conjunction with fighting in an area,oftenincludingtherapeofwomeninpublic.

3)Individuals or groups sexually assaulting peoplein detention because they have access to thepeople. Reports frequently refer to gang rape,while beatings and torture accompany most ofthereportedrapes.

4)Individualsorgroupscommittingsexualassaultson women for the purpose of terrorising andhumiliating them often as part of “ethniccleansing”.Survivorsofsomecampsreportthattheybelievetheyweredetainedforthepurposeofrape.

5)Detentionofwomeninhotelsandsimilarfacilitiesforthesolepurposeofsexuallyentertainingthesoldiers.Thesewomenarereportedlymoreoftenkilledthanexchanged.

6.2 Why rape?

SV can be classified by its context, the following questionthatarisesiswhetherthereisanythinggeneralthatcouldbe

34 Talmar2008,30–32.35 Ibid.


statedabout theassaulter’smotives to rape. Inclassic rapesthatarecommittedduringtimesofpeace,therapist’smotivesareunderstoodtobeone-time-only,uniqueandopportunistic,even if the same person commits several rapes. In SV thattakes place in armed conflicts, the assaulters’ motives areunderstoodtobeless–ifatall–determinedbysexualdesire.Awar-time rape is aboutexpressingpoweranddominationunder a collective strategy to govern by fear and terror. Towhatextentthismotiveispersonalandindividualisticinawarsituation,andhowindividualdesireisreplacedbyacollectivemotiveorbychainofcommand isunclear.Whether rape isalwaysanefficientstrategicweaponforattainingthoseendsthatwereinitiallymeantandplannedisalsoquestionable.

For as long as it is about describing how rape in warfunctions as a social phenomenon, there are three majordiscoursesforexplanations.Theymayoccurmixedeveninthesamecontext,buttheygoasfollows:

1)Oftentimes it is stated that war creates socialeruption that in turn provides opportunitiesto rape. War-related SV results from themultiplicationofopportunitiestotakeadvantageof women who are rendered vulnerable. Rapewaves would result from a multiplication ofopportunisticincidences.Eachsoldiercanusethewarsituationasanopportunity.Thisonecouldbedescribedasanormative assumption.

2)Another commonly expressed argument goesthat women are raped because men find prideand enjoyment in establishing power over thewomen of the enemy. One kind of a feministviewpoint is that in a war situation women’sbodiesbecome symbolicbattlefields. Forced sexwouldnotbeopportunistic,butamanifestationofmen’scommoninterest todominatewomen.This motive could be conscious, half-consciousorunconscious,butstillitisthere.Mass-scaleSVagainst women would thus be an exacerbationofSV thatalreadyoccursduring timesof socialstability. This could be described as a feminist assumption.

3)A third way of reasoning is a derived fromthe second, and refers to development. Indevelopingcountrieswomenfaceadoubleriskofdiscrimination:theyarevulnerablebecauseofthesurroundingpoverty,andaswomentheydonotenjoy the same rights as men. Gender balancethat has become distorted by war, lack of anyresourcesandthelackofRoLwouldmakewomenmorevulnerabletoSV.Thiswayofreasoningcouldbedescribedasadevelopmentalist assumption.

The last assumption mentioned, the developmentalistassumption, is the one that is used most often by theinternationalcommunityandtheUN.Itdoesnottakeadirectstand to the ultimate motives of SV, but claims rather thatpovertyandlackoflegislationcatalyseSV.Fromthisaquestionoflegalitycanberaisedthatif intimesofpeacerapeisnotaclearlyillegalactthatisprosecutedasothercrimeswould,

whatcanbeexpectedduring timesofwar? In that sense itisimportanttopromotetheRoLatalltimes,butinpractice,withoutanacutecrisisthereisnogroundforaninternationalinterventionagainstsexualviolence.

6.3 Sexual violence by context

When rape is described as a war weapon, the underlyingassumption is that the rapist represents the enemy.Nevertheless,rapingcancontinueinapost-conflictphasebycivilians.Thereisscatteredinformation,butafterwarsmaritalandincestuousrapesalsotendtobecomemorecommon,asdoesdomesticviolence.

The DRC is an example of internal displacement as arisk factor for SV. The DRC has a huge problem of internaldisplacement,nearlyonemillionpeoplehavebeendrivenfromtheirhomesintheprovincesofNorthandSouthKivuwhereSVhasbeensaidtobethe“worstintheworld”.Thissuggeststhatthemixofanymilitarybeingclosetowomenwhostayin socially disrupted conditions contributes enormously tothe likelihoodof rape.The importanceof thecontext-factorhasbeenincreasinglyrecognisedsincethebeginningsofthe1990s.AsanexampleofoneofthemostsuccessfuldescriptiveclassificationsisarecentWiltonParkconferencesummarythatdistinguishesSVinthreecategoriesinthefollowingway:36

1)Widespreadandsystematic,whereitisdeployedasamethodbyarmedgroups;

2)Widespread and opportunistic, where armedgroupsandordinaryciviliansexploitconflictandchaostoattackwomen;

3)Isolated and random, where SV is a domesticandcriminalmatter that isunrelatedtopoliticalstrategyortointernationalpeaceandsecurity.

The advantage of this kind of an approach is that itleaves aside all assumptions about gender relations, levelof development or culture. It leaves out any speculationsabouttheultimatelyunknownmotivesofSV,anditcanthusbe agreed by a wide public. The inherent problem of thedevelopmentalistassumptionisthatitcombinesdevelopment,povertyandgenderperspectiveandisthatitisapologeticbyclaimingultimately thatmenrapebecausetheyaremen,orbecausethereisunderdevelopmentandpoverty.

36 WiltonParkReport2008.


7 Socialconsequencesofsexualviolence

Threat of SV creates an obstacle to women’s and girls’participation in public life. If one woman is raped, othersbecomeinfluencedbyfear.Still,thereisageneraldifficultytoacceptthatSVmayhappentoanywoman,andwomenwhoexperienceSVaregivennocredencewhentheyreportbeingassaulted.Rapeisnotconsideredasacrimeforaslongasitcan be portrayed like having sex without force. In times ofpeace,awoman’ssexualconductbeforetheactisexaminedandponderedindetail.

Althoughtheconsentelementhasbeenabolishedintheinternationallaw,andalthoughitisnotdifficulttoagreewitha commonsense understanding that during war conditionsthereisnotalkaboutwoman’sconsent,thebasicpresumptionis that rape is somehowawoman’sown fault isdifficult toabolishcompletely.Beingrapedremainsastigma.Moreover,the absence of compensation, even in symbolic form, torapedwomen(whilestillpunishingtheperpetrators)conveysa message that damage made to women is not worth ofindemnifying.

As the war context in itself increases the vulnerabilityof women and civilians in general to be sexually assaulted,conflictsbringacertainoversexualisationoftheenvironmentin which sex becomes increasingly sold or exchanged forfoodoraccommodation.Thereisasayingthatgoes,inawarsituation“violencebecomessexyandsexbecomesviolence”.

Insocietieswherewomen’snetworksarebasedonkinship,atypicalconsequenceforawomanwhoisrapedisthatshebecomes rejected by her husband and ostracised from hercommunity. It isdifficulttoget (re)married if rape isknown.The rejection of raped women and especially those womenwho are injured has clearly been documented by individualcasesinseveralmedicalstudies.

Whenbeingrapedmeansthereisathreatoftotalrejectionforwomen,italsomeansthatthesphereoftheirdailytasksbecomes narrowed. Going to school equals a threat to beraped,aswellasgoing towaterpoints tobringwater,andthereisnoculturalmechanismforlocalmentoprotectwomenduringtimesofthreat.Bythesekindsofchainreactions,rapewavescanparalyseentirevillages,townsandregions.Overthecourseoftime,agenerationofwomenmaythushavegapsintheirbasiceducation.Assuch,genderrelationsthathave

becomedysfunctionalbygeneralisedSVcantakegenerationstobecomebalancedagain.

In the DRC the most concerned Kivu provinces havesufferednotonly from large-scale SV,but also the rejectionofSVvictimshasbecomeamassphenomenon.ThehospitalsofPanziinSouthKivuandHealAfricainNorthKivu,togetherwith many NGOs that organise vocational training, havebecome isletsof rejectedwomen. TheendemicSV thathascontinued since the beginning of the 1990s has pushedwomenandgirlstothemarginsofsociety.ItislikelythatSVhasalreadyhaddemographic implicationsonthehouseholdlevelbyanincreaseofsinglemothers.Unfortunately,unlikeinthecaseofKinshasa,suchresearchhasnotyetbeendoneinEasternCongo.37

Inthisregard,onebranchoftheHumanRights-orientedapproachcallsforsymbolic reparations.Thismeansthatintheabsenceofpossibilities to compensate thedamagedone tocertain groups and individuals that were falsely prosecuted;thestateshouldexpressapublicapologyforitsmistreatmentofcitizensandacknowledgeitsfailuretoprotectthem.Ifthispolicyiseverimplemented,apublicapologycanplayalargeroleinthelaterstageofpeacebuilding38

In practice, in the DRC many NGOs organise activitiesthattrainrejectedwomentoartisanalprofessionsinordertohave a livelihood that can help them to sustain themselveseconomically. There should however be more variation intraining;itisstrikingthatmostofthevocationaltrainingaimedforwomenareforartisanalandagriculturalprofessions.

37 OnKinshasaseedeHerdt2004.38 ApologyandforgivenessarecentralvaluesinChristianity,

whereasoutside itssphereapologyfromauthoritycanbeinterpretedaslosingone’sface,orasaprovocation.


8 Physicalconsequencesofsexualviolence

During timesofpeace,physical injuries resulting fromrapesare in most cases limited to tearing and bruises.39 In rapes,there isalwaysriskofsexually transmitted infectionsaswellasunwantedpregnancies.Permanentgynaecologicalharmisrare.Physical traumasofrapetendtobemuchmoresevereandcommonduringwars.The injuriesmaybeduetogangrape, detention for sexual slavery, or intruding objects toorifices of the victim. Rape also provokes miscarriages anduntimely deliveries. The eventual unwanted pregnancies intheir turn leadtoabortionsandrisksofcomplications.Risksincreaseimmenselyinamateurabortions.40

The causal relations in between SV, poverty anddevelopmentareundeniablyclearwhenitcomestophysicalconsequencesof rape. In theDRConeof themostdifficultconsequences of rape is fistula, which is a passagewaybetweentwoorgansorvessels.41Theyresultinincontinenceofurineand/orfaeces.Fistulasarealsocausedbyprolongedchildbirth.Theseobstetricfistulascouldbepreventedbycaesareansection.Therefore,theoccurrenceoffistulasreflectsthestateofmaternalhealth.Furthermore,theoccurrenceofobstetricfistulasisalsoanindicatorofdevelopmentandwoman’sstatusingeneralbecausetheyoccurmore likelyatyoungageandshorttimespacingbetweendeliveries.Whenfistulaisaresultof SV, it is calleda traumaticfistula. Fistulas canfinally alsobecausedunintentionallybyhealthcareworkers.Inthatcasethey are classified as iatrogenic fistulas.42 The World HealthOrganization(WHO)estimatesthatapproximatelytwomillionwomen have and an untreated fistula and approximately

39 Loue&Sajatovich2007.40 Onsrud&al.2008.41 Ahuka Ona & al. 2008; Taback 2008; A fistula may

occurbetweenvaginaorrectum,whichiscalledarecto-vaginalfistula,orbetweenvaginaandbladderwhichiscalledarecto-vaginalfistula.

42 Theoccurrenceofiatrogenicfistulasisindirectrelationtoallotherfistulas.Asfistulascauseincontinenceandaninabilitytohavechildren,womenwhogetfistulasrisktobecomeabandonedbytheirhusbandsandostracisedbytheircommunities.InEuropeandindevelopedcountriesingeneral,fistulasarenowadaysrarebecausetheyhavebeeneradicatedbyaccess tocaesareansection. Italsomeansthatthereisnotmuchspecialisationtosurgeryoftraumaticgynaecologicalfistulas.

100000womendevelopfistulaeachyear.Nowadays,fistulaismostprevalentinsub-SaharanAfricaandAsia.

In Eastern Congo, where obstetric fistulas and sexualassaultsarebothcommon,womenmayexperiencebotheventsby coincidence.43 A woman also has a high risk of gettingan iatrogenicfistuladuring the treatmentof trauma,duringcurettageormiscarriagebecausethehealthcareworkerscanbeunprofessionalandhospitaltechnologyisofpoorquality.Inpractice,manyfistulasthatarereportedtohavebeencausedbySVareinfactofobstetricoriatrogenicorigin.Nonetheless,both iatrogenic and obstetric fistulas are indirectly relatedto SV because had the woman not been raped, she wouldnothavehadamiscarriage,abortionoranuntimelydelivery.Therefore,ithasbeensuggestedbyexpertsofgynaecologicalfistulasthatallfistulasthatrelatetoSVshouldbeclassifiedastraumaticfistulas.44

Indevelopedcountries,arapetraumaisunderstoodasapsychologicalone.Itisnotwidelydispersedinformationthatinwarrapes,atleastinCentralAfrica,correctivegynaecologicalsurgeryisoftenneededandthoseoperationsrequiresurgeonswitha lotofexperienceand sufficientlyequippedhospitals.Furthermore, the post-operatory phase of fistula repairoperations requires specialised care, it has ahighdegreeofcomplications and the problem of fistulas may still reoccurduring the patient’s next delivery. Fistulas are complex anduniqueasanysofttissuetrauma.Thereisstillmisinformationabouttheeaseandthestandardprice($300USD)ofsurgicalrepairoperationseveninanUN-fundedweb-page45.Likewise,there are exaggerated figures about the number of repairoperationscarriedoutinprivatehospitalsintheDRC.

Inmanycountries,accesstoasafeabortionisimpossibleor restricted and illegal abortions are frequent, especially inAfrica.TheMaputoPlanofActioncontainsrecommendationsto guarantee safe abortion, but it is still not ratified by allcountries and it has been attacked by a conservative lobbyworkingagainstit.46

43 Onsrud&al.2008.44 Ibid.45 http://www.endfistula.org/donate.htm.46 MaputoPlanofAction2006.


Finally,as for immediate response to rape, there isneedfor an immediate post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP), a specialkit (called Kit-PEP) which is meant for emergency responseandhasbeeninventedtoprotectindividualsexposedtorape,unwantedpregnancy,HIVandsexuallytransmittedinfections.Themedicationshouldbetakenwithin72hoursofexposure,andthetreatmentshouldbefollowedandcontrolledwithinthefollowingmonths.


9 UNSCR1820anditscriticism

SV had never been the initial and independent issue forinternational concern until the UNSC voted for a resolutionspecificallyagainstSVon June19,2008. Itwasdeclared toreaffirm Resolution 1325 from the year 2000 and to be asupportingelementforitsfullimplementation.IturgestheUNto impose sanctions on violators and requests the SecretaryGeneraltocreatealistofmeasuresforminimisingtheriskofSV and to formulateguidelines for peacekeepers toprotectwomen.

TheResolutionpresentsargumentsthatareconfirmationsor reformulations of previous arguments already implicit inUNSCR1325.TheaimofUNSCR1820istospecificallytargetSVbyrecognisingadirectrelationshipbetweenthewidespreadand/orsystematicuseofSVasaninstrumentofconflictandthemaintenanceofinternationalpeace.UNSCR1820compelsthe internationalcommunity to regardSVasaself standingsecurityissuethatislinkedwithdurablepeace,toexcludeSVfrom amnesty proportions, and to make SV prevention andpunishment “an obligation and not an aspiration”. It alsocallsforpreventionofSVthrougheffectivemilitaryorpolicetactics and by efforts to end impunity. Beyond the UNSCR1820,therearealsohopesthatitcouldhelpasajuridicaltoolagainst SV within process of disarmament, demobilization,repatriation, reintegration, and resettlement (DDRRR), inmaking higher ranking commanders responsible for endingrapesbyhis inferiors and therefore, ending rapeswouldbestatedasaconditionbeforeanycompensationwouldbegiventohiscapitulatingtroops.

The reception of UNSCR 1820 has not been withoutcriticism.Therewasnorealinnovationinit;Resolution1325hadalreadytakenSVintoaccountandpresent internationallaw already provides means to intervene SV. In that sense,therewasnoneed foranewresolution.Oneparticularbutimportantpoint,1820evenriskstotakeastepbackwardsbystatingthatSVcanconstituteawarcrime.This formulationdilutes the stand of international law that rape committedby a war setting is a war crime. Furthermore, “war tactic”doesnotfitapost-conflictsetting,whichisverycommontohigh incidences of rape and where the rapists are civilians.It is impossibletoputtheblameonachainofcommand inabsence of a military context. Finally, the scope was almost

solely in relation toAfrica: theDRCandDarfur.This in turncanbeviewedasastrategytofocusondemonisingwarsinAfrica instead of tackling the international connections inthoseconflicts.TheResolutioncame throughduring theUSpresidencyoftheCouncil.Oneyearbefore,asimilarresolutionto define rape as a “weapon of war” had failed to passbecauseofoppositionofChina,RussiaandSouthAfrica.

Redefining rape as a war weapon by UNSCR 1820will hopefully call for more attention and give support inprosecutingrapeinamilitarysuperior-subordinaterelationship.Incertaincasesitcanalsohelpinputtingpressureonwarlordsinpeacenegotiations that theyordercessationof rapingascessation of use of other arms. Nevertheless, resorting tometaphorsthatassociaterapetosomethingotherthanarape– war weapon, strategy, genocide, epidemics, metasthasis,unfortunateby-productofamilitaryconflict,genderdisaster–isnotinitselfasolution.Rather,renamingrapeagainandagainissymptomaticofproblemstoconsideritasawarcrimethatneedsnoextrajustification.


10Conclusion

For ages, rape in armed conflicts has been considered assomething that has “always” taken place alongside thebattle.Alternatively, the issuehasbeenpassedand silencedassomething“toohorrible to imagine”. In recentwarsandarmed conflicts that are intra state and take place in theclose proximity of civilians, SV in conflicts has increased yetagain. Another difference is the role of the media; newsservicehasdevelopedandSVismorelikelytocomeintothepublicdiscourse through themedia.Thanks to internationalconcernandtherapiddevelopmentofinternationallaw,actsofviolenceagainstwomenareconsideredaslegalcrimes.

SVhasbeenusedasasystematicwarweaponwithrationalaimstogovernpopulationsbyterror,butSValsorepresentsone of the most irrational sides of human behaviour. Warconditions seem to fuel the emergence of environmentswhere cultural rules that regulate sexual behaviour vanish,andthecontextbecomesariskforSV.Still,noenvironmentcangeneratebehaviourthathasnobiologicalbasis.Thereforeunderstanding theemergencemechanismsofmassiveSV inwarswouldrequireinvolvementofthebiologicsciencesandneurosciences.Littleisknownabouthowitisphysiologicallypossibletoperformrapebyorderofathirdperson.Whataretherolesofdesire,satisfaction,inhibitionandguiltinessinthatscenario?

Patriarchyorothervariationsofmaledominatedcultureisoftentakenforgrantedtobetheimpetusforrapestobeusedas a weapon. However, according to the same logic, thosepatriarchistculturalattitudesthatregardwomenaspropertyofmenalsohaveaninteresttoprotectwomenagainstSVinawarcontext.TheproblemofoutburstsofSV inwarsmayhavenothingtodowithwoman’sstatusbecausetheinterestisnottorapelowercreatures.Thereisnoclearevidencethatsubordinatewomenareeasiertargetstorapeinwars,orviceversa, that emancipated and empowered women would bebetterprotected fromSVduringarmed conflicts. Therefore,thereshouldbeperhapsbetteradjustmentintheassumptionsof theUNResolutions that linkSVwith theparticipationofwomeninsocietyanddevelopmentissues.

Inotherwords,thesamesetofculturalattitudesthatinawarcontextcanjustifytheuseofrapeasawarweaponisalsolesstolerantinwhatcomestobeingattackedbyrapingone’s

ownwomen.The lackof individuallydirectedcompensationfor the female victim in the past or in traditional societiesonlyshowslackofindividualisticthinking.Assuch,traditionalcustomsinwhichthecompensationtakesformbyexchanginggoodsbetweenfamilies,orwhererevengeisdirectedagainsttheassaulter’skinorcommunity,orinwhichwomenarejustleftontheirown,doesnot in itselfprovea“lowstatus”ofeitherof the sexes.Development, equality andparticipationarevitalvaluesandaims,butSVasaproblemisindependentfromthem.

ThefactthattheSVworstintheworldtakesplaceinanareaofCentralAfricawhich isasanarea that isnotclearlypatrilinear should not be overlooked, if cultural aspects aretobelinkedwiththetopic.Fromthepointviewofdiplomacyin peacebuilding, there could be common grounds enoughinbetweendifferentactors–states,INGO’s,localauthorities–toworkagainstSVasaparticularformofviolencethat isconsideredasparticularly immoral.SVasawarweaponcanbeoutlawed in the sameway and for the same reasons aslandminesoraschemicalweaponscanbeprohibitedbecausethey are cruel and target civilians. It might have been awiserstrategytogostraighttothepointofSVwithoutanybackgroundtheorythatcanbeinterpretedasideologicalorasfeminist–andthereforeaprovocation.

UNSCR1325quiteexplicitlyurgedtheUNMemberStates,“to take specialmeasures toprotectwomenandgirls fromgender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms ofsexualabuse,andallotherformsofviolenceinsituationsofarmed conflict” and to “adopt a gender perspective” withregards“specialneedsofwomenandgirlsduringrepatriationand resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration andpost-conflict reconstruction”. Special attention to protectwomeninwarandpost-conflictisneeded,butintheUNSCRsit isnotstatedwhoshouldprotectwomen.Womenarethesubjectsandwomenaretheobjects,butthereisnomessageaddressed tomen inUN resolutions.Strategies toempowerwomen can end up piling more responsibility on womenthemselveswhentheybecomede factovictimsinwars.

