THE UNIVERSITY OF DAR ES SALAAMDEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC

ADMINISTRATION

CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS (CSOs) RELATIONS WITHTHE STATE AND POLITICAL PARTIES

ByErnest T. Mallya

A paper presented for the Conference on the State ofCivil Society in Tanzania

February 2005

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CSOs RELATIONS WITH THE STATE AND POLITICAL PARTIES

INTRODUCTION‘Civil Society’ occupies the space between an individual andthe government. This structure comprises, among others,voluntary groups that can be very well organized or not-so-well organized, and which assist members to interact in amanner that is beneficial to each – politically, socially,economically and so on. These organizations are the onescalled civil society organizations (CSOs). CSOs in general,can be distinguished between formal and informal, whichcorrespond to the first characteristics on theseorganizations – being organized or unorganized. The formerwould include such organizations as labour unions, whichadhere to codified rules and need governmental sanctions tooperate, among other conditions. Informal organizationsconsist of groups of individuals, who cooperate in differentways for the benefit of their own communities, for collectiveaction, financing, and the provision of services, e.g.neighbourhood vigilante groups, user groups, and informalsupport groups such as burial solidarity groups. Thisdistinction can correspond to the levels of activity and oneorganization can be related to. There are the civil societyorganizations that act as a go-between (when it comes to theinteraction between the state and the society) or community-based. These we can refer to as Non-GovernmentalOrganizations (NGOs) and Community-Based Organizations (COs)respectively.

Within this group of NGOs, we find that they vary widely whenit comes to their mandate, size and resources betweenthemselves and when compared to the CBOs. Mercer has thefollowing to say when it comes to distinguishing NGOs fromCBOs, although she uses the acronym GROs (to stand forGrassroots Organizations) for CBOs:

The term ‘NGO’ is understood here to refer to thoseorganizations that are officially established, runby employed staff (often urban professionals or

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expatriates), well-supported (by domestic or, as isoften the case, international funding), and thatare often relatively large and well-resourced ….They are seen as different from GrassrootsOrganizations (GRO) that are usually understood tobe smaller, often membership based organizations,operating without a paid staff but often reliantupon donor or NGO support, which tend to be issue-based and therefore ephemeral (Mercer, 2002: 6).

The main distinctions within the NGO family are between theadvocacy NGOs, which are concerned with the influencing ofpublic policy, and the service NGOs which are concerned withsocial service delivery. The latter tend to be morepermanent. Elsewhere (van Tuijl, 1999: 499), the servicedelivery NGOs are also referred to as “operational” NGOs.Clark (19991: 40-41) delineates five types of those concernedwith social services delivery NGOs. First, are the reliefand welfare agencies such as Catholic Relief Agencies(CARITAS). Second are the technical innovationsorganizations such as the International Aga Khan Foundation.The third comprises those organizations for pubic servicecontracts, such as CARE International, which is funded fromthe developed world but works in the developing world.Fourth are the popular development agencies such as OXFAM.Lastly are the grass-roots based organizations registered asNGOs and which work for respective local communities. Thereare other ways of classifying NGOS but for the purposes ofthis paper the above explanation would suffice.

Normally, these civil society organizations are organized tocater for common needs, interests, values or traditions. Theensuing energy from their cooperation can be channelled to avariety of activities. It is noted that strong and activecivil society is the foundation on which rest the fourpillars of governance: transparency, accountability,participation and the rule of law (ADB, 2000: 555). Thisseems to be a fact as it has been noted by Mwaikusa (1996:79) that in order to control the government, there is need to

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have other than the state organs to do that – the CSOs. Andit has also been noted that inmost state-civil societyconfrontations, the root cause happens to be the feeling thatstakeholders are alienated from the decision making process –processes which make key decisions that affect the livelihoodof the people. It would therefore seem that many civilsociety organizations help address social exclusion anddemocratic deficit.1

Civil society organizations in Tanzania date back to beforethe coming of colonialists (Chazan, at. al., 1988: 73). Assuch one can say that they precede the modern state we knowof today, Kiondo, (2001) for example, notes that“associational life in pre-colonial Africa was based ontraditional values of sharing and helping each other withinthe context of extended family, neighbourhood, clan and evenbeyond”. The coming of the colonial powers and theinstitution of the state structures we know of today marked anew arrangement as far as the civil organizations wereconcerned. The type of rule that existed in most of the pre-colonial societies had different rules and relationships withthe civil society organizations compared to those with thecolonial state, which came up with structures – political,economic and even social – which “interfered” with the waylife in general was conducted. Most “disturbance” came fromthe imposed new economic relations, starting with themonetization of the economy and its corollary – taxation.

Social life changed with urbanization, the creation ofeconomic zones (plantation and mining), creation of labourreserves and so on. With the oncoming of the colonial state,there was a general shake up of the way civil societyorganizations worked, as well as their type. There was a newactor on the scene – and an important one – as far as theseorganizations were concerned!

1 Democratic deficit is used by the ADB to mean “the lack of voice to thepeople beyond electoral franchise and periodic elections”.

