1

Chaining Mars:

The politics of the English Standing Army 1660-

1716

2

Andrew LavoieMay 2014

In 1698, Daniel Defoe, government pamphleteer, wrote the

following, ‘which Case I offer to prove, First, That ‘tis

absolutely necessary to have some Standing Force; and then, That

with Consent of Parliament ‘tis not Il-legal.’1 Defoe was writing

at the height of the standing army debate in England, a debate

that some traced back to the reign of Charles I and one of the

most profound political questions facing the English Parliament

in the seventeenth century. Defoe’s opinion came at the end of a

long and winding intellectual and practical debate that had seen

the English understanding of the standing army shift and evolve

over time.

Defoe was writing in response to pamphleteers such as John

Trenchard who claimed that a standing army was ‘inconsistent with

1 Daniel, Defoe, A Brief Reply to the History of Standing Armies in England With Some Account of the Authors. (London, 1698). Early English Books Online. p. 4.

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A Free Government,’ and a threat to the English Constitution.2

This view sums up the anti-army ideology succinctly and was

consequently the argument used most often by members of

Parliament who opposed the creation and maintenance of any

permanent military force beyond the militia. The debate regarding

whether or not England should have a standing army had been

raging for some time in the seventeenth century but the argument

really began to pick up under the later Stuart Monarchs from the

Restoration onwards. The debates that broke out at the end of the

Nine Year’s War were a culmination of decades of discussions and

quarrels over the issue. What was at stake was not only the

existence of a permanent standing army but also England’s place

in European affairs and, more crucially for many involved, an

answer to the ultimate question racking English politics in the

seventeenth century; the source of final political authority.

The standing army discussion of the late seventeenth century

was ultimately a debate about power and who controlled that

power, Parliament or the King. The concern and argument over the

standing army was just one facet of the larger issue regarding

2 Lois G. Schwoerer, “No Standing Armies!”: The Antiarmy Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England (Baltimore, 1974), p.1

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royal power and the role of Parliament in English politics but

the standing army was perhaps the most visible and ultimately the

most important point. This paper seeks to accomplish two goals.

First it will examine the concerns Parliament had regarding the

standing army and the conceptual framework that Parliamentarians

approached the army with. This paper is not concerned with the

conceptual framework alone however. Secondly, it will examine the

methods Parliament developed in order to address the problem of a

standing army and the events that led Parliament to reverse its

opposition to a standing army. This paper will show how, as a

result of the events of 1688, it gained an unprecedented level of

control over the army, ultimately resulting in a standing army

becoming a permanent institution for the new political nation of

Great Britain.

The standing army debate had been a point of contention in

English politics since before the Civil Wars. However beginning a

review in 1660, rather than earlier, provides a useful starting

point. The Restoration of Charles II after the collapse of the

Protectorate was seen by many as turning the clock back to a pre-

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Civil War England.3 The Convention Parliament imposed no

limitations on Charles II’s right and prerogatives and swept

aside much of the legislation that had been implemented during

the Protectorate. As historian Tim Harris writes,

‘constitutionally, it was as if the last nineteen years had never

happened.’4 Charles II enjoyed widespread popular support upon

his immediate return and earned even more political capital for

one of the first acts of his reign; the disbandment of the New

Model Army.

The New Model Army had once been a force to be reckoned with

but the last years of Cromwell’s protectorate had seen the New

Model Army become ‘broken in spirit and thoroughly demoralized.’5

Historian John Childs has noted as well that the New Model Army

‘was a grave threat to the sovereign, standing as it did for an

alien theory of government and society.’6 Charles therefore moved

quickly to reduce and disband the New Model Army, an act greeted

with enthusiasm by Parliament. However, Charles was not opposed

to a standing army. On the contrary, Charles wanted a permanent

3 Tim Harris, Restoration: Charles II and His Kingdoms, 1660-1685 (London, 2005), p. 47.4 Ibid., p. 47. 5 John Childs, The Army of Charles II (London, 1976), p. 7.6 Ibid., p. 7.

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force of men on hand to defend himself and the monarchy.7 Childs

notes that part of Charles’ desire for a permanent force was due

to his deep fear of being driven from his throne yet again and a

conviction that a strong military force would give him the

support he needed to maintain his throne.8 This policy would have

repercussions for both Charles and his brother James.