As SV has now been entitled as a “tactic of war” byUN resolution 1820, a parallel change should take place inconceptualizingthevictimsofrapeaswarvictims,andnotas


“raped(women)”.AtpresentinCentralAfrica,forinstance,thevictimsofSVareconceptualisedasasocialproblem.Theattention that is given to victims of SV consists of makingthem objects of various kinds of counselling, reintegrationprogrammes and charity. In this respect, the interventionofmanyNGOagendas to“empowerwomen”–by relyingonUNSCR1325 – can also negatively interfere with rebuildingthe RoL because they create an illusion that a retrainingprogramordonatingagoatforwomancanreplacejuridicalcompensation.

Thus,togetherwithimpunity,theabsenceofcompensationmechanisms for the victims gives a green light for rapes tocontinue.That,ifanything,isamessagethatawomanhasnostatusorvalue.She isvaluelessbecauseshecanbeharmedwithout being compensated for the violence she enduredbyanymeasureofvalue.Intoday’sworld,valueismeasuredandexchangedbymoney.IntheUNapproachthathasbeenadopted in peacebuilding and civilian crisis management,womenareconsideredtohave“specialneeds”inanarmedconflict setting. Special needs are mentioned altogether 8timesinUNSCR1820.Receivingmonetarycompensationforbeingavictimofviolenceinwar,beitSVornon-SVisnotaspecial need, but supposed to be a normal practise in RoL.The question arises whether money should be transformedto some kind of gender-money unless it could be paid forwomen?

Intraditionalsocieties,rapeshavebeensanctionedandithasaprice.Apricecantakeformasaviolentrevengetotheperpetratorandhiscommunity(perhapsintheformofarape)orbyreparationmeasuresdeliveredtothevictim’scommunity.Thesekindsoftraditionalcustomscanbeseenasbackwardpractises that violate woman’s rights as an individual, as ajuridical subject and person. Nonetheless, at present, theinternationalcommunityisinfactactinginthesamewaywhenit passes over the whole question of compensation for thevictimherself.StrengtheningRoLwillbelefthalf-doneforaslongastherightsofthevictimsarenottakenseriously.PerhapsitisonlybyimposingapriceonrapeandbyaddressingittothevictimherselforhimselfthattheinternationalcommunitywillfinallyputwordsintopractiseinthebattleagainstSV.Inpractice,asmanyoftheassaultersareindigentbythetimeoftrial, thiswould requirean international compensation fundforvictimsofSV.

Such an international fund would likely raise questionsabouttheresponsibilityofthestatetowardsitsowncitizen-victims.Iftheinternationalcommunitycoversthereparations–underatransitionaljusticeforinstance–doesitnotreleasethe state of its responsibility? The question is legitimate intermsofprinciples,butinpracticeitshouldbeseenincontrastto the sums of money already budgeted in peacekeepingand civilian crisis management operations. EU countries arewilling topay riskandhardshipallowances to itsowncrisismanagementpersonnelforworkingindangerousareas.TheideathatriskistobecompensatedbymoneyisinternalisedfortheEUcitizens.Theideathatthedemobilisedsoldiersshouldgetamonetaryrewardforturninginarmsfromallsourcesisequallywidelyaccepted.Bothexamplesarebasedonthought

thatultimatelyitisaquestionofcostsofpeacebuilding.Itisthusonly amatter of perspective to includemoneypaid tofemalevictimsalsoasacostforpeacebuilding.

If eradicating SV as a war weapon is to be the prioritynumberone,itisnotnecessarytolinkotheradditionalgoalsabout development, gender and women’s empowermentin the strategy.Theapproachof international law to regardSVas anautonomouswar crime shouldhavebeenusedassuch.UNSCR1820’sformulationtodefineSVaswartacticstillprovidesanopportunitytoassociatevictimsofSVtovictimsof war or to wounded soldiers who are thereby entitled tocompensation. In any case, important progress has alreadybeenmadeinidentifyingSVasanentityof itsownandthelink between war and SV has been established enough inorder to create at least some constant policies against war-relatedsexualassaults.


11Recommendations

ItiswidelyacceptedthatSVhasmedical,juridical,socialandpsychologicaldimensions. In the scarcityof resources, thosefieldscanendupinaconflictofinterests.Fromthepointofviewofthevictim,thefirstpriorityisalwaysmedical,andfromthepointofviewofthelocalgovernmentthefirstpriorityistorestoreRoLandtoendimpunity.Inpractice,allactionsbringcosts:financingisneededtocoversurgicaloperationsandtoconstructhospitals.Financingisequallyneededtobuildpenalestablishments,toorganisecorrectionaltreatmentandtotrainprosecutors.ItisjustifiedtoclaimthatrestoringRoLworksasprevention by creating security, and it is equally justified toclaim thatomitting the victims’ rights is a violationofbasicrights,corruptstheRoLandaddsfueltoSV,whichisathreattohumansecurity.

In practice there are different actors with differentmandates.Some,liketheICRCandMédecinsSansFrontières

(MSF),concentrateondirectcatastropheaidwithexclusivelyhumanitarianmissionsandthedurationofthesemandatesismeanttobeshort.Thepeacemissionsthattargetchangingcertainstructuresofthesociety(SSRforinstance)havelongermandates. Then there is a wide variety of organisations fordevelopment co-operation that are specialised in long termdevelopmentprojectsthataimatchangingthesocietyinthelong run, for example to correct gender-balance in chronicconflictareasbytryingtorebalanceortochangethegenderroles.

Inthedomainofimmediatepeacebuildingmeasuresinapost-conflictsettingrealisticexpectationsareneeded.Table2belowproposessomelikelihoodsofsuccessininterventionsofciviliancrisismanagement:

TABLE 2: What is doable in a short term intervention? Chances of peacebuilding vs. war-related sexual violence (–lesslikelihoodtosuccess+morelikelihoodtosuccess)

Guaranteenon-repetitionofoutbreaksofSV -

ProvidemonitoringandtechnologicalsolutionsforreportingcasesofSV -

ChangelocalperceptionsonSV –

Ensuredeliveryandavailabilityofpost-prophylaxiskits(Pep-Kits)tovillages. +

IdentifyculturesthatarevulnerableforSVinordertoenforcemonitoringandprotection -

IdentifyingenvironmentsthatarevulnerableforSVinordertoenforcemonitoringandprotection +

Preventarapedwoman’sexclusionfromsociety -

Guaranteequalityofcertaindispensariesthatprovidehealthcareavailablerape +

Empowervictimsofrapewhosufferfromphysicalinjuries –

Enforcecapacitybuildingofhealthywomen +


Faced with the complexity of the war-related SV it isevidentthatnosinglestrategycanaddressbothitscausesandeffects.Thatiswhymultidisciplinaryapproachesarenecessary.Theirusedependsnaturallyonthenatureofthecrisisarea.

11.1 Coordination and critical selection of cooperation partners working against sexual violence

Inmissions,oneofthemainproblemsineffortstoeradicateSVisthelackofcoordinationinbetweenpolicedepartments,health services, prosecutors, eventual social integrationproviders,INGOs,NGOsandUN-basedagenciesthatallhavesome kind of agenda to work against SV. Sometimes thereisgeneralignoranceaboutwhichorganisationisundertakingvariousactivities.AsSVhasbecomeofafashionabletopicforfundraising,theagendaofmanyNGOsisrelationforfightingagainstSV,but sometimes theirclaimed“holisticapproach”proves to be a veil for non-professionalism. Therefore, inrationalising coordination on the field, a particularly criticalattitude should be adopted towards the candidates for co-operation.Theprincipleofsupportingthestate’sownershiptoitsowncrisisshouldbeusedasaselectionprincipleforlistingorganisationsthatdonothaveexplicitactionplansbutprovide,forinstancevictimcounselling.Anotherselectionprinciplefordetermining trustworthy agencies is in relation to researchanddatacollection.Anyorganisationshouldberegardedassuspectiftheypublishdatawithoutreportingtheirmethodsofcollectionandarenotabletoprovidedocumentationwhenasked.

11.2 Collect better data and work against misinformation on sexual violence

Data on the magnitude of sexual information should bebased solely on the incidences of rape cases and never oncalculationsandestimationsderivedfromepidemiology.Thekindsofapproximationsthatareoftenpublishedinthemediaabout a certain percentage of women being raped do notfulfil the requirements for being considered a quantitativeresearch method to the phenomenon of SV. They can alsobe regardedasdegradingwomenof a certain country, andfinally,theyimplythatthatSVprevalencewouldbeasbanalasdiabetesortheprevalenceoftuberculosis.MisinformationregardingtheamountsofrapesshouldnotbetoleratedasithasanegativeeffectonthefightagainstSV.Oncerevealed,alltheinformationonSVlosescredibility.

In collecting the incident report, cooperation betweenhealthcareworkersandpoliceshouldbecoordinated.Notthathospitalswouldsubmitidentifiableinformationonitspatientsto thepolice–numerousmisunderstandingson thefieldoflocal and internationalworkersmust be taken into account–butthedifferencebetweenthestatistical,anonymousdataanddatainwhichidentificationisessential(registers)shouldbeclearlydefinedandunderstood.Creatingpracticalmodelsforreportingthecaseswouldbeanotherareaofcapacitybuildingthatshouldbecarriedoutby internationalactors.Thereare

many possibilities for improvement in creating better formsfor medical reports and crime reports. Translation into locallanguages would facilitate the administration enormously;however, sometimes thenational lawsonofficial languagescan create an obstacle for this. Various technical solutions,such as satellite-based communicators could be consideredinsteadofgatheringinformationonpaper.Anotherpossibilitytobe investigated isallowingtothevictimofSVtomakeacrime report regarding the offence at the reception of thedoctor’s office: either the doctors could be accorded therequired juridical rights to write the crime report, or othercandidatescouldbetrainedas“parajurists”.Finally,thiskindofknowledgemanagementshouldbeusedforcoordinatingdatabasesbetweenmedicalexpertsandpolice.

11.3 Bringing together local spiritual leaders to search for a common ground

On the field in crisis areas, any multidisciplinary approachagainst SV requires a minimum common understandingbetweenthe localauthoritiesandkeyopinion leadersabouttheessenceofSV.Theactual localauthoritiesshouldbethefirst individuals identifiedandapproached.Commongroundcan be made about identifying SV, but there may be lesscommongroundasfortothereasonsbeyondSV,aboutwhotheassaulters areandabout the root causesof the conflictitself. Churches and religious NGOs tend to associate thecausesof SV toabreakdownofmoral inwhichpeopleareno more being taught about religion. In finding a commonstrategy,disputesmayariseaboutwhosemoralvaluesshouldberestoredinthewar-tornregion.

IncoordinatingthemanyactorsthatworkagainstSVthereshouldbea consciouseffort towardspluralismon the crisisarea. No single actor should claim a monopoly in knowinghow toeradicateSVorhow toheal communitiesdamagedbySV.Ideally,allthelocalreligiousleadersandleadersofasmanyNGOsaspossiblecouldformulateacommonresolutionagainstSV.

11.4 Encouraging states to ratify international agreements with regard to sexual violence

AsforsupportingthestateauthoritiesinincorporationofrulesrelatingtoSV,internationallawprovidesanappropriatemodelforreformingnationallawsonsexualcrimesatnationallevel.Inthisregard,theDRC’sadoptionofnewlawsonSVinJune2006isanencouragingexamplethatafailedstatecancarryoutprogressive lawreforms.TheDRC’s lawonSVhasbeenpublished in modern and clearly understandable languagein the form of a small booklet that is easy to distribute.Paragraphs about rape have also been translated into locallinguafrancalanguages.

Thestatesshouldalsobeencouragedtoratifyinternationalagreementson reproductive rights,namely the internationallaw treaties, and the Rome Statute on Reproductive Rights.Forcefulimpregnationismentionedasaspecificcrimeunderinternational law, and logically, banning abortion for those


who have been forcefully impregnated (at least for reasonsofethniccleansing forexample) shouldalsobe regardedascrime. However, in the international law as well as in theRomestatute,lawsconcerningpregnancyareleftfornationallegislation.47 Concerning the African continent, the MaputoPlan of Action stands for authorising medical abortion incasesofsexualassault,rape,incestandwhenthecontinuedpregnancyendangers themental andphysicalhealthof themotherorthelifeofthemotherorthefoetus.Still, it isnotratifiedbyallAfricannations.Inpractice,theissueislikelytocausemanycontroversies,butadiscussionaboutthefateofwomenwhoareforcedtocarryforcedpregnanciestotheendshouldbebroughtforwardandexamined.

11.5 Eliminate and/or monitor risk environments for sexual violence

Itwouldbeidealifanearlywarningsystemcouldbedevelopedforrapewaves.Itwould,however,betoodifficulttopredictit from thebasisof the local culture. In recenthistory therehavebeenoutbreaksofSVinJapan,inSouth-EasternEuropeaswellas inCentralAfrica. Instead, it ispossible to identifyrape-riskyenvironments.

Sinceitisknownthattheproximityofinternallydisplacedwomen with any military is a combination that is likely toproduceSV,anythingshouldbemadeinordertopreventthecreationofsuchanenvironment.Thereisnoneedtoidentifyearly warning signals of SV because an area with singlewomendrivenfromtheirhomesinproximityofsoldiersshouldinitselfberegardedasanearlywarning.Oncearefugeeareahasbeenformed,thereshouldbesomekindofanimmediateresponseplanthatcontainsasufficientreserveofkitsofpost-exposureprophylaxesandjuridicalcounselling.

11.6 Initiate or support national policy in regards to the children conceived of rape

Living conditions of children who are born out of rape arelikely to violate Declaration of the Rights of the Child. Anyagendaagainst largelyspreadSVshouldthus includeaplanin regards to organising adoption counselling. The role ofthe state in adoption services shouldbe supported in ordertostrengthentheprincipleofNationalOwnershipandalsoinordertoavoidthedangerofadoptionservicesthatarelinkedtohumantrafficking.

11.7 Strengthening rule of Law by emphasising the rights of victims

EnforcementofRoL isalwaysneededtostopSVinconflictsand in dealing with its consequences. In peace operations,as in theprocessof rebuilding the state,a specificmessageshould be clear that an eventual new legislation on SV orappealing to international law in systematic rape does notjustify the assumption that SV was accepted in any given

47 Sackeallers2005.

war zone only until a prohibitive and punitive law wasestablished. Otherwise, there is a risk that local populationas well as traditional authorities reject juridical innovationsas encroachment. Ideally, in presenting the new law or anymessageaboutpunishabilityofhereshouldbeabridgingtopreviousnationallegislation,religiouslaworlocalmoralcodethatusedtoregulatesexualbehaviour.

Victim’srightsshouldberegardedasanessentialelementofestablishingRoL.ApersonwhohasexperiencedSVshouldbeguaranteedtherighttobetreatedasanyperson injuredinanarmedconflict.Classifyingvictimsofwar-relatedrapesappropriately aswar victims insteadof victimsof SVor just“rapedwomen”andassociatingthemwiththewar-woundedcould provide the critical impetus to consider victims of SVasindividualsubjectswhoareentitledtocompensation.Thiswould also require enforcing collection from the sentencedassaulters. Inpractice, thiswouldnecessitateestablishinganinternationalfoundationbyUNorEUforvictimsofrapes inwars.

11.8 Integrated training on sexual violence to courses on crisis management

Unlikechemicalweaponsorlandmines,SVasawarweaponisbarelyasubjectonwhichthereshouldbespecialcoursesonpeacebuilding.InformationaboutSVshouldbeintegratedtodifferentcoursesrelatedtopeacebuildingandallpre-missiontrainingwherecivilians,policeormilitarypersonnelaretrainedbefore going on missions abroad. A course module on SVshouldcontainbasicinformationoninternationallawandthevarious formsof SV. Inpre-mission training there shouldbeinformation about local administrative practises on SV, suchas theprocedurewithmedical certificates, the local contextofRoL,aswellastheavailabilityofprosecutorsandprisons.Ideallyitshouldcontaininformationonlocalcustomarylawsbyaprofessionalanthropologist.

11.9 raising awareness

AmongthefirstthingsproposedagainstSVinpeacebuildingis “raising awareness”. Yet, there is too many awarenesscampaignsbyradioandbyposterswhichrisk trivialisingSV.Portrayingacertaingroup(womenandchildren)asapossibletarget of mistreatment is dubious because it also recreatesthestereotype imagesofvictimisedwomen. In the longrunitcanprolongandperpetuatemisbalanceingenderrelations.Inthemediathereisalreadyhypearoundthetopicofrapeininternalbattlesanditisalmostexcessivelyreportedasbarbaricnarratives.

Thebeststraight-to-the-matterapproachistoconcentrateon informing the public about the law – provided thatparagraphs outlawing SV do exist – and if not, about theinternational lawand thepunishabilityof SV. There is still alotofmisinformationaboutrapebeingahopelesscrimetobeprosecuted.


Inmanycountries,informingthegeneralpublicaboutlawreformsrequiresdifferentapproachesinurbanandruralareas.IthasbeenfoundbyanNGOintheDRCthat inruralareaswherepeoplearelessliterate,picturesanddiscussioneventsaremoresuccessful inconveyinginformationaboutSVthanwrittenbookletsandposters,whereas in townspicturesareno more that efficient. In organising public events on SV isappropriatetobepreparedthatcertain issuescanupsettheaudienceandstealattention.Outlawingmaritalrapecanbesuchanissue,aswellassymmetryofSV,whetherawomancanrapeaman.48

48 Kabusa&Mbalamya2006.


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AhukaOna,Longombe,ClaudeKaserakaMasumbuko&JospehRuminjo(2008):“FistulaandTraumaticGenitalInjuryfromsexualviolenceinaConflictSettinginEasternCongo:CaseStudies.”reproductive Health Matters,16(31):132–141.

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Reintegration in Aceh IndonesiaOpinionsoftheFinnishciviliancrisismanagementexperts

Tommi Niemi

ThepurposeofthisarticleistoexaminetheopinionsoftheFinnishciviliancrisismanagement

expertsinAcehaboutthereintegrationoftheex-combatantsinAceh.Thisarticleisbasedon

interviewsconductedduringautumn2006.TheinterviewsaimedtofindouthowtheFinnish

civiliancrisismanagementexpertsunderstoodtheconceptofthereintegrationinthelightof

civiliancrisismanagement(CCM)context,methodsandgoals.Anotheraspectanalysedinthis

articleisthequestionaboutthesuccessofthereintegrationinAceh.DidtheFinnishcivilian

crisismanagementexpertsfindthereintegrationinAcehtobeafailureorsuccess?1

1 ThearticlewasfinishedinDecember2007.


1 BackgroundandcontextoftheconflictinAceh

1.1 Disarmament, Demobilisation and reintegration

Peacebuildinginconflicttornsocietiesisalwaysacomplicatedtask.Theproblemisthatonehastoworkinanenvironmentthat is characterised by weak political and social structures,uncertaintyandinsecurity.Inthiskindofsituationtheaimofdisarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, (DDR), is tostrengthentheoverallsecuritysituation.2Inthelongruntheaimof theDDRprocess is to create stability inpost-conflictsocieties.3Today, theDDRprocessesconstitutean importantpartofmanypeacekeepingand reconstructionprogrammesin post-conflict areas.4 Despite the fact that disarmament,demobilisation and reintegration are linked to each other,it should not be defined too strictly as a continuum wheredisarmamentisfollowedbydemobilisationanddemobilisationby reintegration. DDR should be understood more flexiblybecauseitmightbenecessarytocontinuedisarmamentevenifsomegroupsofcombatantshavealreadybeendemobilised.5

In the disarmament phase arms, ammunition andexplosives are collected, controlled and disposed. Theobjectsofdisarmamentcanbebothcombatantsandcivilianpopulation. The aim of the disarmament is to reduce thenumber of weapons in the society. In this way it tries todiminishthethreatofviolence.Onawiderscaledisarmamentis seeking to provide an environment that facilitates thetransition from conflict to peace. Disarmament is normallytakingplaceduringaperiodwhenthepartiesgivinguparmsandthelocalpopulationarestillpartlyunsureofthedurabilityofpeace.6Itshouldalsobekeptinmindthatbygivinguptheirarms,civiliansandespeciallycombatantsarealsogivingupthephysicalandeconomicsecuritythatthearmshaveguaranteedsofar.Whengivingupthearmstheyarehopingthatpeace

2 UNDepartmentofPeacekeepingOperations1999,16.3 StockholmInitiative2006a,13–14.4 Gleichmannetal.2004,12;Knight&Özerdem2004,

499.5 Nilsson2005,31–33;UNSecurityCouncil2000,8.6 Gleichmannetal.2004,29.

and its possibilities are better options than continuing theconflict.7

Demobilisation refers to a formal discharge of activecombatantsfromthearmedforcesorfromanarmedgroup.Thenumbersofarmedforcesarecutoffortheyaredisbandedaspartofabigger transition fromconflict topeace.To thecombatants themselves demobilisation means that they aregivingupthecombatantidentity.Bytakingofftheiruniform,if they have one, they become civilians. The target groupsfor disarmament and demobilisation are in many casesoverlapping but they are not identical. Demobilisation canhappeninmanyways.Mostlythecombatantsarebroughttothecampsthatarebuiltforthedemobilisation.Inothercases,demobilisation can simply constitute the delivering of theuniformandaceremonythatsymbolisesthetransitionfromthemilitarylifetocivilianlife.Demobilisationcanalsohappenwithoutanyformalprocess.Afteraconflictthemembersofanarmedgroupcansimplyleavebehindtheirarmsandunit.8

ThethirdpartoftheDDRprocessisthereintegration.First,the reintegration referred to the programmes dealing withthe economic assimilation of the demobilised combatants.Later,moreemphasishasbeenputon the social aspectsofreintegration.Theintegrationofthecombatantstothelocalcivilsocietyhasbeenconsideredasimportant.Oneofthelatestimprovementshasbeentherecognitionoftheimportanceofpoliticalreintegration.Therefore,thegoalofthereintegrationcanbeconsideredasasocietalprocessaimingateconomic,political and social assimilation of ex-combatants and theirfamiliesintothecivilsociety.9