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Basing on the aforementioned developments, one can from thestart say that there will always be some interaction betweenthe state and civil society organizations. The state setsthe rules, oversees their application, and takes “corrective”(or destructive) measures when it feels that the “correct”path is not being taken. The state has had always to relateto society. As theory has it, its very emergence has to dowith society. The key difference between the politicalorganization before the coming of the colonialists and afteris the fusion of what would have been the state and the“governor” (chief, king or any other ruler of a givensociety) in the person. The well-known saying “l’etat c’est moi”summarizes this. But with developments, there was theseparation between the person (the sovereign) and the state,with the state creating institutions that would act on itsbehalf. It is the relations between these state organs andcivil society organizations that form the core of this paper.

THE RISE OF CSOs ACTIVITY IN AFRICAIt is well documented that CSOs in Africa existed well beforethe coming of the colonialists. After the colonizationprocess had been in place, there were historical events whichnecessitated the creation of CSOs, and NGOs in particular.Welch Jr. (2003) for example, accounts for the creation ofHuman Rights NGOs as early as 1839 to fight slavery on thecontinent. Other NGOs followed with the coming ofmissionaries and their proselytizing activities, working withthe colonial administrations in most cases. Then came theself-help CSOs which catered for the economic and socialadjustments that were needed by own members who werevariously affected by, among others, urbanization, monetizedeconomy as well as labour migration. These later ones wereto be the microcosms of ‘professional’ and trade associationsthat were to be formed at a later stage, mostly in urbansettings as well as in plantations. Some of theseassociations came to take on the political agenda leading tosome turning into nationalist movements. What happened tothe CSO sector in the two or so decades after independence iswell documented by, among others, Welch Jr. (op. cit., 316-

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320). The bourgeoning of the NGO/CSO sector in the 1980s onwards is of interest to us and we discuss that below.

The increased CSO activity in Africa in the 1980s and 1990scan be linked to two main factors. First, it is to do withthe degeneration of the state capacity, thereby leaving thepeople to “cater for themselves”, and secondly, it is thedisaffection of the population with the economic developmentmodels which were not working in their favour. Let usbriefly discuss these two. For the African continent, thedegeneration of the state institutions in the 1970s and1980s, led to the erosion of states’ capacity to deliver itsclassical outputs of social services, infrastructureconducive for socio-economic development, law and order andso on. According to Olowu (2003: 299) this capacity includesthe “delegative capacity” which is concerned with “thestate’s involvement of its citizens from outside the state inthe management of the public sector through devolution ofresponsibilities to local self-governing and no-governmentalentities” (emphasis ours). In some countries the situationwas so bad that the citizens saw no reason to interact withthe state. They rather avoided it as it became irrelevant(see for example, Gordon, 1997: 77). Tanzania was noexception and this phenomenon of reduced state capacityaccounted for much of the resurgence of civil societyorganizations from mid-1980s onwards.

Having said that, we need to mention the fact the process ofliberalization – of politics and economy – led to theweakening of some civil society organizations, which used tointermediate between the society and the state. Theseinclude cooperative societies and trade unions. In manyAfrican countries, these two institutions were until then‘captured’ by the state in the pretext of creating stabilityand nationalist consolidation of power in the post-colonialgovernments. As such, they were not as independentorganizations as they should have been, but they were,nevertheless, pro-members in those difficult circumstances,and, there was some coherence as well as state support from

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time to time, which made them look solid and united. Theyorientation towards their members, in many cases, depended onthe type of leadership and issues at stake. Liberalizationweakened them in various ways. These include, the newfreedom which led to some members of apex organizations towithdraw and create other umbrellas organizations; the lossof membership contributions through retrenchment of membersdue to reforms in the public and parastatal sectors; loss ofincome from crop marketing activities by cooperatives due tothe intervention of the private crop buyers; and thewithdrawal of government support and guarantor status. Theseeffects of liberalization on these organizations led to thecreation of some more space for smaller, sometimes moreinformal civil society organizations that work at thegrassroots levels, which is significant because it is at thelocality where civil society is most readily mobilized aroundlocal issues. Linked to the resurgence of CSOs in theAlternative Development (AD) movement.2

This approach places emphasis on: Autonomy in decision making of territorially

organized communities Local self-reliance Direct (participatory) democracy Experiential social learning (see Friedman, 1998:

vii).

AD sought and still seeks to change the structures to allowthe disempowered to be included in political and economicprocesses and have their rights as citizens and human beings.This is where CSOs become the automatic and most likelyalternative channel for voicing the demands of the, untilthen, voiceless. It would imply that AD aims at empoweringthe disempowered, a point also scored by Salamon et. al.(2003) when they say that CSOs are “empowerment-oriented”.

2 This is an movement that came into being after militants in societybecame disaffected by the mainstream development specialists of the timewhich (1970s backwards) emphasized on rapid cumulative growth, urbanbias, and single-minded pursuit of industrialization.