The return of Charles II had initially solved the major

concern Parliament had regarding a standing army, namely the

disbandment of the New Model Army. It is the reputation and image

of the New Model Army that must be kept firmly in sight if one is

to understand Parliament’s fears regarding the new forces Charles

II organized. Parliament remembered that the New Model Army and

the militia institutions under Oliver Cromwell had been used to

enforce Cromwell’s rule, often viewed as tyrannical.9 John Childs

writes that the New Model was ‘a political force with an interest

in and an effect upon politics acting both as a ‘king maker’ and

an instrument of coercion.’10 The actions of the New Model Army,

England’s first standing army, had soured Parliament to the

7 Ibid., pp. 13-14. 8 Ibid., p. 14. 9 Schwoerer, No Standing Armies!. p. 88.10 Childs, The Army of Charles II. p. 1.

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entire concept of a permanent military force. Parliament’s belief

in the militia came out of the Interregnum and the belief that it

could be a counterpoint to the army, if, or whenever one was

created by the king.11 Luckily, Charles II agreed with Parliament

regarding the conduct of the New Model Army. It had been the

institution that had ensured his father’s execution and driven

himself from his kingdoms and had to go. Unfortunately for

Parliamentarians, Charles II did not agree with their views on

standing armies in general and neither did his brother James.

Both monarchs sought to maintain a permanent force of men to

serve their needs and maintain their position. Parliament’s fears

regarding Charles II and James II’s armies were tied to their

belief that these monarchs would use their armed force in the

same manner that Cromwell had used the New Model Army; to oppress

Parliament and England.

Neither Charles, nor his brother James upon his succession

to the throne, referred to the English armed forces as a standing

army in any official terminology. Indeed, the forces under these

Stuart Kings’ command ‘were always termed ‘the Guards and

11 Schwoerer, No Standing Armies! p. 71.

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Garrisons’ so as to avoid the emotive name of army.’12 The

Guards, once fully established, certainly numbered more than any

force of Guards England had previously seen. Estimates ranged

between 3,000 to 4,000 horse and foot but when compared to

European standards, for example the army of France (estimated to

be 100,000 in 1660) the force was tiny.13 The Guards would

primarily be used for ceremonial and security functions. The

other major component of Charles’ army lay in the wording of the

Disbanding Act passed by Parliament, demobilizing the New Model.

After ordering the disbandment of the soldiers the act went on to

say ‘except such of them or any other his Majestye shall think

fit otherwise to dispose and provide for at his owne charge.’14

For a Parliament that had opposed the concept of a standing army

so strenuously in Charles I and Cromwell’s day this liberal

addition is striking and owes much to the euphoria people must

have felt at Charles II’s return. This clause gave the Kings of

England the right to maintain as many troops as they could

personally afford without redress to Parliament. Many of the

12 Childs, The Army of Charles II, p. 20. 13 Harris, Restoration, p. 65. 14 Schwoerer, No Standing Armies!, p. 76.

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fears of later Parliaments regarding the standing army came from

this clause.

It was not long after Charles had established his forces

that Parliament began to see itself under threat ‘by a pro-

monarchical and popish standing army.’15 To many in Parliament,

the Stuart Monarchs army was an instrument of potential

absolutism and full of Catholics and enemies of Parliament and

English Liberty. Not only did Parliament fear the specter that

had been the New Model Army nor were their concerns limited to

the overt coercion that the Stuart standing army might exert.

Parliament was also concerned by the number of army and navy

officers who also held seats in Parliament.16 The Interregnum had

seen large numbers of army officers take seats in Parliament and

Parliament believed that these men naturally had a conflict of

interest between the will of Parliament and their role as

government employees.17 John Trenchard, while not calling for the

complete removal of these type of men from Parliament, cautions

that ‘some will fervilely comply with the Court to keep their

15 Childs, The Army of Charles II, p. 14. 16 Geoffrey Holmes, British Politics in the Age of Anne (London, 1987), p. 126. 17 Schwoerer, No Standing Armies!, pp. 70-71.