Originally, theDDRprocesswasunderstoodasamilitaryquestion and emphasis was put on the disarmament anddemobilisation. This was however insufficient to ensure theintegrationofthecombatantsintotheciviliansociety.Thisiswhyadevelopmentfocuswasaddedintotheprocess.10Today,reintegration is connected both to the development andsecurityquestions.Becauseoftheseconnectionstheproblems

7 Knight&Özerdem2004,506.8 Gleichmannetal.2004,45–48.9 Nilsson2005,22–28.10 StockholmInitiative2006a,9.


andquestionsraisedduringthereintegrationaremorediversethan during the disarmament or the demobilisation. Thereintegrationtouchesalsoonother issuessuchaseconomicgrowth and the retraining of the combatants, the issuesthat arise when communities are receiving the returningcombatants,and the issues thatarisewith the reintegrationofgroups thathavespecialneeds, forexamplewomenandchildren.11

The main objects of disarmament, demobilisation andreintegrationarethecombatants.Forexample,thecriteriathatdefinewhowillgetthereintegrationbenefitsarebasedonthedefinitionofcombatant.A“combatant”canbeagovernmentsoldier, a rebel, a cook or a prostitute. In general, peaceagreements12definewhicharmedgroupsarepartoftheDDRprocess,buttheydonotdefinewhatismeantbycombatant.13Incaseswherethecombatantsareaclearlydistinctgroupandthesegroupshavetheirclearlydefinedcommandstructures,thedefinitionofcombatant isnotaproblem. Inthepresentday “new” wars, this is hardly the case because the samepersoncanbeacombatant,arobberoraciviliandependingfromthepointofview.14

Theopinionsofhowextensivelya combatant shouldbedefinedcanbedividedintwo.Thesupportersofthebroaderdefinitionaresayingthatthegoal,buildinghumansecurityviatheDDRprocessnecessitatesasbroaddefinitionaspossible.Thedefinitionofthecombatantshouldcoverallpeoplewhohave been part of the fighting forces as combatants, or insupporting roles.15 These supporting roles canbecomposedof logistical or administrative functions but also somethingelseoutsidethepresentdaymilitaryorganisation.Ifthisisnotdone,theresultcouldbeasituationwhereasexslavedoesnotgetthebenefitsthattheircaptorsaregetting.16

Thenarrowdefinitionarguesthatonlytheoneswhohaveparticipated in direct fighting and their families should beconsideredascombatantswhoareeligibletothereintegrationbenefits. Refugees, communities who are receiving the ex-combatants,andthepeoplewhohavenotparticipatedindirectfightingshouldnotbecountedasbeneficiariesinreintegrationprogrammesorcountedascombatants.Inconflicts,differentgroupshavedifferentneedsandproblems. Ifthesedifferentgroupsare squeezedunder the topic“ex-combatant”, thentheallocationofreintegrationbenefitsisdifficult.Thebroaddefinitionofex-combatantweakenstheeffectivenessof theaid. Other groups, than the armed combatants, should behelpedviaotherreliefprogrammes.17

11 InternationalPeaceAcademy2002,2.12 Look for example the peace agreement between the

government of Sierra Leone and the RevolutionaryUnitedFrontofSierraLeone(RUF)fromtheyear1999athttp://www.sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.html.

13 Eronen&Linden2006,8.14 Specht2003,77.15 Ibid.16 Gleichmannetal.2004,15.17 Nilsson2005,25–26.

1.2 Aceh and GAM

Aceh is situatedon thenorth-westernpartofSumatra.Thepopulation is around four million and the capital is BandaAceh.Themost common spoken language isAcehand theofficial language is Bahasa Indonesia.18 Aceh is one of therichest parts of Indonesia in regard to its natural resources,both oil and natural gas. This turned Indonesia’s economyaround in the 1970s, but the profits flowed to Jakarta tosupport Java’s development or Jakarta-based politicians andmilitarymen.19TodayoilandgasstillaccountforasignificantshareofAceh’sGDPbut inthefuturethissharewilldeclineduetoamajorreductioninAceh’soilreserves.20Agriculture21isatthemomentAceh’smaineconomicalfield.22

The state of Aceh was founded in the early sixteenthcenturyandits“goldenage”occurredintheearlyseventeenthcenturyduringthereignofSultanIskandarMuda1607–1636.AfterthiseratheMalay-governedcosmopolitantradingstateceased to be a significant force outside the northern tip ofSumatra.23 By the 1820s Aceh was again expanding as acommercialandpoliticalpower.Duringthistimeitproducedover half of the world’s supply of pepper.24 Up until theDutchconquestAceh’seconomicandcultural linkagesweretothe IndianOceanandMalayanPeninsula,nottotheJavaseaworlddominatedfirstby the Java then theDutch.25 FortheDutchAcehwastoopowerfulandwealthytoallowittocontinueasanindependentstate.In1873theDutchstartedtheconquestofAcehbuttheAceheneseresistancecontinuedformanydecadesaftertheannexation.26

During the Second World War Aceh alongside withIndonesia was occupied by Japanese. The surrender ofJapanese Emperor in August 1945 left a power vacuum inAceh.27In1945AcheneseleadersdeclaredtheareaaspartoftheRepublicofIndonesia.AtfirsttheRepublicangovernmenthadaverylimitedcapacitytoinfluenceeventsinAceh.Inlate1948andearly1949DaudBereu’eh,militarycommanderofthe province of North Sumatra and an Acehenese religiousleader, demanded formal recognitionofAcehas a separateprovince. During this time the Republican government wasinweakenedpositionandacceptedtheAcehenesedemand.From 1950s onwards Republican government sought toreassert its authority in Aceh. In September 1953 DaudBereu’eh proclaimed Aceh’s secession from the Republic ofIndonesia, and itsadherence to the Indonesian Islamic stateof theDarul Islam. Thiswas followedby a seriesof attacks

18 Reid2006,4–5.19 Taylor2003,365;Brown&Cribb1995,162–163.20 TheWorldBank&BankofIndonesia2009;TheWorld

Bank2005.21 Thisincludesforestryandfishery.22 TheWorldBank&BankofIndonesia2009.23 Ricklefs1993,32–36.24 Ricklefs1993,143–144.25 Reid2003,1.26 Ricklefs1993,143–145.27 Reid2006,105–106.


on army and government posts.28 The goal of the rebellionwas not independence, but rather regional autonomy andproclamationofIndonesiaasanIslamicstate.29DaudBereu’ehandhistroopswithdrewtothehillsandamilitarystalemateensued.EventuallyDaudBereu’ehagreedtoaceasefirein1957andtalksthenbeganwithJakartaforapermanentsolutiontoAceh.In1959thegovernmentacceptedthecreationofwhatwasvirtuallyan IslamicstatewithinthenationbygivingtheAceh the status of a SpecialDistrict (Daerah Istimewa). Thefightingthenstopped.30Thisandotherconcessionsthecentralgovernment made were eroded by the centralisation andauthoritarianruleofJakartaorweresimplynotimplemented.31

In1976anewrebelgroup,TheAcehFreedomMovement(Gerakan Aceh Merdeka GAM),wasfounded.ItsleaderwasTeungkuHasandiTiro.Thesmall-scaleinitialrevoltwasquicklysuppressedandmostof the leaderswere killedor arrested,althoughHasandiTiroandafewothersmanagedtoescapeoverseas. A larger rebellion in 1989 was met by a harshcounter-insurgencyoperationandAcehwasdeclaredtobeaMilitaryOperationsZone(Daerah operasi Militer,DOM).ThisgavewideauthoritytotheIndonesianarmytodealwiththemovement.TheGAMrebellionwaslargelydefeatedby1992.ThefallofPresidentSuhartoinMay1998ledtothecollapseof the authority of the central government. This caused asudden growth in antimilitary and anti-Jakarta sentiment inAceh.InanefforttorestorepublicconfidenceinthecentralgovernmenttheDOMstatusofAcehwaslifted.Despitethis,violencecontinuedinAceh.Bythemiddleof1999theGAMwasbetterorganisedandincontrolofagreaterproportionofAcehnesecountrysidethaneverbefore.32

DespitetheviolencetherewerepeacetalksbetweentheIndonesian government and the GAM. These talks led to asocalledHumanitarianPause inMay2000.Theaimsof theagreement were, among others, to deliver humanitarianassistanceandpromoteconfidence-buildingmeasures.33Thiscease-firedidnotrestonfirmfoundations.AlmostassoonastheHumanitarianPausestartedtherewerereportsofclashesbetween Indonesian security forces and GAM combatants.Despite this thepausewas a significant achievement and italso set apattern thatwas tobe replicated throughout thefollowingyearsofthepeaceprocess.34

In 2002, after further negotiations and pressure fromthe Indonesian government. The Cessation of HostilitiesFramework Agreement (COHA) was signed between thegovernmentof IndonesiaandGAM inDecember2002.Theannouncement of the agreement was greeted with muchpopular enthusiasm inAceh, aswell as in Jakarta andeveninternationally.Despite theagreement, clashes continued to

28 Brown&Cribb1995,40–41.29 InternationalCrisisGroup2001,3.30 Ricklefs1993,265.31 InternationalCrisisGroup2001,3.32 Aspinall&Crouch2003,6.33 JointUnderstandingonHumanitarianPause forAceh

2000,article1.34 Aspinall&Crouch2003,14–16.

occurandneitherofthepartiescompliedwiththeagreement.35Forexampletheagreementrequiredthe“phasedplacement”ofGAM’s“weapons,arms,andordinanceinthedesignatedsites”togetherwiththe“simultaneousphasedrelocationofTNIforces”.36GAMfighterswerenaturallyreluctanttohandover their weapons so long as armed soldiers and policeremained in Aceh. In order to save the agreement the twosides met on May 2002. The discussions failed and militaryemergencydeclarationwasissuedtoAceh.37

In 2004 the elected president Yudhoyno wanted toresolve the conflict of Aceh by peaceful negotiations. AlsothetsunamiofDecember26,2004changedthepoliticalandhumanitarian situation inAceh.Becauseof thecatastrophe,internationalhelpwasneeded,which ledto theopeningofthe previously closed area. These changes gave a possibilityto IndonesiangovernmenttoprovidehelpfortheAcheneseand in this way to enhance its popularity among the localpopulation. Quickly after the tsunami the government ofIndonesiaopenedunofficialtalkswithGAM’srepresentativesinFinland,withthehelpofaFinnishcitizenJuhaChristensen.38ThepeacenegotiationswereinitiatedinHelsinkibetweentheGovernmentofIndonesiaandtheGAMundertheauspicesoftheCrisisManagement Initiative (CMI), anon-governmentalorganisation chaired by the former Finnish President MarttiAhtisaari.39FromJanuary2005onwardsthepeacenegotiationswentthroughfivenegotiationrounds.ThelastofthesewasconcludedJuly17,2005.Boththegovernmentof IndonesiaandGAMagreedthatthememberstatesofboththeEUandtheASEANwouldbemostsuitabletoforman independentcontrolcommission.Thetasksofthecommissionweredefinedinthepeaceagreement.40

According to the agreement, which was named as aMemorandum of Understanding (MoU), the government ofIndonesiahadtopulloutitsnon-organic41militaryandpoliceforces from Aceh in four stages. This withdrawal was tohappeninparallelwiththesubmissionofGAM’s840weaponsthatalsohappenedinfourstages.IntheMoU,thepartiesalsoagreedthattheywoulddraftanewlawforthegovernanceofAceh.Aftertheenactmentofthelaw,localelectionsweresupposed to be held. In addition to this, the MoU coveredanagreementaboutthe legal issuesofAceh,humanrights,security arrangements, amnesty, and the establishment ofAcehMonitoringMission(AMM)anditsfunctions.42

In addition to this, it stated in the MoU that thegovernmentof IndonesiaandtheauthoritiesofAcehwouldtake measures to assist persons who have participated inGAM activities to facilitate their reintegration into the civil

35 Aspinall&Crouch2003,32–36.36 COHA2002,article3b.37 Aspinall&Crouch2003,37–38,43–45.38 CounciloftheEuropeanUnion2005a.39 CounciloftheEuropeanUnion2005b,3.40 CounciloftheEuropeanUnion2005a.41 Non-organic troopsmean troops thatwere situated in

AcehtemporallyfromotherareasofIndonesia.42 MoU2005,3.


society. These measures included economic facilitation toformer combatants, pardoned political prisoners and war-affectedcivilians.Accordingtotheagreement, thesegroupsweretoreceivesuitablefarmingland,employmentor,inthecaseofincapacitytowork,adequatesocialsecurityfromtheauthoritiesofAceh.Alsoall persons thathadbeengrantedamnesty or released fromprisonor detentionwere tohaveallpolitical,economicandsocialrights.Alsotherehabilitationof public and private property destroyed or damaged as aconsequenceoftheconflictwaspartofthereintegration.43

1.3 The Aceh Monitoring Mission

TheAcehMonitoringMissionwasofficially launchedon15September 2005 and the mission ended on 15 December2006.44Accordingto theMoU, the tasksof theAMMwereasfollows.45

a)monitor the demobilisation of GAM anddecommissioningofitsarmaments,

b)monitor the relocation of non-organic militaryforcesandnon-organicpolicetroops,

c)monitorthereintegrationofactiveGAMmembers,d)monitor thehuman rights situationandprovide

assistanceinthisfield,e)monitortheprocessoflegislationchange,f)ruleondisputedamnestycases,g)investigate and rule on complaints and alleged

violationsoftheMoU,h)establish and maintain liaison and good

cooperationwiththeparties.

The parties responsible of the AMM were EU togetherwith five ASEAN contributing countries (Brunei, Malaysia,Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) and Norway andSwitzerland. At most it numbered 227 internationalpersonnel.46 About thirty Finns worked in the mission fromthe beginning. Of these thirty, fifteen were mainly workingwith disarmament, and fifteen as monitor, reintegration orhumanrightsexpertsor inother functions. Inmy research Ihavefocusedonthelattergroupbecausetheywereengagedin the reintegration issues. Those who were involved in thedisarmamentaccountedforonlyonepartoftheDDR.

AMM’sDecommissioningBranchthatincludedanofficeattheAMMHeadQuartersand fourMobileDecommissioningTeams, was responsible for the disarmament in Aceh.According to thepeaceagreement,GAMhad tohandover840weaponstoAMM.Thishappenedinfourstagesandinevery stage 210 weapons were submitted.47 DisarmamentendedDecember20,2005bywhichdateGAMhadhandedoverthese840weapons.Inpractice,disarmamenthappenedinplacesthatGAMhadpreviouslyannounced.Intheseplaces

43 MoU2005,3.2–3.2.7.44 AMMhomepage.45 MoU2005,5.2.46 CounciloftheEuropeanUnion2005a.47 AMMHQDecommOffice2005.

GAMsubmittedtheirweaponstoAMM.AMMthencheckedthe functioning and condition of the weapons. Also therepresentativesoftheIndonesianarmyapprovedtheweapons.Afterthisthegunsweredestroyedbycuttingthemintothreepieces.AMMalsotookcareofthedisposalofexplosivesandammunition.48

When the last weapons were submitted, Indonesiapulled out 25 890 soldiers and 5 791 police. Officially,GAM demobilised itself and ceased to be an armed actorin December 2005.49 Therefore, disarmament can beregardedasasuccess inAceh.DespiteoftheGAM’sofficialdeclarationofitsdemobilisationitisstillunsurewhetherthedemobilisationwasasuccess. InDDR,demobilisationmeansthatacombatantgivesuptheirfighteridentityandoldmilitarycommandstructuresdisappear.50InsomecasesthemembersofGAMspenttheirtimeasaseparategroupanddidnotwantto assimilate to the normal population.51 According to theinterviewedFinns,thegroup’sidentityamongthemembersofGAMremainedstrong.

The MoU provisions on reintegration cover assistanceto three groups: GAM ex-combatants, amnestied politicalprisoners, and affected civilians.52 To achieve this, agovernmental implementingbodyoftheMoUreintegration,Badan reintegrasi dan damai Aceh (BRA) was established.AMMmonitoredtheworkofBRAbothatprovincialanddistrictlevel.Atdistrict level elevenAMMdistrictofficesmonitoredandreportedonthefieldsituation,toensurethattheagreedassistancewasreceivedbythebeneficiarygroups.53AMMwasreorganizedon15September2006whenAMM’sBandaAcehoffice, with its two mobile teams, took up the monitoringresponsibility.54

1.4 The method and the research question

OneofthemainmethodsusedinconductingresearchaboutDDRisbyinterviews.55Myownresearchusesthistechnique.The first selection of the interviewees was initiated via theFinnish Ministry of the Interior. Originally there had beenfifteen Finns working in Aceh as monitors, reintegration orhuman rights specialists. From the Ministry of the Interior Ireceived a list of twelve people. From these twelve I finallyinterviewedeight.Reasonsforthemissinginterviewsarethatsomeofthesepeopleworkedabroadduringtheresearch,ortheinterviewwasnotpossibleforotherreasons.Theinterviewmethodthatwasusedtogatherinformationforthisarticleisthethemeinterview56andthetoolforthearrangementand

48 Merikallio2006,167-169.49 TheWorldBank2006,2.50 Gleichmannetal.2004,45–48.51 TheWorldBank2006,26.52 MoU2005,3.2.3.53 AMMhomepage.54 AMM2006.55 Look for example Conaway & Martinéz 2004; Brett &

Specht2004.56 In theme interviews the themes that have previously

been decided on guide the process of the interview.


description of interview material was the content analysis57.With the interviewees it was agreed that they wouldremain anonymous. Referencing of interviewees is by usingabbreviationssuchasI1,I2etc.

One might question the decision to concentrate on theopinions of the Finnish experts. The main reason for thisselectionwaseconomical.ThisarticleisbasedonathesisworkoninternationalpoliticsfortheUniversityofTampere,Finland.Asastudentone’sfinancial situationdidn’tallow interviewsmade abroad. It should also be reiterated that the FinnishcontingentinAMMwasthebiggestamongtheparticipatorycountries.58

Mostofthetextsaboutreintegrationarecasestudiesandcompilationsoflessonslearnedwithoutemphasisonbuildinga reintegration theory.59 Therefore, the themes discussedhere did not emerge from some theory on reintegration,but from literatureabout the reintegration.Thefirst theme,thegoal of the reintegration, emergedbecause there is stillsome disagreement about it.60 I wanted to find out howthe Finns saw it. The second theme was the subjects of the reintegration which is also extensively discussed in thereintegrationliterature61.Thirdlyandmostsignificantly,thereisalwaysdiscussionabout the methods of the reintegrationinthereintegrationliterature.62Whatshouldbedoneandhow?Asforthefourthandfifththemes,the success and failures of the reintegration,IwantedtoknowhowtheintervieweesfeltaboutthereintegrationinAceh.

One tries to find valuable answers in the light of theresearch question of theme interviews. The interviewthemes are based on the frame of a research and onthepreviousknowledgeabouttheresearchsubject.Thethemeinterviewisnotaformulathathastobefollowedprecisely. The relation of the interview questions tothe research framedovary fromallowing the intuitivefindingstokeepingtothequestionspreviouslydecided.(Tuomi&Sarajärvi2002,76–78)

57 Contentanalysisistheverbaldescriptionofthecontentoftheanalyseddocuments.Thematerialoftheresearchrepresentsthephenomenoninquestion.Thepurposeoftheanalysisistocreateaverbalandclearpresentationofthephenomenoninquestion.Theaimofthecontentanalysis istoorganisethematerial intoacompactandclear form without losing its information. With a wellstructuredanalysisitispossibletomakeclearconclusionsabout the phenomenon in question. The qualitativetreatmentofthematerialisbasedonlogicalreasoningand interpretation, where the material is divided intosmallerparts,conceptualized,andcodedinanewwaytoalocigalentity.(Tuomi&Sarajärvi2002,109–110)

58 TheMinistryoftheInterior2005.59 Nilsson2005,35.60 Nilsson2005,22–29;StockholmInitiative2006b,20–28.61 Look forexampleNilsson2005,14;Specht2003,76–

81;StockholmInitiative2006b,28–32.62 LookforexampleGleichmannetal.2004,77–90;Specht

2003,94–102;StockholmInitiative2006b,33–45.