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CSOs-STATE RELATIONS: LIFELINE, SYMBIOSIS OR KISS OF DEATH?It is worth starting this section with a comment on theinvolvement or non-involvement of CSOs in politics. There isa general regulation in Tanzania that CSOs-especially NGOs –should not engage in politics. Since this section and thepaper in general is about the relationship between the state– which is an organ of power – and the CSOs, then it would beappropriate to see whether one can interact with the statewithout them being involved in power play. Politics is allabout power. And, when we define power, it becomes obviousthat CSOs cannot avoid politics. Whether one defines power,it becomes obvious that CSOs cannot avoid politics. Whetherone defines power as “the capacity to change the probabilityof outcomes’ (Dahl, 1961), ‘politics as who gets what, when,and how’ or ‘the participation in decisions about severesanctions, that is about major rewards and deprivations’(Lasswell, 1958), or ‘the ability to make things happen thatwould not have happened otherwise’ (Deutsch, 1970), we cansee that civil society is right there is politics! Even whenone looks at David Easton’s input-output model, the civilsociety is the source of the inputs – including demands andsupport – which are part and parcel of the political system.Whichever way one may want to look at it, there is no wayCSOs can absent themselves from politics. It would look likeit is in the acknowledgement of that, that the NGO Act (2002)does not have any explicit provisions barring NGOs fromengaging in political activity. However, the old SocietiesOrdinance, which was not repealed by the NGO Act, puts somerestrictions on political activities by civil societyorganizations. It is, however, specifically stated in the2002 law, that non-partisanship should be adhered by NGOswhen it comes to political affiliation. As such, when aCSO/NGO campaigns for a political party then it is seen asbreaking a key principle in the CSO law. The problem is thatof interpretation though. A CSO’s agenda and that of a givenpolitical party may happen to be the same, similar or have anoverlap. It would be easy for those fighting CSOs tointerpret that as being deliberate support for the politicalparty’s agenda by the CSO.

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Having noted that, ,may be it would be correct to say thatCSOs are asked not to engaged in politics, they are onlyasked not to pursue the control of state power in theirstatus as CSOs, as they are legally not provided for, norwere they purposefully created to do that. This is why theyhappen to support political parties pursuing the capture ofstate power through, say, electoral campaigns, they are seenas “engaging in politics”.

Despite this cautious note about the state-CSOs and the issueof politics, these organizations have such a big potential toperform tasks that would help the government to perform or beseen to perform its duties better. This is more so when weconsider that the explosion of CSO numbers in the aftermathof the economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s was due to thevirtual breakdown of the social services networks assupported by incapacitated governments. CSOs can helpgovernment deliver services more efficiently and effectivelyby identifying target groups, facilitating their access tothe services on offer, and even coordinating the delivery ofservices from various sources. NGOs are known to havereached people where governments have failed to reach,especially in the developing countries where infrastructureis poor, or because of some political reasons. And, mostimportantly, CSOs can provide checks and balances on abuse ofpower at different levels of the ‘implementation structure’.

The relationship between CSOs and the state has undergone anumber of twists and shifts, of course, depending on thestate(s) in question. Traditionally, and as some CSOs (andmore so NGOs) see themselves even now, there should not betoo close a relationship between themselves and the state ifthey are to perform a good job. As Jjuuko (1996: 194)observes, some independent NGOs regard themselves asdiametrically opposed to the state or at least as sometimesbeing incompatible. As we shall see later in this paper, maybe this needs not be the case! On the other hand, Kirsten(2004: 16) remarks that civil society and NGOs, in trying to

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influence governmental action and policy, they have had toengage the state in different ways including some which haveentered into formal partnerships with governments to developpolicy jointly; some have acted as consultants togovernments; and some have remained outside of anycontractual arrangement with government and chose to act in amore traditional manner of influencing policy throughadvocacy strategies.

Kiondo envisions three scenarios of state-CSO relationships.The first one is a situation where the state sees the CSOs asbeing its partner in development and other state activities,and therefore, CSOs are seen as being supportive of thestate. In most cases, these activities are the ones relatedto social welfare and advocacy. In Tanzania, there are manyCSOs that fall in this category. The faith-based CSOs andNGOs in particular have played a big role in health andeducation since the pre-Independence era. They are now veryactive in these service sectors as well. A clear example isthe conversion of some religious organizations’ hospitalsinto District Designated Hospitals. Having said that, weneed to remind ourselves that at some point the faith-basedNGOs and CSOs have had difficult times with the state also.During the socialist era in Tanzania, and more specificallyduring the nationalization exercise after the promulgation ofthe Arusha Declaration in 1967, many religious organizations“lost” their properties to the state. These includedschools, hospitals, and even land. Given the difficultiesthat the government has been facing in running thesefacilities as was the case with other facilities, whenliberalization of the economy came, many of these propertieswere returned to their original owners. Some church schoolsturned government schools could not be returned given thecomposition of the student community (as for example a thenChristians only school now with a religiously mixed studentcommunity) and the investment the government had put intothese facilities since their nationalization.

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Another example of CSOs that have been cooperating with thestate would include the many advocacy CSOs, which are in thegood books of the government. Examples would be thosedealing with the HIV/AIDS campaigns in communities. Theseare doing a good job, which the government cannot do alonggiven the resources needed and the scope of the exercisecountrywide. There are others in areas of environmentalprotection, civic education and good governance, to mentionsome areas. In this case of cooperation one can say that therelationship has been that of “lifeline” to some CSOs as thegovernment facilitated the availability of funds, as well as“symbiotic” relationship in that the state has had itsfunctions performed by these supposedly non-state actors.