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Places, others will oppose it as unreasonably to get them.’18

Parliament, during Charles’ reign and through the succeeding

reigns feared ‘being submerged,’ by ‘a rising tide of placemen,

army and navy officers and pensioners.’19 Any increase in army

size would equal a corresponding increase in the number of

officers who attained political office and the ultimate fear was

of a Parliament dominated by the King’s men who would vote

through anything the monarch wanted.

At this time there were two, not entirely distinct,

Parliamentarian camps which opposed a standing army: the anti-

army faction and the anti-court faction. The anti-army faction

generally believed that the army was an instrument of tyranny and

that any army officers in Parliament were a threat to

Parliament’s role of balancing the king’s power as we have seen

above. The anti-court faction consisted of the political

Opposition, the future Whig party, to the crown’s supporters and

saw the use of anti-army ideology as a weapon to be used in their

political conflict with the crown.20 Lois Schwoerer, in

18 John Trenchard, Free Thoughts Concerning Officers in the House of Commons (London, 1698), Early English Books Online, p. 3. 19 Holmes, British Politics in the Age of Anne, p.149. 20 Schwoerer, No Standing Armies!, p. 95.

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attempting to decipher the first call for military disbandment in

Charles II’s reign writes that ‘the resolution was, more

probably, a symbolic gesture against the most visible and

potentially most dangerous instrument of a government whose

policies and practices members of the House increasingly

distrusted and disliked.’21 It was an effective tool as it played

upon deep seated fears regarding absolutism, popery, and military

dictatorship that were a fundamental component of the psyche of

many politicians and English citizens who could well remember the

dark years of the Civil War and the Protectorate. It was also an

argument that none of the pro-army supporters were effectively

able to counter until well after the Glorious Revolution.

The good will and popular support Charles enjoyed in the early

years of his reign was quickly exhausted and by the 1670s,

Parliament had come to mistrust their monarch. Charles’ foreign

policies, particularly his friendship with France, raised the

specter of ‘popery and arbitrary government in England.’22 Fears

of a Catholic successor to the English throne personified by

21 Ibid., p. 92. 22 Harris, Restoration, p. 174.

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Charles’ brother James caused widespread panic and the infamous

Exclusion Crisis and Popish Plot whipped fears of arbitrary

government, popery, and anti-Catholic feelings to a fever

pitch.23 The new Guards quickly came under Parliamentary attack,

as did the forces Charles raised for a supposed war with France

in 1677-78.24 Parliament instantly feared the increase of troops,

especially when it became clear that Charles was not planning on

war, and Parliament called for its disbandment for fear that

Charles meant to use it against them.25 There were also concerns

raised regarding Charles’ troops in Tangier and in French service

as the officers and men stationed in these places were viewed as

suspect by Parliament should they returned to England.26 Charles

eventually disbanded the troops raised for the French conflict

but the Exclusion Crisis reopened the grievances Parliament

harbored against the army with important consequences in the next

reign.

23 Ibid., p. 204. 24 Ibid., p. 174. 25 Ibid., pp. 174-175. 26 Ibid., p. 148. For more on the Tangier Garrison and English soldiers in France see John Childs, The Army of Charles II and J.N.P Watson Captain General and Rebel Chief: The Life of James Duke of Monmouth (London, 1979).

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Parliament’s distrust of the standing army became more acute

with the accession of James II in 1685. James was not viewed

kindly by Parliament who mistrusted him due to his Catholicism

and apparent absolutist tendencies and his actions after becoming

king did little to assuage Parliament’s concerns. James was

forced soon after his coronation to put down a rebellion led by

Charles II’s bastard son, James, Duke of Monmouth.27 The Duke of

Monmouth’s rebellion saw James’ army increase to 15,710 men in

July and 19,778 men by December.28 This increase was largely due

to the need for additional troops required to combat both

Monmouth’s rebellion and a simultaneous rebellion in Scotland by

the Duke of Argyll.29 Neither rebellion was successful nor long

lasting but both had a major impact on the standing army debate.