2 UnderstandingthereintegrationinAceh

I think it was and it is a quite good mission, but we have a lot to learn from it and if we especially speak about this reintegration side then this is one of those things.63

TheAMMoperation lasted fromAugust2005 toDecember2006.64OneofthetasksofAMMwastomonitortheprocessofthereintegrationwhichwasundertheresponsibilityofthegovernmentof Indonesia.BecauseAMMwas thereonly forayear,itcouldnotmonitorthewholereintegrationprocess.Resultsof thereintegrationprocessshouldbecontrolledforatleasttenyearsfromthebeginningoftheprocess.Becauseof lack of time, the opinions of the Finnish civilian crisismanagementexpertsgiveapictureofwhattheyunderstoodand saw of the reintegration in its infancy. Because of thelengthofAMM’smandateitwasconsideredimportantinsidethemissionthatitshouldhelptobuildaworkingreintegrationsysteminAcehbeforeitsexit.65

2.1 The objective of the reintegration and its targets

Theaimofthereintegrationissocial,economicalandpoliticalinclusionofthecombatantsandtheirfamiliesintocivilsociety.66TheMoUisambiguousaboutthetargetsofthereintegration.Strictly interpreted it says that reintegration is only meantfortheex-combatantsoftheGAM67.AccordingtotheMoU

63 I5,translationbytheauthor.64 AMMhomepage.65 AMMSpecialReport074,7.66 Nilsson2005,26-28.67 GAM’smemberswerenotonlycombatantsthatcarried

guns. GAM was also a civilian organisation. Someof the active GAM members were responsible for thelogistics,partofthemwereakindofapoliceandpartof them trained to be combatants. Major part of thecombatants,75%,wasfromagegroupfrom18to35.Pardonedpoliticalprisonerswereolder,althoughmajorpart of them were also from the age group from 18to35. InGAMtherewerehardlyanycombatantsthatwereundereighteen.Someofthecombatantsclaimedthat theyhad joinedGAMwhen theywere sixteenorseventeen, but when the World Bank was conductingits research, combatants under eighteen were not

the government of Indonesia and the authorities of Acehwill take measures to assist persons who have participatedin GAM activities to facilitate their reintegration into civilsociety.Thesemeasuresalsoincludedeconomicfacilitationtoformercombatants,pardonedpoliticalprisonersandaffectedcivilians.68 ItshouldbenotedthatAMM’smandatewasonlyto monitor the reintegration of active GAM members.69 Inthislightitiseasytounderstandthattheintervieweesplacedemphasis especiallyon the reintegrationof the combatants.All but one agreed that inclusion of GAM’s members andthe combatants was part of the reintegration. “It was like; place these combatants back to civil society.”70Ontheotherhandsomeof the intervieweesdidnot separate theobjectsand means of the reintegration. In this situation the objectof the reintegration was, for example, to provide economichelpandsupporttothecombatantsreturningtosociety.Oneoftheintervieweesthoughtthattheaimofthereintegrationwas stated in the MoU: “officially the things mentioned in the Memorandum of Understanding were understood as reintegration. To the guerrillas, coming from the mountains, was promised money, land and education.”71 Generally,amongsttheintervieweestherewasaconsensusthattheaimof the reintegration was the integration of the combatantsback to the society. Also within the UN there is a growingconsensusthatfocusingonthecombatantsisessentialinthereintegration process, despite the fact that the combatantsmaygetdisproportionatebenefitsaftertheconflict.72

Theopinionsoftheintervieweesweresplitonsignificanceof the reintegration. They canbedivided into twooppositegroups according to how extensively and within what timeframe the reintegration is viewed. According to the first

found.GAMusedchildrenasmessengers,guardsorascertain kinds of scouts for gathering the information.About 4 % of GAM’s combatants were women. Thewomen combatants were also younger than the malecombatants,because60%ofthemwereunder25yearsold.(TheWorldBank2006,12–14)

68 MoU2005,3.2.3.69 MoU2005,5.2.70 I3,translationbytheauthor.71 I5,translationbytheauthor.72 UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme2005,34.


opinionthereintegrationinAcehshouldbelookedatthroughtheMoU.Reintegrationshouldbeunderstoodasthepartieshaveagreed tobe in thepeaceagreementandnoexternalelements shouldbe introduced. This view sees reintegrationmoreasatechnicalprocessandasaworkthathastobedoneimmediately.Reintegrationtiesthefightersintoworkandgivesthemsomethingelsetothinkabout.Fromthispointofviewreintegrationisseenasarathernarrowfieldthatisfollowedbyanotherkindofhelp.Theotherviewseesreintegrationasawiderprocessthatisconnectedtoothereventsandchangesinsociety.Reintegrationisunderstoodasalongtimeprocessandresultscannotbeachievedinashorttime.

According to the MoU the targets of the reintegrationwere people that had taken part in GAM activities. Part ofthe reintegration was the economic facilitation to formercombatants, pardoned political prisoners and affectedcivilians.Thesegroupsweretoreceiveanallocationofsuitablefarming land, employment, or, in the case of incapacity towork,adequatesocialsecurityfromtheauthoritiesofAceh.73All the interviewees consider theex-combatantsofGAMorthose who had participated in the fighting as participantsof the reintegration. At the same time the majority of theinterviewees believed that the pardoned political prisonersand affected civilians should also be the targets of thereintegration. Although in the case of affected civilians it isnotpossible to talkabout reintegration in the samewayaswith the combatants and the pardoned political prisonersbecausetheywereneverseparatedfromsocietyasthelattertwogroupswere.

Thequestionaboutwomencausedthebiggestdifferenceamongst the interviewees. The opinions were split in twoand this separation followed the separation that existedpreviouslyonthequestionaboutthelengthandobjectofthereintegration. The question about women was problematicin a sense that in the MoU combatants are mentioned butthere isnodefinitionof thecontentof thisdefinition.74ThepartiesoftheMoU,(thegovernmentofIndonesiaandGAM),inpracticeexcludedwomenoutsidethereintegrationprocess.They did not bring out the status of women combatantsalthoughtherewerewomencombatants inAceh.75Becauseof this the reintegration focused on men combatants andwomencombatantsdidnotreceivethereintegrationbenefits.Abouthalfoftheintervieweesthoughtthattheexclusionofwomen was a problem: ”In my understanding the women combatants having been left out of this whole reintegration process as beneficiaries is a central problem.”76

Partoftheintervieweesdidnotdiscusstheissueofwomencombatants. To these interviewees, women were mainlythought of as affected civilians. One saw that the womencombatants had adapted as men had. Another intervieweewasnotsureiftherehadbeenwomencombatantsinAceh.Also,theseintervieweesdidnotconsidertheissueimportant

73 MoU2005,3.2.5.74 MoU2005,3.2.3–3.2.5.75 AMMSpecialReport074,6–7.76 I8,translationbytheauthor.

inthereintegration.Itwasthoughtthatreintegrationispartofthefirstphaseinthecontainmentofthecrisis.Thewomenissue should only be presented in the most acute phase ofcrisis.“It is difficult to strengthen the status of women in this stage. It doesn’t bring a good result.”77

Anotherdifferenceamongtheintervieweeswastheissueofhowwellthetargetgroupwasdefined.Atthebeginningitwasintendedthatreintegrationbenefitswouldbegivento3 000 combatants. In addition, benefits would be given tothepardonedprisonersandaffectedcivilians.GAMandtheIndonesian government had decided these numbers alreadyduringthenegotiationphaseoftheMoU,afterwhichitwaswritten intheMoU.Sothenumberofthebeneficiarieshadbeendecidedbeforelaunchingthereintegrationprogramme.Accordingtotheinterviewees,theGAMcombatantswhohadsurrenderedbeforethesigningoftheMoUwerenotincludedin these numbers. The conflict had continued at differentlevels of intensity for about30 years, so a largenumberofcombatants were in danger of being excluded from thereintegrationassistancethatwasmeantforthecombatants.A confused process in the distribution of the reintegrationfunds and in the organisation that was responsible for it,theBRA,ledtoanincreaseinthenumberofbeneficiaries.InMarch2007thegroupsthathadreceivedorweretoreceiveintegration benefits were the GAM combatants, the civilianmembersofGAM,politicalprisoners,theGAMmembersthathad surrendered before the signing of the MoU, the militiathathadfoughtagainstGAM,andtheaffectedcivilians.Theaffected civilians did not receive themoneydirectly but themoney was distributed to different villages. Also separateassistancewasgiventoinvalidsinhousingandtothoseusinghealthservices.Intotal,thegovernmentofIndonesiawastouseabout150millionUSdollarsforthesebenefitsduringtheperiodof2005–2007.78SothetargetgroupfortheintegrationbenefitshadwidenedfromwhatwasoriginallyagreedintheMoU.

When it was asked was the definition of the subjectgroup for the reintegration in theMoUa successor failure,theminority of the interviewees considered it a success. “It should be clearly defined what is the target group.”79 Themajoritythoughitwasafailure.ThosewhothoughtitwasasuccesssaidthatinthereintegrationprocessthereshouldbeaclearlydefinedtargetgroupliketherewasinAceh. Inthiswaythereintegrationprocesswaseasiertoobservefromthemonitors’pointofview.Themeasurabilityofthereintegrationwasthoughttobeimportant.Alsothelackofdistincttargetgroup was considered as making the possible reintegrationmoredifficult.

Fromanotherpointofviewthedefinitionhadbeenafailurebecausethetargetgrouphadgrownduringthereintegrationprocess.“First of all the number of the combatants had been agreed to be 3000 in the MoU that was total nonsense and

77 I6,translationbytheauthor.78 WorldBank&DSF2007,4.79 I4,translationbytheauthor.

CrisisManagementCentreFinlandYearbook 2008100

everybody knows that there were a lot more.”80Inthesamewaya categoricaldefinitionwasnot consideredas thebeststartingpoint for thereintegrationbecausetherewerea lotmorethatneededthehelp.Partoftheintervieweesthoughtthat it would be better if the assistance had been given tocommunities. The communities and villages would havebeen given the money and they could have decided howtouse thismoney. In theendthishappenedwhentheBRAgave economic assistance to villages.81 This approach wasconsidered as more important because after a long conflictmajority of thepopulation canbe regarded as victims.Alsothiskindofapproachwasthoughttohelppreventproblemscausedbyenvy. Partof theAchenese saw the reintegrationbenefits thatweregiven to the combatants as rewards andthis did cause envy. For a reintegration programme to besuccessful,thebenefitsshouldbebalancedsothatitfulfilstheexpectationsofthecombatantsbutitisnotseenasareward.Inconflictswherethecombatantshavecommittedatrocitiesthe supporting of combatants is easily seen as rewarding.Thenitwouldbehardforthelocalpopulationtoacceptthedistributionofthereintegrationbenefitstothecombatants.82

According to one of the interviewees, an option to thecategorical approach would be an idea where the startingpointwouldnotbedifferentgroupsofpeoplebuttheneedsofthepeople.Firststepwouldbeasurveyoftheneedsthatpeople have. The reintegration programme or programmesshould be based on these needs. Those interviewees thatdidnotthinkthecategoricalapproachwasthebestpossiblesolution, were the same people that supported the widerdefinitionofthecombatantsandsawtheexclusionofwomenasaproblem.Despitethissomeoftheseintervieweessaidthattheyunderstoodthecategoricaldefinitionthroughthebudgetlogicbecause the resourcesof thegovernmentof Indonesiawerelimited.

2.2 The methods of the reintegration

Themethodsofthereintegrationingeneralwereinvestigatedin the interviews. Despite this, all interviewees linked theiranswers to their experiences in Aceh. Many of them saidthat they cannot generalise about the AMM, only aboutexperiences they had in Aceh. Nevertheless, many of themproposedmethodsexcludedfromtheMoU’sframework.Themethodsthatweremoststronglypresentedwereemployment,educationandfinancialhelp.

According to the MoU, part of the reintegration waseconomical assistance, but also the allocation of suitablefarming land, employment, or, in the case of incapacity towork, adequate social security provided by the authoritiesof Aceh.83 In AMM it was also thought that part of thereintegrationwasthevocational trainingandhealthcare. Inpractice, employment, vocational training and health care

80 I8,translationbytheauthor.81 WorldBank&DSF2007,4.82 InternationalPeaceAcademy2002,4.83 MoU2005,3.2.5.

were not emphasised enough and they did not have a bigimpact on reintegration. In AMM it was thought that thelowoverall levelofthesocialsecurityandpooremploymentsituationinAcehwerethemainreasonsforthis.IntheMoUitwasalsostatedthat thepeoplewhohadrenouncedtheirIndonesiancitizenshipduringtheconflicthadthepossibilitytoregainit.Intheinterviewsthisdidnotcomeoutbecausethequestionofcitizenshipwasnotimportanttotheparties.Thebiggest Acehenese community abroad was in Malaysia andtheyhadnotgivenuptheircitizenship.TheAceheneselivinginEuropeandtheUnitedStatesdidnothaveimmediateneedtocomeback.Inpractice,theMoU’smainfocusinthefieldofreintegrationwasoneconomicassistance.84

AresearchmadebytheWorldBankfoundthatthebiggestneed the GAM combatants had was the capital. Housing,health care, vocational training, and elementary schoolingcame in order of importance after this. They also neededmoney for their everyday life. However, the biggest needwas the capital that they could use to buy land or to startuptheirownbusinesses.85Otherresearch,coordinatedbytheInternationalOrganizationofMigration,discoveredthat85%ofthepeople,whoseminorityweretheex-combatants,hadproblemsinsupportingtheirfamiliesand90%haddifficultiesinfindingwork.Also72%hadproblemsinfindingenoughfood. In this research, 600 people were interviewed in thedistrictsofPidien,BireuenandAcehUtara.86

Intheend,economicalassistancewasnotconsideredasaveryimportanttoolinreintegration.Thiswasmildlysurprisingbecausethemajoritythoughtthatthebiggestproblemwiththedistributionofthereintegrationassistancewasthemajordownfallandinpracticethemainfocuswasintheeconomicalassistance. The assistance was thought to help the ex-combatantstosurviveimmediatelyaftertheconflict.“In the first stage the economical assistance that people don’t need to steal or do other crimes in order to get the daily food.”87

On the other hand, the reintegration was criticised forbeingtoofocusedonthedistributionofthemoney.Manysawthe poverty as a problem, but considered that it could notbefixedonlybygivingeconomicalassistance.Sothecriticismwas not targeted at the fact that money was given. It wasthought, however, that economical assistance diverted thefocusfromotherkindsofhelpanditwouldnothelptocreatelongstandingprerequisitesforthereintegration.Otherformsofactionwereneeded.Alsotheamountofmoneywasthoughttoberelativelysmallandthiscouldbeoneexplanationforthefact that the intervieweesdidnotthinkthattheeconomicalassistance was very significant. It was thought that wideractions were needed to alleviate the poverty. These actionswerenotverypreciselyidentifiedbutemphasiswasputontheperseveranceofthereintegrationwork.

Giving jobs was a theme that came up in most of theinterviews. This is supported by the fact that combatants

84 Tardioli2007.85 TheWorldBank2006,40–41.86 InternationalOrganizationforMigration2006,19.87 I4,translationbytheauthor.


saw unemployment and the lack of money as their biggestproblem.88Normally,thearmedconflictsaffectthefunctioningoftheemploymentmarkets.Especially“newwars”89diminishdomesticandforeigninvestments.Themarketsaredisturbedbythedestructionoftheinfrastructureandtheindustrymaystop functioning. These effectsmaynot disappear after thepeace. For example, different kinds of physical and mentalinjuries can make working harder and reduce the amountof work force after the conflict. Unemployment rates arenormallyveryhighinareaswheretherehasbeenaconflict.90

There was some variation in the opinions of theintervieweesofwhytheysawemploymentasimportant.Thefirstviewpointconsidereditimportanttocreatejobsbecauseavasteunemployedgroupofpeoplecancauseproblems.Bygivingthemjobsitwouldbepossibletogivethemsomethingelsetothinkabout.“That is like the foundation of everything, when a person is employed in some way then he doesn’t have time to think about what to do.”91Alsotheotherviewpointagreedthatemploymentwasimportantinreintegration.Butthemain valuewas that itmadepossible for thepeople tointegrateintosociety.Withajobitwaspossibletoearnmoneyandgetaholdof anormal life. Employmentwasawayofkeepingtheex-combatantsoutoftrouble.

Normally, many of those who earn because of conflictare unemployed after the conflict. This is particularly thecase with the combatants. What increases the problem isthat these people do not necessary have education andthosemechanismsthatcouldprovideeducationandtraininghave disappeared or been destroyed.92 All the intervieweesmentioned that education was one way to reintegrate thepeople.Specialemphasiswasputontrainingthatwouldgivepeopleprofessionalskills,forexampleapprenticeshipsinworkplaces.Thiskindoftrainingwasseenasgivingthepossibilityof reintegration through work. Training programmes thathavebeendoneafteraconflicthaveshownthatvocationaltraininginitselfdoesnotcreatejobsbutitimprovespeople’spossibilities to find them. Typically, insufficient attention isgiven to training in post-conflict societies.93 This came outin the interviewsbywayof emphasison the importanceofeducation and its civilizing value. Importance was givenmostlytovocationaltraining.Themajorityoftheintervieweesthought that the level of education of the combatants waslow. Inreality,theeducationleveloftheGAMmembersdid

88 TheWorldBank2006,41.89 AccordingtoMaryKaldorduringthe1980sand1990s

anewtypeoforganisedviolencedevelopedespeciallyinAfricaandinEasternEurope.Thesewarsshedescribeswiththetermnewwar.Whatisnewistheblurringofthedistinctionsbetweenwar,organisedcrimeandlarge-scale violations of human rights. (Kaldor 1999, 1–3.)It canalsobesaid that there isnot thatmuchnew inthese ’new wars’. Same kind of things can be foundthroughout the history of conflicts. (Newman 2004,174–175)

90 Krishnamurty2003,53–55.91 I4,translationbytheauthor.92 Krishnamurty2003,56–57.93 Barcia&Date-Bah2003,211.

notdifferfromtheeducationlevelofanaverageAcehenese.94In thiscase, the interviewees thought thathighereducationwouldbeonemethodofreintegration.“Firstly the best way is to educate them in some way, train them in some profession and this is the way to reintegrate them to society.”95

Some of the interviewees introduced the idea ofeconomical counselling along with the employment andtraining.InAceh,supportwasgiventothecombatantstostarteconomicactivities.Accordingtotheintervieweesthefightershadestablishedfishfarmsandothertypesofsmallbusinesses.These new small businesses were seen to have problemsbecause the fighters did not have enough knowledge ofthe markets or adequate business skills. Thus, economicalcounsellingwas considered important.Alsomarket researchthatwouldgive informationtothecombatantsandtrainingthathadtodowithmarketingwasconsideredimportant.

According to the MoU, the government of Indonesiawas to allocate funds for the rehabilitation of public andprivate property destroyed or damaged as a consequenceof the conflict.96 Many of the Achenese had problems withhousing.97Someintervieweespresentedtheideaofrebuildingthedestroyedhomes.ManypeoplehadbeenforcedtoleavetootherareasofAceh.TheysaidthatfortheAcheneseitwasshameful to live in other people’s homes. It was seen thatthe abolition of this problem would be important for socialreintegration.

FarminglandwastobeallocatedaccordingtotheMoU.98Aceh ismainlyanagriculturalcommunityandtheallocationofthefarminglandisaneasywaytoemploypeople.Thoseintervieweeswhoconsideredthattheworkwouldkeeppeopleout of trouble also thought the allocation of the farminglandtobeanimportantwaytoemploypeople.Someofthecombatantswhohadmadetheirlivingpreviouslyfromfarmingdid not want to go back to agriculture after the conflict.99Therefore, someof the interviewees saw that the efforts toget the combatants back to farming were problematic. Inpractice, the question was theoretical because according tothoseintervieweesfarminglandwasnotallocatedduringthetimewhenAMMwasthere.

Theinterviewsincludedideasaboutstrengtheningthecivilsociety,providingadequateinformationandmakingtheMoUbetterunderstoodamongthecombatants.Alsobuildingtrustwasthoughtimportant.Thosewhounderstoodreintegrationbroadlywerealsosupportingthechangeofthosestructuresinsocietythatwereseenascausesfortheconflict.Intheendthemainfocusbasedontheinterviewswasputatwork,trainingandfinancialassistance.

2.3 Two viewpoints

94 TheWorldBank2006,15.95 I7,translationbytheauthor.96 MoU2005,3.2.4.97 InternationalOrganizationforMigration2006,19.98 MoU2005,3.2.5.99 TheWorldBank2006,41–42.


Twoviewpointsemergedclearlyfromtheinterviews.Differentopinionsareeasiertobringoutwiththiskindofseparation,which may have affected the analysis. Also the differencesin opinions may have been caused by the fact that someinterviewees lookedat the reintegrationprocess from insidethe AMM’s mandate, while some interviewees looked atreintegrationmoregenerally.Despitethis,twopointsofviewcanbefoundintheresults.Noneoftheintervieweesareintheextremesofthescale.However,thescaledoesnotrepresentnormaldistributionandthedifferencesinopinionsareclear.

The views are labelled here as “technical” and “broad”view.Accordingtothetechnicalview,reintegrationisaprocessthathappenswithinacertaintimeframe.Thetechnicalviewsees reintegration as a shorter process than the wide one.According to it, the targets of the reintegration should beclearlydefined.Primetargetsarethenthecombatants.Alsothe reintegration itselfhas tobedefined, its length, targetsandsoon. In reintegration, the targets shouldbebound towork and training, so that they do not have time to causetrouble. Issues concerning sex and helping physically andmentallysickareimportant,buttheyshouldnotbeincludedintheactualreintegrationinsteadfollowafterit.Thisviewissupportedbythecontrollabilityoftheprocessandthepossiblelimitsofthereintegrationbudget.

The broad view understands reintegration more widely.It also sees the reintegration as a longer process than thetechnicalview.Further,thetargetsofthereintegrationarenotonlythecombatantsbutalsootherplayersthathavesupportedthearmedactioneveniftheydidnotactuallycarryweaponsduringtheconflict.Theissueofwomenandchildrenwasalsoconsidered as important. The methods of the reintegrationwerealsoseenmorewidelyandthedistinctionbetweenthereintegrationanddevelopmentaidbecomesblurred.

Thisseparationcanbepartlyunderstoodbythewaythetechnicalviewgroupsawthereintegrationstrictlythroughthemandateoftheoperation.Itdidnotconsiderthewomenissuetobeimportantbecauseitwasnotmentionedinthemandate.Ontheotherhand,thequestionaboutwhatispursuedwiththe reintegration isprobablymore significant. If thegoalofthe reintegration is to simply strengthen theoverall securitysituation, then the fast employment of the combatantswithoutthinkingoftheirrealneedscanbeajustifiedwaytoproceed.Ifthegoalofthereintegrationiseconomical,socialand political reintegration, then the technical view cannotbeconsideradequate.Inthiscaseabroaderviewisneeded,where the needs of the combatants and their families aretakenintoconsideration.