The second scenario is where the state feels that itsinterests are threatened by the activities of the CSOs.These activities would include situations where the CSOs wereproviding a political platform – whether real or imagined –for political opponents to those in power. Unfortunately, inTanzania and elsewhere in Africa, most of the NGOs/CSOs thatdeal with human rights and gender sensitization happen to beseen from that angle by the state. This has been explainedby the fact that while the state is supposed to be theguardian of human rights, it has, in most of the times beenthe biggest violator of these rights. Given the level ofliteracy among Tanzanians, for example, these organizationshave been making their members and other beneficiaries awareof their rights and urge them to demand these rights fromstate organs; and this is seen, in most cases, asconfrontation. The political leadership has had a “politicalhoneymoon” in the post-independence Tanzania in that thepolitical culture that obtained in the country did not moulda population that was critical of the leadership. It was, inthe words of Verba et. al. (1963) parochial-subject culture,in which the majority lay within the parochial polar of thecontinuum. Now that people are demanding their rights theleadership feels threatened. As a strategy to remain inpower as well as putting such groups in check, differentmechanisms were put in place including licensing and

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registration conditions, cooption and even banning such NGOswhich raised (political) consciousness among the population.

A classic case here is the Baraza la Wanawake Tanzania3

(BAWATA) which was deregistered on 30th June 1997. thereintroduction of multiparty politics in Tanzania in 1992 ledto the formation of other political parties than CCM. Allthe new parties had their women wing of some kind. Thiseroded the Umoja wa Wanawake Tanzania’s (UWT) claim over therepresentational role of all Tanzania women. UWT was andstill is a CCM mass organization. As such women as a groupwas now fragmented – at least theoretically as we cannotclaim that the UWT was a truly unifying women organization.

Also the Presidential Commission on Single or MultipartySystem in Tanzania had recommended that the state should letthe mass organizations go from its control (URT, 1992: para386). UWT opted to remain under the CCM though. With thissituation where UWT was no longer the unifying organizationfor Tanzanian women, a need for one such organization wasimminent. This was much so because women’s problems werelikely not to be addressed in the fragmented and dividedorganizations that emerged with the introduction ofmultiparty politics. It is on this footing that a conferencewas organized in July 1994 at the University of Dar es Salaamto discuss the position of women in the new politicalsetting. It decided that a free non-governmentalorganization in the name of Baraza la Wanawake Tanzania, inshort BAWATA. The following year BAWATA was registered bythe Registrar of Societies.

BAWATA’s objectives were spelt out in Article 4 of itsconstitution. These include:

To liberate the women from all forms of genderexploitation, oppression, discrimination anddegradation and to condemn the same;

To work as an institution or a forum on behalf ofwomen and through which they will be able to initiate

3 This translates to Women Council of Tanzania.11

and further their targets and interests in allaspects of social life;

To unite all women without regard to their religious,colour, age, creed, status, levels of education orauthority, political parties, ideology or any otherthing so as to strengthen their efforts in thestruggle for protecting their rights and equality;

To mobilize all women for purposes of giving themleadership whereby they will effectively beparticipating in the bringing about economic andsocial development;

To educate women on their basic rights and duties inthe society;

To maintain women’s respect; To foster women’s participation and implementing of

various national projects; and To make a follow-up on law reforms, particularly on

the area affecting women activities (BAWATA, 1995).In their campaigns for the 1995 general elections, allpolitical parties had a women’s agenda in their electionmanifesto. BAWATA, on its part had come up with a strategyof mobilizing women and sensitizing them about their rightsand obligations, through civic education programmes. BAWATAaimed at educating women on electoral issues including theexposing of the candidates who had serious proportions (andprogrammes) for women in their election manifestos. It alsowanted those who were campaigning to access political officeto know what women wanted from them, were they to be elected.Many of the areas touched by the BAWATA document includedwomen rights, rights to inheritance, right to own land, andright to social services including health, education, waterand so on. Further, and may be this is the one which madethe government nervous was the fact that BAWATA gave women’sviews as to which qualities of a presidential candidate whowas likely to take women interests at heart. May be by sodoing one of the opposition parties’ candidate fitted betterthan that of the ruling party! Further, BAWATA interpretedfor women each political party’s position on the issues ofconcern to women as they appeared in the election manifestos

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(BAWATA, 1995B). These brought BAWATA into direct collisionwith state interests. Key questions could be raised here:

Was the state ready to stomach all the objectives ofBAWATA as pronounced in its constitution?

What would happen to the party affiliated UWT wereBAWATA to thrive?

With the sensitization women received and would go onreceiving, was the ruling party sure of thisconstituency as its own any more?

BAWATA was not to last long, though. After its mobilizationactivities in the 1995 elections and other such work, thegovernment started a barrage of accusations that, amongothers, it was run like a political party, it did not submitits annual accounts to the relevant authority, etc. Thelatter accusation was rebutted by the Norwegian Embassy inDar es Salaam which was partly funding BAWATA activities.The Embassy explained that BAWATA had been submitting itsaudited accounts always in time. The government deregisteredBAWATA on 30th June 1997 on the general claim that it failedto comply with the provisions of the Societies Ordinance Cap.337 of 1954. it was ‘advised’ that it could start a freshregistration process after making changes to the constitutionand hold new elections to as to have new office bearers!!4

It certainly seems that the coming into being of BAWATA as anautonomous nation-wide women organization was not a welcomemove to the government as it can be substantiated bystatements from, among others, the top statement – thePresident.5 In such a situation, a human rights CSO workingwith or having a close relationship with the state could be“a kiss of death” as the state would make sure that theiragendas are derailed, or if they happen to be stubbom, putthem out of business through the available means. They wouldrather keep their distance.