After the rebellions had been put down, James did not take any

steps to disband his newly raised regiments. Not only did he keep

the forces raised under arms but James also disparaged the

conduct of the militia during the course of the invasions.30

Based on this belief in the militia’s ineptitude and his desire 27 Tim Harris, Revolution: The Great Crisis of the British Monarchy, 1685-1720 (London, 2006), p. 75. 28 Childs, The Army, James II and the Glorious Revolution, p. 2. 29 Harris, Revolution, p. 67.30 Childs, The Army, James II and the Glorious Revolution p.6.

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for a stronger central government, James refused to follow his

brother’s policy of disbanding troops when Parliament requested

it and he had no need to as his monetary situation was

significantly better than his brothers.31 As such, Parliament

immediately began to suspect the worst of James’ intentions

fearing the prospect of a Catholic King wielding a standing army

of his co-religionists against the rest of Protestant England.32

Matters were not helped by James’ Irish agent, the Earl of

Tyrconnell. Tyrconnell, using the Monmouth & Argyll rebellions as

justification, launched a full scale purge of the Irish army of

Anglicans, replacing both officers and men with Catholics.33 Not

only did this raise Parliamentary fears that James would soon

pursue a similar policy in England with an aim to crushing

Parliamentary opposition to his policies but the move also

greatly disturbed the Anglican officers in the English army who

feared similar treatment. 34 All these actions contributed to the

atmosphere that allowed William of Orange to succeed where the

31 Ibid., p. 11.32 Ibid., p. 11.33 Ibid., pp. 60-61. 34 Ibid., p. 139.

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Duke of Monmouth had failed and drove James from his throne in

1688.

The ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688 and the settlement that

followed in 1689 were a watershed for the standing army debate

though at the time this would not have been immediately clear to

those involved in the process of transferring power from James II

to William & Mary. At the heart of the Revolution Settlement was

the famous Declaration of Rights, a treaty that its framers said

was only ‘a restatement of existing law.’35 In reality, it was a

radical document that did much to address the apprehension that

had arisen between Parliament and the monarchy and which had been

the source of continuing discord within English politics. The

Declaration certainly infringed on Royal prerogative by declaring

such rights as the suspending and dispensing power and extra-

parliamentary taxation illegal.36 However, one of the principal

acts of the Declaration was affirming that ‘the keeping of a

standing army in peacetime without parliamentary consent to be

illegal.’37 This statement stripped the king of his previous

35 Stephen Bartow Baxter, William III (Longmans, 1966), p. 256. 36 Harris, Revolution, p. 331. 37 Ibid., p. 331.

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right to keep as many troops as he could afford. The Declaration

of Rights ensured that the king would have to obtain

Parliamentary consent for any standing force he wished to

maintain.

Following on the heels of the Declaration of Rights was the

Mutiny Act of 1689. The Act focused on addressing the ‘regulation

of the discipline of the army’ and dealt with such matters as

punishments ‘for mutiny, sedition, or desertion.’38 In addition,

the Act was only issued for six months, meaning that Parliament

had to meet often if the king wanted to maintain an army of any

size.39 Schwoerer points out that ‘the Mutiny Act and certain

clauses in the Declaration of Rights had the effect of assuring

that the king, if he was to keep an army, would not be able to

function without Parliament.’40 Despite these successes,

Parliament still mistrusted the concept of a standing army. The

foundation for Parliamentary control of the army had been laid

but it was soon apparent that the majority in Parliament were

38 Schwoerer, No Standing Armies! p. 152. 39 Ibid., p. 152. 40 Ibid., p. 152.

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unaware of the potential this control offered as evidenced by the

Parliamentary debate that broke out in the 1690s.

The Nine Year’s War in which England had become embroiled as a

result of the Glorious Revolution, fought in Ireland, Scotland

and Flanders, ended in 1697 with the Treaty of Rijswijk.41 Almost

immediately the army that William III had raised and nourished

came under attack. It is at this point that we see the attacks

against the Standing Army were the result of a Parliament

blissfully unaware of the nature of larger European politics and

focused more on their own private concerns regarding the use of

England’s army. One of the key war aims had been the

acknowledgment of William III as king and Louis XIV had done so

in the Treaty of Rijswijk.42 For many of William’s subjects this

was the end of the matter and as such they wanted a quick return

to the happier days of pre-war England. Many Englishmen were

tired of William III and his supporters. As Stephen Baxter

writes, ‘They were war-weary, and tax-weary, and most of all

weary of their little Dutch master and his rapacious Dutch

41 Baxter, William III, pp. 357-358.42 Ibid., p. 359.

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friends.’43 Parliament saw the maintenance of a standing army as

the most onerous of the new king’s desired policies, one they

were eager to eliminate. However, there was a faction in

Parliament and the public that supported William III’s desire to

maintain an army and their arguments reveal a deeper appreciation

of what the army could do for the government rather than a focus

on the army in opposition to Parliament.