Asmentionedearlier,reintegration isalsoaboutsecurity.AccordingtoBillMcSweeney,securitycanbeseenaspositiveor negative. Negative security sees security as the absenceof something negative, for example as an absence of waror violence. Negative security is security from something towhichitisconnected:objectsthatcanbeseen,weightedormeasured.Inthiscasetheobjectsareprotectingandpreventingsomethingfromhappening.Positivesecurityisfreedomfromsomething.Itisaquestionofmakingsomethingpossible.In

thiscase it is referring,forexample, tohumansecurity.100 Inthe technical and broad views these same features can befound.Thetechnicalviewemphasisesthemeasurabilityofthereintegration.Italsoseesthatthesuccessofthereintegrationismoreabouttheabsenceofnegativethings,liketheabsenceofviolence.This is indicatedby the idea thatpeople shouldbeemployedinawaythatdoesn’tcausetrouble.Thenagain,thebroadviewhasmoreincommonwiththepositivesecurity.It emphasises the tackling of structural problems, widerdefinitionsofthesubjectsofthereintegration,andincludingthecommunitiesaspartoftheprocess.

100 McSweeney1999,14-15.


3 ThesuccessesandfailuresofthereintegrationinAceh

Most of the interviewees returned from Aceh during theearly autumn 2006. Since then, some of the problems thatwerebroughtoutintheirinterviewshavebeensolved.WhenI asked in the interviews whether the reintegration was asuccessorafailure,atthetimethefailuresandproblemsofthereintegrationwereofmainconcern,whichwassurprising.BeforetheinterviewsIhadbeenundertheimpressionthatthebeginningofthereintegrationprocesshadbeenasuccess.OnereasonforthiscanbethattheEUwantedtobuildasuccessstoryoutofAceh.DuringtheinterviewsIgotadimmerpictureofthesituation.However,theopinionsofthoseciviliancrisismanagementexpertswhohadbeeninAcehforlongestweremorepositive.ThissuggeststhatthereintegrationprocesshadcreatedsomeprogressinAceh.

One reason for the negativity can be the fact that theofficial reintegration process had not really started duringthe interviewees’ stay in Aceh and they mainly brought upproblems that were related to this. On the other hand, thesocialreintegrationhadbeensuccessful.Thecombatantshadreturnedtotheirvillagesandtownsandtheyhadmainlybeenreceivedwell.Therehadbeen incidentsbetweenthepartiesafter the signing of the MoU but these had been resolvedwith the help of the AMM. Peace has lasted. The majorityof the intervieweeswereconcernedaboutthefutureof thereintegrationprocess.However,ithastobekeptinmindthatthesuccessofthereintegrationshouldbeestimatedtenyearsfromnowratherthanonlyafterthefirstyear.

The definition of the subjects of reintegration is widein Aceh, because combatants, pardoned prisoners, andaffectedciviliansarepartofit.101Onewaytogothroughthesuccessesandfailuresofthereintegrationistogothroughitseparately,onegroupatatime.Now,Ihavetoadmitthatthisseparationwasnotmadeintheseinterviewsandonlyoneoftheintervieweesmadethisseparationinhisanswers.Becauseof this, I will discuss the problems that emerged from theinterviewsoneatatime.

The government of Indonesia demanded that themembersofGAMshouldregisterbeforetheywouldprovidereintegrationassistance to thisgroup. This causedproblems

101 MoU2005,3.2.3.

because the members of GAM considered the lists as asecurityriskifthepeaceprocessturnedouttobeafailure.Thisdispute ledtoastopinthedistributionofthegovernment’sreintegration assistance. About half of the intervieweesbrought this up. At the same time the dispute about thenamelistswasseenaspartofawiderstructuralprobleminIndonesia’sadministration.However,theintervieweesdidnotelaborateonthisproblem.Partly,becausesomeintervieweeshadbeen inAcehforso longthatthisproblemhadalreadybeensolved.Itwasanissueoftrust.Becauseofthedistrust,GAMwastooafraidtogiveupthenames.Afterthetrusthadbeen rebuilt, the listswerenot an issue anymore. Then thereintegrationcouldproceedwiththecombatants.102

BRAwastheorganisationofIndonesia’sgovernmentthathadbeenestablishedforthedistributionofthereintegrationassistance. Also, it was meant to work in cooperation witha common forum called Forum Bersama. Members of thiscommon forum were representatives of the governmentof Indonesia, GAM, international organisations, and localcivic organisations.103 In June 2006 the representatives ofgovernment, GAM, and civic organisations withdrew fromthis agreement because of a growing tension betweenthem.104Manyoftheintervieweesbroughtouttheproblemsconnected with the functioning of BRA as major stumblingblocksinthereintegration.InsideBRAtherehadbeen,amongothers, a political power struggle. At the same time therewereproblemsinBRA’sreintegrationprogrammesthatwerecausedbypoorplanningandcorruption.105Theintervieweesparticularly emphasised the problems with the distributionof the reintegration assistance. When the news about thepossibility of getting reintegration financial assistance fromBRAreachedthepeople,about40000–50000applicationswere submitted. The organisation of BRA could not handletheseapplicationsanditbecameparalysed.Alsoitwasclearthatsomeoftheseapplicationswereunfounded.Amongthe

102 Kokkarinen2006.103 AMMSpecialReport058,4–5.104 WorldBank&DSF2006,2.105 AMMSpecialReport087,4.


intervieweesBRAwasseenasabureaucraticorganisationthatwashardtotakemeasureofanddidnotworkproperly.

The majority of the interviewees saw that the problemsconnected with the local administration was making thereintegration harder. These problems were slow, ineffectiveadministration, corruption, and bad communication. Thiswas seen particularly with issues connected to BRA, andalso the interviewees considered this a wider problem. Badadministrationandthelackofgoodgovernancewereseenasmakingthereintegrationmoredifficult.Alsotheintervieweeswereunsatisfiedwiththeslowprogressofthereintegration:”You are always left with an impression that someone is always foot-dragging and there is always some explanation why something hasn’t happened.”106 Related to this issue, somebroughtup thebadcommunication.Therewasnotenoughdiscussion and information sharing about the reintegration.Also the information and public relations work of BRA wasconsideredweak.TheinformationdidnotspreadfromBRA’scentralofficetothedistrictofficesandinsmallvillagestheywerenotalwaysawareof theprogressof thereintegration.Alsotheflowofthe information insideGAMwasseenasaproblem.

Asdiscussedbefore,womenwereneglectedintheofficialreintegrationandtheywerenotpartof the institutions thatmade decisions about the reintegration, even though therehadbeenwomenfightersinAceh.107Becauseofthereasonsstated before, the interviewees were divided whether thiswasaprobleminAcehornot.IfthereintegrationprocessislookedatfromoutsidetheAMM’smandate,thiscanclearlybeconsideredasaprobleminthereintegration.Themesthatwerealmostalwaysbroughtoutintheinterviews,althoughindifferentways,werepovertyanddifficultiesinfindingwork.Themajorityofthecombatantswereunemployed,andsomeinterviewees considered that because of the unemploymentandthe lackofotherbasicneedscrimewasgrowing.SincethesigningoftheMoU,thecrimeratehadbeengrowingandthis growth concentrated on the areas that were previouslypivotaltoGAM.108

Many interviewees emphasised the lack of housing.109Homeshadbeendestroyedduringtheconflict,whichforcedmanytomovetootherplacesinAcehandtolivewiththeirrelatives or rent an accommodation. This was seen as aproblem of the social reintegration because people did nothaveahomeortheyhadtoliveinunfamiliarenvironment.

According to the interviewees one of the problems wasthe lack of trust between the ex-combatants of GAM andrepresentativesofthegovernment,thepoliceandarmy.Alsotherewasalackoftrustbetweenciviliansandthepoliceandarmy.ItwasseenthatoneofthereasonsforthiswasthefactthatthemainpartofthemilitarypersonnelandthepoliceinAceh were from other parts of Indonesia. In spite of peacetherestillwasnorealtrustbetweentheparties:“of course the

106 I8,translationbyauthor.107 AMMSpecialReport074,6–7.108 WorldBank&DSF2006,2.109 InternationalOrganizationforMigration2006,19.

trust to the government and officials was really bad, amongst the civilians and GAM.”110

Asbroughtoutearlier, the lackofeconomicknowledgeorhelpwasseenasaprobleminthereintegration.InAcehitwaspossibletogetreintegrationassistancetodifferentkindsofcommonprojectsthatthecombatantshadestablishedwiththis money, for example, fish farms. The interviewees sawthatthelackofknowledgeaboutthemarketsandeconomycausedfailuresintheseprojects:“These combatants needed this kind of support. A grass-root level support about what is reasonable and what kind of economic activity would have prerequisites for long-lasting entrepreneurship.”111

AlsosomeintervieweeswereconcernedaboutthewaytheeconomyofAcehandtheformercombatantsweresteered.Firstly, theway the combatantsweredirected to agriculturewassetindoubt.InaresearchdonebytheWorldBank,27%ofthecombatantswantedtofindnewkindofwork.30%ofthecombatantsand43%ofthepoliticalprisonershadbeenfarmers,whichhadbeen thebiggestoccupationalgroup.112Withthisbackgrounditisunderstandablethatnoteveryonewanted tobea farmer.Some intervieweesargued that inaplacewhereagriculturewasdominantthepeopleshouldbedirectedtoagriculturebecausethisisoneoftheeasiestwaystoemployaperson.

Theproblemsthattheintervieweespresentedweresimilar.Themajorityoftheintervieweesespeciallyconsidered,asthebiggestproblems,thenamelistsandtheactionofBRA.Thosewhobroughtoutthestatusofwomencombatantssawthisasacentralprobleminthereintegration.Thingspresentedonlybyoneintervieweewererare.

Theonlylargescalesuccessfulthingthattheintervieweesbrought up was the return of the combatants to theircommunities. So the social reintegration can be regardedas a success inAceh.Almost 90%of the combatants hadnot facedproblems in their returnto theirhomes.113Duringthe conflict many of the combatants kept contact with thelocal population. Therefore, the differences between thelocalpopulationandGAMwerenotbig,whichexplainsthesuccessfulreturntothecommunities.114TheopinionsofthosewhohadstayedinAcehforthelongestweremorepositivethantheopinionsofthosewhohadleftearlier.Theseintervieweessaw that the reintegration had made some progress. Therewerealsoterritorialdifferencesandinsomeareastherehadbeenlesserprogress.Aconcreteexampleoftheprogresswastherebuildingofthehousesthathadbeendestroyedduringtheconflict:“The BrA built a lot of houses during the end of the year. They built quite a lot in the villages. This BrA started to work finally.”115

110 I1,translationbytheauthor.111 I8,translationbytheauthor.112 TheWorldBank2006,41–42.113 TheWorldBank2006,ix.114 TheWorldBank2006,23.115 I1,translationbytheauthor.


ThetargetsofthereintegrationinAcehwerethreegroups:politicalprisoners,ex-combatants,andaffectedcivilians.Thereintegrationofthepardonedpoliticalprisonerswasseenasmore successful than the reintegration of the combatants.The issueabout thename lists thatdelayed thedistributionofthereintegrationassistancehadnottouchedtheprisoners.ThemajorityoftheintervieweeswerenotinAcehduringthelocalelectionsinDecember11,2006.116Thefeelingsofthoseinterviewees that stayed until the elections were generallypositiveaboutthepoliticalprocessandthereintegrationofthecombatants.Accordingtothem,thepoliticalstatementshadbeenconciliatorybeforetheelections.Closertotheelectionsthe importanceof thepolitical reintegrationwas increasing.The combatants were considered as being well informedabout the political situation. The political reintegration canbe regardedasasuccessduring that time,because inAcehsuccessful elections were held where the Acehenese andamong them the combatants and the pardoned politicalprisonerswereabletovote.

Ifthereintegration is lookedatasawhole inAcehthenaccordingtotheintervieweestheeconomicreintegrationcanbe consideredasa failureduring the timewhenAMMwasthere.Ontheotherhand,thepoliticalandsocialreintegrationwere successful. The successful social reintegration heremeans that the combatants had returned to their villageswithout considerable problems. Without work or earningsandinanatmosphereofpossiblemistrust,thesuccessofthesocial reintegration canbe threatened in the future.Due toreintegrationbeingalongprocessonlythepassingoftimecangivetherightanswerstothesequestions.

116 InternationalCrisisGroup2006.


4 Conclusion

Whatweretheresultsofthisarticle?First,IwantedtofindouthowtheFinnishciviliancrisismanagementexpertsunderstoodthe concept of the reintegration in the light of its subjects,methodsandgoals. Thegoalof reintegrationwasgenerallyunderstood to be the return of the combatants to society.Thequestionofwhowere the subjectsof the reintegrationevokeddisagreement.Especiallythestatusofwomendividedthe opinions. The broad view also saw the gender issue assignificanttothereintegration.Accordingtotheinterviewees,the main methods for the reintegration were employment,training and economical assistance. The opinions about thereintegration can be divided roughly into two categories:the broad and the technical views. The technical view sawreintegration more as a clearly defined process where thesubjects and time schedule of the reintegration should beclear.Thisviewhadpointsofcontactwiththenegativesecuritywherethesecurityisseenasanabsenceofsomethreat.Thebroadviewdidnotemphasiseclearcategoriesasthetechnicaldid. Furthermore, they emphasized the connection of thereintegrationtothewholesociety.Inthiscasetheirviewhasmore incommonwiththepositivesecuritywheresecurity isseenasafreedomtodosomething.

Anotherquestion forwhich Iwanted tofindananswerwasdidtheFinnishciviliancrisismanagementexpertsfindthereintegration in Aceh as a failure or success? Those civiliancrisismanagementexpertsthatleftAcehinSeptember2006sawthereintegrationinanegativelight.ThosewholeftAcehin December 2006 saw the reintegration more positively.The biggest problems in reintegration were seen in theeconomic side. The distribution of financial assistance hadcontinued but unemployment was high. Nonetheless, manyinterviewees brought out examples how the combatantshad started smallbusinesses,with varying success,with thefunds theyhad received from the reintegrationprogramme.The interviewees, who were in Aceh during the elections,considered it successful. So the political reintegration hadproceeded well. Social reintegration had been a success, atleastinthebeginning,becausethecombatantshadreturnedtotheirvillagesandcitiesmainlywithoutproblems.Thelackofemploymentandmoneywasseenasaproblemthatcancauseproblemsinthefuture.Theeconomicalreintegrationwastheleastsuccessfulofthethreepartsofthereintegration.


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Appendix

The interview outline

1.WhatdidyoudoandhowlongwereyouinAceh?

2.Howdoyouunderstandthereintegration?Whatisthegoalofthereintegration?Whoarethesubjectsofthereintegration?If the interviewees didn’t bring out the issue ofwomenIbroughtitoutintentionally.Whatarethemeansofthereintegration?Howthereintegrationshouldhappen?QuiteoftenIalsoaskedthatwhatdopeopleneedaftertheconflict.

3.WasthereintegrationasuccessorafailureinAceh?With additional questions I tried to clarify reasonsforthis.


An introduction to Integrated Crisis Management

Cedric de Coning

IntegratedCrisisManagementisoneapproachtomanagecrisisandenhancepeacebuilding

inacoordinatedandsustainableway.Thisarticleanalysestheconceptualframeworkof

peacebuildingandcrisismanagementactivitiesaswellasdescribesdifferentapproachesand

conceptualdefinitionsrelatedtotheseactivities.Themajoroutcomeofthisarticleisthecritical

analysisonthelimitsofcoordinationanddifferentapproachesinachallengingenvironmentof

internationalpeacebuildingandcrisismanagementoperations.1

1 ThisarticlewaswrittentoserveasareaderfortheIntegratedCrisisManagementCourseinOctober2009.ThecoursewasorganisedbytheFinnishCentreofExpertiseinComprehensiveCrisisManagementwhichwasfoundedjointlybytheFinnishDefenceForces InternationalCentre (FINCENT)and theCrisisManagementCentreFinland (CMCFinland) inNovember2008.


1 Achangefrompeacekeepingtopeacebuilding

The international response to conflict, as developed inthe context of the United Nations, is to try first to preventconflict (conflictprevention). If that fails, thenext step is tomake peace, by facilitating negotiation among the partieswith a view to reaching a cease-fire or peace agreement(peacemaking). In somecases, a stabilisationoperationmaybe deployed to protect civilians and secure the delivery ofhumanitarianassistancewhilstnegotiationsareunderwaytosecureapeaceagreement.Ifaceasefireorpeaceagreementisreachedthatincludesaneutralthird-partymonitoringrole,theUN,oraregionalorganisationauthorisedbytheSecurityCouncil, would typically deploy a peacekeeping mission tomonitor the ceasefire, and to support the implementationof the peace agreement. Once the conflict zone has beenstabilised and a peace process has been agreed upon, theinternationalcommunitywouldshiftitsfocusfromemergencyassistancetopost-conflictreconstruction.Thisphaseisfocusedonrebuildingandreconciliation,withtheaimofconsolidatingthepeaceprocessbyaddressingtherootcausesoftheconflictsoastopreventitfromre-occurringagain(peacebuilding).

Inthepost-ColdWarera,thefocusofinternationalcrisismanagementisincreasinglyshiftingfrompeacekeeping,whichwas about maintaining the status quo, to peacebuilding,whichhastodowithmanagingchange.Thenexusbetweendevelopment and peace has become a central focus ofpeacebuildingthinkingandpracticeoverthelastdecade.

Peacebuilding operations are international interventionsthatsupporttheprocessofreconciliationandreconstructioninpost-conflictsocieties.Intheshorttermtheyaredesignedto assist and consolidate peace processes, and prevent arelapse intoconflict,buttheirultimateaimistoaddresstherootcausesofaconflict,andtolaythefoundationforsocialjusticeandsustainablepeace.

Itisclear,however,thatdespiteagrowingawarenessinthelast twodecades that the security, socio-economic,political,andreconciliationdimensionsofpost-conflictoperationsareinter-linked,theagenciesthatundertaketheseoperationshavebeen finding it extremely difficult to meaningfully integratethese different dimensions into coherent country strategies.Coherencecanbeunderstoodastheefforttoensurethatthepeace,security,humanitarian,anddevelopmentdimensionsof

apeacebuildinginterventioninaparticularcrisisaredirectedtowardsacommonobjective.

The failure to effectively coordinate the political,governance, development and security dimensions ofpeacebuilding systems, has been identified as a seriouscause for concern by most major evaluations and best-practice studies undertaken in recent years. For instance,the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding, that analysed336 peacebuilding projects implemented by Germany, theNetherlands, theUnitedKingdomandNorwayover the lastdecade,hasidentifiedalackofcoherenceatthestrategiclevel–whatittermsa“strategicdeficit”–asthemostsignificantobstacletosustainablepeacebuilding.TheUtsteinstudyfoundthatmorethan55%oftheprogrammesitevaluateddidnotshowanylinktoalargercountrystrategy.

Integration and coordination are thus critical elementsin any peacebuilding process, without which it would beimpossible to achieve an overall state of mutual coherenceamong the different policies and actions of the variousagenciesengagedinagivenpeacebuildingoperation.


2 Definitionofpeacebuilding

Peacebuilding is a holistic concept that provides forsimultaneous short, medium and long-term programmes topreventdisputesfromescalating,toavoidrelapseintoviolentconflict and to build and consolidate sustainable peace. Itrequiresacoherentandcoordinatedmultidimensionalresponsebyabroad rangeof role-players includinggovernment, civilsociety,theprivatesectorandinternationalagencies.

These various actors undertake a range of interrelatedprogrammesthatspanthesecurity,politicalandgovernance,socio-economic development and reconciliation dimensionsof society, and that collectively and cumulatively addressesboththecausesandconsequencesoftheconflictand,inthelong-term, establish the foundations for social-justice andsustainablepeaceanddevelopment.

TheUNPolicyCommittee, initsMay2007deliberations,approvedausefuldefinitionofpeacebuilding,namely:

Peacebuildinginvolvesarangeofmeasurestargetedtoreducetheriskoflapsingorrelapsingintoconflict,to strengthen national capacities at all levels forconflictmanagement,andtolaythefoundationsforsustainablepeaceanddevelopment.Peacebuildingstrategies must be coherent and tailored to thespecificneedsofthecountryconcerned,basedonnationalownership,andshouldcompriseacarefullyprioritised, sequenced, and therefore relativelynarrowsetofactivitiesaimedatachievingtheaboveobjectives.

Peacebuilding aims to consolidate and institutionalisepeace by undertaking a range of actions that go beyondpreventing violence (negative peace). It aims to address theunderlyingrootcausesofconflictandtocreatetheconditionsforajustsocialorder(positivepeace).Inthiscontext,itmaybe useful to revisit the distinction between preventativepeacebuildingandpost-conflictpeacebuilding,asmuchoftheconceptual confusion comesaboutwhen these twodistinctperspectivesofpeacebuildingaremuddledtogether.

Preventative peacebuilding refers to activities, orprogrammes, aimed at addressing short to medium termconflict factors that may result in a lapse, or relapse intoviolent conflict. Some donors now have funds specificallyearmarked for peacebuilding, and those funds would mostlikelybeused to fund specificprogrammes in this category.

The time frame forpreventativepeacebuilding is necessarilyshort-tomedium-term,becauseit isfocussedonimmediateor imminent threats to the peace process. Examples ofpreventative peacebuilding programmes include conflictresolution training and capacity building. The developmentof institutional capabilities needed for conflict prevention,suchas thePeaceCommission insouthernSudanora localcapacity,suchastheIturiPacificationCommission.Supportforcivilsocietyorwomen’sgroupstoparticipateinpeacemakinginitiatives, and support for national reconciliation initiatives,includingaspectsof transitional justice.Somedonorswouldalsosupportspecificprogrammeactivitiesthatformpartof,or support, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration(DDR),RuleofLaw(RoL)andSecuritySectorReform(SSR),outoftheirpeacebuildingfunds.

Some donors do not earmark funds specifically forpeacebuilding, but prefer to encourage a Conflict SensitiveDevelopment approach when working in conflict-affectedcountries.ConflictSensitiveDevelopmentprogrammeshaveadevelopmentalobjective,forexample,povertyreduction,butissensitivetotheconflictenvironmentwithinwhichtheyoperate,inthatspecificstepsaretakeninthedesignandmanagementoftheprogrammetoeitheravoidaggravatingthesituation,ortoproactivelysupportconflictpreventionefforts.