4 See, “Mwambulukutu Afafanua Hatua ya Serikali: BAWATA IliendeshaShughuli Kisiasa”, Uhuru (Tanzania), 7th December 1996, p. 1.5 See, “BAWATA Waonywa: Acheni Kujihusisha na Siasa – Mwinyi”, Uhuru(Tanzania) 19th September 1995, p. 3.

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The third scenario is the one in which the state feels thatnational security is at risk due to the activities of someCSOs/NGOs. In most cases, this would happen when it comes tothe sources and levels of funding. When funding is fromoutside the country, and the involved amount are, from thestandpoint of the state, too large, then questions start tobe raised. Monitoring of the activities become closer andgenerally the SCO/NGO in question would face hurdles here andthere whenever they came into contact with the state. Again,the most likely candidates in this basket are the quasi-political NGOs. These would include human rights NGOs andthose which are specifically created to do political roles asis the case with election observation and monitoring.

The interaction between CSOs and the state in this includealso the recent shift on the part of donors and aid agenciesto want to use CSOs as channels of development aid. Thereason for this is that some donors and aid agencies see thismove as one way of rebuking dictatorships and reducingcorruption. This would usually lead to the government towant to have some control of what is happening in the pretextof “national security” interests. Regulation becomesnecessary on the part of the state. One way of doing that isby formulating an NGO policy and enacting an NGO law – bothof which would want to address some of these issues in amanner that would restrict the free operation of CSOs andNGOs. Again in this relationship the CSOs need to be‘vigilant’ as working close to the government can cost themtheir very existence.

While we can have these three categories of the state-CSOrelation, they are not always clear-cut. There are instanceswhere the issue of the day would determine the reaction ofthe state. For instance, when Tanzania Media WorkersAssociation (TAMWA) campaigned for children and women rights,the state was supportive because that was in line with itsown policy. TAMWA has, for example, worked very cordiallywith the Ministry of Community Development, Gender andChildren when it comes to implementing its mission, which is

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“to use the media to sensitize society on gender issues andadvocate and lobby for policy and legal changes which favourthe promotion of the rights of women and children”. Giventhat Tanzania is a signatory to the International Declarationof Human Rights, the Convention for the Elimination of AllForms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Conventionon the Rights of Children (CRC) and the SADC Platform ofAction, there was little chance that the state would be atloggerheads with what TAMWA declared it wanted to do. Onewould not be so sure that the cordial relationship with thestate would be maintained in if the same NGO campaigned andraised women awareness about their rights and obligations inthe political system!

There are also instances when the state consulted with CSOswith regard to policy issues. Such was the case when thegovernment was preparing the NGOs, Sexual Offences and LandBills. Such NGOs as TANGO, HakiElimu, TGNP, LHRC and TAMWAspearheaded the campaigns for public hearing by theparliamentary committees involved in the said bills.However, there are also instances where the same CSO can bethe darling of the state and at another point it becomes anadversary of some sort, and therefore, unwanted. In Tanzaniaa case in point are the cooperatives. These institutionswhich started during the colonial era and they wereprotecting peasant farmers from middlemen and other croppurchasers, in the main. Other types of cooperatives alsocropped up, especially in urban areas. After independence,the government tried to support cooperatives – especiallythrough Unions which unified peasant cooperative societies –but it ended up interfering too much in their affairs. Inthe end they were for some reason seen as a threat by thestate and in 1975 they were abolished. Such was theKilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union (KNCU) which hadaccumulated wealth and was advancing the interests of thepeasants in such a way that the independence governmentthough it needed more control over such unions in order tohave, among other goals, “even development” all over thecountry. In the place of the Unions, the government

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introduced pan-territorial parastatals called cropauthorities. These, for a number of reasons, failed dismally(see, for example Ellis, 1988; Lofchie, 1989, and Ponte2002). The government then decided to reintroducecooperatives in 1982 as a way of increasing production, butalso as a way of controlling the peasants especially when itcame to taxation. And, contrary to cooperative principles –such as economic viability – the government establishedcooperative societies in all villages in the country in thepretext of helping peasant production! So between 1982 andthe oncoming of private crop buyers, the government held them(coops) dearly for the ‘good job’ they were doing for it.Generally, the cooperatives were used as vehicles forgovernment agricultural policy, as well as a means to havethe peasant production under effective taxation.