The debate over the standing army that raged from 1697-1699

saw the widespread use of pamphlets by both sides in order to

make the case either for or against the standing army. The anti-

army crowd was led by John Trenchard, a great intellectual of the

day though not a Member of Parliament.44 Trenchard and his

followers argued that standing armies were instruments of

absolutism and that allowing a continuation of a standing army

would alter the delicate balance of power between the king and

Parliament that was the heart of English politics.45 Trenchard

argued that a standing army is inconsistent with a free monarchy

as ‘the king is perpetual General, may model the Army as he

43 Ibid., p. 360. 44Schwoerer, No Standing Armies!. p. 174. 45 Ibid., p. 180.

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pleases, and it will be called High-Treason to oppose him.’46 The

people had the right to resist and the anti-army pamphlets

claimed that the king was already powerful enough with his army

to oppress the people if he chose.47 These opponents argued that

the Navy and militia were all the country needed for defense;

Trenchard claims that in ancient times ‘A general Exercise of the

best of their People in the use of Arms, was the only Bulwark of

their liberties.’48 While admitting the militias’ defects the

opposition declared that the institution could quickly be

reformed to be more than a match for any professional military

force.49 Their arguments boiled down to two points; the threat to

liberty posed by the standing army and that the Navy and militia

were adequate defenses for England.50

The pro-army camp of William III had a tough fight because

much of the anti-army ideology played upon traditional fears

regarding the army and government and memories of the New Model.

William III couldn’t believe that ‘anyone seriously suspected him46 John Trenchard, An Argument, Shewing That a Standing Army Is Inconsistent with a Free Government and Absolutely Destructive to the Constitution of the English Monarchy, (London, 1697), Early English Books Online, p. 11. 47 Schwoerer, No Standing Armies!, p. 18048 Trenchard, An Argument, p. 7. 49 Schwoerer, No Standing Armies!, pp. 182-183.50 Ibid., p. 184.

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of a design on the liberties of the English people,’ especially

since his invasion of 1688 had been launched to defend those very

same rights.51 William III believed that in order to maintain the

peace he needed an army of 20,000 to 30,000 men but left his

desires ambiguous to his followers in Parliament who were left to

argue the cause of the standing army.52 William was served more

ably by his supporters outside of Parliament such as Daniel Defoe

than his allies within Parliament. Defoe wrote numerous pamphlets

in response to the pamphlets of Trenchard and others during the

course of the Parliamentary Debate. Of these, A brief reply to the

History of standing armies in England published in 1698, best lays out the

reasons for a standing army. Defoe argues that the anti-army

writers’ true purpose was to cause discontent and were not truly

concerned with the well-being of England.53 He goes on to address

each of the points related to the debate from the usefulness of a

standing army to the false belief in the navy and militia. He

argues that the peace recently won was due to the army and that

‘the most ridiculous things in the World to be wholly Disarm’d at

51 Baxter, William III, p. 362.52 Ibid., p. 362. 53 Defoe, A Brief Reply to the History of Standing Armies in England With Some Account of the Authors, pp. iii-iv.

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such a time, when all the Nations in the World have Forces in

Pay.’54 He argues that to strip the army bare will give the

French more cause to break the recent peace and that England now

has obligations to her allies to provide troops in times of

war.55 In regards to the Navy and militia, Defoe points out the

successful invasion of England in 1688 in the face of a Navy and

Militia.56 He further writes that ‘suppose this Fleet and this

Militia to be all that you can pretend, what would this be to a

war in Flanders?’57 Defoe and the standing army advocates point

out that England now has continental obligations and a European

presence that cannot be maintained by the navy and militia alone.