Animportantpre-requisiteforaPreventativePeacebuildingapproachisanunderstandingoftheriskstothepeaceprocess,andtheconflictfactorsthatcharacterisetheconflictsystem.A Post-Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) is, or should be,typicallyundertakenaspartoftheprocessleadinguptothedesignofappropriatePreventativePeacebuildingprogrammes.Itisthusimportanttoworktowardsacommonunderstandingofwhattheconflictfactorsinaparticularcontextare,fromtheearliestplanningstagesandcontinuouslythroughoutthelifecycleofthepeacebuildingsystem.Fundingfor,andcapacitybuilding towards, effectiveparticipation in a PCIA approachwouldalsoberegardedasaPreventativePeacebuildingactivity.

Post-Conflict Peacebuilding on the other hand refers tothe total combined effort of the peacebuilding dimensions(e.g. those listed below), and may exist in the form ofan overall agreed process that are usually described in astrategic framework. There may be specific processes andstructures that facilitate thedevelopment,managementand


monitoring of such peacebuilding frameworks, and thesemaybe specifically funded,but ingeneral support for Post-ConflictPeacebuildingoccursinahighlyfragmentedmannerinthatthevariousagenciesthatparticipatein,andcontributeto, theoverallprocess,each independentlydesign,manage,monitorandevaluateandsecurefundingfor theiractivities.Theseactivitiesarenotnecessarilyidentifiedas,orfundedas,peacebuildingactivitiesattheprogrammelevel.Instead,theywould,forinstance,beconsideredandfundedasindependentpeacekeeping, development, human rights, or Rule of Lawactivities. Including some specific Preventative Peacebuildingactivities that would be explicitly programmed and fundedaspeacebuildingactivities,suchastheonesdescribedintheprevious section. It is when these activities are consideredtogether, in the context of their combined and cumulativeeffect, over time, that their Post-Conflict Peacebuildingidentityemerge.

Astrategicor integratedframework,that isaimedatanoverall strategic vision for the post-conflict peacebuildingprocess, such as a conflict sensitive Poverty Reduction

Strategy (PRS), or similar frameworks, such as the earlierResults Focussed Transitional Framework in Liberia and themorerecentIntegratedPeacebuildingFrameworkinBurundi,sketch out the overall priorities and objectives of the post-conflict peacebuilding strategy for a particular country. TheindividualactivitiesdescribedabovebecomepartofthePost-ConflictPeacebuildingprocesswhentheycontributeto,andis considered as part of the overall effort directed towardsachievingtheobjectivessetoutinthestrategicvision.Insomecasestheindividualagenciesandactivitiesmaybeconsciousoftheirroleintheoverallframework,butinmostcasesthislinkage is drawn only at the systemic level, for instance instrategicevaluationsor inannualPRSreports.Thisdoesnotimplythattheconnectionsareartificial,butratherthatthoseattheprogrammelevelarenotalwaysawareofthedegreetowhichtheir individualactivitiescontributetoanoverallPost-ConflictPeacebuildingframework.

Table 1: A list of peacebuilding dimensions

Security&RuleofLaw

ProvidingaSafeandSecureEnvironment

ProtectionofCivilians

SecuritySectorReform

Disarmament&Demobilisation

Police,Corrections&theJudicialReform(RuleofLaw)

Political&Governance

SupportthePeaceProcess&OverseethePoliticalTransition

PoliticalParticipation,NationalDialogue&Reconciliation

Governmentinstitutions&CivilServiceCapacityBuilding(Governance)

ExtendStateAuthorityThroughouttheTerritory

ConflictManagementCapacity

Socio-economicRecovery

PhysicalInfrastructure:Roads,Ports,Airports;Electricity;Telecommunications

SocialServices:Health,Education,SocialWelfare,PopulationRegistration,CivilSociety

StimulatingandFacilitatingEconomicGrowth

StrengthenCivilSociety

HumanRights HumanRightsEducation,AdvocacyandMonitoring

HumanitarianAssistance

EmergencyandEarlyRecoveryServicesintheareasofFood,Water&Sanitation,Shelter,Health,Refugees/IDPsandProtection


3 Peacebuildingphases

Peacebuilding is situated in the time-period between thecessation of violent conflict and the return to a normaldevelopmentprocess.Itispossibletoidentifythreephasesthatmaybegenerallyapplicabletomostpeacebuildingprocesses:namely, the stabilisation phase; the transitional phase; and,the consolidation phase. However, these phases should notbe understood as clear, distinct phases with identifiableboundaries.Theyareratherlooselyidentifiablephasesthroughwhich most (not all) post-conflict transitions progress. Theyoverlap and one country can experiencedifferent phases atthesametimeindifferentregions,e.g.onecanarguethatthepeaceprocessintheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongoisinthetransitionsphase,butthattheKivusarestillexperiencingmanycharacteristicsofthestabilisationphase.TheSudancanbe argued to be in the transitional phase in the context ofthe North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement, but inthe stabilisationphase in the contextof theDarfur conflict.Afghanistan should be in the transitional phase, but hasregressedbackintothestabilisationphase.

Stabilisation phase

Thestabilisationphaseistheemergencyperiodthatprecedes,orfollows immediatelyaftertheformalendingofhostilities,and typically focuses on: (1) establishing a safe and secureenvironment;and,(2)respondingtotheconsequencesoftheconflict throughemergencyreliefoperations. Insomecases,forinstanceinthecaseoftheAU(AfricanUnion)/UNHybridoperation inDarfur (UNAMID)ortheAUMission inSomalia(AMISOM), the stabilisation mission has been deployedprior toacease-fireorpeaceagreement inorder toprotectciviliansandsecurehumanitarianassistancewhilstapoliticalprocess seeks anend to the conflict. Inothers, for instancetheUNmissionsinLiberia(UNMIL)andBurundi(ONUB),peaceoperationshasdeployedtoassistwiththeimplementationofapeaceagreement,buteveninthesecasestheinitialphaseofthemissionwillbefocusedonstabilisation.

Transitional phase

Thetransitionalphasetypicallystartswiththeappointmentofaninterimgovernment,followedby,intheshortestreasonableperiod,someformofelectionorlegitimatetraditionalprocessto elect a transitional government, constituent assemblyor some other body responsible for writing a constitutionor otherwise laying the foundation for a future politicaldispensation. The transitional stage typically ends with anelection,runaccordingtothenewconstitution,afterwhichafullysovereignandlegitimacyelectedgovernmentisinpower.

Consolidation phase

The consolidation phase is aimed at supporting the newlyelected government and civil society with a broad range ofprogrammesaimedatfosteringreconciliation,boostingsocio-economic recovery and supporting ongoing processes ofchangeanddevelopment.Anexamplecouldbesecuritysectorandjudicialsectorreformprocesses.

Thetransitionfromthepeacebuildingprocesstoanormaldevelopment process is gradual and it will typically be verydifficult topinpoint theexactperiodwhensucha transitionoccurred.Thepeacebuildingprocesscangenerallybesaidtohavecometoandendwhenanewlyelectedgovernmentisinaposition toensure thehuman securityof all its citizenswithoutextraordinaryexternalassistance;thegovernmenthasextended its control and protection throughout its territory;and,thefoundationoftheruleoflawandsocial justicehasbeenfirmlyestablished.Thenewsocietycanthusreasonablybeexpectedtocontinueonthepathtosustainablepeaceanddevelopmentwithoutundueinternalorexternalthreatstoitsstability.


4 Peacebuildingactors

When considering the different actors in peacebuildingoperationswecanmakeadistinctionbetween internal andexternalactors.

INTERNALANDEXTERNALPLAYERS

Theinternalactorsarecomprisedofthegovernmentoftheday,thepartiestotheconflict,theprivatesectorandcivilsocietyinallitsdifferentvarieties.

The external actors are the peace operation, the UNCountry Team, international NGOs, regional and sub-regionalorganisations like theEU,AUorECOWASanddonoragencies.

4.1 External actors

There are a number of external actors that need to beconsidered in the peacebuilding context. Key among theseis thepeaceoperation, theUNCountry Team, internationalNGOsanddonoragencies.

Inmanypost-conflictsituationstheUN,theAUorasub-regionalorganisationsliketheEconomicCommunityofWestAfricanStates(ECOWAS),theSouthernAfricanDevelopmentCommunity (SADC), or the Intergovernmental Authority onDevelopment(IGAD)intheHornofAfricawilldeployapeaceoperationtostabilisethesituationandtomonitorandsupportthe peace process. The bulk of a peace operation’s effortandresourceswillbefocusedonensuringasafeandsecureenvironmentsothattherestofthepeacebuildingworkcanbecarriedoutwithoutfearofdisruption.

The different membersof the UN System in a givencountryarecommonlyreferredto as the UN Country Team(UNCT). The UNCT is headedby a Resident Representative.The Resident Representative(RR) is also the ResidentCoordinator (RC) of the UNSystem in the country andusually also the Humanitarian

Coordinator (HC). The members of the UNCT may includetheUNDevelopmentProgramme(UNDP),WorldBank(WB),UN High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR), World FoodProgramme(WFP),UNChildren’sFund(UNICEF),WorldHealthOrganization (WHO), UN Development Fund for Women(UNIFEM), the Office for the Coordination of HumanitarianAffairs(OCHA)andothers.

All of these agencies, funds and offices have their ownmandates,budgetsandprogrammesandtheRC/HC’sfunctionistoensurethattheUNCTdevelopsacoherentprogrammeinsupport of theneeds of the countrywhere they are based.ThemembersoftheUNCTmeetonaregularbasisandusevariouscoordinationmechanismstoharmonise theirpoliciesandprogrammes.

The members of the UNCT and the Government of thecountry where they operate usually agree on a commonstrategic framework, called the UN Development AssistanceFramework (UNDAF), that specify how the UN system willsupport the Government over a given time-frame, typically3 to 5 years. The UNDAF is typically aligned with an evenbroaderstrategicframeworkthatencompasstheGovernmentand all the external actors, including beyond the UN theInternational Financial Institutions (IFIs), like theWorldBankand the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the donorcountries.ThisoverallstrategicframeworkisusuallycalledthePovertyReductionStrategyPaper(PRSP).

The international non-governmental organisations(NGOs) include abroad rangeof independentnot-for-profitorganisations that work in the humanitarian assistance anddevelopmentspheres.MostNGOshavedevelopedaspecificfield of specialisation. Some like Médecins sans Frontières(DoctorswithoutBorders)focusonthehealthsector.Oxfamisknownforitsworkinthewater&sanitationandpreventivehealthsectors.Others,likeCareInternationalandWorldVisionhaveamorecross-cuttingapproachandmaybe involved infooddistribution,agricultureprojectsandsupportofrefugeesor internally displaced persons. In some cases, these NGOswillexecuteprogrammesforwhichtheyhaveobtainedtheirownfunding,whilstinotherstheymayactasimplementingpartnersforUNagencieslikeUNHCR(refugees)orWFP(fooddistribution).

UNCOUNTRYTEAMUNCTtypicallyincludes:• RR/RC/HC• UNDP• WorldBank• UNHCR• WFP• UNICEF• WHO• UNIFEM• OCHA…andothers.


ThedonorcommunityincludesmultilateraldonoragenciessuchastheEuropeanUnion(EU)andEuropeanCommission(EC/ECHO), and bilateral donor agencies like JICA (Japan),USAID (USA), DFID (UK), GTZ (Germany), NORAD (Norway),SIDA(Sweden),CIDA(Canada),GOAL(Ireland).Mostofthesedonor agencies areusuallypresent at the country level, buttheydon’texecuteprogrammesthemselves.TheyprovidetheresourcesfortheUNsystemandtheNGOsthatdotheactualwork. Many UN agencies subcontract the actual work toNGOs,soapproximately80%ofalltheprogrammaticactivityinthefieldiscarriedoutbyNGOs.

4.2 Internal actors

Theinternalactorsarecomprisedofthegovernmentoftheday,thepartiestotheconflict,theprivatesectorandcivilsocietyinall itsdifferentvarieties.Inprinciple,thehostgovernmentand other internal actors should play the lead role in thereconstructionprocess,sinceitistheirownfuturethathangsinthebalance.Unfortunately,inmanycases,thecapacityofthe internal actors has been so severely diminished by theconflictthattheyareunabletofulfilthisrole.Asaresult,theinternationalaidcommunityoften,bydefault,playsmoreofaleadingrolethanwouldotherwisebedesired.Ataminimum,coordinationprocessesshouldensurethatthehostcommunityparticipatesinalldecisionsthateffectthem,andthatthereisaprocessinplacetosupportthemtodevelopthecapacitytoplaytheirrightfulrole.Asthepeacebuildingprocessdevelops,theinternalactorsshouldplayanincreasinglyimportantrole.


5 Toolsofpeacebuilding

Akeycharacteristicofthepeacebuildingprocessisthatallitsdimensionsare inter-linkedand interdependent. The variousprogrammesandactivities,andtheagenciesthatcarrythemout, are interdependent in that no single programme canachievethegoalofthepeacebuildingoperation–addressingthe consequences and causesof the conflict and laying thefoundation for social justice and sustainable peace – on itsown. It isonly if theircombinedandsustainedeffortprovessuccessfulinthelongtermthattheinvestmentmadeineachindividualprogrammecanbesaidtohavebeenworthwhile.

Table 2: Convergence around three core dimensions of peacebuilding

Whole-of-Government NATO Counterinsurgency Doctrine World Bank United Nations

Defence Clear Security Security

Diplomacy Hold Governance Political

Development Build Development EconomicandSocialReconstruction

Theprojectcyclesofthedifferentdimensions,clustersandprogrammes need to be synchronised with each other andwiththeoverallpeacebuildingstrategy.Individualprogrammesneed to continuously adjust their planning to the feedbackreceived from elsewhere in the system, to ensure that thecombined effect on the society is positive, consistent andproducedataratethatcanbeabsorbedbytheinternalactors.

It is the total collective and cumulative effect of all theprogrammesundertaken inall thesedimensionsandsectorsthatslowlybuildsapositivemomentumtowardssustainablepeace. The timing, prioritisation and sequencing betweenthesedimensionsandsectorsarethusveryimportant.Thisiswhyintegrationandcoordinationisacriticalsuccessfactorinpeacebuildingoperations.

The search for a Comprehensive Approach should beunderstood in the context of an increasingly complex andinterdependent international conflict management system.Thescopeofthecrisisfacedbytheinternationalcommunityis often of such a scale that no single agency, governmentor international organisation can manage it on its own. Inresponse,awide-rangeofagencies,governmentalandnon-

governmental, and regional and international organisationshaveeachbeguntodevelopspecialisedcapacitiestomanagedifferent aspects of these emergencies, and together theyhavebeenabletorespondwithabroadrangeofinterlinkedactivities.

The distributed nature of this multi-dimensional andmulti-disciplinary response has been able to manage someof the highly dynamic crisis environments reasonably well.In others, however, the degree to which the internationalconflictmanagementsystemlackcoherenceandcoordination

among the diverse international and local actors that makeup the system, resulted in, amongst others, inter-agencyrivalry, working at cross-purposes, competition for funding,duplicationofeffortandlessthanoptimaleconomiesofscale.Allofwhich, taken together, contributed toanoverallpoorsuccessrate,measuredinthesustainabilityofthesystemsthatcameaboutasaresultoftheseinternationalinterventions.

Inorder toaddress these shortcomingsand improve theoverallsuccessrateoftheinternationalconflictmanagementsystem,variousagencies,governmentsandorganisationshavestartedexploring,independentlyfromeachother,witharangeof models and mechanisms aimed at improving the overallcoherence, cooperation and coordination of their conflictmanagementsystems.Alltheseinitiativeshaveasimilaraim,namelytoachievegreaterharmonisationandsynchronisationamong the activities of the different international and localactors, across the analysis, planning, implementation,management and evaluation aspects of the programmecycle. The core aim is to bridge the security-developmentdivideandtointegratethepolitical,security,developmental,economical and other dimensions required to ensure a


system-wideresponsetoanyspecificconflictsystem.ThetermComprehensiveApproachisusedhereasanumbrellaconceptforthesedifferentinitiatives.

Atthenationallevel,anumberofGovernmentshavebeenexperimenting with improving the cooperation among theirownministriesordepartments,bothwithaviewtoimprovingthemanagementoftheirrespectivenationalandinternationalchallenges. These initiatives are now collectively known asso-called Whole-of-Government approaches. The UnitedKingdom’s (UK) joined-up approach under the Blair years isprobablyoneoftheleadingexamplesoftheemergenceofthistrendatthenationallevel.

In the context of international conflict management anumber of national-level Whole-of-Government approachesshouldbementioned.TheCanadianGovernmentdevelopedthe so-called 3D (diplomacy, development and defence)concept,andmanyothershavesinceusedthe3Dmodelasthefoundationoftheirownapproaches.Infact,the3Dconcepthas become a general catch phrase for the ComprehensiveApproachbecauseitsoconciselycapturesthemainsecurity-development axis and the need for an inter-connectednessamongthesedifferentdimensionsofGovernment.

The UK also applied its’ joined-up approach to theinternational arena and created an inter-agency unit, firstcalled the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU), andlater re-named to theStabilizationUnit. Itbrought togetherthe Ministry of Defence, the Department for InternationalDevelopment (DFID)and theForeignMinistry,and,amongstothers,manageda joint fundingpool. TheUnitedStatesofAmerica developed something similar, namely the Officefor the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), but it has not, to date, achieved the same degree ofinter-agency cohesion and participation as the UK initiative.InsteaditisnowfocusedoncoordinatingthedifferentcivilianagenciesoftheUSGovernmentengagedininternationalcrisismanagement,andthedevelopmentofacivilianstandbyrosterorresourcepoolthatisaimedatimprovingtheabilityoftheUSGovernmenttodeploycivilianexperts.

VariousotherGovernmentssuchasNorway,SwedenandtheNetherlandshaveexperimentedwith theirownnationalcoherenceinitiatives.Mostoftheminvolveinter-departmentalcoordinationmeetings,someatvariouslevelsrangingfromtheMinisterialtotheworkinglevel.InsomecasesmoreMinistriesor departments, such as Justice, Correctional Services, theInterior/HomeAffairs,etc.havebeenengaged,and inmanycases these initiatives have been aimed at better managingspecificdeployments. In fact,allof thecountriesmentionedthusfararedeployedinAfghanistan,andmostparticipatein,or lead, a specificProvincial ReconstructionTeam (PRT). ThePRTconceptis,initself,aWhole-of-Governmentexperiment,inthateachPRTismeanttoconsistof,apartfromitssecurity(military) element, political advisors, development advisorsand police advisors. The PRT concept thus provides for thecombined deployment of several Government departments,withthepremisethat thiswill result inan improvedWhole-of-Government approach, that will have a more system-wide or multi-dimensional impact on the stabilisation and

reconstruction goals and objectives of the internationalintervention, within each PRT’s area of operation. We willcomebacktothesuccess,orratherlackofsuccess,thatthePRTmodel,andthustheWhole-of-GovernmentapproachhashadinthecaseofAfghanistaninthenextchapter,whenwewill analyse the coherence dilemma and related challengesexperiencedbytheinternationalcommunity.

At the multilateral level the United Nations, EuropeanUnion,AfricanUnionandNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO)areeachalsoengaged invarious initiativesaimedatimproving the coherence within the different parts of theirownorganisations,aswellasbetweentheirorganisationsandtheotherinternationalandlocalstakeholderstheyworkwithintheinternationalconflictmanagementcontext.

The European Union has developed a sophisticatedCrisis Management capability, including military, police andcivilian capacities, but have not yet deployed integratedmissions where these three dimensions operate together asone mission, with one budget and one mandate. Instead,they have until now been deployed in parallel missions,alongsideotherEUpresencesinthesamecountries,suchaselectionmonitoringmissions,developmentandhumanitarianmissions, and political/diplomatic EU Council and EUCommissionrepresentations.TheEUhas,however,developeda specific civil-military coordination tool (CMCO) tomanagethe coordination among these Crisis Management actors. Ithas not yet, however, developed a capacity to integrate itsCrisisManagement,developmentandhumanitarianmissions,anditwillbeunabletodosountilthenewtreatycomesintoforce,asitrequirestheintegrationofCouncilandCommissionresponsibilities,whichisnotpossibleunderthecurrentsystem.TheEUhasestablishedaworking relationshipwith theUN,especiallyinthecontextoftheoperationswhereithasacloseworking relationshipwithUNpeacekeepingoperations. TheEuropeanUnionForce(EUFOR)operationsintheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongoandinChad/CentralAfricanRepublicarethetwomostrecentexamples.Cooperationinthiscontextincludedjointassessmentmissions,jointplanning,jointafteractionreviewsandclosecooperationforthehandoveroftheEUmission’sresponsibilitiestoUnitedNationsMissionintheCentral African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) in March2009.

NATO has developed the Effects Based Approach toOperations (EBAO), but it is still unclear whether NATOregardstheEBAOasits“comprehensiveapproach”doctrine,orwhetherNATOseesEBAOasthemilitarycomponentofalargerinternational‘comprehensiveapproach’effort.However,NATOisessentiallyamilitaryalliance,andcanonlydeployassuch.Anycivilians,e.g.politicalanddevelopmentaladvisorsitdeploysare theretoserveandadvicetheCommander,sothat (s)he can better fulfil the military mission. NATO canthusonlyparticipateinalarger‘comprehensiveapproach’,asit is incapableofachievingasystem-wideeffecton itsown.NATO has entered into a working relationship with the UNand efforts are underway, for instance in the Afghanistancontext,toworkmorecloselyunderUNleadershiptoachievea more comprehensive effort. This represents a marked


departurefromthepastwheretheUnitedStatesandNATOactivelyworkedtoundermineandlimittheroleoftheUnitedNations in Afghanistan, and is reflective of the realisationthathasemergedamongtheNATOmemberstates in2007and2008that itwillnotbeabletoachieve itsobjectives inAfghanistan through military means alone. Instead, there isagrowingrecognitionthat it isonlythroughasystem-wide,multidimensional response – the so-called ComprehensiveApproach – that the international community can assistAfghanistan to achieve greater stability and work towardsa sustainable political future, and it is in this context thatNATOhasnowformerlyagreedtocoordinateitsworkundertheoveralldirectionoftheSpecialRepresentativeoftheUNSecretary-General(SRSG)inAfghanistan.