The other civil society organizations that were used by thestate were the trade unions through their apex organization.Immediately after independence, the government decided toinstitute control over these organizations as a means toconsolidate power and to advance the developmentalistphilosophy that guided socio-economic policy. The name ofthe apex organization changed several times6 and by 1998 whena new trade union law was passed, it bore the name ofTanzania Federation of Trade Unions (TFTU). This trade unionumbrella organization was consulted by the government beforethe enactment of the Trade Unions Act of 1998, a piece oflegislation which is praised by some as being in line withthe political and economic developments since reforms began(see, for example, Mukandala, 2001: 49). The legislation isimportant because of the sectors it covers vi-a-vis theeconomy. The TFTU also has had some programmes which aredevelopmental and which the government would want to run onits own such as gender sensitization, human and workers6 Before independence it was Tanganyika Federation of Labour – TFL, in1964 it turned to National Union of Tanganyika Workers – NUTA, in 1977when CCM was born, NUTA was renamed Jumuiya ya Wafanyakazi Tanzania –JUWATA and was one of the party’s mass organizations, in 1991 it turnedto Organization of Tanzania Trade Unions – OTTU, in 1995 it was renamedTanzania Federation of Trade Unions – TFTU, and today we have TUCTA.

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rights, women/workers participation, anti-child labourcampaigns and programmes, youth development and so on (Ibid.,45-46).

Perhaps it would be important if we mention the fact thatCSOs, and specifically CBOs, being what they are, they tendto deal more with local government and authorities than theywould deal with the central government. Their interactionwith the central government comes only when they participatein projects or programmes that are funded by the centralgovernment. But for the local government activities andconcerns, CSOs are right in the picture because that is thelevel at which they are competent and where their ingenuitymakes a difference.

In including this section, we would want to state that CSO-state relationship needs to be looked at from the point ofview of the one seeking that relationship and, whether theother party is ready to participate in that relationship. Insome cases, there can be mutual benefit. In other cases oneparty may be reaping benefits that are greater than theother. It is also important to look at the nature of thestate. As we have noted, the possible continuum that NGOscan manoeuvre in their relationship with the state can runfrom a lifeline, through a symbiotic rapport, to a possiblekiss of death. If the regime in place is dictatorial,undemocratic and a violator of human rights, a closecooperation could well be “a kiss of death” to the NGO inquestion. The state will find ways to either emasculate itby donating “gifts” which will muzzle the NGO, or will justlegislate the NGO out of business. If the regime is ratherdemocratic, observes rule of law and needs the cooperation ofcivil society organizations for the implementation of somebeneficial programmes to the community, then thisrelationship can be a source of life for the NGO. There canbe a series of other relationship patterns that would, in oneway or another, be of mutual benefit.

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There are also issues of accountability when NGOs/CBOs engagein service provision – whether funded by donors or by thestate. This aspect has two sides to it. First, would theNGOs/CBOs still be accountable to their members, or will theystill be pursuing their original goals? How much will theybe able to do in order to balance the forces – the need toperform the core activities for which they were formed, andthe need to have the state on their side in order to drawresources, among others? Second, there is the governments’accountability to the population and the donor as far as theuse of resources is concerned. NGOs/CBOs are nottraditionally vehicles for the delivery of services paid forby taxpayers or donor funds that need to be repaid. Whensomething goes wrong there can be problems for the governmentin accounting for its decisions, although a lot of arm-twisting might have come from the donors.

The co-opting of NGOs into state service provision has otherrepercussions also. As noted earlier, by helping the stateto deliver services, and which is sponsored by some donorsinstitutions, the state may end up being the net gainer,depending on its history. While the donors may feel thatthey are rebuking corrupt, undemocratic and inefficientregimes by channelling aid money through CBOs/NGOs, thiscould be a way to cleanse the state in the eyes of theelectorate. As Whitefield (2003: 383) remarks, “The powerfulinfluence of donor agencies on local organizations, combinedwith the application of civil society as idea to achievetheir objectives of economic and political liberalization,may work towards stabilizing the existing social andpolitical order”. Depending on the timing of the activities,which happen when there are harsh conditions, the performanceof the CSOs may raise expectation and confidence in theregime thereby staying in power longer than it could havebeen, were the current arrangements not in place. The statecan even use the opportunity to channel resources to its foesand friends alike, a thing that could have been impossiblewere the state to be the direct provider of the services. In

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short, CBO/NGO activities of that nature are there tostrengthen the state.

Furthermore, the issue of identity of the CSO involved ingovernmental activities needs to be put in perspective aswell. Schwartz (2004: 36) remarks that an NGO remains andNGO if there are conditions that are met when it comes to therelationship it has between itself and the government –otherwise we may end up having what he terms GONGOs –Government Non-Governmental Organizations. He defines theseas those NGOs formed by government institutions or agencies.And, he notes that Knup (1998) provides quantitative criteriato determine when an NGO turns into a GONGO. These are,first, the level of government financing of the activities ofthe said NGO; and second, the number of government employeesserving among the workers of the NGO, or serving as boardmembers of the NGO.

CSOs RELATIONS WITH POLITICAL PARTIESPolitical parties are CSOs that have one key aim – thecapture of state power. This quality is the one which makethem eligible for engaging in politics as opposed to theother CSOs. In this section we are looking at therelationship between the other CSOs and political parties.As discussed earlier in this paper, in some cases politicalparties have parented CSOs or the other way round. Labourparties, for example, are known to have emerged from labourtrade unions. In Tanzania the law – The Non-GovernmentalOrganizations Act Section 2 – allows political parties toform CSOs/NGOs under their auspices (URT, 2002). Even priorto the passing of the law, the then only political party hadsuch organizations. These included parents, women, youth;and at some point cooperatives and trade unions. Today, theregistered political parties have similar civil societyorganizations.