However, as John Childs writes, “After 1697, the House of Commons

wanted nothing more than to withdraw back into its traditional

island fastness and concentrate upon colonies, navies, and

trade.’58 Consequently, William III lost the debate for a large

standing army for England. Parliament voted to reduce the army to

54 Ibid., p. 8. 55 Ibid., p. 8. 56 Ibid., p. 12. 57 Ibid., p. 10, p. 12. 58 John Childs, The British Army of William III, 1689-1702 (Manchester, 1987), p. 205.

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10,000 men and then 7,000 men in England, leaving William only

24,600 men across his three kingdoms.59

Part William’s failure to maintain his army in the face of

Parliamentary opposition revolved around the acute fiscal crisis

England had gone through in the last few years of the Nine Year’s

War. England had not only financed its own army in first Ireland

and then Europe but also provided financial aid to allied armies

in Europe; English subsidies to the Duke of Savoy alone amounted

to £95,000 per year.60 By wars end, England was paying for an

army of 68,000-69,000 men in Flanders, part subject troops, part

foreign hires.61 This was an enormous financial burden on

England, a country which had never had any major continental

involvement on this scale. Even the creation of the Bank of

England in 1694 did little initially to stem the growing fiscal

crisis in England.62 The Recoinage Crisis of 1695-7 barely held

off the complete economic collapse of England’s finances and on

the whole, England’s economy was gravely disrupted by wars end.63

59 Ibid., pp. 202-203. 60 D. W. Jones, War and Economy in the Age of William III and Marlborough (Oxford, 1988), p. 8. 61 Ibid., p. 9. 62 Ibid., p. 1. 63 Ibid., p. 2.

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William’s desire for a large standing army probably appeared to

many members of Parliament as impossible to support financially

and therefore the army was downsized.

Yet the foundations for effective fiscal policies had been

laid down during this period. The Bank of England, new methods of

loan disbursement, and Parliamentary taxation all played a role

but one method that deserves special recognition with regard to

its effect on the army was the audit. Aaron Graham, writing about

James Brydges, Paymaster of Forces abroad during the War of

Spanish Succession relates that while auditing services of the

period seemed inefficient, Brydges letters suggest ‘that audit

bodies during this period were considerably more effective than

has often been allowed, at deterring if not detecting

corruption.’64 Brydges correspondence reveals a complex set of

arrangements and ploys to hide actions of corruption from the

audits.65 While the plots of Brydges and his associates might

seem to suggest that corruption was a major problem, poorly dealt

with, and detrimental to army operations, there is a key point in

64 Aaron Graham, “Auditing Leviathan: Corruption and State Formation in Early Eighteenth-Century Britain,” The English Historical Review 128 (2013), p. 808. 65 Ibid., p. 835.

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Graham’s analysis that needs to be comprehended. Brydges survived

due to political patronage while ‘Lesser officials who lacked

such political standing did their best to avoid any enterprises

that might expose them to objection at the Exchequer.’66

Furthermore, the ‘unsystematic and unpredictable nature of

various audit procedures also meant that men such as Brydges

could never be quite sure where the axe would fall, creating

powerful incentives for caution.’67 This meant that fewer

officials took part in corruption and those that did were more

circumspect and generally took much less than they could have,

ensuring that the army finances continued to function effectively

enough to maintain the running of the war effort.

The new financial structures, particularly the audit, gave

Parliament the last piece of control over the army. The army

itself existed not at the king’s pleasure as the 1697-99 debate

showed but at Parliaments and its conduct was organized and

regulated by the Mutiny Act. The fiscal crisis during the Nine

Year’s War had forced England to adopt new fiscal policies to

better handle its finances and the audit gave it a powerful, if

66 Ibid., p. 835. 67 Ibid., p. 837.

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infrequently used tool, for dealing with those who sought to

embezzle or misuse army funds. While the instruments of control

had passed irrevocably to Parliament it took another war and,

more importantly a rebellion, to convince Parliament to maintain

the army permanently.