TheAfricanUnionisalsocommittedtoaComprehensiveApproachinitspolicypositionsandoverallstrategicrelations,butitisconstrainedinrealisingsuchanapproachforanumberofreasons.Firstly, theAUisprimarilyapoliticalandsecurityorganisationwithvery limitedcapacity toplayameaningfulrole in the humanitarian, developmental and peacebuildingareas,exceptformusteringpoliticalsupportandparticipatinginenablingframeworks.Secondly,thethreepeaceoperationsthattheAUhasundertakentodate, inBurundi,DarfurandSomalia,hasbeenprimarilymilitaryoperations,withasizeablepolice component in Darfur and small civilian components.Thisisbothbecausetheciviliandimensionofpeaceoperationsis still underdeveloped in the AU, and because these haveall been stabilisation-type operations that have less scopefor civilian roles. Thirdly, in the African Standby Force (ASF)contextthere isaconcertedeffortunderwaytodevelopthecivilian dimension of the ASF, but these efforts have to beunderstood in an environment where peacekeeping is stillviewedprimarilyasamilitaryresponsibility.For instance,theASF initiative is steeredby theAUMinistersofDefenceandSecurity,andwhilsttheyarebroadlysupportiveoftheciviliandimension,theirnaturalinterestandfocuslieswiththemilitarydimensionofpeaceoperations.Lastly,theAUhasdevelopedand adopted a policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction andDevelopment,butthispolicyhasnotresultedyetintangibleaction, mainly for the reasons highlighted in the first pointraisedabove,andhasalsonot yetbeen integrated intoAUoperationsforthesecondreasondiscussedearlier.TheAUhasagoodworkingrelationshipwiththeUN,EUandNATO,bothintermsofsupportandcooperationwithexistingoperations,e.g. inthecontextofthehybridUN/AUoperationinDarfur,andintermsofcapacitybuildingforthefutureinthecontextoftheASF.

Among the various multilateral bodies discussed here,the United Nations has perhaps made the most progresswith achieving a Comprehensive Approach to date. It hasdeveloped a sophisticated multidimensional and IntegratedApproachmodelthathasbeenrefinedoverthelasttwoandahalfdecadesinmorethan20peacekeepingoperations.Theseinitiatives have gained further momentum since the WorldSummitin2000.OntheonehandtheUNsystemispiloting–under the slogan“DeliveringasOne” - recommendationsby the high-level panel on system-wide coherence that

has looked into coherence among those members of theUN family working in the humanitarian, development andenvironmental areas. On the other hand, the UN has beenimplementing an initiative to integrate the UN’s political,security, developmental, human rights and humanitarianagencies under one Integrated Missions structure when theUN deploys a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation.Thesedevelopmentsdeservecloserscrutiny,andastheUN’sexperiences with coherence and coordination will form amajorpartoftheempiricalinformationthatwillbeaddressedthroughoutthisstudy,thenextsectionwilldealwiththeUN’sexperiencesinthisregardingreaterdetail.


6 TheUnitedNationsIntegratedApproach

TheUnitedNations (UN)systemhasrespondedtotheseriesof complex challenges it was facing by the late 1990s bycommissioning a series of high-level panels and workinggroupsthatconsideredvariousaspectsofthisdilemma,andbyexperimentingwithanumberofstrategicandoperationalcoordinationmodels.Theseeffortsculminated,over the lasthalf-decade, in the Integrated Approach. The IntegratedApproachreferstoaspecifictypeofoperationalprocessanddesign, where the planning and coordination processes ofthedifferent elementsof theUN family is integrated into asinglecountry-levelUNsystem,when itundertakescomplexpeacekeepingoperations.

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan first described theconceptasfollows:

An Integrated Mission is based on a commonstrategic plan and a shared understanding of thepriorities and types of programme interventionsthatneedtobeundertakenatvariousstagesoftherecovery process. Through this integrated process,the UN system seeks to maximize its contributiontowards countries emerging from conflict byengagingitsdifferentcapabilitiesinacoherentandmutuallysupportivemanner.2

TheNoteoftheSecretary-GeneralonIntegratedMissionsestablishes the IntegratedApproachas theguidingprinciplefor the design and implementation of complex UN peaceoperations in post-conflict situations and for linking thedifferentdimensionsofpeacebuilding(political,development,humanitarian, human rights, ruleof law, social and securityaspects)intoacoherentsupportstrategy.UNSecretary-GeneralBanKiMoonhasreaffirmedtheIntegratedApproachastheguiding principle for all conflict and post-conflict situationswhere the UN has a Country Team and a multidimensionalpeacekeeping operation, or a political of peacebuildingoffice, regardless of whether these missions are structurallyintegratedornot.

TheIntegratedMissionsconceptreferstoatypeofmissionwherethereareprocesses,mechanismsandstructuresinplacethat generate and sustain a common strategic objective, as

2 UN2006a,4.

well as a comprehensive operational approach, among thepolitical, security, development, human rights, and whereappropriate,humanitarian,UNactorsatcountrylevel.

The 2008 Secretary-General’s decision on integrationintroduces the notion of the Integrated Approach. It differsfrom the Integrated Missions concept in that it does notrequirestructuralintegration,althoughitprovidesforit,whereappropriate. Instead, the Integrated Approach refers to astrategicpartnershipbetweentheUNpeacekeepingoperationandtheUNCountryTeamthatensuresthatallcomponentsoftheUNsystemoperateinacoherentandmutuallysupportivemanner,andinclosecollaborationwithotherpartners.

AnIntegratedApproachrequires:(1)AsharedvisionoftheUN’sstrategicobjectives,(2)closelyalignedorintegratedplanning,(3)a set of agreed results, timelines and

responsibilitiesforthedeliveryoftaskscriticaltoconsolidatingpeace,and

(4)agreed mechanisms for monitoring andevaluation.

ThecorefeaturesoftheUN’sIntegratedApproachcanbesummarisedasfollows:

• Context: Multidimensional and system-wide UNfamilysupporttothestabilisationofaconflictortheimplementationofacomprehensivepeaceprocessinapost-conflictsetting, i.e.actionstoestablishameaningfulpeaceprocess,orwhere suchapeaceprocess is inplace,supporttothepartieswiththeimplementationofthisprocess;• Purpose: The main purpose of the integratedapproachistomaximizetheindividualandcollectiveimpactoftheUN’sresponse,concentratingonthoseactivitiesrequiredtoconsolidatepeace;Dimensions: Recognition that a comprehensiveapproachrequiresasystem-wideprocess,thatcoversthe political, security, development, human rights,rule of law and where appropriate, humanitarian,dimensions;• Participating UN Agents: Understanding that inorder for all these dimension to be brought into


playinasynchronised,appropriatelysequencedandcoherent fashion, the UN family, which consist ofa diverse range of departments in the Secretariat,independently constituted funds, agencies andprogrammes, and the Bretton Woods institutions,need to operate as one integrated UN system atcountrylevel;• Operational Coordination: Establishment of arange of processes, mechanisms and structuresthatwillgeneratecommonassessments,integratedplans, operational coordination mechanisms,commonmonitoringtoolsandanabilitytoevaluatethe overall effect and impact of the IntegratedApproach thathasbeenbroughtaboutamongalltherelevantelementsoftheUNsystem.

TheassumptionoftheIntegratedApproachisthatamorecoherentmodel, thatmanages toproducea comprehensiveand coordinated UN system-wide effort, will have a morerelevant, effective, efficient and sustainable impact on thepeaceprocess.

WithintheUNsystemtherearevarioussemi-autonomousagencies, funds, offices and programmes that have ahumanitarian and development mandate, as well asdepartmentsoftheUNSecretariatthathastheresponsibilityforpeaceoperations.AlthoughthecoreoftheUNintegrationeffort will be aimed at achieving system-wide coherenceamongthesemembersoftheUNsystem,thecomprehensiveapproach isnotmeant tobe limitedtothemembersof theUNfamily.ThemembersoftheUNsystemthatparticipateintheUNIntegratedApproach,shouldfacilitateandparticipatein,variousothercoordination initiativesaimedatpromotingoverall harmonisation among the external actors, andalignment between the internal and external actors in anygivencountryorregionalconflictsystem.

The Integrated Approach thus need to be understoodin a wider international context where coherence is beingpursued at national level among government departments(Whole-of-Government), and internationally among donors(harmonisation),betweendonorsandrecipients (alignment),within theUNdevelopment,humanitarianandenvironmentdimensions (system-wide coherence), and between thepeace,security,humanrights,humanitariananddevelopmentdimensions of the UN system at country level (IntegratedMissions).

Integrated Missions has now been officially accepted intheUNSystemas themission structureof choice. Itwill bethe dominant management structure for UN peacekeepingoperations in the near- to mid-term, and it may have asignificantinfluencethewaytheEuropeanUnion(EU),NATO,andtheAfricanUnion(AU)aremanagingtheirownrespectiveintegrationandcomprehensiveapproachinitiatives.

However, one needs to be mindful that integration ina non-UN context refers to multidimensional integration,rather than system-wide integration. For instance, the AU’sIntegrated Planning Task Force (IPTF) refers to a mechanismwherethemilitary,policeandcivilianplanningfunctionsareintegrated, as opposed to the UN’s Integrated Mission TaskForce that refers to the coming together of planners fromthe UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO),UN Department of Field Support (DFS), UN Department ofPoliticalAffairs(DPA),UNDevelopmentGroup,UNOfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs(OCHA)andothersin theUN system.The former remainsapeaceand securityfocused process, although it is now multi-dimensional,whereas the latter refers to the integrationof thepolitical,peacekeeping, humanitarian and development dimensions,thusworkingtowardssystem-wideintegration.

Table 3: A typical UN Integrated Mission where one of the DSRSGs is also the RC/HC3

3 UNDPKO2008.


7 Coordination

7.1 Coordination with the military

Theprimaryroleofthemilitarycomponentofapeacebuildingoperationistoensureasafeandsecureenvironmentwithinwhichtherestoftheexternalandinternalactorscanoperate.Thesecondary roleof themilitarycomponent is tomake itsresourcesavailabletoexternalandinternalactors insupportoftheoverallmissionobjectives.Forinstance,inthecontextof a DDR programme, the military component may be in apositiontoprovidetransport,medicalservices,camp-building,weaponsstorageand/orweapondestructionservices,overandaboveitssecurityfunction.Similarly,inthecontextofanUN-supportedelection,whereaUNpeaceoperationisdeployed,themilitarycomponentmaybeinapositiontoassistwiththeidentificationofsuitablesitesforpollingstations;engineeringsupportintermsofbuildingorre-habilitatingstructuresthatcanbeusedduringtheelectionaswellasrehabilitateorbuildroadsandbridgesthatprovideaccesstopollingstations;andtheprovisionoftransport,manpower,andequipment–overandaboveitssecurityfunction.

The use of military assets in the peacebuilding contextdiffers from the use of military assets in the humanitariancontext. Humanitarian actors operate on the basis of thehumanitarianprinciples–humanity,neutralityandimpartiality–andtheseprinciplesismeanttoensuretheirindependencefrom political interference. Their work is purely focused onassisting those affectedby the conflict. They arenot in anyway involved in resolving the conflict itself. Humanitarian-military coordination thus needs to be undertaken in suchaway that itdoesnotharm thehumanitarianprinciples. Inthepeacebuildingcontext,however,thecivilianagenciesthatundertakepeacebuildingworkisdirectlyengagedinresolvingtheconflictandthereisthusnoassumptionofindependence.This does not necessarily mean that they are not impartial,but it means that they are openly working to manage orresolvetheconflict,andthatthesecivilianactorsshouldnotbeconfusedwithhumanitarianactors.

In the peacebuilding context, for example in a DDR orelections programme, both military and civilian partners areunderstood to be engaged in an activity aimed at bringingabout a specific outcome that will fundamentally change

thedynamicsofthesituation.Thoseopposedtoanelection,for instance, will be opposed to all that are involved in theelectoral process, regardless of whether they are civilian ormilitary. The close cooperation between military and civilianpartnersinthepeacebuildingcontextdoesthusnothavethesame implicationsfor thesecurityof thecivilianpartners,orbeneficiarypopulation,asitwouldhaveinthehumanitariancontext. One must thus be careful, when referring to civil-military coordination, to distinguish between humanitarian-militaryandpeacebuilidng-militarycoordination.

Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) refers to a specificbranch of the military force that is responsible for liaisonbetween the military force and its civilian partners, as wellas for coordinating the support provided by the force toits international partners and the local community. CIMICactions should be integrated into the larger mission effortandshouldbecoordinatedwithallpartnersandstakeholders.For instance, community support actions should be aimedat helping the local community. They must be based onthe need of the community (needs driven as supposed tosupplydriven)andthecommunityshouldbeencouragedtotakeownershipof,anddirect, theseprojects.CIMICactionsshould be coordinated with all partners and stakeholders(e.g.inthecaseofamilitaryunitrehabilitatingaschool,suchservices should be coordinated with the appropriate civilianauthorities: local education authorities; local communityleaders;UNICEF;OCHA;NGOsworkingintheeducationfield,thatmaybeactiveinthearea,etc.)sothattheactionsofthemilitaryunitarecomplementarytotheactions(humanitariananddevelopment)thatarebeingundertakenbyappropriatecivilianandhumanitarianactors.Forinstance,aCIMICschoolrehabilitation project should not be in competition with, orundermine, the activities of these civilian actors. It shouldbe undertaken in support of a larger school rehabilitationprogramme, so that the school that is rehabilitated throughCIMICactionwill be integrated into, and supportedby, thelargerprogramme–thelargerprogrammemay,forinstance,support the national and/or local education authorities andensurethatthereareteachersandschoolmaterialavailable–thusensuringlonger-temsustainability


7.2 What does coordination mean?

TheOxfordAdvancedLearner’sDictionaryofCurrentEnglishexplains that cooperation means “working together for acommon purpose,” whilst coordination means “makingthings,peopleandparts functiontogetherefficientlyand inanorganisedway.”TheCollinsEnglishDictionaryprovidesaninsight into coordination that seemsevenmore relevant forourpurpose. Itdefinescoordinationas“theorganisationoftheactivitiesoftwoormoregroupsinsuchawaythateachmayworkmoreefficiently andbeawareofwhat theothergroup(s)aredoing.”

ThemostauthoritativedefinitionofcoordinationappearstobethatcoinedbyMinear&Chellia:

Coordination is the systematic utilization of policyinstrumentstodeliverhumanitarianassistance inacohesive and effective manner. Such instrumentsinclude: (1) strategic planning; (2) gathering dataandmanaginginformation;(3)mobilizingresourcesand ensuring accountability; (4) orchestrating afunctional division of labour; (5) negotiating andmaintaining a serviceable framework with hostpolitical authorities; and, (6) providing leadership.Sensiblyandsensitivelyemployed,suchinstrumentsinject an element of discipline without undulyconstrainingaction.4

7.3 The dimensions of coordination

There aremany factors that frustrate coordination, but twodeserveparticularattention.Thefirst isthesheernumberofinternationalandlocalactorsinvolved,andthesecondisthewide-rangingscopeofactivitiesundertakenby theseactors.The interaction among this large number of actors and theinterplayamongthemultipledimensionsexplainthecomplexityinherent in post-conflict reconstruction operations. To thesewe can still add an infinite number of complicating factorsincluding, amongst others: the language and socio-culturalgapsbetweenthoseundertakingpost-conflictreconstructionprogrammesandthebeneficiariestheyareintendedtoassist;and, the inconsistencies and selectivity of the neo-liberalinternational policy regime that serve to compound existingglobalinequalities5.

The information revolution has multiplied the numberof actors involved inpost-conflict reconstructionoperations.It has amplified the influence of the media, nurtured amore educated and better informed public, and increasedthe number of institutions and agencies engaged in peace,security,reliefandreconstructionactions.

4 Minear&Chellia1992,3.5 Pugh&Cooper2004,197.

7.4 Separating coordination and management

Thereshouldbeacleardistinctionbetweenmanagementandcoordination.Decision-makingtakesplaceinthemanagementfunction,whilstthecoordinationfunctionisusedtoexchangeinformation.Ifthesetwofunctionsareseparated,coordinationwillnotposeathreattoanyunitorprogramme.Thisisbecauseeach individual agent will retain full control over their owndecision-makingfunction.

Forcoordinationtobepalatabletodefensiveinstitutionalcultures, ithastobenon-threatening.Andfor ittobenon-threatening ithas tobevoluntary,andfreeofanydecision-makingpowerovertheparticipatingagency.


8 Fromstrategytoevaluation

8.1 Strategic direction

One of the prerequisites for a coherent peacebuildingoperationisaclearlyarticulatedoverallstrategyagainstwhichindividual units, offices and programmes can benchmarktheirownplansandprogress.Theoverallcountrystrategyisproducedbythecumulativeandcollectiveplanningeffortsofalltheunits,officesandprogrammesinthesystem.

Thepeaceandsecurityaspectsofsuchanoverallstrategyare derived from the UN Security Council resolutions thatdeterminethemandateofthemissionandthestrategicplansdeveloped by the SRSG to implement that mandate. Thehumanitarian and development community’s strategies arederivedfromcommonassessmentandappealprocessesthatmay result in aCommonHumanitarianActionPlan (CHAP),a Common Country Assessment (CCA), a UN DevelopmentAssistance Framework (UNDAF) or a Poverty ReductionStrategyPaper(PRSP)–dependingonthespecificcase.

The peace operation, the UN Country Team and otherexternalactors,suchastheNGOanddonorcommunity,needtoworkcloselywith the internalcommunity, includingbothgovernmentandcivil-societyrepresentatives.Thisisdonewithaviewtodevelopingonecommoncountrystrategy.

8.2 Planning and assessments

In order to achieve the desired level of synergy it is nowbecomingcommonpracticetoenrichplanningatthehigheror home headquarters level through integrated planningmechanisms and joint assessment missions. For example, intheUNSecretariatinNewYork,planningforpeaceoperationsnow benefit from an Integrated Mission Planning Process(IMPP)systemthatbringvariousUNdepartmentsandagenciestogethertoprovideinputintotheplanningprocess.Itisalsonowcommonpracticetoundertakejointassessmentmissionsthatassistinensuringthatthereisacommonunderstandingoftheproblemsthatneedtobeaddressed.

At the field headquarters or mission management level,theSpecialRepresentativeoftheSecretary-General(SRSG)andotherseniormanagerscoordinatewiththerepresentativesofgovernment,partiestothepeaceprocess,headsofthevarious

agencies,organisations,diplomaticmissionsandinternationalorganisations.Theyusevariousregularandad-hocmeetingstoachievetheircoordinationobjectives.Theseniormanagersalsomakeuseofanumberofstrategicplanninginstrumentstoencourageabroadlycohesiveapproachwithinthepeace,security,humanitariananddevelopmentcommunity–andtoensurethatthisapproachsupportstheneedsandprioritiesofthehostcommunity.

Apart from the common strategic planning frameworksintroducedabove,missionsalsousevariousothermechanismsto exchange information and ensure integration amongcomponentsatthemissionHQlevel.TheJointMissionAnalysisCells (JMAC) is one example. The JMAC is a jointly staffedunitwheretheinformationgatheredbyvariouscomponents(militaryunits,militaryobservers,police,politicalaffairs,civilaffairs, human rights, etc.) is collated and analysed. In thiswaythemissionmanagementbenefitsfromoneconsolidatedinformationpictureaboutthemissionandthepeaceprocessthathasbeeninformedbyallthedifferentperspectiveswithinthemission.

8.3 Mobilising resources

The international community has developed various toolsto mobilise resources. The United Nations Office for theCoordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) coordinatestheConsolidatedAppealsProcess(CAP).TheCAPisfirstandforemost a strategic planning and coordination tool. ThehumanitariancommunityseestheCAPasthemainstrategy-settingtoolinrespondingtoman-madeandotherslow-onsetdisasters.

In the development dimension, the United NationsDevelopment Programme (UNDP) or the World Bank willtypicallytaketheleadtocoordinatefundraisingforcommonpriorities throughdonor conferences. Thedonor conferenceforAfghanistaninJanuary2001andtheconferenceforLiberiainFebruary2004aretwosuchexamples.

In some cases transitional appeals are launched on thebasis of a Common Country Assessment (CCA), and thenserve as the foundation for a UN Development AssistanceFramework (UNDAF) and/or a Poverty Reduction Strategy


Paper (PRSP), as appropriate. Once the funds have beenallocated the coordination shifts to implementation andoperationalcoordination.

In the case of UN peace operations, the missions arefunded throughassessed contributions. Part of theworkoftheCIMICOfficerwillbetounderstandhowthesedifferentfunding mechanisms work, and which mechanisms withinandoutsidethemissionbudgetcanbeaccessedtofacilitatespecificprojects,e.g.QuickImpactProjects.

8.4 Monitoring and evaluation

The country strategy initiative should be supported by amonitoring and evaluation system. Such an inter-agencyinitiative should not only provide feedback on individualand overall progress, but also encourage programmes andagenciestoparticipateintheoverallcoordinationprocess.Allactorsshouldberequestedtoreportonthestepstheytooktosynchronisetheirplansandoperationswiththeothersinthesystem,andwiththeoverallobjectivesofthemission.Inthiswaytheevaluationprocessbecomesnormative:itencouragesandrewardsbehaviourthatenablescoherence;itdiscouragesandsanctionsbehaviourthatinhibitscoordination.