There are instances when political parties degenerate into“electoral machines” thereby making societies needalternative organizations to address the issues of the day.

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Or, the political parties may just happen not to do their joband civil society reacts by creating alternative venues forthe expression of its interests. These organizations createdas political alternatives may end up blurring the distinctionbetween such an organization and a political party. Thereverse of the above is also possible. The emergence ofsingle-issue parties like the Greens now in several Europeancountries and the National Parties of Britain and France, andwhose role is likely to be more in the nature of non-governmental activism than serious contention for statepower, are the case in point.

The ‘unintentional cooperation’ between the Lawyers’Environmental Action Team (LEAT) and the Tanzania LabourParty (TLP) as far as the Bulyanhulu saga was concerned isanother area in which we have seen political partiescollaborating with a CSO in placing their demands to thegovernment. The issue in point is that LEAT and TLP weredemanding that the government set an independent commissionto investigate the (alleged) deaths of innocent artisanalminers at a mine at Bulyanhulu in Shinyanga Region when aforeign company was allowed to take over the area for large-scale mining. It was alleged that the company evicted thesmall-scale miners forcefully and some died in the process.There was, of course, some coincidence of issue of interestbetween TLP and LEAT as the TLP was pursuing the issue toboost its political fortunes, while LEAT, as an environmentalactivist CSO, was after the rights of artisanal miners andthe wider picture of environmental degeneration caused by themining industry in Tanzania. LEAT also claims that thebenefits accruing to Tanzanians are peanuts compared to whatthe multinationals are reaping (see, for example, Lissu,2004). The two ended up teaming together to press thegovernment for action.

THE DAK SIDE OF CSOsCSOs have most of the times been seen as some goodinstitutions in the society. Unfortunately, that is notalways the case. There is also the underworld of civil

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society organizations. Civil society organizations cancomprise associations with agendas that are politicallysubversive, economically crippling and socially disruptive.We know of worldwide crime rings in money laundering, drugand human trafficking and so on. At national level there arealways associations, however secretive, that have agendasthat are contrary to the law. When this is the case then thestate must have keen interest on such associations becausethese have got to be defeated as they can be a menace to thecivil society and the state itself. In some cases we mayhave CSOs that can wear both faces – the good and the bad –depending on the response to their demands on the state, oreven society itself.

The Animal Rights Groups in Britain and other developednations, for instance, are known to have organizedrallies to discourage vivisection and all activitieslinked to medical research using animals forexperimentation. This can be seen as a noble goal.But, they are known to have threatened scientists,torched laboratories, and graffitied walls and vehiclesof research centers.

The Pro-Life Lobbies in the USA, for example, havecampaigned for allowing unborn children to be given achance. However, they been accused of being behind themurder of doctors administering abortions, as well astorching abortion clinics.

The vigilante groups in Tanzania – also known as SunguSungu – ma have done a very good job when it comes toprotecting property and life. But they are also knownfor instances of brutality, killings and even plunder ofthe properties of the people they are supposed toprotect.

The activities of the Lords Resistance Army in Ugandaalso fall in this category of civil societyorganizations turned criminal organizations – forwhatever purpose they are pursuing.

Organized crime associations – such as for drug pushersand users, car thieves, and small arms traders as well

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as other items – are a reality and the police wouldalways lean of these from the criminal fraternity.

In Tanzania we have heard of the police “breaking rings” ofcriminals in this and that area of criminal activity. These“rings” are, in fact, associations! They have their peers,they have leadership and chains of command and so on. Therelationship between these types of CSOs and the state willdefinitely be confrontational – unless in the rate incidenceswhere the state is an accomplice in such activities. Thestate has the duty of protecting life and property. So whenan organization is set to go against that, then the state hasnothing to do but to act.

The other dark side of CSOs is concerned with lack ofaccountability, transparency and representatives. One otherarea where the government has come into close monitoring ofCSOs especially the larger NGOs is when it comes to thequestions arising from the three areas of ‘good CSOgovernance’. NGOs have been accused of several policy andoperational problems all over the world. These includebureaucratic tendencies, uneconomical duplication,excessively narrow issue advocacy, non-participatorydecision-making processes, top-down management, paternalisticattitudes and so on. While one can ask the question whetherthese deficiencies are intentional or not, we cannot rule outthe presence of people who join the CSOs with personalagendas as top priority, rather than the agendas of the CSOsthemselves. We have heard of “brief case NGOs”, someregistered but non-existed NGOs and so on. We have heard oftarget population complaining of the resources meant for themnot reaching them. For instance, people living with HIV havefrom time to time complained of some NGOs not directing theresources meant for them as they should.

In Tanzania one can allude to the enactment of the 2002 NGOlaw to these three aspects, which NGOs need to address.There has been debate on whether they should be subjected togovernment regulation while they are private. However, given

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that so many emerged, and so many resources are beingchannelled through them, some kind of accountability andcontrol need to be put in place. This calls into mind thethird scenario as put forward by Kondo that in some instancesthe government ma feel that national security is at risk.Given that some CSOs are being funded from outside thecountry, there has to be a way of accounting for such fundsto the donating countries or communities. In some donorcountries the accounting has got to be through theparliament. In such situations, having clean financialstatements is not only good for the recipient CSOs, but forTanzania as a whole lest Tanzania’s name is tarnished. NGOson their part have taken measures. They are trying to bemore explicit as to what they are doing by issuing clearerstatements of goals, stricter financial management, equalopportunities to men and women, better self-monitoringevaluation processes, opening up to government when neededand closer networking with other NGOs.