Louis XIV’s recognition of James II’s son as James III

thereby threatening everything accomplished by the Glorious

Revolution ensured that England would enter the War of Spanish

Succession if for no other reason than to secure the political

settlement of 1689.68 Victory in that war made England, now Great

Britain after the Act of Union in 1707, a major player in

European politics.69 However, the Act of Union had been the

culmination of a series of successful maneuvers by the English

Parliament to gain control over Scotland.70 This had caused

widespread resentment in Scotland and while England might have

felt secure enough by the end of the War of Spanish Succession to

reduce the army to 23,486 men, events in Scotland soon changed

their mind.71 The Jacobite Rising of 1715 caught the British

68 Baxter, William III, p. 392. 69 Harris, Revolution. p. 36. 70 Ibid., p. 497. 71 R. E. Scouller, The Armies of Queen Anne (Oxford, 1966), p. 82.

26

government unawares and the Whigs were not prepared for the

necessary response.72 The British army, cut down in size in 1713,

suddenly found itself without enough men to face the crisis and

the new King George I had to call on the Dutch Republic for

additional troops to put down the rebellion.73 The British

government survived the Rising of ’15 but the lesson had been

learned. With the Stuarts still active abroad, the Protestant

succession was in danger and therefore safeguards needed to be

taken to prevent a repeat of the ’15. Parliament voted to

increase the size of the army in 1716 to 36,000 men and by 1727-

30 Great Britain was maintaining 26,000 men in England.74 These

men would be used by Parliament in peace to maintain the new

regime and safeguard the succession of the Hanoverians from all

threats, foreign and domestic.

There is a further point to be made regarding Parliament’s

attitude towards the army in this period which cannot be expanded

on in the current paper. Recent studies on the Dutch Republic,

72 Bruce Lenman, The Jacobite Risings in Britain 1689-1746 (Aberdeen, 1995), p. 155. 73 John Baynes, The Jacobite Rising of 1715 (London, 1970), p. 31. 74 Geoffrey Holmes, Augustan England: Professions, State and Society, 1680-1730 (London, 1982), p. 264.

27

England’s closest political neighbor, have drawn a number of

conclusions that seem to mirror much of what has been written

regarding the Parliamentary debate on the standing army. The

Dutch mistrusted their army and in 1651 broke the army into units

distributed amongst the various provinces as garrisons which were

then allowed to decline.75 The Dutch Republic nearly lost its

independence in the 1670s under the onslaught of Louis XIV due to

the army’s deficiencies and was forced to reform and enlarge the

army to meet the threat and survive.76 The Dutch views on the

army and its ultimate reversal of attitude is mirrored in England

only a few decades later and a study of the two polities could

shed valuable light on the army and its impact on concepts of

liberty. Further comparative work could be done on Parliament’s

views regarding the Navy during this time. While concerned more

with corruption and operational effectiveness, Parliament’s

attitude towards the Navy was not as sunny as might be expected

and work can be done relating Parliament’s views on the army to

that of the Navy.

75 Olaf van Nimwegen, The Dutch Army and the Military Revolutions, 1588-1688 (Woodbridge, 2010), pp. 517-518. 76 Ibid., pp. 518-519.

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The great irony of Parliament’s fight against the standing

army is that the original purpose for its creation, namely

Charles II’s desire to secure his throne, was the ultimate result

of Parliament’s policies. John Childs writes that the army

Charles II first raised became ‘a non-political body concerned

solely with the execution of the civil authority’s wishes

regarding national defense and the preservation of internal law

and order.’77 By the time of George I, this was exactly what the

army was doing. Charles II wanted an army to secure his throne

and enforce his policies. By 1716, Parliament needed an army to

secure the political settlement and the enforcement of its

policies. Parliamentary concern over the threats the army posed

to liberty, its potential use as a method of coercion, its cost,

and ultimately who controlled it put it on a collision path with

the Stuart monarchs. In the course of this dispute, and thanks

largely to the events of 1688, Parliament created the legal

framework for the maintenance of an army that existed at

Parliament’s pleasure, not the king’s. This victory ensured that

the king could never act without Parliament and that the army

77 Childs, The Army of Charles II. p. 1.

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would never be used against Parliament as the New Model Army had

been. In the course of the late seventeenth century, Parliament

had managed, haphazardly and without true planning, to create an

army that would secure English liberty rather than oppress it.

30

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