Anotherimportantelementistheabilityofthesystemtomonitortheeffectitishavingonitsenvironment.Theproject-cyclesofthedifferentprogrammesandagenciesneedtobesynchronised, toensure that theircombinedandcumulativeeffect on the host society is positive. Projects must beconsistentanddeliveredataratethatcanbeabsorbedbythelocalcommunities.Whentheultimateaimoftheinternationaloperation issustainablepeace,thentheoverallstrategyandthe pace of its implementation has to reflect the optimalrelationshipbetweendeliveryandabsorption.


9 Thelimitsofcoordination,integrationandthecomprehensiveapproach

Thosethatfavouracomprehensiveandintegratedapproachshareanumberofbroad,notalwaysexplicitlystated,policyassumptions,suchas:

(a)Followingacomprehensiveapproachwillresultinmoreefficientandmoreeffective interventions,withamoresustainableoutcome;

(b)It is possible to integrate the political, security,humanrights,developmentalandhumanitariandimensionsbecause,attheendoftheday,theyhavethesamegoalsandobjectives;

(c)There is sufficient willingness amongst thedifferentagenciestoworktogethertoachieveacomprehensiveapproach;and

(d)Thereissufficientstructuralflexibilitytoallowthedifferentagenciestoworktogether,andwhereobstaclesareidentified,thereisawillingnesstoaddressanysuchimpediments.

Although these initiatives are all fairly recent, initialindications from the field, and past experiences withcoordination, indicate however, that at the operationaland tactical levels many of these assumptions are, at bestchallenged, and at worse, flawed. In the next few sectionswe will look into some of the major challenges that acomprehensiveofintegratedapproachwillneedtomanage.

9.1 Conflicting values and principles

The practical application of the comprehensive approachconceptdifferswidelydependingontheactualcontext,butonecanconcludethatoneofthemostimportantindicatorsofthedegreetowhichmeaningfulcoherencecanbeachieved,isthedegreeofhostilitythatispresentintheconflictsystem.Theorganisationalvaluesandoperatingprinciplesthatguidethehumanrightsandhumanitarianactors, for instance,aremorelikelytobeinconflictwiththevaluesandprinciplesofthe political and security actors, in contexts where some ofthe international and local actors are hostile to each other.This tension will be especially acute in situations where aninternational intervention has to deal with a hostile hostGovernment, e.g. in the case of Darfur in Sudan, or whereaninternational interventionhastodealwithaninsurgency,

e.g. in the case of Afghanistan, or is engaged in forcefullydisarming rebel or militia groups, e.g. in the DemocraticRepublicoftheCongo(DRC).

This implies that coherencemaybemoredifficult in theearlyphasesofaninterventionwherethereisadualsecurity(stabilisation)andhumanitarianfocus.However,thistensionisequallyinevidenceinsituationsthathavedevelopedintothetransitional and consolidationphases, butwherepocketsofinstabilityremain,orwhereinstabilityflairsupafteraperiodofrelativecalm.Thephaseoftheinterventionisthusnotasmuchofanindicationasthedegreeofhostility.

The tension is derived from the fact that the operatingprinciples of the humanitarian agencies require them todemonstrate their neutrality between all parties perceivedto be in dispute, including those parts of the internationalcommunity that are, or are perceived to be, using force orothercoercivemeansagainstoneormoreofthepartiesintheconflictsystem.

Such fundamental differences in values and principlesarenot,however, limited tohostileenvironments.Therearealso other instances where the values and principles of thevarious actors couldbe in conflict. Thedifferent actorsmayhavedifferentviewswithregardtowhichaspectstoprioritise.Political and security actors may typically prefer to focuson stabilising a situation before addressing human rightsviolations, or todealwith corruption, blackmarket trading,racketeeringornarcotics,especiallyifactorstheyperceivetobe the key to stabilising the situation is suspected of beingresponsible for such human rights atrocities or criminalbehaviour.

In some cases the timetable of one dimension may bein conflictwith theprinciplesof another.One case inpointis the election time-table in Liberia (2004–2006) whichmotivated those responsible for the election to encouragethe InternallyDispacedPersons (IDPs) inMonrovia to returnto theiroriginal communities so that they canbe registeredtheretovote.TheUNMissioninLiberia(UNMIL)pressurisedthose agencies responsible for reintegration to persuadethe IDPs to return, and to start offering them reintegrationsupport.However, theseagenciesdisagreedwith the returntimetable suggested by UNMIL, because their assessments


informed themthat theconditionswasnotyet sufficient toprovidealternativesustainablelivelihoodsforthereturneesintheirhome locations.This situationcaused tensionbetweenthepoliticalanddevelopmental/humanitarianactorsbecausetheirrespectivegoals,shorttermvs.longterm,andoperatingvaluesandprinciplesbroughtthemintodirectoppositionwithanother.

Anotherexamplewouldbesituationswherepoliticalandsecurityactorsmaywishtorewardcertainpoliticalormilitaryactors for their cooperation with humanitarian assistanceordevelopmentalprojects. In somecontexts, for instance incounterinsurgencydoctrine,communitiesthatcooperatewiththeGovernmentandinternationalforcesshouldberewardedwithaidtoshowthemthatcooperationwiththeGovernmentand international forces bring them more benefits thancooperationwiththeinsurgents.Sucha winning the hearts and mindsapproachcouldresultinthepoliticalandmilitaryactorsplacingunduepressureonthedevelopmentandhumanitarianactors to provide services in selected areas, or the politicaland security actors could use their own means to provideservices that appear to bedevelopmental andhumanitarianinaction.AtthesametimetheGovernmentandinternationalforcesmaydiscouragethosedevelopmentalandhumanitarianactors that provide services in areas under the control ofthe insurgents. All of these variations will result in blurringthe distinction between political/military and humanitarianaction,andthusunderminetheindependence,neutralityandimpartialityofthehumanitarianactors,intheeyesofthelocalcommunitiesandtheinsurgents,andthiswillresultinseveretensionswithinacomprehensiveapproachcommunity,or intheinabilitytoachieveacomprehensiveapproach.

The assumption that there is a sufficient level of sharedvalues,principles,goalsandobjectivesisthusnotsupportedby the evidence from the field. This is not to say that it isimpossibletoachievemeaningfulcoherenceandcoordinationacross the various dimensions under a comprehensiveapproachumbrella.Rather,thepointisthattherewillbetimesand situations where it is not possible to have a commonapproach.Insteadofassumingthattherewillalwaysberoomforacommonapproach,realitydictatesthattherewillhavetobe trade-offs, second-best solutions, compromises andevensometimesaninabilitytocometoanykindofagreement.Inall of these circumstances, however, it is preferable to havepre-agreedmechanismsfordialogueandcoordination–evenif only aimed at de-confliction - where the different viewpointscanberaisedandwherethedifferentactorscaninformeachotheroftheirrespectiveprinciples,goals,objectivesandapproaches, so thatwhen these tensionsoccur theycanbediscountedinatransparentandwellinformedmanner.

9.2 Conflicting rules, regulations and resource management processes

There are also structural impediments to coherence andcooperationthat,althoughtechnical,aresignificantobstaclesatthefield-levelastheyare:

(a)typicallyimposedbyhigherorderprocessesandthusnotchangeableinthefield,

(b)they require considerable political will andinstitutionalefforttochange,

(c)they typically take a long time to change asthey are subject to negotiation among variousstakeholdersandthedecision-makingprocessesrequiredtochangethemusuallytakesplaceonlyonceayear,orevenless.

These structural impediments fall into two broadcategories, namely administrative rules and regulations, andresourcemanagementprocesses.Intherulesandregulationscategory we find organisational procedures that discouragecooperation. These are typically instances that, for instance,prohibit UN peacekeeping personnel from allowing anynon-UN peacekeeping personnel into UN vehicles, dueto insurance coverage and indemnity issues, or prohibitpersonnelfromamilitaryforcefrommovingaroundwithoutarms,whichimpedetheabilityofliaisonpersonneltoattendcivilianmeetings, etc. Inotherwords theyareoften tacticallevelpracticalarrangements thathaveahigh impactontheabilityofpeopletoworktogetherinthefield,buttherulesorregulationsthemselveshavebeenestablishedatahigherlevel,typically at the higher-headquarters level, and for differentreasons,e.g.insuranceorsecurityofpersonnel,anditisthusverydifficulttochangeintheshortterm.

Another example, in the UN context, is the lack offlexibility that agencies have to share resources. For goodoperational reasons, most UN agencies will have their owntelecommunications, information technology, transportand other resources. However, each of these agencies havedevelopedtheseovertheyearsindependentlyfromtheothers,andtheinteroperabilityofthesevarioussystemsisaproblemin the field. Often, especially in the early stages of a crisis,some agencies have resources in the field whilst others arestillwaitingfortheirstoarrive.Inthesecircumstancesbettercooperation among the agencies to share the resourcesavailable would seem logical, but organisational rules andregulations, and complicated reimbursement processes hasresultedinsub-optimumsharingofresources.Anothercaseinpointisairservices.

Veryoftentheunderlyingcause inthesecasesrelatestofinancial management issues. For good and sound financialreasons, organisations have to budget for resources, andonceallocated,havetousetheresourcesasplanned.Wheredeviations occur they have to pre-cleared and reported.Althoughthesesystemsmakeforgoodfinancialmanagement,andneedtobeespeciallyvigorousaspublicfundsareasstake,they do not make it any easier for field level managers tooperateinhighlydynamicsituations.Eachagencyhasitsownbudgetandfinancialrulesandregulations,andthesetypicallydo not easily provide for pooling of funds or resources,sharing resources, or other forms of cooperation. One areathat is particularly sensitive relates to the remuneration ofpersonnel.Peoplefromallkindsofagenciesandbackgroundwork closely together, but are rewarded at different scalesandhavedifferentbenefits. In somecases thesedifferences


aresignificant,especiallyamonglocalandinternationalstaff.This causes tension, resentmentandmobilityamongpeopleworkingtogether,but isverydifficult toharmoniseas thesebenefits are determined at higher-headquarters, and as thepeople involved fall into so many different categories. It is,for instance,verydifficult tocomparetheremunerationandbenefitsofamilitaryofficer,whoisemployednationally,andthusonlyreceivesanadditionalfieldallowance,withthatofacivilianUNstaffmemberwhoisemployedonashort-termcontract, and whose field-level salary represents their totalincome.

Those organisations that rely on voluntary funding alsooftenneedtobeabletoshowthefundingagencyhowtheirspecificcontributionshavehadanimpact,andasthisbecomesverydifficult in cooperative ventures, suchorganisationsareoftenunderpressuretoactindependently.

Therearethusarangeofstructuralissuesthatdiscouragecoherence and cooperation among agencies in the field,and many of these are very difficult, or may take a longtime, to change. Many personnel in the field are on short-termcontractsandhavebeenhiredspecificallyforfield-levelpositions without prior service at the headquarters level,and they feel disempowered to influence these higher-leveldecision-making processes. This is one of the reasons whypersonality,or individual leadership,playssuchan importantrole inthesecontexts.Somemanagers,especiallythosethathave long-term career ambitions in a specific organisation,choose to follow the organisational rules and regulations,regardless of their side-effects, and are afraid to alert theirhigher-headquarters of such negative side-effects, in case itaffects their future career prospects.Others choose tofightthe system, and may make short-term gains, but generallyseem to become frustrated with the system and leave. Themost successful group seem to strike a balance betweenthese extremes, and seems to develop coping mechanismsto find ways around some rules and regulations whilst, atthesametime,maximisingthe leveragetheycangetoutofothers.Thesemanagerslearnhowtousethesystemtotheiradvantage,andarecapableofcoping–oreventothrive–inthesehighlychallengingenvironments.

9.3 Inappropriate management philosophies, processes and tools

Such personalities are, however, in short supply and wecannot rely on them to overcome the shortcomings of thesystem.Weneedtorecognisetheinadequaciesofthecurrentdominant management philosophies, policies and processestodealwiththehighlydynamic,complexandinterdependentcomprehensive approach context, and develop newmanagement models designed to cope with the particularmanagement needs in this environment. The current modelisbasedon independent inward lookingclosed-loopprojectcycle and budget-based systems. Managers are meant toensurethatprojectsaremanagedagainstgoalsandobjectives,accordingtopre-approvedbudgetsandinputs,toproducepre-determinedoutputs.Anydeviationsfromtheprojectplanare

frownedupon,willdrawunwantedscrutiny,andwillrequirethorough motivation. The model ensures that the project iscarried out according to plan and within budget. It makesnoor littleprovisionforcoordinationwithotherprojects,oradaptationtoahighlydynamicenvironment.

A comprehensive approach context requires, however,thateachprogrammeunderstandsnotonly its independentreality, but also its interdependent reality. Each programmeis independentinthatit isexecutedundertheauspicesofacertainbureaucratic organisation that exist as a legal entity,thathasitsownbudgetandtheauthority,andresponsibility,tomanagetheprogramme.Thetraditionalprojectmanagementmodel has been designed to serve this independent reality.Eachprogrammeis,however,alsointerdependent inthat itsmeaning is derived from its part in the larger system, i.e. itcontributestoachievingaspecificeffectthatonlymakessenseifyoutakeintoaccountthatothersarecontributingtowardsother effects, and the total combined effect is necessary toachieve momentum towards peace. For instance, a specificdevelopmentalprogrammemayprovidevocationaltrainingaspart of a larger DDR programme in a post-conflict context,butthatprogrammeonlymakessense(havemeaning)ifitisunderstoodinitsoverallcontextasbeingpartofalargerpeaceprocess that includes a DDR programme, in which severalorganisations are taking part, and the vocational trainingprogramme can only considered to be a success if othersidentify, registeranddisarmcombatants,and ifothersworktoward sustained livelihoods and economic recovery whichwillcreatetheenvironmentwithinwhichthevocationcanbeapplied.Insuchacontextaprogrammemanagerneedstobeabletoestablishandmaintainanetworkthatensuresthattheparticular programme is connected with other programmesthatmayhaveaninfluenceonitsoutcome,andthatwillresultinitbeingabletoadjusttochangeselsewhereinthesystem.Inotherwordsitisnotjustaboutmanagingtheindependentreality, but also the interdependent reality of being partof a highly dynamic complex system, that requires that theindividual programme needs to be coherent with, at leastsomeaspectsofthelargersystemandthatcoordinationwithothers,andadaptation tochangeselsewhere in the system,become additional requirements. In this context changesto theplanshouldnotbe frowneduponbutexpected,andmanagersshouldbeexpectedtoplanforandreportontheireffortstoensurecoherence,coordinationandadaptation.

Thecomprehensiveapproachalsorequiresaculturechangewithin the higher headquarters that would require thoseresponsible for developing policy, as well as those planningandmanagingspecificinterventions,torecogniseandcounterthe tendency of their own bureaucracies to be self serving,andtobepre-occupiedwithself-preservation,andinsteadtoencourage an organisational culture, both at headquartersand in the field, that embraces both the independent andinterdependentrealitiesofworkinginthishighlydynamicandcomplexenvironment.


9.4 Unintended consequences

It is also important to recognise that no intervention in acomplexsystemcanhaveonlyoneeffect.Complexsystemsaredynamicandrespondtointerventionsinanonlinearfashion.Wemaybeable toanticipate someof theways inwhichacomplex system will respond to an intervention, includingtheresponsesweintendedtostimulatethroughouractions.However,thesystemwillalsorespondinwaysthatwecouldnotanticipate.Ifweacceptthatunintendedconsequencesareanaturaloutcomeofthedynamicnatureofcomplexsystems,thenwealsohavetorecognisethattheycannotbeavoidedaltogether. Some unintended consequences should havebeenforeseenoranticipated,especiallyiftheyhaveoccurredundersimilarcircumstancesinthepast,whilstothersmaybetotally unexpected. We have to recognise that unintendedconsequences are a predictable side-effect of peacekeepingoperations, i.e. the likelihood that there will be unintendedconsequences is predictable, but the specific unintendedconsequences are not always predictable. This possibilityshouldthereforebefactoredintotheplanning,coordinationandmonitoringofpeacebuildingsystems.


10Conclusion

Integrated Crisis Management and Peacebuilding is an all-encompassing concept that incorporates a wide variety ofresponses aimed at supporting the rehabilitation, recoveryandreconstructionofthemanyfacetsofasocietyrecoveringfromconflict. It seeks toalter theconditions that ledtotheconflictinthefirstplace.Ultimately,peacebuildingisaimedatestablishing theconditionsnecessary toensure social justiceandsustainablepeaceanddevelopment.

Thekeycharacteristicofpeacebuildingoperationsisthatallthedifferentdimensionsareinterrelatedandinterdependent.It is the total collective and cumulative effect of all theprogrammes undertaken in these different dimensions thatslowlybuildspositivemomentumtowardssustainablepeace.The timing, prioritisation and sequencing between thesedimensionsarethusveryimportant.Thisiswhycoordinationisacriticalsuccessfactorinpeacebuildingoperations.

Good coordination requires a web of coordinationstructuresatalllevels,workingbothfromthebottomup,andfrom the topdown.This isnecessary toensure feedback inbothdirections.At the strategic level coherenceamong theUN,AU, ECOWASand thedonor community is key.At theoperational and tactical level a vast network of liaison andcoordination mechanisms exist. The network is feeding thesystem with the information it needs to remain focused onthoseareasthatrequirethemosteffort,whilststayingtruetotheoverallgoalsandobjectivesofthemission.


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Authors

Mr.Cedric de Coning isaResearchFellowattheAfricanCenterfortheConstructiveResolutionofDisputes(ACCORD)andtheNorwegianInstituteofInternationalAffairs(NUPI).HestartedhiscareerasaSouthAfricandiplomatinWashingtonD.C. and Addis Ababa, and he also worked for the UNDepartment of Peacekeeping Operations in East Timor andinNewYork.Cedric isaDPhilcandidateattheUniversityofStellenboschandhisrecentpublicationsinclude:Civil-Military Coordination in United Nations and African Peace operations, ACCorD (2007) and the Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping,UNUPress(2007),whichheco-editedwithProfChiyukiAoiandProfRameshThakur.

Ms. Kirsi Henriksson is the Head of Research andDevelopmentat theCrisisManagementCentreFinland.ShehasaMasterofArtsinGeneralHistoryfromtheUniversityofTampere,Finland.Previously,shehasworkedasaResearcherintheTamperePeaceResearchInstitute,aswellasaResearcherand Lecturer at the Department of History, University ofTampere. During 2006–2009 she worked as Chief Editor ofa scientific journal published by the Finnish Peace ResearchAssociation, kosmopolis. Her regional expertise lies withinNorth-Africa,especiallywithAlgeria.

Dr. Ari Kerkkänen has Ph.D. from the University ofHelsinki (2001).Currently,heworksasDirectorof theCrisisManagementCentreFinland.Hisformerappointmentsareasfollows: University Researcher (University of Helsinki, 2006),Political Advisor (Multinational Task Force North, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2005), War Crimes Intelligence Analyst (UNInternational Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,2002–2005),PoliticalMonitorandSeniorOperationsOfficerinSerbia(EUMM2001–2002),UNMilitaryObserver(UNPROFOR1994–1995, UN Staff Officer (UNPROFOR, 1993) and UNOperations Duty Officer (UNIFIL, 1991–1992). His regionalexpertiselieswithintheMiddleEastandtheWesternBalkans.

Mr.Tommi Niemi has aMasterof International Relationsfrom the University of Tampere. He is currently studyingMaster’sDegreeinLawintheUniversityofHelsinki.

Dr. Elina Penttinen works currently in a joint researchproject (TamperePeaceResearch InstituteandCMCFinland)titled “Enhancement of expertise in comprehensive crisismanagement”. Her earlier research includes gender-mainstreaming of civilian crisis management, researchmethodologies and creative analytic writing funded by theAcademy of Finland including postdoctoral and doctoralfunding.Herdoctoralthesis(2004)“Corporealglobalization”was published by Routledge in 2008 with a new title“Globalization, Prostitution and Sex-trafficking: corporealpolitics”.ShehasworkedinTamperePeaceResearchInstituteasaresearcherandasanadjunctprofessorattheDepartmentof Political Science and International Relations,University ofTampere,Finland.

Mr. Ville-Veikko Pitkänen isaResearcheratCMCFinland.Heprimarilyconcentratesoncivil-militarycoordinationincrisismanagementbuthasalsoanalysedtheimplementationoftheUN Resolution 1325 “Women, Peace and Security” into allfacetsofCMCFinlandactivities.Mr.PitkänenholdsaMaster’sofSocialSciencedegreeinInternationalStudies.

Dr.Maaria YlänköhasPh.D.fromtheUniversityofHelsinki(2002). Shehasworkedas aResearchCoordinator atCMCFinlanduntilOctober2009andcurrentlysheworksasGenderExpert for EUPOL and EUSEC operations in the DemocraticRepublic of Congo. Previously she has been working as aLecturer inthe InstituteforAsianandAfricanStudiesattheUniversityofHelsinki,Finland.

CivilianCrisisManagementStudiesCMCFinlandYEARBOOK2009on

CMCFINLANDCIVILIANCRISISMANAGEMENTSTUDIESINTHISVOLUME:

ThegenderperspectiveintrainingandrecruitmentofFinnishciviliancrisismanagementexpertsVILLE-VEIKKOPITKÄNEN

Highintegrityandfemininecare:FemalepoliceofficersasprotectorsinciviliancrisismanagementELINAPENTTINEN

War-relatedsexualviolenceagainstwomen:ItsdimensionsandproposalsforaresponseMAARIAYLÄNKÖ

ReintegrationinAcehIndonesiaOpinionsoftheFinnishciviliancrisismanagementexpertsTOMMINIEMI

AnintroductiontoIntegratedCrisisManagementCEDRICDECONING

Hulkontie83,POBox1325,FI-70821Kuopio,Finlandtel.+358(0)718750341fax+358(0)718753650www.cmcfinland.fi

ISBN978-952-67127-2-7

ISSN1797-2140


Civilian Crisis Management Studies - CMC Finland

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Transcript of Civilian Crisis Management Studies - CMC Finland