While it is not often for the states in the developing worldto give financial support to CSOs, it is nevertheless theduty of the government to play a role in distinguishingbetween genuine CSOs from those which have personalized orfraudulent agendas. By so doing, it will help the supportersof CSOs to channel their assistance through CSOs with theright credentials. At the same time, the government has tomake sure that some CSOs are not used by corrupt stateofficials for personal gain. It is not always that thewrongdoers will come from the CSOs!

CONCLUSIONOn the one hand, it has always been a dilemma for CSOs, andmore so for the intermediary ones, when it comes to decidinghow close to the government they should be. On the one hand,activist CSOs have more than often been reluctant to carryout their activities with government funding, or to act asagents of ministries, departments and agencies of government,or even to accept grants to meet staff and overhead costs.The obvious reason for this is that they see such involvement

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as compromising their ability to exert pressure on thegovernment from the outside and perform their legitimate roleon behalf of civil society. These concerns are legitimate.However, CSOs should not automatically assume that the stateand its apparatuses are a threat to them and theirindependence in particular. Given that the citizens’interests are paramount, any coalitions, partnerships orcooperation that will see to it that this is attained shouldbe taken seriously. But when any engagements are struck thenthe limits must be well negotiated in order to balancebetween the goals of the CSO and the possible repercussionsthat may come out of that relationship as far as theinterests of the members or intended beneficiaries areconcerned. Here we are talking of the CSO not losing itsidentity, not displacing or replacing its goal(s). Importantalso is the need for CSOs to make sure that they come cleanwhen it comes to accountability and transparency.

But, on the other hand, there is so much productive potentialwhen these actors join hands and work together. The CSO-government and CSO-donor cooperation makes a lot of sense.One way out – which, however, seems difficult – is asituation where there are unconditional grants from thegovernment/donor to a CSO. This is only to maintain theindependence of these CSOs. It is only unfortunate that thesaying “there is no free lunch’ always looms large in suchsituations! One fact needs to be put across to governmentsand their development partners also. Statistics show that inAfrica, some countries have 3.5% of their economically activepopulations engaged in the CSO sector. In East Africa, theaverage percentage is 2.5 of the economically activepopulations (Salamon, et. al., op. cit.: 45). And, incountries where volunteers and donated labour count a lottowards the development effort, there is even more for thegovernment to gain from cooperating with the CSOs as it isrecorded that more than half of the workers in the CSO sectorare volunteers (Salamon et. al., ibid). Given the problem ofunemployment in most countries, 2.5% of the economicallyactive population cannot be taken for granted. The state has

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got to take notice and create the favourable environment forthe CSO to work properly.

One more are in which the government may need to intervene isin the relationship between the private sector and the CSOs.NGOs are likely to deliver more with similar resources thanthe private sector, and therefore, the NGOs’ edge over theprivate sector. In this era of public sector reforms wherethe private sector has been identified as the government’spartner number one, and having a variety of cooperationarrangements in place, the CSOs the private sector has cometo see the CSOs as a threat to them. Both have come torealize that sometimes they are varying for the sameresources. The CSOs, however, have an advantage over theprivate sector most of the times in that they do not work forprofit even when their efficiency levels are the same. It islikely, therefore, that the CSOs will deliver better, giventhey operate on a level playing field. The challenge is,therefore, for the government – which is the regulator – tosee how the two partners in development can be harmonized forthe betterment of the lives of the citizens.

We would, therefore, say that the government/state-CSOrelationship should be open for negotiation and forrenegotiation once an arrangement to work together has beenagreed. It is a matter of leaving the window open for mutualadjustments. The government needs to look for ways to allowa CSO remain a CSO while reaping the potential of theseorganizations, and CSOs (in their different forms, sizes andactivities) need to keep the distance that is stipulated inthe rules that allowed them to operate. One way of makingthings better for CSOs is for them to campaign for betterrules of the game as far as they concerned. It remains afact though, as Henderson (1997: 356) notes that theunfortunate irony is that NGOs must come to terms withexisting host governmental authorities often by acceding torepressive policies and accommodating national and localbureaucrats.

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District Hospitals

The district is a very important level in the provision of healthservices in the country each district is supposed to have a districthospital. For those districts which donate have Government normallynegotiates with religious organizations to designate voluntary hospitalsget subventions from the Government to contract terms.

HEALTH FACILITIES (2000):

Facility Agency Govt. Parastatal Vol/Rel Private Others

Consultancy/Specialized Hospitals

4 2 2 0 -

Regional Hospitals 17 0 0 0 - District Hospitals 55 0 13 0 - Other Hospitals 2 6 56 20 2 Health Centres 409 6 48 16 - Dispensaries 2450 202 612 663 28 Specialized Clinics 75 0 4 22 - Nursing Homes 0 0 0 6 - Private Laboratories 18 3 9 184 - Private X-Ray Units 5 3 2 16 1

Source:   Ministry of Health Statistic (Last updated 2007 December 6)

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